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Budiongan JR Vs Dela Cruz
Budiongan JR Vs Dela Cruz
GR NO 170288
FACTS
The municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated the amount of P450,000 for the purchase of a road roller for the
municipality. However, the Municipal development Council recommended that the said amount be realigned and used
for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez Street. The proposed realignment was included in
the December 21, 2001 agenda of the Sangguniang Bayan of Carmen but discussion thereon was deferred. Later,
the Municipal treasurer issued a certificate of the availability of funds for the project. Thereafter, the Office of the
Municipal Engineer prepared a Program of Works and Cost Estimates duly noted/approved by Municipal Budget
Officer Taciana B. Espejo and Mayor Budiongan.
Bidding was conducted and Mayor Budiongan issued a Notice of Award and Notice to Commence Work. The
Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to sign and enter into a contract with the Contractor
Malmis. The latter then commenced the project. Later, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving
the realignment of funds. Thus the Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance approving the realignment of the fund.
Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners before the Office of the Ombudsman of Visayas alleging
illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for
the purpose.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found probable cause and recommended the filing of an
information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioners. However, the complaint
against Hermosila Logrono, Desiderio Gudia, Jr. and Herbert Malmis was dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
issued the assailed Memorandum modifying the charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1)
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and
(2) violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly "directly or indirectly having
financial or pecuniary interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity."
Thus, two separate Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No.
3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as Criminal Case No. 28076.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information charging them with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. In a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to
the Office of the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. It held that although Malmis benefited from the
contract, the same is not unwarranted considering that the project was implemented, executed and completed.
On June 27, 2005, an Amended Information was filed charging petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
alleging that petitioners, by prematurely awarding to Malmis the project despite the absence of funds specifically
appropriated for such purpose, and thereafter paying the contract price from the Municipal Treasury which was
originally appropriated for the purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue injury to the government.
Finding that the Amended Information contains all the material averments necessary to make out a case for the first
mode of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, i.e., causing any undue injury to any party, including the government,
the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its Resolution dated August 18, 2005.
On even date, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reinvestigation arguing that the above Informations were filed without affording them the opportunity to file counter-
affidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. On September 20, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying the motion insofar as Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It held that it is too late in the day to remand
the case for reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already been arraigned and the case had long been set
for pre-trial proceedings, with both parties having filed their respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075,
the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners however
were not given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the modified charges. Thus, it granted leave to the
petitioners to file with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a motion for
reinvestigation) of the said office's Memorandum dated April 28, 2004.
ISSUES
1. Whether the modification of the charge from violation of Art. 220 of the RPC to violations of Secs. 3(e) and
3(h) of RA 3019 denied the petitioners their rights to due process since they were not given the opportunity
to answer and present evidence on the new charge in a preliminary investigation
2. Whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the challenged resolutions finding probable cause for violation of RA 3019
HELD
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The
absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same
defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction
of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or
oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
1. Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the
charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise
to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts. Moreover,
petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or serious
irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as
required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the
modification of the offense charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation,
did not amount to a violation of their rights.
Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case
No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of the petitioners under the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005.
2. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral component of the Ombudsman and is under the latter's
supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to
approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his
discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such
exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. Absent any
showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of
probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Office of the Special Prosecutor's resolution denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration since there is nothing to substantiate petitioners' claim that it gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.