Procedural Due Process
Procedural Due Process
mitted on brief for Vaughan, appellee. provisions, and in March, 1947, it petitioned the Surrogate's
MULLANE v. CENTRAL HANOVER TR. CO., (1950) Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee.
No. 378 Peter Keber and C. Alexander Capron filed a brief for the During the accounting period a total of 113 trusts,
Argued: February 8, 1950 Decided: April 24, 1950 New York State Bankers Association, as amicus curiae, approximately half inter vivos and half testamentary,
A trust company in New York which had exclusive urging affirmance. participated in the common trust fund, the gross capital of
management and control of a common trust fund established which was nearly three million dollars. The record does not
by it under 100-c of the New York Banking Law petitioned MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. show the number or residence of the beneficiaries, but they
under that section for a judicial settlement of accounts which were many and it is clear that some of them were not
would be binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth This controversy questions the constitutional sufficiency of residents of the State of New York.
therein upon everyone having any interest in the common notice to notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of
fund or in any participating trust. In this common fund the accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund established The only notice given beneficiaries of this specific application
trust company had invested assets of numerous small trusts under the New York Banking Law. The New York Court of was by publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance
of which it was trustee and of which some of the Appeals considered and overruled objections that the with the minimum requirements of N. Y. Banking Law 100-c
beneficiaries were residents and some nonresidents of the statutory notice contravenes requirements of the Fourteenth (12): "After filing such petition [for judicial settlement of its
State. The only notice of this petition given beneficiaries was Amendment and that by allowance of the account account] the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court
by publication in a local newspaper pursuant to 100-c (12). beneficiaries were deprived of property without due process in which the petition is filed and shall publish not less than
Held: of law. 299 N. Y. 697, 87 N. E. 2d 73. The case is here on once in each week [339 U.S. 306, 310] for four successive
appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257. weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the court a notice
1. Whether such a proceeding for settlement of accounts be or citation addressed generally without naming them to all
technically in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem, the interest Common trust fund legislation is addressed to a problem parties interested in such common trust fund and in such
of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by appropriate for state action. Mounting overheads have made estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which
the grace of its laws and are administered under the administration of small trusts undesirable to corporate may be described in the notice or citation only in the manner
supervision of its courts is such as to establish beyond doubt trustees. In order that donors and testators of moderately set forth in said petition and without setting forth the
the right of its courts to determine the interests of all sized trusts may not be denied the service of corporate residence of any such decedent or donor of any such estate,
claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure fiduciaries, the District of Columbia and some [339 U.S. 306, trust or fund." Thus the only notice required, and the only
accords full opportunity to appear and be heard. Pp. 311- 308] thirty states other than New York have permitted one given, was by newspaper publication setting forth
313. pooling small trust estates into one fund for investment merely the name and address of the trust company, the
2. The statutory notice by publication is sufficient as to any administration. * The income, capital gains, losses and name and the date of establishment of the common trust
beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to expenses of the collective trust are shared by the constituent fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds.
the trustee, since there are no other means of giving them trusts in proportion to their contribution. By this plan,
notice which are both practicable and more effective. Pp. diversification of risk and economy of management can be At the time the first investment in the common fund was
313-318. extended to those whose capital standing alone would not made on behalf of each participating estate, however, the
3. Such notice by publication is not sufficient under the obtain such advantage. trust company, pursuant to the requirements of 100-c (9),
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving had notified by mail each person of full age and sound mind
of substantial property rights known persons whose Statutory authorization for the establishment of such whose name and address were then known to it and who
whereabouts are also known, since it is not impracticable to common trust funds is provided in the New York Banking was "entitled to share in the income therefrom . . . [or] . . .
make serious efforts to notify them at least by ordinary mail Law, 100-c (c. 687, L. 1937, as amended by c. 602, L. 1943 who would be entitled to share in the principal if the event
to their addresses on record with the trust company. Pp. and c. 158, L. 1944). Under this Act a trust company may, upon which such estate, trust or fund will become
318-320. with approval of the State Banking Board, establish a distributable should have occurred at the time of sending
299 N. Y. 697, 87 N. E. 2d 73, reversed. common fund and, within prescribed limits, [339 U.S. 306, such notice." Included in the notice was a copy of those
Overruling objections to the statutory notice to beneficiaries 309] invest therein the assets of an unlimited number of provisions of the Act relating to the sending of the notice
by publication authorized by 100-c of the New York Banking estates, trusts or other funds of which it is trustee. Each itself and to the judicial settlement of common trust fund
Law, a New York Surrogate's Court entered a final decree participating trust shares ratably in the common fund, but accounts.
accepting an accounting of the trustee of [339 U.S. 306, 307] exclusive management and control is in the trust company
a common trust fund established pursuant to that section. 75 as trustee, and neither a fiduciary nor any beneficiary of a Upon the filing of the petition for the settlement of accounts,
N. Y. S. 2d 397. This decree was affirmed by the Appellate participating trust is deemed to have ownership in any appellant was, by order of the court pursuant to 100-c (12),
Division of the Supreme Court of New York (see 274 App. particular asset or investment of this common fund. The trust appointed special guardian and attorney for all persons
Div. 772, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 127) and the Court of Appeals of company must keep fund assets separate from its own, and known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or
New York (299 N. Y. 697, 87 N. E. 2d 73). On appeal to this in its fiduciary capacity may not deal with itself or any might thereafter have any interest in the income of the
Court, reversed, p. 320. affiliate. Provisions are made for accounting twelve to fifteen common trust fund; and appellee Vaughan was appointed to
months after the establishment of a fund and triennially represent those similarly interested in the principal. There
Kenneth J. Mullane argued the cause and filed a brief for thereafter. The decree in each such judicial settlement of were no other appearances on behalf of any one interested
appellant. accounts is made binding and conclusive as to any matter in either interest or principal. [339 U.S. 306, 311]
set forth in the account upon everyone having any interest in
Albert B. Maginnes argued the cause for the Central the common fund or in any participating estate, trust or fund. Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice and the
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., appellee. With him on the brief statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were
was J. Quincy Hunsicker, 3rd. In January, 1946, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth
established a common trust fund in accordance with these Amendment, and therefore that the court was without
jurisdiction to render a final and binding decree. Appellant's would classify the present proceeding, which has some opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
objections were entertained and overruled, the Surrogate characteristics and is wanting in some features of 394 . This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless
holding that the notice required and given was sufficient. 75 proceedings both in rem and in personam. But in any event one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose
N. Y. S. 2d 397. A final decree accepting the accounts has we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or
been entered, affirmed by the Appellate Division of the to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a contest.
Supreme Court, 275 App. Div. 769, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 907, and classification for which the standards are so elusive and
by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 299 N. Y. confused generally and which, being primarily for state The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving
697, 87 N. E. 2d 73. courts to define, may and do vary from state to state. a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding
Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between or determining when constructive notice may be utilized or
The effect of this decree, as held below, is to settle "all actions in rem and those in personam in many branches of what test it must meet. Personal service has not in all
questions respecting the management of the common fund." law, or on other issues, or the reasoning which underlies circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the
We understand that every right which beneficiaries would them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort to process due to residents, and it has more often been held
otherwise have against the trust company, either as trustee constructive service in this proceeding [339 U.S. 306, 313] unnecessary as to nonresidents. We disturb none of the
of the common fund or as trustee of any individual trust, for upon how its courts or this Court may regard this historic established rules on these subjects. No decision constitutes
improper management of the common trust fund during the antithesis. It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the a controlling or even a very illuminating precedent for the
period covered by the accounting is sealed and wholly technical definition of its chosen procedure, the interest of case before us. But a few general principles stand out in the
terminated by the decree. See Matter of Hoaglund, 194 each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by books.
Misc. 803, 811-812, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 156, 164, aff'd 272 App. the grace of its laws and are administered under the
Div. 1040, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 911, aff'd 297 N. Y. 920, 79 N. E. 2d supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
746; Matter of Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 459, 470, 67 N. as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
Y. S. 2d 444, 453; Matter of Security Trust Co. of Rochester, determine the interests of all claimants, resident or reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
id. 748, 760, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 260, 271; Matter of Continental nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
Bank & Trust Co., id. 795, 797, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 806, 807-808. to appear and be heard. afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 ; Grannis v. Ordean, 234
We are met at the outset with a challenge to the power of the Quite different from the question of a state's power to U.S. 385 ; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 ; Roller v. Holly,
State - the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against discharge trustees is that of the opportunity it must give 176 U.S. 398 . The notice must be of such nature as
those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New beneficiaries to contest. Many controversies have raged reasonably to convey the required information, Grannis v.
York. It is contended that the proceeding is one in personam about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Ordean, supra, and it must afford a reasonable time for
in that the decree affects neither title to nor possession of Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they those interested to make their appearance, Roller v. Holly,
any res, but adjudges only personal rights of the require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by supra, and cf. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71 . But if with
beneficiaries to surcharge their trustee for negligence or adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case
breach of trust. Accordingly, it is said, under the strict hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. these conditions [339 U.S. 306, 315] are reasonably met,
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , the Surrogate the constitutional requirements are satisfied. "The criterion is
[339 U.S. 306, 312] is without jurisdiction as to In two ways this proceeding does or may deprive not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and
nonresidents upon whom personal service of process was beneficiaries of property. It may cut off their rights to have reasonable character of the requirements, having reference
not made. the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments of to the subject with which the statute deals." American Land
their interests. Also, their interests are presumably subject to Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 ; and see Blinn v. Nelson, 222
Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam diminution in the proceeding by allowance of fees and U.S. 1, 7 .
are ancient and originally expressed in procedural terms expenses to one who, in their names but without their
what seems really to have been a distinction in the knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
substantive law of property under a system quite unlike our contest. Certainly the proceeding is one in which they may gesture is not due process. The means employed must be
own. Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, be deprived of property rights and hence notice and hearing such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
66; Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to must measure up to the standards of due process. might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The
Modern Law, 298. The legal recognition and rise in economic reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any
importance of incorporeal or intangible forms of property Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in
have upset the ancient simplicity of property law and the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, compare
clarity of its distinctions, while new forms of proceedings proceeding. But the vital interest of the State in bringing any Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 , with Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
have confused the old procedural classification. American issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served 276 U.S. 13 , or, where conditions do not reasonably permit
courts have sometimes classed certain actions as in rem only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside of such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less
because personal service of process was not required, and the State can somehow be determined. A construction of the likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and
at other times have held personal service of process not Due Process Clause which [339 U.S. 306, 314] would place customary substitutes.
required because the action was in rem. See cases collected impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be
in Freeman on Judgments, 1517 et seq. (5th ed.). justified. It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as
prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting
Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been Against this interest of the State we must balance the interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the
sometimes termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases
or more vaguely still, "in the nature of a proceeding in rem." Amendment. This is defined by our holding that "The reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice
It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or fundamental requisite of due process of law is the have been concerned with actions founded on process
constructively served through local newspapers. Chance constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights. months and perhaps years in advance does not answer this
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458 ; Blinn v. purpose. The trustee periodically remits their income to
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 ; and see Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 them, and we think that they might reasonably expect that
newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of . with or apart from their remittances word might come to them
the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the personally that steps were being taken affecting their
information will never reach him are large indeed. The Those beneficiaries represented by appellant whose interests.
chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be
notice required does not even name those whose attention it ascertained come clearly within this category. As to them the We need not weigh contentions that a requirement of
is supposed to attract, and does not inform acquaintances statutory notice is sufficient. However great the odds that personal service of citation on even the large number of
who might call it to attention. In weighing its sufficiency on publication will never reach the eyes of such unknown known resident or nonresident beneficiaries would, by [339
the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we are unable to parties, it is not in the typical case much more likely to fail U.S. 306, 319] reasons of delay if not of expense, seriously
regard this as more than a feint. [339 U.S. 306, 316] than any of the choices open to legislators endeavoring to interfere with the proper administration of the fund. Of course
prescribe the best notice practicable. personal service even without the jurisdiction of the issuing
Nor is publication here reinforced by steps likely to attract authority serves the end of actual and personal notice,
the parties' attention to the proceeding. It is true that Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense whatever power of compulsion it might lack. However, no
publication traditionally has been acceptable as notification with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose such service is required under the circumstances. This type
supplemental to other action which in itself may reasonably interests are either conjectural or future or, although they of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The
be expected to convey a warning. The ways of an owner with could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with
tangible property are such that he usually arranges means to of business come to knowledge of the common trustee. that of a class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund
learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary Whatever searches might be required in another situation and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other
rights. Hence, libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel or entry under ordinary standards of diligence, in view of the beneficiaries. Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach
upon real estate in the name of law may reasonably be character of the proceedings and the nature of the interests most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard
expected to come promptly to the owner's attention. When here involved we think them unnecessary. We recognize the the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure
the state within which the owner has located such property practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on to the benefit of all. We think that under such circumstances
seizes it for some reason, publication or posting affords an frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every
additional measure of notification. A state may indulge the beneficiaries, many of whose interests in the common fund beneficiary are justifiable. "Now and then an extraordinary
assumption that one who has left tangible property in the are so remote as to be ephemeral; and we have no doubt case may turn up, but constitutional law like other mortal
state either has abandoned it, in which case proceedings that such impracticable and extended searches are not contrivances has to take some chances, and in the great
against it deprive him of nothing, cf. Anderson National Bank required in the [339 U.S. 306, 318] name of due process. majority of instances no doubt justice will be done." Blinn v.
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 ; Security Savings Bank v. The expense of keeping informed from day to day of Nelson, supra, 7.
California, 263 U.S. 282 , or that he has left some caretaker substitutions among even current income beneficiaries and
under a duty to let him know that it is being jeopardized. presumptive remaindermen, to say nothing of the far greater The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate,
Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 ; Huling v. Kaw Valley R. Co., number of contingent beneficiaries, would impose a severe not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because
130 U.S. 559 . As phrased long ago by Chief Justice burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to
Marshall in The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144, "It is the part of advantages. These are practical matters in which we should reach those who could easily be informed by other means at
common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a be reluctant to disturb the judgment of the state authorities. hand. However it may have been in former times, the mails
thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means
situation to protect it." Accordingly we overrule appellant's constitutional objections of communication. Moreover, the fact that the trust company
to published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of has been able to give mailed notice to known beneficiaries at
In the case before us there is, of course, no abandonment. any beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown the time the common trust fund was established is
On the other hand these beneficiaries do have a resident to the trustee. persuasive that postal notification at the time of accounting
fiduciary as caretaker of their interest in this property. But it is would not seriously burden the plan.
their caretaker who in the accounting becomes their As to known present beneficiaries of known place of
adversary. Their trustee is released from giving notice of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a In some situations the law requires greater precautions in its
jeopardy, and no one else is expected to do so. Not even the different footing. Exceptions in the name of necessity do not proceedings than the business world accepts for its own
special guardian is required or apparently expected to sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability purposes. In few, if any, will it be satisfied with [339 U.S. 306,
communicate with his ward and client, and, of course, if such notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach 320] less. Certainly it is instructive, in determining the
a duty were merely transferred [339 U.S. 306, 317] from the interested parties. Where the names and postoffice reasonableness of the impersonal broadcast notification
trustee to the guardian, economy would not be served and addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the here used, to ask whether it would satisfy a prudent man of
more likely the cost would be increased. reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the business, counting his pennies but finding it in his interest to
mails to apprise them of its pendency. convey information to many persons whose names and
This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to addresses are in his files. We are not satisfied that it would.
publication as a customary substitute in another class of The trustee has on its books the names and addresses of Publication may theoretically be available for all the world to
cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to the income beneficiaries represented by appellant, and we see, but it is too much in our day to suppose that each or
give more adequate warning. Thus it has been recognized find no tenable ground for dispensing with a serious effort to any individual beneficiary does or could examine all that is
that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, inform them personally of the accounting, at least by published to see if something may be tucked away in it that
employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means ordinary mail to the record addresses. Cf. Wuchter v. affects his property interests. We have before indicated in
of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no Pizzutti, supra. Certainly sending them a copy of the statute reference to notice by publication that, "Great caution should
be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced second. Thus, they should be treated as separate and
secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." McDonald v. Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she will distinct offenses. 7
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 . kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr.
Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying "lumabas The Court of Appeals further ruled that "a basic requirement
We hold that the notice of judicial settlement of accounts ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan" of due process on the other hand is that a person must be
required by the New York Banking Law 100-c (12) is A verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas
incompatible with the requirements of the Fourteenth grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved her towards the vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182).
Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving known door causing her to stumble, her both hands protected her In the instant case however, Lucas came to know of the
persons whose whereabouts are also known of substantial face from smashing upon the door. modification of the charge against him only when he
property rights. Accordingly the judgment is reversed and the received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the
cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the service. 8
with this opinion. office, grabbed her the second time while she attempted to
regain her posture after being pushed the first time. . . . while Hence, this petition.
Reversed. doing all this, Mr. Lucas shouted at the affiant, saying,
3. Republic of the Philippines "labas, huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan". 4 The issues are (a) whether respondent Lucas was denied
SUPREME COURT due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
Manila On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct, and (b)
a summons requiring respondent to answer the complaint, whether the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.
EN BANC not to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from
receipt. On June 17, 1992, respondent Lucas submitted a Petitioner anchors its position on the view that "the formal
letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI, denying the charge against a respondent in an administrative case need
charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh of not be drafted with the precision of an information in a
G.R. No. 127838 January 21, 1999 complainant Linatok, that what transpired was that he criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the
accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he reached for his substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did the allegation of the acts complained of, and not the
vs. not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact designation of the offense. 9
JOSE J. LUCAS, respondent. with Linatok's leg.
We deny the petition.
On May 31, 1993, after a formal investigation by the BOPI,
DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent guilty As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing
of simple misconduct 5 and recommending a penalty of guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave
PARDO, J.: suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service
Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation. Commission, we held that "in grave misconduct as
The petition for review on certiorari before the Court assails distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which set aside the In due time, respondent appealed the decision to the Civil corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
resolution of the Civil Service Commission 2 and reinstated Service Commission (CSC). On July 7, 1994, the CSC of established rule, must be manifest, 10 which is obviously
that of the Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI for brevity), issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave lacking in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as
Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, 3 misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived
suspending respondent for one month, for simple from the service. 6 Respondent moved for reconsideration him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave
misconduct. but the CSC denied the motion. misconduct.
To provide a factual backdrop of the case, a recital of the Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals 11 that: (a) a
facts is necessary. October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its basic requirement of due process is that a person must be
decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and duly informed of the charges against him 12 and that (b) a
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA, stating thus: "It is person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was
information officer at the Agricultural Information Division, true that the Civil Service Act does not define grave and not charged. 13
Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the simple misconduct. There is, however, no question that
office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against these offenses fall under different categories. This is clear Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same from a perusal of memorandum circular No. 49-89 dated fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
agency, for misconduct. August 3, 1989 (also known as the guidelines in the process in investigations and hearings. 14
application of penalties in administrative cases) itself which
Raquel described the incident in the following manner: classifies administrative offenses into three: grave, less The right to substantive and procedural due process is
grave and light offenses. The charge of grave misconduct applicable in administrative proceedings. 15
While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose falls under the classification of grave offenses while simple
J. Lucas, Raquel noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. misconduct is classified as a less grave offense. The former Of course, we do not in any way condone respondent's act.
Jose Lucas, at that very instant used to sit upon. Thereafter, is punishable by dismissal while the latter is punishable Even in jest, he had no right to touch complainant's leg.
Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his shoe. At that moment she felt either by suspension (one month and one day to six However, under the circumstances, such act is not
Mr. Lucas' hand touching her thigh and running down his months), if it is the first offense; or by dismissal, if it is the constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. We note that securing Emigrant Certificate Clearances ("ECCs") for him Resolution assured Ledesma of a fair investigation and
respondent has been in the service for twenty (20) years and and Ching Tsai. He gave their passports and P3,000 to granted her an additional forty-eight hours to submit a
this is his first offense. Ledesma. Steve Tsai claimed that Ledesma has helped him verified explanation to the charges. It also notified Ledesma
obtain ECCs for the previous three years. He usually paid that the formal hearing of her administrative case would be
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES the petition P1,500 for each ECC. He knew that out of the amount conducted in the office of Associate Commissioner Yap on
for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Ledesma kept P200 to P300 as a "service charge."6 23 April 1999.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37137.1wphi1.nt
According to Steve Tsai, Ledesma instructed him to return Ledesma appealed Associate Commissioner Yaps
No cost. for the ECCs on 17 March 1999, a Wednesday. However, Resolution to the DOJ on 22 April 1999. Ledesma failed to
Ledesma did not give him the ECCs on that date. Steve Tsai appear at the scheduled hearing before Associate
SO ORDERED. informed Ledesma that he and his sister were leaving for a Commissioner Yap, and neglected to submit a verified
Republic of the Philippines vacation that Friday. Ledesma replied that he should return explanation. Associate Commissioner Yap placed Ledesma
SUPREME COURT the next day, but when he did, she was still unable to under preventive suspension.
produce the requested documents. On Friday, 19 March
EN BANC 1999, Ledesma gave Steve Tsai the ECCs but did not return On 4 June 1999, Acting Commissioner Ma. Luisa Ylagan-
their passports. Cortez rendered a Decision10 ("Bureaus Decision") finding
G.R. No. 154521 September 30, 2005 Ledesma guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct
Ching Tsais affidavit7 mostly repeated her brothers prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Bureaus
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioners, allegations. On 15 March 1999, she gave Steve Tsai P1,500 Decision meted Ledesma with the penalties of dismissal,
vs. and her passport because he was meeting Ledesma. On 18 disqualification from re-entry into the service, and forfeiture
JULIANA E. LEDESMA, Respondent. March 1999, Ching Tsai accompanied her brother to see of all benefits and emoluments. Ledesma assailed the
Ledesma, but to no avail. The next day, Steve Tsai received Bureaus Decision before the DOJ. On 16 August 1999, the
DECISION their ECCs but not their passports, with the result that the DOJ dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Bureaus
complainants were not able to leave the country for their Decision.
CARPIO, J.: planned vacation.
Ledesma appealed to the CSC. In her appeal
The Case On 23 March 1999, complainants jointly executed a memorandum,11 Ledesma claimed that: (1) she asked
supplemental affidavit8 attesting that they confronted Steve Tsai only for the amount lawfully required; (2) the extra
Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Ledesma about their missing passports in the presence of amount complainants voluntarily gave was what the travel
Decision2 of 31 July 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo Yap ("Associate agent had requested for her assistance; and (3)
appellate court modified the Civil Service Commissions Commissioner Yap"). The confrontation took place while complainants, particularly Steve Tsai, executed their
("CSC") Resolutions No. 0012513 and No. 002748,4 dated Associate Commissioner Yap was conducting an ocular affidavits under questionable circumstances. Ledesma also
24 May 2000 and 11 December 2000, respectively. The CSC inspection of the Records Section and a re-enactment of explained that she did not appear at the 23 April 1999
found Juliana E. Ledesma ("Ledesma") guilty of grave Steve Tsais "break-in"9 into the office. Ledesma denied that hearing because her appeal from Associate Commissioner
misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best she was in possession of complainants passports. Yaps Resolution was pending before the DOJ.
interest of the service, and dismissed her from the service. Complainants supplemental affidavit was also sworn before
The Court of Appeals found Ledesma guilty of simple Prosecutor Icay. The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
misconduct only, and suspended her for six months.
An administrative case was filed against Ledesma based on On 24 May 2000, the CSC issued Resolution No. 001251
Antecedent Facts complainants affidavits. In a memorandum dated 12 April dismissing Ledesmas appeal. The CSC pointed out that
1999, the Bureau directed Ledesma to submit a verified while Ledesma admitted receiving P3,000 from Steve Tsai,
Ledesma is a Clerk III at the Records Section of the Bureau answer to the complaint-affidavits. there was no proof that she later gave the money to a travel
of Immigration ("Bureau"). She has been with the Bureau for agent. The CSC also ruled that Ledesma was guilty of
more than 32 years. Rank-and-file employees of the Bureau On 16 April 1999, Ledesma filed a Queries/Bill of Particulars concealment or dishonesty when she did not explain to
elected Ledesma to chair their union, Buklod ng mga Kawani seeking a ten-day extension to file her answer. Ledesma Steve Tsai that he was paying more than the required fees.
ng CID ("Buklod"), for three consecutive terms. argued that the complaint-affidavits did not charge her with The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 001251 reads:
any offense, and requested that the Department of Justice
On 20 March 1999, a Saturday, Tsai I Hau, also known as ("DOJ") investigate her case. Ledesma believed that the WHEREFORE, the appeal of Juliana E. Ledesma is
Steve Tsai, and his sister, Tsai Ching Yi ("Ching Tsai"), Bureau would not be impartial because of her conflict with dismissed. Accordingly, the decision dated August 16, 1999
executed complaint-affidavits against Ledesma. The Tsai then Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez ("Commissioner of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, affirming the
siblings ("complainants") are Taiwanese nationals who were Rodriguez"). Commissioner Rodriguez refused to recognize decision of the Bureau of Immigration dated June 4, 1999
studying in the country at the time. Both complaint-affidavits the promotion of 132 Bureau employees, including Ledesma. finding her guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
were sworn before Assistant City Prosecutor Henry B. Icay The Bureaus Promotion and Selection Board approved Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
("Prosecutor Icay"), the prosecuting officer detailed to the these 132 promotions a few months before Commissioner for which she is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the
Bureau at the time. Rodriguez was appointed as head of the Bureau in 1988. service, with its accessory penalties, stands.12
In his affidavit,5 Steve Tsai attested that on 15 March 1999 Associate Commissioner Yap issued a Resolution and Ledesma filed a motion for reconsideration and then a
he went to the Bureau to seek Ledesmas assistance in Notice of Formal Investigation on 19 April 1999. The supplemental motion for reconsideration. She attached to
the latter a so-called Sworn Statement13 ("Leonors pay for six (6) months. However, since petitioner has been Appeals discussed at length in its 15-page Decision the
statement") from a Lilian Leonor ("Leonor"). Ledesma out of the service for more than six months, she is therefore factual and legal basis for its verdict of simple misconduct.
claimed that she had just received Leonors statement by ordered REINSTATED immediately. The appellate court Decision thus sufficiently complied with
registered mail. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires
Accordingly, petitioner Ledesma is entitled to payment of only that a courts decision be clear on why either party
According to Leonors statement, Ledesma merely referred backwages from the time she was dismissed from the prevailed under the law applicable to the facts as proved.18
Steve Tsai to Leonor, who was one of the Liaison Officers service, commencing from the time she has deemed served The constitutional provision does not require a point-by-point
accredited by the Bureau. On 15 March 1999, in the the aforestated six (6) months suspension up to the time of refutation of the CSCs Resolutions so long as the basis for
presence of Steve Tsai, Ledesma handed complainants her actual reinstatement.14 the Court of Appeals decision modifying the former is clear.
passports, documents and P3,000 to Leonor. Leonor
secured the ECCs and proceeded to the Records Section on Dissatisfied, the CSC elevated the Court of Appeals The records support the appellate courts finding that Steve
Friday, 19 March 1999. Once there, Leonor discovered that Decision of 31 July 2002 to this Court. Ledesma did not Tsai knowingly paid more than the required ECC fees. Steve
she had left complainants passports in another folder. appeal. She returned to work in the Bureau pursuant to the Tsai stated in his affidavit that he knew he was paying P200
Leonor left a message for Ledesma, who was not around, Decision of the Court of Appeals. or P300 more than the necessary fees.19 There is no basis
that she would return with complainants passports on "the in finding that Ledesma "concealed" this fact from Steve Tsai
next working day." However, when she heard that Steve Tsai The Issue to mislead him into paying more money.
had been caught breaking into the Records Section, Leonor
decided to stay away from the Bureau. Leonor came forward The CSCs sole assignment of error reads: The CSC next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
only when she found out that Ledesma was being dismissed finding Ledesma guilty of simple misconduct when the
from the Bureau. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF charge against her was for grave misconduct. Citing Civil
LAW IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF PETITIONER Service Commission v. Lucas,20 the CSC posits that a
The CSC gave scant consideration to Leonors statement. AND AT THE SAME TIME DOWNGRADING THE OFFENSE person charged with grave misconduct cannot be convicted
The CSC noted that Leonor was not a government employee COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT FROM GRAVE of simple misconduct because the two are distinct and
or a party to the case, and that Ledesma had never MISCONDUCT TO SIMPLE MISCONDUCT BECAUSE OF separate offenses.
mentioned Leonors name in her appeal memorandum or HER LENGTH OF SERVICE AND THE SUPPOSED
first motion for reconsideration. Given its late introduction, ABSENCE OF A CORRUPT INTENTION TO VIOLATE THE This argument ignores prevailing jurisprudence and
the CSC found Leonors statement highly doubtful. LAW.15 misapplies the Courts ruling in Lucas. In that case, the CSC
found Lucas guilty of grave misconduct though the charge
In its Resolution No. 002748 dated 11 December 2000, the The CSC also scored the Court of Appeals supposed failure against him was for simple misconduct only. The Court held
CSC denied Ledesmas motion for reconsideration and to rule on whether respondent committed the administrative that the CSCs verdict in Lucas violated the basic
affirmed Resolution No. 001251. offense of dishonesty. requirements of due process. The Court ruled that even in
an administrative proceeding Lucas had the right to be
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Ruling of the Court informed of the charges against him, as well as the right not
to be convicted of an offense for which he was not
On appeal, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of Leonors The petition lacks merit. charged.21
statement and the conflict between Ledesma and
Commissioner Rodriguez. Taking Ledesmas three decades Whether the Decision of the Court of Appeals Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and
of previously unblemished service and the circumstances of definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
the case into account, the appellate court held that there was Violated Ledesmas Constitutional Right to Due Process gross negligence by a public officer."22 The misconduct is
insufficient proof that Ledesma acted with corrupt intention grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
or willful intent to violate the law or established rules. The CSCs contention that the Court of Appeals failed to rule corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
on the charge of dishonesty and violated Section 14, Article established rules, which must be established by substantial
The Court of Appeals found Ledesma guilty of simple VIII of the Constitution16 is without basis. evidence.23 Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. A
misconduct only, thus: person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for
The Decision of the Court of Appeals states: simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of
Considering that petitioner Ledesma served the government the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.
for more than thirty (30) years with an untarnished record of Petitioner is not innocent of any misconduct and We agree
service and evidence show[s] that petitioner had not with public respondent CSC that there are substantial Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of
previously or persistently committed acts inimical to evidence to prove her guilt, not of dishonesty, grave simple misconduct. A person charged with simple
government service, the act committed by petitioner may be misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the misconduct cannot be held liable for the more serious
classified as simple misconduct. Thus, the penalty service but simple misconduct.17 offense of grave misconduct because he will be deprived of
commensurate thereof would be six (6) months suspension his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against
without pay. Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not simply ignore the him. A charge of simple misconduct does not give him notice
charge of dishonesty, as the CSC alleges. Rather, the that he must traverse and if necessary rebut not only the
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions are hereby appellate court found that the evidence did not support the charge of misconduct, but also the element of corruption or
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that she is found guilty charges enumerated, including that of dishonesty. The willful intent to violate the law or established rules. This is the
of simple misconduct. Petitioner Ledesma is therefore appellate court appreciated the evidence presented and the situation in the case of Civil Service Commission v. Lucas.
penalized to suffer a suspension from the service without facts of the case differently from the CSC. The Court of
In contrast, a person charged with grave misconduct is put This issue is factual in nature because it requires a re- Rodriguez before the Ombudsman. This was not refuted by
on notice that he stands accused of misconduct coupled with evaluation of the evidence at hand. Under Rule 45, factual the BI.
any of the elements of corruption or willful intent to violate findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review. The
the law or established rules. Thus, such person can be held general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Interestingly, immediately after said conflict arose, several
liable for simple misconduct if any of the elements to make Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to fabricated cases were instituted by fictitious individuals
the misconduct grave is not established by substantial this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or against petitioner Ledesma before the Ombudsman.
evidence. In such a situation, there is no violation of a in this case the administrative body, make contradictory Eventually, the Ombudsman dismissed these cases. Hence,
persons constitutional right to be informed of the charges findings.28 However, the exception does not apply in every it is highly probable that said cases were intended to harass
against him. This is the situation in the present case. instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or petitioner. It is therefore not far-fetched that petitioner will
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the suspect that then Commissioner Rodriguez had a hand in
Consequently, the Court does not see how a verdict of Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such the filing of said fabricated cases against her.32 (Emphasis
simple misconduct can violate Ledesmas right to due findings are supported by the record or based on substantial supplied)
process. The Court has, on several instances, overturned evidence.29
charges of grave misconduct where the circumstances The records indeed show that, after 32 years of blameless
showed that the respondent only committed simple Likewise, although the factual findings of administrative service, three administrative complaints suddenly surfaced
misconduct.24 bodies are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, against Ledesma within the same month. The complaints
such findings must be supported by substantial evidence.30 were filed successively at the rate of almost one complaint a
Even in criminal cases, a person may be convicted of a After a careful review of the records, we agree with the Court week in March 1999.33 Ledesma claims that these charges
different offense than the offense he is charged with if the of Appeals that the elements particular to grave misconduct were meant to cause her removal from the Bureau after she
latter offense necessarily includes the elements of the lesser were not adequately proven in this case. signed Buklods complaint against Commissioner Rodriguez.
offense established by the evidence.25 There is no reason The first two complaints against Ledesma were lodged with
why the same principle should not apply in administrative The charges against Ledesma are based on the affidavits the Ombudsman. The latter summarily dismissed these
cases. Criminal cases operate under more stringent rules executed by complainants, particularly Steve Tsais. As the complaints for lack of merit and because the complainants in
than administrative proceedings. The right of an accused to Court of Appeals observed, peculiar circumstances those cases appeared to be fictitious.34 Only the charges
due process is even more closely guarded in a criminal surrounding the execution of complainants affidavits cast filed with the Bureau prospered.
case. doubt on their credibility.
The Court finds it strange that, except for the brief mention of
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Finding Ledesma The Bureaus security log shows that Steve Tsai broke into an "ocular inspection and re-enactment of the break-in
Guilty of Simple Misconduct the Records Section office on 20 March 1999, a Saturday incident conducted by Associate Commissioner Yap" in
and a non-working day.31 Bureau guards caught Steve Tsai complainants supplemental affidavit, there is barely any
The Court of Appeals affirmed the CSCs Resolutions insofar and detained him. Within a few hours, while Steve Tsai was reference to the incident in the records forwarded by the
as the latter found that Ledesma committed misconduct. under Bureau custody, he and his sister executed their Bureau and the CSC. Only Ledesma has persistently
Ledesma herself accepted this finding when she did not complaint-affidavits against Ledesma. Both complaint- brought the incident to the attention of the agencies and
appeal and returned to work pursuant to the appellate court affidavits were acknowledged before and certified by courts hearing her case.
Decision. Prosecutor Icay on the same non-working day, 20 March
1999. Indeed, the Bureau and CSC seem to have mostly ignored
Ledesma disclosed in her appeal memorandum26 before the Steve Tsais self-styled "break-in" and its implications on this
CSC that she asked Steve Tsai for an amount sufficient to Three days later, during a re-enactment of Steve Tsais case. There is no reference to it in the Bureaus Decision.
cover the fees for two ECCs, and that complainants gave her break-in, complainants confronted Ledesma in the presence The CSC similarly regarded the break-in as irrelevant to the
P3,000, or P460 more than the sum required. Even if of Associate Commissioner Yap. Complainants executed present case. The CSCs discussion of the break-in amounts
Ledesma subsequently passed the P3,000 and their supplemental affidavit against Ledesma on the same to scarcely more than a paragraph, as follows:
complainants documents to a travel agent, the fact remains day, again with the assistance of Prosecutor Icay.
that Ledesma, a Records clerk, had no authority to receive xxx The Commission in dismissing Ledesmas appeal in
money or documents for Bureau transactions or to transact The haste marking the execution of complainants affidavits CSC Resolution No. 00-1251 did not lose sight of the fact
with foreign nationals seeking ECCs. Having been with the and the proceedings against Ledesma gives some force to that initially, the complainant was placed under custody
Bureau for more than three decades, Ledesma was surely the latters claim that Bureau officials were eager to because of breaking into a government office. The
aware of the rules and procedure of the Bureau on the prosecute her. We quote the findings of the Court of Appeals investigation of the incident resulted in a reasonable
issuance of ECCs. Ledesma herself explained that it was the on the rancor between Ledesma and Bureau management: explanation as to the reason why the complainant broke into
Bureaus Alien Registration Division that was responsible for the BI premises. Consequently, the satisfactory explanation
processing ECCs.27 By her own admission, Ledesmas It must be remembered that petitioner and then of the complainant led to Ledesmas exposure to
actions contravened the established rules of the Bureau on Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez were at odds over administrative charges.
the issuance of ECCs. several issues at the [Bureau of Immigration] BI especially
with the promotion of 132 personnel whose assumption to The criminal liability of the complainant for unlawfully
The remaining question is whether Ledesma is guilty of office was impeded by Commissioner Rodriguez. Hence, entering the premises, on the other hand, is a matter distinct
grave misconduct and deserves dismissal from the service petitioner who was the Chairperson of the BI employees from the instant case.35
and forfeiture of all her benefits. union, Buklod ng mga Kawani ng CID, and also one of the
132 personnel, filed a case against then Commissioner A review of the records shows that there was practically no
investigation conducted on the break-in. Again, the Bureaus
Decision does not even mention the incident. The Bureau admission, however, does not prove by itself corruption or complainants affidavits to the same meticulous examination
decided against Ledesma mainly because she failed to the other elements particular to grave misconduct. Ledesma it gave to Leonors statement.
answer the charges against her and to attend the hearing on admitted to receiving the money only so she could pass it to
23 April 1999.36 The "reasonable" and "satisfactory" someone else and not for her own benefit. In the absence of WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
explanation the CSC refers to is the bare allegation of the substantial evidence to the contrary, Ledesmas explanation Decision of 31 July 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Bureau that Steve Tsai broke into the Records Section to is plausible. Moreover, to warrant dismissal, the misconduct SP No. 62827.
look for his passport. It should be noted that this explanation must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and
does not even appear in any of the affidavits executed by not trifling.40 That is not the case here. SO ORDERED.
Steve Tsai. Republic of the Philippines
We stress that the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil SUPREME COURT
Certainly, Steve Tsai cannot be prosecuted for his offense in servant. Public service is a public trust, and whoever breaks Manila
this proceeding. However, the mere fact that Steve Tsai that trust is subject to sanction. Dismissal and forfeiture of
executed his complaint-affidavit on the same day that he benefits, however, are not penalties imposed for all FIRST DIVISION
was caught for suspicious activities should have raised infractions, particularly when it is a first offense. There must
misgivings about his character, motives and truthfulness. be substantial evidence that grave misconduct or some other A.M. No. P-07-2333 December 19, 2007
That the Bureau so quickly placed full faith and credence in grave offense meriting dismissal under the law was (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2510-P)
Steve Tsais claims puzzles the Court. committed.
ANONYMOUS, complainant,
More disturbing is the undisputed contention that Steve Tsai Further, this is Ledesmas first offense in more than three vs.
was not charged for such a serious offense. This is highly decades of otherwise untarnished public service. Under the MA. VICTORIA P. RADAM, Utility Worker, Office of the Clerk
unusual, to say the least. Ordinarily, a foreigner who breaks circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals that of Court, Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, respondent.
into a government office would expect to face investigation, suspension for six months is an adequate penalty.41
prosecution and perhaps expulsion from the country, if not RESOLUTION
incarceration. Instead, Steve Tsai received speedy and A final note. The CSC disregarded Leonors statement
extensive assistance from the very agency he tried to because, among other reasons, Leonor had "no personality CORONA, J.:
burglarize. in the instant case to offer in evidence her affidavit."42 By
this, the CSC meant that Leonor was not a government In an anonymous letter-complaint dated September 30,
In administrative proceedings, the burden is on the employee, that she was not a party to the instant case, and 2005,1 respondent Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the
complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations that the CSC "had no disciplinary jurisdiction" over her.43 Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
in his or her complaint.37 Obviously, the credibility of the Alaminos City in Pangasinan, was charged with immorality.
complainant should be considered in judging whether the Leonor, however, was not trying to intervene in the present The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was
standard of evidence was met or not. Although less than case. Leonor was offering her statement merely as a unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in
preponderant, substantial evidence is not just any scrap or witness. A person need not be a government employee or a October 2005.2 The complainant claimed that respondents
scintilla of evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of party to a case to offer evidence in an administrative behavior tainted the image of the judiciary.
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as proceeding. Under the rules, any person who can perceive
adequate to justify a conclusion.38 and make his perception known to others, and who has In connection with the complaint, Judge Elpidio N. Abella3
personal knowledge about the facts of a case, can be a conducted a discreet investigation to verify the allegations
The standard was not met in this case. Taken as a whole, witness.44 against respondent.
the circumstances surrounding this case and the execution
of the complaint-affidavits against Ledesma would raise Nevertheless, Leonors statement has certain shortcomings. In his report dated March 8, 2006,4 Judge Abella made the
doubts in a reasonable mind. Despite its title as a "Sworn Statement," 45 Leonors following findings:
statement was not acknowledged before a notary public or
The primary complainant, Steve Tsai, is a foreigner who was officer legally authorized to administer oaths. It was thus not On March 1, 2006, respondent submitted a letter addressed
a mere student at the time. Yet he blithely broke into a "sworn to" and could not be regarded as having been given to the Honorable Court Administrator, thru the undersigned,
government office on a day that he probably knew, from his under oath. It is in effect a private document, ordinarily duly subscribed and sworn to before the Clerk of Court VI of
stay in the country, to be a non-working day. At the least, this subject to proof of its due execution and authenticity.46 In the Court, alleging among others, the following:
brazen and appalling conduct shows that Steve Tsai is admitting Leonors statement, the Court of Appeals held that
hardly trustworthy. His version of events should not be the CSC is not bound by technical rules of procedure in 1) She admitted that she is single/unmarried, and indeed she
accepted wholesale. We have previously held that the administrative proceedings. Although true,47 this does not was pregnant and actually gave birth to a baby boy named
standard of substantial evidence is not met by affidavits of preclude the CSC from considering a documents technical Christian Jeon Radam on 03 November 2005 at the Western
questionable veracity.39 defects and the tardiness of its submission in weighing its Pangasinan District Hospital, Alaminos City;
probative value.
Given the questionable nature of the complainants affidavits, 2) The reason why she did not yet marry the father of her
we are left with Ledesmas admission that she received However, the CSC should have also considered the dubious child Christian Jeon was that she and the childs father have
P3,000 from complainants. There is no dispute that P2,560 circumstances under which the complaint against Ledesma pending application[s] [to migrate to Canada] as in fact they
was the required fee for two ECCs in 1999. This amount was was lodged. The burden of proof in administrative cases lies have [a] mutual plan to remain unmarried [and]
actually paid to the Bureau, and Steve Tsai and Ching Tsai on the complainant. The CSC should have subjected
received their ECCs. Only P460 is unaccounted. Ledesmas
3) Nevertheless, she expressed her remorse and promised document that accommodates various belief systems
not to commit the same mistake and indiscretion in the However, it proposed that she be held liable for conduct irrespective of dogmatic origins.19
future. unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine of P5,000
for stating in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon (2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself
Further investigation reveal[ed] the following: that the father was "unknown" to her.10 married to a woman other than the mother, then there is a
cause for administrative sanction against either the father or
1) That respondent was appointed as Utility Worker on The OCA correctly exonerated respondent from the charge the mother.20 In such a case, the "disgraceful and immoral
September 4, 2000; of immorality. However, its recommendation to hold her liable conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a
for a charge of which she was not previously informed was married person.21 The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally
2) The father of Christian Jeon Radam is unknown, as wrong. recognized22 and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a
shown by the childs Certificate of Live Birth, hereto special contract of permanent union.23 Accordingly, judicial
attached;5 For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with
giving birth out of wedlock is not per se immoral under civil married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow
3) It was verbally admitted by the respondent that she had service laws. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, of fidelity.
given birth to two (2) other children before Christian Jeon, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
but they were conceived and born while respondent was corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the
working abroad and before she was employed in the [Office unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.11 father of her child was unmarried. Therefore, respondent
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of] Alaminos cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct
City.6 In Estrada v. Escritor,12 we emphasized that in determining simply because she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out
whether the acts complained of constitute "disgraceful and of wedlock.
In this connection, Judge Abella made the following immoral behavior" under civil service laws, the distinction
recommendation: between public and secular morality on the one hand, and Respondent was indicted only for alleged immorality for
religious morality, on the other should be kept in mind.13 The giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which
Since respondent admitted that she is single and that she distinction between public and secular morality as expressed she was informed. Judge Abellas investigation focused
got pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy without being albeit not exclusively in the law, on the one hand, and solely on that matter. Thus, the recommendation of the OCA
married to the father of the child, albeit she advanced the religious morality, on the other, is important because the that she be held administratively liable in connection with an
reason for her remaining unmarried, it being that she and her jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular entry in the birth certificate of Christian Jeon came like a
boyfriend had a mutual plan to migrate to Canada, this morality.14 Thus, government action, including its thief in the night. It was unwarranted. Respondent was
Investigating Judge considers that such conduct of the proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like neither confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it.
respondent fell short of the strict standards of Court adultery or concubinage, must have a secular purpose.15 To hold her liable for a totally different charge of which she
personnel and contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics and was totally unaware will violate her right to due process.
the Civil Service Rules. A place in the judiciary demands For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and
upright men and women who must carry on with dignity, immoral" behavior under civil service laws, it must be The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding
hence respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular is the opportunity to explain ones side, whether written or
conduct which cannot be countenanced by the Court. morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, verbal.24 This presupposes that one has been previously
Certainly, the image of the Judiciary has been affected by specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it apprised of the accusation against him or her. Here,
such conduct of the respondent. be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly respondent was deprived of both with regard to her alleged
demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the
Premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws.16 At the birth certificate of her child.
that respondent MA. VICTORIA RADAM be accordingly same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as
found GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that An employee must be informed of the charges proferred
UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the against him, and the normal way by which the employee
(1) month or a fine of Php5,000.00 is respectfully majority.17 is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges
recommended, with warning that a repetition of the same or against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.7 Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the cannot [be] dispense[d] with and still remain consistent with
fact that an unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock: the constitutional provision on due process. The second
After reviewing the findings and recommendation of Judge minimum requirement is that the employee charged with
Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) (1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
recommended that, in accordance with Villanueva v. Milan,8 is not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say,
respondent be absolved of the charge of immorality because immoral conduct.18 It may be a not-so-ideal situation and his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to
her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock) may cause complications for both mother and child but it present evidence in support of his defense(s).25
did not affect the character and nature of her position as a does not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no
utility worker.9 It observed: law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those Ones employment is not merely a specie of property rights.
circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes It is also the means by which he and those who depend on
[T]here is no indication that the relationship of respondent to the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried him live.26 It is therefore protected by the guarantee of
her alleged boyfriend has caused prejudice to any person or persons. Neither does the situation contravene any security of tenure. And in the civil service, this means that no
has adversely affected the performance of her function as fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a government employee may be removed, suspended or
utility worker to the detriment of the public service. disciplined unless for cause provided by law27 and after due
process. Unless the constitutional guarantee of due process of the national library in particular, and the country in
is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to insist on its general." She was ordered dismissed from the government Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary
observance in all cases involving a deprivation, denigration service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the
or dilution of ones right to life, liberty and property. her retirement benefits and other remunerations. case for Secretary Gloria.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals
respondent Ma. Victoria P. Radam is hereby DISMISSED. resolution. Thereafter, or on 1 October 1996, she received erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of
She is, however, strongly advised to be more circumspect in another resolution correcting the typographical errors found petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
her personal and official actuations in the future. on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial
judgment. court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
SO ORDERED. motion to dismiss.
Republic of the Philippines On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the
SUPREME COURT Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for
Manila purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most reconsideration as the trial court's order denying the motion
appropriate to take under the circumstances."2 Her petition to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for
SECOND DIVISION was, however, denied. reconsideration would practically be a useless ceremony as
the trial court virtually decided the case, and that there is no
G.R. No. 132248 January 19, 2000 Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of
and DECS Resolution dated September 25, 1996, which the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23 October petition for mandamus has no leg to stand on hence should
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion have been dismissed for lack of cause of action.
petitioner, was merely "noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October
vs. 1996 Order that the denial of the request for the production Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the
MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent. of the Investigation Committee Report was final.3 As earlier motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature as it did not
stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner still has a
BELLOSILLO, J.: September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive
she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before rights have not been violated as she contends; that
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy of mandamus to
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law,
through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from DECS order or regulation prohibiting the release of the
Appeals1 dismissing the certiorari filed by then DECS enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of petitioned documents for reasons of confidentiality or
Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its the said report.4 national security.
Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration
thereof.1wphi1.nt Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules
principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the
filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to reasons therefor
then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library the trial court. In its assailed Decision of 24 November 1997
for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim,
the best interest of the service. The complaint charged Secretary Gloria's petition for lack of merit holding that deny the motion or order the amendment of the pleading.
respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical
documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the
Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her any motion for reconsideration of the assailed order with the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her respondent judge before filing the instant petition to this
possession, without legal authority and justification, some Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity . . . . SECOND. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly
forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were Even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be the reasons therefor (Emphasis supplied).
missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library. disregarded, the petition at hand, nevertheless, must fail.
The denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several the respondent judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit."
hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special not appealable. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and
Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking
DECS Secretary in the administrative case while respondent objection(s) raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called
was represented by her own private counsel. On 25 proceed with the trial and, in case of adverse decision, to upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding elevate the entire case on appeal in due course.
respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The
best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of Court of Appeals on 13 January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus
historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice the instant petition for review. and the trial court's jurisdiction over the rulings and actions
of administrative agencies without stating the basis why her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held
petitioner's motion to dismiss was being denied. We are crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and in Ruiz v. Drilon8 that a respondent in an administrative case
reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed Order comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. recommendations of any investigating committee created to
This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to
Gloria on 14 March 1997 to which petitioner filed their (sic) to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
opposition on April 8, 1997. before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the
would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was charges and the evidence presented against her during the
Respondent premised his motion on the following grounds: not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no
(a) Mandamus does not lie to compel respondent DECS liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the doubt had been accorded these rights.
Secretary to release the Report of the DECS Investigating rules was justified.
Committee because the Petition does not state a cause of Respondent's assertion that the investigation report would
action; (b) The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, be used "to guide [her] on what action would be appropriate
legal and valid, and therefore, the writ of preliminary through a motion for reconsideration, has been given an to take under the circumstances,"9 hardly merits
injunction cannot be granted to enjoin its execution; while opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed
petitioner alleged among others that she has no plain, However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well- investigation report is an internal communication between
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of the the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it
lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when mandatory provision of the Rules; as in this case, a motion other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. As
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2 October
"Purely ministerial" are acts to be performed in a given state aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower court 1996
of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate directly on certiorari.5
of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his own Respondent's (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of
While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission cannot has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is the Decision itself . . . . [t]he report is an internal
be controlled by mandamus . . . . the court can decide settled that mandamus is employed to compel the communication between the Investigating Committee and
whether the duty is discretionary or ministerial . . . . performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being the DECS Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the
its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a latter had already read and used the same in making his
Generally, courts have no supervising power over the discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of own determination of the facts and applicable law of the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to case, to be expressed in the Decision he may make.
of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and finding respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be
of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or official, doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty used as part although not controlling of the basis for
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The the decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the
be disturbed except where the board or official has gone writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil
beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the Service Commission may all the records of the case,
powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In
duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there is neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a the latter appellate tribunal, the respondent's counsel may be
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is command to exercise a power already possessed and to allowed to read and/or be given a copy of the Report to
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is perform a duty already imposed.6 enable the appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of appellant's Brief Memorandum.
passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to
evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself
duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law . . . . Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that
duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law
WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded.
dismiss by herein respondent is hereby denied for lack of for. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be
merit and is hereby ordered to file its (sic) responsive the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to
pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by
Copy furnished petitioner who is likewise given ten (10) days Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the denying her access to the investigation report.
to submit his (sic) comment or opposition. service.7 By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the
DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. In fine, the trial court's Order of 23 April 1997 denying
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of Obviously, it will serve no useful purpose now to compel petitioner's motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment
the discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion
relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of report. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to
cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply
order only confused petitioner and left her unable to Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on
determine the errors which would be the proper subject of on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant
the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and "maliciously retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after
resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case borrowing them from his office.17 Lastly, he denied violating
rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish No. 2902. The RTC already fixed the price and issued an the Rules on Notarial Practice.18
respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as
petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance, just compensation for the property.2 On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to
while the trial court's order is merely interlocutory and non- Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006 praying
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her for the early resolution of the complaint.19
same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion. late husband in the expropriation case as intervenors for
being the new registered owners of the property. The On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss
the Court of Appeals of 24 November 1997 sustaining the sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, the Case dated November 14, 2006.20
trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for
its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying the amount of consideration. The respondent further alleged On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Affidavit21 affirming and confirming the existence,
petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the court a Government when the RTC issues the order to transfer the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS titles.3 The respondent then fraudulently without their Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;22 the Memorandum of
Investigation Committee Report is DISMISSED for want of knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000;23 and the Deed of
cause of action.1wphi1.nt converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent
Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001,4 selling the subject submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to his
SO ORDERED. property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25
Republic of the Philippines P200,000.00.5
SUPREME COURT The IBPs Findings
Manila The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid
the P200,000.00 purchase price or that they would sell the In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19,
SECOND DIVISION property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya
least P6,000,000.00 as just compensation.6 found the respondent administratively liable for violating
Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013 Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 even though lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
vs. Reynold and Sylvia (his mothers sister) are his uncle and client that may come into his possession) of the Code of
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent. his aunt, respectively.7 Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).26 She
DECISION The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8 recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.27
BRION, J.: The respondent argued that the complainants greed to get
the just Compensation9 caused her to file this "baseless, In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14,
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 unfounded and malicious" disbarment case.10 He claimed 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP
tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant) against Atty. Glenn Carlos that the sale was their voluntary transaction and that he Commissioners finding, but increased the penalty imposed
Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant "simply ratified the document."11 He also claimed that to two (2) years suspension and a warning:
and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the
"preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent converted properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000; that they RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives. were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
subsequently sold his share to Reynold under a Deed of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.12 Commissioner [in] the above-entitled case, herein made part
complaint, the Court referred the complaint to the of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, evaluation and and her late husband to execute any "preparatory deed of and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
recommendation. sale" in favor of the City Government.13 He also denied that respondents violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon
the Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when they 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule IV,
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are signed it.14 That he filed for the spouses Ylaya and Reynold Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED
Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 that there was no agreement to use the document for the from practice of law for two (2) years with a Warning that
located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. expropriation case.15 He also argued that it was clear from commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632 the document that the intended buyer was a natural person, severely. [emphases supplied]
(property) was already the subject of expropriation not a juridical person, because there were spaces for the
proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa buyers legal age, marital status, and citizenship,16 and he On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for
(City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former was even constrained to file a subsequent Motion to Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008, attaching, among
others, a copy of the complainants Affidavit dated February Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8- process takes place. The requirements of due process are
27, 2008, admitting the existence, genuineness and due 13-SC. satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Cirilo and opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the The Courts Ruling
Deed of Absolute Sale between Laurentino and Reynold; Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the
and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP President,41 we held that "due process, as a constitutional
complainant dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation Commissioner and those of the IBP Board of Governors precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-
case.29 finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings,
1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34 written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral
On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in
with the Supreme Court, requesting that the IBP be directed We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude[,
to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.30 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for being provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not
remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties. legally objectionable for being violative of due process, for
By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,31 We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondents Motion 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on submitted by the parties."42
matter or any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.32 neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. In this case, the respondents failure to cross-examine the
complainant is not a sufficient ground to support the claim
On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for a. Due process violation that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent
Review (on appeal) assailing the IBPs findings, as was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged
follows:33 The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the
Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings,
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule, no denial of evidence and testimony were received and considered by
was pre-signed and fraudulently notarized without requiring due process takes place where a party has been given an the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and
Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal hearing thus, opportunity to be heard and to present his case;35 what is recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Boards
violated the respondents right to due process as he was not prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. Resolution.
able to cross-examine her. This is not to mention that the
complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to prove her The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due
bare allegations; process because he was not given the "amplest opportunity process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
to defend himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the to object to the admissibility of documents or present party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion
public documents (MOA and 2 other DOAS) duly executed controverting evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this case, the
by the parties therein and notarized by the respondent; conclusion without requiring the complainant to adduce requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent."43
evidence in a formal hearing and despite the absence of
c) In totally ignoring the complainants Affidavit admitting the corroborative proof. He insists that these defects rendered We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or
genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute the complainants allegations as hearsay, and the IBPs Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006, submitted his case
Sale in issue; report, recommendation or resolution null and void. to the IBP for its resolution without any further hearings. The
motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory conference
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face on October 6, 2005, significantly did not contain any
Reynold So and Fe Ylaya of the subject lots despite the confrontation with the complainant when she failed to appear statement regarding a denial of due process. In effect, the
existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co- at the required mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,37 respondent himself waived his cross-examination of the
ownership of Ylaya and So; and the records reveal that the respondent fully participated complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to
during the entire proceedings and submitted numerous resolve the case based on the pleadings and the evidence
e) In finding the respondent/appellants act of notarizing the pleadings, including evidence, before the IBP. He was even on record. To quote his own submission:
DOAS as contrary to the notarial rules. allowed to file a motion for reconsideration supported by his
submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and 1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
The Issues ruled upon in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October
8, 2010.38 2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the with all its attachments denying all the allegations in the
following issues: In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. complaint;
Laguesma,39 we held that due process, as applied to
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain 3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper.
process; and ones side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,40 due process in On April 28, 2006, the respondent also filed his supplemental
an administrative context does not require trial-type position paper. By contrast, up to this date, the
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position
the respondent is administratively liable for violating Canon opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or paper thus, waived her right to file the same;
1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence
case as all the defenses and counter-arguments are calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations presented by both parties, finds that the charges of the
supported by documentary evidence, it is most respectfully as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief
prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest based on the following:
ordered dismissed for lack of merit without further hearing; administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and actually co-owner of spouses Ylanas (sic) in the properties
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan in Civil responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and
Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same property, posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a Spouses Ylanas (sic) is hard to believe despite the
and such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted] presentation of the Memorandum of Agreement.
her Verified Complaint as shown in the certification of non-
forum shopping, the outright dismissal of this case is The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents
warranted, hence, this motion; and the case but a witness who brought the matter to the of a written document are put in issue, the best evidence
attention of the Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale between
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.44 character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the
(underscore ours; italics supplied) which the complainant must adduce evidence. subject properties is only Laurentino L. Ylaya married to Fe
A. Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So was
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not likewise a buyer together with Laurentino Ylaya, or that the
which provides that: indispensable to the disciplinary proceedings and her failure former paid half of the purchase price.
to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold
proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP So, assisted by a lawyer at that and who allegedly paid half
as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the name in the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate
resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which respondents misconduct to warrant the exercise of its of Title subsequently issued.
event the disciplinary powers.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances b. Merits of the Complaint and Reynold So produced by the respondent cannot
may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings. overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of Memorandum of Agreement was executed more than a
In this case, the IBP Commissioners findings were twice proof required is preponderance of evidence which the month AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors the first review complainant has the burden to discharge."49 Preponderance the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that
resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30245 dated of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side the complainant denied ever having executed the
December 14, 2007, affirming the IBP Commissioners is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the
findings, but modifying the penalty; the second review of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to signatories in the said Memorandum of Agreement would
resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, the court as worthy of belief compared to the presented reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the complainant
2010,46 denying the respondents motion for contrary evidence. and her husband are not the same with their signatures in
reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of other documents.
Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in
warranting a remedial action or the invalidation of the determining whether preponderance of evidence exists, the Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum
proceedings. court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and of Agreement is valid, thereby making Laurentino Ylaya and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of (Please see Annex "B" of respondents Comment), this
are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the the facts to which they testify, and the probability or sell it to Reynold So for P200,000 x x x when his minimum
conduct of one of its officers,47 not the trial of an action or a improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or expenses for the purchase thereof is already P225,000.00
suit. want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as and he was expecting to receive P7,000,000.00, more or
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the less. That would mean that if Reynold So and the
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. number of witnesses, although it does not mean that complainant were co-owners, the P7,000,000.00 would then
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.50 By be equally divided among them at P3,500,000.00 each, far
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the law, a lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is above the P200,000.00 selling price reflected in the pre-
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is signed Deed of Sale.
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.51 As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu respondent committed serious error in notarizing the Deed of
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows: Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
need of money to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino 2003;69 the complainants Counter Affidavit dated March 26,
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications a notary public is disqualified agreed to the price of P200,000.00 as this was almost the 2004 against the charge of libel;70 and the respondents
from performing a notarial act if he: same value of his investment when he and Reynold jointly letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan dated April 5,
acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was with 2004, requesting for "official information regarding the actual
(a) x x x. the agreement and consent of the complainant who attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE
voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale.60 seminar.71
(b) x x x.
After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, the respondent and find the evidence insufficient to prove proof of specific acts constituting deceit or fraud on the
or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code respondents part. The documents by themselves are neutral
the fourth civil degree." of Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of and, at the most, show the breakdown of the attorney-client
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the evidence against relationship between the respondent and the complainant. It
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is
violate the aforementioned Rule becausehis uncle Reynold deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the complainant and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts
So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and constituting these allegations.72
but the seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4,
respondents Supplemental Position Paper) is misplaced. 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no prohibition exists We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of
Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are against the notarization of a document in which any of the proof is on the complainant; the Court exercises its
considered principals in the contract entered into. parties interested is the notarys relative within the 4th civil disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her
degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.73
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent notarized the documents. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
respondent that his uncle was not a principal so as to apply adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a
the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces
violated the Rules when he notarized the subject Commissioner concluded that the respondent is liable for of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when
Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the
his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and a co-ownership between Laurentino and Reynold; in her equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party
Reynold So were principal parties in the said Memorandum opinion, the signatures of the complainant and of her carrying the burden of proof.74
of Agreement.52 husband on the MOA "are not the same with their signatures
in other documents."62 In this case, we find that the complainants evidence and the
The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioners findings records of the case do not show the respondents deliberate
are contrary to the presented evidence, specifically to the We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof,
MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging may raise some questions regarding the respondents legal the complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01
the existence of a co-ownership;53 to the complainants Ex practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear of the Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce be
Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To evidence of the respondents specific acts of fraud and dismissed.
Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she deceit. His failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership
stated that the parties have entered into a compromise does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and the We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the
agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and issue of his relationship with Reynold, whom the complainant
complaint arose from a misunderstanding, that the respondent was responsible for creating these alleges to be the respondents uncle because Reynold is
miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts;54 to spurious documents. We are further persuaded, after noting married to the respondents maternal aunt.75 However, this
her Affidavit dated February 27, 200855 affirming and that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner failed is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable for
confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of to specify what differences she observed in the spouses violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;56 Ylayas signatures in the MOA and what documents were because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 200176
and to the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.57 used in comparison. and the MOA dated April 19, 200077 were notarized by the
respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on
In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of Apart from her allegations, the complainants pieces of July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000 -
evidence prove that this administrative complaint against him evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632 and 162633;63 her 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised
is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the
Peneyra, the complainants counsel in this administrative May 17, 2000;64 the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902 present prohibition against notarizing documents where the
case, as the hand behind the complaint.58 According to the dated November 6, 2000 fixing the price of just parties are related to the notary public within the 4th civil
respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his compensation;65 the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise
family after his father filed several administrative cases 2001;66 the spouses Ylayas Verified Manifestation dated dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No.
of a warning and a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.59 2902, assailing the Motion to Deposit Just Compensation c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the
filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms the sale between Laurentino and Reynold;67 the Provincial representing conflicting interests without the written consent
that there was a co-ownership between him and Laurentino; Prosecutors Subpoena to the complainant in connection of all concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon
that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to with the respondents complaint for libel;68 the respondents 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his
Reynold because he (Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire complaint for libel against the complainant dated August 27,
clients properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for We affirm the IBP Commissioners finding that the We are aware of the complainants Ex Parte Motion to
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. respondent violated Canon 16. The respondent admits to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case
losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his dated November 14, 200690 and her Affidavit91 affirming
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states: care by Reynold.83 According to the respondent, the and confirming the existence, genuineness and due
complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs over the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed 6, 2000.92 The complainant explains that the parties have
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure them from his office.84 Reynold confirms that the TCTs were entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
of the facts. [emphasis ours] taken by the complainant from the respondents law office.85 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because
of a "misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is appreciation of facts";93 she erroneously accused the
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that respondent of ill motives and bad intentions, but after being
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the enlightened, she is convinced that he has no personal or
so. Part of the lawyers duty to his client is to avoid original TCTs of properties owned by another an act that pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No.
representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline could result in damage should merit a finding of legal 2902; that such misunderstanding was due to her
professional employment, no matter how attractive the fee malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband during
offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation of the allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not his lifetime.94 The complainant now pleads for the
proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of appear that the respondent was aware or present when the respondents forgiveness, stating that he has been her and
professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a complainant borrowed the TCTs,86 we nevertheless hold the her late husbands lawyer for over a decade and affirms her
retainer from a defendant after he has given professional respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care trust and confidence in him.95 We take note that under their
advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for Compromise Agreement dated November 14, 2006 for the
employment from another in a matter adversely affecting any his clients properties that were in his custody. expropriation case,96 the complainant and Reynold equally
interest of his former client. It is his duty to decline share the just compensation, which have since increased to
employment in any of these and similar circumstances in We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, P10,000,000.00.
view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
interests.78 Despite the respondents admission that he represented the While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the
complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case and the Affidavit
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest and that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene appear to exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration
applies "even if the lawyer would not be called upon to in their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a is not the necessary legal effect as the submitted motion and
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant herself affidavit are immaterial for purposes of the present
for the other, or that there would be no occasion to use the states that she and her late husband were forced to file the proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
confidential information acquired from one to the Motion for Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The states that, "No investigation shall be interrupted or
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly records of the case, which include the Motion for Leave to terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
unrelated."79 The sole exception is provided in Canon 15, Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility if conclusion.87 the complainant to prosecute the same."
there is a written consent from all the parties after full
disclosure. Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance,
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in we disbarred the respondent therein for taking advantage of
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What his clients and for transferring the title of their property to his
the respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyers name. In Bautista v. Bernabe,98 we revoked the lawyers
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact notarial commission, disqualified him from reappointment as
case show that the respondent retained clients who had formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the a notary public for two years, and suspended him from the
close dealings with each other. The respondent admits to mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his practice of law for one year for notarizing a document
acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya client is per se a violation.88 without requiring the affiant to personally appear before him.
and Reynold at one point during the proceedings in Civil In this cited case, we said:
Case No. 2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyers failure to file a
Reynold in the same proceedings,81 asserting Reynolds position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint
ownership over the property against all other claims, Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the
including that of the spouses Ylaya.82 respondent clearly failed in this case in his duty to his client administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or
when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
We find no record of any written consent from any of the Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
parties involved and we cannot give the respondent the the circumstances, we find that there was want of diligence; basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This
facts of this case that the respondent retained Reynold as respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
his client and actively opposed the interests of his former Code of Professional Responsibility. proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. d. The Complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the Case and her Affidavit private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 September 29, 2009
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the Responsibility. In Josefina M. Anion v. Atty. Clemencio x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The Sabitsana, Jr.,104 we suspended the respondent therein -----x
complainant or the person who called the attention of the from the practice of law for one (1) year, for violating Canon
court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as Under the circumstances, we find a one (1) year suspension
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against the DECISION
justice.99 respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside
complainants desistance or withdrawal does not terminate Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated December 14, 2007
the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of
where pecuniary consideration has been given to the the IBP Board of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn
complainant as a consideration for her desistance. We note Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15,
in this regard that she would receive P5,000,000.00, or half Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
of the just compensation under the Compromise Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED This involves an administrative complaint[1] filed by
Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband,
against the respondent.101 From this perspective, we that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality
consider the complainants desistance to be suspect; it is not more severely. and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit any The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent
actual misconduct; rather, because of the consideration, the SO ORDERED. was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the
complainant is now amenable to the position of the THIRD DIVISION Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
respondent and/or Reynold.
MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent
e. Procedural aspect Complainant, engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a
certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of
20s. The relationship continued until the time of the filing of
Governors are merely recommendatory and do not attain
the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of the abuses
finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule
committed by respondent, to wit:
139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - versus - (a) [Respondent] has been using court personnel,
namely, Emmanuel Botiong Tenefrancia, process server, as
constant escort of his paramour in going to their appointed
xxxx trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place where
she is staying, and as errand boy seeing to their needs when
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total respondent and his mistress are together;
membership, determines that the respondent should be
MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall (b) Respondent has been using another court
28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte,
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and employee in the person of Camilo Bandivas, court sheriff, as
Respondent.
recommendations which, together with the whole record of contact person to his young lover and in summoning and
the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court bringing complainants witnesses to respondent to be
for final action.1wphi1 A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650 harassed and threatened;
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1195-RTJ)
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the practice of law.102 It exercises such disciplinary (c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondents lover, has
Present: been brought many times by respondent to his court in Liloy,
functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty
to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are Zamboanga del Norte, thereby scandalizing court personnel
exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., and lawyers, who sometimes must wait for the session to
and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of Chairperson, start because respondent and his mistress are not yet
suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are CHICO-NAZARIO, through with each other; That the scandalous relations of
always subject to this Courts review and approval. VELASCO, JR., respondent with his mistress is an open secret among
NACHURA, and lawyers, court personnel and litigants [in] Liloy, Zamboanga
The Penalty PERALTA, JJ. del Norte;
In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of Promulgated: (d) Respondent has not been calendaring (sic)
suspension of six ( 6) months from the practice of law on the cases nor holding court sessions nor court hearings on
Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an extended date Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge
with his paramour, to the great prejudice of public service; October 17, 1999, and that both dined and spent the night Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant
there together inside one bedroom.[18] He said that he failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent
(e) Respondent and his paramour had often met at accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the next day to the committed acts of immorality, or that his conduct was
the house of Zoosima (sic) Ojano Carangan, aunt of said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
respondents paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, outside the house creating a commotion within the Investigating Justice, however, recommended that Judge
and the people of Taway know that respondent judge, who neighborhood.[19] On cross-examination, Mutia admitted Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and
usually arrives in his car, has been shamelessly and that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside circumspection in his actions.[30]
immorally carrying on an illicit affair with said Judilyn the said house, or whether she left that night and just
Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out of their returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also The case now comes before this Court for final resolution.
houses upon seeing respondents car parked at the house of pointed to Mutia that the spot where he positioned himself,
the aunt of respondents young mistress, and these barrio while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by leaves and
tall trees.[20] There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First,
folks often watch respondent come and go; [and] considering the finding of the Investigating Justice, we ask:
is it really necessary that administrative complaints against
(f) Respondent has one or two other women lovers The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing
whom he shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of court He testified that he was hired by Seranillos to drive a evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And
personnel.[2] motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of
Macias. He said that he saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos disciplinary sanction on respondent judge?
on three (3) occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge
Macias and Seranillos; and that he was slapped once by
Complainant attached the affidavits of Shem Tabotabo,[3] Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos.[21] On I.
Zacarias Cordova,[4] Zosima Carangan,[5] Danny Layogue cross-examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not
and Consolacion S. Layogue,[6] her son Marictibert Corpus really sure if the motorcycle he saw was actually owned by In several cases,[31] this Court has ruled that if what is
Macias,[7] Ruben Perater,[8] Roel Mutia,[9] and Aniceto Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct that,
Zozobrado.[10] However, five of them Tabotabo,[11] presumption.[22] He also admitted that he had been residing if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the
Cordova,[12] Carangan,[13] Danny Layogue,[14] and with complainants counsel since the date he executed his quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative
Marictibert Macias[15] later recanted their affidavits. affidavit against Judge Macias.[23] charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial
officer should be more than substantial.
On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution[16] The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to
referring the complaint to Court of Appeals Associate Justice testify after respondents counsel objected because the The first case involving an administrative complaint filed
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and intended testimony would cover an event that took place against a judge in this jurisdiction was decided in 1922 in In
recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice Rosario after the filing of the complaint, and Dialos affidavit narrated re Impeachment of Horrilleno.[32] There, Justice Malcolm
issued an Order[17] setting the initial hearing on November matters that were not covered by the allegations in the explained:
27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to submit a list complaint.[24] Complainant manifested her intention to file a
of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. motion to amend the complaint.[25] The Investigating Justice
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first
The hearing was, however, reset to January 28, 29, 30, and ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness,
instance has heretofore not been well defined. The Supreme
31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28, 2002, complainant Margie Macias, without prejudice to her
Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is
the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint
authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to
exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion shall have been resolved. Complainant, however, refused,
require that charges made against a judge of first instance
by both parties, the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, saying that she would testify only after Dialo had testified.
shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter, to
13, and 14, 2002. [26] The Investigating Justice warned complainant that her
give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer;
refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right to
thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be deemed
present further witnesses and evidence.[27] Despite the
On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without further
warning, complainant refused to proceed with her direct
Investigating Justice of their desire to confer in a last effort to annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a
testimony. The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to
settle. The request was again granted with an order that both prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-General
rest her case, but she again refused.
parties should be ready the following day if no settlement who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the
was reached. The following day, March 12, 2002, the conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the
scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties failed to reach The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He Attorney-Generals investigation, a hearing is had before the
any amicable settlement. denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that court en banc and it sits in judgment to determine if sufficient
complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency
him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional State of the respondent judge as warrants the court in
From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence. He believed that recommending his removal to the Governor-General.
that only four (4) witnesses shall be presented. The first complainants accusations were brought about by her Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in
witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by psychiatric condition characterized as severe paranoia.[28] other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in
complainants son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias
after suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair. In character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable
summary, Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved
Report and Recommendation[29] to this Court. He beyond a reasonable doubt.[33]
II. UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of
P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
With Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to However, in this case, we are not convinced that
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact that the complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that SO ORDERED.
case will only involve an administrative, and not a criminal, respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the EN BANC
complaint. The reason is explained, albeit scarcely, in rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears
Alcuizar v. Carpio:[34] the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint.[40]
If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent
cannot be held liable for the charge.[41] OFFICE OF THE COURT
While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support ADMINISTRATOR,
a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the Complainant,
proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232
Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed from the
highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of
his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified Present:
applicable to criminal cases.[35] CORONA, C.J.,
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations.[42] CARPIO,
We have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for VELASCO, JR.,
In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied a grave offense, the evidence against him should be LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof competent and derived from direct knowledge.[43] This BRION,
necessary in resolving administrative complaints against quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy. - versus - PERALTA,
judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a clarification has to be BERSAMIN,
made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno and Alcuizar DEL CASTILLO,
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and ABAD,
may be said to have been superseded by the Courts recent insufficient to convincingly prove that respondent committed
rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen,[36] Reyes v. Paderanga,[37] VILLARAMA, JR.,
disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should PEREZ,
and Naval v. Panday.[38] not have refused to testify during the hearing. More than MENDOZA,
anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, SERENO,
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary Presiding Judge and Acting REYES, and
own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require a burden of proof, considering that the allegations in her Presiding Judge of the Regional PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato
against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of She should have been more zealous in prosecuting her City and Branch 15, Shariff
the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are complaint. Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, Promulgated:
required to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity Respondent. April 10, 2012
and morality. Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Justice that although the charges of immorality and conduct ----------x
When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not
position or office for the commission of a grave offense in satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be
connection with his office, we merely require that the completely exonerated.[44] Mutias testimony that he saw
complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a DECISION
disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of
a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability.[39] immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of
There appears no compelling reason to require a higher impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such
PER CURIAM:
degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light
judges. offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not
more than P10,000.00.[45] In light of the circumstances
affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and
Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj
jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
commence only when he dons the habiliments of a P10,000.00. (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge
magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The
nature of the position requires nothing less than a 24-hour of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.
daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any judge who WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative
cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best This case originated from reports by the Local Civil
sitting on the bench. Considering the proliferation of interest of the service against respondent Judge Mariano Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the
complaints of abuses and immorality committed by judges, it Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy, Zamboanga Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an
is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on
impeccable conduct from the members of its bench. However, respondent is held administratively liable for annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge
Indar.
5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious in M. Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary Heights,
To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA documents may appear and cause damage to the Courts Cotabato City. The LBC report indicated that the Order was
conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, Integrity.2 received by a certain Mrs. Asok.
where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted
by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010
not appear in the records of cases received, pending or Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasors Indorsement addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan),
disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the and in response to the Australian Embassy letter, Judge Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve
annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC- Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that this the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to
Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service of
the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service,
Registrars are not within the series of case numbers subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained
recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.3 unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and
RTC-Cotabato. his location since then was unknown.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting
decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying standards.
with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus,
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,23 the Court Since this is Judge Indars third offense, showing the
explained the difference between simple misconduct and depravity of his character and aggravating27 the serious
grave misconduct, thus: In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous offenses of gross misconduct and dishonesty,28 the Court
annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal
The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.29
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
disregard established rules, which must be established by when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge SC.30 This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate perform official duties honestly. Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such
appear in the records of cases received, pending, or Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides:
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, which Judge
annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the Indar presided. The cases do not likewise exist in the docket Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the books of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato. The Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. Audit Team also noted that the case numbers in the list are special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are
There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato. disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
(4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC- the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the records of the trial breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized
case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila court and found nothing to show that proceedings were had as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, on the questioned annulment cases. There was nothing in
pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records to show that (1) petitions were filed; (2) docket
the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional fees were paid; (3) the parties were notified of hearings; (4) In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who hearings were calendared and actually held; (5) shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken; and (6) respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any the cases were submitted for decision. member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
misconduct. entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the case, resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the
issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons of the
only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling
of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indars dishonesty. CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has no place PROCESSES.
in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than The Court notes that this is not Judge Indars first offense. In
dismissal from the service. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,25 the Court imposed on him a fine of
P10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any immoral or deceitful act.
The Court defines dishonesty as: hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case, A.M. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
No. RTJ-07-2069,26 the Court found him guilty of gross THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
x x x a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial PROFESSION.
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or Conduct and accordingly fined him P25,000.
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing decisions
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or making it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial
betray.24
and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a This Decision is immediately executory.
jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice
nor consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its SO ORDERED.
also a ground for disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only United States Supreme Court
Rules of Court provides: master its tenets and principles but should also accord INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT, (1977)
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral No. 75-6527
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by character is of much greater import, as far as the general Argued: Decided: April 19, 1977
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Petitioners, pupils in a Dade County, Fla., junior high school,
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the (Emphasis supplied) filed this action in Federal District Court pursuant to 42
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross U.S.C. 1981-1988 for damages and injunctive and
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by declaratory relief against respondent school officials, alleging
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct that petitioners and other students had been subjected to
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyers Oath, disciplinary corporal punishment in violation of their
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of constitutional rights. The Florida statute then in effect
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves authorized corporal punishment after the teacher had
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case disbarment. consulted with the principal or teacher in charge of the
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at school, specifying that the punishment was not to be
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid "degrading or unduly severe." A School Board regulation
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis contained specific directions and limitations, authorizing
supplied) In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice punishment administered to a recalcitrant student's buttocks
Borretas recommendation to conduct an investigation on her with a wooden paddle. The evidence showed that the
alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned paddling of petitioners was exceptionally harsh. The District
Decisions. Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint,
In Samson v. Caballero,31 where the Court automatically finding no basis for constitutional relief. The Court of Appeals
disbarred the respondent judge, pursuant to the provisions of affirmed. Held:
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC, the Court held: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P.
Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 14, 1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Under the same rule, a respondent may forthwith be Amendment does not apply to disciplinary corporal
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why punishment in public schools. Pp. 664-671.
Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise (a) The history of the Eighth Amendment and the decisions
the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except
disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar. The rule does of this Court make it clear that the prohibition against cruel
accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-
not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable and unusual punishment was designed to protect those
employment in any branch of the government, including
as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to convicted of crime. Pp. 664-668.
government-owned or controlled corporations.
comment on and show cause why he should not be (b) There is no need to wrench the Eighth Amendment from
disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order its historical context and extend it to public school
for him to comment on why he should not be held Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons disciplinary practices. The openness of the public school and
administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional its supervision by the community afford significant
words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which that
give an explanation on why he should not be held the Roll of Attorneys. Amendment protects convicted criminals. These safeguards
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but are reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law,
also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indars whereby any punishment going beyond that which is
meaning of automatic conversion of administrative cases record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the of the child may result in both civil and criminal liability. Pp.
against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in 668-671.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary the country. 2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint does not require notice and hearing prior to imposition of
filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to corporal punishment as that practice is authorized and
proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of Court limited by the common law. Pp. 672-682. [430 U.S. 651, 652]
rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged (a) Liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case participation in the authentication of the questioned is implicated where public school authorities, acting under
against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals Decisions on the annulment of marriage cases issued by color of state law, deliberately punish a child for misconduct
and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second- Judge Indar. by restraint and infliction of appreciable physical pain.
level court. Freedom from bodily restraint and punishment is within the
liberty interest in personal security that has historically been
Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil protected from state deprivation without due process of law.
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only
Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City, the same Pp. 672-674.
affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral
to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the (b) Under the longstanding accommodation between the
character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue
annulment of marriages filed with their offices. child's interest in personal security and the traditional
in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is
common-law privilege, there can be no deprivation of students as a means of maintaining school discipline discipline than suspension or expulsion. Contrary to the
substantive rights as long as the corporal punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the procedural requirements of the statute and regulation,
remains within the limits of that privilege. The child Eighth Amendment; and, second, to the extent that paddling teachers often paddled students on their own authority
nonetheless has a strong interest in procedural safeguards is constitutionally permissible, whether the Due Process without first consulting the principal. 8
that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment and provide for Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prior notice
the resolution of disputed questions of justification. Pp. 675- and an opportunity to be heard. Petitioners focused on Drew Junior High School, the school
676. in which both Ingraham and Andrews were enrolled in the fall
(c) The Florida scheme, considered in light of the openness I of 1970. In an apparent reference to Drew, the District Court
of the school environment, affords significant protection Petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews filed found that "[t]he instances of punishment which could be
against unjustified corporal punishment of schoolchildren. the complaint in this case on January 7, 1971, in the United characterized as severe, accepting the students' testimony
The teacher and principal must exercise prudence and States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 1 At as credible, took place in one junior high school." App. 147.
restraint when they decide that corporal punishment is the time both were enrolled in the Charles R. Drew Junior The evidence, consisting mainly of the testimony of 16
necessary for disciplinary purposes. If the punishment is High School in Dade County, Fla., Ingraham in the eighth students, suggests that the regime at Drew was
later found to be excessive, they may be held liable in grade and Andrews in the ninth. The complaint contained exceptionally harsh. The testimony of Ingraham and
damages or be subject to criminal penalties. Where the three counts, each alleging a separate cause of action for Andrews, in support of their individual claims for damages, is
State has thus preserved what "has always been the law of deprivation of constitutional rights, under 42 U.S.C. 1981- illustrative. Because he was slow to respond to his teacher's
the land," United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692 , the 1988. Counts one and two were individual actions for instructions, Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks
case for administrative safeguards is significantly less damages by Ingraham and Andrews based on paddling with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal's
compelling than it would otherwise be. Pp. 676-680. incidents that allegedly occurred in October 1970 at Drew office. The paddling was so severe that he suffered a
(d) Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a Junior High School. Count three was a class action for hematoma 9 requiring medical attention and keeping him out
constitutional requirement would significantly intrude into the declaratory and [430 U.S. 651, 654] injunctive relief filed on of school for several days. 10 Andrews was paddled several
area of educational responsibility that lies primarily with the behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. 2 Named times for minor infractions. On two occasions he was struck
public school authorities. Prior procedural safeguards require as defendants in all counts were respondents Willie J. Wright on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his arm for
a diversion of educational resources, and school authorities (principal at Drew Junior High School), Lemmie Deliford (an a week. 11 [430 U.S. 651, 658]
may abandon corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure assistant principal), Solomon Barnes (an assistant to the
rather than incur the burdens of complying with procedural principal), and Edward L. Whigham (superintendent of the The District Court made no findings on the credibility of the
requirements. The incremental benefit of invoking the Dade County School System). 3 students' testimony. Rather, assuming their testimony to be
Constitution to impose prior notice and a hearing cannot credible, the court found no constitutional basis for relief.
justify the costs. Pp. 680-682. Petitioners presented their evidence at a week-long trial With respect to count three, the class action, the court
525 F.2d 909, affirmed. before the District Court. At the close of petitioners' case, concluded that the punishment authorized and practiced
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which respondents moved for dismissal of count three "on the generally in the county schools violated no constitutional
BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has right. Id., at 143, 149. With respect to counts one and two,
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting shown no right to relief," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41 (b), and for the individual damages actions, the court concluded that
opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, a ruling that the evidence would be insufficient to go to a jury while corporal punishment could in some cases violate the
JJ., joined, post, p. 683. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting on counts one and two. 4 The District Court granted the Eighth Amendment, in this case a jury could not lawfully find
opinion, post, p. 700. motion as to all three counts, and dismissed the complaint "the elements of severity, arbitrary infliction, unacceptability
without hearing evidence on behalf of the school authorities. in terms of contemporary standards, or gross disproportion
Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioners. With him App. 142-150. [430 U.S. 651, 655] which are necessary to bring `punishment' to the
on the briefs were Howard W. Dixon and Peter M. Siegel. constitutional level of `cruel and unusual punishment.'" Id., at
[430 U.S. 651, 653] Petitioners' evidence may be summarized briefly. In the 143.
1970-1971 school year many of the 237 schools in Dade
Frank A. Howard, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for County used corporal punishment as a means of maintaining A panel of the Court of Appeals voted to reverse. 498 F.2d
respondents. * discipline pursuant to Florida legislation and a local School 248 (CA5 1974). The panel concluded that the punishment
Board regulation. 5 The statute then in effect authorized was so severe and oppressive as to violate the Eighth and
[ Footnote * ] Michael Nussbaum, Lucien Hilmer, Ronald G. limited corporal punishment by negative inference, Fourteenth Amendments, and that the procedures outlined in
Precup, and David Rubin filed a brief for the National proscribing punishment which was "degrading or unduly Policy 5144 failed to satisfy the requirements of the Due
Education Assn. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of severe" or which was inflicted without prior consultation with Process Clause. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leon Fieldman the principal or the teacher in charge of the school. Fla. Stat. these conclusions and affirmed the judgment of the District
for the National School Boards Assn.: and by Tobias Simon Ann. 232.27 (1961). 6 The regulation, Dade County School Court. 525 F.2d 909 (1976). The full court held that the Due
and Elizabeth J. du Fresne for the United Teachers of Dade, Board Policy [430 U.S. 651, 656] 5144, contained explicit Process Clause did not require notice or an opportunity to be
Local 1974, AFT, AFL-CIO. Gertrude M. Bacon filed a brief directions and limitations. 7 The authorized punishment heard:
for the American Psychological Association Task Force on consisted of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks
the Rights of Children and Youths as amicus curiae. with a flat wooden paddle measuring less than two feet long, "In essence, we refuse to set forth, as constitutionally
three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick. The mandated, procedural standards for an activity which is not
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. normal punishment was limited to one to five "licks" or blows substantial enough, on a constitutional level, to justify the
with the paddle and resulted in [430 U.S. 651, 657] no time and effort which would have to be expended by the
This case presents questions concerning the use of corporal apparent physical injury to the student. School authorities school in adhering to those procedures or to justify further
punishment in public schools: First, whether the paddling of viewed corporal punishment as a less drastic means of
interference by federal courts into the internal affairs of Teachers may impose reasonable but not excessive force to traditionally have been associated with the criminal process,
public schools." Id., at 919. discipline a child. 19 Blackstone catalogued among the and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of
The court also rejected the petitioners' substantive "absolute rights of individuals" the right "to security from the the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of
contentions. The Eighth Amendment, in the court's view, was corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.
simply inapplicable to corporal punishment in public [430 wounding," 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134, but he did An examination of the history of the Amendment and the
U.S. 651, 659] schools. Stressing the likelihood of civil and not regard it a "corporal insult" for a teacher to inflict decisions of this Court construing the proscription against
criminal liability in state law, if petitioners' evidence were "moderate correction" on a child in his care. To the extent cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed
believed, the court held that "[t]he administration of corporal that force was "necessary to answer the purposes for which to protect those convicted of crimes. We adhere to this long-
punishment in public schools, whether or not excessively [the teacher] is employed," Blackstone viewed it as standing limitation and hold that the Eighth Amendment does
administered, does not come within the scope of Eighth "justifiable or lawful." Id., at *453; 3 id., at *120. The basic not apply to the paddling of children as a means of
Amendment protection." Id., at 915. Nor was there any doctrine has not changed. The prevalent rule in this country maintaining discipline in public schools.
substantive violation of the Due Process Clause. The court today privileges such force as a teacher or administrator
noted that "[p]addling of recalcitrant children has long been "reasonably believes to be necessary for [the child's] proper A
an accepted method of promoting good behavior and control, training, or education." Restatement (Second) of The history of the Eighth Amendment is well known. 29 The
instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the Torts 147 (2) (1965); see id., 153 (2). To the extent that the text was taken, almost verbatim, from a provision of the
mischievous heads of school children." Id., at 917. The court force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in virtually Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in turn derived
refused to examine instances of punishment individually: all States is subject to possible civil and criminal liability. 20 from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The English version,
"We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for [430 U.S. 651, 662] adopted after the accession of William and Mary, was
example, whether a teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling intended to curb the excesses of English judges under the
a particular child for certain behavior or whether in a Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher reign of James II. Historians have viewed the English
particular instance of misconduct five licks would have been as deriving from the parents, 21 the concept of parental provision as a reaction either to the "Bloody Assize," the
a more appropriate punishment than ten licks. . . ." Ibid. delegation has been replaced by the view - more consonant treason trials conducted by Chief Justice Jeffreys in 1685
We granted certiorari, limited to the questions of cruel and with compulsory education laws - that the State itself may after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, 30 or
unusual punishment and procedural due process. 425 U.S. impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably to the perjury prosecution of Titus Oates in the same year.
990 . 12 necessary "for the proper education of the child and for the 31 In [430 U.S. 651, 665] either case, the exclusive
II maintenance of group discipline." 1 F. Harper & F. James, concern of the English version was the conduct of judges in
In addressing the scope of the Eighth Amendment's Law of Torts 3.20, p. 292 (1956). 22 All of the circumstances enforcing the criminal law. The original draft introduced in the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, this Court has are to be taken into account in determining whether the House of Commons provided: 32
found it useful to refer to "[t]raditional common-law punishment is reasonable in a particular case. Among the
concepts," Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) most important considerations are the seriousness of the "The requiring excessive bail of persons committed in
(plurality opinion), and to the "attitude[s] which our society offense, the attitude and past behavior of the child, the criminal cases and imposing excessive fines, and illegal
has traditionally taken." Id., at 531. So, too, in defining the nature and severity of the punishment, the age and strength punishments, to be prevented."
requirements [430 U.S. 651, 660] of procedural due of the child, and the availability of less severe but equally Although the reference to "criminal cases" was eliminated
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the effective means of discipline. Id., at 290-291; Restatement from the final draft, the preservation of a similar reference in
Court has been attuned to what "has always been the law of (Second) of Torts 150, Comments c-e, p. 268 (1965). the preamble 33 indicates that the deletion was without
the land," United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692 substantive significance. Thus, Blackstone treated each of
(1964), and to "traditional ideas of fair procedure." Greene v. Of the 23 States that have addressed the problem through the provision's three prohibitions as bearing only on criminal
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959). We therefore begin by legislation, 21 have authorized the moderate use of corporal proceedings and judgments. 34
examining the way in which our traditions and our laws have punishment in public schools. 23 Of these States only a few The Americans who adopted the language of this part of the
responded to the use of corporal punishment in public [430 U.S. 651, 663] have elaborated on the common-law English Bill of Rights in framing their own State and Federal
schools. test of reasonableness, typically providing for approval or Constitutions 100 years later feared the imposition of torture
notification of the child's parents, 24 or for infliction of and other cruel punishments not only by judges acting
The use of corporal punishment in this country as a means punishment only by the principal 25 or in the presence of an beyond their lawful authority, but also by legislatures
of disciplining schoolchildren dates back to the colonial adult witness. 26 Only two States, Massachusetts and New engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would
period. 13 It has survived the transformation of primary and Jersey, have prohibited all corporal punishment in their be measured. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371
secondary education from the colonials' reliance on optional public schools. 27 Where the legislatures have not acted, the -373 (1910). Indeed, the principal concern of the American
private arrangements to our present system of compulsory state courts have uniformly preserved the common-law rule Framers appears to have been with the legislative definition
education and dependence on public schools. 14 Despite permitting teachers to use reasonable force in disciplining of crimes and punishments. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a children in their charge. 28 446 -447 (1890); [430 U.S. 651, 666] Furman v. Georgia,
means of punishing criminal offenders, 15 the practice 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). But if
continues to play a role in the public education of Against this background of historical and contemporary the American provision was intended to restrain government
schoolchildren in most parts of the country. 16 Professional approval of reasonable corporal punishment, we turn to the more broadly than its English model, the subject to which it
and public opinion is sharply divided on the practice, 17 and constitutional questions before us. [430 U.S. 651, 664] was intended to apply - the criminal process - was the same.
has been for more than [430 U.S. 651, 661] a century. 18
Yet we can discern no trend toward its elimination. III At the time of its ratification, the original Constitution was
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not criticized in the Massachusetts and Virginia Conventions for
At common law a single principle has governed the use of be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and its failure to provide any protection for persons convicted of
corporal punishment since before the American Revolution: unusual punishments inflicted." Bail, fines, and punishment crimes. 35 This criticism provided the impetus for inclusion of
the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. When the Eighth "deportation is not a punishment for crime." Id., at 730; see restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at
Amendment was debated in the First Congress, it was met Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return
by the objection that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments U.S. 585 (1913). And in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the
Clause might have the effect of outlawing what were then (1959), the Court sustained a judgment of civil contempt, support of family and friends and is rarely apart from
the common criminal punishments of hanging, whipping, and resulting in incarceration pending compliance with a teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any
earcropping. 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789). The objection subpoena, against a claim that the judgment imposed cruel instances of mistreatment.
was not heeded, "precisely because the legislature would and unusual punishment. It was emphasized that the case
otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe involved "`essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit The openness of the public school and its supervision by the
punishments for crimes." Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 263. of other parties . . . exercised for centuries to secure community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of
compliance with judicial decrees.'" Id., at 81, quoting Green abuses from which the Eighth Amendment protects the
B v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (dissenting prisoner. In virtually every community where corporal
In light of this history, it is not surprising to find that every opinion). 36 punishment is permitted in the schools, these safeguards are
decision of this Court considering whether a punishment is reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law. Public
"cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth and C school teachers and administrators are privileged at
Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a criminal Petitioners acknowledge that the original design of the Cruel common law to inflict only such corporal punishment as is
punishment. [430 U.S. 651, 667] See Estelle v. Gamble, and Unusual Punishments Clause was to limit criminal reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline
429 U.S. 97 (1976) (incarceration without medical care); punishments, but urge nonetheless that the prohibition of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege may
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (execution for should be extended to ban the paddling of schoolchildren. result in both civil and criminal liability. See Part II, supra. As
murder); Furman v. Georgia, supra (execution for murder); Observing that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could long as the schools are open to public scrutiny, there is no
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion) ($20 not have envisioned our present system of public and reason to believe that the common-law constraints will not
fine for public drunkenness); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. compulsory education, with its opportunities for noncriminal effectively remedy and deter excesses such as those alleged
660 (1962) (incarceration as a criminal for addiction to punishments, petitioners contend that extension of the in this case. 39 [430 U.S. 651, 671]
narcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality prohibition against cruel punishments is necessary lest we
opinion) (expatriation for desertion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis afford greater protection [430 U.S. 651, 669] to criminals We conclude that when public school teachers or
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (execution by than to schoolchildren. It would be anomalous, they say, if administrators impose disciplinary corporal punishment, the
electrocution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United schoolchildren could be beaten without constitutional Eighth Amendment is inapplicable. The pertinent
States, supra (15 years' imprisonment and other penalties redress, while hardened criminals suffering the same constitutional question is whether the imposition is
for falsifying an official document); Howard v. Fleming, 191 beatings at the hands of their jailers might have a valid claim consonant with the requirements of due process. 40 [430
U.S. 126 (1903) (10 years' imprisonment for conspiracy to under the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 U.S. 651, 672]
defraud); In re Kemmler, supra (execution by electrocution); F.2d 571 (CA8 1968); cf. Estelle v. Gamble, supra. Whatever
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (execution by firing force this logic may have in other settings, 37 we find it an IV
squad); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867) (fine inadequate basis for wrenching the Eighth Amendment from The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state deprivation
and imprisonment at hard labor for bootlegging). its historical context and extending it to traditional of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
disciplinary practices in the public schools. Application of this prohibition requires the familiar two-stage
These decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual analysis: We must first ask whether the asserted individual
Punishments Clause circumscribes the criminal process in The prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different interest are encompassed within the Fourteenth
three ways: First, it limits the kinds of punishment that can circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal Amendment's protection of "life, liberty or property"; if
be imposed on those convicted of crimes, e. g., Estelle v. conviction and incarceration. The prisoner's conviction protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what
Gamble supra; Trop v. Dulles, supra; second, it proscribes entitles the State to classify him as a "criminal," and his procedures constitute "due process of law." Morrissey v.
punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the incarceration deprives him of the freedom "to be with family Brewer, 408 U.S., at 481 ; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
crime, e. g., Weems v. United States, supra; and third, it and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of U.S. 564, 569 -572 (1972). See Friendly, Some Kind of
imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal normal life." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975). Following that
and punished as such, e. g., Robinson v. California, supra. see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 -225 (1976). analysis here, we find that corporal punishment in public
We have recognized the last limitation as one to be applied Prison brutality, as the Court of Appeals observed in this schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty
sparingly. "The primary purpose of [the Cruel and Unusual case, is "part of the total punishment to which the individual interest, but we hold that the traditional common-law
Punishments Clause] has always been considered, and is being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper remedies are fully adequate to afford due process.
properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny." 525 F.2d, at 915. 38
punishment imposed for the violation of criminal Even so, the protection afforded [430 U.S. 651, 670] by the A
statutes . . . ." Powell v. Texas, supra, at 531-532 (plurality Eighth Amendment is limited. After incarceration, only the "[T]he range of interests protected by procedural due
opinion). "`unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'" Estelle v. process is not infinite." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at
Gamble, 429 U.S., at 103 , quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 570. We have repeatedly rejected "the notion that any
In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to U.S., at 173 , constitutes cruel and unusual punishment grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient
confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no Clause." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S., at 224 . Due process
difficulty [430 U.S. 651, 668] finding the Eighth Amendment The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the is required only when a decision of the State implicates an
inapplicable. Thus, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may not always be interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. 698 (1893), the Court held the Eighth Amendment voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. And "to determine whether due process requirements apply
inapplicable to the deportation of aliens on the ground that Except perhaps when very young, the child is not physically
in the first place, we must look not to the `weight' but to the interest that will be affected . . .; second, the risk of an But they must exercise prudence and restraint. For Florida
nature of the interest at stake." Roth, supra, at 570-571. erroneous deprivation of such interest . . . and the probable has preserved the traditional judicial proceedings for
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, later value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural determining whether the punishment was justified. If the
incorporated into the Fourteenth, was intended to give safeguards; and finally, the [state] interest, including the punishment inflicted is later found to have been excessive -
Americans [430 U.S. 651, 673] at least the protection function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens not reasonably believed at the time to be necessary for the
against governmental power that they had enjoyed as that the additional or substitute procedural requirement child's discipline or training - the school authorities inflicting it
Englishmen against the power of the Crown. The liberty would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 may be held liable in damages to the child and, if malice is
preserved from deprivation without due process included the (1976). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 -168 (1974) shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties. 45
right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at (POWELL, J., concurring).
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 1 Although students have testified in this case to specific
by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Because it is rooted in history, the child's liberty interest in instances of abuse, there is every reason to believe that
see Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 -124 (1889). avoiding corporal punishment while in the care of public such mistreatment is an aberration. The uncontradicted
Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to be school authorities is subject to historical limitations. Under evidence suggests that corporal punishment in the Dade
free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified the common law, an invasion of personal security gave rise County schools was, "[w]ith the exception of a few cases, . . .
intrusions on personal security. 41 to a right to recover damages in a subsequent judicial unremarkable in physical severity." App. 147. Moreover,
While the contours of this historic liberty interest in the proceeding. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *120-121. But because paddlings are usually inflicted in response to
context of our federal system of government have not been the right of recovery was qualified by the concept of conduct directly [430 U.S. 651, 678] observed by teachers
defined precisely, 42 they always have been thought to justification. Thus, there could be no recovery against a in their presence, the risk that a child will be paddled without
encompass [430 U.S. 651, 674] freedom from bodily teacher who gave only "moderate correction" to a child. Id., cause is typically insignificant. In the ordinary case, a
restraint and punishment. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at *120. To the [430 U.S. 651, 676] extent that the force disciplinary paddling neither threatens seriously to violate
165 (1952). It is fundamental that the state cannot hold and used was reasonable in light of its purpose, it was not any substantive rights nor condemns the child "to suffer
physically punish an individual except in accordance with wrongful, but rather "justifiable or lawful." Ibid. grievous loss of any kind." Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,
due process of law. 341 U.S., at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The concept that reasonable corporal punishment in school
This constitutionally protected liberty interest is at stake in is justifiable continues to be recognized in the laws of most In those cases where severe punishment is contemplated,
this case. There is, of course, a de minimis level of States. See Part II, supra. It represents "the balance struck the available civil and criminal sanctions for abuse -
imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned. But by this country," Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) considered in light of the openness of the school
at least where school authorities, acting under color of state (Harlan, J., dissenting), between the child's interest in environment - afford significant protection against unjustified
law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by personal security and the traditional view that some limited corporal punishment. See supra, at 670. Teachers and
restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, corporal punishment may be necessary in the course of a school authorities are unlikely to inflict corporal punishment
we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are child's education. Under that longstanding accommodation of unnecessarily or excessively when a possible consequence
implicated. 43 interests, there can be no deprivation of substantive rights as of doing so is the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the limits of against them. 46
B the common-law privilege.
"[T]he question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. It still may be argued, of course, that the child's liberty
Brewer, supra, at 481. Were it not for the common-law This is not to say that the child's interest in procedural interest would be better protected if the common-law
privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal safeguards is insubstantial. The school disciplinary process remedies were supplemented by the administrative
punishment on children in their care, and the availability of is not "a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken safeguards of prior notice and a hearing. We have found
the traditional remedies for abuse, the case for requiring and never unfair. . . ." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 -580 frequently that some kind of prior hearing is necessary to
advance procedural safeguards would be strong indeed. 44 (1975). In any deliberate infliction of corporal punishment on guard against arbitrary impositions on interests protected by
But here we deal with a punishment - paddling - within that a child who is restrained for that purpose, there is some risk the Fourteenth Amendment. [430 U.S. 651, 679] See, e. g.,
tradition, [430 U.S. 651, 675] and the question is whether that the intrusion on the child's liberty will be unjustified and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 569 -570; Wolff v.
the common-law remedies are adequate to afford due therefore unlawful. In these circumstances the child has a McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 -558 (1974); cf. Friendly, 123
process. strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1275-1277. But where the State has
"`[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical risk of wrongful punishment and provide for the resolution of preserved what "has always been the law of the land,"
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and disputed questions of justification. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), the case for
circumstances. . . . Representing a profound attitude of administrative safeguards is significantly less compelling. 47
fairness . . . `due process' is compounded of history, reason, We turn now to a consideration of the safeguards that are
the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the available under applicable Florida law. There is a relevant analogy in the criminal law. Although the
strength of the democratic faith which we profess. . . ." Anti- Fourth Amendment specifically proscribes "seizure" of a
Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 -163 (1951) 2 person without probable cause, the risk that police will act
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Florida has continued to recognize, and indeed has unreasonably in arresting a suspect is not thought to require
Whether in this case the common-law remedies for strengthened by statute, the common-law right of a child not an advance determination of the facts. In United States v.
excessive corporal punishment constitute due process of law to be subjected to excessive corporal punishment in school. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), we reaffirmed the traditional
must turn on an analysis of the competing interests at stake, Under Florida law the teacher and principal of the school common-law rule that police officers may make warrantless
viewed against the background of "history, reason, [and] the decide in the first instance whether corporal punishment is public arrests on probable cause. Although we observed that
past course of decisions." The analysis requires reasonably necessary under the circumstances in order to an advance determination of probable cause by a magistrate
consideration of three distinct factors: "First, the private discipline [430 U.S. 651, 677] a child who has misbehaved. would be desirable, we declined "to transform this judicial
preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the relief. At the close of petitioners' case, however, the parties
the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental agreed that the evidence offered on count three (together
warrantless public arrests on probable cause . . . ." Id., at constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in with certain stipulated testimony) would be considered, for
423; see id., at 429 (POWELL, J., concurring). Despite the the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. purposes of a motion for directed verdict, as if it had also
distinct possibility that a police officer may improperly assess 503, 507 (1969). 54 been offered on counts one and two. It was understood that
the facts and thus unconstitutionally deprive an individual of respondents could reassert a right to jury trial if the motion
[430 U.S. 651, 680] liberty, we declined to depart from the "At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the were denied. App. 142.
traditional rule by which the officer's perception is subjected individual affected . . . and to society in terms of increased
to judicial scrutiny only after the fact. 48 There is no more assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the [ Footnote 5 ] The evidence does not show how many of the
reason to depart from tradition and require advance cost." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 348 . We think that schools actually employed corporal punishment as a means
procedural safeguards for intrusions on personal security to point has been reached in this case. In view of the low of maintaining discipline. The authorization of the practice by
which the Fourth Amendment does not apply. incidence of abuse, the openness of our schools, and the the School Board extended to 231 of the schools in the
common-law safeguards that already exist, the risk of error 1970-1971 school year, but at least 10 of those schools did
3 that may result in violation of a schoolchild's substantive not administer corporal punishment as a matter of school
But even if the need for advance procedural safeguards rights can only be regarded as minimal. Imposing additional policy. Id., at 137-139.
were clear, the question would remain whether the administrative safeguards as a constitutional requirement
incremental benefit could justify the cost. Acceptance of might reduce that risk marginally, but would also entail a [ Footnote 6 ] In the 1970-1971 school year, 232.27
petitioners' claims would work a transformation in the law significant intrusion into an area of primary educational provided: "Each teacher or other member of the staff of any
governing corporal punishment in Florida and most other responsibility. We conclude that the Due Process Clause school shall assume such authority for the control of pupils
States. Given the impracticability of formulating a rule of does not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition as may be assigned to him by the principal and shall keep
procedural due process that varies with the severity of the of corporal punishment in the public schools, as that practice good order in the classroom and in other places in which he
particular imposition, 49 the prior hearing petitioners seek is authorized and limited by the common law. 55 [430 U.S. is assigned to be in charge of pupils, but he shall not inflict
would have to precede any paddling, however moderate or 651, 683] corporal punishment before consulting the principal or
trivial. V teacher in charge of the school, and in no case shall such
Petitioners cannot prevail on either of the theories before us punishment be degrading or unduly severe in its nature. . . ."
Such a universal constitutional requirement would in this case. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against Effective July 1, 1976, the Florida Legislature amended the
significantly burden the use of corporal punishment as a cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable to school law governing corporal punishment. Section 232.27 now
disciplinary measure. Hearings - even informal hearings - paddlings, and the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of reads: "Subject to law and to the rules of the district school
require time, personnel, and a diversion of attention from procedural due process is satisfied by Florida's preservation board, each teacher or other member of the staff of any
normal school pursuits. School authorities may well choose of common-law constraints and remedies. We therefore school shall have such authority for the control and discipline
to abandon corporal punishment rather than incur the agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' evidence of students as may be assigned to him by the principal or his
burdens of complying with the procedural requirements. affords no basis for injunctive relief, and that petitioners designated representative and shall keep good order in the
Teachers, properly concerned with maintaining authority in cannot recover damages on the basis of any Eighth classroom and in other places in which he is assigned to be
the classroom, may well prefer to rely on other disciplinary Amendment or procedural due process violation. in charge of students. If a teacher feels that corporal
measures - which they may view as less effective - rather punishment is necessary, at least the following procedures
than confront the [430 U.S. 651, 681] possible disruption Affirmed. shall be followed: "(1) The use of corporal punishment shall
that prior notice and a hearing may entail. 50 Paradoxically, Footnotes be approved in principle by the principal before it is used, but
such an alteration of disciplinary policy is most likely to occur [ Footnote 1 ] As Ingraham and Andrews were minors, the approval is not necessary for each specific instance in which
in the ordinary case where the contemplated punishment is complaint was filed in the names of Eloise Ingraham, James' it is used. "(2) A teacher or principal may administer corporal
well within the common-law privilege. 51 mother, and Willie Everett, Roosevelt's father. punishment only in the presence of another adult who is
[ Footnote 2 ] The District Court certified the class, under informed beforehand, and in the student's presence, of the
Elimination or curtailment of corporal punishment would be Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2) and (c) (1), as follows: "`All reason for the punishment. "(3) A teacher or principal who
welcomed by many as a societal advance. But when such a students of the Dade County School system who are subject has administered punishment shall, [430 U.S. 651, 656]
policy choice may result from this Court's determination of an to the corporal punishment policies issued by the Defendant, upon request, provide the pupil's parent or guardian with a
asserted right to due process, rather than from the normal Dade County School Board . . . .'" App. 17. One student was written explanation of the reason for the punishment and the
processes of community debate and legislative action, the specifically excepted from the class by request. name of the other [adult] who was present." Fla. Stat. Ann.
societal costs cannot be dismissed as insubstantial. 52 We 232.27 (1977) (codifier's notation omitted). Corporal
are reviewing here a legislative judgment, rooted in history [ Footnote 3 ] The complaint also named the Dade County punishment is now defined as "the moderate use of physical
and reaffirmed in the laws of many States, that corporal School Board as a defendant, but the Court of Appeals held force or physical contact by a teacher or principal as may be
punishment serves important educational interests. This that the Board was not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce school rules."
judgment must be viewed in light of the disciplinary problems 1981-1988 and dismissed the suit against the Board for want 228.041 (28). The local school boards are expressly
common-place in the schools. As noted in Goss v. Lopez, of jurisdiction. 525 F.2d 909, 912 (CA5 1976). This aspect of authorized to adopt rules governing student conduct and
419 U.S., at 580 : "Events calling for discipline are frequent the Court of Appeals' judgment is not before us. discipline and are directed to make available codes of
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective student conduct. 230.23 (6). Teachers and principals are
action." 53 Assessment [430 U.S. 651, 682] of the need for, [ Footnote 4 ] Petitioners had waived their right to jury trial on given immunity from civil and criminal liability for enforcing
and the appropriate means of maintaining, school discipline the claims for damages in counts one and two, but disciplinary rules, "[e]xcept in the case of excessive force or
is committed generally to the discretion of school authorities respondents had not. The District Court proceeded initially to cruel and unusual punishment . . . ." 232.275.
subject to state law. "[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized hear evidence only on count three, the claim for injunctive
[ Footnote 7 ] In the 1970-1971 school year, Policy 5144 know them did not gain momentum in the country as a whole [ Footnote 23 ] Cal. Educ. Code 49000-49001 (West Supp.
authorized corporal punishment where the failure of other until the mid-1800's, and it was not until 1918 that 1977); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, 701 (Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat.
means of seeking cooperation from the student made its use compulsory school attendance laws were in force in all the Ann. 232.27 (1977); Ga. Code Ann. 32-835, 32-836 (1976);
necessary. The regulation specified that the principal should States. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 Haw. Rev. Stat. 298-16 (1975 Supp.), 703-309 (2) (Spec.
determine the necessity for corporal punishment, that the n. 4 (1954), citing Cubberley, Public Education in the United Pamphlet 1975); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 122, 24-24, 34-84a (1977
student should understand the seriousness of the offense States 408-423, 563-565 (1934 ed.); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, Supp.); Ind. Code Ann. 20-8.1-5-2 (1975); Md. Ann. Code,
and the reason for the punishment, and that the punishment 406 U.S. 205, 226 , and n. 15 (1972). Art. 77, 98B (1975) (in specified counties); Mich. Comp.
should be administered in the presence of another adult in Laws Ann., 340.756 [430 U.S. 651, 663] (1970); Mont. Rev.
circumstances not calculated to hold the student up to [ Footnote 15 ] See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 Codes Ann. 75-6109 (1971); Nev. Rev. Stat. 392.465 (1973);
shame or ridicule. The regulation cautioned against using (CA8 1968); Falk, supra, at 85-88. N.C. Gen. Stat. 115-146 (1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
corporal punishment against a student under psychological 3319.41 (1972); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 70, 6-114 (1972); Pa.
or medical treatment, and warned that the person [ Footnote 16 ] See K. Larson & M. Karpas, Effective Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, 13-1317 (Supp. 1976); S. C. Code 59-63-
administering the punishment "must realize his own personal Secondary School Discipline 146 (1963); A. Reitman, J. 260 (1977); S. D. Compiled Laws Ann. 13-32-2 (1975); Vt.
liabilities" in any case of physical injury. App. 15. While this Follman, & E. Ladd, Corporal Punishment in the Public Stat. Ann., Tit. 16, 1161 (Supp. 1976); Va. Code Ann. 22-
litigation was pending in the District Court, the Dade County Schools 2-5 (ACLU Report 1972). 231.1 (1973); W. Va. Code, 18A-5-1 (1977); Wyo. Stat. 21.1-
School Board amended Policy 5144 to standardize the size 64 (Supp. 1975).
of the paddles used in accordance with the description in the [ Footnote 17 ] For samplings of scholarly opinion on the use
text, to proscribe striking a child with a paddle elsewhere of corporal punishment in the schools, see F. Reardon & R. [ Footnote 24 ] Cal. Educ. Code 49001 (West Supp. 1977)
than on the buttocks, to limit the permissible number of Reynolds, Corporal Punishment in [430 U.S. 651, 661] (requiring prior parental approval in writing); Fla. Stat. Ann.
"licks" (five for elementary and intermediate grades and Pennsylvania 1-2, 34 (1975); National Education 232.27 (3) (1977) (requiring a written explanation on
seven for junior and senior grades), and to require a Association, Report of the Task Force on Corporal request); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 75-6109 (1971) (requiring
contemporaneous explanation of the need for the Punishment (1972); K. James, Corporal Punishment in the prior parental notification).
punishment to the student and a subsequent notification to Public Schools 8-16 (1963). Opinion surveys taken since
the parents. App. 126-128. 1970 have consistently shown a majority of teachers and of [ Footnote 25 ] Md. Ann. Code, Art. 77, 98B (1975).
the general public favoring moderate use of corporal
[ Footnote 8 ] 498 F.2d 248, 255, and n. 7 (1974) (original punishment in the lower grades. See Reardon & Reynolds, [ Footnote 26 ] Fla. Stat. Ann. 232.27 (1977); Haw. Rev.
panel opinion), vacated on rehearing, 525 F.2d 909 (1976); supra, at 2, 23-26; Delaware Department of Public Stats. 298-16 (1975 Supp.); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 75-6109
App. 48, 138, 146; Exhibits 14, 15. Instruction, Report on the Corporal Punishment Survey 48 (1971).
(1974); Reitman, Follman, & Ladd, supra, at 34-35; National
[ Footnote 9 ] Stedman's Medical Dictionary (23d ed. 1976) Education Association, supra, at 7. [ Footnote 27 ] Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 71, 37G (Supp.
defines "hematoma" as "[a] localized mass of extravasated 1976); N. J. Stat. Ann. 18A: 6-1 (1968).
blood that is relatively or completely confined within an organ [ Footnote 18 ] See Falk, supra, 66-69; cf. Cooper v.
or tissue . . .; the blood is usually clotted (or partly clotted), McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853). [ Footnote 28 ] E. g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So.2d
and, depending on how long it has been there, may manifest 49 (1954); La Frentz v. Gallagher, 105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d
various degrees of organization and decolorization." [ Footnote 19 ] See 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts 804 (1969); Berry v. Arnold School Dist., 199 Ark. 1118, 137
3.20, pp. 288-292 (1956); Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, S. W. 2d 256 (1940); Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280,
[ Footnote 10 ] App. 3-4, 18-20, 68-85, 129-136. 12 Vand. L. Rev. 723, 734-738 (1959); W. Prosser, Law of 141 A. 2d 639 (1958); Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110
Torts 136-137 (4th ed. 1971). N. W. 2d 258 (1961); Carr v. Wright, 423 S. W. 2d 521 (Ky.
[ Footnote 11 ] Id., at 4-5, 104-113. The similar experiences 1968); Christman v. Hickman, 225 Mo. App. 828, 37 S. W. 2d
of several other students at Drew, to which they individually [ Footnote 20 ] See cases cited n. 28, infra. The criminal 672 (1931); Simms v. School Dist. No. 1, 13 Ore. App. 119,
testified in the District Court, are summarized in the original codes of many States include provisions explicitly 508 P.2d 236 (1973); Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S. W.
panel opinion in the Court of Appeals, 498 F.2d, at 257-259. recognizing the teacher's common-law privilege [430 U.S. 2d 634 (1944); Prendergast v. Masterson, 196 S. W. 246
651, 662] to inflict reasonable corporal punishment. E. g., (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See generally sources cited n. 19,
[ Footnote 12 ] We denied review of a third question Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-246 (A) (1) (1956); Conn. Gen. Stat. supra.
presented in the petition for certiorari: "Is the infliction of 53a-18 (1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-840 (2) (1975); N. Y.
severe corporal punishment upon public school students Penal Law 35.10 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1976); Ore. [ Footnote 29 ] See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168
arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to achieving any Rev. Stat. 161.205 (1) (1975). -173 (1976) (joint opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and
legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the STEVENS, JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion); Furman v.
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?" Pet. [ Footnote 21 ] See Proehl, supra, at 726, and n. 13. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316 -328 (1972) (MARSHALL, J.,
for Cert. 2. concurring); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
[ Footnote 22 ] Today, corporal punishment in school is Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969).
[ Footnote 13 ] See H. Falk, Corporal Punishment 11-48 conditioned on parental approval only in California. Cal.
(1941); N. Edwards & H. Richey, The School in the American Educ. Code 49001 (West Supp. 1977). Cf. Morrow v. Wood, [ Footnote 30 ] See I. Brant, The Bill of Rights 155 (1965).
Social Order 115-116 (1947). 35 Wis. 59 (1874). This Court has held in a summary
affirmance that parental approval of corporal punishment is [ Footnote 31 ] See Granucci, supra, at 852-860.
[ Footnote 14 ] Public and compulsory education existed in not constitutionally required. Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907
New England before the Revolution, see id., at 50-68, 78-81, (1975), aff'g 395 F. Supp. 294 (MDNC). [ Footnote 32 ] Id., at 855.
97-113, but the demand for free public schools as we now
[ Footnote 33 ] The preamble reads in part: "WHEREAS the U.S. 459 . . . (1947), or to cover conditions of confinement due process of law. Where the State seeks to impose
late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil which may make intolerable an otherwise constitutional term punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent
counsellors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did of imprisonment." Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the
endeavor to subvert and extirpate . . . the laws and liberties (CA2), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) (citation omitted). Fourteenth Amendment.
of this kingdom. . . . "10. And excessive bail hath been
required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the [ Footnote 39 ] Putting history aside as irrelevant, the [ Footnote 41 ] See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134.
benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects. "11. dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE argues that a Under the 39th Article of the Magna Carta, an individual
And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and "purposive analysis" should control the reach of the Eighth could not be deprived of this right of personal security
cruel punishments inflicted. . . ." R. Perry & J. Cooper, Amendment. Post, at 686-688. There is no support whatever "except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of
Sources of Our Liberties 245-246 (1959). for this approach in the decisions of this Court. Although an the land." Perry & Cooper, supra, n. 33, at 17. By
imposition must be "punishment" for the Cruel and Unusual subsequent enactments of Parliament during the time of
[ Footnote 34 ] 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *297 (bail), Punishments Clause to apply, the Court has never held that Edward III, the right was protected from deprivation except
*379 (fines and other punishments). all punishments are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. "by due process of law." See Shattuck, The True Meaning of
See n. 40, infra. The [430 U.S. 651, 671] applicability of the the Term "Liberty," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 372-373 (1891).
[ Footnote 35 ] Abraham Holmes of Massachusetts Eighth Amendment always has turned on its original
complained specifically of the absence of a provision meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation. See [ Footnote 42 ] See, e. g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
restraining Congress in its power to determine "what kind of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 169 -173 (joint opinion); 535, 541 (1942) (sterilization); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 315 -328 (MARSHALL, J., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Union Pacific R. Co. v.
crimes." 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 111 concurring). The dissenting opinion warns that as a Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 -252 (1891) (physical
(1876). Patrick Henry was of the same mind: "What says our consequence of our decision today, teachers may "cut off a examinations); cf. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894).
[Virginia] bill of rights? - `that excessive bail ought not to be child's ear for being late to class." Post, at 684. This rhetoric The right of personal security is also protected by the Fourth
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual bears no relation to reality or to the issues presented in this Amendment, which was made applicable to the States
punishments inflicted.' Are you not, therefore, now calling on case. The laws of virtually every State forbid the excessive through the Fourteenth because its protection was viewed as
those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to physical punishment of schoolchildren. Yet the logic of the "implicit in `the concept of ordered liberty' . . . enshrined in
prescribe trials and define punishments without this control? dissent would make the judgment of which disciplinary the history and the basic constitutional documents of
Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? punishments are reasonable and which are excessive a English-speaking peoples." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
You let them loose; you do more - you depart from the matter of constitutional principle in every case, to be decided 27 -28 (1949). It has been said of the Fourth Amendment
genius of your country. . . ." 3 id., at 447. ultimately by this Court. The hazards of such a broad that its "overriding function . . . is to protect personal privacy
reading of the Eighth Amendment are clear. "It is always time and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."
[ Footnote 36 ] In urging us to extend the Eighth Amendment to say that this Nation is too large, too complex and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). But the
to ban school paddlings, petitioners rely on the many composed of too great a diversity of peoples for any one of principal concern of that Amendment's prohibition against
decisions in which this Court has held that the prohibition us to have the wisdom to establish the rules by which local unreasonable searches and seizures is with intrusions on
against "cruel and unusual" punishments is not "`fastened to Americans must govern their local affairs. The constitutional privacy in the course of criminal investigations. See Whalen
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion rule we are urged to adopt is not merely revolutionary - it v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n. 32 (1977). Petitioners do not
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.'" Gregg v. departs from the ancient faith based on the premise that contend that the Fourth Amendment applies, according to its
Georgia, 428 U.S., at 171 (joint opinion); see, e. g., Trop v. experience in making local laws by local people themselves terms, to corporal punishment in public school.
Dulles, 356 U.S., 86, 100-101 (1958) (plurality opinion); is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to follow."
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 , 378 (1910). Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547 -548 (1968) (opinion of [ Footnote 43 ] Unlike Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975),
This reliance is misplaced. Our Eighth Amendment decisions Black, J.). this case does not involve the state-created property interest
have referred to "evolving standards of decency," Trop v. in public education. The purpose of corporal punishment is
Dulles, supra, at 101, only in determining whether criminal [ Footnote 40 ] Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate to correct a child's behavior without interrupting his
punishments are "cruel and unusual" under the Amendment. only after the State has complied with the constitutional education. That corporal punishment may, in a rare case,
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal have the unintended effect of temporarily removing a child
[ Footnote 37 ] Some punishments, though not labeled prosecutions. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 from school affords no basis for concluding that the practice
"criminal" by the State, may be sufficiently analogous to -318 (1946). Thus, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), the itself deprives students of property protected by the
criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are plurality appropriately took the view that denationalization Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does this case involve any
administered to justify application of the Eighth Amendment. was an impermissible punishment for wartime desertion state-created interest in liberty going beyond the Fourteenth
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). We have no occasion in under the Eighth Amendment, because desertion already Amendment's protection of freedom from bodily restraint and
this case, for example, to consider whether or under what had been established at a criminal trial. But in Kennedy v. corporal punishment. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), where the Court 225 -227 (1976).
juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth considered denationalization as a punishment for evading
Amendment. the draft, the Court refused to reach the Eighth Amendment [ Footnote 44 ] If the common-law privilege to inflict
issue, holding instead that the punishment could be imposed reasonable corporal punishment in school were inapplicable,
[ Footnote 38 ] Judge Friendly similarly has observed that only through the criminal process. Id., at 162-167, 186, and it is doubtful whether any procedure short of a trial in a
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "can fairly be n. 43. As these cases demonstrate, the State does not criminal or juvenile court could satisfy the requirements of
deemed to be applicable to the manner in which an acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth procedural due process for the imposition of such
otherwise constitutional sentence . . . is carried out by an Amendment is concerned until after [430 U.S. 651, 672] it punishment. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S., at 317
executioner, see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with -318; cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 -529 (1975).
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (CA7 1975), conduct committed in his presence and observed by him."
[ Footnote 45 ] See supra, at 655-657, 661. The statutory modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. pending, No. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497 (1974), citing Ex parte
prohibition against "degrading" or unnecessarily "severe" 76-6204. We have no occasion in this case, see supra, at Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). The punishment so imposed may
corporal punishment in former 232.27 has been construed 659, and n. 12, to decide whether or under what be as severe as six months in prison. See Codispoti v.
as a statement of the common-law principle. See 1937 Op. circumstances corporal punishment of a public school child Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513 -515 (1974); cf. Muniz v.
Fla. Atty. Gen., Biennial Report of the Atty. Gen. 169 (1937- may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475 -476 (1975).
1938); cf. 1957 Op. Fla. Atty. Gen., Biennial Report of the vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.
Atty. Gen. 7, 8 (1957-1958). Florida Stat. Ann. 827.03 (3) [ Footnote 55 ] MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion
(1976) makes malicious punishment of a child a felony. Both [ Footnote 48 ] See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). offers no manageable standards for determining what
the District Court, App. 144, and the Court of Appeals, 525 The reasonableness of a warrantless public arrest may be process is due in any particular case. The [430 U.S. 651,
F.2d, at 915, expressed the view that the common-law tort subjected to subsequent judicial scrutiny in a civil action 683] dissent apparently would require, as a general rule,
remedy was available to the petitioners in this case. And against the law enforcement officer or in a suppression only "an informal give-and-take between student and
petitioners conceded in this Court that a teacher who inflicts hearing to determine whether any evidence seized in the disciplinarian." Post, at 693. But the dissent would depart
excessive punishment on a child may be held both civilly and arrest may be used in a criminal trial. from these "minimal procedures" - requiring even witnesses,
criminally liable under Florida law. Brief for Petitioners 33 n. counsel, and cross-examination - in cases where the
11, 34; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 52-53. In view of the statutory [ Footnote 49 ] "[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped punishment reaches some undefined level of severity. Post,
adoption of the common-law rule, and the unanimity of the by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as at 700 n. 18. School authorities are left to guess at the
parties and the courts below, the doubts expressed in MR. applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. . . degree of punishment that will require more than an
JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion as to the availability of ." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976). "informal give-and-take" and at the additional process that
tort remedies in Florida can only be viewed as chimerical. may be constitutionally required. The impracticality of such
The dissent makes much of the fact that no Florida court has [ Footnote 50 ] If a prior hearing, with the inevitable attendant an approach is self-evident, and illustrates the hazards of
ever "recognized" a damages remedy for unreasonable publicity within the school, resulted in rejection of the ignoring the traditional solution of the common law. We
corporal punishment. Post, at 694 n. 11, 700. But the teacher's recommendation, the consequent impairment of agree with the dissent that the Goss procedures will often
absence of reported Florida decisions hardly suggests that the teacher's ability to maintain discipline in the classroom be, "if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal
no remedy is available. Rather, it merely confirms the would not be insubstantial. would impose upon himself." Post, at 700, quoting Goss, 419
commonsense judgment that excessive corporal punishment U.S., at 583 . But before this Court invokes the Constitution
is exceedingly rare in the public schools. [ Footnote 51 ] The effect of interposing prior procedural to impose a procedural requirement, it should be reasonably
safeguards may well be to make the punishment more certain that the effect will be to afford protection appropriate
[ Footnote 46 ] The low incidence of abuse, and the severe by increasing the anxiety of the child. For this reason, to the constitutional interests at stake. The dissenting
availability of established judicial remedies in the event of the school authorities in Dade County found it desirable that opinion's reading of the Constitution suggests no such
abuse, distinguish this case from Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. the punishment be inflicted as soon as possible after the beneficial result and, indeed, invites a lowering of existing
565 (1975). The Ohio law struck down in Goss provided for infraction. App. 48-49. constitutional standards.
suspensions from public school of up to 10 days without "any
written procedure applicable to suspensions." Id., at 567. [ Footnote 52 ] "It may be true that procedural regularity in MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE
Although Ohio law provided generally for administrative disciplinary proceedings promotes a sense of institutional BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE
review, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2506.01 (Supp. 1973), the rapport and open communication, a perception of fair STEVENS join, dissenting.
Court assumed that the short suspensions would not be treatment, and provides the offender and his fellow students
stayed pending review, with the result that the review a showcase of democracy at work. But . . . [r]espect for Today the Court holds that corporal punishment in public
proceeding could serve neither a deterrent nor a remedial democratic institutions will equally dissipate if they are schools, no matter how severe, can never be the subject of
function. 419 U.S., at 581 n. 10. In these circumstances, the thought too ineffectual to provide their students an the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment. It also
Court held the law authorizing suspensions unconstitutional environment of order in which the educational process may holds [430 U.S. 651, 684] that students in the public school
for failure to require "that there be at least an informal give- go forward. . . ." Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme systems are not constitutionally entitled to a hearing of any
and-take between student and disciplinarian, preferably prior Court as School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 71- sort before beatings can be inflicted on them. Because I
to the suspension . . . ." Id., at 584. The subsequent civil and 72. believe that these holdings are inconsistent with the prior
criminal proceedings available in this case may be viewed as decisions of this Court and are contrary to a reasoned
affording substantially greater protection to the child than the [ Footnote 53 ] The seriousness of the disciplinary problems analysis of the constitutional provisions involved, I
informal conference mandated by Goss. in the Nation's public schools has been documented in a respectfully dissent.
recent congressional report, Senate Committee on the
[ Footnote 47 ] "[P]rior hearings might well be dispensed with Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile [430 U.S. I
in many circumstances in which the state's conduct, if not 651, 682] Delinquency, Challenge for the Third Century: A
adequately justified, would constitute a common-law tort. Education in a Safe Environment - Final Report on the The Eighth Amendment places a flat prohibition against the
This would leave the injured plaintiff in precisely the same Nature and Prevention of School Violence and Vandalism, infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." This reflects a
posture as a common-law plaintiff, and this procedural 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977). societal judgment that there are some punishments that are
consequence would be quite harmonious with the so barbaric and inhumane that we will not permit them to be
substantive view that the fourteenth amendment [ Footnote 54 ] The need to maintain order in a trial imposed on anyone, no matter how opprobrious the offense.
encompasses the same liberties as those protected by the courtroom raises similar problems. In that context, this Court See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962)
common law." Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 has recognized the power of the trial judge "to punish (Douglas, J., concurring). If there are some punishments that
Cornell L. Rev. 405, 431 (1977) (footnote omitted). See summarily and without notice or hearing contemptuous are so barbaric that they may not be imposed for the
commission of crimes, designated by our social system as ordinarily associated [430 U.S. 651, 687] with punishment, public schools than it is in the prison system. 7 However, it
the most thoroughly reprehensible acts an individual can such as retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence. 3 Id., at 96. cannot be reasonably suggested that just because cruel and
commit, then, a fortiori, similar punishments may not be Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). unusual punishments may occur less frequently under public
imposed on persons for less culpable acts, such as scrutiny, they will not occur at all. The mere fact that a public
breaches of school discipline. Thus, if it is constitutionally If this purposive approach were followed in the present case, flogging or a public execution would be available for all to
impermissible to cut off someone's ear for the commission of it would be clear that spanking in the Florida public schools see would not render the punishment constitutional if it were
murder, it must be unconstitutional to cut off a child's ear for is punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. otherwise impermissible. Similarly, the majority would not
being late to class. 1 Although there were no ears cut off in The District Court found that "[c]orporal punishment is one of suggest that a prisoner who is placed in a minimum-security
this case, the [430 U.S. 651, 685] record reveals beatings a variety of measures employed in the school system for the prison and permitted to go home to his family on the
so severe that if they were inflicted on a hardened criminal correction of pupil behavior and the preservation of order." weekends should be any less entitled to Eighth Amendment
for the commission of a serious crime, they might not pass App. 146. Behavior correction and [430 U.S. 651, 688] protections than his counterpart in a maximum-security
constitutional muster. preservation of order are purposes ordinarily associated with prison. In short, if a punishment is so barbaric and inhumane
punishment. that it goes beyond the tolerance of a civilized society, its
Nevertheless, the majority holds that the Eighth Amendment openness to public scrutiny should have nothing to do with
"was designed to protect [only] those convicted of crimes," Without even mentioning the purposive analysis applied in its constitutional validity.
ante, at 664, relying on a vague and inconclusive recitation the prior decisions of this Court, the majority adopts a rule
of the history of the Amendment. Yet the constitutional that turns on the label given to the offense for which the Nor is it an adequate answer that schoolchildren may have
prohibition is against cruel and unusual punishments; punishment is inflicted. Thus, the record in this case reveals other state and constitutional remedies available to them.
nowhere is that prohibition limited or modified by the that one student at Drew Junior High School received 50 Even assuming that the remedies available to public school
language of the Constitution. Certainly, the fact that the licks with a paddle for allegedly making an obscene students are adequate under Florida law, 8 the availability of
Framers did not choose to insert the word "criminal" into the telephone call. Brief for Petitioners 13. The majority holds state remedies has never been determinative of the
language of the Eighth Amendment is strong evidence that that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit such coverage or of the protections afforded by the Eighth
the Amendment was designed to prohibit all inhumane or punishment since it was only inflicted for a breach of school Amendment. The reason is obvious. The fact that a person
barbaric punishments, no matter what the nature of the discipline. However, that same conduct is punishable as a may have a [430 U.S. 651, 691] state-law cause of action
offense for which the punishment is imposed. misdemeanor under Florida law, Fla. Stat. Ann. 365.16 against a public official who tortures him with a thumbscrew
(Supp. 1977), and there can be little doubt that if that same for the commission of an antisocial act has nothing to do with
No one can deny that spanking of schoolchildren is "punishment" had been inflicted by an officer of the state the fact that such official conduct is cruel and unusual
"punishment" under any reasonable reading of the word, for courts for violation of 365.16, it would have had to satisfy the punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Indeed,
the similarities between spanking in public schools and other requirements of the Eighth Amendment. the majority's view was implicitly rejected this Term in Estelle
forms of punishment are too obvious to ignore. Like other v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), when the Court held that
forms of punishment, spanking of schoolchildren involves an C failure to provide for the medical needs of prisoners could
institutionalized response to the violation of some official rule In fact, as the Court recognizes, the Eighth Amendment has constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though a
or regulation proscribing certain conduct and is imposed never been confined to criminal punishments. 4 medical malpractice remedy in tort was available to
[430 U.S. 651, 686] for the purpose of rehabilitating the Nevertheless, the majority adheres to its view that any prisoners under state law. Id., at 107 n. 15.
offender, deterring the offender and others like him from protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment must have
committing the violation in the future, and inflicting some something to do with [430 U.S. 651, 689] criminals, and it D
measure of social retribution for the harm that has been would therefore confine any exceptions to its general rule By holding that the Eighth Amendment protects only
done. that only criminal punishments are covered by the Eighth criminals, the majority adopts the view that one is entitled to
Amendment to abuses inflicted on prisoners. Thus, if a the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment only if he
B prisoner is beaten mercilessly for a breach of discipline, he is is punished for acts that are sufficiently opprobrious for
We are fortunate that in our society punishments that are entitled to the protection of the Eighth Amendment, while a society to make them "criminal." This is a curious holding in
severe enough to raise a doubt as to their constitutional schoolchild who commits the same breach of discipline and view of the fact that the more culpable the offender the more
validity are ordinarily not imposed without first affording the is similarly beaten is simply not covered. likely it is that the punishment will not be disproportionate to
accused the full panoply of procedural safeguards provided the offense, and consequently, the less likely it is that the
by the criminal process. 2 The effect has been that "every The purported explanation of this anomaly is the assertion punishment will be cruel and unusual. 9 Conversely, a public
decision of this Court considering whether a punishment is that schoolchildren have no need for the Eighth Amendment. school student who is spanked for a mere breach of
`cruel and unusual' within the meaning of the Eighth and We are told that schools are open institutions, subject to discipline may sometimes have a strong argument that the
Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a criminal constant public scrutiny; that schoolchildren have adequate punishment does not fit the offense, depending upon the
punishment." Ante, at 666. The Court would have us believe remedies under state law; 5 and that prisoners suffer the severity of the beating, and therefore that it is cruel and
from this fact that there is a recognized distinction between social stigma of being labeled as criminals. How any of these unusual. Yet the majority would afford the student no
criminal and noncriminal punishment for purposes of the policy considerations got into the Constitution is difficult to protection no matter how inhumane and barbaric the
Eighth Amendment. This is plainly wrong. "[E]ven a clear discern, for the Court has never considered any of these punishment inflicted on him might be.
legislative classification of a statute as `non-penal' would not factors in determining the scope of the Eighth Amendment. 6
alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute." Trop [430 U.S. 651, 690] The issue presented in this phase of the case is limited to
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (plurality opinion). The whether corporal punishment in public schools can ever be
relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a The essence of the majority's argument is that prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. I am therefore not [430
punishment is inflicted has been labeled as criminal, but schoolchildren do not need Eighth Amendment protection U.S. 651, 692] suggesting that spanking in the public
whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those because corporal punishment is less subject to abuse in the schools is in every instance prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. My own view is that it is not. I only take issue [430 U.S. 651, 694] in utmost good faith . . . on the reports
with the extreme view of the majority that corporal and advice of others," supra, at 692; the student has no "The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the
punishment in public schools, no matter how barbaric, remedy at all for punishment imposed on the basis of criminal justice system, and its balance between individual
inhumane, or severe, is never limited by the Eighth mistaken facts, at least as long as the punishment was and public interests always has been thought to define the
Amendment. Where corporal punishment becomes so reasonable from the point of view of the disciplinarian, `process that is due' for seizures of person or property in
severe as to be unacceptable in a civilized society, I can see uninformed by any prior hearing. 11 The "traditional [430 criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending
no reason that it should become any more acceptable just U.S. 651, 695] common-law remedies" on which the trial. . . . Moreover, the Fourth Amendment probable cause
because it is inflicted on children in the public schools. majority relies, ante, at 672, thus do nothing to protect the determination is in fact only the first stage of an elaborate
student from the danger that concerned the Court in Goss - system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the
II the risk of reasonable, good-faith mistake in the school rights of those accused of criminal conduct. The relatively
The majority concedes that corporal punishment in the public disciplinary process. simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with school
schools implicates an interest protected by the Due Process principal before suspension) presented in the [procedural
Clause - the liberty interest of the student to be free from Second, and more important, even if the student could sue due process] cases cited in the concurring opinion are
"bodily restraint and punishment" involving "appreciable for good-faith error in the infliction of punishment, the lawsuit inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different context of the
physical pain" inflicted by persons acting under color of state occurs after the punishment has been finally imposed. The criminal justice system." Id., at 125 n. 27. (Emphasis in last
law. Ante, at 674. The question remaining, as the majority infliction of physical pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be sentence added.)
recognizes, is what process is due. undone in a subsequent proceeding. There is every reason While a case dealing with warrantless arrests is perhaps not
to require, as the Court did in Goss, a few minutes of altogether "inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different
The reason that the Constitution requires a State to provide "informal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian" context" of the school disciplinary process, such a case is far
"due process of law" when it punishes an individual for [430 U.S. 651, 696] as a "meaningful hedge" against the weaker authority than procedural due process cases such as
misconduct is to protect the individual from erroneous or erroneous infliction of irreparable injury. 419 U.S., at 583 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that deal with
mistaken punishment that the State would not have inflicted -584. 12 deprivations of liberty outside the criminal context.
had it found the facts in a more reliable way. See, e. g., Second, contrary to the majority's suggestion, ante, at 680 n.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 344 (1976). In The majority's conclusion that a damages remedy for 48, the reason that the Court has upheld warrantless arrests
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court applied this excessive corporal punishment affords adequate process on probable cause is not because the police officer's
principle to the school disciplinary process, holding that a rests on the novel theory that the State may punish an assessment of the facts "may be subjected to subsequent
student must be given an informal opportunity to be heard individual without giving him any opportunity to present his judicial scrutiny in a civil action against the law enforcement
before he is finally suspended from public school. side of the story, as long as he can later recover damages officer or in a suppression hearing . . . ." The reason that the
from a state official if he is innocent. The logic of this theory Court has upheld arrests without warrants is that they are
"Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, would permit a State that punished speeding with a one-day the "first stage of an elaborate system" of procedural
frequently act on the reports and advice of others; and the jail sentence to make a driver serve his sentence first without protections, Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, at 125 n. 27, and that
controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under a trial and then sue to recover damages for wrongful the State is not free to continue the deprivation beyond this
challenge are often disputed. The risk of error is not at all imprisonment. 13 Similarly, the State could finally take away first stage without procedures. The Constitution requires the
trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done a prisoner's good-time credits for alleged disciplinary State to provide [430 U.S. 651, 699] "a fair and reliable
without prohibitive cost or interference [430 U.S. 651, 693] infractions and require him to bring a damages suit after he determination of probable cause" by a judicial officer prior to
with the educational process." Id., at 580. (Emphasis added.) was eventually released. There is no authority for this theory, the imposition of "any significant pretrial restraint of liberty"
To guard against this risk of punishing an innocent child, the nor does the majority purport to find any, 14 in the other than "a brief period of detention to take the
Due Process Clause requires, not an "elaborate hearing" procedural due process [430 U.S. 651, 697] decisions of administrative steps incident to [a warrantless] arrest." Id., at
before a neutral party, but simply "an informal give-and-take this Court. Those cases have "consistently held that some 114, 125. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) This
between student and disciplinarian" which gives the student kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is "practical compromise" is made necessary because
"an opportunity to explain his version of the facts." Id., at finally deprived of his property interests . . . [and that] a "requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification
580, 582, 584. person's liberty is equally protected . . . ." Wolff v. McDonnell, prior to any arrest . . . would constitute an intolerable
The Court now holds that these "rudimentary precautions 418 U.S. 539, 557 -558 (1974). (Emphasis added.) handicap for legitimate law enforcement," id., at 113; but it is
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct," id., at the probable-cause determination prior to any significant
581, are not required if the student is punished with The majority attempts to support its novel theory by drawing period of pretrial incarceration, rather than a damages action
"appreciable physical pain" rather than with a suspension, an analogy to warrantless arrests on probable cause, which or suppression hearing, that affords the suspect due
even though both punishments deprive the student of a the Court has held reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. process.
constitutionally protected interest. Although the respondent United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). This analogy
school authorities provide absolutely no process to the fails for two reasons. First, the particular requirements of the There is, in short, no basis in logic or authority for the
student before the punishment is finally inflicted, the majority Fourth Amendment, rooted in the "ancient common-law majority's suggestion that an action to recover damages for
concludes that the student is nonetheless given due process rule[s]" regulating police practices, id., at 418, must be excessive corporal punishment "afford[s] substantially
because he can later sue the teacher and recover damages understood in the context of the criminal justice system for greater protection to the child than the informal conference
if the punishment was "excessive." which that Amendment was explicitly tailored. Thus in mandated by Goss." 15 The majority purports to follow the
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court, speaking settled principle that what process is due depends on "`the
This tort action is utterly inadequate to protect against through MR. JUSTICE POWELL, rejected the argument that risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the protected]
erroneous infliction of punishment for two reasons. 10 First, procedural protections required in Goss and other due interest . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or
under Florida law, a student punished for an act he did not process [430 U.S. 651, 698] cases should be afforded to a substitute procedural safeguards'"; 16 it recognizes, as did
commit cannot recover damages from a teacher "proceeding criminal suspect arrested without a warrant. Goss, the risk of error in the school disciplinary process 17
and concedes that "the child has a strong interest in is not "cruel and unusual," not because it is not "punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Such deliberate
procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful as the majority suggests. indifference to a prisoner's medical needs clearly is not
punishment . . .," ante, at 676; [430 U.S. 651, 700] but it punishment inflicted for the commission of a crime; it is
somehow concludes that this risk is adequately reduced by a [ Footnote 2 ] By no means is it suggested that just because merely misconduct by a prison official. Similarly, the Eighth
damages remedy that never has been recognized by a spanking of schoolchildren is "punishment" within the Circuit has held that whipping a prisoner with a strap in order
Florida court, that leaves unprotected the innocent student meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the to maintain discipline is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
punished by mistake, and that allows the State to punish first school disciplinary process is in any way "criminal" and Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (1968) (Blackmun, J.). See
and hear the student's version of events later. I cannot therefore subject to the full panoply of criminal procedural also Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-1140 (CA8
agree. guarantees. See Part II, infra. Ordinarily, the conduct for 1973) (injection of vomit-inducing drugs as part of aversion
which schoolchildren are punished is not sufficiently therapy held to be cruel and unusual); Vann v. Scott, 467
The majority emphasizes, as did the dissenters in Goss, that opprobrious to be called "criminal" in our society, and even F.2d 1235, 1240-1241 (CA7 1972) (Stevens, J.) (Eighth
even the "rudimentary precautions" required by that decision violations of school disciplinary rules that might also Amendment protects runaway children against cruel and
would impose some burden on the school disciplinary constitute a crime, see infra, at 688, are not subject to the inhumane treatment, regardless of whether such treatment is
process. But those costs are no greater if the student is criminal process. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 labeled "rehabilitation" or "punishment").
paddled rather than suspended; the risk of error in the (1976), where the Court held that persons who violate prison
punishment is no smaller; and the fear of "a significant disciplinary rules are not entitled to the full panoply of [ Footnote 5 ] By finding that bodily punishment invades a
intrusion" into the disciplinary process, ante, at 682 (cf. criminal procedural safeguards, even if the rule violation constitutionally protected liberty interest within the meaning
Goss, supra, at 585 (POWELL, J., dissenting)), is just as might also constitute a crime. of the Due Process Clause, the majority suggests that the
exaggerated. The disciplinarian need only take a few Clause might also afford a remedy for excessive spanking
minutes to give the student "notice of the charges against [ Footnote 3 ] The majority cites Trop as one of the cases independently of the Eighth Amendment. If this were the
him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence that "dealt with a criminal punishment" but neglects to follow case, the Court's present thesis would have little practical
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the analysis mandated by that decision. In Trop the petitioner significance. If rather than holding that the Due Process
the story." 419 U.S., at 581 . In this context the Constitution was convicted of desertion by a military court-martial and Clause affords a remedy by way of the express commands
requires, "if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal sentenced to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay of the Eighth Amendment, the majority would recognize a
would impose upon himself" in order to avoid injustice. 18 and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. After he was cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a deprivation of
Id., at 583. punished for the offense he committed, petitioner's "liberty" flowing from an excessive paddling, the Court's
application for a passport was turned down. Petitioner was opinion is merely a lengthy word of advice with respect to the
I would reverse the judgment below. told that he had been deprived of the "rights of citizenship" drafting of civil complaints. Petitioners in this case did raise
under 401 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 because he had the substantive due process issue in their petition for
[ Footnote 1 ] There is little reason to fear that if the Eighth been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces. The certiorari, ante, at 659 n. 12, but consideration of that
Amendment is held to apply at all to corporal punishment of plurality took the view that denationalization in this context question was foreclosed by our limited grant of certiorari. If it
schoolchildren, all paddlings, however moderate, would be was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth is probable that schoolchildren would be entitled to
prohibited. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (CA8 1968), Amendment. The majority would have us believe that the protection under some theory of substantive due process,
held that any paddling or flogging of prisoners, convicted of determinative factor in Trop was that the petitioner had been the Court should not now affirm the judgment below, but
crime and serving prison terms, violated the cruel and convicted of desertion; yet there is no suggestion in Trop that should amend the grant of certiorari and set this case for
unusual punishment ban of the Eighth Amendment. But the disposition of the military court-martial had anything to do reargument.
aside from the fact that Bishop has never been embraced by with the decision in that case. Instead, while recognizing that
this Court, the theory of that case was not that bodily the Eighth Amendment extends only to punishments that are [ Footnote 6 ] In support of its policy considerations, the only
punishments are intrinsically barbaric or excessively severe penal in nature, the plurality adopted a purposive approach cases from this Court cited by the majority are Morrissey v.
but that paddling of prisoners is "degrading to the punisher for determining when punishment is penal. "In deciding Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Meachum v. Fano, 427
and to the punished alike." Id., at 580. That approach may whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based U.S. 215 (1976), both cases involving prisoners' rights to
be acceptable in the criminal justice system, but it has little if its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the procedural due process.
any relevance to corporal [430 U.S. 651, 685] punishment statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment -
in the schools, for it can hardly be said that the use of that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc. - it [ Footnote 7 ] There is no evidence in the record that
moderate paddlings in the discipline of children is has been considered penal. But a statute has been corporal punishment has been abused in the prison systems
inconsistent with the country's evolving standards of considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, more often than in the public schools. Indeed, corporal
decency. On the other hand, when punishment involves a but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental punishment is seldom authorized in state prisons. See
cruel, severe beating or chopping off an ear, something more purpose." 356 U.S., at 96 (footnotes omitted). Although the Jackson v. Bishop, supra, at 580, where MR. JUSTICE (then
than merely the dignity of the individual is involved. quoted passage is taken from the plurality opinion of Mr. Judge) BLACKMUN noted: "[O]nly two states still permit the
Whenever a given criminal punishment is "cruel and Chief Justice Warren, joined by three other Justices, MR. use of the strap [in prisons]. Thus almost uniformly has it
unusual" because it is inhumane or barbaric, I can think of JUSTICE BRENNAN, in a concurring opinion, adopted a been abolished." By relying on its own view of the nature of
no reason why it would be any less inhumane or barbaric similar approach in concluding that 401 (g) was beyond the these two public institutions, without any evidence being
when inflicted on a schoolchild, as punishment for classroom power of Congress to enact. heard on the question below, the majority today predicates a
misconduct. The issue in this case is whether spankings constitutional principle on mere armchair speculation.
inflicted on public school children for breaking school rules is [ Footnote 4 ] Ante, at 669. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
"punishment," not whether such punishment is "cruel and (1976), a case decided this Term, the Court held that [ Footnote 8 ] There is some doubt that the state-law
unusual." If the Eighth Amendment does not bar moderate "deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners" by remedies available to public school children are adequate.
spanking in public schools, it is because moderate spanking prison officials constitutes cruel and unusual punishment See n. 11, infra.
in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual [ Footnote 13 ] To the extent that the majority attempts to find
[ Footnote 9 ] For a penalty to be consistent with the Eighth punishment." Fla. Stat. Ann. 232.275 (1976).) At a minimum, "a relevant analogy in the criminal law" - warrantless arrests
Amendment "the punishment must not be grossly out of this immunity would protect school officials from damages on probable cause - to its holding here, ante, at 679-680
proportion to the severity of the crime." Gregg v. Georgia, liability for reasonable mistakes made in good faith. (and see infra, at 697-699), it has chosen the wrong analogy.
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of STEWART, "Although there have been differing emphases and If the majority forthrightly applied its present due process
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). formulations of the common-law immunity of public school analysis to the area of criminal prosecutions, the police
officials in cases of student expulsion or suspension, state officer not only could arrest a suspect without a warrant but
[ Footnote 10 ] Here, as in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 courts have generally recognized that such [430 U.S. 651, also could convict the suspect without a trial and sentence
-581, n. 9 (1975), the record suggests that there may be a 696] officers should be protected from tort liability under him to a short jail term. The accused would get his due
substantial risk of error in the discipline administered by state law for all goodfaith, nonmalicious action taken to fulfill process in a tort suit for false imprisonment.
respondent school authorities. Respondents concede that their official duties." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318
some of the petitioners who were punished "denied (1975) (adopting this rule for 1983 suits involving school [ Footnote 14 ] For the proposition that the need for a prior
misconduct" and that "in some cases the punishments may discipline) (footnote omitted); see id., at 318 n. 9 (citing state hearing is "significantly [430 U.S. 651, 697] less
have been mistaken . . . ." Brief for Respondents 60-61. The cases). Florida has applied this rule to a police officer's compelling" where the State has preserved "common-law
Court of Appeals panel below noted numerous instances of determination of probable cause to arrest; the officer is not remedies," ante, at 679, 678, the majority cites only one
students punished despite claims of innocence, 498 F.2d liable in damages for an arrest not based on probable cause case, Bonner v. Coughlin, supra, dismissing an allegation by
248, 256-258 (CA5 1974), and was "particularly disturbed by if the officer reasonably believed that probable cause a prisoner that prison guards acting under color of state law
the testimony that whole classes of students were corporally existed. Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. had deprived him of property without due process of law by
punished for the misconduct of a few." Id., at 268 n. 36. To 1960); cf. Middleton v. Fort Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 negligently failing to close the door of his cell after a search,
the extent that the majority focuses on the incidence of and (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (police officer would be personally with the foreseeable consequence that his trial transcript
remedies for unduly severe punishments, it fails to address liable for intentional tort of making an arrest pursuant to was stolen. The panel held that the right to recover under
petitioners' claim that procedural safeguards are required to warrant he knew to be void); Wilson v. O'Neal, 118 So.2d state law for the negligence of state employees provided the
reduce the risk of punishments that are simply mistaken. 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (law enforcement officer not prisoner with due process of law. The decision is
liable in damages for obtaining an arrest warrant on the distinguishable from the instant case on two grounds. First,
[ Footnote 11 ] The majority's assurances to the contrary, it is basis of an incorrect identification). There is every reason to recovery was not barred by sovereign or official immunity,
unclear to me whether and to what extent Florida law think that the Florida courts would apply a similar immunity and the state remedy ensured that the prisoner would be
provides a damages action against school officials for standard in a hypothetical damages suit against a school "made whole for any loss of property." 517 F.2d, at 1319, and
excessive corporal punishment. Giving the majority the disciplinarian. A final limitation on the student's damages n. 23. Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
benefit of every doubt, I think it is fair to say that the most a remedy under Florida law is that the student can recover 102, 156 (1974). The point here, of course, is that the
student punished on the basis of mistaken allegations of only from the personal assets of the official; the school student cannot be made whole for the infliction of wrongful
misconduct can hope for in Florida is a recovery for board's treasury is absolutely protected by sovereign punishment. Second, the State cannot hold a pre-deprivation
unreasonable or bad-faith error. But I strongly suspect that immunity from damages for the torts of its agents. Buck v. hearing where it does not intend to inflict the deprivation; the
even this remedy is not available. Although the majority does McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). A best it can do to protect the individual from an unauthorized
not cite a single case decided under Florida law that teacher's limited resources may deter the jury from and inadvertent act is to provide a damages remedy. 517
recognizes a student's right to sue a school official to recover awarding, or prevent the student from collecting, the full F.2d, at 1319 n. 25. Here the deprivation is intentional and a
damages for excessive punishment, I am willing to assume amount of damages to which he is entitled. Cf. Bonner v. prior hearing altogether feasible.
that such a tort action does exist in Florida. I nevertheless Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 n. 23 (CA7 1975), modified
have serious doubts about whether it would ever provide a en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. pending, No. 76-6204 [ Footnote 15 ] Ante, at 678 n. 46.
recovery to a student simply because he was punished for (state-law remedy affords due process where no sovereign
an offense he did not commit. All the cases in other or official immunity bars tort suit for negligence by prison [ Footnote 16 ] Ante, at 675, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
jurisdictions cited by the majority, ante, at 663 n. 28, involved guard). 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
allegations of punishment disproportionate to the misconduct
with which the student was charged; none of the decisions [ Footnote 12 ] Cf. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 [ Footnote 17 ] Ante, at 676, quoting Goss, 419 U.S., at 579
even suggest that a student could recover by showing that U.S. 338, 351 -359 (1977). The Court there held that, in -580. Elsewhere in its opinion the majority asserts that the
the teacher incorrectly imposed punishment for something levying on a taxpayer's assets pursuant to a jeopardy risk of error is "typically insignificant" because "paddlings are
the student had not done. The majority appears to agree that assessment, revenue agents must obtain a warrant before usually inflicted in response to conduct directly observed by
the damages remedy is available only in cases of searching the taxpayer's office but not before seizing his teachers in their presence." Ante, at 677-678. But it cites no
punishment unreasonable in light of the misconduct charged. property in a manner that involves no invasion of privacy. G. finding or evidence in the record for this assertion, and there
It states: "In those cases where severe punishment is M. Leasing thus reflects the principle that the case for is no such restriction in the statute or regulations authorizing
contemplated, the available civil and criminal sanctions for advance procedural safeguards (such as a magistrate's corporal punishment. See ante, at 655 n. 6, 656 n. 7. Indeed,
abuse . . . afford significant protection against unjustified determination of probable cause) is more compelling when the panel below noted specific instances in which students
corporal punishment." Ante, at 678. (Emphasis added.) Even the Government finally inflicts an injury that cannot be were punished by an assistant to the principal who was not
if the common-law remedy for excessive punishment repaired in a subsequent judicial proceeding (invasion of present when the alleged offenses were committed. 498
extends to punishment that is "excessive" only in the sense privacy) than when it inflicts a temporary injury which can be F.2d, at 257, 259.
that it is imposed on the basis of mistaken facts, the school undone (seizure of property). The infliction of bodily
authorities are still protected from personal liability by punishment, like the invasion of privacy, presents this most [ Footnote 18 ] My view here expressed that the minimal
common-law immunity. (They are protected by statutory compelling case for advance procedural safeguards. procedures of Goss are required for any corporal
immunity for liability for enforcing disciplinary rules "[e]xcept punishment implicating the student's liberty interest is, of
course, not meant to imply that this minimum would be 3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic
constitutionally sufficient no matter how severe the G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986 showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in leading boycotts
punishment inflicted. The Court made this reservation explicit of classes"; that when his father was notified of this
in Goss by suggesting that more elaborate procedures such DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had
as witnesses, counsel, and cross-examination might well be ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners, demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to
required for suspensions longer than the 10-day maximum vs. the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in
involved in that case. 419 U.S., at 583 -584. A similar caveat NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National
is appropriate here. his capacity as President of National University, University, et al.," at the hearing of which on November 23,
respondents. 1983 this Court had admonished "the students involved (to)
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners. to them to study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead
MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S analysis of the Eighth Amendment or actively participate in activities within the university
issue is, I believe, unanswerable. I am also persuaded that Samson S. Alcantara for respondents. premises, conducted without prior permit from school
his analysis of the procedural due process issue is correct. authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that
Notwithstanding my disagreement with the Court's holding moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal charges for malicious
[430 U.S. 651, 701] on the latter question, my respect for mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S reasoning in Part IV-B of his NARVASA, J.: Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of
opinion for the Court prompts these comments. properties of respondent University on September 12, 1983
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel ", and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No.
The constitutional prohibition of state deprivations of life, Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled
liberty, or property without due process of law does not, by come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for
its express language, require that a hearing be provided their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them damages arising from destruction of university properties
before any deprivation may occur. To be sure, the timing of to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and
the process may be a critical element in determining its equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory 4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman
adequacy - that is, in deciding what process is due in a injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege: "he continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to the
particular context. Generally, adequate notice and a fair spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ...
opportunity to be heard in advance of any deprivation of a 1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the
constitutionally protected interest are essential. The Court refusal to re-enroll them in their respective courses is "the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within
has recognized, however, that the wording of the command latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the university premises but without permit from university
that there shall be no deprivation "without" due process of premises of the University. officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and
law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation
remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient. 1 2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a 5) that petitioners have "failures in their records,
continuation of its cavalier if not hostile attitude to the (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "
When only an invasion of a property interest is involved, student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human
there is a greater likelihood that a damages award will make rights already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National Respondents close their comment with the following
a person completely whole than when an invasion of the University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter assertions, to wit:
individual's interest in freedom from bodily restraint and contempt for the principle of due process of law to the
punishment has occurred. In the property context, therefore, prejudice of petitioners;" and 1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to
frequently a postdeprivation state remedy may be all the have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in
process that the Fourteenth Amendment requires. It may 3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as
also be true - although I do not express an opinion on the penalty of expulsion without cause or if there be any, without an institution of higher learning, must also be respected. It is
point - that an adequate state remedy for defamation may being informed of such cause and without being afforded the also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who continually
satisfy the due process requirement when a State has opportunity to defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine despise and villify respondent university and its officials and
impaired an individual's interest in his reputation. On that Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]). faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollment in an
hypothesis, the Court's analysis today gives rise to the institution that they hate.
thought that Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 , may have been In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent
correctly decided on an incorrect rationale. Perhaps the University and its President pursuant to this Court's 2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to
Court will one day [430 U.S. 651, 702] agree with MR. requirement therefor 1 , respondents make the claim: legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S appraisal of the importance of the concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent
constitutional interest at stake in id., at 720-723, 734 1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first university.
(dissenting opinion), and nevertheless conclude that an semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own
adequate state remedy may prevent every state-inflicted fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their 3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the
injury to a person's reputation from violating 42 U.S.C. 1983. constitutional and human rights;" semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled to enroll
Republic of the Philippines them after the end of the semester.
SUPREME COURT 2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only
Manila on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was already On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as
closed;" follows:
EN BANC
... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to
Court Resolved to NOTE the same and to require a REPLY not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a activities within the university premises, conducted without minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1)
the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have
them may be subjected with their right to lawful defense and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University the right to answer the charges against them, with the
recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this official designated by the school authorities to hear and
against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students decide the case.
meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
Juan P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full standing. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents
cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever protest are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll or otherwise
or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to
ventilated in a lawful and peaceful manner. students, have the right among others "to freely choose their any disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them may
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia their course therein up to graduation, except in case of forth.
academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or being SO ORDERED.
July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already closed), it being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Republic of the Philippines
alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools SUPREME COURT
attempted to do so several times before that date, all to no 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student Manila
avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the
him to do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only THIRD DIVISION
Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This
school premises," although there were no existing Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time; Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents
of imposing sanctions on students without due investigation. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES,
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO,
the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that "petitioners' right Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES
to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for ... YAP, petitioners,
restricted or limited; and (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of vs.
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES,
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) management of the college." 10 The rules may include those in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional
in the school premises without the permission of the governing student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER
school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
persistently refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought "every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
by the students. " Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO
further provides that- VALDES, JR., respondents.
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another
resolution, this time reading as follows: ... The school rules governing discipline and the DECISION
corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and and defined in writing and made known to the students REYES, R.T., J.:
deliberating on the issues raised in the petition for and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the
extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng
preliminary mandatory injunction as well as the respondents' regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng dalawang
comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for effective as of the date of their promulgation unless fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang
petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to (a) otherwise specified. 12 pamantasan.
give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the
respondents' comment as ANSWER to the petition; and (c) But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
within twenty (20) days from notice. ... . stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to
petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Came March 29, 1995 and the following events. respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez
Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James
education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual.
freedom. buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada;
Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to while respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent
following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated him in the head with something heavy in his hands "parang Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently being
July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims,
against respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening
the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People before they returned to the campus to have their wounds
reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. treated. Apparently, there were three cars roaming the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting vicinity.6
private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group
preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The
May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual,
(CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the
the penalties for the other private respondents from also running with the group. "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private
expulsion to exclusion.5 respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau
Factual Antecedents point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a
Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29, fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging
1995 involving private respondents occurred: their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang private respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints8
gagalaw. Uwian na lang." were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente.
appears that one week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of
Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in Miguel Building. St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul
near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-
and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-
house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods up a book for his friend from another friend who lives MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No.
while watching television. These two brods had earlier somewhere in the area. 9495-3-25121.
finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three,
together with four other persons went back to Manang's and As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate
confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and
admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints
the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their
There was no rumble or physical violence then. restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and respective answers.9
Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But,
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were
two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB
Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents.
for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent
respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made. Lee and two others. notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12,
1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first
the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus. kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline
Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the
Papio. They were looking for a person whose description His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising
matched James Yap. According to them, this person a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.
supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
Yap, one of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na
lang." Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board
among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon
Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and xxxx behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution
present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995
lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of
witnesses. was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to the construction workers who were doing some works in the Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte
provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the motion to amend his petition to correct an allegation in
your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their evening, the workers according to him would wait for him paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge
proposed testimony. sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in
The workers get paid everyday. the amended petition.27
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your
failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with
statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a the workers listed there, supposedly attesting to the fact that copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission he paid the workers at the date and time in question.16 25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section
of the principal act complained of. 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
xxxx (MRPS).
For your strict compliance.13
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention29
1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of the officers that we were preparing."17 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel
Board as follows: On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty.
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to
was one of the few instances when he was picked-up by a expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On
driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, dispositive part of the resolution reads: June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to
respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
this particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds
asked his permission to use the car and thus, his dad respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an
instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to
not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB- dismiss and its supplement, and granted private
the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of
also employed. and thereby orders their automatic expulsion. preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB- For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or
Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La Salle at MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge. any and all other persons acting for and in its behalf is/are
4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the restrained and enjoined from
Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF SO ORDERED.21
Paraaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the 1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3,
house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the
in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University
arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the
Authority is located at the South Harbor.14 Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995. Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
xxxx On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the 2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-
RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and intervention in the courses offered at respondent De La Salle
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for University and to immediately allow them to enroll and
friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary complete their respective courses/degrees until their
1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by
get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition the latter.
irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of
went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted.
minutes. Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any and all
for Internal Affairs. persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of enjoyed from:
respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a
corroborate Valdez' alibi.15 TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, 1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3,
representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner
June 1, 1995; and preliminary injunction. DLSU.42
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in- On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar,
intervention in the courses offered at respondent (De La Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to
Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner and of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-
petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to 96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat. be excluded.38 The Resolution states:
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon RESOLUTION 181-96 granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar,
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive disposing thus:
bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE
respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in- UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein
intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED petition is hereby directed.
may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will finally ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. SO ORDERED.44
entitled thereto. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows:
for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to file their THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is
receipt thereof. OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, immediately executory in character, the pendency of a
MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
SO ORDERED.33 MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO
EXCLUSION.39 After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again
enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or SO ORDERED.45
1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case
(respondents there) in contempt of court.34 Aguilar also of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the
accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion
20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of
issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
of which reads: No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do
so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the September 23, 1996 which states: for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent
orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary
subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent
other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case RTC Judge of Manila.47
immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate
May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned
and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, order granting private respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to
June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 considering the set deadline for enrollment this current reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the
and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his order reads:
petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the
and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to
courses until their graduation from said school.36 Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the SO ORDERED.41 is declared to be in force and effect.
enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995
Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by
1995. petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at petitioners'
respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent expense.
directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722,
SO ORDERED.48 CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and purposes."
conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the complete their degree courses until their graduation.
continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the
September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the creation of the CHED, provides:
95-74122. merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition. cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the
and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant Commission on Higher Education is hereby created,
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54 This is in hereinafter referred to as Commission.
urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious
1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to The Commission shall be independent and separate from
implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial and attached to the office of the President for administrative
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court. justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation.55 purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the programs in all post secondary educational institutions,
manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his power of supervision and review over public and private.
course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his disciplinary cases decided by institutions
enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as of higher learning. The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in
indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
However, despite having completed all the academic Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The
certificate of completion/graduation in his favor. ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral. Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
Issues Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review xxxx
student expulsion cases, even those involving students in
We are tasked to resolve the following issues: secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such
the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
that impose disciplinary action on their students found "Education Act of 1982." o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its
violating disciplinary rules. effective operations and for the continued enhancement of
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not growth or development of higher education.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review
expelling private respondents. over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that
They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law? reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving
develop moral character and instill discipline among its institutions of higher learning.
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation
freedom? of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make
recommendation, setting, and development of academic no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher of higher learning are concerned. They show that the
substantial evidence? learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions authority and supervision over all public and private
under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
respondents is proportionate to their misdeed. CHED's "coverage" of institutions of higher education is public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8.
Our Ruling The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to
replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED,
that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the cases. which is "both public and private institutions of higher
expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless education as well as degree granting programs in all post
authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, We cannot agree. secondary educational institutions, public and private." That
because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is would be absurd.
now faced with the spectacle of having two different
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all
educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case
Hence, it is under the CHED authority. Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral No. 9495-3-25121.
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due
protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens society as conceived by our entire history.64 The process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the
to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held
accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring inflexible.65 that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its observance of procedural due process. And it bears
exercise and observance for the continued intellectual In administrative cases, such as investigations of students stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving
growth of students, the advancement of learning and found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
research, the development of responsible and effective standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential
cultural heritage. of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right part thereof."
to answer the charges against them and with the assistance
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning,
No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to possesses academic freedom which includes determination
involving students on the tertiary level would continue to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence of who to admit for study.
arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to official designated by the school authorities to hear and Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na
academic freedom. decide the case."66 pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop
ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in
that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
the responsibilities of other government entities having bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to among the primary rights that must be respected even in school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
the CHED.62 administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to interference save possibly when the overriding public
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's interest calls for some restraint.74 According to present
student discipline cases should therefore be read in side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722. or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is given the independence of an academic institution to determine for
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
"[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state- process.70
supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
[On Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or instances, essential to due process it is enough that the indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and their respective sides of the controversy and to present right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
development of academic plans, programs and standards for supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically
institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a
us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard curricula and to continue their course therein up to
does not distinguish, neither should we. through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established
process.72 academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very
jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free
the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline choice of students for admission to its school.
possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
for that matter. opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente
fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law. informed of the evidence presented against them as they
attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng
proseso ng batas. their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board ebidensiyang substansyal.
administration of the school. This we would be most loathe Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed to do. when accused has no other possible defense for what could
the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time,
may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his
clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, favor.93
place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87
the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private
crime."78 Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution as
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private
successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.
been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that
accused where categorical and consistent, without any universities are established, not merely to develop the It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and
should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or that "the establishment of rules governing university-student
testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing flowering if you will, of the total man.89 relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
testimonies of the offended parties.81 to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the
Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept
the crime who can positively identify the accused.82 Alibi is certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint of proportionality between the offense committed and the
an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with Discipline Board, to wit: sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness
caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83 intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.95
Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak C E R T I F I C AT I O N
and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful We agree with respondent CHED that under the
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN: circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by
assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.
truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former this Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at about Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few
must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury.
easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame, Disciplinary measures especially where they involve
reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the
accused by the witnesses.85 class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a
Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases.
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to
student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed,
doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool
evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our permission to leave rather than a punitive measure.96
Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a driver. Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not
conclusion." expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such,
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90 pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents
respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1 The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials
They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro immediately issued.
the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2
impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims. PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated
is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila,
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It is Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED
expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing: true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May
fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility
reinstatement of respondent students who have been as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of
investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92 On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.
from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately Common Pleas of Hamilton County, 25 Oh.Nisi Prius (N.S.) The defendant was arrested and charged with the unlawful
issued. 580, which reversed a judgment of the Mayor of the Village possession of intoxicating liquor at White Oak, another
of North College Hill convicting and fining Tumey for violation village in Hamilton County, Ohio, on a warrant issued by the
SO ORDERED of the Ohio Prohibition Act and ordering that he be Mayor of North College Hill. The Mayor acted under the
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. sections of the State Prohibition Act, and Ordinance No. 125
of the Village of North College Hill adopted in pursuance
Tumey v. Ohio Page 273 U. S. 514 thereof.
No. 527 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Section 6212-15 (Ohio General Code) provides that "No
Court. person shall after the passage of this act manufacture
Argued November 29, 30, 1926 possess . . . any intoxicating liquors. . . ."
The question in this case is whether certain statutes of Ohio,
Decided March 7, 1927 in providing for the trial by the mayor of a village of one Section 6212-17 provides that
accused of violating the Prohibition Act of the State, deprive
273 U.S. 510 the accused of due process of law and violate the ". . . any person who violates the provisions of this act
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (General Code, Sections 6212-13 to 6212-20) for a first
offense shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Page 273 U. S. 515 more than one thousand dollars; for a second offense he
shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor more
Syllabus because of the pecuniary and other interest which those than two thousand dollars; for a third and each subsequent
statutes give the mayor in the result of the trial. offense he shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars
1. To subject a defendant to trial in a criminal case involving nor more than two thousand dollars and be imprisoned in the
his liberty or property before a judge having a direct, Tumey, the plaintiff in error, hereafter to be called the state penitentiary not less than one year nor more than five
personal, substantial interest in convicting him is a denial of defendant, was arrested and brought before Mayor Pugh, of years. . . ."
due process of law. P. 273 U. S. 522. the Village of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal The Mayor has authority, which he exercised in this case, to
2. A system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service because of the disqualification of the Mayor to try him, under order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in
only when he convicts the defendant has not become so the Fourteenth Amendment. The Mayor denied the motion, prison until the fine and costs are paid. At the time of this
customary in the common law or in this country that it can be proceeded to the trial, convicted the defendant of unlawfully sentence, the prisoner received a credit of sixty cents a day
regarded as due process where the costs usually imposed possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton County, as for each day's imprisonment. By a recent amendment, that
are not so small as to be within the maxim de minimis non charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned credit has been increased to one dollar and a half a day.
curat lex. Pp. 273 U. S. 523, 273 U. S. 531. until the fine and costs were paid. He obtained a bill of Sections 13716, 13717, Ohio Gen.Code.
exceptions and carried the case on error to the Court of
Page 273 U. S. 511 Common Pleas of Hamilton County. That court heard the Section 62118 provides, in part, that
case and reversed the judgment on the ground that the
3. Under statutes of Ohio, offenses against State prohibition, Mayor was disqualified, as claimed. 25 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) "Any justice of the peace, mayor, municipal or police judge,
involving a wide range of fines enforceable by imprisonment, 580. The State sought review by the Court of Appeals of the probate or common pleas judge within the county with whom
may be tried without a jury, before the mayor of any rural first appellate district of Ohio, which reversed the Common the affidavit is filed charging a violation of any of the
village situate in the county (however populous) in which Pleas and affirmed the judgment of the Mayor. 23 Ohio Law provisions of this act (G.C. Sections 6212-13 to 6212-20)
offenses occur; his judgment upon the facts is final and Reporter, 634. when the offense is alleged to have been committed in the
conclusive unless so clearly unsupported as to indicate county in which such mayor, justice of the peace, or judge
mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty; the fines are On May 4, 1926, the State Supreme Court refused
divided between the State and village; the village, by means defendant's application to require the Court of Appeals to Page 273 U. S. 517
of the fines collected, hires attorneys and detectives to arrest certify its record in the case. The defendant then filed a
alleged offenders anywhere in the county and prosecute petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the may be sitting, shall have final jurisdiction to try such cases
them before the mayor; in addition to his salary, the mayor, judgment of the Mayor's Court and of the Appellate Court be upon such affidavits without a jury, unless imprisonment is a
when he convicts, but not otherwise, receive his fees and reversed on constitutional grounds. On May 11, 1926, the part of the penalty, but error may be prosecuted to the
cost amounting to a substantial income; the fine offer a Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for judgment of such mayor, justice of the peace, or judge as
means of adding materially to the financial prosperity of the the reason that no debatable constitutional question was herein provided."
village, for which the mayor, in his executive capacity, is involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought here
responsible. Held violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the State Error from the Mayor's Court lies to the court of Common
Pp. 273 U. S. 520, 273 U. S. 531. Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed. Matthews v. Pleas of the County, and a bill of exceptions is necessary to
Huwe, Treasurer, 269 U. S. 262; Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, present questions arising on the evidence. Sections 10359,
115 Oh.St. 701, reversed. 265 U. S. 384. This brings us to the merits of the case. 10361, Ohio General Code. The appellate review in respect
of evidence is such that the judgment can only be set aside
ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio which Page 273 U. S. 516 by the reviewing court on the ground that it is so clearly
declined to review a judgment of the State Court of Appeals, unsupported by the weight of the evidence as to indicate
22 Oh.L.Rep. 634, reversing a judgment of the Court of some misapprehension or mistake or bias on the part of the
trial court, or a willful disregard of duties. Datesh v. State, 23 prohibiting the liquor traffic, an amount of money equal to 15
Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 273. percent. of the fine collected, and other fees allowed by law." Page 273 U. S. 520
Section 6212-19 provides that "Section II. That the attorney at law of record prosecuting The fees which the Mayor and Marshal received in this case
persons charged with violating the law of the state of Ohio, came to them by virtue of the general statutes of the state
"Money arising from fines and forfeited bonds shall be paid prohibiting the liquor traffic, shall receive as compensation applying to all state cases, liquor and otherwise. The Mayor
one-half into the state treasury credited to the general for legal services an amount equal to 10 percent. of the fine was entitled to hold the legal fees taxed in his favor. Ohio
revenue fund, one-half to the treasury of the township, collected, in all cases, whether the plea be guilty or not General Code, 4270; State v. Nolte, 111 O.S. 486.
municipality or county where the prosecution is held, guilty." Moreover, the North College Hill village council sought to
according as to whether the officer hearing the case is a remove all doubt on this point by providing ( 5, Ord. 125,
township, municipal, or county officer." "Section IV. That detectives and secret service officers shall supra), that he should receive or retain the amount of his
receive as compensation for their services in securing the costs in each case, in addition to his regular salary, as
Section 6212-37 provides that evidence necessary to secure the conviction of compensation for hearing such cases. But no fees or costs
in such cases are paid him except by the defendant if
"The council of any city or village may by ordinance Page 273 U. S. 519 convicted. There is, therefore, no way by which the Mayor
authorize the use of any part of the fines collected for the may be paid for his service as judge if he does not convict
violation of any law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of persons violating the law of the state of Ohio, prohibiting the those who are brought before him, nor is there any fund from
intoxicating liquors, for the purpose of hiring attorneys, liquor traffic, an amount of money equal to 15 percent. of the which marshals, inspectors and detectives can be paid for
detectives. or secret service officers to secure the fine collected." their services in arresting and bringing to trial and furnishing
enforcement of such prohibition law. And such council are the evidence to convict in such cases, except it be from the
hereby authorized to appropriate not more than five hundred "Section V. That the mayor of the village of North College initial $500 which the village may vote from its treasury to set
dollars annually from the general revenue funds for the Hill, Ohio, shall receive or retain the amount of his costs in the court going, or from a fund created by the fines thereafter
purpose of enforcing the law prohibiting the manufacture and each case, in addition to his regular salary, as compensation collected from convicted defendants.
sale of intoxicating liquors, when there are no funds for hearing such cases."
available from the fines collected for the violation of such By an Act of 1913 (103 O.L. 290), the Mayor's court in
prohibitory law." "Section VI. This ordinance is hereby declared to be an villages in Hamilton County and in half a dozen other
emergency ordinance, necessary to the immediate counties with large cities was deprived of jurisdiction to hear
Under the authority of the last section, the Village Council of preservation of the public peace and safety, made necessary and punish misdemeanors committed in the county beyond
North College Hill passed Ordinance No. 125, as follows: by reason of the flagrant violation of the laws of Ohio, the limits of the corporation. The Prohibition Act, known as
enacted to prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquors, and shall be the Crabbe Act, adopted in 1920 (108 O.L., Pt. 1, 388 and
Page 273 U. S. 518 in effect from and after its passage." Pt. 2, 1182) changed this, and gave to the Mayor of every
village in the State jurisdiction within the county in which it
"An ordinance to provide for compensation to be paid from The duties of the Mayor of a village in Ohio are primarily was situate to try violations of that Act.
the secret service funds of the Village of North College Hill, executive. Sections of the General Code of Ohio provide as
Hamilton County, Ohio, created by authority of Section follows: Counsel for the State in their brief explain the vesting by
62137, of the General Code of Ohio, to detectives, secret state legislatures of this country of jurisdiction in village
service officers, deputy marshals' and attorneys' fees, costs, "Section 4248. The executive power and authority of villages courts as follows:
etc., for services in securing evidence necessary to shall be vested in a mayor, clerk, treasurer, marshal, street
conviction and prosecuting violation of the law of the state of commissioner, and such other officers and departments "The purpose of extending the jurisdiction in the first instance
Ohio prohibiting the liquor traffic." thereof as are created by law." was to break up places of outlawry that were located on the
municipal boundary just outside of the city. The Legislature
"Be it ordained by the Council of the Village of North College "Section 4255. . . . He (the Mayor) shall be the chief also
Hill, Hamilton County, Ohio:" conservator of the peace within the corporation. . . . He shall
be the president of the council, and shall preside at all Page 273 U. S. 521
"Section I. That fifty percent of all moneys hereafter paid into regular and special meetings thereof, but shall have no vote
the treasury of said village of North College Hill, Ohio, that is except in case of a tie." faced the situation that, in some of the cities the law
one-half of the share of all fines collected and paid into and enforcement agencies were failing to perform their duty, and
belonging to said village of North College Hill, Ohio, received "Section 4258. . . . He shall see that all ordinances, bylaws therefore, in order that those forces that believe in
from fines collected under any law of the state of Ohio and resolutions are faithfully obeyed and enforced." enforcement and upholding of law might have some courts
prohibiting the liquor traffic, shall constitute a separate fund through which process could be had, it gave to mayors
to be called the Secret Service Fund to be used for the "Section 4259. The mayor shall communicate to council from county-wide jurisdiction."
purpose of securing the enforcement of any prohibition law." time to time a statement of the finances of the municipality
and such other information relating thereto and to the It was further pointed out in argument that the system by
"Section II. That deputy marshals of the village of North general condition of affairs of the municipality as he deems which the fines to be collected were to be divided between
College Hill, Ohio, shall receive as compensation for their proper or as may be required by council." the State and the village was for the proper purpose of
services in securing the evidence necessary to secure the stimulating the activities of the village officers to such due
conviction of persons violating the law of the state of Ohio, "Section 4262. The mayor shall supervise the conduct of all enforcement.
the officers of the corporation. . . . "
The Village of North College Hill in Hamilton County, Ohio, is the Judges, pp. 785, 787); Year Book, 8 Henry 6, 19, s.c. 2 country showing a practice that inferior judicial officers were
shown by the federal census to have a population of 1104. Roll.Abridg. 93; Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 253 U. S. 247; dependent upon the conviction of the defendant for receiving
That of Hamilton County, including the City of Cincinnati, is Stuart v. Mechanics' & Farmers' Bank, 19 Johns. 496; their compensation. Indeed, in analogous cases, it is very
more than half a million. The evidence discloses that Mayor Ranger v. Railroad, 5 H.L.C. 72. We are not embarrassed by clear that the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer,
Pugh came to office after ordinance No. 125 was adopted, such considerations here, for there were available in this judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter
and that there was a division of public sentiment in the case other judicial officers who had which he was to decide rendered the decision voidable.
village as to whether the ordinance should continue in effect. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke, 118a; s.c. 2 Brownlow and
A petition opposing it and signed by a majority of the voters Page 273 U. S. 523 Goldesborough's Rep. 255; City of London v. Wood, 12
was presented to Mayor Pugh. To this, the Mayor answered Modern Rep. 669, 687; Day v. Savage, Hobart 85, 87;
with the declaration that, if the village was in need of no disqualification either by reason of the character of their Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burrows 1847, 1856, 1857 and
finances, he was in favor of, and would carry on, "the Liquor compensation or their relation to the village government. 1858.
Court," as it was popularly called, but that, if the court was
not needed for village financial reasons, he would not do so. All questions of judicial qualification may not involve As early as the 12th Richard II, A.D. 1388, it was provided
It appears that substantial sums were expended out of the constitutional validity. Thus, matters of kinship, personal that there should be a commission of the justices of the
village treasury, from the fund made up of the fines thus bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem peace, with six justices in the county once a quarter, which
collected, for village improvements and repairs. The Mayor generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. might sit for three days, and that the justices should receive
was the owner of a house in the village. Wheeling v. Black, 25 W.Va. 266, 270. But it certainly four shillings a day "as wages," to be paid by the sheriffs out
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a of a fund made up of fines and amercements, and that that
Between May 11, 1923 and December 31, 1923, the total defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject fund should be added to out of the fines and amercements
amount of fines for violation of the prohibition law, collected his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of from the courts of the Lords of the Franchises, which were
by this village court, was upwards of $20,000, from which the which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest hundred courts allowed by the King by grant to individuals.
State received $8,992.50, North College Hill received in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.
$4,471.25 for its general uses, $2,697.25 was placed to the It was required that the justices of the peace should be
credit of the village safety fund, and the balance was put in The Mayor of the Village of North College Hill, Ohio, had a knights, esquires or gentlemen of the land -- qualifications
the secret service fund. Out of this, the person acting as direct, personal, pecuniary interest in convicting the that were not modified until 1906. The wages paid were used
prosecutor in the liquor court received defendant who came before him for trial, in the twelve dollars "to defray their common diet," and soon became obsolete. 1
of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have Holdsworth's History of English Law, 288, 289. The wages
Page 273 U. S. 522 received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not paid were not dependent on conviction
exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the
in that period $1,796.50; the deputy marshals, inspectors law and the ordinance. Counsel for the State do not deny Page 273 U. S. 525
and other employees, including the detectives, received this, but assert the validity of the practice as an exception to
$2,697.75, and $438.50 was paid for cost in transporting the general rule. The rely upon the cases of Ownbey v. of the defendant. They were paid at a time when the
prisoners, serving writs and other services in connection with Morgan, 256 U. S. 94; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land distinction between torts and criminal case was not clear,
the trial of these cases. Mayor Pugh received $696.35 from and Improvement Company, 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 276-280. Holdsworth, Vol. 2, 363, 365; Vol. 3, 328, and they came
these liquor cases during that period as his fees and costs, These cases show that, in determining what due process of from a fund which was created by fines and amercements
in addition to his regular salary. law is, under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, the Court collected from both sides in the controversy. There was
must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding always a plaintiff, whether in the action for a tort or the
That officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are existing in the common and statute law of England before prosecution for an offense. In the latter, he was called the
disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided the emigration of our ancestors, which were shown not to prosecutor. If he failed to prove his case, whether civil or
is, of course, the general rule. Dimes v. Grand Junction have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by criminal, he was subject to amercement pro falso clamore,
Canal, 3 H.L.C. 759; Gregory v. Railroad, 4 O.S. 675; Peace having been acted on by them after the settlement of this while if he succeeded, the defendant was in misericordia.
v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324; Taylor v. Commissioners, 105 country. Counsel contend that, in Ohio and in other States, in See Comm. v. Johnson, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 195, 198; Musser v.
Mass. 225; Kentish Artillery v. Gardiner, 15 R.I. 296; Moses the economy which it is found necessary to maintain in the Good, 11 Id. 247. Thus, in the outcome, someone would be
v. Julian, 45 N.H. 52; State v. Crane, 36 N.J.L. 394; Railroad administration of justice in the inferior courts by justices of amerced in every case, and the amercements generally
Company v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; Stockwell v. Township, 22 the peace and by judicial officers of like jurisdiction, the only went to the Crown, and the fund was considerable. The
Mich. 341; Findley v. Smith, 42 W.Va. 299; Nettleton's compensation which the State and county Statute of Richard II remained on the statute book until 1855,
Appeal, 28 Conn. 268; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, when it was repealed by the 18th and 19th Victoria.
7th ed., p. 592, et seq. Nice questions, however, often arise Page 273 U. S. 524 Meantime, the hundred courts by franchise had largely
as to what the degree or nature of the interest must be. One disappeared. The wages referred to were not part of the
is in respect of the effect of the membership of a judge in a and township can afford is the fees and costs earned by costs. The costs at common law were the amounts paid
class of taxpayers or others to be affected by a principle of them, and that such compensation is so small that it is not to either by the plaintiff or prosecutor or by the defendant for
law, statutory or constitutional, to be applied in a case be regarded as likely to influence improperly a judicial officer the witnesses or services of the court officers. Burn's Justice,
between other parties and in which the judge has no other in the discharge of his duty, or as prejudicing the defendant Vol. 1, p. 628. Chitty's Criminal Law, 4 ed. 1841, Vol. 1, 829.
interest. Then the circumstance that there is no judge not in securing justice, even though the magistrate will receive See also 14 George III, ch. 20, 1774. For hundreds of years,
equally disqualified to act in such a case has been held to nothing if the defendant is not convicted. the justices of the peace of England seem not to have
affect the question. Wheeling v. Black, 25 W.Va. 266, 280; received compensation for court work. Instead of that, they
Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, 20 N.J.L. 457; Dimes v. Grand We have been referred to no cases at common law in were required, upon entering upon the office, to pay certain
Junction Canal, 3 H.L.C. 759 (see Baron Parke's Answer for England prior to the separation of colonies from the mother
fees. Holdsworth, Vol. 1, p. 289; 19 Halsbury's Laws of In two of these States only has the question been anew by proper proceedings in court. An exactly opposite
England, 1152. Local judges in towns are paid salaries. considered by their courts, and it has been held that conclusion was reached by the United States Circuit Court
provision for payment to the judge of fees only in case of for the Northern District of Ohio in Meyers v. Shields, 61 Fed.
There was at the common law the greatest sensitiveness conviction does not disqualify him. Those are Bennett v. 713, 725 et seq.
over the existence of any pecuniary interest, however small State, 4 Tex.App. 72; Wellmaker v. Terrell, 3 Ga.App. 791.
or infinitesimal, in the justices of the peace. In Hawkins, 2 There is no discussion in either of the question of due In other States than those above-mentioned, the minor
Pleas of the Crown, we find the following: process of law. The existence of a statute authorizing the courts are paid for their services by the State or county
practice seems to have been the controlling consideration. regardless of acquittal or conviction, except that, in Virginia,
"The general rule of law certainly is that justices of the peace Two other cases are cited. In Ex parte Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88, the minor courts receive one-half of the usual fees where
ought not to execute their office in their own case [citing 1 the judge was paid a regular salary, fixed by law. The fund there is acquittal. Four States have put into their
Salk. 396], and even in cases where such out of which this was paid was increased by fees and fines constitutions a provision that the State must pay the costs in
collected in his court, but there is no evidence that payment such cases in case of acquittal. They are California, Florida,
Page 273 U. S. 526 of his salary was dependent on the amount of his collections Louisiana and South Carolina.
or convictions. In Herbert v. Baltimore County, 97 Md. 639,
proceeding seems indispensably necessary, as in being the action was by a justice of the peace against a county for The strict common law rule was adopted in this country as
publicly assaulted or personally abused, or their authority services in criminal cases. A new law limited him to $10 a one to be enforced where nothing but the common law
otherwise contemned while in the execution of their duty, yet month. The statement of the case does not distinctly show controlled, and citizens and taxpayers have been held
if another justice be present, his assistance should be that, in convictions, he would have had a larger incompetent to sit in suits against the municipal corporation
required to punish the offender (Stra. 240)." compensation from his costs collected out of the defendant, of which they have been residents. Diveny v.
but this may be assumed from the argument. His contention
"And by the common law, if an order of removal were made was that the new law was invalid because it did not give the Page 273 U. S. 529
by two justices, and one of them was an inhabitant of the defendants before him due process. The court held against
parish from which the pauper was removed, such order was him, chiefly on the ground that he must be satisfied with the Elmira, 51 N.Y. 506; Corwein v. Names, 11 Johns. 76; Clark
illegal and bad on the ground that the justice who was an compensation the law afforded him. Responding to his v. Lamb, 2 Allen 396; Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa 565;
inhabitant was interested, as being liable to the poor's rate. argument that the new law was invalid because justices Fulweiler v. St. Louis, 61 Mo. 479; Petition of New Boston,
(Rex v. Great Chart, Burr. S.C.194, Stra. 1173.)" would be induced to convict when in justice they should 49 N.H. 328; Commonwealth v. McLane, 4 Gray 427; Fine v.
acquit, the court said: St. Louis Public Schools, 30 Mo. 166, 173. With other courts,
And this strict principle, unless there is relief by the statute, however, and with the legislatures, the strict rule seemed to
is seen in modern cases. Queen v. The Recorder of "We cannot recognize the force of this suggestion, founded be inconvenient, impracticable, and unnecessary, and the
Cambridge, 8 Ellis & Blackburn, 637; Regina v. Hammond, 9 as it is upon the assumption that the justices will violate their view was taken that such remote or minute interest in the
Law Times Reports (N.S.) 423; The Queen v. Rand, Law oaths and the duties of their office, and not upon anything litigation might be declared by the Legislature not to be a
Reports, 1st Queen's Bench, 230; Queen v. Gafford, 1st that the law authorizes to be done." reason for disqualification of a judge or juror.
Queen's Bench Division, 381; 19 Halsbury's Laws of
England 1156. So far as the case goes, it is an authority for the contention A case, much cited, in which this conclusion was reached
of the State, but the issue thus raised was not and in which the old English corporation cases were
There was, then, no usage at common law by which justices considered was that of City Council v. Pepper, 1 Richardson
of the peace or inferior judicial officers were paid fees on Page 273 U. S. 528 (S.C.) 364. The recorder of the City of Charleston sentenced
condition that they convicted the defendants, and such a a nonresident of the city for violation of a city ordinance
practice certainly cannot find support as due process of law considered at length, and was not one which, in such an requiring him to take out a license for what he did or to pay a
in English precedent. It may be that the principle, as stated action, the court would be patient to hear pressed by the fine not exceeding $20. The contention was that the
in Blackstone, Book 3rd, page 400, that the King shall justice whose constitutional rights were not affected. Tyler v. defendant was a noncorporator and nonresident, and not
neither pay nor receive costs, because it is the King's Court, 179 U. S. 405, 179 U. S. 409; California Reduction subject to the jurisdiction of the city court; that the recorder
prerogative not to pay them to a subject and is beneath his Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 199 U. S. was a corporator and interested in the penalty, and therefore
dignity to receive them, was misunderstood and led, as 318. was not competent to try the cause. The Court said (p. 366)
suggested by Mr. Lewis in his edition of Blackstone, Vol. 3, in respect to Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burrows 1847, supra:
p. 400, n. 60, to the practice in some States, in minor cases, In the case of Probasco v. Raine, Auditor, 50 O.S. 378, the
of allowing inferior judges no compensation except by fees question arose whether the fee of 4 percent. payable to "It will be remarked that that case depends altogether upon
collected of the convicted defendant; but whether it did or county auditors for placing omitted property on the duplicate the common law, and if the city court depended upon the
not, the principle relied on did not support the practice. That list for taxation, which required investigation and quasi- same for its jurisdiction, the objection might be fatal. But the
practice has prevailed, and still prevails, in Arkansas, judicial consideration, was invalid. The court held that it was establishment and jurisdiction of the city court commences
Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Georgia, Ohio and not, and that the objection urged there could not be based with the Act of 1801. By that Act, it is clothed with the power
Texas, and it seems on the argument that a man could not be a judge in his own of trying all offences against the by laws of the city, and for
case; that the auditor had no case to be adjudged, but that, that purpose is given concurrent jurisdiction with the court of
Page 273 U. S. 527 on the contrary, he was the taxing officer before whom other Sessions. This grant of power is from all the people of the
parties were cited to appear and show cause why they State, through their Legislature, and surely they have the
at one time to have obtained in Indiana, Oregon, Illinois and should not bear their equal burden of taxation. The court power to dispense with the common law objection that the
Alabama. said that the action of the auditor was not final so as to cut corporators
off further inquiry, but that the whole case might be gone into
Page 273 U. S. 530 "But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not But the pecuniary interest of the Mayor in the result of his
see how the legislature can have any power to abolish a judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process
were interested, and ought not to be intrusted with the maxim which is among the fundamentals of judicial of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were
enforcement of their laws against others. The authority given authority." drawn to stimulate small municipalities in the country part of
to the city court to try all offenders against the city counties in which there are large cities, to organize and
ordinances impliedly declares that, notwithstanding the Referring then to a remark in the case of the Matter of Leefe, maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the
common law objection, it was right and proper to give it the 2 Barb.Ch. 39, that the people of the State, when framing Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is
power to enforce the city law against all offenders. That there their constitution, might possibly establish so great an offered of dividing between
was great reason in this cannot be doubted when it is anomaly, if they saw fit, the learned author says:
remembered that the interest of the corporators is so minute Page 273 U. S. 533
as not to be even thought of by sheriff, juror, or judge. It is "Even this must be deemed doubtful, since the adoption of
very much like the interest which similar officers would feel in the fourteenth article of the amendments to the Federal the State and the village the large fines provided by the law
enforcing a State law the sanction of which was a penalty. Constitution, which denies to the state the right to deprive for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without
The sum thus to be recovered goes in exoneration of some one of life, liberty or property without due process of law." a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review
part of the burden of government to which every citizen is confined to questions of law presented by a bill of
subjected, but such an interest has no effect upon the mind. From this review, we conclude that a system by which an exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set
It is too slight to excite prejudice against a defendant. The inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence unless it
same thing is the case here. For the judge, sheriff and jurors, the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to
are members of a corporation of many thousand members. the general practice either at common law or in this country indicate mistake, bias or willful disregard of duty by the trial
What interest of value have they in a fine of twenty dollars? It that it can be regarded as due process of law unless the court. The statute specifically authorizes the village to
would put a most eminent calculator to great trouble to costs usually imposed are so small that they may be employ detectives, deputy marshals, and other assistants to
ascertain the very minute grain of interest which each of properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curat detect crime of this kind all over the county, and to bring
these gentlemen might have. To remove so shadowy and lex. offenders before the Mayor's court, and it offers to the village
slight an objection, the Legislature thought proper to clothe council and its officers a means of substantially adding to the
the city court, consisting of its judge, clerk, sheriff and jurors, The Mayor received for his fees and costs in the present income of the village to relieve it from further taxation. The
with authority to try the defendant, and he cannot now object case $12, and from such costs under the Prohibition Act mayor is the chief executive of the village. He supervises all
to it." the other executive officers. He is charged with the business
Page 273 U. S. 532 of looking after the finances of the village. It appears from
And the same view is taken in Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 the evidence in this case, and would be plain if the evidence
Mass. 90; Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray 472, 475; for seven months he made about $100 a month, in addition did not show it, that the law is calculated to awaken the
Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio 290; Commissioners v. Lytle, to his salary. We cannot regard the prospect of receipt or interest of all those in the village charged with the
3 Ohio 289; Wheeling v. Black, 25 W.Va. 266, 280; Board of loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, responsibility of raising the public money and expending it, in
Justices v. Fennimore, 1 N.J.L.190; Foreman v. Mariana, 43 remote, trifling or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair the pecuniarily successful conduct of such a court. The
Ark. 324; Cartersville v. Lyon, 69 Ga. 577; Omaha v. to each defendant, brought before the Mayor for the careful mayor represents the village, and cannot escape his
Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446; Hill v. Wells, 6 Pickering 104; and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence, that the representative capacity. On the other hand, he is given the
Commonwealth v. Emery, 11 Cushing 406; Barnett prospect of such a loss by the Mayor should weigh against judicial duty, first, of determining whether the defendant is
his acquittal. guilty at all, and second, having found his guilt, to measure
Page 273 U. S. 531 his punishment between $100 as a minimum and $1,000 as
These are not cases in which the penalties and the costs are a maximum for first offenses, and $300 as a minimum and
v. State, 4 Tex.App. 72; Wellmaker v. Terrell, 3 Ga.App. 791; negligible. The field of jurisdiction is not that of a small $2,000 as a maximum for second offenses. With his interest
State v. Craig, 80 Maine 85. community engaged in enforcing its own local regulations. as mayor in the financial condition of the village, and his
The court is a state agency imposing substantial responsibility therefor, might not a defendant with reason say
Mr. Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, punishment, and the cases to be considered are gathered that he feared he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence
7th edition, page 594, points out that the real ground of the from the whole county by the energy of the village marshals from one who would have so strong a motive to help his
ruling in these cases is that and detectives regularly employed by the village for the village by conviction and a heavy fine? The old English
purpose. It is not to be treated as a mere village tribunal for cases, cited above, of the
"interest is so remote, trifling and insignificant that it may village peccadillos. There are doubtless mayors who would
fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment not allow such a consideration as $12 costs in each case to Page 273 U. S. 534
of or of influencing the conduct of an individual. And where affect their judgment in it; but the requirement of due process
penalties are imposed, to be recovered only in a municipal of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument days of Coke and Holt and Mansfield, are not nearly so
court, the judge or jurors in which would be interested as that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice strong. A situation in which an official perforce occupies two
corporators in the recovery, the law providing for such could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan
recovery must be regarded as precluding the objection of which would offer a possible temptation to the average man and the other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due
interest." as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes
the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the before him. City of Boston v. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315; Florida
But the learned judge then proceeds: balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the ex rel. Colcord v. Young, 31 Fla. 594. It is, of course, so
accused denies the latter due process of law. common to vest the mayor of villages with inferior judicial
functions that the mere union of the executive power and the
judicial power in him cannot be said to violate due process of graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. Respondent respectfully prays for such other reliefs and
law. The minor penalties usually attaching to the ordinances There were thus presented at the outset both features of the remedies as may be deemed just and equitable in the
of a village council, or to the misdemeanors in which the disqualification. premises. 1
mayor may pronounce final judgment without a jury, do not
involve any such addition to the revenue of the village as to The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio must be In its resolution of 19 August 1996, the Court required
justify the fear that the mayor would be influenced in his reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings respondent to comment on the letter-complaint.
judicial judgment by that fact. The difference between such a not inconsistent with this opinion.
case and the plan and operation of the statutes before us is In his comment, dated 20 September 1996, respondent
so plain as not to call for further elaboration. Judgment reversed. Judge admitted that he had filed his own pleadings with the
Republic of the Philippines COMELEC out of respect and in deference to the order of 16
Counsel for the State argue that it has been decided by this SUPREME COURT November 1995 of the COMELEC En Banc requiring
Court that the legislature of a State may provide such Manila respondents to comment on the petition. The urgent
system of courts as it chooses; that there is nothing in the manifestation he filed was meant to rectify the assertion of
Fourteenth Amendment that requires a jury trial for any EN BANC complainant that he had erroneously cited Section 8, Rule
offender; that it may give such territorial jurisdiction to its 35, of the Omnibus Election Code. Attached to his comment
courts as it sees fit, and therefore that there is nothing before this Court was his resolution, dated 31 July 1996,
sinister or constitutionally invalid in giving to a village mayor where respondent Judge, ruling on the motion for inhibition,
the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to try misdemeanors A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375 October 16, 1997 held:
committed anywhere in the county, even though the mayor
presides over a village of 1,100 people and exercises ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, complainant, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
jurisdiction over offenses committed in a county of 500,000. vs. this Court hereby rendered this resolution on the pending
This is true, and is established by the decisions of this Court JUDGE ANGELITO C. TEH, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, incidents to wit:
in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 101 U. S. 30; In re Rosario, Batangas, respondent.
Claasen, 140 U. S. 200. See also Carey v. State, 70 Ohio 1. The protestee's unverified Motion to Dismiss and
State 121. It is also correctly pointed out that it is completely Motion to Strike Out Opposition are hereby DENIED for lack
within the power of the legislature to dispose of the fines of sufficient legal and factual basis;
collected
PER CURIAM: 2. The Motion for Inhibition is likewise DENIED for
Page 273 U. S. 535 lack of sufficient legal and factual basis;
In a letter, dated 01 April 1996, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal
in criminal cases as it will, and it may therefore divide the related to the Court the actuations of Judge Angelito C. Teh, 3. And for compelling the respondent Judge to
fines as it does here, one-half to the State and one-half to Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of the Regional engage the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to
the village by whose mayor they are imposed and collected. Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, relative to the Motion for Inhibition, the Protestee's counsel, Atty.
It is further said with truth that the legislature of a State may, Election Case No. R-95-001. Romulo B. Macalintal is hereby ordered to pay P100,000.00
and often ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by as Attorney's Fees and litigation expenses incident to his
offering to those who shall initiate and carry on such It would appear that Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse Motion for Inhibition.
prosecutions rewards for thus acting in the interest of the to the client of Atty. Macalintal in the aforenumbered election
State and the people. The legislature may offer rewards or a case. Atty. Macalintal questioned the resolution, via a petition SO ORDERED. 2
percentage of the recovery to informers. United States v. for certiorari, before the Commission on Elections
Murphy & Morgan, 16 Pet. 203. It may authorize the ("COMELEC"). While the case was pending at the In its resolution, dated 12 March 1997, the Court resolved to:
employment of detectives. But these principles do not at all COMELEC, Judge Teh actively participated in the
affect the question whether the State, by the operation of the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, still (a) DIRECT Judge Angelito Teh to ACT on the motion
statutes we have considered, has not vested the judicial later, an urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer forthwith for inhibition in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
power in one who, by reason of his interest both as an filed a motion to prevent respondent Judge from further Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court;
individual and as chief executive of the village, is disqualified acting on Election Case No. R-95-001. Instead of acting on
to exercise it in the trial of the defendant. the motion for inhibition, Judge Teh hired his own lawyer and (b) TREAT the letter dated April 1, 1996 of
filed his answer before his own court, with the prayer: complainant as an administrative complaint against Judge
It is finally argued that the evidence shows clearly that the Angelito Teh and docket accordingly;
defendant was guilty, and that he was only fined $100, which 1. That Judgment be rendered dismissing the Motion
was the minimum amount, and therefore that he cannot for Inhibition for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis; (c) CONSIDER the comment dated September 20,
complain of a lack of due process, either in his conviction or 1996 of Judge Teh filed in compliance with the resolution of
in the amount of the judgment. The plea was not guilty, and 2. Ordering the movant to pay the undersigned August 19, 1996 as comment on the complaint; and
he was convicted. No matter what the evidence was against respondent in the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees
him, he had the right to have an impartial judge. He and expenses for litigation; (d) require the parties to MANIFEST within fifteen (15)
seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the days from notice hereof whether they are willing to submit
trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which 3. Cost of this suit. this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already
existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the filed herein. 3
outcome and because of his official motive to convict and to
In his manifestation, dated 29 April 1997, respondent Judge waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be
expressed his willingness to submit the case for resolution relates to official actuations in a case but should apply accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 15
on the basis of his comment which he repleaded and himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the
reproduced. He also made his observation that the complaint cases in his court. He is merely a nominal party to the case WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Angelito C. Teh
of Atty. Macalintal had not been under oath. and has no personal interest nor personality therein. 8 guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the Court hereby
dismisses him from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
In his compliance, dated 24 April 1997, complainant Respondent's folly did not stop there. When complainant and with prejudice to re-employment in any other branch,
informed the Court that his letter of 01 April 1996 was not filed a motion for respondent's inhibition in Election Case No. instrumentality or agency of the government, including
intended as an administrative complaint but that he was R-95-001, the latter, instead of acting thereon in accordance government-owned and controlled corporations.
leaving the matter of treating it as such to the discretion of with Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court, hired his own
this Court in the exercise of its administrative control and lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith denied Judge C. Teh is hereby enjoined upon his receipt hereof to
supervision over the members of the judiciary. He likewise the same, ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to pay cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining
manifested his willingness to submit the case for resolution P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation to his office.
on the basis of the pleadings already filed. He, in passing, expenses "for compelling the respondent Judge to engage
informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July 1996 issued the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to the This decision is immediately executory.
by respondent judge was found by the COMELEC to be Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both
"irrational." as a party litigant and as a judge before his own court. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of
Judge Angelito C. Teh with this Court.
While Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that In the Court's resolution of 12 March 1997, respondent was
complaints against Judges should be sworn to, the Court directed to act on the motion for inhibition in accordance with SO ORDERED.
deems it proper to dispense with the requirement since the the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137, 9 of the Republic of the Philippines
letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the recommendation of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge either misunderstood or SUPREME COURT
Office of the Court Administrator, has heretofore been chose to misunderstand the directive for, in his order, dated Manila
treated as an administrative complaint and considering, 17 April 1997, he granted the motion for inhibition "in
further, that respondent Judge, in his comment, practically compliance with the resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the EN BANC
admitted all pertinent allegations of complainant. Under the Court, in its resolution of 12 March 1997, merely required
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its respondent Judge to act on the motion for inhibition in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006
authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with the
would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
misconduct. 4 determination of the question of his disqualification." vs.
Certainly, he was not directed by the Court either to grant or JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
Section 5, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court 5 provides: deny the motion.
x--------------x
Sec. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. When Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of
the petition filed related to the acts or omissions of a court or courts need not only be just but must be perceived to be just A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC March 31, 2006
judge, the petitioner shall join, as parties defendant with and completely free from suspicion or doubt both in its
such court or judge, the person or persons interested in fairness and integrity. 10 Judges, being the visible Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the representation of the law and, most importantly, of justice, 11 FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
duty of such person or persons to appear and defend, both should be the embodiment of independence, competence,
in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge and integrity. 12 Once again, the Court would also wish to x--------------x
affected by the proceedings, and costs awarded in such say that a member of the bench must continuously keep
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 March 31, 2006
person or persons in interest only, and not against the court and show acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
or judge. authoritative doctrines. 13 Not for a moment, indeed, does
the learning process in law cease. LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,
Evidently, the active participation of respondent judge, being vs.
merely a nominal or formal party 6 in the certiorari In the case before us, respondent's gross deviation from the JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
proceedings, is not called for. In Turqueza vs. Hernando, 7 acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest. In Castaos
the Court has explained: vs. Escao, J., 14 the Court has had occasion to state: DECISION
. . . (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
judge whose order is challenged in an appellate court does basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
not have to file any answer or take active part in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and "Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led
proceeding unless expressly directed by order of this Court. undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1
It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend, vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done
both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both THE CASES
whose order or decision is at issue. The judge should instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in
maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court (d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he
Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified
2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct; Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26
for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on (e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. August 1999.
him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the
psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to
application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the the private practice of law; prosecute.7 However, on 21 March 2000, he presented
required psychological evaluation exposed problems with himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by
self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal (f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge
deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual from the Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against
distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by
Floro was unfit to be a judge. hearing; Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge
Floros motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, (g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of
second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused; Justice Ramirez. 13
Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998. (h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered
settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN by the Court to comment on Judge Floros motion to dismiss,
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
(OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2 and the accused to sign the settlement even without the Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16
presence of the trial prosecutor; The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from
Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to (i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable
erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the
submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief the accused based on the ground that the accused is Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 "mahina ang pick-up"; Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17
recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge (j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13
Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez came
psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide; out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001,
Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against
under preventive suspension for the duration of the (k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of
investigation against him. Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and office.
the Philippine justice system;
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July
adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the (l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language 1999 preventive suspension follows:
complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the during court proceedings;
commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by 1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane
the audit team: (m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987. Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team,
Office of the Court Administrator 18
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self- Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred
laudatory statements regarding qualifications and for to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez 2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin
announcing in open court during court session his (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro 19
Judicial Conduct; was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the
resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate 3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L.
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20
quarters; proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized
medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the 4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in Court resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura,
violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures; suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the
administrative charges against him." He was barely eight Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch
months into his position. Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21
inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court chance to have the case be assigned to other judges In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc
Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice through an impartial raffle. adopted the recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge Floro,
Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October
Administrator22 When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999.
should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January
Ramirez23 "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report
(Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 and recommendation.
7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
Ramirez24 For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and
"8. Raffle of Cases: recommendation in this case as well as in the second case
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14
filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed.25 On 14 February xxxx February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the
2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26 other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M.
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. application of the interested party who seeks issuance of a No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have
Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage of his shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its
moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal station. willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein.
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private x x x x" Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her
without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order willingness to submit her case for decision based on the
complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private the special raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously
complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN. verified application of the interested party seeking a offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006,
provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judges Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M.
Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s No. 99-7-273-RTC.
2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative
opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 Circular. In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering
September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to render as
Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to well a consolidated decision.
October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C.
case.27 Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all
judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For
Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed
makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our
resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical
Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be concerned. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the
Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge
Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct). Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter
voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine
the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges
petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei. ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge
which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter judicial, not administrative.29 to be imposed.
written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel.28
The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted
following evaluation: (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in violation of with an evil mind or because of a psychological or mental
Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion of the subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x applicability of equity.
for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his
ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to nomination x x x."
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For
("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly discussed no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of
as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
These charges involve common facts and to treat them lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41
separately will be superfluous. Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge
DISCUSSION undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt
Floro acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a
succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self- ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human
laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the
announcing in open court during court session his statement regarding their qualifications or legal services judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against
qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held
Judicial Conduct reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of
for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or the code they swore to observe.
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory of court, had been announcing in open court his
is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon
honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct? 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of
LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom
start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to
law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might
with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the
Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice
Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book with, address, telephone number and special branch of law confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is
of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The practiced." In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities
people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to ask be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval,
Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions the honors he received from his law school with a claim of definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
were asked; hence the session commenced."33 being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of
simplicity and modesty required of judges. As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple
G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards containing the Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his misconduct only.
name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or only
improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by (b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as
to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye- sleeping quarters
earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro
include in their calling cards their former/present circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floros very own The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros
titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the
etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39 right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as
Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing
were given merely as tokens to close friends or by As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room."
reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of the 42
dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being
professional employment. more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or
its amendment, automatically classified violations of the factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping" on his
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or "alalay"
his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was his branch a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods
clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian
that during his initial court session, she would briefly amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that
announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when
honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro conduct which is a light charge. he saw the members thereof.
agreed as the introduction was done only during the first
week of his assumption into office. "Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper
"gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person
to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office granting the motion for release on recognizance is being e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court
hours and while there is no one else in the room. The issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither hearings on application for release on recognizance,
situation would have been different if there had been any rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included
allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just the interview/hearing on the applications for release on
facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial
wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are the chambers.45
service when he and his family used his chambers as hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
residential quarters, with the provincial government paying The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for
for the electrical bills. On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and ignorance of the rules on probation under Presidential
20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto his remonstrations, the release of an accused on
allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44 recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the
for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law,46
Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is
sensibilities of his staff who were understandably violated any rule of procedure with respect to the cases incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to
uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified
allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed. offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory request for provisional liberty."
orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated,
Procedure rendered and entered. Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem
that he completely did away with the requirement for an
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion xxxx investigation report by the probation officer. Under the
for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted
the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the only during the period for awaiting the submission of the
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the investigation report on the application for probation and the
accused requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge
the applications for release on recognizance, thus: Mijares49 :
The memorandum report reads:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions,
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on application
the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to
proceeded with the hearing of the following matters: 968, a Special Law on Probation. underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty
envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no
accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and due course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the
20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which
Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and of the City/Public Prosecutor. the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish
"People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15)
of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve
a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, the application for probation. By allowing the temporary
without the accused being sworn by the administering officer. Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the
(Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously
Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the
start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants.
hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous being a responsible member of the community where the (Emphasis supplied)
hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. form of direct and even cross examination questions. As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the
would automatically inform the accused that they are release of an accused on recognizance need not be in
qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of
would even instruct his staff to draft the application in behalf stand, since there is no such requirement. All that is stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals
of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of 50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final
will immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is
appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered
as Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of the accused are cases, etc. by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro
the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce
into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and
accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and should be held administratively liable. 59 measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65
20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma
Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. (d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is
John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And
written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty
Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put
his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule. The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his
members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro- ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and
Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the bonded accused who have to continually pay for the In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial
release on recognizance of the accused without the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases. judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party,
presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even
opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human
ordered the release without first requiring the probation what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from
officer to render a case study and investigation report on the for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would
accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of
accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing. could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned
assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows
accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear
was already a done deal even before the hearing on his not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk
application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law,
probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in litigant or private complainant that he sided with the but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is
the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a accused. equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that
matter of policy, had been approving applications for release casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not
on recognizance hastily and without observing the Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with
requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a constitutional significance.
nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and
accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when in the presence of his Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer (h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral
the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited with them especially those under detention as he, himself, No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due many unfounded offenses. 60 complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even
process." 52 without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court more credible especially since it is corroborated by (j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which
need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal
the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on eagerness in approving application for release on Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53 recognizance as previously discussed.
The memorandum report states:
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge
understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously. 54 should so behave at all times as to promote public During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge
office to know and simply apply it for anything less is This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent considering that the private complainant was not being
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if and honest but should be believed and perceived to be represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesars ascendancy and influence to convince the private
sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 63 complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of
harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the
rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion private complainants and the accused sign the settlement.
of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as
discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and Annex "8").
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias
and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of xxxx
beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress
20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on Order likewise dated 8 March 1999. at the instance of Judge Floro.
record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and
the accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras (i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts have prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of
reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally the accused based on the ground that the accused is
public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio. "mahina ang pick-up"
report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid
order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February
original order given in open court. Actually, the said criminal Appeals 68 wherein we declared: 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu
case was already settled even without the presence of the proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the
public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the
absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina
criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge ang pick-up." 70
private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
to the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is
(unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the
of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted
attached as Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo,
stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case). thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial
read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused
administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67 recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion
dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, of any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the
Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained bench and he appeared trembling and stammering;
against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial finality. (Emphasis supplied)
prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the amount c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily
to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order admitted that accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of
by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they made in open court ostensibly a judicial approval of a reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to compromise agreement which was amended or revised by
which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often
immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty
Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter- regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a and to not guilty, and so forth;
charges filed by the accused against the complaining compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall
witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to have submitted its comments thereto. 69 e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon
settle the case. However, the written Order issued by citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions
respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into Considering then that it was well within the discretion of of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of
by the parties in open court. Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135,
and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang
the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the (under paragraph "j" of the complaint). pick-up";
hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the
Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in
concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
considering that the parties suggested that they would file settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since
the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even it is well-settled that "the court may order a physical or
for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental
reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p.
conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs.
130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for
cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension
cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan
Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72
As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil
admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for trial is cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending before
Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the lower courts. 76
pick-up." side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case,
is not an actionable wrong. Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138
suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the (e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or
strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to
12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, engaging in the private practice of law client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which reads: on the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall not engage
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior in the private practice of law."
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge
scheduled dates of hearing claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound cases. 77
mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully In support of the above charges, the memorandum report
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently states: A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been
purpose. personal cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex
He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be some of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his
made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case
Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. he filed against his brothers for the custody of their "mild,
Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be admitted that he does not file an application for leave of mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he
made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well absence. prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could
within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He
of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone
assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by
upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79
found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued
make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as
Alcalde 75 : party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the counsel. 80
pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC,
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers Malabon. The proscription against the private practice of law by judges
that an accused is apparently in a present condition of is based on sound public policy, thus:
insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that
the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the [T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of
accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of
proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time
detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an extending special favors to their own private interests and
xxxx "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment with assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of
Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81
cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro
carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that
to the accused the information to enable him to effectively 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than an
prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or
While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature
deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a
suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully attached as Annex "9". lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of
satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge
assistance the law secures or gives. x x x. Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe
to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the "yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by
does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Rules of Court, to wit: the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and
Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he "Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes,
himself is the petitioner. of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a
realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila maraming unauthorized recording of a private conversation is
unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh ako wala inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents
Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin except na thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floros word against
oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical hindi papayag kasi marami diyang " that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath
explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize the
was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these
judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court, particular charges would therefore depend upon which party
in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of the case involving his brother. He even condemned the is more credible.
Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute unfairness of the system. Thus, he said: Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
pending before another court or administrative agency." By
doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow "Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01
judge in a very awkward position. korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the
napakayaman, ako walang pera." Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim
that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of his He continued: A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of
personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time
Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was "Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said
incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of that since theory and the practice of law are very different,
we have held that although administrative proceedings are my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases.
not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun ganun Sabi Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise
of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "Dyan sa
limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of
process. 84 Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the
the Philippine justice system isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya very institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to
malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85 courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in
language during court proceedings the justice system?
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically
The memorandum report reads: arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by xxxx
his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for
observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by court proceedings?
was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro).
Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the
(Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher,
also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A". he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding
contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty.
xxxx staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang
No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by babaing yan" and then he would call even not during court
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter
A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not
Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. this was inside his chambers. surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a
During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and
parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with During the investigation, it was established that the two Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow
the trial. tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is
already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly judge
content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites 4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct
for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and
discussed in open Court, before all of us, the court staff proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, 5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct
present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will
defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge.
to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious
actual transcription of the proceedings because it contained honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from
offensive languages against the justice system, against a of a judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which office without salary and other benefits for more than three
certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P
Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the
instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility responsible for any detraction therefrom. circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that
of the amicable settlement between the parties, he Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was
integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to
may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is no
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt
in the record because it contained offensive languages the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The
highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, avoided. fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as
"putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and
etcetera, etcetera". 88 Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of
straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition
especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions
himself. death and that he has unseen "little friends" are of his office
manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions and As we have explained, the common thread which binds the
because subject utterances are consistent with Judge responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-
Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to 1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro
with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90 embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an
having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his appropriate mental or psychological examination and which
utterances against the judicial system on account of his Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets the charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform
are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived guidelines in the administration of justice following the the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in
were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by ratification of the 1987 Constitution. disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of
the persons who were either in charge of the cases against dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best
although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably linked The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview
he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which
sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in
his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by
that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic
Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he
quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a There are evidences of developing psychotic process at
conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent But before we even go into that, we must determine the present.
proof of violation on Judge Floros part. appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13
charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found REMARKS:
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13
1987 charges against him. Thus: Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious
during the interview. He was argumentative and over
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro 1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of
marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he 2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of
discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He
Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain 3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of
studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National
was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self- responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when
discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93 Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15
of his achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the services of a
accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out
analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001.
he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, 107
and that the biggest secret of the universe are the "unseen resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological
things." He can predict future events because of "power in capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for
psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro the third time in December 2000, this time in connection with
released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical
13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" examination." Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that
seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him. "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate her part, stated that:
irrelevant. psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in
the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a
disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu.
(conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive
level). 92 Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court educational background, his current functioning is gauged
on 22 February 2000. 96 along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro
again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when The order to submit to the appropriate psychological He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine
he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by
Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing
(Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to
evaluation. Dr. Vista observed: sanctions. 97 make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu.
Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed
and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural
reluctant to reveal information about his family background motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and
and would rather talk about his work and academic duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a
achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99 delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has
into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the interfered and tainted his occupational and social
various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his
and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision- things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court court duties as a judge. 108
making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation
swings with the slightest provocation. that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of
before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G.
change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code
of social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills of Medical Ethics. 103 The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus
and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three[3]
ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists,
perceptual distortions were evident during the interview. of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend
sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
mental retardation (68) which is below the expected According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of
cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down,
academic background and achievements, he has lapses in al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations
judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104 The Court en banc conducted by several mental health professionals which
character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in
and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena was ordered to submit to psychological and mental connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon
though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the
judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report
dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as
Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo- outlook of the patient? a Judge.
Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation
(MPC), states in part: A: Yes, Sir. xxxx
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] xxxx
CHARACTERISTICS proceedings and you were here when we were cross-
examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in A: Yes, Sir. 110
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources the course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his
to cope with everyday demands. He is able to handle both failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior
concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook? Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated
he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the
between things and ideas. xxxx interview Judge Floro
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where A: Yes, Sir. [W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about
he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics
tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize Q: Fatal [flaw]? intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational,
procedures and details so as to get things done correctly logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent,
and on schedule. He uses conventional standards to A: Yes, Sir. emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no
determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111
readily accept others ideas and contributions especially if Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview
these oppose his own. that he is capable of being in a trance? This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla,
M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report that
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is A: He did not.
expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-
emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he
and decisions. letters? was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times
approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented,
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS A: He did not. conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English.
He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and xxxx was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech
respected for his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he with tendency to be argumentative or defensive but there
sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of
others according to these standards. When things do not who will not be pronouncing or making pronouncement associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited.
develop along desired lines, he may become restless and concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct? Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious.
impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature There were no abnormal involuntary movements or tics.
and can be expected to comply with conventional social xxxx Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment,
demands. 109 insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not
A: Yes sir. reveal abnormal results.
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A.
Reyes opined on cross-examination that "psychologically Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation
speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus: that he is capable of having trances in the course of his of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his
private activities and even in the course of the performance nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112
JUDGE AQUINO: of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on A: I agree with you, Sir. Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had its
his testimony here and on every available records of the limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain
proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality information left out by his patient. 114 The following
Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha exchange is thus instructive:
Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by
Powers to be a fatal [flaw]? location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the
pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known as
xxxx pagiging reality oriented? duwendes?
xxxx Q: When you said abnormal something would have made Based on the clinical observation and the results of the
you suspect that there was abnormality in the person of psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro,
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health Judge Floro? Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-
doctor you might have missed some information or it is oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic
possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us A: Given the data. disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable
everything. of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro further studies/work-ups.
as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge
course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba
altered a little? typing a letter? also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge. 117 The
relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino
xxxx xxxx are hereunder reproduced:
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is
may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any probably drastically altered. 115 wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with
corroborative contradiction. power of [bi-location]?
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the xxxx
transpired after the interview, would that be correct? relevant portions of which state:
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to
A: The interview has its limitations. Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was be in two (2) places at one time.
observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his Q: And that something must be wrong?
interview are confirmed by events that transpired after the profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction
interview, would you not say you have more reason to have with the way his colleagues are handling his pending A: Yes.
your evaluation altered? administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented
and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a
A: Yes. perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in this very
place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision- case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit,
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview making capacity were adequately functioning. another person, another character unseen who is with him at
Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the number the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as xxxx
a psychic at all? xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion of witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for
"sumapi" to me is unbelievable. the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that xxxx
there is this difficulty in manners of attention span and
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience A: Yes. 118
from some delusion? trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is
manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez,
xxxx rationalize or to control expressions or as well as physical reported that:
when he is in a trance.
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T.
distortion, your Honor. Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla,
proceeding, he was in a trance? respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of
Q: No, Delusion. insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial
A: No, I have not encountered any. Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes. Manila, Branch 73.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse? maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his
person. pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not finish
A: Both are on the same footing. his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state
A: Maybe weird. in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila,
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and
proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters would Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo
turn out to be fit to become a judge? of the proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000, Cabauatan who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is
afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic powers
xxxx Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is
trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and
a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. for him to say that he is very successful over many other
mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations Thats a trance that is created by the so called Because applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is
or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda.
symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd,
hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge
duration. hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So
psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I never is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge? was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude
A: Yes, doubtful capacity. this very moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or
ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and
you are practicing with psychiatry. Jr.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge
see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from
A: Yes. Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein Judge doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue
Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in discharging the functions of his office.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person? RECOMMENDATION
particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was
doing so, he was under trance normal. A: No. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by
reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to
xxxx Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional
proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be
considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound had and still had a socalled counter part, his other side, REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119
syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the
phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic claim of a normal, mental sound person? We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot
mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental
syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of A: No. impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of
concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA
person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose] Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is
concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony course not fit to sit as judge?
"insane" as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both
his case have never said so. place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their
and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case 128
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb.
general laymans term, a catchall word referring to various In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is
mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant,
medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the went to state that "psychic phenomena" was destined to goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
signs and symptoms of psychosis. testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
Floros decision is quoted hereunder: discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy,
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial
contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An 3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness necessity of order in the social life." 129
honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is
administer justice in order to promote the stability of INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be
much of the weight in this daunting task of administering to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief,
courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be Despite his impressive academic background and
of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that problems with decision-making. His character traits such as
are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123 is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion: paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper
honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross Ineria were "sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21,
misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the
psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his that he saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and eight months that he served as RTC judge, indubitably
case indicate gross deficiency in competence and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an
independence. THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE impartial judge.
IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY; Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of
"psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of his government. Thus:
power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR
and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted
Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by and identified himself with large components of the judges
that he had been seen by several people to have been in accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is
two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously,
"angel of death" who can inflict pains on people, especially TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial
upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of
Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY behavior that the judges role demands. A large proportion of
sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own should have been corrected to another word SUITABLE to his experiences on the bench develop and reinforce such
witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture
black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and
powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in reason that the seeming error DAY should be corrected; the even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve
his chambers during his break time. All these things validate Courts sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the
the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his
uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must
action. DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as
WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 a judge. 131
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief (Emphasis supplied)
system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than
acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that those expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system. guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or
independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve executives. 132
to other requirements, persons of proven competence,
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18 The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under
i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and justice, October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules of preventive suspension resolved to:
but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in
Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in (1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the
judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from
but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro
legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity." and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for
133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the states: investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60)
functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT
States: SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x mental institution.
self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own
views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino
shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE
judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the
a right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power. and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council. administrative charges against him. 140
xxxx It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge
well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist or Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the
accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134 mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as
Court Clinic. amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90)
fundamental requirements of competence and objectivity It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as days from the date of its commencement or within such
expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and,
continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the
challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary. AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit
years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years. recommendation." 142
other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his
not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by
have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would
cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major and a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his
unfortunate faux pas. disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to substantive rights." 138 administrative case against him or her. 143 This is because
his application for judgeship. He went through the entire
gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be
JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to followed in administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, [U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges
having failed the psychological examinations given by the Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when who are charged with a serious offense warranting
SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon
the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above.
evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final
the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere decision is reached in the administrative case especially
is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in
procuring these evaluations. inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to
courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the
to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental and pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image
psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and
had been guided primarily by the Constitution which law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition substantive rights.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde,
the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13
servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, charges against him.
the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive
looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not
proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase
144 Appeals, should likewise be applied. Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are
free of blame. As we are wont to say:
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation
suspension up to the present because of the serious charge would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach
of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a and do complete justice where courts of law, through the
investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than
Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his administrative charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis courts. 148
to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be
examination. Worse, what started out as single case against emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to
him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first blame for the delay in the resolution of his case, equitable
one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on considerations constrain us to award him back salaries,
Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived just and equitable grounds. 147 allowances and other economic benefits for a period
had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros
last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily
Ramirez. 146 Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at
compassion in this case considering that the rules on themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the
included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We investigation." Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months The period of three years seems to us the most equitable
have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, even pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give
thus: months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it
of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven
who was placed under preventive suspension pending And, though he was given donations by those who came to cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February
investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to
allowances and other economic benefits for the entire his loss of income as Judge. peg the period at less than three years then the same would
duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension
doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held he had to live through with Damocles sword hanging over
peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days should be his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice
preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders". the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a his profession.
matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries,
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for allowances and other economic benefits for a period Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case
13 months, during which period he was not paid his corresponding to three of his almost seven years against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro,
teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of
Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the merit.
several loans to provide for his familys basic needs. indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he
perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed through
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the
entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-
have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this
suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to
measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is
conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as dismissed for being moot and academic.
ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation already discussed, contributed to the delay in the
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically ERNESTO VALVERDE, PABLO PABILONA, ARMANDO
disabling condition. MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and CECILIO OOVILLA,
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. respondents-appellees.
No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is without Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to
basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors (and, Tordesilla & Advincula for petitioners-appellants.
necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit. unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we
cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse Mariano M. Lozada for private respondents-appellees.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with environment factors they have no control over.
it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
including government-owned or controlled corporations. AQUINO, J.:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the
considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460; second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first
the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor decision and holding that it was improper from Benjamin M.
disqualification from appointment to any other public office 2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines.
and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's
as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set
Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re- immediately; aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should
entering government service for positions that do not require review anew the decision of the Director of Mines "and,
him to dispense justice. The reports contain 3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court".
statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits The antecedental proceedings are as follows:
cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal corresponding to three (3) years;
consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor 4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he
modification of work environment. Thus: Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants
MERIT; and (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared
self- organization." 149 5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private
in private practice." 150 SO ORDERED. respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a
Republic of the Philippines demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest),
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre- SUPREME COURT Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover
occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena not Manila any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in
detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151 accordance with law.
SECOND DIVISION
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining
in moderate proficiency . His concern for the details that G.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979 claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo
make up a total field represents his attempts at being Pabilona, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly
systematic and cautious." 152 ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO P. NAVA, located and registered (pp. 224-231, Record on Appeal).
VIOLA S. NAVA, FEDERICO S. NAVA, PERLA NAVA,
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153 HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDRO S. NAVA, (2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the
PURIFICACION SISON, A. TORDESILLAS, GUIDO Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a ADVINCULA, PEDRO ANGULO and TOMAS MARAMBA, appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed
judge because of the sensitive nature of said position, he petitioners-appellants, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of
may still be successful in other areas of endeavor. vs. inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 2151, on August 16, 1963 as it he was adjudicating the case
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, for the first time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate
that Judge Floros current administrative and medical GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ, ALEJANDRO MENDEZ, jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of
problems are not totally of his making. He was duly NICANOR MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMO Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from
appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, YABUT, ANDRES R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO, his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as
appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of CASIMIRO N. EBIDO, ENRIQUE RIVERA, SEVERINO trial judge and appellate judge in the same case.
dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and MIVA, ELENITO B. MARTINEZ, LUCAS EDURAIN,
FELIMON ENCIO, EMILIO ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA,
He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed The defendants-movants prayed that the appeal be
mining claims, while, on the other hand, the Martinez and dismissed, meaning that the decisions of the lower court and In contrast, the private respondents, who did not appeal from
Pabilona groups had validly located the said claims. Hence, of Director and Secretary Gozon be affirmed. the second decision of the Court of Appeals, instead of
he dismissed the appeal from his own decision (pp. 340-341, sustaining its holding that this case be referred to the
Record on Appeal). The petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration. In Minister of Natural Resources or instead of defending that
their opposition, they reiterated the contention in their brief second decision, they being appellees, pray for the
(3) On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed a that Secretary Gozon's decision was void and, therefore, the affirmance of the trial court's judgment sustaining the
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, factual findings therein are not binding on the courts. decisions of Director and Secretary Gozon.
assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that they
be declared the prior locators and possessors of the sixty- As already stated, the same Sixth Division (composed of The inconsistent positions of the parties, which were induced
nine mineral claims in question. Impleaded as defendants in Pascula, Agrava and Maco, JJ.) in its second decision of by the contradictory decisions of the Court of Appeals,
the case were the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural October 13, 1978, set aside its first decision and granted the constitute the peculiar twist of this case in this Court.
Resources, the Director of Mines and the members of the motion for curiously enough, the first decision was
Martinez and Pabilona groups. reconsidered not on the ground advanced by the movants- We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of
defendants, now the private respondents (Martinez and discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The
After hearing, the lower court sustained Secretary Gozon's Pabilona groups), which was that the factual findings of the palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and
decision and dismissed the case. It held that the administrative officials should be upheld, but on the ground Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of
disqualification petition of a judge to review his own decision raised in petitioners' opposition, namely, that Secretary Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining
or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to Gozon's decision was void because he was disqualified to Law, Commonwealth Act No. 13-i, provides:
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining review his own decision as Director of Mines.
Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining
Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he So, as already noted, the Court of Appeals in its second locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for
had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a decision remanded the case to the Minister of Natural decision:
ground for disqualification; that the petitioners did not Resources for another review of Director Gozon's decision.
seasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon from This was the prayer of the petitioners in their brief but in their Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines
deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that opposition to the motion for reconsideration, they prayed that may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
the Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, the first decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor be Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt.
animosity or hostility to the petitioners (pp. 386-9, Record on maintained.
Appeal). In case any one of the parties should disagree from the
(6) The second decision did not satisfy the parties. They filed decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary
(4) The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The motions for reconsideration. The petitioners in their motion of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be
Sixth Division of that Court (Pascual, Agcaoili and Climaco, reiterated their prayer that the first decision be reinstated. taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days
JJ.) in its decision dated February 15, 1978 reversed the They abandoned their prayer that the case be returned to from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the said
judgment of the trial court and declared that the petitioners the Minister of Natural Resources. On the other hand, the decision or order shag be final and binding upon the parties
were the rightful locators and possessors of the said sixty- private respondents in their motion insisted that the trial concerned. (As amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved
nine mining claims and held as invalid the mining claims court's decision be affirmed on the basis of the factual on June 18,1952).*
overlapping the same. findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Court of Appeals Undoubtedly, the provision of section 61 that the decision of
That Division found that the petitioners (Nava group) had denied both motions in its resolutions of December 27, 1978 the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of
discovered minerals and had validly located the said sixty- and January 15, 1979. Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the
nine mining claims and that there was no sufficient basis for Secretary should be a person different from the Director of
Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining claims of the Only the petitioners appealed from the second decision of Mines.
Martinez and Pabilona groups were validly located. the Court of Appeals. There is an arresting and noteworthy
peculiarity in the present posture of this case now on appeal In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
(5) The defendants, now the private respondents- to this Court (as arresting and noteworthy as the peculiarity officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer
appellees, filed a motion for reconsideration based that Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
principally on the ground that the Court of Appeals should of Mines), under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or
have respected the factual findings of the Director of Mines there would be no real review of the case. The decision of
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on That twist or peculiarity is that while the petitioners (Nava the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it
the theory that the facts found in administrative decisions group) in their appellants' brief in the Court of Appeals would be the same view since being human, he would not
cannot be disturbed on appeal to the courts, citing Republic prayed that Secretary Gozon's decision, alleged to be admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
Act No. 4388 which amended section 61 of the Mining Law biased, be declared void and that the case be returned to the
effective June 19, 1965; Pajo vs. Ago, 108 Phil. 905; Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for another That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the
Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz 65 O.G. review of Director Gozon's order, in their appellants' brief in disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the
8473; Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 119 Phil. 169, Ortua vs. this Court, they changed that relief and they now pray that appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his decision or
Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440. the second decision of the Court of Appeals, referring this ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of
case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another review, Court: secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law).
be declared void and that its first decision be affirmed.
A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without On September 12, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint
things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing issuing any receipt. A confrontation took place where against respondent PAL before the NLRC-NCR for illegal
his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked petitioner was asked by the security officer to empty his dismissal, attorney's fees and damages. The case was
his undersecretary to undertake the review. pockets. The dollars paid by Ms. Kondo were not found in docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 and
his possession. However, when the lower panel of the raffled off to then Labor Arbiter Raul T. Aquino. Aquino found
Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, check-in counter he was manning was searched, the sum of the evidence adduced by private respondent PAL in
meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon two hundred sixty five dollars (US $265) was found therein terminating petitioner's employment insufficient. Aquino
reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. (See Amos consisting of two (2) one hundred dollar bills, one (1) fifty declared petitioner's dismissal illegal and ordered his
Treat & Co. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 306 dollar bill, one (1) ten dollar bill and one (1) five dollar bill. reinstatement with backwages. Respondent PAL appealed
F. 2nd 260, 267.) Petitioner was administratively charged and investigated by the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On May 19, 1995, the
a committee formed by private respondent PAL.[3] Second Division of public respondent NLRC, composed of
WHEREFORE, we set aside the order of the Secretary of Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay, Rogelio I. Rayala
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated August 16, 1963 as In an affidavit presented to the investigators, Ms. Kondo and Raul T. Aquino as presiding commissioner, promulgated
affirmed by the trial court as well as the first decision of the declared that she was with three (3) Japanese friends when its Resolution reversing the decision of then Labor Arbiter
Court of Appeals. she checked in on June 7, 1991, for their flight to Narita, Aquino and dismissing the complaint against respondent
Japan. While in line, a man approached her and told her that PAL. Petitioner filed on June 5, 1995, a motion for the
We affirm its second decision, returning the case to the she had excess baggage. She denied the allegation since reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution and an
Minister of Natural Resources, with the directive that the pieces of baggage did not only belong to her but also to Amended Motion for Reconsideration on June 15, 1995.
petitioners' appeal to the Minister be resolved de novo with her Japanese companions. The man did not believe that the Public respondent NLRC, thru the Second Division with only
the least delay as provided for in Presidential Decree No. Japanese were her companions and he charged that she two commissioners taking part, namely, Commissioners
309, "establishing rules and procedures for the speedy just approached them at the airport. To settle the matter, he Calaycay and Rayala, denied the motion.
disposition or settlement of conflicting mining claims". told her to give him two hundred dollars (US $200) and he
apologized for their argument. She gave him one (1) one Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
We reverse the second part of that second decision stating hundred dollar bill and two (2) fifty dollar bills or a total of two of Court where petitioner submits the following assignment
that "thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial hundred dollars (US $200) as excess baggage fee. She of errors:
court". That portion is unwarranted because the trial court placed the money at the side of his counter desk and he
does not retain any jurisdiction over the case once it is covered it with a piece of paper. He did not issue a receipt. "I. Public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of
remanded to the Minister of Natural Resources. No costs. She then reported the matter to JAL's representative. Ms. discretion and/or in excess of jurisdiction when the Hon.
Kondo identified the employee who checked her in as the Raul T. Aquino, in his capacity as Presiding Commissioner of
SO ORDERED. petitioner.[4] the Second Division of the NLRC and as a member thereof,
SECOND DIVISION participated actively in the promulgation of the aforesaid
[G.R. No. 122389. June 19, 1997] In his affidavit, petitioner admitted that he was the one who decision and in the consultation of the members thereof in
checked in Ms. Kondo and her Japanese companions. They reaching the conclusion before it was assigned to the
MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR checked in five (5) pieces of luggage which weighed 80 kilos ponente, Hon. Calaycay.
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, and within the allowed limit for check-in baggage. He
INC. (PAL), respondents. attached the claim checks to the jacket of their tickets, "II. Public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion as
DECISION returned the tickets and passport to Ms. Kondo. He then in fact it exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the
PUNO, J.: heard an altercation involving a woman passenger with affidavit of Lolita Kondo sufficient to declare his dismissal
excess hand-carried baggage who was being charged for it; from employment legal even without any cross-examination
Assailed in the petition for certiorari before us is the she was insisting she had paid for it in the counter but could during the investigation conducted by Philippine Air Lines.
Resolution of the public respondent National Labor Relations not produce a receipt. The passenger turned out to be Ms.
Commission[1] (hereinafter NLRC) reversing the Decision of Kondo and she was accusing Cocoy Gabriel as the one who "III. Public respondent NLRC seriously and gravely erred
the Labor Arbiter[2] in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 charged her for excess baggage. Mr. Gabriel at that time amounting to abuse of discretion and/or in excess of its
finding the dismissal of petitioner Miguel Singson illegal and was assigned at the THAI Airways counter, hence, it was jurisdiction when it declared in the assailed decision that the
ordering his reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion for impossible that a passenger for a JAL flight would pay him quantum of evidence necessary to justify the supreme
reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent US $200. Petitioner was talking to the JAL's representative penalty of dismissal of the petitioner have been complied
in an Order dated June 27, 1995. when two PAL employees and Ms. Kondo approached them. with, and in not imposing the burden of proving the legality of
He was told of Ms. Kondo's claim that she paid the excess the dismissal of the petitioner."
The antecedent facts reveal that petitioner Singson was baggage fee to him. Petitioner was surprised at the
employed by private respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. accusation since Ms. Kondo had no excess baggage when We find merit in this petition.
(hereinafter PAL) as Traffic Representative Passenger, she checked in.[5]
Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in Petitioner assails the Resolution of the public respondent
passengers and baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, The investigation committee found petitioner guilty of the NLRC on account of Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's
1991, petitioner was assigned to serve the check-in counter offense charged and recommended his dismissal. Private participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his own
of Japan Air Lines (hereinafter JAL) for Flight 742. Among respondent PAL adopted the committee's recommendation decision as labor arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-
the passengers checked in by him was Ms. Lolita Kondo and dismissed him from the service effective June 7, 1991. 05750-91. Respondents contend that Commissioner
who was bound for Narita, Japan. After checking in, Ms. [6] Aquino's failure to inhibit himself is a harmless error that will
Kondo lodged a complaint alleging that petitioner required not infirm the subject resolution. We do not agree. In the
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[7] we laid He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the postdated 21 July 1992; that as of 20 July 1992 V & G Better
down the requisites of procedural due process in resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his Homes SA No. 365-535506-4 has only P33,436.78; that in
administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing, right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The the afternoon of 20 July 1992 the amount of P2,336,563.32
which includes the right to present one's case and submit denial of petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal (consisting of P2,200,000.00 in cash; P100,000.00 in check;
evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. and P36,563.22 in withdrawal slip) was received by Teller
the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have Mary Ann Aznar as payment for the loan of V & G Better
something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the Second Division Homes for which PNB Official Receipt No. 952981E was
substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence of the NLRC dated May 19, 1995 and its Order dated June issued; that the transaction was recognized as an increase
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record 27, 1995 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 is SET in PNB Cebu Branchs cash-on-hand and a decrease in the
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body ASIDE. The case is remanded to the NLRC for further loan account of V & G Better Homes; that the PNB Cebu
or any of its judges must act on its own independent proceedings. No Costs. Credit Committee approved the loan at the rate of 23% lower
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not than the 26% interest rate on its first renewal and 27% on its
simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the Board or SO ORDERED. second renewal; that the loan proceeds was credited to the
body should, in all controversial questions, render its SECOND DIVISION account of V & G Better Homes on 21 July 1992, the same
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding [G.R. No. 159190. June 30, 2005] day that the withdrawal slip of P2.2 M was taken by Mr.
can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the Montesa from Ms. Jecong and given to Irene Abellanosa to
decision rendered. In addition, administrative due process CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. be taken as her transaction for the day; and that upon the
includes (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, instruction of Montesa, Savings Account No. 365-535506-4
the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's respondents. of V & G Better Homes was debited and the withdrawal slip
legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend DECISION was validated by Teller Abellanosa although no actual cash
his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: withdrawal was made.
in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated
competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that Court, with application for temporary restraining order, seeks Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein,
tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the to nullify the Ombudsmans disapproval of the Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch
hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to memorandum[1] dated 03 November 1999 of Special Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch,
the parties.[8] It is self-evident from the ruling case law that Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as
the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of
same person whose decision is the subject of review. Thus, No. 21654, as well as the memorandum[2] dated 09 June PNB funds.
we have ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce be 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
other than the officer whose decision is under review."[9] In an order dated 22 December 1992, the Office of the
The Facts Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered Tejano,
In the case at bar, we hold that petitioner was denied due Montesa, Jecong, Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz to
process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine file their respective counter-affidavits.[4]
presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan,
in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation regarding an In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation
reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under alleged unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the
Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G) under Savings proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
NLRC,[10] each Division shall consist of one member from Account No. 365-5355-6-4. Act No. 3019,[5] as amended, against petitioner Cayetano A.
the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G.
Commissioner and one member each from the workers and The report, as summarized by Special Prosecution Officer III [6] The case against Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for
employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Jesus A. Micael, is as follows:[3] lack of evidence. The resolution was approved by Deputy
Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then
among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of . . . [I]n the morning of 17 July 1992, Emilio P. Montesa Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the (Bank Executive Officer of PNB Cebu) handed a note to
start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can Jane Rita Jecong (Cashier) instructing her to include her The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special
hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who cash requisition for the day from Central Bank Cebu, the Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines of the Office of the Special
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited amount of P2.2 M at P1,000.00 denomination; that on 20 Prosecutor.
himself from any participation in this case. July 1992 at about past 10:00 A.M., Juanito Mata (Cashier
III), upon the instruction of Cayetano A. Tejano Jr. (Vice In a Memorandum[7] dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed
Prescinding from this premise, the May 19, 1995 resolution President and Branch Manager of PNB Cebu), took the P2.2 the resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G.
of the respondent NLRC is void for the Division that handed M from Ms. Jecong and delivered the same to Mr. Tejano; Canton.
it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. that at about noontime of same day, Mr. Mara handed to Ms.
The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that Jecong a pre-signed withdrawal slip against SA No. 365- On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G.
the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied 535506-4 under the name of V & G Better Homes for the Ferrer recommended the approval of the memorandum of
by two commissioners and without the participation of same amount to replace the cash withdrawn and to serve as Special Prosecution Officer Ines.
Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial cash-on-hand at the end of the days transaction; that the
review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. withdrawal slip was approved by Mr. Tejano and was
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special submitted to the respondent court before receiving the RECONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL BY THE NEW
Prosecutor, concurred in the approval of Ferrer.[8] motion for reconsideration.[12] OMBUDSMAN.
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11
November 1994. Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office II
of the Special Prosecutors failure to resolve his motion for
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution[13] dated 24 March WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED AGAINST THE
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, 2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the ACCUSED IS A CLEAR CASE OF PERSECUTION AND
was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as Ombudsman to resolve the said motion. NOT PROSECUTION CONTEMPLATED UNDER R.A. 3019,
Criminal Case No. 21654. AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-
In a memorandum[14] dated 09 June 2003, Special GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, REPUBLIC ACT
On 08 December 1994, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial of the NO. 1374 AND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII, BOOK
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special II OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Motion for Reinvestigation. Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed his previous position
and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal III
In an order dated[9] 12 December 1994, the Sandiganbayan of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special
granted the motion for reinvestigation. Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
On 22 December 1994, petitioner filed his motion for On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who
reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved Ruling of the Court
Joselito Ferrers memorandum recommending the denial of
On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the motion for reconsideration. Quite apart from the above, we find a focal issue apparently
the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.[10] glossed over by the parties - whether or not Ombudsman
The reinvestigation was assigned to Special Prosecution Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in
Officer III Jesus Micael. issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the disapproving the 03 November 1999 memorandum of
Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner No. 21654. dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 against petitioner
Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz, Special Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G
Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum[11] dated 03 On 25 August 2003, the First Division of this Court issued for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, where he
November 1999, recommended the dismissal of the case. the temporary restraining order prayed for. had earlier participated in the preliminary investigation of the
The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special said criminal case recommending the filing of the
Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special On 28 July 2004, the instant petition was transferred to the information.
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. Second Division of this Court.
This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, Issues interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory
as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for Petitioner raises the following issues: powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent
the dismissal of the case with the marginal note assign the in the Ombudsman who beholden to no one, acts as the
case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case I champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of
aggressively. public service.[15] Such discretionary power of the
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court to review,
On 02 February 2000, Special Prosecutor Micael filed a OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse
Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his DISCRETION WHEN IT DISAPPROVED THE EARLIER of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the
memorandum, informing the Sandiganbayan of the RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE latter.
disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation AGAINST ALL THE ACCUSED WITHOUT ANY COGENT
to dismiss the case. OR VERIFIABLE REASON AMOUNTING TO LACK OF Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY: exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
Reconsideration of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto 1. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ABUSED ITS jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
of the recommendation of Micael. DISCRETION IN THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1999 AGAINST ALL refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
Apparently, petitioners motion for reconsideration was not ACCUSED FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000, Special MANDATED UNDER SECTION 13 R.A. 6770 IN RELATION arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set TO SECTION 3, RULE 112 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL hostility.[16]
the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that the PROCEDURE.
prosecution did not give due course to the motion for Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse
reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion 2. THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROCECUTOR DID NOT of discretion. Petitioner attributes partiality on the part of
which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
added that the results of the reinvestigation were already A RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is recommended the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654, as
the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or well as the memorandum dated 09 June 2003, which denied
in the recommendation for the filing of the information before there would be no real review of the case. The decision of petitioners motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The
the Sandiganbayan. the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it case is remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for further
would be the same view since being human, he would not proceedings. No costs.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the SO ORDERED.
same person whose decision is under review. [17] In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Republic of the Philippines
Zambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, Government[23] concedes the applicability of the prohibition SUPREME COURT
[18] the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, Manila
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been thus:
established that the case concerned an appeal of the SECOND DIVISION
Secretarys own previous decision, which he handed down Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the
while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. We have objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should G.R. No. 173277 February 25, 2015
equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited
Division of the National Labor Relations Commission, from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
because one of its members, Commissioner Raul Aquino, but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the vs.
participated in the review of the case which he had earlier parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, COURT OF APPEALS, 20TH
decided on as a former labor arbiter.[19] Likewise, this Court inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as DIVISION, CEBU CITY, Respondents.
struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistance important as reality.
Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service DECISION
Commission, in which he, then concurrently its Chairman, The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating
had earlier concurred.[20] officer conducting a preliminary investigation. This is the MENDOZA, J.:
reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
the instant case and having recommended the filing of an supervision over the prosecution arm of the government, is Court assails the May 2, 2006 Resolution1 of the Court of
appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto given ample power to designate another prosecutor to Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737, which denied the
to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same handle the investigation and prosecution of a case when the motion for intervention and reconsideration of its January 21,
during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise disqualified by 2005 Decision,2 filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman
review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty. (Ombudsman).
No. 6770, which provides: (Underlining supplied)
The Antecedents
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and Desiertos disapproval of the 03 November 1999 The present controversy stemmed from the administrative
duties: memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael complaint lodged by Gilda D. Daradal (Daradal), a clerk in
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 the Provincial Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar,
... was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman against private respondent Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo
Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar, with the Office of
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or Desiertos actuation. As stressed in Singson v. NLRC:[24] the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual
representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the Harassment and Oppression, docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-
effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions . . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact 96-04846.
and duties herein or hereinafter provided; . . . that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was
denied by two commissioners and without the participation of In her complaint, Daradal alleged that on July 19, 1996, at
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial about 10:00 oclock in the morning at the Motor Pool Division
Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced, from review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. of the Provincial Engineering Department, Catbalogan,
that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the Samar, Quimbo asked her to massage his forehead and
accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in a resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his nape. In the course thereof, he said, "You had been lying to
subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I have
would make a turnabout and take a position contradictory to denial of petitioners right to an impartial review of his appeal to see yours?" She was appalled as the utterance was made
his earlier finding. is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. in the presence of her co-employees. She added that by
(Underlining supplied) virtue of a Memorandum,3 dated August 6, 1996, Quimbo
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a ordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in
dispute may not review his decision on appeal.[21] We take With the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility
our bearings from Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of discuss the other issues raised by petitioner. personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of the
Appeals[22] which succinctly explained that: personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office from August
WHEREFORE, the Ombudsmans disapproval of the 16-31,1996 because of her refusal to submit to his sexual
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate memorandum dated 03 November 1999, where Prosecutor advances.
officer might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
In his defense, Quimbo retorted that the charge instituted Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were is to hear, investigate and decide administrative and
against him was fictitious. He claimed that Daradal enjoyed a (sic)administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority appropriate criminal cases against public official[s] or
"very important person" (VIP) treatment for a long period of to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government employee[s] instituted by or brought before it directly, and
time and, when required to work, rebelled against him. He service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under not to litigate. Therefore, we rule that the Office of the
asserted that the charge of sexual harassment and Section 13, subparagraph (3) of Article XI of the 1987 Ombudsman has no legal standing to intervene in the case
oppression was intended to embarrass and ridicule him and Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend" the at bench.
that the discretion to order her detail was validly exercised. removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault,
to the public official concerned. xxxx
On March 26, 1996, Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of
the complaint. The motion, however, was denied by the x x x" Not in conformity with the pronouncement of the CA, the
Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order, dated August 11, 1998. Ombudsman instituted a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
There is no gainsaying the fact that the Office of the of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion
The Ombudsman-Visayas Ruling Ombudsman is vested with the jurisdiction to take amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
cognizance of cases for the purpose of ascertaining whether the CA. It posited that there was no appeal or any plain,
On December 9, 1998, after due proceedings, the or not public servants have committed administrative speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
Ombudsman Visayas issued a resolution4 dismissing the offenses. However, their power is only to recommend to the to challenge the validity of the assailed CA Resolution, dated
case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out May 2, 2005. Thus, it was constrained to resort to the filing
guilty of oppression. The Ombudsman- Visayas imposed the and it is best left to the proper disciplining authority to of the said petition.
penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay. impose such penalty, which in this case is the Office of the
Governor of the Province of Samar.7 The Ombudsmans Position
The dispositive portion of the said resolution reads:
Accordingly, the fallo of the January 21, 2005 Decision In its Memorandum,10 the Ombudsman stressed that, as the
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Office reads: champion of the people, it had the right and legal interest to
finds Prudencio C. Quimbo, guilty of Oppression, thus mete seek redress on the apparent erroneous reversal by the CA
upon him, the penalty of SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment of its decision in an administrative disciplinary case. It
without pay, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this insisted that, as the disciplining authority, it has the power
30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission. case and SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated December and prerogative to directly impose any administrative
9, 1998 and the Order dated April 15, 1999 issued by the penalty. It asserted that the obiter dictum in the case of
SO RESOLVED.5 Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0486 in so Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsma (Tapiador)11 heavily
far as it directly imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of relied upon by the CA, to declare its disciplinary powers as
Engr. Quimbo moved for reconsideration but his motion was suspension from the service. merely recommendatory had been rejected by the Court in
denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order,6 dated April numerous cases.
15, 1999. IT IS SO ORDERED.8
Respondent Quimbos Position
The CA Ruling On February 14, 2005, the Ombudsman filed an omnibus
motion for intervention and reconsideration of the CA In his Memorandum,12 Quimbo contended that the
Aggrieved, Quimbo elevated the case before the CA by way decision, dated January 21, 2005. Ombudsman had no legal standing to intervene or to seek
of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. reconsideration of the assailed CA decision because the real
The case, entitled "Prudencio C. Quimbo vs. Gilda D. In its Resolution,9 dated May 2, 2006, the CA denied the party in interest was Daradal. He further stated that the
Daradal," was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54737. said motion. In so doing, the CA explained: assailed CA decision was based on prevailing jurisprudence
at the time the said decision was rendered.
On January 21, 2005, the CA reversed the December 9, For one, we have noted that the person adversely affected
1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999 Order of the by our ruling in SP No. 54737 is respondent Gilda D. ISSUES
Ombudsman-Visayas. In reversing the said ruling, the CA Daradal who opted not to file a motion for reconsideration
ratiocinated: thereof. Basic is the rule that "every action must be Based on the parties respective contentions, the issues for
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in this Courts resolution are as follows:
The Office of the Ombudsman has no power to directly interest."
impose sanctions against government officials and I. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring
employees who are subject of its investigation as its power is x x x x. that the Ombudsman lacks the power to directly impose
only limited to recommend the appropriate sanctions but not administrative penalties against erring public officials or
directly to impose the same. For another, as a quasi-judicial body, the office of the employees.
Ombudsman can be likened to a judge who should detach
In Tapiador vs. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a II. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in denying
Court pronounced: higher court for review. the Ombudsmans plea to validly intervene in its proceedings
for lack of legal interest.
"x x x In filing a motion for intervention and reconsideration, the
Ombudsman dangerously departed from its role as The Courts Ruling
adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function
The Court grants the Ombudsmans petition. The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the
investigations as in the present case is settled. Section 19 of Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)No.
Preliminary matters RA 6770 provides: 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose
The Ombudsman has the power SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman administrative penalties against errant public servants.
to directly impose shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow
administrative penalties against omissions which: on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority
public officials or employees. in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation; Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the powers of which
In the case of Ombudsman v. Apolonio,13 the Court extend to no more than making findings of fact and
categorically delineated the Ombudsmans power to directly (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan
impose, not merely recommend, administrative sanctions under the 1973 Constitution who might file and prosecute
against erring public officials or employees, viz: (3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials
functions, though in accordance with law; and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the current
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary 6770, is intended to play a more active role in the
prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of ascertainment of facts; enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and
its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the other offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on the (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an The Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely
allegation that the Constitution only grants it improper purpose; or a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him
recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this to implement his own actions.16
Court. (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
The Ombudsman has the legal
The Court first rejected this interpretation in Ledesma v. The point of contention is the binding power of any decision interest to intervene in the
Court of Appeals, where the Court, speaking through Mme. or order that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman proceedings before the CA.
Justice Ynares-Santiago, held: after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3)
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided: The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique requisite legal interest to intervene in the proceedings where
feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the its decision is at risk of being inappropriately impaired has
deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act following powers, functions, and duties: x x x x been laid to rest in Ombudsman v. De Chavez.17 In the said
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the
officers or employees of the Government, or of any (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its
government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis, 19 of the Rules of Court,18 the Ombudsman may validly
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees, underscoring and italization in the original.) intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the
thus: matter is beyond cavil. The Court elucidated, thus:
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (Ledesma),14 the Court
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the definitively stated that the statement in Tapiador regarding x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different
following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its the Ombudsmans power was merely an obiter dictum and, from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of as such, could not be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement. government because the people under its jurisdiction are
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act Thus: public officials who, through pressure and influence, can
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed against them.
inefficient. x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main Its function is critical because public interest (in the
point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on November administrative case. The statement that made reference to xxx
17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal
mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is interest in the subject matter of litigation.1wphi1 Paragraph
promptly on complaints but also to enforce the before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the attached
administrative, civil and criminal liability of government doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial motion to recall writ of preliminary injunction averred:
officers and employees in every case where the evidence examination.
warrants to promote efficient service by the Government to "2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has
the people. The import of the Ledesma ruling is crystal clear. Although the right to seek redress on the apparently erroneous
the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI15 of the issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary
Constitution merely indicates a "recommendatory" function, Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's
this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power Joint Decision x x x x."
of the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a
In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the A. Grave Offenses genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal,
Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal the National Legislature has devolved the three great
interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it xxxx inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political
invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of subdivision is thereby vested with such powers subject to
the people," a disciplinary authority vested with quasi-judicial 13. Oppression constitutional and statutory limitations.
function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against
public officials. To hold otherwise would have been 1st Offense - Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has
tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the to one (1) year; expressly empowered the LGUs to enact and adopt
guardian of public trust and accountability. ordinances to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit illegal
2nd Offense - Dismissal. parking within their jurisdictions. Now challenged before the
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal Court are the constitutionality and validity of one such
interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed In the present case, the Ombudsman found Quimbo ordinance on the ground that the ordinance constituted a
acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable administratively liable for the grave offense of Oppression contravention of the guaranty of due process under the
under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil and correspondingly meted out a penalty of suspension for Constitution by authorizing the immobilization of offending
Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act as a champion six ( 6) months without pay. While his administrative liability vehicles through the clamping of tires. The challenge
of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that for Oppression is undisputed, it behooves the Court to adjust originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the penalty imposed upon him to conform to CSC MC No. of the petitioners vehicle owners who had borne the brunt
the parameters of its authority. 30. Accordingly, the Court finds it necessary to modify the of the implementation of the ordinance with the RTC
penalty to suspension for six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, but it has now
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or without pay to accurately reflect the classification of the reached the Court as a consolidated appeal taken in due
disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound offense for which he was found liable. WHEREFORE, the course by the petitioners after the Court of Appeals (CA)
discretion of the court after a consideration of the petition is GRANTED. The January 21, 2005 Decision and reversed the judgment of the RTC.
appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not the May 2, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such City in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737 are hereby NULLIFIED and Antecedents
discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law SET ASIDE. The December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April
and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the 15, 1999 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, in OMB- On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the VIS-ADM-96-0486, are hereby REINSTATED with City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the
Constitution and RA 6770. MODIFICATION that the penalty of SUSPENSION to be traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
imposed upon Prudencio C. Quimbo be for SIX (6) MONTHS violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
xxxx and ONE (1) DAY without pay. Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).1 The
pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 1664
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the SO ORDERED. read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was in question. EN BANC Section 1. POLICY It is the policy of the government of the
This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any
disdainful) of the power, duties and functions of the Office of G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013 provision of any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or
the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise
detached, disinterested and neutral specially when VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as amended, in
defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases (TITO) SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN, Respondents. order to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the
against government personnel, the offense is committed streets in the City of Cebu at all times.
against the government and public interest. What further [G.R. No. 159692]
proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in the Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES Any vehicle
accountability of public officers is necessary? (Italics BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., AND BIENVENIDO found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the
supplied. Citations omitted.) DOUGLAS LUKE BRADBURY JABAN, Petitioners, v. City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in ALVIN GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF CITY of the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot
the present case, gravely erred in disallowing the OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEA, AS PRESIDING vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to
Ombudsmans motion to intervene. It failed to consider the OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD, AND immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any
essence of the Ombudsmans constitutionally and statutorily CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu
conferred powers establishing its clear legal interest in CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO, AND LITO City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby
ensuring that its directive be implemented. GILBUENA, Respondents. authorized to immobilize any violating vehicle as
hereinabove provided.
Substantive Aspect DECISION
Section 3. PENALTIES Any motor vehicle, owner or driver
Significantly, Section A, Subsection 13 of Civil Service BERSAMIN, J.: violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989 and/or restrictions, as may be provided under Ordinance No.
(CSC MC No. 30), the applicable rule then, expressly The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local 801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall be
provides: government units (LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment by each penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the
ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle immobilizer client on that day; that his car was impounded for three days, condemns. In another case[s], procedural due process is
may not be removed or released without its owner or driver and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu City through the to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It
Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties for the release of his car;6 that the fine was imposed without contemplate(s) notice and opportunity to be heard before
for all prior traffic law violations that remain unpaid or any court hearing and without due process of law, for he was judgment is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or
unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had property. In both procedural and substantive due process, a
Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said vehicle, undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on the hearing is always a prerequisite, hence, the taking or
and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car was deprivation of ones life, liberty or property must be done
personnel of the bureau responsible for the release of the parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas upon and with observance of the due process clause of the
immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic Constitution and the nonobservance or violation thereof is,
any of the following officers:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled perforce, unconstitutional.
a) Chairman, CITOM to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping and
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology P1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcia final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his prohibited, restrycted (sic) or regulated area in the street or
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an car in a very secluded place where there was no sign along the street, the vehicle is immobilized by clamping any
immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle
denver boot vehicle immobilizer or other such special operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay immobilizer or any other special gadget which immobilized
gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be the total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus,
prosecuted for such loss or destruction under pain or court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole
penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other justice.7cralawred determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP
existing ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel.
addition to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise The vehicle immobilizer cannot be removed or released
Philippines; Provided that any such act may not be sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo without the owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer
compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially. Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the
property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu accumulated penalties of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and City, and damages.8 He averred that on the morning of July violations, plus the administrative penalty of P500.00 and,
constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the further, the immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon
thereof shall be towed to the city government impounding sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to presentation of the receipt of said payments and upon
area for safekeeping and may be released only after the make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman,
provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully complied asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal
with. from the front of the residence inasmuch as his daughters Felipe Belcina. It should be stressed that the owner of the
car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these ordeals
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance the unloading would not take too long;9 that while waiting for at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the
shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting officer,
less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or of a office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the prosecutor, Judge and collector. Otherwise stated, the owner
fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor house to answer the call; that after a short while, his sonin of the immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his right to
more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), or both such law informed him that unknown persons had clamped the the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing by
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the front wheel of his car;10 that he rushed outside and found a a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights,
court.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by power or authority. The Ordinance in question is penal in
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and CITOM representatives with a warning that the unauthorized nature, and it has been held;
his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban removal of the clamp would subject the remover to criminal
(Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the charges;11 and that in the late afternoon a group headed by xxx
City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing
Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its the flow of traffic.12 WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is
Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmea, and the chairman hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 1664
and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co unconstitutional and directing the defendant City of Cebu to
Management (CITOM), seeking the declaration of Ordinance defendants,13 the City Attorney of Cebu presented similar pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the sum of P110,000.00
No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had representing the value of his car, and to all the plaintiffs,
process and for being contrary to law, and damages.3 Their only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the Valentino L. Legaspi, Bienvenido P. Jaban and Bienvenido
complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had plaintiffs;14 and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00
properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili presumption of constitutionality and validity.15 each or P300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another
Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as temperate or
his office;4 that upon his return after less than 10 minutes, The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, moderate damages. With costs against defendant City of
he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, which, after trial, rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision Cebu.
and a notice being posted on the car to the effect that it declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void upon the
would be a criminal offense to break the clamp;5 that he had following ratiocination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SO ORDERED.16 (citations
been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was omitted)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important expressed by Daniel Webster as a law which hears before it
The City of Cebu and its codefendants appealed to the CA, governance, and those which are essential to the promotion Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues
assigning the following errors to the RTC, namely: (a) the of the general welfare. are decisive of the challenge, to
RTC erred in declaring that Ordinance No. 1664 was This provision contains what is traditionally known as the wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. general welfare clause. As expounded in United States vs. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit
1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding Salaveria, 39 Phil 102, the general welfare clause has two of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
that any violation prior to its declaration as being branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
unconstitutional was irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly the
erred in awarding damages to the plaintiffs; (d) granting, discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.
arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is Ruling
damages awarded were excessive and contrary to law; and much more independent of the specific functions of the
(e) the decision of the RTC was void, because the Office of council, and authorizes such ordinances as shall seem The petitions for review have no merit.
the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been notified of the necessary and proper to provide for health, safety, prosperity
proceedings. and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants. A.
On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause Tests for a valid ordinance
decision,17 overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance complements the more specific powers granted a local
No. 1664 valid, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary government. It serves as a catchall provision that ensures In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,18 the Court restates the tests
The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of that the local government will be equipped to meet any local of a valid ordinance thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ordinance 1664. Defendantsappellants contend that the contingency that bears upon the welfare of its constituents The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
passage of Ordinance 1664 is in accordance with the police but has not been actually anticipated. So varied and protean line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the are the activities that affect the legitimate interests of the must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, local inhabitants that it is wellnigh impossible to say government unit to enact and must be passed according to
otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A thematic beforehand what may or may not be done specifically the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
analysis of the law on municipal corporations confirms this through law. To ensure that a local government can react following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
view. As in previous legislation, the Local Government Code positively to the peoples needs and expectations, the the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
delegates police powers to the local governments in two general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
ways. Firstly, it enumerates the subjects on which the allow the local legislative council to enact such measures as not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise these powers. Thus, the occasion requires. consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
with respect to the use of public streets, Section 458 of the unreasonable.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Code states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the
Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the may be deemed a legitimate exercise of the police powers of formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the
legislative branch of the city, x x x shall x x x the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. This local corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in
law authorizes traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow for accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, safekeeping vehicles on the streets that are illegally parked substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity
sidewalks, bridges, park and other public places and and to release them upon payment of the announced of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution
approve the construction, improvement, repair and penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has become and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops necessary to resort to these measures because of the traffic and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of
owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and existing penalties to curb it. The ordinance is designed to B.
the operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to improve traffic conditions in the City of Cebu and thus shows
be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort and Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal
putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on convenience of the people of Cebu. The only restrictions to requirements
the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and an ordinance passed under the general welfare clause, as
sprinkling of streets and public places; declared in Salaveria, is that the regulation must be Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the
reasonable, consonant with the general powers and corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu?
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit purposes of the corporation, consistent with national laws
encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in and policies, and not unreasonable or discriminatory. The The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues
the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of measure in question undoubtedly comes within these being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the
encroachments and illegal constructions in public places. parameters. enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full
It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope Upon the denial of their respective motions for compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted
of the legislative authority of the local government is set out reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the
in Section 16, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary came to the Court via separate petitions for review on various LGUs of the States great powers, namely: the police
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit certiorari. The appeals were consolidated. power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, Issues parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of
making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State xxx guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial
subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations. involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed by the
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
In particular, police power is regarded as the most essential, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,26 the Court expounded on
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it construction, improvement repair and maintenance of the the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law as a
does to all the great public needs.20 It is unquestionably same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or limitation on the acts of government,
the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to regulate the use of the same by privatelyowned vehicles viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and which serve the public; regulate garages and operation of This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by limits on government, usually called procedural due
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of process and substantive due process.
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets;
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same.21 and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the
According to Cooley: [The police power] embraces the and public places; procedures that the government must follow before it
whole system of internal regulation by which the state seeks deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic
not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences (vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in of notice and what form of hearing the government must
citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of provide when it takes a particular action.
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent the conflict of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places;
rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of (emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks
his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
enjoyment of rights by others.22 leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the away a persons life, liberty, or property. In other words,
problem of traffic congestions associated with development substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of and progress because they were directly familiar with the justification for the governments action. Case law in the
delegated police power. In Metropolitan Manila Development situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
Authority v. BelAir Village Association, Inc.,23 the Court would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.
cogently observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used,
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards. such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the
the President and administrative boards as well as the government will meet substantive due process only if it can
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local C. prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise government purpose.
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive
national lawmaking body. (emphasis requirements The police power granted to local government units must
supplied)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification,
the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Constitution, which ordains:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.24 Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
Section 458 of the LGC relevantly denied the equal protection of the laws. bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to person to his life, liberty and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on property.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the Constitutional Law has vividly written:25 The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as x x x. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his confiscation and immobilization of the motor vehicles to the
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection of due traffic enforcers or the regular personnel of the Philippine
process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an National Police (PNP) instead of to officials exercising
xxx unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated. judicial authority, was violative of the constitutional guaranty
Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the of due process; that such confiscation and immobilization
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified should only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law;
effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any and that the immobilization and the clamping of the cars and
provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to government act that militates against the ordinary norms of motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could be
said services and facilities, shall: justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great subject to abuse.
purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic
On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of
1664 violated the constitutional guaranty of due process for the streets of the City of Cebu. procedural due process?
being arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions
conferring upon the traffic enforcers the absolute discretion Legaspis attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of
to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all at 1664 for being vague and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny. procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances
the same time were vague and ambiguous.28 He reminds As can be readily seen, its text was forthright and under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such
that the grant of police powers for the general welfare under unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion on requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due
the LGC was not unlimited but subject to constitutional the meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the
limitations;29 and that these consolidated cases should not there be any vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, passport of a person being sought for the commission of a
be resolved differently from the resolution of a third case which the OSG does not concede,31 there was nothing that crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 1664 (Astillero case), a proper application of the basic rules of statutory administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer
in which the decision of the same RTC declaring Ordinance construction could not justly rectify. for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to
No. 1664 as unconstitutional had attained finality following be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and
the denial of due course to the appeal of the City of Cebu The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners the abatement of nuisance per se.32 Add to them the arrest
and its codefendants. affected by Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves were not of a person in flagrante delicto.33
accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing,
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to The clamping of the petitioners vehicles pursuant to
guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly
petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that situated) was of the same character as the aforecited
review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of reason. established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing.
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its unwarranted. transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension.
consistency with public policy. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trialtype hearing prior
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due
Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse
include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. Section the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally
the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were precisely the 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior
subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly aiming to ensure administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to
a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.
of Cebu at all times (Section 1). This aim was borne out by Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee
its Whereas Clauses, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was
WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code City Prosecutor Felipe Belcia officials named in the a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against
(Ordinance No. 801) as amended, provided for Parking ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade
Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the streets of Cebu such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. liability by simply driving away.
City; That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to
such recourse did not diminish the fairness and Finally, Legaspis position, that the final decision of the RTC
WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of reasonableness of the escape clause written in the rendered in the Astillero case declaring Ordinance No. 1664
parking on certain streets of Cebu City, violations continued ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by unconstitutional bound the City of Cebu, thereby precluding
unabated due, among others, to the very low penalties clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the these consolidated appeals from being decided differently, is
imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City; driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends
apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that too much importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC
WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver irrelevant, because the connection between that case to
address the traffic congestions caused by illegal parkings in to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter these cases was not at all shown. For another, he ignores
the streets of Cebu City; persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only to that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so
prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in these
WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the cases being already pending in the CA. Being the same
No.1642 in order to fully address and solve the problem of immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated
illegal parking and other violations of the Traffic Code of impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle that in the regular course of proceedings, the outcome of the
Cebu City;30 (emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the
the growth and progress in the population and economic towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property. Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain
centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a
1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the
general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of fairness interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system
therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government and reasonableness. of the nation, should have exercised a becoming modesty
on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and
that the Constitution required the majority vote of the Court would be a precedent binding on all.35 ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine.34 Such
becoming modesty also forewarned that any declaration of WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on SO ORDERED.
unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision