Section 9.

Evidence of written agreements

[ANACTA] Pilipinas Bank v. CA

Pilipinas Bank vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141060 September 29, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner obtained from private respondent Meridian Assurance Corporation a Money Securities and
Payroll Comprehensive Policy which was effective from January 13, 1985 to January 13, 1986. While the
policy was in full force and effect, petitioner's armored vehicle bearing Plate No. NBT 379 which was on its
way to deliver the payroll withdrawal of its client Luzon Development Bank ACLEM Paper Mills, was robbed by
two armed men wearing police uniforms. The loss suffered by petitioner as a result of the heist amounted to
P545,301.40.
Petitioner filed a formal notice of claim under its insurance policy with private respondent on December 3,
1985, invoking Section II of the Policy which states:
Section II-MONEY AND SECURITIES OUTSIDE PREMISES
The Company will subject to the Limits of this Section as hereinafter provided indemnify the insured
against loss by any cause whatsoever occuring (sic) outside the premises of Money and Securities in the
personal charge of a Messenger in transit on a Money Route x x x.
and the warranty/rider attached to the Policy which provides that-
WARRANTED that in respect of PILIPINAS BANK Head Office and all its branches, pick-up and/or deposits
and withdrawals without the use of armored car, company car, or official's car shall be covered by this policy. x
xx

Private respondent denied petitioner's claim and averred that the insurance does not cover the deliveries of
the withdrawals to petitioner's clients. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint against private respondent with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss which was later granted by the
RTC. Petitioner then moved to reconsider the trial court's order, but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC's order
dismissing the complaint. The appellate court granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings.
After the case was remanded to the RTC and the latter set the case for pre-trial, petitioner filed its Pre-Trial
Brief, stating among others, that it would present as one of its witnesses Mr. Cesar R. Tubianosa to testify on
the existence and due execution of the insurance policy, particularly on the negotiations that were held prior to
the execution thereof, including negotiations that led to the attachment warranties, to prove that the loss
subject of petitioners claim is covered by the Policy. Private respondent objected and argued that said witness
testimony regarding the negotiations on the terms and conditions of the policy would be violative of the best
evidence rule. However, private respondents objection was overruled and Tubianosa was allowed to take the
stand.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Witness, praying that it be allowed to recall Tubianosa to testify on the
negotiations pertaining to the terms and conditions of the policy before its issuance to determine the intention
of the parties regarding the said terms and conditions. Private respondent objected thereto, on the ground that
the same would violate the parol evidence rule. However the RTC denied the said motion to recall Tubianosa,
ruling that the same would violate the parol evidence rule, which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Motion to recall Tubianosa would violate the parol evidence rule.

HELD: No. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires that for parol evidence to be
admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to
express the true agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.
Petitioner failed to raise the issue of an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy,
or of the failure of said contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in its
Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when it affirmed the RTCs Order
disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such disallowance is in accord with the rule that
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
other terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
In Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals:
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in
this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. xxx.

[ANACTA] Eagleridge Development Corp v. Cameron

Eagleridge Development Corp. vs Cameron Granville 3

G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014

FACTS: Respondent Cameron filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision of SC which reversed and
set aside the Court of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase
Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006, including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that
petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same. Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation, Marcelo N.
Naval, and Crispin I. Oben filed on June 7, 2013 their motion to ad.mit attached opposition. Subsequently,
respondent filed its reply and petitioners their motion to admit attached rejoinder.
The motion for reconsideration raises the following points:
(1) The motion for production was filed out of time;
(2) The production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule; and 8
(3) The LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.
Respondent asserts that there was no "insistent refusal" on its part to present the LSPA, but that petitioners
filed their motion for production way out of time, even beyond the protracted pre-trial period from September
2005 to 2011. Hence, petitioners had no one to blame but themselves when the trial court denied their motion
as it was filed only during the trial proper.
Respondent also contends that: (1) the production of the LSPA will violate the parol evidence rule under Rule
130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court; (2) the LSPA is a privileged/confidential bank document;and (3) under
the Special Purpose Vehicle Act, "the only obligation of both the assignor (bank) and the assignee (the SPV;
respondent Cameron) is to give notice to the debtor (Eagleridge, Naval,and Oben) that its account has been
assigned/transferred to a special purpose vehicle (Sec. 12, R.A. 9182) [and] [i]t does not require of the special
purpose vehicle or the bank to disclose all financial documents included in the assignment/sale/transfer[.]"
For their part, petitioners counter that their motion for production was not filed out of time, and "[t]here is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing motions for production, beyond
the pre-trial."
Further, assuming that there was a valid transfer of the loan obligation of petitioner EDC, Article 1634 is
applicable and, therefore, petitioners must be informed of the actual transfer price, which information may only
be supplied by the LSPA. Petitioners argue that the substitution of respondent in the case a quowas "not
sufficient demandas contemplated under Article 1634 of the Civil Code inasmuch asrespondent Cameron
failed . . . to inform petitioner EDC of the price it paid for the [transfer of the] loan obligation," which made it
"impossible for petitioners to reimburse what was paid for the acquisition of the . . . loan obligation [of EDC]."
Additionally, petitioners contend that respondent was not a party to the deed of assignment, but Cameron
Granville Asset Management (SPV-AMC), Inc., hence, "as [to] the actual parties to the Deed of Assignment
are concerned, no such demand has yet been made."
Petitioners add that the amount of their liability to respondent is one of the factual issues to be resolved as
stated in the November 21, 2011 pretrial order of the Regional Trial Court, which makes the LSPA clearly
relevant and material to the disposition of the case.
Petitioners next argue that the parol evidence rule is not applicable to them because they were not parties
tothe deed of assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to determine the complete
terms of the Deed of Assignment." Besides, the deed of assignment made express reference to the LSPA,
hence,the latter cannot be considered as extrinsic to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allowance of the production of the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA)
would violate the parol evidence rule in Rule 130, Section 9.
HELD: No. The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking evidence to
determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.
Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is
when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement, as in the case a quo.
Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not
those expressly referred to in the written agreement. "[D]ocuments can be read together when one refers to
the other."60 By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was
meant to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.

As we have stated in our decision, Rule 132, Section 17 of the Rules of Court allows a party to inquire into the
whole of the writing or record when a part of it is given in evidence by the other party. Since the deed of
assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA
which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be
inquired into by petitioners.

Petitioners right to
extinguish their debt has not
yet lapsed
Petitioners right to extinguish their debt under Article 1634 on assignment of credits has not yet lapsed. The
pertinent provision is reproduced here:
Art. 1634. When a credit or other incorporeal right in litigation is sold, the debtor shall have a right to
extinguish it by reimbursing the assignee for the price the latter paid therefor, the judicial costs incurred by
him, and the interest on the price from the day on which the same was paid. A credit or other incorporeal right
shall be considered in litigation from the time the complaint concerning the same is answered.
The debtor may exercise his right within thirty days from the date the assignee demands payment from him

The LSPA is not privileged

and confidential in nature
Respondents contention that the LSPA is privileged and confidential is likewise untenable.
Indeed, Rule 27 contains the proviso that the documents sought to be produced and inspected must not be
privileged against disclosure. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. These
are communication between or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b) between attorney
and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and
public interest.
Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a trust
relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of the foregoing
categories.

[BULLECER] Manila Electric Co. v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy

Manila Electric Co. v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy
Facts:
Respondents are the owners, by way of succession, of a parcel of land consisting of 8,550 square meters
located in Trece Martires City (Trece Martires property). Dionisio, respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
donated a 680-square meter portion (subject land) of the 8,550 square meter property to the Communications
and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply to
the province of Cavite. A deed of donation was executed to reflect and formalize the transfer. Sometime in
1985, CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution system, consisting of transformers and
accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops, and customer meters and all rights and privileges
necessary for providing electrical service in Cavite. This was embodied in a memorandum of agreement
(MOA), signed by the parties. Thereafter, MERALCO occupied the subject land. MERALCO, through its
Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal Department, Atty. L.D. Torres (Atty. Torres), wrote a letter to
Dionisio requesting the latter's permission for the continued use of the subject land as a substation site. The
parties were not able to reach any agreement. Respondents offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO, but
their offer was rejected. For said reason, respondents demanded that MERALCO vacate the subject land.
Despite the written demand, MERALCO did not move out of the subject land. Thus, respondents were
constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.
MTCC rendered the decision dismissing respondents' complaint for unlawful detainer against MERALCO. The
RTC affirmed the MTCC ruling that the latter had no jurisdiction to interpret contracts involving the sale of the
subject land to MERALCO. The CA set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence aliunde, such as the letters of Petitioners Assistant Vice President and Head of
Legal Department Atty. Torres and Internal Memorandum of Petitioner which purportedly recognized
Respondents ownership of the property can prevail over the deed of absolute sale.
HELD:
MERALCO posits that extrinsic evidence, such as the letter request, dated October 11, 1985, and
the Internal Memorandum, dated December 6, 1985, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale
between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 13022 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has combed the records and is not convinced.
It is undisputed that on October 11, 1985 or four (4) months after the approval of the MOA and the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal
Department, Atty. Torres, sent a letter to Dionisio seeking his permission for the continued use of the subject
land. Relative thereto, L.G. de la Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO sent the December 16,
1985 Internal Memorandum, addressed to Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty. Torres, informing them of some
obstacles in reaching a lease agreement with the Deloys. Evidently, by these two documents, MERALCO
acknowledged that the owners of the subject land were the Deloys. It is clear as daylight. The first letter was
written barely four (4) months after the deed of sale was accomplished. As observed by the CA, MERALCO
never disputed the declarations contained in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits.
Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations are
admissible against MERALCO.
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party The act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
In Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, 24 it was written, thus:
. . . Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on
the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such
declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the
truth, and it is his fault if it does not.
Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds that the letter and the internal memorandum
presented, offered and properly admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself, constitute an
admission against its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of the
documents.

[BULLECER] Spouses Paras v. Kimwa Construction

Spouses Paras vs. Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation

FACTS:
In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in December 1994, Lucia was approached by
Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase gravel and sand from her. Kimwa allegedly asked that it be
"assured" of 40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates. 20 Lucia countered that her concession area was
due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit expires. 21 Thus, she emphasized that
she would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa "provided the forty thousand cubic meter[s] w[ould]
be withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15 May 1995[.]" 22 Kimwa then assured Lucia that
it would take only two to three months for it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. 23
Convinced of Kimwa's assurances, Lucia and Kimwa entered into the Agreement. 24
Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was able to extract and haul 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. However, after extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly transferred to the
concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their Agreement. They then addressed
demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses Paras filed their Complaint. Kimwa asserted
that the Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and
that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses
Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently. 30
On May 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. The trial court
noted that the Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were set aside exclusively for Kimwa.On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. It faulted the trial court for basing
its findings on evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. It noted
that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates by May 15, 1995. In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration to
Spouses Paras. 35
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners Spouses Paras were able to establish that respondent Kimwa was obliged to
haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to
acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the
Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced into writing. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement. The term "agreement" includes wills.
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four (4)
items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the agreement[.]" 41 Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading
such that it falls under the exception is not limited to the party initiating an action.TIADCc
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any
of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed
before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure to
express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to
petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission
of parol evidence.
Considering how the Agreement's mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the parties' true
intent was successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint (and even responded to by
respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be
introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have
been the parties' true intent, may be admitted and considered. AIDSTE
Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from the position (unless convincingly shown otherwise) that
individuals act as rational human beings, i.e, "[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his concerns[.]" 58 This
basic evidentiary stance, taken with the supporting evidence petitioners Spouses Paras adduced,
respondent Kimwa's awareness of the conditions under which petitioner Lucia Paras was bound, and the
Agreement's own text specifying exclusive allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports petitioners Spouses
Paras' position that respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before
May 15, 1995. As it admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable for breach of
contract in respect of the remaining 30,000 cubic meters.

[CANA] Marquez v. Espejo

MARQUEZ VS. ESPEJO
DOCTRINE: When the parties admit the contents of written docs but put in issue whether these docs
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look
beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
determine such intent.
Rule 130, Sec 9 specifically provides that Parol Evidence Rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and
their successors-in-interest." The Parol Evidence Rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written doc in question, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.

FACTS: Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of the two agricultural lands of Lantap
Property located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and the Murong Property located at Brgy.
Murong of the same town which were subsequently foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
(RBBI) due to their failure to pay the loans in the said bank. But a Deed of Sale was made on Feb. 26,
1985covering "TCT No. T-62096" (corresponds to Murong property) without description as to the location of
the subject property whether it is in Brgy. Murong or Brgy.Lantap.
TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong Property and TCT No. T-62836 dated
June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap Property in favor of RBBI. However, both TCTsdid not specifically
state its location whether it is in Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of Marquez and DelaCruz covered
by TCT No. T-62836 (corresponds to Lantap Property) but described being located in Brgy. Murong.DAR
issued Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to Marquez and Dela Cruz upon payment of the
purchase price to RBBI.
Nemi Fernandez, husband of Elenita Espejo, was the tenant of Lantap Property while Salun-at Marquez and
Nestor Dela Cruz were the tenants of the Murong Property. No evidence that Espejos took possession of
Murong Property nor demanded lease rentals from petioners, Marquez and Dela Cruz.
Espejos filed Complaint on Feb. 10, 1997 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya based on the Deed of Sale indicating that TCT No. T-62096 (referring to Murong
Property) was the subject of theirbuy-back transaction.RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers
appearing on the Deed of Sale and VLTs but was reversed by Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
In appeal, the CA annulled and set aside DARABs decision because in using the Best Evidence Rule
embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the
description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is
the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property that the respondents
repurchased. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong
was considered to be a mere typographical error.
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320
with the Supreme Court but was denied. CAs decision becomes final and executory. A petition for review on
Certiorari was filed in the SC by Marquez and Dela Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly applied the Parol evidence in the case.
HELD: No, the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place,
respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the
written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
"between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and
does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument. 44
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
Here, the petitioners' VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property
as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being
located in "Barangay Murong." Even the respondents' Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent
was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to
express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the
parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule
that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of
a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would
give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

[CANA]Spouses Amoncio v. Benedicto

DOCTRINE: Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule allows such evidence to be
received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been decided against him,
invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment. Hence, by failing to object to respondent's
testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.
|
FACTS: In December 1997, Garcia and respondent took possession of their respective leased portions. In
July 1999, Garcia pre-terminated his contract with petitioners. Respondent, on the other hand, stayed on until
June 8, 2000. According to petitioners, respondent stopped paying his monthly rentals in December 1999.
Shortly thereafter, petitioners claimed they discovered respondent putting up improvements on another 120
sq. m. portion of their property which was never leased to him nor to Garcia. They added he had also
occupied Garcia's portion immediately after the latter left.
Petitioners asked respondent to pay his arrears and desist from continuing with his construction but he took
no heed. Because of respondent's failure to meet petitioners' demands, they asked him to vacate the property.
On January 27, 2000, they rescinded the lease contract. On June 23, 2000, petitioners filed in the RTC of
Quezon City a case for recovery of possession of real property against respondent. In the complaint,
petitioners asked respondent to pay the following: (1) rent from January 27, 2000 or from the time his lease
contract was rescinded until he vacated the property; (2) rent for Garcia's portion from August 1999 until he
vacated it and (3) rent for the remaining 120 sq. m. which was not covered by his or Garcia's contract.
Petitioners likewise insisted that respondent was liable to pay his arrears from December 1999 until the
expiration of his lease contract in August 2002. According to them, the lease contract provided:
"in the event of [respondent's] failure to complete the term of the lease, [he would] still be liable to
answer for the rentals of the remaining period."
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent denied petitioners' accusations and alleged that it was them who
owed him money. According to him, he and petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio agreed to construct five commercial
buildings on petitioners' property. One of the buildings was to go to Garcia, two to petitioners and the last two
to him. They also agreed that he was to finance the construction and petitioners were to pay him for the two
buildings assigned to them. Respondent added he was to pay the rentals for five years and surrender the
buildings (on his leased portion) to petitioners after the lapse of said period. However, in June 2000, he
vacated the premises after he and petitioners could no longer settle things amicably.
Respondent asked to be paid: (1) P600,000 for the construction cost of the two buildings that went to
petitioners; (2) P300,000 as adjusted cost of the portion leased to him and (3) P10,000 as attorney's fees. The
RTC admitted the evidence presented by the respondents to prove the said agreement because the petitioner
did not object. CA affirmed, petitioner now is questioning whether the parole evidence rule here is applicable.
ISSUE: whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable even if the case does not fall under any of the four
exceptions.
HELD: Yes. Although the present case does not appear to fall under any of the given exceptions written in
Section 9 of Rule 130, however, a party to a contract may prove the existence of any separate oral agreement
as to any matter which is not inconsistent with its terms. This may be done if, from the circumstances of the
case, the court believes that the document does not convey entirely the whole of the parties' transaction.
In this case, there are tell-tale signs that petitioners and respondent had other agreements aside from those
established by the lease contract. And we find it difficult to ignore them. We agree with the trial court:
. . . [T]hat [respondent], indeed, undertook the construction subject hereof, is not disputed by
[petitioners]. [Respondent] testified that two units thereof were intended for [petitioners], another two
 units for him and one for . . . Garcia at the cost of P300,000.00 per unit or for a total budget of P1.5
million.
Evidence further disclosed that the [b]uilding [p]ermit issued therefor by the Building Official bore the
signature of [petitioner] Wilfredo Amoncio . . .
. . . the Court cannot be unmindful of [petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio's denial by any knowledge of the
whole construction undertaken by herein [respondent.] But it is evident that [petitioners] have
chosen to adopt inconsistent positions which, by applicable jurisprudence, [are] barred. Said the
Court in this regard:
The doctrine of estoppel prohibits a party from assuming inconsistent position based on the
principle of election, and precludes him from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed
after having accepted benefits therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be
contrary to equity and would put a premium on fraud and misrepresentation . . .
Moreover, petitioners also failed to make a timely objection against respondent's assertion of their prior
agreement on the construction of the buildings. Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule
allows such evidence to be received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has
been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment. Hence, by failing to
object to respondent's testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.

[CANA]Spouses Trinidad v. Imson

FACTS:
On August 17, 2007, herein petitioners filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City a
Complaint for ejectment against herein respondent. In their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that: they are
the owners of a condominium unit, denominated as Unit 2203, which is located at AIC Gold Tower, Emerald
Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City; they purchased the condominium unit from three (3) Indian nationals who
originally contracted to buy the said property from the developer, AIC Realty Corporation (AIC), but had not
fully paid for it yet; petitioners' purchase was evidenced by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights dated
June 13, 2002 and, later on, a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 dated July 13, 2007 in the name of petitioner
Armando; at the time of petitioners' purchase of the subject condominium unit, the same was being leased by
respondent from the original owners; the period of lease was from April 1, 2002 to March 1, 2003; petitioners
respected the contract of lease between respondent and the original owners; however, since June 2002 up to
the time of the filing of the complaint for ejectment, respondent neither remitted nor consigned the monthly
rentals due to petitioners for her continued use of the condominium unit; the rental arrears amounted to a total
of P2,130,000.00; petitioners sent a letter of demand to respondent requiring that she, together with any and
all persons using the said unit with her approval, vacate the premises and pay her arrears; respondent ignored
petitioners' demand letter; petitioners tried to settle the case amicably but no agreement was reached.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, respondent countered that: she, indeed,
entered into a contract of lease with the original owners of the disputed condominium unit which was to
commence on April 1, 2002 and would end on March 1, 2003; sometime in June 2002, she decided to
purchase the unit; however, since she was then undergoing proceedings to annul her previous marriage and
thinking that her purchase of the subject property would disrupt the property arrangements already agreed
upon, she thought it best not to have the condominium unit registered yet in her name; instead, she requested
Armando Trinidad, who was her confidante, to purchase the unit and register it under his name with the
understanding that the said property would actually be owned by respondent; Armando agreed without
objection, which led to the execution of the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights in his name; payments
for the purchase price were made by respondent through cash and checks paid to the original owners who
acknowledged said payments; aside from paying the purchase price, respondent also paid the real property
taxes due on the condominium unit as well as the association dues, water bills, common area real estate tax,
building insurance and other charges billed by the developer; having full trust in Armando, coupled with her
hectic schedule, respondent did not bother to transfer ownership of the subject unit in her name; since April
2002 up to the time of filing her Answer, respondent has been in open and public possession of the subject
property; in 2007, while respondent was out of the country, Armando, without respondent's knowledge,
annotated his claim on the condominium certificate of title; he also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his
favor on July 13, 2007; as a result, respondent was surprised to receive a copy of petitioners' demand letter
and complaint.
CA: The CA ratiocinated that, based on the evidence adduced by the parties, respondent's claim of ownership
deserves more credence. The CA ruled that records of payment of the purchase price of the subject property,
through respondent's personal checks, acknowledgment of these payments by the former owners by way of
receipt and affidavit, and respondent's exercise of acts of ownership prove that she is the owner of the
disputed condominium unit and, thus, is entitled to the possession thereof.
Petitioners argue: That under the Parole Evidence Rule, when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as between the
parties, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Based on this rule,
petitioners contend that since the former owners, as well as respondent, are all parties to the Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights, they are bound by the said Deed and they cannot allege terms which are
not found within the said agreement.||
ISSUE:
whether or not the CA correctly apply the Parole Evidence Rule.
HELD:
Yes. The fact that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights was put in writing and notarized
does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the Parole Evidence Rule. The rule
on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 9, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides the exceptions, to wit:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. . . .
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. As observed by the CA, respondent squarely put in
issue in her Answer that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights did not express the
true intent of the parties. Hence, the exception applies.
Indeed, petitioners failed to offer any credible explanation why payments of the purchase price were made by
respondent by using her personal checks if she is not, in fact, the buyer of the property. Neither was there any
justification why respondent paid the real property taxes due on the property, as well as the utility bills,
association dues, common area real estate tax and building insurance. More importantly, petitioners also fell
short in advancing a plausible refutation why the former owners would execute an affidavit indicating therein
that the agreement among the parties is that the subject property shall be purchased in the name of Armando
with the understanding between the latter and respondent that Armando would hold the property in
respondent's behalf until it will be placed in her name, thus exposing themselves to possible perjury charges,
if such agreement is not really true.|
In addition, if petitioners are the real owners of the subject condominium unit, why did they wait until February
19, 2007, or almost four (4) years after the supposed expiration of respondent's lease contract, to demand
that she vacate the disputed premises and pay rentals. Moreover, as the MeTC has noted, it was only in 2007
that Armando annotated his claim on the condominium certificate of title, executed the subject Deed of
Absolute Sale and requested certification of his ownership from the developer.

[DLC] Leighton Contractors Philippines Inc. v. CNP Industries

FACTS:

In 1997, Hardie Jardin, Inc. (HJI) awarded the contract for site preparation, building foundation and
structural steel works of its fibre cement plant project in Barangay Tatalon in San Isidro, Cabuyao, Laguna to
petitioner Leighton Contractors Philippines, Inc. Respondent CNP Industries, Inc. submitted to petitioner a
proposal to undertake, as subcontractor, the construction of the structural steelworks of HJI's fibre cement
plant project. Petitioner accepted the proposal.
Meanwhile, petitioner revised the fabrication drawings of several of the structure's columns
necessitating adjustments in the designs of roof ridge ventilation and crane beams. Petitioner
communicated the said revisions to respondent on July 16, 1997. Respondent estimated that the said
revisions required an additional 8,132 kgs. of steel costing P13,442,882. However, it did not re-negotiate the
fixed lump-sum price with petitioner.
On July 28, 1997, petitioner and respondent signed a sub-contract providing: this Sub-contract is
on a Fixed Lump Sum basis and is not subject to re-measurement.
Moreover, the contract required respondent to finish the project within 20 weeks from the time
petitioner was allowed access to the site on June 20, 1997, that is, on or before November 6, 1997.
On July 29, 1997, petitioner paid respondent 10% of the project cost amounting to P4,422,390.90.
Thereafter, respondent informed petitioner that, due to the revisions in the designs of the roof ridge
ventilation and crane beams, it incurred "additional costs" amounting to P13,442,882. Respondent
submitted its weekly progress report including the progress billing. Petitioner, on the other hand, paid the
billings.Because respondent was unable to meet the project schedule, petitioner took over the project on
April 27, 1998. At the time of the takeover, respondent had already accomplished 86% of the project for
which petitioner paid P42,008,343.69.
Thereafter, respondent again asked petitioner to settle the "outstanding balance" of
P12,364,993.94, asserting that the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were excluded from the project
cost. Petitioner refused to pay as the July 28, 1997 subcontract clearly stated that the sub-contract price
was a fixed lump sum.
The parties submitted the matter to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) for
arbitration.
Respondent argued that the proposal it submitted excluded the roof ridge ventilation and crane
beams as the fabrications drawings were "clouded" or had not been finalized when the subcontract was
executed on July 28, 1997. Furthermore, respondent claimed that petitioner approved the cost estimates.
This proved that the said portions were "additional works" excluded from the fixed lump-sum price.
Petitioner, asserted that the subcontract explicitly included the aforementioned works in the scope of
work. Furthermore, it was not liable for the "additional costs" incurred by respondent as the subcontract
clearly provided that the project was for the fixed lump-sum price of P44,223,909.
CIAC rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the balance of the
contract price plus additional works, the cost of arbitration and attorney's fees.
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the CIAC decision via a petition for review in the CA. CA dismissed
the petition and affirmed the CIAC decision in toto. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable to pay for the increase in cost due to the adjustments made in the design of
the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams

HELD:
NO. The parties entered into a contract for a piece of work whereby petitioner engaged respondent
as contractor to build and provide the necessary materials for the construction of the structural steel works
of HJI's fiber cement plant for a fixed lump-sum price of P44,223,909.
The parol evidence rule, embodied in Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court holds that when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. It, however, admits of exceptions such as when the parties
subsequently modify the terms of their original agreement.
The scope of work was defined in the subcontract as the completion of the structural steel works
according to the main drawing, technical specifications and the main contract. Thus, to determine whether
the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were included in the scope of work, reference to the main
drawing, technical specifications and main contract is necessary. The main contract stated that the structural
steel works included Drawing Nos. P302-6200-S-405 and P302-6200-S-402. This, according to petitioner
and respondent, referred to the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams. Hence, the said works were clearly
included in the sub-contract works.TcSaHC
[DLC] Rosario Textile Mills Corp. v. Home Bankers Savings

FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home Bankers Savings &
Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit Line for P10 million. The bank approved credit line but for only P8 million. The
bank notified RTMC of the grant of the said loan thru a letter which contains terms and conditions conformed
by RTMC thru Edilberto V. Yujuico. On March 3, 1989, Yujuico signed a Surety Agreement in favor of the
bank, in which he bound himself jointly and severally with RTMC for the payment of all RTMC's indebtedness
to the bank from 1989 to 1990. RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each
drawdown being covered by a separate promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC, represented by Yujuico,
executed in favor of the bank a total of eleven (11) promissory notes.
Despite the lapse of the respective due dates under the promissory notes and notwithstanding the
bank's demand letters, RTMC failed to pay its loans. Hence, on January 22, 1993, the bank filed a complaint
for sum of money against RTMC and Yujuico.
In their answer, RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be absolved from liability. They claimed
that although the grant of the credit line and the execution of the suretyship agreement are admitted, the bank
gave assurance that the suretyship agreement was merely a formality under which Yujuico will not be
personally liable. They argue that the importation of raw materials under the credit line was with a grant of
option to them to turn-over to the bank the imported raw materials should these fail to meet their
manufacturing requirements. RTMC offered to make such turn-over since the imported materials did not
conform to the required specifications. However, the bank refused to accept the same, until the materials were
destroyed by a fire which gutted down RTMC's premises.
RTC ruled in favor of the bank. Dissatisfied, RTMC and Yujuico appealed to the Court of Appeals,
contending that under the trust receipt contracts between the parties,they merely held the goods described
therein in trust for respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company (the bank) which owns the same.
Since the ownership of the goods remains with the bank, then it should bear the loss. With the destruction of
the goods by fire, petitioners should have been relieved of any obligation to pay.
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the bank is merely the holder of the
security for its advance payments to petitioners; and that the goods they purchased, through the credit line
extended by the bank, belong to them and hold said goods at their own risk.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Yujuico is bound by the suretyship agreement

HELD:
YES.
First, there is no record to support his allegation that the surety agreement is a "mere formality;"
Second, as correctly held by the CA, the Suretyship Agreement signed by petitioner Yujuico binds
him. The terms clearly show that he agreed to pay the bank jointly and severally with RTMC. The parol
evidence rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court is in point, thus:
"SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;
 (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
xxx xxx xxx."
Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence
aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document. We have carefully examined the Suretyship Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no
ambiguity therein. Documents must be taken as explaining all the terms of the agreement between the
parties when there appears to be no ambiguity in the language of said documents nor any failure to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties.

Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provision

[DLC] Home Development Mutual Fund v. CA

FACTS:

On January 1, 1985, CONVIR and Associates, Inc., represented by its President, Dra. Cora J. Virata,
and the petitioner, Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF ), represented by its Senior Vice-President,
Vicente Reventar III, entered into a CONSULTANCY AGREEMENT by virtue of which the former obligated
itself to render medical services to the employees of HDMF.
On December 16, 1985, Dra. Cora J. Virata wrote petitioner Marilou O. Adea-Proctor, then Deputy
Chief Executive Officer and Officer-in-Charge of HDMF, to inform that she (Dra. Cora J. Virata) was assuming
from their (petitioners') silence that subject Agreement was renewed for the succeeding period, from January
1, 1986 to December 31, 1986.
In her Reply-letter, dated December 23, 1985, petitioner notified Dra. Cora J. Virata of the termination
of the contract upon its expiration on December 31, 1985; informing Dra. Virata of the appointment by
management of a full-time physician to the vacant plantilla position, such that her services would not be
needed anymore. But such letter-reply was formally and actually received by the private respondents only on
January 9, 1986.
In the Complaint filed on January 15, 1986 private respondents averred petitioners' sudden and
unexpected termination of the Consultancy Agreement, which requires a written notice thirty (30) days in
advance, did not conform therewith.
In their Answers sent in on January 14, 1986, petitioners Adea-Proctor and HDMF sought the
dismissal of the Complaint; contending inter alia that the Complaint states no cause of action arising from the
termination of the contract.
The trial court ruled against HDMF. On appeal, the aforesaid judgment was affirmed with modification
by CA, deleting the award of compensatory damages for want of sufficient evidence to support the same. With
the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present Petition.

ISSUE:
W/N petition should prosper

HELD:
NO.
The pivot of inquiry is the correct construction or interpretation of subject Consultancy Agreement,
particularly its, provision:
 "That this agreement takes effect on January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985; Provided,
however, that either party who desires to terminate the contract may serve the other party a
written notice at least thirty (30) days in advance."
The first clause of the aforecited stipulation, which is the bone of petitioners' stance, basically deals
with the term of the contract; while the proviso, which is the core of private respondents' action, prescribes the
manner the service contract in question could be terminated.
It is petitioners' submission that the first clause referred to is independent, distinct and separate from
the said proviso, such that upon the expiration of the period stated in the first clause, the Consultancy
Agreement ceased to have any binding effect between the contracting parties even though they ( petitioners)
did not give any written notice of termination at least thirty (30) days in advance.
We cannot fathom how contracting parties, who are sui juris, and knowledgeable of the purposes for
which they solemnly put their Agreement into writing, could be so careless as to include inconsistent
conditions in such a short and simple provision in their contract sued upon.
Time-honored is the rule that "In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." Article 1374 of the
New Civil Code, on the other hand, requires that "The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly."
Conformably, to ascertain the true meaning or import of the controverted provision of subject Consultancy
Agreement, its entirety must be considered; not merely the first clause. Consequently, petitioners'
interpretation solely based on the first clause, and which completely ignored the second clause under scrutiny,
cannot be upheld.
The law mandates that "Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."
In the second assigned error, petitioners theorize that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
medical services of private respondents were unreasonably terminated because the December 26, 1985 letter
of termination "was served or mailed so close to the end of the year . . . "
We discern nothing reversible in such conclusion arrived at by public respondent. Ordinarily, what is
reasonable time under the circumstances of a particular case is a mixed question of law and of fact, for
determination by the trier of facts. This Court is not a trier of facts. Furthermore, well settled is the doctrine that
"the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great respect by appellate courts and should not be
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstances
of sufficient weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the situation." The facts of the case, as
stated by the trial court were adopted by the Court of Appeals. And a conscientious sifting of the records fails
to bring to light any fact or circumstance militative against the correctness of the said findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.

[EVIDENTE]
BPI Family Savings Bank v. Spouses Domingo
G.R. No. 158676, November 27, 2006

FACTS:
Respondent Julian Cruz is the owner of a commercial lot and building located in Novaliches, Quezon City. A
lease agreement was executed between BPI-FSB and Cruz over the said property containing the following
stipulation:

Assignment and Sublease The lessee has the right to sublease the premises or any portion thereof to a third
party. The lessee may not, however, assign or transfer its right or interest under this lease without the written
consent of the lessor.

BPI-FSB then subleased the same premises to respondent Benjamin Villa.While BPI-FSB apparently did not
secure the written consent of Julian Cruz, it appears that Cruz was aware of the sublease and acceded to it
because he made neither an objection nor a protest thereto. The aforementioned sublease contract between
BPI-FSB and Benjamin Villa embodied the following clause:

The sublessee shall not assign this contract of sublease or sublease any part of the premises to any
person or entity.
Benjamin Villa occupied and used the premises as a restaurant. His business failed to prosper and he decided
to close it down. Villa learned that Mrs. Zenaida Domingo was interested in taking over his restaurant
business thereat. Negotiations pushed through and the price of P650,000.00 was agreed upon between the
two. Villa, however, informed Mrs. Domingo that as a mere sublessee under his sublease contract with BPI-
FSB, he was prohibited from assigning his rights as a sublessee. It was, therefore, necessary to rescind his
sublease contract with BPI-FSB so that the latter could directly execute a sublease contract with the Domingo
spouses. Villa informed the principal lessee BPI-FSB about the arrangement and the latter acceded.

Villa received from the Domingos the total amount of P6500,000.00 as payment for his rights over the
premises.

BPI-FSB executed a sublease contract in favor of the Domingos. A Deed of Rescission of the sublease
agreement between BPI-FSB and Villa was executed and signed by BPI-FSB and Villa. Villa vacated the
subject premises and turned over the key thereof to the Domingos. The following day the Domingos went to
clean and fix the premises but could not enter because the door was padlocked. Moreover, there was posted
at the glass window of the commercial building a sign to the effect that the place was not for lease or
sublease. Apparently, Julian Cruz, the owner-lessor, preempted the Domingos' visit in order to padlock the
premises and post said notice the day previous.

The Domingos thus demanded of Villa either compliance with their contract of sublease or the return of their
payment of P650,000.00. Efforts exerted by Villa and BPI-FSB to place the Domingos in possession of the
subject premises proved futile due to the refusal of Cruz to open the same.

The Domingos filed suit in the RTC of Quezon City for a sum of money with damages against both Villa and
BPI-FSB. In turn, Villa and BPI-FSB filed their respective third-party complaints against Cruz.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Domingos, and accordingly rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendants BPI-Family Savings Bank and Benjamin Villa to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and
severally, the following amounts:

1.1 P650,000.00 as actual damages, representing the amount paid by plaintiffs to defendant Villa, with
interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

1.2 P100,000.00 as moral damages;

1.3 P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

1.4 P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.

2. Ordering third-party defendant Julian Cruz to reimburse third-party plaintiffs BPI-FSB and Villa for
whatever amounts said defendants/third-party plaintiffs will pay the plaintiffs by virtue of this judgment;

3. Ordering third-party defendant Cruz to pay third-party plaintiff BPI-FSB the amount of P25,000.00 as
attorney's fees;

4. Ordering third-party defendant Cruz to pay third-party plaintiff Villa the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees;

5. Dismissing for lack of merit the counterclaims and cross-claims of defendants BPI-FSB and Villa, and
the counterclaims of third-party defendant Cruz.

Costs against third-party defendant Cruz.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judgment appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion and committed a reversible error in NOT applying the
provisions of Articles 1207 and 1311 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CA but minus the award of moral and exemplary
damages.

Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 1207. x x x There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law or the
nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Neither BPI-FSB nor Villa can escape liability by disclaiming privity to an agreement with the Domingos. There
are more than one, indeed several, relevant agreements involved in this case. To waylay any possibility of
confusion, we shall enumerate them to distinguish one from the other:

1. The original lease agreement between Julian Cruz and BPI-FSB;

2. The first sublease contract between BPI-FSB and Villa;

3. The sale of goodwill of the Carousel Food House, and the assignment and transfer of all of Villa's rights and
interests to the premises and improvements thereon, between Villa and the Domingos;

4. The second sublease contract between BPI-FSB and the Domingos; and

5. The Deed of Rescission of the first sublease contract between Villa and BPI-FSB.

No cogent reason to disturb the trial court's finding that both BPI-FSB and Villa assured the Domingos that
they would eventually be placed in possession of the premises in question as sublessee. Not only is there
evidence to corroborate this finding; it is likewise the version more consistent with common human
experience.

Both BPI-FSB and Villa each had their own respective agreements with the Domingos, albeit for a single
purpose. Villa sold to the Domingos the goodwill of his restaurant business, as well as all his rights and
interests in the premises and its improvements. BPI-FSB, on the other hand, subleased the same premises to
the Domingos. These two contracts are intertwined. Indeed, the Domingos' enjoyment of the goodwill and
business of Villa would be an impossibility without the BPI-FSB Domingos sublease contract.

it was due to Cruz's actions of padlocking the premises and posting notices thereat that prevented the
Domingos from taking possession of the place. It is precisely for this reason why the two (2) courts below
correctly adjudged Cruz to be ultimately liable for what is due the Domingos and thus directed him to
reimburse what Villa and BPI-FSB must pay the spouses.

As found by the trial court, Cruz himself was guilty of breach with respect to his basic lease agreement with
BPI-FSB. Concededly, said agreement contained the following stipulation:

Assignment and Sublease The lessee has the right to sublease the premises or any portion thereof to a third
party. The lessee may not, however, assign or transfer its right or interest under is lease without the written
consent of the lessor. (Emphasis supplied.)

On surface, the foregoing stipulation seemingly insulates Cruz from any liability in this case. However, basic is
the rule that in the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.[12] The trial court was quick to point out, and
rightly so, that the first sentence of the aforequoted covenant speaks of what the lessee can do, while the
second sentence refers to what it cannot do without the consent of the lessor. This is evident from the phrase
may not however found in the second sentence, which means that the act of sub-leasing in the first sentence
may be done by the lessee without the consent of the lessor but the act of assignment or transfer of rights in
the second sentence cannot be done by the lessee without the consent of the lessor. Clearly, the parties
intended a distinction between a sublease and an assignment of rights.

To our mind, the CA was correct in affirming the trial court's distinguishing between a sublease and an
assignment of rights. In a sublease situation, the lessee (BPI-FSB, in this case) continues to be liable to the
lessor (Cruz) for the payment of rent. The sublessee (the Domingos in this case) pays rent not to the lessor
(Cruz) but to the lessee/sub-lessor (BPI-FSB). On the other hand, in an assignment of rights, the assignee
steps into the shoes of the lessee who is thereupon freed from his obligations under the lease because from
then on it is the assignee who is liable to the lessor for rental payment. In other words, in an assignment of
rights, there is a change of lessor, which is not so in a sublease situation. It is thus understandable why it is
not necessary for the lessor to give his consent to a sublease, while in an assignment of rights, it is a
necessity for the lessor to require his prior consent. This is for the lessor's own protection.

[EVIDENTE]
Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137557, October 30, 2000

FACTS:
DBP is the owner of a parcel of land in Bulacan. On August 8, 1983, it sold the land to respondent spouses
Nilo and Esperanza De La Pea under a Deed of Conditional Sale for P207,000.00. [4] The Deed of Conditional
Sale stipulated:
That the down payment shall be P41,400.00 and the balance of P165,600.00 to be paid in six (6) years on the
semi-annual amortization plan at 18% interest per annum. The first amortization of P23,126.14 shall be due
and payable six (6) months from the date of execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale and all subsequent
amortizations shall be due and payable every six (6) months thereafter.

After the execution of the contract, the spouses De La Pea constructed a house on the said lot and began
living there. They also introduced other improvements therein by planting fruit trees and building a small
garage.[5] Pursuant to their contract with the DBP, respondent spouses De La Pea made payments totaling to
P289,600.00 from1983 to 1989.

After making the above payments, Esperanza De La Pea went to petitioner DBP and asked for the execution
of a Deed of Absolute Sale and for the issuance of the title to the property.[7] On January 5, 1989, however,
respondent spouses De La Pea were informed by DBP through a letter that there was still a balance of
P221,86.85 , broken down as follows, owing from them:
Principal P 150,765.35
Regular Interest 57,121.13
Additional Interest 9,799.01
Penalty Charges 4,182.36
TOTAL P 221,867.85[8]

In another letter, dated July 11, 1989, DBP demanded from respondent spouses the payment of this amount,
which had increased to P225,855.86 as of June 30, 1989, otherwise, it would rescind the sale. In reply,
respondent spouses, in a letter dated August 11, 1989, proposed a settlement of the amount through semi-
annual payments over a period of five years.

As the parties failed to reach an agreement, respondent spouses filed a complaint against petitioner on
January 30, 1990 for specific performance and damages with injunction before the Valenzuela RTC. The RTC
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, as plaintiffs have still to pay the defendant the sum of
P54,200.00 as interest to be able to sue for specific performance and declaring the writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby declared permanent.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its construction of the Deed of Conditional Sale.

HELD:
The questioned provision states:

That the down payment shall be P41,400.00 and the balance of P165,600.00 to be paid in six (6) years on the
semi-annual amortization plan at 18% interest per annum. The first amortization of P23,126.14 shall be due
and payable six (6) months from the date of execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale and all subsequent
amortizations shall be due and payable every six (6) months thereafter.

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the above stipulation fails to specify the monthly
amortization, we find no ground for construing any ambiguity against the DBP as the party responsible
therefor. As stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sale, the first amortization was in the amount of P23,126.14
to be paid six months from the date of the execution of the contract. Subsequent amortizations were due and
payable every six months thereafter. Such stipulation cannot be construed other than that the subsequent
amortizations should be in the same amount as the first, to be paid every six months thereafter. There being
no other basis for the payment of the subsequent amortizations, the reasonable conclusion one can reach is
that subsequent payments shall be made in the same amount as the first payment.
With regard to the remaining monetary obligation of the private respondents, the question is whether
respondent spouses could be held liable for the interests and penalty charges considering that they had
already paid the full amount of the principal obligation and petitioner DBP did not object to the late payments
made by them.
The contract provided that [t]he first amortization of P23,236.14 shall be due and payable six (6) months from
the date of execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale and all subsequent amortizations shall be due and
payable every six (6) months thereafter. As the contract was executed on August 8, 1983, the first amortization
became due on February 8, 1994 while the next one fell due on August 8 of that year. The subsequent
amortizations were to be paid every six months thereafter, i.e., on February 8 and August 8 of the following
years. Respondent spouses failed to comply with the schedule of payment of amortizations.

As private respondents failed to pay on time, they incurred additional interests and penalty charges which
were applied to the payments they already made, pursuant to their contract. The payments subsequently
made by respondent spouses were applied to their obligation, including interests.

In this case, the interest and penalty charges to be paid by private respondents in case of delay in payments
were expressly stipulated in the Conditional Contract of Sale. Under the Civil Code, parties to a contract can
make stipulations therein provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.[27] There being no question as to the validity of the Conditional Contract of Sale, the DBP correctly
applied the provision on interests and penalty charges when private respondents failed to pay on the dates
agreed upon. No further notice to private respondents had to be given to them.

The Court of Appeals likewise erred in disregarding paragraph 8 of the contract on interests and penalty
charges and concluding that the unpaid balance of private respondents was merely in the amount of
P54,200.00. In determining the amount of P54,200.00, both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals
erroneously took into account only the 18% annual interest on the remaining balance of P165,000.00:

In computing the liability of private respondents, the trial court determined what constitutes 18% of the
principal amount of P165,600.00 and then multiplied such amount by six, the number of years the loan is to be
paid, the product of which was P178,200.00. From the payments made by private respondents in the amount
of P289,600.00, the remaining balance of P165,600.00 was deducted, which resulted in the overpayment of
P124,000. This supposed overpayment of P124,000.00 was then deducted from the amount of interest, as
determined by the trial court, which is P178,200.00, resulting in the difference of P54,200.00. This final
amount of P54,200.00, decided by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was the final remaining
balance of private respondents. However, the computation is erroneous. Following the method adopted by the
trial court, the product of 18% of the principal amount of P165,600.00 (P29,808.00) multiplied by six is
P178,848.00. Hence, from the amount of P178,848.00 must be subtracted the supposed overpayment of
P124,000.00, resulting in the difference of P54,848.00

Article 1374 of the Civil Code provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. In the same vein,
Rule 130, 11 of the Rules on Evidence states that In the construction of an instrument where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. Accordingly,
the annual interest of 18% must be construed together with paragraph 8 of the Deed of Conditional Sale
imposing additional interests and penalty in case of arrears in making payments. Hence, upon failure of
private respondents to pay their amortizations on the prescribed dates, they incurred interests and penalty
charges at the stipulated rates. Private respondents cannot be allowed to renege on their obligation on the
ground that what they had paid was in excess of the principal obligation in the amount of P207,000.00. Nor
can private respondents demand fulfillment of petitioners obligation to execute a final deed of sale and deliver
the title to the land in their favor when they have not yet fully paid their principal obligation with the accrued
interests thereto. [N]either the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract
he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences.
Be that as it may, we find the interests to be excessive. It is noteworthy that the interests paid by private
respondents, which amounted to P233,361.50, including therein the regular interest, additional interest,
penalty charges, and interest on advances, is more than the principal obligation in the amount of
P207,000.00, which private respondents owed. Moreover, the additional interest of 18% alone amounted to
P106,853.45, which is almost half of what was already paid by private respondents.

Article 1229 of the Civil Code states that Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.

In the instant case, private respondents made regular payments to petitioner DBP in compliance with their
principal obligation. They failed only to pay on the dates stipulated in the contract. This indicates the absence
of bad faith on the part of private respondents and their willingness to comply with the terms of the contract.
Moreover, of their principal obligation in the amount of P207,000.00, private respondents have already paid
P289,600.00 in favor of petitioner. These circumstances convince us of the necessity to equitably reduce the
interest due to petitioner and we do so by reducing to 10% the additional interest of 18% per annum computed
on total amortizations past due.

[EVIDENTE]
De Mesa v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 106467-68, October 19, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners Dolores Ligaya de Mesa owns several parcels of land which were mortgaged to the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as security for the loan she obtained from the bank. Failing to pay all her
mortgage debts, all her mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction. In all said auction
sales, DBP was the winning bidder. Petitioner requested DBP that she be allowed to repurchase her
foreclosed properties. In the meantime, petitioner sold the foreclosed properties to private respondent OSSA
House Inc. (OSSA), under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, under the condition that the latter
was to assume the payment of the mortgage on installment basis. DBP granted petitioners request to
repurchase the foreclosed properties. Private respondent OSSA paid DBP the first to eight quarterly
installments in the total amount of P137,593.31, which installment payments were applied to petitioners
obligation with the DBP. After OSSA paid the eighth quarterly installment, petitioner notified private respondent
OSSA that she was rescinding the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of the latter on the
ground that OSSA failed to comply with the terms and conditions of their agreement. OSSA offered to pay the
difference between the purchase price and the mortgage obligation to DBP after deducting the down payment
as stipulated in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, but petitioner refused to accept such payment.

OSSA filed a complaint for consignation against the petitioner. DBP, likewise, refused to accept the 9th
quarterly installment paid by OSSA, forcing the latter to file against DBP and petitioner a case for specific
performance and consignation. The two cases were eventually consolidated upon petitioners motion.

The trial court rendered a decision declaring the consignation of OSSA proper and valid and ordered de Mesa
and DBP to withdraw and receive said payments due them which OSSA had consigned with the court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court modified the trial courts decision declaring
the consignation valid only as far as petitioner de Mesa is concerned and ordered de Mesa to receive the said
amount consigned with the court and pay DBP the said amount. Petitioner de Mesa filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether what was sold to respondent OSSA was merely the right to redeem the foreclosed properties and not
the foreclosed properties themselves.

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the terms of the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage are clear and leave no doubt as to what was sold thereunder. Nowhere
is it provided in the deed, as the petitioner insisted that what she sold to respondent OSSA was merely the
right to redeem the mortgaged properties and not the foreclosed properties themselves. According to the
Court, the contract was so explicit and unambiguous that it does not justify any attempt to read into it any
supposed intention of the parties, as the said contract is to be understood literally, just as they appear on its
face.

When the words of a contract are plain and readily understood, there is no room for construction. As the
agreement of the parties are reduced to writing, such agreement is considered as containing all its terms and
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the written
agreement other than the contents of the writing. In the case under consideration, the terms of the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage Debt are clear and leave no doubt as to what were sold thereunder.
Nowhere is it provided in the contract as the petitioner insists, that what she sold to respondent OSSA was
merely the right to redeem the mortgaged properties and not the foreclosed properties themselves. On the
contrary, the very words of the contract reveal that the subject of the sale were all the properties described in
items I, II, III of the First Whereas Clause. Indeed, the contract under scrutiny is so explicit and unambiguous
that it does not justify any attempt to read into it any supposed intention of the parties, as the said contract is
to be understood literally, just as they appear on its face. Petitioner capitalizes on the following prefatory
clause of the contract, to wit: WHEREAS, the VENDOR (defendant De Mesa) is the registered owner with a
preferential right of redemption of the following mortgaged properties with the Development Bank of the
Philippines, more particularly described as follows: However, not the slightest indication can be gleaned from
the abovequoted provision that the subject of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was petitioners
right of redemption. The said provision merely speaks of the preferential right of the latter to redeem the real
properties involved.

[OFALSA]
G.R. No. 154852. October 21, 2004
MULTINATIONAL VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and DANILO F. CUNETA, petitioners,
vs. ARA SECURITY & SURVEILLANCE AGENCY, INC., Represented by THERESA C. MAMAED,
President and General Manager, respondent.

FACTS
It is alleged that Ara Security and Surveillance, Inc. (Ara) was hired by Multinational Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (Multinational) to provide security services at the Multinational Village, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. Their agreement was embodied in a document. The contract was to take effect for a period of 1 year
on a monthly fee of P107,500.00. Under the same contract, Ara will provide Multinational with thirty (30)
guards. In less than a year, Danilo F. Cuneta, President of Multinational, wrote Ara a letter terminating the
aforesaid contract, having found the guards' services to be unsatisfactory, causing loss of confidence in the
ability of the security guards to comply with the terms of the contract. Thus, Ara commenced the present suit
for injunction with preliminary injunction, preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order with
damages. A TRO was issued enjoining Multinational from replacing the guards with another agency.
Multinational submitted an Answer together with an opposition to the injunction claiming that it has the right to
pre-terminate the contract under paragraph 5 thereof stating:
" After three (3) months of satisfactory performance, the parties may negotiate for the extension of this
contract and other matters that might be advantageous to both parties."
The trial court ruled in favor of Ara. Unsatisfied, petitioners appealed to the CA. The CA held that petitioners
had breached their Contract when they pre-terminated it on the basis of paragraph 5 thereof. Furthermore,
the CA ruled that petitioners had no good and valid ground to pre-terminate the Contract, because the
documentary evidence they had presented was hearsay and of no probative value. The appellate court
affirmed the lower court's findings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding respondent's position as the more acceptable interpretation of
the contract in question that the contract cannot be terminated even after three months of unsatisfactory
performance.

HELD
The Petition has no merit. Petitioners allege that under Paragraph 5, the Contract can no longer be enforced
after the three-month period if the guards' performance is unsatisfactory. A reading of paragraph 5 yields the
simple and natural meaning that the parties may extend the Contract's life upon mutual agreement. Under
paragraph 5, the clause "satisfactory performance" is expressly and clearly a consideration for extending the
life of the Contract. Petitioners contend that the court a quo did not comply with Section 11 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, because it failed to give effect to paragraph 5 relative to the provision of the Contract on the
duration of its effectivity. Contrary to petitioners' contention, paragraph 5 is not inconsistent with the clause on
duration. The former does not in any way deal with the termination of the Contract. Neither does it provide for
a right to rescind.
Section 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions

[OFALSA]
G.R. No. 179326. July 31, 2013.]
LUCIANO P. CAEDO, * petitioner, vs. KAMPILAN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. and
RAMONCITO L. ARQUIZA, respondents.

FACTS
Respondent agency hired petitioner as security guard and assigned him at the Naga Power Barge 102 of the
National Power Corporation (NPC) Toledo City. For not wearing proper uniform while on duty as per report of
Allan Alfafara (Alfafara) of the NPC, petitioner was suspended for a month. NPC informed respondent agency
that it was no longer interested in petitioner's services and thus requested for his replacement. Petitioner
requested respondent Arquiza to issue a certification in connection with his intended retirement effective that
month. Respondent Arquiza issued the Certification stating Canedo was terminated from his employment as
per client's request. Petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against respondents. Petitioner narrated that when he
reported back to work after his one-month suspension, he was surprised to find out that he was already
terminated from the service. Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioner was not dismissed
from service. However, in view of NPC's request for his replacement, respondents had to pull him out from
NPC. But instead of waiting for a new posting, petitioner filed a complaint against them. Based on the
Certification, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner was illegally dismissed from the service. Respondents filed
a Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC arguing that the Labor Arbiter erred in concluding that petitioner
was illegally dismissed based solely on the Certification. They contended that the said Certification is not
sufficient to establish petitioner's dismissal as such fact must be proven by direct evidence of actual dismissal.
They also averred that the word "terminated" as used in the said Certification actually meant "pulled-out" and
this can be construed from the following phrase "as per client's request." This position is strengthened by
petitioner's letter requesting for a Certification in connection with his intended retirement. Respondents
explained that the subject Certification was only issued upon petitioner's request in order to facilitate his
application for entitlement to retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS). And the word
"terminated", assuming its literal meaning, was only used in order to serve the purpose of the same, that is, to
show SSS that petitioner is no longer in service.

NLRC held that the Certification should be read in conjunction with the letter of NPC requesting for
petitioner's relief from his post. The NLRC noted that it is common practice for clients of security agencies to
demand replacement of any security guard assigned to them but cannot demand their dismissal from the
employ of the security agency. And from the time petitioner was relieved from his NPC posting, he was
considered on a floating status which can last for a maximum period of six months. The CA denied the
Petition after it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Petitioner now comes to this
Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE
WON CA COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND CONFORMED TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD TERMINATED AS MERE PULL-OUT

HELD
We deny the Petition. Petitioner relies on the word "terminated" as used in the Certification issued him by
respondent Arquiza and argues that the same is a clear indication that he was dismissed from service.
Petitioner cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by
positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss. Upon a close reading of the
Certification, this Court is of the opinion that petitioner was not dismissed from service. The import of the said
Certification is that petitioner was assigned in NPC from November 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003 and that on
May 7, 2003, respondents terminated his assignment to NPC upon the latter's request. This is the correct
interpretation based on the true intention of the parties as shown by their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts and the other evidence on record as discussed above. Section 12 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the parties must be pursued.
Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms

[PERENA] Moreno, Jr. v. Private Management Office

FACTS:

The subject-matter of this complaint is the J. Moreno Building. Plaintiff Jose R. Moreno is the owner of the
Ground Floor, the 7th Floor and the Penthouse of the J. Moreno Building and the lot on which it stands.
Defendant Private Management Office is the owner of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th floors of the building.

On February 13, 1993, the defendant called for a conference for the purpose of discussing plaintiffs right of
first refusal over the floors of the building owned by defendant. At said meeting, defendant informed plaintiff
that the proposed purchase price for said floors was TWENTY ONE MILLION PESOS (P21,000,000.00). On
February 22, 1993, defendant, in a letter signed by its Trustee, Juan W. Moran, informed plaintiff thru Atty.
Jose Feria, Jr., that the Board of Trustees (BOT) of PMO is in agreement that Mr. Jose Moreno, Jr. has the
right of first refusal and requested plaintiff to deposit 10% of the suggested indicative price of P21.0 million
on or before February 26, 1993.

Then on March 12, 1993, defendant wrote plaintiff that its Legal Department has questioned the basis for the
computation of the indicative price for the said floors.On April 2, 1993, defendant wrote plaintiff that the BOT
has tentatively agreed on a settlement price of P42,274,702.17 for the said floors.

Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale over the subject floors at the price of P21M.

HELD:

The Court ruled that there no perfection of the contract of sale over the subject floors at the price of P21M.

The letter of February 22, 1993 and the surrounding circumstances clearly show that the parties are not past
the stage of negotiation, hence there could not have been a perfected contract of sale. The letter clearly states
that P21,000,000.00 is merely a suggested indicative price of the subject floors as it was yet to be approved
by the Board of Trustees. Before the Board could confirm the suggested indicative price, the Committee on
Privatization must first approve the terms of the sale or disposition. The imposition of this suspensive condition
finds basis under Proclamation No. 50 which vests in the Committee the power to approve the sale of
government assets, including the price of the asset to be sold.

Petitioner further argues that the suggested indicative price of P21,000,000.00 is not a proposed price, but the
selling price indicative of the value at which respondent was willing to sell. Petitioner posits that under Section
14, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, the term should be taken in its ordinary and usual acceptation
and should be taken to mean as a price which is indicated or specified which, if accepted, gives rise to a
meeting of minds.

Under the same section and rule invoked by petitioner, the terms of a writing are presumed to have been used
in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical,
or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which case
the agreement must be construed accordingly.

The reliance of the trial court in the Webster definition of the term indicative, as also adopted by petitioner, is
misplaced. The transaction at bar involves the sale of an asset under a privatization scheme which attaches a
peculiar meaning or signification to the term indicative price. Under No. 6.1 of the General Bidding Procedures
and Rules of respondent, an indicative price is a ball-park figure and [respondent] supplies such a figure
purely to define the ball-park. The plain contention of petitioner that the transaction involves an ordinary arms-
length sale of property is unsubstantiated and leaves much to be desired. This case sprung from a case of
specific performance initiated by petitioner who has the burden to prove that the case should be spared from
the application of the technical terms in the sale and disposition of assets under privatization. Petitioner failed
to discharge the burden.
[PERENA] Jimenez v. Reyes

FACTS:

This is a civil action for libel. The defendant is editor and proprietor of the weekly newspaper called "El
Mensajero Catolico," published in the city of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The plaintiff is also a resident of Vigan,
following the profession of attorney at law; he is also a druggist and has operated a drug store in Vigan for the
last seventeen years; and he is a councilman of the municipality. On August 29, 1910, the defendant
published, in the aforesaid newspaper, an article which is quoted in full below. These facts are alleged in the
complaint and expressly admitted in the answer. The article in question follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"FATHER THOMPKINS ACQUITTED.

"Innocence has triumphed again. Truth and Justice, even in the midst of the passions and miseries of
mankind, cannot be trampled under foot when Providence, the Divine Intelligence, intervenes. Lord, the
insufferable Protestant, the constant persecutor of the Faith and her ministers, was unable to prove the
complaint which he presented, through his attorney, Mr. Antonio Maria Jimenez, before the justice of the
peace of Vigan. It could not have been otherwise. The intelligent populace of Vigan had expected this result
and they were not mistaken. The judgment handed down by the upright justice of the peace, Mr. Lupo Asurin,
is replete with rational logic, which demonstrates his great talent. From a mere perusal of the judgment, one
can not help being satisfied with the clearness of expression, the depth of thought, and the simplicity of style.
We regret that we can not publish it in its entirely because of its length.

"To the Rev. Father Thompkins and the Order to which he belongs we extend our most cordial
congratulations, because Innocence emerged triumphant in spite of the efforts of her enemies to tarnish her,
to cover her with filth and human wretchedness. The Catholic Church is also to be congratulated because the
acquittal of the Rev. Father Thompkins is her victory against error and falsity, against the mendacity and bad
faith of certain miserable creatures who have used their profession to deceive the unwary public and
encompass its ruin."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is alleged that the part of the last sentence of this article following the word "victory" is libelous of the
plaintiff.

Moved by the institution of the present action, the defendant published another article in his newspaper on
September 5, 1910, which is reproduced below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"OUR EDITOR AGAIN BEFORE THE COURTS OF JUSTICE.

"Explanation. Our esteemed editor, Mr. Fidel Reyes, has been again charged with libel before the Court of
First Instance of this province. The complainant is Mr. Antonio Maria Jimenez, lawyer, druggist, president of
the Ilocano University, and councilman of this municipality of Vigan, who asks and indemnity of ten thousand
pesos in his complaint for losses and damages. On learning of this complaint, we felt in the bottom of our
heart a sincere pleasure, because, beyond it, we perceived another fine opportunity to demonstrate to the
public the sanity of the doctrine for which we stand, and the purity of our motives and intentions.

"The cause of the complaint was our article of last Monday, entitled Father Thompkins Acquitted, and we are
going to reproduce it to-day below in this entirely, to satisfy the curiosity of our readers. Here it is:"

[Here is quoted in full the article already quoted above. ]

"According to the complaint, it is alleged that our words, certain miserable creatures who have used their
profession to deceive the unwary public and encompass its ruin, alluded to Mr. Antonio Maria Jimenez. Why it
is thought that those words refer to Mr. Antonio Maria Jimenez is beyond our comprehension, because,
frankly, our intention was not to censure him in the least, nor did we endeavor, through them, to reproach any
specific individual with respect to his position or professional honor.

"We are the first to recognize the nobility of character, the loftiness of purpose, and the probity in his dealings
which Mr. Jimenez has always shown in all his acts, social as well as private and official.
"In his profession as attorney, all Vigan knows and we are the first to admit that Mr. Jimenez is the No. 1, or, in
other words, he is the non plus ultra of his colleagues. Mr. Jimenez is not like other shameless lawyers who
undertake the despicable business of pettifogging.

"In his profession of pharmacist, all Vigan is aware of and we are the first to admit his great skill in the various
drug-chemical combinations, and that Mr. Jimenez has never used his pharmaceutical knowledge to cause
harm to anyone; Mr. Antonio Maria Jimenez is not the type of other druggists who, forgetting the high mission
with which they have been endowed by God of superiority over their neighbors, use their knowledge to satisfy
base passions and execute dreadful plans.

"In his profession as proprietor of the Ilocano University, Mr. Jimenez has never deceived students like certain
directors of universities and colleges who issue titles of lawyer or bachelor without even examining the
candidates, provided they give them a little money.

"In his capacity of councilman, we are also the first to recognize his activity.

"In his domestic relations, all Vigan knows and we are the first to admit that Mr. Jimenez leads a tranquil and
happy life in the midst of his family; because, as a father, he loves his children; and as a husband, affectionate
to this wife, because every time he travels he takes with him his sweet helpmate.

"Finally, we did not endeavor to humiliate any specific person by our article, Father Thompkins Acquitted,
much less the famous and celebrated lawyer and druggist, Mr. Antonio Maria Jimenez.

"In conclusion, permit us to say that we do not make this explanation with the intention of disavowing any
responsibility, criminal or civil, because we are convinced that we have not committed any crime against
anyone; rather, we desire to make it plain that our purpose was to oppose the enemies of our Faith, as to
whom our pen will never rest in showing them the error into which they have fallen, to the end that they may
return to the bosom of the Catholic Church, which is the only true religion."cralaw virt

The plaintiff has attempted to show that the odium of the last paragraph will be attached to him as the attorney
for the prosecution in the Thompkins case. The defendant has attempted to show that the criticism in the last
paragraph referred to no determinate person, but to those clergy of other religions than his own who resort to
deceit in their efforts to inculcate their doctrines and promote, in that manner, the interests of their respective
creeds. This is the explanation given in the last paragraph of the second article as amplified in the brief of the
defendant on this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the interpretation by the parties of the alleged libelous article may be admitted by the
Courts.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the interpretation by the parties cannot be admitted by the Courts.

The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence
is nevertheless admissible that they have a local, technical or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so
used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly."
(Sec. 290, Code Civ. Proc.)

No attempt has been made to show that the words of either of these articles "have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification.

When neither party endeavors to show a hidden meaning or latent ambiguities in the publication complained
of, it is for the court to determine whether its contents are libelous, after giving to the article as a whole such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the publication would naturally be
understood. Opinions of witnesses upon this point are immaterial.

In Tawney v. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (190 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this
point: In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are
conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning
as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what
was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole." In applying these
rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by
the publisher on being called to account.

[RAMOS] Security Bank Corp. v. CA

Facts:
SBC and PISA entered into a Contract of Security Services (CSS)[3] wherein PISA undertook to secure, guard,
and protect the personnel and property of SBC through the deployment of qualified and properly equipped
guards in SBCs premises and branches. Paragraph 9 of the CSS provides:
[PISA] shall be liable for any loss, damage or injury suffered by [SBC], its officers, employees, clients,
guests, visitors and other persons allowed entry into [SBCs] premises where such loss, damage or
injury is due to the negligence or willful act of the guards or representatives of [PISA]. If such loss,
damage or injury is caused by a party other than the guards or representatives of [PISA], [PISA] shall
be jointly and severally liable with said party if [PISA] failed to exercise due [diligence] in preventing
such loss, damage or injury. [4]

Paragraph 12 of the CSS also provides:

12. [SBC] obliges itself to inform [PISA] in writing through [the] Guard-in-Charge assigned to the
former, the existence of any loss or damage to [SBCs] properties within Forty-Eight (48) hours after its
discovery by [SBC]; otherwise, [SBC] shall be considered to have waived its right to proceed against
[PISA] by reason of such loss or damage. Such written notice is not required if [PISA] took part in the
investigation of the loss or damage or in case the loss or damage is caused by [PISAs] guard/s or
representative/s, in which case [SBC] may assert the claim for reimbursement at any time. x x x [5]
(Emphasis added)

Taytay Branch Office of SBC was robbed PHP12,927,628.01. Among the suspects in the robbery were two
regular security guards of PISA. [6]
At the time, SBC Taytay Branch was covered by a Money, Securities and Payroll Robbery Policy with Liberty
Insurance Corporation (LIC), wherein the latter endeavored to indemnify the former against loss of money,
payroll and securities that may result from robbery or any attempt thereof within the premises of SBCs Taytay
Branch Office, up to the maximum amount of PHP9,900,000.00. [7] The insurance policy provided, however,
that LIC would not be liable if the loss was caused by any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of SBC officers,
employees or by its authorized representative.[8]
SBC and PISA entered into a Post-Robbery Agreement (PRA) whereby PISA paid PHP3,027,728.01, which
was the difference between the total amount lost and the maximum amount insured. [9] PISA made the
payment in the interest of maintaining good relations, without necessarily admitting its liability for the loss
suffered by SBC by reason of the Taytay robbery. [10]
Paragraph 5 of the PRA specifically states that PISAs payment was subject to express terms and conditions,
one of which was the following:

(e) The parties hereto further agree that this agreement and/or payment of the whole amount of
P3,027,728.01, shall not affect or prejudice, directly or indirectly, whatever cause of action SBC may
have against PISA and whatever claim or defense the latter may have against SBC, if the maximum
recoverable proceeds of the insurance covering the loss suffered by SBC could not be recovered from
the insurer. Further, it is agreed that should Security Guards Wilson Taca and Ernesto Mariano be
absolved from the charge of robbery in band and/or are found by the proper court not to have been
involved at all in the alleged conspiracy, and that it is duly established through legal action before the
competent court that their failure to prevent the robbery was not due to their, or their PISA co-guards
negligence and/or willful act, whatever installments may have been paid by PISA under this Agreement
shall be reimbursed with legal interest to be computed from the time of actual payment, the same to be
amortized in eighteen (18) equally monthly installments, with the interest thereto being based on the
diminishing balance. [11] (Emphasis added)

Issue: W/N
Court of Appeals erred in declaring:

(1) A suspensive condition exists in paragraph 5 of the PRA which bars SBC from impleading
PISA as an alternative defendant in civil case No. 92-337 until after the final adjudication of the
suit instituted by SBC against LIC for payment of indemnity; and
 (2) The PRA takes precedence over the CSS.

Ruling:
We grant the petition.

At the outset, it should be noted that at the heart of this controversy is the proper interpretation of paragraph
5(e) of the PRA, which provides:

The parties hereto further agree that this agreement and/or payment of the whole amount of
P3,027,728.01, shall not affect or prejudice, directly or indirectly, whatever cause of action SBC may
have against PISA and whatever claim or defense the latter may have against SBC, if the maximum
recoverable proceeds of the insurance covering the loss suffered by SBC could not be recovered from
the insurer. x x x

To start with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that SBCs right of action against PISA was modified by the
PRA, insofar as the PISAs liability for the Taytay robbery is concerned, particularly through paragraph 5(e).
The Court of Appeals stated:[25]

While it cannot be gainsaid that the terms and conditions in the Contract of Security Services (CSS)
were incorporated to the PRA (sic) as integral parts thereof, nevertheless, We conform to the finding of
the court of origin that the 2nd contract (PRA) precisely and particularly dealt with the mode of resolving
PISAs liability resulting, if any, from [the] March 12, 1992 robbery. (Order dated July 12, 1993, p.1;
Records, p.113). It distinctively provides a clear cut manner by which the right of action against PISA
may be exercised by [SBC] pertaining to a specific robbery incidenta matter visibly non-existent in the
CSS. Indeed, this special provision controls and prevails over the general terms and conditions extant
on the CSS. (Yatco v. El Hogar Filipino, 67 Phil. 610) When a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. Ergo, a particular intent, as in this case reflected in
letter e, paragraph 5 of the PRA will control a general intent embodied in paragraph 9 of the Contract
of Security Services. (Section 12, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court) Thus, the PRA is paramount to
and prevails over the terms and stipulations in the first contract (CSS) on matters relevant and material
to PISAs liability relating to the robbery. [26]

Indeed, the clear import of paragraph 5(e) of the PRA is that recovery of the insurance proceeds would affect
or prejudice SBCs claim against PISA. If LIC had granted SBCs claim for indemnity, then SBC could no longer
claim the same amount from PISA. As a corollary, it is only upon LICs denial of SBCs claim that SBCs right of
action against PISA could accrue. To rule otherwise would be to countenance SBCs double recovery from its
loss and lead to its unjust enrichment.
If some stipulations of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual. [34] The various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
[35]
When it is impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding articles, and the doubts
refer to incidental circumstances of an onerous contract, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest
reciprocity of interests. [36]

[RAMOS] Enriquez v. A.S. Watson

Facts: This action was brought on April 12, 1911, by Rafael, Antonio, Trinidad, Cayetano, Rosario, Gertrudis
and Carmen Enriquez, and Antonio Gascon (the latter being a minor, was represented by his guardian ad
litem), as owners and lessors of the property Nos. 72, 74, an 76 Escolta, city of Manila, against A. S. Watson
& Company, Ltd., as lessee of said property. The plaintiffs allege that on June 22, 1906, Rafael, Carmen,
Antonio, and Trinidad Enriquez and Antonio Gascon executed to the defendant a contract of mortgage and
lease upon their participation in that property; that on January 19, 1907, the other plaintiffs executed the same
mortgage and lease in favor of the defendant upon their interest in the same property; that the said contract of
lease has been terminated by the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendant of the principal and interest of the
mortgage; that the said contract of lease is null and of no effect by reason of the minority of the plaintiff
Antonio Gascon, who is still a minor; that the defendant, after June 22, 1906, made all the repairs necessary
to its business with the approval of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs further allege that there exists in that building a principal wall about one meter in thickness and
five meters in height, which extends from the front of the building on the Escolta to the rear of the same; that
upon this wall rests the second floor of the building and that it is necessary to safely maintain the building
against earthquakes and typhoons; that on 11th of April, 1911, the defendant commenced to destroy and
remove the said wall and was on the date of the filing of this complaint actually engaged in the destruction and
removal of the same; and unless restrained, would continue such destruction and removal, to the irreparable
injury of the plaintiffs; and that the defendant has varied the form and substance of the leased premises. The
plaintiffs therefore prayed that the defendant be prohibited from destroying and removing said wall; that it be
ordered to rebuild or replace that part which it had removed or destroyed; and that the contract of lease be
declared terminated and rescinded.
On the 12th day of April, 1911, a preliminary injunction was issued by the Court of First Instance. On the 21st
of that month, the defendant company answered dmitting the allegations as to the ownership, mortgage, and
lease, contained in paragraphs 1, 2, an 3 of the complaint, and denying all the other allegations therein.
On the 24th day of May, 1911, The Philippines Drug Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, appeared and asked leave to intervene as an interested party. This leave being granted, it
alleged that it is the actual owner of the pharmacy situated in the leased premises, which formerly belonged to
the defendant A. S. Watson & Company, Ltd.; and that the defendant sublet to it the ground floor of the leased
property under the same conditions as are expressed in the original contract of lease. The intervener further
alleged, as did the defendant, the necessity for the removal of the wall in question in order to give it more
space as required by its business, and that the removal of this wall was authorized in Paragraph M of the
original lease.
The trial court, after considering the evidence presented, making a personal inspection of the leased
premises, and hearing the arguments of counsel for both parties, and after making its findings of facts and
conclusions of law, entered the following decree, to wit:
The court denies the rescission and declaration of nullity of the contract of lease demanded by the plaintiffs
From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed

Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to declare the contract of lease voidable or rescinded for one of two
reasons: first, because of the minority of one of the lessors; and second, because neither the defendant nor
intervener had authority under the contract of lease to remove the wall in question? Plaintiffs do not now insist
that the contract of lease was terminated on the payment of the mortgage.

Held:
The supreme court of Spain had under consideration this very question in its resolution of April 26, 1907 (vol.
15 Jurisprudencia referente al Codigo Civil, p. 194). In this case, a contract of lease for twelve years, executed
by one of the coowners of a certain property, one of whom was a minor, had been presented for registry.
Registry was refused for the reason, among others, the majority of the coowners lacked authority to execute
said contract of lease. It was argued that the majority of the coowners, in their enjoyment of the control of the
management and administration of the thing, acted in a representative or an administrative capacity in regard
to the minority. In determining the questions presented in this case, the court said:
That for the administration and better enjoyment of the thing, the decision of the majority of the coowners is
obligatory, and that there is no majority, unless the decision is made by the coowners, that represent the
majority of the interests that constitute the object of the community, are general rules laid down in article 398
of the Civil Code, governing community of property.
The contract of lease is by its nature and purpose one of the means of enjoyment or development of
nonfungible property, and, in this concept, may be agreed upon by the coowners of a thing, provided always
that they represent a majority of the interests of the community, the decision being obligatory for all by virtue of
the powers that are expressly conferred upon them by virtue of said provisions.
This doctrine was recognized by the supreme court in its decision of June 30, 1897, and of the 8th of July,
1902, and by this court in its resolution of May 29, 1906, considering as included in the powers conferred in
said article, leases exceeding a period of six years, decided upon by a majority of the coowners of a property
possessed in common.
In the case of the Manila Building and Loan Association and Pealosa (13 Phil. Rep., 575), this court said:
If the object leased were a house, it is evident that the lessee might effect such improvements for use,
recreation or comfort as would not change its form or substance as he deemed fit; he could build a tower or
luxurious pavilion more expensive than the house itself, to which, at the expiration of the lease, the owner of
the house would have no right whatever, unless the lessee could not remove the same without injury to the
house to which it was attached as an improvement, excepting of course the right to cause the same to be
demolished so that the house might be returned to him in the same condition that the lessee received it;
The supreme court of Spain recognizes the fact that no ironclad rules for the interpretation of these articles
can be laid down which would govern all cases. These provisions must be applied according to the facts and
circumstances of each case. Manresa is inclined to the view that industrial development should be taken into
consideration in the determination of questions involved in the application of said articles. The provisions of
these articles are general rules of law, and, like most general propositions, are not to be accepted without
limitation or reserve, under any and all circumstances. They must be interpreted in the light of the growth of
civilization and varying conditions. Certain obligations are placed upon the lessee to prevent lawless acts
which would result in waste or destruction. The importance of these obligations to the lessor cannot be
denied. Especially are they valuable and essential to the protection of a landlord who rents his premises for a
short time.
In this contract of lease there are two clauses which deserve careful consideration.
Clause K:
All the expenditures for cleaning, painting, and repairs which the building may require and all that is ordered
done by the Board of Health, will be at the expense of the lessee, A. S. Watson and Company, Limited.
Clause M:
The lessee may make such works on the building as the business which it has established therein requires,
provided always that neither the strength nor the value of the said building is impaired.
It will be noted that the word "reparaciones" is used in Clause K, and the word "obras" in Clause M. Counsel
for the appellants insist that the word "obras" as thus used means the same as "reparaciones." The
Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Castilian Language (Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua Castellana)
defines these words as follows:
OBRA:
1. A thing made or produce by an agent.
xxx xxx xxx
4. A building in course of construction.
Sections 290 and 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provide:
SEC. 290. Terms of a writing presumed to be in their ordinary sense. The terms of a writing are presumed
to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is nevertheless admissible that they
have a local, technical or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular
instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.
SEC. 293. Where intention of different parties to instrument not the same. When the terms of an agreement
have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either
party in which he supposed the other understood it; and when different constructions of a provision are
otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made.
In the case at bar no proof has been presented tending to show that the word "obras" was used in a technical
or special sense, or that it has a local signification, and therefore, it must be considered as used in its ordinary
and general sense. If there exist any ambiguity and if the meaning that the appellants give to the word "obras"
is proper, the meaning given by the appellees is likewise proper, consequently, we must apply the rule laid
down in section 293, above quoted, for the reason that the stipulation contained in Clause M of the contract is
a stipulation in the favor of the lessee.
The question was raised as to whether the conduct of the parties in carrying out the terms of this lease has
been such as to show or indicate their intention or understanding of the meaning of the word "obras" when
they inserted this word in Clause M. Upon this point the trial court said:
That under and by virtue of the said contract of lease, the defendant company entered into possession of the
leased premises, making therein alterations and repairs at a cost of some P60,000, including the removal of
the whole front of the building facing upon the Escolta and replacing the same upon the new street line,
established by the city of Manila, with a modern and a decorative commercial front; the removal of the heavy
tiled roof and the replacing of the same with a light galvanized roof; the removal of various walls and replacing
the same with steel columns and girders; the tearing down and rebuilding of a part of the building and the
adding thereto of a camarin upon the Pasig River; and the building of a river wall and reclamation of a
considerable amount of ground; and which alteration included the removal of that part of the wall in question
which extended from point A to point G on the plan of the premises introduced in evidence as defendant's
Exhibit No. 9, all of which repairs, alterations and improvements, were made with final approval of the
plaintiffs, although after much controversy and many disagreements, and to which alterations and
improvements the plaintiffs contributed the sum of about eighteen hundred pesos paid by the city of Manila for
the expropriation for street purposes of the small strip along the front of the building heretofore mentioned.
These findings of fact are, we think, fully supported by the evidence. The result is that these important and
material changes, which include the removal of a great portion of the very wall in question, were made by
virtue of the contract of lease itself. It is true that the owners objected at first, but afterwards consented in
accordance with the provisions of Clause M, and not by reason of any subsequent specific agreement. After
all, that the defendants have the right under the law and the provisions of Clause M of the contract of lease to
remove the wall in question, cannot be seriously doubted, provided always that neither the solidity of the
building nor its value be impaired.
There is nothing in the contract of lease in the case at bar which even tends to prohibit the lessee from
subletting the whole or any part of the leased premises. The lessee's right to do this cannot be questioned,
and his subtenant is not only obligated to carry out his part of the contract with the sublessor, but he is also
bound to the lessors for all of the acts which refer to the use and preservation of the premises, in the manner
agreed upon between the lessors and the lessee. The lessors can compel the subtenant to comply with these
conditions. This sets up the privity between the lessors and the subtenant. But it is said that the contract of
lease in question is not assignable. This contract is an ordinary one, under which the lessee as we have said,
has a perfect right to sublet the whole of the premises for the entire time. Should the lessee do this, would it
not amount to an assignment of the contract of the lease? The power of assignment is incident to the state of
every lessee of things, unless he has been restrained by the terms of his lease. In the contract of lease in
question, the lessors, by Clause M, agree that the lessee may make such changes as its business requires,
provided that neither the solidity nor the value of the building is prejudiced. This is a specific right granted to
the lessee. This right is a part of the lease itself and affects directly the thing leased. It is not, therefore, a
personal obligation between the lessors and the lessee.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs against the
appellant.

Section 15. Written words control printed

[TAN] Jarque v. Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 32986, November 11, 1930]

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of the motorboat Pandan and had a marine insurance policy with the respondents
Smith, Bell & Co. (SBC) and Union Fire Insurance Co. (UFIC) where there was a rider in the insurance
contract that stated that the insurance was against the absolute total loss of the vessel only. On a voyage,
the vessel was met with difficult weather which forced it to jettison part of its cargo. As a result, respondent
UFIC was assessed a certain amount as its contribution to the general average. UFIC, insisting on the rider
did not comply with the assessment. Petitioner filed a cases w/ the trial court w/c rendered judgment in its
favor.
The contract was presented in court and is printed in the English common form of marine policies where one
of the clauses read:
The UFIC shall bear the hurt, detriment or damage of the said vessel or any part thereof.
Attached to the policy was a rider containing typewritten provision w/c included:
AGAINST THE ABSOLUTE TOTAL LOSS OF THE VESSEL ONLY, AND TO PAY PROPORTIONATE
SALVAGE CHARGES OF TEH DECLARED VALUE.

Issue: W/c of the aforementioned provisions shall prevail?

Held:
It is a well settled rule that in case repugnance exists between written and printed portions of a policy, the
written portion prevails, and there can be no question that as far as any inconsistency exists, the above-
mentioned typed "rider" prevails over the printed clause it covers. Section 291 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that "when an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form and the two are
inconsistent, the former controls the latter."
Judgment in favor of the petitioner.

[TAN] De los Santos v. Vibar, G.R. No. 150931, July 16, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner introduced respondent to De Leon who loaned from respondent the amount of 500,000 Php. After
the promissory note was signed by the parties, respondents counsel said that petitioner should be held as the
guarantor of De Leon. Petitioner gave a nod of approval and so De Leon wrote down the word guarantor
beside the signature of petitioner.
After De Leon failed to pay the loan, several written and oral demands were made to w/c De Leon failed to
answer. Frustrated, respondent filed a suit for the collection of a sum of money in the trial court w/c held that
petitioner was not a guarantor.
On appeal, the CA ruled otherwise.
Issue: WON petitioner is a guarantor.

Held:
The SC held that Cecilias act of nodding her head signified her assent to the insertion of the word guarantor.
The word guarantor could have been inserted by Cecilia herself, or by someone authorized by Cecilia. In
either case, Cecilia would be bound as guarantor. In this case, Cecilia, by nodding her head, authorized de
Leon, who prepared the promissory note, to insert the word guarantor. Since de Leon made the insertion only
after Atty. Bautista had raised the need for Cecilia to be a guarantor, a positive or negative reaction was
expected from Cecilia, who responded by giving her nod of approval. Otherwise, Cecilia should have
immediately expressed her objection to the insertion of the word guarantor. Cecilias act of nodding her head
showed her consent to be a guarantor.

It is axiomatic that the written word guarantor prevails over the typewritten word witness. In case of conflict,
the written word prevails over the printed word. Section 15 of Rule 130 provides:

Sec. 15. Written words control printed. - When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a
printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter.

The rationale for this rule is that the written words are the latest expression of the will of the parties. Thus, in
this case, the latest expression of Cecilias will is that she signed the promissory note as guarantor.

Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings

Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred

[PATAWARAN] Horrigan v. Troika Commercial Inc., G.R. No. 148411, November 29, 2005

FACTS: Troika Commercial, Inc., (Troika), herein respondent, is the lessee of the entire ground floor of a two-
story building located at San Juan, Metro Manila. Respondent then sub-let a portion of the ground floor to
Martha Horrigan, petitioner, to be used for her restaurant Tia Maria. The contract of Sub-lease was prepared
by Marthas husband which provides the following provisions:

2. In consideration thereof, Martha R. Horrigan undertakes, promises and guarantees payment to

Troika of the following:
2.1. P12,500 monthly starting March 15, 1983 and every month thereafter until December 31, 1989
payable every ___ day of the month.

2.2. In addition to the above (sub-par 2.1), P4,500 monthly starting August 1, 1983 and every month
thereafter for seven (7) years until December 31, 1989 plus a guaranteed yearly increase equivalent
to 10% thereof."

Troika construed the 10% annual increase to apply to both the original monthly rental of P12,500 and the
additional rent of P4,500 under the contract while Martha argues that the 10% annual increase applies only to
the additional rent of P4,500 under the contract.

Troika sent Martha billing statements explaining the 10% annual increase of rental rates but were ignored. As
a result, Troika was forced to send a final demand letter asking her to pay the amount of P318, 489
corresponding the unpaid rental adjustments which were also ignored prompting Troika to file with the RTC of
Makati a complaint for sum of money.

In Marthas answer, she avers that the 10% annual increase in rent applies only to the additional rental of
P4,500. She also admitted that from June 1984, she has been giving Troika P1,200 monthly ex-gratis in
appreciation of its efforts to improve her business which are not to be considered as rental adjustments. She
also claimed that even assuming that she still owed respondent, under sub-paragraph 2.2, the amount due is
only P58,485.50 as opposed to Troikas claim of P318,489.

RTC: Ruled in favor of Troika and ordered Martha to pay P318,489 with interest at 12% per annum
representing the unpaid rental adjustments. Martha appealed.

CA: Affirmed the RTC in toto.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that the 10% annual increase applies to both the original monthly rental of
P12,500 and the additional monthly rental of P4,500.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Troika.

 "ART. 1377: The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity." the party who draws up the contract, in which obscure words or phrases appear, bears
the responsibility for causing the ambiguity or obscurity, and hence, these must be construed against him. In
this case, it was Marthas husband that prepared the sub-lease contract and consequently, the ambiguity must
be construed against Martha as she is presumed to have confirmed the same.

Section 17, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: "Of two constructions, which preferred. When the
terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to
prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of
a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose
favor the provision was made.
There is no question that the 10% annual increase of rents was for the benefit of Troika, being the sub-lessor.
As such, any doubt in its interpretation must be interpreted in its favor under Sec 17, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. The decision of the CA is affirmed in toto.

[PATAWARAN] Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Pure Cane Molasses Co., G.R. No. 36026A,
November 16, 1932

The case is an appeal taken by the defendant Pure Cane Molasses Co. from the decision of the CFI of Iloilo in
holding that the contract under exhibit A cannot be cancelled and that the sum of 6,000 is but a guarantee or
bond, payment of which does not entitle the defendant to cancel the contract.

FACTS: Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract of sale of 200,000-400,000 gallons of molasses for a
period of 5 consecutive milling seasons beginning with the milling season 1929-1930.

Plaintiff Asturias brought an action to amend the contract of sale in the sense that only 50% of Asturias total
output of molasses would be considered sold. However, Pure Cane filed a supplemental answer alleging that
Asturias had given it the option to cancel the molasses contract upon payment of the sum of P6,000 which
was the bond required by Asturias as shown by admitted exhibits A, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 which were letters
that were exchanged between Manuel Garcia, treasurer and acting manager of Asturias and T. Nielsen, the
predecessor-in-interest of Pure Cane.

During the negotiations as shown by the exhibits, it is undisputed that T. Nielsen agreed and put up the bond
having Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation as its guarantor.

Pure Cane now prays that the contract be cancelled and for Asturias to be compelled by the court to
accept the amount of P6,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pure Cane is entitled to the rescission or cancellation of the contract upon payment of
P6,000.

HELD: In Exhibit 4, Manuel Garcia communicated to Nielsen the following: we require a bond of P6,000 to
answer for your failure to comply with the terms thereof; in other words, in case you may later wish to have
said contract cancelled. This bond may be in cash, or on the undertaking of a solvent firm."

In Exhibit 7, Garcia also used the following words: "We should like to insert in the contract that if you should
wish to cancel it before the expiration of the five year period, you would have to pay us P6,000 which is the
bond we require, and that this bond must be in force for five years.

And finally, Exhibit 9 which should have been considered by the trial court instead of rejecting it outright being
material and competent and states the following: "The bond which we require is not for the payment for the
molasses to be delivered to Mr. Nielsen; it is for the purpose of securing his compliance for five years with the
terms of the contract with this Central, so that in case of his failure to comply therewith we could take said sum
of P6,000 by way of indemnity for damages.

In view of the foregoing quotations from letters written by the manager of the appellee, there can be no doubt
that the appellant was given the option to cancel the contract upon payment of P6,000, which is the amount
fixed for the bond to guarantee the fulfillment of the contract. The intention of the parties was to consider
this stipulation as an integral part of the contract of sale, and we have no doubt in so holding.

"SEC. 293. Where intention of different parties to instrument not the same. When the terms of an
agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against
either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are
otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made." (Code of Civil Procedure.)

"ART. 1288. Obscure terms of a contract shall not be so construed as to favor the party who occasioned the
obscurity." (Civil Code.)
According to these provisions any obscurity in the contract regarding the point in question, where the terms
are susceptible of different interpretations, they should be interpreted in favor of the herein appellant both
because the right to cancel was established for its benefit, and because it was the appellee, through its
manager, that gave rise to the ambiguity in considering the bond sometimes as a guarantee, and at other
times as indemnity for liquidated damages, and lastly as compensation in case of rescission.

SC: Pure Cane is entitled to the cancellation of the contract. Judgement appealed from is reversed and the
contract of sale is declared cancelled and it is ordered that the sum of P6,000 be delivered the Asturias.

[ABON] Enriquez v. A. S. Watson & Co. Ltd., G.R. No. 7180, March 30, 1912

DOCTRINE: When it is not shown that words or phrases have a technical or special use, and they are
susceptible of two interpretations, that interpretation most favorable to the party in whose favor they are used
must be given.

FACTS:

This action was brought on April 12, 1911, by Rafael, Antonio, Trinidad, Cayetano, Rosario, Gertrudis and
Carmen Enriquez, and Antonio Gascon (the latter being a minor, was represented by his guardian ad litem),
as owners and lessors of the property Nos. 72, 74, an 76 Escolta, city of Manila, against A. S. Watson &
Company, Ltd., as lessee of said property. The plaintiffs allege that on June 22, 1906, Rafael, Carmen,
Antonio, and Trinidad Enriquez and Antonio Gascon executed to the defendant a contract of mortgage and
lease upon their participation in that property; that on January 19, 1907, the other plaintiffs executed the same
mortgage and lease in favor of the defendant upon their interest in the same property; that the said contract of
lease has been terminated by the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendant of the principal and interest of the
mortgage; that the said contract of lease is null and of no effect by reason of the minority of the plaintiff
Antonio Gascon, who is still a minor; that the defendant, after June 22, 1906, made all the repairs necessary
to its business with the approval of the plaintiffs.

However, the property was leased to the defendant for a period of twelve years with permission to renew the
lease for a further period of six years.

Moreover, plaintiffs further allege that there exists in that building a principal wall about one meter in thickness
and five meters in height, which extends from the front of the building on the Escolta to the rear of the same;
that upon this wall rests the second floor of the building and that it is necessary to safely maintain the building
against earthquakes and typhoons; the defendant commenced to destroy and remove the said wall and was
on the date of the filing of this complaint actually engaged in the destruction and removal of the same; and
unless restrained, would continue such destruction and removal, to the irreparable injury of the plaintiffs; and
that the defendant has varied the form and substance of the leased premises.

The plaintiffs therefore prayed that the defendant be prohibited from destroying and removing said wall; that it
be ordered to rebuild or replace that part which it had removed or destroyed; and that the contract of lease be
declared terminated and rescinded.

As a defense, the defendant alleges that under the provisions of Paragraph M of the contract of lease, it has
expended the sum of over sixty thousand pesos in improving the leased premises, and that on making such
expenditure it believed that it would be reimbursed by enjoying the occupancy and subrenting of the premises.
(Paragraph M:The lessee may make such works on the building as the business which it has established
therein requires, provided always that neither the strength nor the value of the said building is impaired.)
On the 24th day of May, 1911, The Philippines Drug Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, appeared and asked leave to intervene as an interested party. It alleged, as did the
defendant, the necessity for the removal of the wall in question in order to give it more space as required by its
business, and that the removal of this wall was authorized in Paragraph M of the original lease.

The trial court denies the rescission and declaration of nullity of the contract of lease demanded by the
plaintiffs, declaring such contract of lease to be valid and subsisting and binding upon the parties and upon
the sublessee and intervener, the Philippine Drug Company, and continues and declares final the preliminary
writ of injunction issued herein on the 12th day of April, 1911, but modifying the same by permitting the
defendant, A. S. Watson & Co. Ltd., or the intervener, the Philippines Drug Company, to remove the wall in
question on the condition that they substitute it with properly constructed concrete pillars and arches and such
other work as may be necessary.

From this judgment the plaintiffs appealed and make the following assignment of errors: 1. The judgment is
erroneous in not having declared rescinded the contract of lease.2. The judgment is erroneous in finding that
the lessee and sublessee have the right to change the form and substance of the property leased.3. The
judgment is erroneous in finding that the lessee acted in good faith in beginning the destruction of the
wall believing that under the contract of lease it had the right to do this.4. The judgment is erroneous in
not finding that the building is weakened by the destruction of the wall.5. The judgment is erroneous is so far
as it modifies the preliminary injunction.6. The judgment is erroneous in not declaring perpetual the
preliminary injunction.7. The judgment is erroneous in the dispositive part thereof relating to the form and
manner of making the modifications in the property because it does not relate to anything at issue in the
case.8. The judgment is erroneous in the part relating to the form and manner of making the modifications in
the property because it does not dispose of anything judicially, but, on the contrary, gives permission to the
opposing parties without commanding them to do anything.9. The judgment is erroneous because it does not
order the repair of the destruction made in the wall.10. The judgment is erroneous because it declares valid
the contract of lease.11. The court erred in denying the motion for a new trial.

ISSUE: WON the appellees have violated the terms of the contract of lease and thereby entitle the appellants
to have said contract of lease rescinded.

HELD: NO.
Before considering the contract in question, it might be well to examine the right of the lessee to make
changes in the property leased, if there were no express stipulation therefor in the contract.

Article 1573 of the Civil Code provides:

A lessee shall have, with regard to the useful and voluntary improvements, the same rights which are granted
the usufructuary.

Article 487 of the same code reads:

The usufructuary may make on the property which is the object of the usufruct any improvements, useful or for
recreation, which he may deem proper, provided he does not change its form or substance; but he shall have
no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove said improvements, should it be possible to do
so without injury to the prope he result is that the lessee may make any improvements, useful or for
recreation, in the property leased that he may deem proper, provided that he does not change its form or
substance.

In the said contract of lease, two clauses deserves careful consideration, to wit:

Clause K:
All the expenditures for cleaning, painting, and repairs which the building may require and all that is ordered
done by the Board of Health, will be at the expense of the lessee, A. S. Watson and Company, Limited.
Clause M:
The lessee may make such works on the building as the business which it has established therein requires,
provided always that neither the strength nor the value of the said building is impaired.

It will be noted that the word "reparaciones" is used in Clause K, and the word "obras" in Clause M. Counsel
for the appellants insist that the word "obras" as thus used means the same as "reparaciones." The
Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Castilian Language (Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua Castellana)
defines these words as follows:
OBRA:
1. A thing made or produce by an agent.
xxx xxx xxx
4. A building in course of construction.
REPARACION:
1. The action an effect of repair. (Reparar-verb: To mend, to straighten, or correct the damage suffered by
something.)
The New Dictionary of the Castilian Language (Nuevo Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana) defines the same
words as follows:
OBRA:
Anything made, created, or produced by the some power or agent. Any construction of architecture, masonry,
or carpentry, applied especially to buildings in course of construction or repair, as: "There are three jobs in
Calle Hortaleza. Everything in my house is disordered and topsy-turvy because of the work."
REPARACION:
The act or effect of repairing or of being repaired. The fact of the repairing, in the sense of renewing or
improving something.
The only synonym given in this work for "obra" is produccion."
It may be that repairs are included in the definition of "obras." Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the word
"obras," used in its general sense, has a far more comprehensive meaning than just simple repairs.

Sections 290 and 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provide:

SEC. 290. Terms of a writing presumed to be in their ordinary sense. The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is nevertheless
admissible that they have a local, technical or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and
understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.
SEC. 293. Where intention of different parties to instrument not the same. When the terms of an
agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against
either party in which he supposed the other understood it; and when different constructions of a provision are
otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made.

In the case at bar no proof has been presented tending to show that the word "obras" was used in a technical
or special sense, or that it has a local signification, and therefore, it must be considered as used in its ordinary
and general sense. If there exist any ambiguity and if the meaning that the appellants give to the word "obras"
is proper, the meaning given by the appellees is likewise proper, consequently, we must apply the rule laid
down in section 293, above quoted, for the reason that the stipulation contained in Clause M of the contract is
a stipulation in the favor of the lessee.
Counsel for appellants insist that in order to define the meaning of the word "obras" we should refer to the
articles of the Civil Code that deal with contracts of lease. This might be done in those cases where the
intention of the parties could not be ascertained from either the contract itself or from the conduct of the
parties in executing and carrying out the same. In the case at bar, all that is necessary is to give a fair and
reasonable interpretation to the meaning of clause M of the contract of lease. This clause contains certain
limitations on the exercise of the right to make alterations (obras): first, the alterations (obras) proposed to be
made must be required by the business; second, such alterations must not injure the solidity of the building;
and third, the same must not prejudice the value of the building. But it is insisted, as we have said, that the
word "obras" in clause M must be interpreted to mean "reparaciones" as used in Clause K. Clause K imposes
upon the lessee the obligation to make the repairs required by the building for its conservation. If the words
have exactly the same meaning and were intended by the parties to mean the same thing, then the insertion
of clause M would only have had the effect of giving to the lessee the right to keep the building in repair, when,
as a matter of fact, Clause K made it its duty to repair the building. As we understand the contract, in Clause K
a duty is imposed upon the lessee, while in Clause M a right is given to it. In Clause K the word "reparaciones"
is used in connection with the duty, and in clause M the word "obras" is used in connection with the right. If the
contracting parties had intended that the two words be used in the same sense they would have so stated, or
they would have eliminated Clause M entirely as being useless, as it is meaningless to say that when a duty is
imposed upon a person it is necessary to expressly give him a right to perform that duty. If he did not have the
right to perform that duty, the same would not have been imposed upon him. The stipulations in Clause M are
expressed as clearly and explicitly as they could have been under the circumstances. At the time of the
execution of this contract of lease, it was impossible to know what would be the requirements of the business
during its term of eighteen years. It was likewise impossible for the parties to have then agreed in detail as to
the changes that might be necessary. The lessee wished to reserve to itself the right to make the changes in
the property required by its business, and none of the parties could anticipate what might be required during
this long period of time. This right was conferred upon the lessee by the lessors, but the right, as we have
said, had its limitations: that is, the lessee could not prejudice the solidity or the value of the building without
breaking the contract.
The question was raised as to whether the conduct of the parties in carrying out the terms of this lease has
been such as to show or indicate their intention or understanding of the meaning of the word "obras" when
they inserted this word in Clause M. Upon this point the trial court said:
That under and by virtue of the said contract of lease, the defendant company entered into possession of the
leased premises, making therein alterations and repairs at a cost of some P60,000, including the removal of
the whole front of the building facing upon the Escolta and replacing the same upon the new street line,
established by the city of Manila, with a modern and a decorative commercial front; the removal of the heavy
tiled roof and the replacing of the same with a light galvanized roof; the removal of various walls and replacing
the same with steel columns and girders; the tearing down and rebuilding of a part of the building and the
adding thereto of a camarin upon the Pasig River; and the building of a river wall and reclamation of a
considerable amount of ground; and which alteration included the removal of that part of the wall in question
which extended from point A to point G on the plan of the premises introduced in evidence as defendant's
Exhibit No. 9, all of which repairs, alterations and improvements, were made with final approval of the
plaintiffs, although after much controversy and many disagreements, and to which alterations and
improvements the plaintiffs contributed the sum of about eighteen hundred pesos paid by the city of Manila for
the expropriation for street purposes of the small strip along the front of the building heretofore mentioned.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs against the appellant.

Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right

Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage

C. Testimonial Evidence

1. Qualification of Witnesses

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications

[JULARBAL] Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic, G.R. No. 188956, March 20, 2013

FACTS:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Orders dated February 17,
2009 and July 9, 2009of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in Land Registration Case
No. N-11517.

Petitioner was "created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, and was designed to
establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No. 340."

Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over three parcels of land located in West
Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application was later docketed as LRC Case No.
N-11517 and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo.

These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218,
issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998.

The application was filed by Mr.Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr.Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the
petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized Secretarys Certificate dated August 18, 2003.
 After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since no oppositor registered any
oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued an order of general
default against the whole world, and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms.Aban), its Vice President and
Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified

Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following which, the court a quo
granted the application in a Decision dated April 21, 2008.

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May
12, 2008, wherein it argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its name
and the petitioner failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its
behalf.

On June 2, 2008, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition.

On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued the assailed Order granting the Motion for
Reconsideration of the OSG on the ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case.

The Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the court a quo in the other assailed Order
dated July 9, 2009. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioners
application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.

HELD:

We answer in the affirmative.

The reason of the court a quo in dismissing petitioners application for land registration on the ground
of failure to prosecute was the lack of authority on the part of Ms.Aban to testify on behalf of the petitioner.

However, Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only three
instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the
date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

Cavili v. Judge Florendo speaks of the disqualifications:

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.1wphi1 Section 19 disqualifies
those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of
being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship.
Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not
be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called.

A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms.Aban is qualified to testify as a
witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and being able to
make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the disqualifications described
above.

The RTC clearly erred in ordering the dismissal of the subject application for land registration for
failure to prosecute because petitioners witness did not possess an authorization to testify on behalf of
petitioner. The court a quo also erred when it concluded that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly
authorized representative of the petitioner. The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
Verification/Certification of the application, and neither did they question the authority of Mr.Azcueta to file the
subject application on behalf of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court dated February 17, 2009 and July 9, 2009 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated April 21, 2008, granting the Application for Registration of Title of the petitioner is
hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.

[JULARBAL] People v. Umali y Amado, G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991

FACTS:

Francisco Manalo, was investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a
case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him. He was likewise facing other charges such
as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong
Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco to identify the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the
policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the
dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty.Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave
Manalo four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. Few minutes thereafter,
Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which were allegedly bought from the accused Gloria
Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the manner and
circumstances of how he was able to purchase marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali.

After securing a search warrant, with the help of Manalos affidavit, supported by the toils of marijuana, the
police operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali, in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan, served the
search warrant and were able to confiscate from the person of Gloria Umali the four P5.00 bills with serial
numbers as reflected in the police blotter and a can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana
leaves. Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.Upon
arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After
trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalos testimony should be given credit

HELD:
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court
committedreversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to
betrustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, hestressed
that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to have some of hiscases dismissed,
he was likely to tell falsehood.Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who canperceive, and perceiving can make known their
perception to others may bewitnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be aground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil
Code which states that persons convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or falsetestimony" are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the witness Francisco Manalo is notconvicted of any of the
above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does notinvolve the probate of a will, We
rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal chargeswhen he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness should begiven full faith and credit, in the absence of
evidence that he was actuated by improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness
Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, histestimony must be accorded full credence.

[ABON] People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 100199, January 18, 1993

DOCTRINE: Mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a
witness, and conviction of a crime does not disqualify such person from being presented as a witness unless
otherwise provided by law.
FACTS:
On 10 November 1992, the accused Eleuterio de Leon and Reynaldo Manayao were charged with the crime
of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That at or about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1992, in the Municipality of Angat, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with
Armalite rifles and Caliber .45 pistols, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with
common design, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, employing
means to the [sic] weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush, attack and
shoot from behind Marcelino Santiago who was hit at the head while he was driving his owner-type jeep, and
as a result he died instantaneously to the prejudice and damage of his legal heirs.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano, a farmer from
Angat, Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee of Robal Transit; and SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome.

The substance of their testimony was that at approximately 9:30 a.m. of 23 August 1992 in the vicinity of the
Robal Transit Terminal in Angat, Bulacan, they saw the accused gun down Marcelino Santiago, one of the
managers of Robal Transit, while the latter was driving his jeep. Mariano was walking in the opposite direction
that the jeep was headed, while Chavez was following the vehicle of the victim as the former wanted to tell the
latter something.
The victim's jeep had already passed Mariano when the shots were fired. Turning around, Mariano saw the
accused shooting the victim, with de Leon holding an Armalite at waist level and Manayao, a .45 caliber pistol
at shoulder height. Mariano heard six shots in all. As he was only about ten meters away from the accused,
he could still see the gun barrels emitting smoke. After shooting the victim, both accused, joined by a third
male whom Mariano could not identify, left the area by leisurely walking towards an alley, which was right in
front of Mariano. Mariano immediately recognized the two accused because they were his townmates.
Mariano went home at once. It was only after the funeral that he told the wife of the victim that he knew her
husband's killers. He then gave his statement to the police.

The prosecution forthwith presented Dr. Rosauro Villarama, the Municipal Health Officer of Angat, Bulacan,
who performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Marcelino Santiago, at 11:00 a.m. of 23 August 1992.
He found one gunshot wound on the victim's head, the entry point being above the right ear and the point of
exit, "slightly above 3 in. front of left ear," causing a fracture and laceration. He concluded that the cause of
the victim's death was "cerebral hemorrhage, gunshot wound, head." 17 This gunshot wound was caused by
an Armalite.

Three additional witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely, Eduardo Valencia, Chief of the
Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Angat Police Station; Senior Inspector Carlito Feliciano, Chief of
the Angat Police Station; and Mrs. Mercedes Villarama-Santiago, widow of the victim.

On 23 March 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision wherein it gave full faith and credence
to the prosecution's evidence and declared the alibi offered by the defense to be feeble. Accused Reynaldo
Manayao chose not to appeal from the decision. Only appellant Eleuterio de Leon appealed from the decision.

Nevertheless, one of the assigned errors of the accused-appellant de Leon is that Marianos admission that he
was charged with homicide or murder to another court should give no credence to him because the latter was
himself accused of having killed somebody.

ISSUE: WON the pendency of a criminal case against a Mariano disqualifies him from becoming a witness.

HELD: NO.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections
[Sections 21, 22, 23, 20, and 25], all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the
mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a
matter of fact, conviction of a crime does not disqualify such person from being presented as a witness unless
otherwise provided by law.
[ABON] People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 115367, September 28, 1995

DOCTRINE: The fact of prior conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a
witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be
examined for its relevance and credibility.

FACTS:
Sometime after 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 6 February 1986, that is, on the eve of the "snap"
presidential election held on 7 February 1986, appellant Prudencio Dominguez then Mayor of the Municipality
of Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental and his brother Roger C. Dominguez went to visit their second cousin,
Judge Purita A. Boligor. Judge Boligor, according to the defense, was promoting the candidacy of Mrs.
Corazon C. Aquino, the opposition candidate in the presidential race. Mayor Dominguez was affiliated with the
"Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan" ("KBL") and was at that time working for the re-election of former President
Marcos. Mayor Dominguez and Roger arrived at Judge Boligor's house in Sinacaban in an Integrated National
Police ("INP") jeep driven by Felix Amis, a police officer detailed as security man of Mayor Dominguez.
Rodolfo Macalisang, brother-in-law of Mayor Dominguez, emerged on the leftside of the jeep, spoke briefly
with the Mayor, then stepped aside and stayed under the shadow of a citrus (calamansi) tree. The Mayor and
his brother Roger proceeded towards Judge Boligor's house and entered that house. There they met with
Judge Boligor and her brother Luther Avancea who was then the UNIDO Chairman in Sinacaban, Misamis
Occidental. About ten (10) minutes later, Rodolfo Macalisang entered Judge Boligor's house with an M-16
armalite automatic rifle and bursts of gunfire were heard. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Dominguez and Roger ran
out of the house, got into the jeep which had been waiting for them and sped away. Macalisang then came out
of the house and disappeared into the darkness. Judge Boligor and Luther were found inside the house, with
multiple bullet wounds in vital parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.

Meanwhile,prosecution's case rested mainly on the testimony of Oscar Cagod who witnessed the above
sequence of events from a store across the street. The defense, for its part, attacked the credibility and the
testimony of Oscar Cagod on the following grounds: First, Cagod was not a disinterested witness, having
lived in the house of Judge Boligor for eighteen (18) to nineteen (19) years and having treated the Judge like
his own mother;Second, Cagod waited for four (4) months after the slaying of Judge Boligor and Luther
Avancea before he executed his sworn statement;Third, Cagod, according to the defense, executed his
sworn statement only after the police authorities had arrested him and promised him immunity from
prosecution. His testimony therefore came from a polluted source and should be received only with utmost
caution.Fourth, Cagod had been convicted, when he was twelve (12) years old, of murder, a crime
involving moral turpitude and accordingly his testimony deserved no credence.Last, the defense
assailed the testimony of Cagod as being incredible in itself.

ISSUE: WON the prior conviction of a crime of Oscar Cadot would discredit him as a witness.

HELD. NO.
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows: Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except
as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses.
. . . [C]onviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
(Emphasis supplied).

In Cordial v. People, this Court echoed the above cited provision of law stating that
even convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense, they
"can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a
witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be
examined for its relevance and credibility. None of the cases cited by the appellants militates against this
proposition.
Oscar Cagod did not dispute his prior conviction for murder when he was only twelve (12) years old. Because
of his minority, instead of being imprisoned, he was placed under the custody of Judge Boligor and her late
husband, who was then Chief of Police of Sinacaban. Cagod lived with the for eighteen (18) or nineteen (19)
years until Judge Boligor was slain. During that period of time, Cagod had no record of any bad or socially
destructive behavior. He had in fact been of much help around the Boligors' house and had in fact worked for
appellant Mayor Dominguez himself as a motorcar driver. His testimony was not in favor of an accused
"comrade," and Oscar Cagod, moreover, was obviously not a hardened criminal. Taking account of these
circumstances, the Court considers that Oscar Cagod's credibility was not put in doubt by reason alone of
conviction of a crime when he was twelve (12) years old.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court dated 10 May 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED. Prudencio and Rodolfo
were found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Judge Purita A.

[ANACTA] People v. Aleman y Longhas, G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013

People vs. Aleman

G.R. No. 181539 July 24, 2013

FACTS: On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Mark went out of his house to play ball
in the basketball court. He walked to the basketball court, played there, and at about 9:00 oclock, he stopped
playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball court where there were five cars
parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man walking towards a car. The fat man was talking on his cellular
phone. He then noticed two men following the fat man, who entered a parked car. The two male persons who
were then following the fat man then separated: one went to the left side of the fat mans car and stood by the
door at the drivers side of the vehicle. While the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of
the car. Mark made a diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides, (Exhibit "L") depicting the car
and the positions of the two men. The man who stood by the door at the drivers side had a knife while his
companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat man
repeatedly on different parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the fat mans
personal belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left. He followed them to
a place which he described as far and there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made a
drawing representing the place where he followed them (Exh. "M"). After burying the knife in the ground, the
men left and he followed them again to a place which he described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the
culprits uncovered his face. He recognized him as the person who went to the left side of the car and stabbed
the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin Aleman. After which, the two men left. He decided
not to follow them and went home instead.
When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the knife was buried under the
ground. It was 9:56 oclock when the men took off their bonnets. The man with the knife removed the
bloodstained white t-shirt that he was wearing and, along with his bonnet, threw it away in a place he
described as flowing or running water. At about 10:00 oclock, the two men boarded a motorcycle and left.

Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay Botocan, Project 2, Quezon
City when he testified. He interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident
happened on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a 15-minute walk from his residence. A
road separates the billiards hall from Sikatuna Bliss. Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the
eyewitness, Mark, failed to identify him during the police line-up. Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo Pasco
stated that he was the one who prepared the spot report although it was his superior who signed it. He further
stated that Mark failed to identify accused-appellant during the police line-up.
After studying the parties respective evidence, the trial court rejected the defenses of accused-
appellant for their inherent weakness and implausibility. On the other hand, it viewed the prosecutions
evidence favorably, particularly the eyewitness testimony of Mark and his positive identification of accused-
appellant as the one who stabbed the victim. In particular, the trial court found Marks testimony simple and
credible. He had no ill motive that would make him testify falsely against accused-appellant. While there were
minor inconsistencies in his testimony, the discrepancies were inconsequential and did not affect the
truthfulness of Marks narration. The trial court

ISSUE: Whether or not Mark, being a deaf-mute, is qualified to be a witness.

HELD: The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is
that "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses." A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her sense of
sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and experiences.
The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with others but he/she
may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches.
Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make observations and
he/she can make those observations known to others.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would impel Mark to testify falsely
against accused-appellant. As the determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question of fact, this
Court respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts on the matter.

Accused-appellants attempt to render doubtful Marks identification of him fails.1wphi1 Indeed, the law
requires not simply an eyewitness account of the act of committing the crime but the positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Marks failure to identify accused-appellant
in a police line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police line-up is
essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open court.Nevertheless, the records show that Mark
identified accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the victim in a police line-up on February 18, 2003 and,
more importantly, in open court in the course of Marks testimony.

[ANACTA] People v. Bustos, G.R. No. 27200, January 20, 1928

People vs. Bustos

G.R. No. L-27200 January 20, 1928

(A 1928 case; Ruling opposite of the case of People vs Aleman)

FACTS: On the afternoon of October 24, 1925, while trying to determine the boundaries of the lands which
they respectively occupied on the Gadalupe, Estate, Francisco Bustos and Angel del Castillo became
engaged in a dispute finally resulting in the former catching the latter by the neck. Attracted by the cries of the
people, Mariano Montemayor and his ward, Antonio Macaspac, ran to the place of the fight, Antonio
Macaspac catching hold of Francisco Bustos, and Mariano Montemayor of Angel del Castillo, thus separating
the combatants. Mariano Montemayor entertained Angel del Castillo on the street by conversing with him.
Antonio Macaspac took Francisco Bustos to the latter's house. Laureana Yumul, Angel del Castillo's wife, who
was also there went to her house, leaving her husband. On nearing her home, she heard the desperate cries
of her deaf-mute daughter, Soledad Encarnacion, who was under a mango tree gesticulating and making
signs, failing upon her knees and getting up again, without knowing what to do. Going in the direction pointed
out by her daughter, Laureana Yumul came upon her son Felipe del Castillo stretched out on the ground
wounded, expiring a few moments later.
That same night Francisco Bustos presented himself to the municipal president with a wound on his
forehead, stating that he had been stoned by someone. He was taken to the General Hospital where he was
examined and found to have a wound on his forehead and several bruises on his nose and lips, caused by a
blunt instrument which might have been a stone.

The only question of fact to determine in this appeal is: Who is or are responsible for the wounds
found on Felipe del Castillo's body, which caused death?

On this point Laureana Yumul testified to the effect that when she repaired to the place pointed out by
her deaf-mute daughter, she found her son stretched out on the ground, wounded, and she asked him who
had inflicted the wounds on him; that her son answered: "Mother, go to the municipality and report this,
because Francisco Bustos and Antonio Macaspac have hacked me up;" that upon hearing this, should
shouted for help several times; that after the lapse of sufficient time for one to finish smoking a cigarette, her
son expired; that some time thereafter, the agents of authority arrived, but her son was already dead.
Aside from the ante-mortem declaration of Felipe del Castillo, as to who had inflicted the wounds that
caused his death, we have the testimony of Mariano del Castillo, the 8-year-old brother of the deceased, to
the effect that on his return from having pastured his carabaos, he saw his brother pursued by Francisco
Bustos and Antonio Macaspac, the former armed with a dagger and the latter with a bolo. As he became
frightened he ran to his house, where he met his father, Angel del Castillo, to whom he related what he had
seen. When Angel del Castillo had heard his son's story, he picked up a bolo and went in search of his son's
aggressors, but did not find them in their respective homes.
The prosecution also presented Soledad Encarnacion, deaf-mute daughter of Laureana Yumul, who
was interpreted by a teacher from the deaf and dumb school who had never taught the witness; nor had the
latter ever been to such a school.

ISSUE: Whether or not Soledad Encarnacions testimony, even as a deaf-mute, should be admitted in this
case.

HELD:
No. While it is true that modern pedagogy has made tremendous strides in the instruction and education of
persons so afflicted, even to the extent of enabling the blind to read by means of the sense of touch and deaf-
mutes to receive instruction through conventional signs and objects, nevertheless, with respect to deaf-mutes,
it is necessary that he who is to communicate with them know the meaning of their signs, either from
having had them taught to him, or from having acquired a knowledge of them through frequent
contact with the same. Without these circumstances, although it is possible to guess part of what deaf-mutes
mean by their signs even without having had much to do with them, still much of what they wish to say
escapes us, and in our eagerness to understand them, we resort to enjecture. It will be seen how dangerous
then in such a procedure to arrive at the truth, and above all when the life and liberty of an accused man are
at stake. This was shown in the present case, in which during the course of interpretation, there were times
when the interpreter could not make out what the witness meant by such signs as she uses, and this is
due to the fact that the deaf-mute had never been a pupil of the interpreter, nor had the latter previously had
anything to do with the former, such as would have given her an opportunity to acquire some knowledge of the
meaning of the signs the deaf-mute used. In view of this, it would not be prudent to admit the deaf-mute's
testimony as interpreted by the teacher.

[ANG] [People v. Tuangco, G.R. No. 130331, November 22, 2000

FACTS: In the morning of January 4, 1995, the naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a bookkeeper employed by
the Centro Escolar University Credit Cooperative in Manila was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters
away from the national highway in Apalit. Her body bore multiple stab wounds and her private parts were
bloodied and showed signs of sexual abuse.
On May 18, 1995 two informations were filed in court charging Adel Tuangco y Dizon, Nelson Pineda
Jr. alias "Jun Tattoo" , and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon alias "Baba" with the crimes of rape with homicide and
theft. Tuangco and 'Baba' were apprehended and 'Tattoo' remained at large.
The principal evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre
Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. He gave his testimony through sign language, which was interpreted by a sign
language expert. Sanggalan testified being with the three accused in a beer house during daytime, and went
to loiter in a waiting shed when nighttime came. It was mentioned that 'Baba' and 'Tattoo' were drinking Pidol
cough syrup during the time. Sanggalan also testified that upon seeing the victim, the three accused followed
her to the rice fields, subdued her, inserted the cough syrup bottle inside her genitals and took turns in raping
her. He also testified that he was about 3 and a half meters from the event of the rape. It was testified further
that Tuangco took the victim's handbag, 'Tattoo' took the camera, and 'Baba' took the ring and earrings.
The medico legal corroborated the testimony of the witness when he testified that there were massive
blood clots inside the victim's genitals that were made by a hard foreign like object like a bottle.
Tuangco and 'Baba' were convicted of Theft and Rape. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the
case on automatic review.
DEFENSE:In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused- appellant points out that
because Silvestre Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in a special school for deaf-mutes, the possibility
that resort to conjectures and surmises, brought about by overzealousness to understand what his witness
really wanted to say could not be discounted. Thus, accused-appellant cites certain portions of Sanggalan's
testimony which appeared unclear, e.g., the witness admitted that the place where the incident happened was
"very dark", and he was inconsistent as to who, between Adel Tuangco or Jun Tatoo, was the first to rape the
victim. Thus, his handicap prevented a truthful narration of what really transpired.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a deaf-mute is credible

HELD: Yes. Sanggalan answered the questions in a candid and straightforward manner, using sign language.
While the Court observes minor inconsistencies in his declarations, these are not reasons to render his
testimony incredible. On the contrary, it is well-established that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a
witness are indications that the same is not rehearsed and all the more should be considered credible. Thus,
discrepancies in minor details indicate veracity rather than prevarication and only tend to bolster the probative
value of such testimony.
The court recognizes the competency of the sign language expert. Her credentials show that she is
competent. In another case, the inability to properly translate the testimony of the witness led to an acquittal,
but here there is no such problem. A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent
witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts
they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
In its futile attempt to destroy the credibility of witness Sanggalan, the defense attacked his character
and present a witness in the person of Merlita Baliber to show that he is a drunkard and a drug addict.
Likewise the defense presented documentary evidence to show that Sanggalan had been accused of rape in
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Rizal. These evidence presented by the defense are
unavailing. Even a fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness. The mere
pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. For the test to
measure the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity to knowledge and
consistent with experience of mankind.
The defense of alibi must yield to the positive identification of the accused-appellants by Sanggalan,
and the attempt of the mother of the accused-appellants, Erlinda Tuangco, a sister, Glessen Tuangco, and the
common-law wife of Adel Tuangco, Liza Reyes, to corroborate such a defense must fail. Baliber admitted that
she was asked by the mother of accused Adel Tuangco and accused Sonny Tuangco to testify in these
proceedings to help the said accused. Then too, the demeanor by which Baliber was testifying immediately
casts doubt on her motive for taking the witness stand and renders incredible her testimony. Thus, on several
times at the witness stand, she had been observed smiling and not candid with her declarations.

[ANG] People v. Gerones, G.R. No. 91116, January 24, 1991

FACTS: The complaint was filed for the rape of Liliosa Gargantilla, a mental retardate, a complaint was filed
on September 10, 1986 against Calixto Raga alias "Calix" and Leonardo Gerones alias "Nanding or Narding".
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The accused-appellant contends that the complaint did not give jurisdiction to the trial court the same
having been signed by a mentally incompetent woman. Initially, a complaint was filed with the barangay
captain by Francisco Gargantilla, the victim's father. Rule 110, Section 5 also provides that in the case of a
deceased or incapacitated person, the State may initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The information filed
by the Provincial Prosecutor, the complaint initiated by the father, and the complaint filed by the offended party
herself sufficiently confer jurisdiction on the trial court.
Trial proceeded and a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not an incompetent's testimony may be given credence.

HELD: YES. Determination of the competency of witnesses to testify in the hands of the trial court. As
repeatedly held by this Court, the factual findings of the trial court as to the guilt of the accused, particularly
the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies are accorded great respect on
appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge who has the advantage of
actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses as they
present the same.
The records show that the victim managed to communicate her ordeal to the court clearly and
consistently. The trial court found Liliosa to have the mental capacity of a ten year old. We are convinced that
a ten year old girl can adequately narrate facts which show that she has been raped. Thus, the trial court
observed: ". . . In the overall, she was able to communicate that the man who is not blind and the man without
eyes helped each other in deflowering her thru force and intimidation. Her narration was crude but she
managed to communicate the traumatic incident".
Moreover, while the psychiatry report states that the victim cannot be expected to be a capable
witness, at the same time it admitted that Liliosa can comprehend the nature of her acts under a limited
extent. The same report concludes that she is verbally productive although she talks in incomplete sentences
at times. What is required by the rules merely is that the witness is able to make her perception known to
others. Thus, Rule 130, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court states: "Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. . . .
Considering the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Liliosa Gargantilla is a competent witness.
There is likewise no reason to doubt her credibility as she had no motive to testify against the accused. No
motive can be ascribed to complainant or to her father and step-mother other than a desire for justice and
redress for a terrible wrong. She was a poor barrio girl with the mental capacity of a 10-year old,
inexperienced to the ways of the world. It is highly improbable that she would fabricate matters and impute the
crime unless it was true.
What is decisive in the rape charge is the complainant's positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the malefactors. The victim was even able to testify that only one actually had sexual
intercourse with her and that was the blind, man while the other man who was not blind held her and pointed a
knife at her while the former was raping her.

[ANG] People v. Hamto y Coderas, G.R. No. 128137, August 2, 2001

FACTS: "Iniyot ako ni Mario, Fernan and Dondon." That statement uttered by mental Retardate Mary Grace
Labatete to her sister Werlinia upon seeing Fernan Pervera. This led to the investigation which resulted in an
information of the crime of rape against Fernan Pervera, Mario Hamto and Ronald Cuesta. Mario and Ronald
were apprehended but Fernan remained at large. Mary Grace was brought to the National Center for Mental
Health for psychiatric examination. At the Criminal Investigation Section in Camp Crame, Mary Grace, with the
assistance of her sister, gave a statement on the alleged rape.
Mary Grace testified that Fernan, Mario and Ronald raped her in the fifteen-seater double-tire
jeepney. They all smelled of liquor at that time, according to her. It was Mario who raped her first, she said.
Mario boxed her on the chest, covered her mouth and held her hands. Mario then removed her panty. Ronald
prevented her from going out of the jeepney. Mario removed his pants and raped her. Afterwards, Mary Grace
said "Ayaw ko nang magpaiyot". The three refused to let her go and raped her again one after another. She
felt pain. She did not tell her Ate Lina (Werlinia) about the incident because she forgot to do so.
Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, Medico-legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, also
testified for the prosecution. In her report, she confirmed that Mary Grace had deep-healed lacerations at 3:00
o'clock and 6:00 o'clock positions indicating that she is no longer a virgin and that the deep-healed lacerations
were inflicted more than seven (7) days prior to the examination.
Dr. Celeste Pea-Vista, a resident physician at the National Center for Mental Health, conducted a
psychiatric examination of Mary Grace and found that Mary Grace was retarded with a mental age of a seven-
year-old. It was also established that she had an IQ level of 35-42 and had "diminutive deficit in adoptive
functioning." She was perceptive but had difficulty in interpretation. She could tell what happened but found it
difficult to know the meaning of things.
The Hamto used the defense of alibi, stating that he was at Atimonan Quezon for a 'pasiyam' in a
funeral. Mario Hamto and Fernan Pervera were employed by Werlinia as drivers while Ronald Cuesta,
nicknamed Dondon, was hired as conductor. Mario Hamto y Coderas and Ronald Cuesta y Overo are
convicted of rape. Mario appealed his conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a mental retardate may be given probative value.

HELD: YES. Although Mary Grace was mentally retarded, her testimony cannot be discredited. All persons
who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Mere
intellectual weakness of a witness is not a ground to disqualify, or at the very least discredit, a witness. The
intellectual weakness of Mary Grace does not make her incompetent as a witness if, at the time she testified,
she had the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, understand the nature and obligation of
an oath, and give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters about which she testifies. Her
narration as to how the rape was committed, in the court's view, was straightforward, despite her mental
weakness.
A perusal of said testimony would readily show that Mary Grace despite her mental deficiency was able to
testify clearly and persuasively. The psychiatrist who examined her testified that Mary Grace was capable of
being receptive and perceptive. She could tell what happened but found difficulty in interpreting things. Mary
Grace's credibility commands great weight and respect.

[ANG] People v. Deauna, G.R. Nos. 143200-01, August 1, 2002

FACTS: Sometime in September 1996, victim Josephine Deauna who was 19 years old at that time, was at
their house in Block 10-A, Lot 7 of Nylon Street, Litex Village San Jose, Montalban, Rizal. She was lying down
while her sister Jasmin was already sleeping when a man suddenly held her hand. She recognized the man to
be her father, appellant Richard Deauna. Appellant proceeded to kiss Josephines neck, who was at that time
lying on her stomach. Then appellant touched her breasts. Thereafter, appellant inserted his finger in
Josephines vagina and played with it (Pinaglaruan niya ng kanyang daliri ang aking ari.).
 While Josephine was lying on her stomach, she felt appellant insert his penis in her vagina and felt
pain at the penetration. Josephine, however, could not do anything because she was afraid of her father.
When appellant withdrew, he warned Josephine not to tell her mother about this incident.
In another incident, one evening in July 1997, Josephine was already sleeping when appellant
approached her again. Appellant kissed her neck and started playing with her body, particularly feeling her
breasts. Appellant proceeded to touch her vagina and succeeded in having intercourse with her. Josephine
kept her eyes shut and did not do anything for fear of her father.
Josephine later told her mother [of] these incidents but the latter refused to believe her. Thus, on
August 2, 1997, Josephine went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to report the two (2) criminal
incidents. There, she gave her sworn statements and the Medico-Legal expert in the person of Dr. Noel Minay
subjected Josephine to a medical genital examination. The medico-legal corroborated Josephine's testimony
upon testifying there was indeed lacerations in the hymen. Richard Deauna was convicted two counts of the
rape of his daughter Josephine Deauna.
The defense presented the testimonies of two medical officers in the National Center for Mental
Health, one of which noted that the subject Josephine was insane because her thought processes were loose,
there was derailment in the words used, and depersonalization (a strange sense of the personal self or the
body) was evident. Josephine manifested that she was already dead and was brought back to life. The mental
state of Josephine may be brought about by a situation, strong enough to bring her to the so called breaking
point. There is doubt that when she testified in court, she was expressing her thoughts or feelings, truthfully or
intelligently as her judgment was already clouded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: NO. Appellant claims that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. He avers
that the testimony of complainant is uncorroborated and materially inconsistent with the medical findings of
the examining doctor. He adds that her conduct after the alleged rape incident renders her accusations highly
dubious. He points to alleged uncertainty as to the cause of her vaginal lacerations and insists that such
uncertainty should be resolved in his favor. Moreover, he explains that she merely concocted the rape
charges, allegedly because of a grudge against him for having disciplined her.
As regards the argument that the vaginal lacerations could have been caused by reasons other than
penile penetration, suffice it to say that the presence or the absence of vaginal lacerations is of no moment. It
is settled that a hymenal rupture or any indication of vaginal laceration or genital injury is not necessary for the
consummation of rape.
The accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim,
provided that her testimony is clear, credible, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. When a rape victims testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency, it deserves full faith and credence and cannot be discarded.
The fact of rape and the identity of the perpetrator were sufficiently established by the prosecution on
the basis of the clear, coherent and candid narration by the victim of the sexual abuse she suffered in the
hands of her father.
As regards the allegation of appellant that his daughter merely fabricated the charges of rape against
him in retaliation for his having whipped her, we find it hard to believe that she would concoct a tale of rape
against her father, simply to take revenge for the physical maltreatment inflicted upon her. This Court has
declared that parental punishment is not a sufficient reason for a daughter to falsely charge her father with
rape. Even when chastised or consumed with revenge, a daughter, more so a young woman like the victim,
would have to have a certain amount of psychological depravity to concoct a story that could take the life or
the liberty of her father and drag herself and the rest of the family to shame and humiliation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Complainant's testimony is credible
HELD: YES. In determining the credibility of the testimony of private complainant, the pivotal question to be
resolved is whether she was insane when she testified in court on the rape incidents. In this connection, it may
well be noted that during the pendency of the appeal, she submitted to the Court numerous letters and
manifestations including an affidavit of desistance, essentially stating that her father had not raped her, and
that she had been insane when she testified in court.
The normal state of mind of the victim was unperturbed even after the foregoing initial mental
examination and remained intact during the early and the middle part of the trial. Although one of the expert
witnesses testified that the mental illness of the victim could have existed prior to the diagnosis made on her,
no clear and categorical statement to this effect was presented. In any event, courts are not bound by the
opinions of expert witnesses on such matters, especially when they appear to be merely speculative and
conjectural, as in this case.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court
may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are
inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable.
 Even assuming that the victim was already insane during her earlier testimony, this fact alone will not
render her statements incredible or inadmissible in evidence. Her mental imbalance or abnormal state of mind
would not automatically affect her credibility. Indeed, even a mental retardate or feeble-minded person may
qualify as a competent witness, considering that all persons who can perceive and, perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Unsoundness of mind does not per se render a witness incompetent. One may be insane, yet be
capable in law of giving competent testimony. The general rule is that lunatics or persons affected with insanity
are admissible as witnesses, if they have sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and
are capable of giving correct accounts of the matters that they have seen or heard with respect to the
questions at issue.
As regards the recantation of the victim, we emphasize that mere retraction by a prosecution witness
does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony. If such testimony was sufficiently clear, consistent and
credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its
subsequent retraction. It has long been held that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts.
To be sure, recantations made by witnesses must be viewed with utmost caution and circumspection,
because the motivations behind them may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. Moreover, to
automatically uphold them in any form would allow unscrupulous witnesses to trifle with the legal processes
and make a mockery of established judicial proceedings, to the detriment of the entire justice system.

[ANG] People v. Acbangin, G.R. No. 117216, August 9, 2000

FACTS: On April 23, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Danilo Acbangin was worried when his
daughter, four-year old Sweet Grace Acbangin (hereinafter referred to as "Sweet") did not come home.
Sweet's father, Danilo, testified that he last saw Sweet on the same day, at six o'clock in the evening, playing
in Jocelyn's house. Jocelyn was the common law wife of his second cousin, Remy Acbangin. Danilo went to
Jocelyn's house and looked for Sweet. There was no one there.
At around seven fifteen in the evening, Danilo reported to the Barangay and the Bacoor Police Station
that Sweet was missing. On the same day at eleven o'clock in the evening, Jocelyn arrived at Danilo's house
without Sweet. When asked where the child was, Jocelyn denied knowing of the child's whereabouts.
On April 24, 1991, Danilo made a second report to the Bacoor Police Station, stating that Jocelyn
returned without the child. On April 24, 1991, Jocelyn informed Danilo's mother-in-law that Sweet was in Niu's
house in Tondo, Manila. On April 25, 1991, the case was reported to the Manila police.
Jocelyn accompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police officers to Niu's house. Jocelyn
personally knew Niu and was first to enter the house. Jocelyn went up to the second floor of the house. She
went down with Niu and Sweet. Sweet was well-dressed and smiling. She ran to her father and embraced
him. Niu then voluntarily turned Sweet over to her father and the policemen. Pat. Manuel Lao testified that
when he asked Niu how she came to have possession of the child, she answered that a certain "Helen"
brought the child to her. This "Helen" could not be found.
However, on the witness stand, Niu told a different story. Niu narrated that it was Jocelyn who brought
Sweet to her house on April 23, 1991. Jocelyn told Niu that she was going to leave the child and was going to
return to get her.
On April 26, 1991, a complaint for kidnapping a minor was filed against accused appellant Jocelyn
Acbangin, accused Niu, Helen Doe and Juana Doe with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite.
The court convicted Acbangin of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and acquitted
Niu.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sweet's testimony may be disregarded on the count of her age

HELD: Sweet's testimony, stating that it was Jocelyn who brought her to Niu's house, should not be
disregarded. Section 20, Rule 134 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, "All persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others may be witnesses." A witness' young age will not
deter him or her from being a competent and credible witness. To be a competent child witness, the following
criteria must be met: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of
communication. All these were met by Sweet. Besides, the trial court's assessment of Sweet's credibility
should be upheld and respected since its assessment was not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of any
material fact.
NOTE: UNRELATED: Accused-appellant contends that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. IT WAS. Requisites were met. Burdensome and harsh as it may be, the trial court
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. True, Sweet was not maltreated. True also, that at the time of the crime, Jocelyn was only 21 years old. However, the crime as defined by
law was committed. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh, but it is the law. Jocelyn knew for two days where Sweet was. In fact, it was she who brought Sweet to Niu's house. The fact that
she later on felt remorse for taking Sweet to Tondo, Manila and showed Sweet's father where the child was, cannot absolve her. At that point, the crime was consummated. Jocelyn's
repentance and desistance came too late. The SC agreed with the trial court that a strict application of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code would be too harsh, taking into consideration the
minimal injury caused by the offense. We agree that the accused be recommended to the Chief Executive for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.

[BERNARDO] People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, February 22, 1996

FACTS:
Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three young children, was put to fire in her home in Balasing, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, on 22 November 1989. She suffered extensive second to fourth degree burns and died of
hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns on 30 November 1989. Her husband, accused-
appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with the crime of parricide in an information filed on 29 June 1990
with Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The prosecution presented as its
witnesses Paul Michael Mendoza, a five-year old child of the victim and the accused-appellant; Jhun Avila,
Teofisto Avila, and Rodora Avila, the victim's brother, father, and sister, respectively; and Dr. Nieto M.
Salvador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NRI). On its part, the defense
presented the accused-appellant himself and Erlinda Porciuncula, a childhood friend. As to how Gina was
burned, only five-year old Paul Michael could testify thereon. In his testimony during the presentation of the
evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul Michael declared that one evening inside their house, his father
boxed his mother on her mouth and then tied her up. However, the witness did not answer succeeding
questions which sought to elicit what happened thereafter, although he kept on looking at his father throughout
this period. He later revealed that he saw matches and kerosene in their house. He likewise declared that his
mother was now in heaven because she was dead. During his rebuttal testimony on 12 October 1992, Paul
Michael categorically declared that it was his father who "burned" his mother. The accused-appellant, who
was drunk at that time, first tied the victim's hands behind her back, then "poured kerosene" on the front of her
body and set her aflame. Paul Michael further declared that his father tied-up his mother because they
quarreled when his mother wanted him (Paul Michael) to go with the accused-appellant to the street corner,
but his father refused. Finally, many times before, his parents quarreled because his father was always drunk.
In giving full credence to the testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael, the trial court observed that:

As provided by Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a person who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known his perception to others, may be a witness. A four-year old boy can already speak clearly, can
understand things happening around him, and ready to study, to read and to write. For families who can
afford, a four-year old child is already sent to the nursery to begin his/her studies. An intelligent boy is
undoubtedly the best observer to be found. He is little influenced by the suggestion of others and describes
objects and occurrences as he has really seen them (Pp. vs. Bustos, 45 Phil. 9).

Paul Michael was five months over four years when the incident happened. He could perceive things
happening around him. This was the reason why when his grandfather and an uncle found him in the house of
a neighbor, he was in a state of shock, or at least dumbfounded (tulala). Because he knew the implication of
what had happened to his mother. He knew that the burning of his mother might cause her death. If, indeed,
he could not yet perceive things, such happening would pass unnoticed and without impact on him. Unless a
child's testimony is punctured with serious inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that he was coached, if he
can perceive and make known his perception, he is considered a competent witness (Pp. vs. Cidro, et al., 56
O.G. 3547). The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial he testified on
was that his father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further questions, he refused to answer
anymore. The Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the accused, was
directly in his sight and whenever their eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness
was presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court likewise directed the
accused to sit farther away thereby placing the accused out of the direct sight of the witness. As a result, the
child was able to testify freely and extensively without hesitation. The accused asked this Court to disregard
the testimony of Paul Michael for being "open to serious question and consideration" as it was "often attended
[by] unintelligible answers and punctuated by contrary answers to previously given answers"; "[b]esides the
child's tender age, he suffer[s] from [a] lack or inadequacy of sense of duty to tell the truth." He further claims
that per the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer, the victim did not die of burns but of hypostatic pneumonia.
After a thorough examination of the records and scrutiny of the evidence, we find no merit in this appeal. The
accused-appellant's seven-page Brief miserably fails to present convincing grounds why the challenged
decision should be overturned. The lower court convicted the accused-appellant primarily on the basis of the
testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael Mendoza, and it is obvious that the pith of the present appeal is the
child's competency to testify and the credibility of his testimony.

Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses . . . .

With respect to the disqualification of children to be witnesses, Section 21(b) of the abovementioned rule
reads:

The following persons cannot be witnesses:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is
examined. In United States vs. Buncad, the Court stated:

The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity
of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. 32 And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient
intelligence according to the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make
such determination

ISSUE: W/N the five year old child of the accused and victim is considered a competent witness.

HELD: YES.

The Supreme Court sustained that the trial court has adjudged Paul Michael competent to testify. A close and
careful examination of the testimony of Paul Michael shows that at the time he testified, he could be deemed a
child of above average intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive answers to the questions asked of him
by the trial judge, as well as recalling events and relating them to such recollections. The initial hesitancy of
Paul Michael to name his father as the author of the crime was sufficiently explained by the trial court as
follows: The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a] witness, the only thing substantial he testified on was
that his father boxed his mother in the mouth and tied her. On further questions, he refused to answer
anymore. The Court noticed the reason for such adamant attitude of the witness. His father, the accused, was
directly in his sight and whenever their eyes met, the child could speak no more. The second time the witness
was presented, the private prosecutor covered the child from the accused. The Court likewise directed the
accused to sit farther away thereby placing the accused out of the direct sight of the witness. As a result, the
child was able to testify freely and extensively without hesitation. The accused-appellant's contention that Paul
Michael's testimony could have been influenced by the relatives of Gina, who were full of "unwavering anger,
hatred, hostility, resentment, revenge," more so since the child had been in their custody since after 22
November 1989, is unacceptable. The charge is nothing but unmitigated speculation as not a shred of
evidence was offered in support thereof. Not even the rigorous cross-examination Paul Michael underwent
dented the probative force of his testimony; on the contrary, it merely added strength thereto as it elicited
nothing less than the boy's adherence to truth. We realize how extremely painful it was for Paul Michael to
reveal that it was his father who burned his mother. He knew that such a revelation could send his father to jail
and thus brand him a son of a killer or a convict. If he did, nevertheless, it was to expose the truth and give
justice to his mother who met an excruciatingly painful death. Verily, "from the mouths of children we get the
truth." Neither are we persuaded by the accused-appellant's claim that the cause of death of his wife was
hypostatic pneumonia and not due to the burns she sustained. Such a claim borders on misrepresentation, for
as earlier shown, both the Autopsy Report (Exhibit "H-1") and the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination
(Exhibit "H-1") indicated the cause of death to be "hypostatic pneumonia; infected fourth degree burns."
Moreover, as testified to by Dr. Nieto Salvador, the proximate cause of the hypostatic pneumonia was Gina's
recumbent position due to the fourth degree burns she suffered.

[BERNARDO] People vs. Galas, G.R. No. 114007, September 24, 1996

FACTS: On 23 December 1995, at around 9:00 p.m., Fedrico Gamayon and his 15-year old son Crisanto,
who was riding on a carabao, and 6-year old nephew Joemar, who was riding on the sled, were on their way
home to Tinagong Dagat from Sandoval, Narra, Palawan, where they had sold copra to certain Gabileo. When
they were the house of accused Gonzalo Galas, Federico was called by Gonzalo. When Federico approached
Gonzalo, the latter suddenly hacked Federico with a bolo. Federico fell to the ground, then accused Josue
Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado "ganged up" on Federico, according to Crisanto; or
"helped each other mauling" Federico, according to Joemar. Josue Galas hacked Federico with a bolo, while
Noe Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado were armed with pieces of wood. Federico was unable to fight
back; he could not even unsheath his bolo from its scabbard. Crisanto Gamayon could not do anything to help
his father because he was afraid; moreover, the accused ran after him. Crisanto ran to his uncle for help, but
the latter was not in his house. Crisanto did not return to the crime scene until the next day and after the
incident was reported to the police authorities. Federico lay there until the next day when the police and Dr.
Dominador Hubo, the municipal health officer, arrived to transport and examine Federico's cadaver. Federico
sustained six hack wounds and two stab wounds inflicted on various parts of his body. The prosecution was
commenced by the filing of a criminal complaint for murder in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Narra,
Palawan. The complaint was then amended to charge the accused with the lesser offense of homicide. In his
resolution of 7 April 1986, 2 then Provincial Fiscal Aurelio Trampe recommended the filing of an information for
murder due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. After the reinvestigation, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sesinio B. Belen, with the approval of
Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito Demaala, filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information which now
charges the accused with Homicide. As ground for the downgrading of the offense charged, Prosecutor Belen
alleged that the reinvestigation disclosed no evidence of evident premeditation nor treachery, and the victim
even had the opportunity to wound accused Gonzalo Galas.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the relationship between the deceased and the two main witnesses diminishes the potency of their
testimony.
2. W/N the age of one of the main witnesses, Joemar Deocadiz, who was five years old when he allegedly
witnessed the killing disqualifies him as a witness.

HELD:
1. NO. Such emphasis is misplaced. This Court has held in a number of cases that relationship between the
witnesses and the deceased does not automatically impair the credibility of the former. We have likewise held
that a witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render it more
credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody
other than the real culpit. They have a definite stake at seeing the guilty person brought before the courts so
that justice may be served. It is not to be lightly supposed that relatives of the victim would callously violate
their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons who are in fact innocent of the
crime.

2. NO. It must be stressed that Joemar's age does not disqualify him as a witness. Section 20, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses. The exceptions thereto are found in the succeeding Section 20 and, insofar as
children are concerned, only those whose mental maturity is such so as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating truthfully are disqualified. It is thus
clear that any child, regardless of age, can be competent witness if they meet the following criteria: (a)
capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. 46 The accused urge
us to give no weight to Joemar's testimony because of its unreliability; they claim that he could not even
remember the month and the year when the incident happened. A close scrutiny of his testimony discloses,
however, that Joemar was clear on the facts he observed surrounding the death of Federico which, according
to him took place on a date "nearing Christmas." 47 Since the date of Federico's death was indubitably
established to be 23 December 1985, which was, indeed, "nearing Christmas," Joemar's approximation was
sufficient.
The accused also harp on Crisanto Gamayon's credibility on the ground that if he were really there, he would
have unquestionably helped his father instead of merely standing still and simply gaping at the latter's killing
by five men and returning to the scene only on the following day. Crisanto's testimony that he was afraid 48
sufficiently refutes this objection. Fear has been known to render people immobile, if not useless, in some life-
and-death situations. Crisanto and Joemar left Federico's body overnight at the scene of the crime because
darkness had fallen and fear gripped them. Under the circumstances, the 16-year old Crisanto and the 5-year
old Joemar could not be expected to act like adults, in full possession of their mental, emotional, and
psychological faculties.

While Gonzalo's co-accused were seen at the scene of the crime by Crisanto and Joemar, no clear and
convincing evidence can support a conclusion that the said co-accused were able to inflict any injury either
a stab or hack wound with the use of a bolo, or contusion, abrasion, or hematoma with the use of pieces of
wood on Federico. There is, as well, absolutely no evidence of conspiracy among Gonzalo and his co-
accused as to make each of the latter equally liable for all the acts of Gonzalo under the doctrine that once
conspiracy is established the act of one is the act of all. Crisanto and Joemar may have thus
miscomprehended or misappreciated the sequence of events after the arrival of Gonzalo's co-accused.
We cannot fully agree with the trial courts' unqualified reliance on the testimonies of Crisanto and Joemar, nor
cast our imprimatur on its assessment of the said witnesses' credibility pursuant to the rule that the issue of
credibility is addressed to the trial court since it heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner or testifying during the trial. For one, the trial court overlooked the foregoing facts, viz.; infliction of the
wounds by one person with the use of one weapon, and the absence of any injury caused by the mauling or
clubbing. Excepted from the rule on the binding character of the trial court's assessment of credibility of
witnesses are instances when trial courts have overlooked, misapplied, and misinterpreted facts and
circumstances of great weight and value which would affect the result of the case.
That Crisanto and Joemar could have misapprehended or misappreciated the events, especially as to the
participation of Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado, could easily be deduced from
the fact that the incident occurred at nighttime; Crisanto was "a little bit far" from his father, and he ran away.
Joemar, who was only six years old, was sitting on a sled. He did not testify as to his distance to Federico
when the latter was attacked. We have then serious doubts as to the culpability of accused Josue Galas, Noe
Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado. Their acquittal is inevitable for failure of the prosecution to
overcome the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed in Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, December 15, 2000

[BERNARDO] People vs Esugon y Avila, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015

DOCTRINE: Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's competency
as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

FACTS:
On or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed
weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away cash money amounting to P13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said
JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly caused her
death. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger
sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant,
whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a
chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his
father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mothers lower chest. His father then brought her
to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one
who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his fathers
pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there was no light. Upon
being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he
was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through
the stairway. Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victims death was
hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region, measuring 2.8 x 0.5
cm, 4 cm from left of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior and upward, piercing the right
ventricle of the hear t, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left lung. Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the
victim. He narrated that he and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they have
four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At
about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby,
while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl
woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone
shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran
outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her
and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the
hospital where she eventually died. He spent P23,000.00 for the funeral and P44,500.00 for the wake and
burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his wife
since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant. Sharon, sister-in-
law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they were roused from their
sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis cry for help. She saw that there was blood on the
victims chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed that the victims children were trembling
in fear and were crying. They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and
had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see
who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw somebody
enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that
the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po
yung pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes
watches the television at the house of the victim. On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on
the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies
did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant.

ISSUES: W/N the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was
credible.

HELD: The most important task of the State in the successful prosecution of the accused is his
credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this appeal turns on
whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was
credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole
testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the person who had entered their
home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.

The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events
witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be
witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion,
ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a
witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity
with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the
outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for
disqualification.

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with
which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the childs competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to
tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child.

The appellant did not object to Carls competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events
and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a
competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination of Carl, the appellant
extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt
to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to
 distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception to the trial court.
Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the competency of Carl to testify against the
appellant.The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not
disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did
not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only
to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil,
because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator.

[BERNARDO] People v. Ibaez y Albante, G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013

FACTS: That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus
and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredos daughter, an adolescent at the time, was
underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of a neighbor, three (3)meters away from the place where
Wilfredo and his companions were ostensibly in merrymaking. Rachel saw her father step away from the
group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and
hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully covered,
Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest. Jesus,
armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she
watched the attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her mother running out of their house and crying for help.On
that same auspicious date, 29 August 2004, Rowena, Wilfredos wife and Rachels mother, was inside their
house taking care of their youngest daughter. She heard a commotion coming from the neighboring house,
about eight (8) steps away, so she rushed in that direction. Once outside their house, she saw Wilfredo
prostrate on the ground covered with blood on his face and forehead. Upon reaching Wilfredo, Rowena saw
accused Jesus, standing one meter away from Wilfredo, holding an iron bar. Edwin and Alfredo stood beside
Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt. Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran away while Edwin went home. Rowena
asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However, Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive and was
pronounced dead on arrival. The trial court convicted Edwin and Alfredo of Murder. On appeal, Edwin and
Alfredo found no reprieve. The Court of Appeals did not deviate from the RTCs ruling and affirmed in toto its
finding of guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the witness Rachel, an adolescent at the time (10 years old) of the
commission of the offense is credible.

HELD: Yes. To discredit the eyewitness testimony of Rachel, they presented Aniceta who testified that she
and Rachel were out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel could not have
witnessed the murder of Wilfredo.

Both lower courts, however, found the testimony of Rachel credible: This Court finds the testimony of Rachel
clear and convincing. The testimony flows from a person who was present in the place where the killing
occurred. They are replete with details sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to appellants. We have no
reason to doubt Rachels credibility. Her candid account of the incident, standing alone, clearly established the
components of the crime of murder. Appellants defense of denial, not sufficiently proven, cannot overcome
the conclusions drawn from said evidence. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and
conclusions of the trial court. Rachels testimony was delivered in a firm, candid, and straightforward manner.
There is no showing that Rachel wavered from the basic facts of her testimony, even when she was subjected
to a rigorous examination.

Rachel was only ten (10) years old when she witnessed the murder of the victim. She testified in open court
two (2) years later. Thus, she cannot be expected to give an error-free narration of the events that happened
two years earlier. The alleged inconsistencies between her sworn statement and testimony referred to by
appellants do not affect her credibility. What is important is that in all her narrations she consistently and
clearly identified appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Inconsistencies between the sworn statement
and the testimony in court do not militate against witness credibility since sworn statements are generally
considered inferior to the testimony in open court. As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and
credence to Rachels testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was
categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.
The defense, accused-appellants herein, tried to further discredit Rachels testimony by arguing that Rachel
was a mere child who had studied only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read, and
did not know how to tell time. We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child
when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her
mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. With exceptions
provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.Thus, petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels lack of education and
inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of
Rachel as to who killed her father. We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-
examination on the competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her
father was attacked by accused-appellants. From her position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she
saw her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the happening
unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her perception was not diminished.

[BERNARDO] People v. Rama, G.R. No. 136304, January 25, 2001

FACTS: The birth of the New Year in 1998 saw the loss of Roger and Eufemia Cabiguin's infant child, Joyce
Ann Cabiguin. For her loss, an information was filed against the accused Roger Rama, alleging that on or
about the 1st day of January, 1998, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROGER RAMA, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap JOYCE ANN CABIGUIN, a minor, one (1) year and six (6) months old.1wphi1.nsecution's
story was gathered mainly from the testimony of five-year old Roxanne Cabiguin, a cousin of Joyce Ann. On
January 1, 1998, Roxanne, her sister Rose Ann, Mama Weng, Uncle Dony, grandmother Diana, Joyce Ann
and the latter's younger brother Pogi were at the Dagupan public plaza. Roxanne played with her Uncle Dony,
Rose Ann, and Joyce Ann at the plaza's stage while her Mama Weng sat at the side of the stage, feeding
Pogi. Mama Diana went to a store to buy some food. At that time, the accused Rama and another man were
also at the plaza. Rama called Roxanne and told her that if she would bring the beautiful girl (referring to
Joyce Ann) to him, he would give Roxanne a biscuit. Rama gave her one biscuit. She ate it. She then carried
Joyce Ann to the accused Rama who ran away with little Joyce Ann. Roxanne told her Mama Weng and
Mama Diana that Joyce Ann was taken by a man. They looked for Joyce Ann and the man but they were
nowhere to be found. During her testimony, Roxanne pointed to the accused Rama as the man who took
away Joyce Ann. Roxanne's testimony was corroborated by Pierre Torio. On January 1, 1998, he was with his
cousin and niece at the Dagupan City plaza from about 1: 15 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Facing the stage, they sat on a
bench to its right. They were about nine to ten meters away from the stage. There were about seven children
playing on the stage. At about 1:30 p.m. to 2:00 p.m., the accused Rama entered the plaza and sat about five
to six meters away from them. He was with two other men and a pregnant woman. He entered the plaza
playground where many kids were playing. He stared at the children and looked confused, then came out
seemingly not knowing what to do, and approached the stage. But before he could reach the stage, he
returned to the playground. Subsequently, at about 2:45 p.m., a tall man asked Torio if he saw the missing
Joyce Ann. He replied that he saw the accused Rama acting suspiciously in the plaza. He did not see though
whether Rama took Joyce Ann. By this time, Rama was nowhere in sight.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the prosecutions failure to present Bryan and Benjamin, the two children who allegedly
saw the accused Rama take Joyce Anne militate against the story of the prosecution.
2. W/N the testimony of Roxanne, a five-year-old deserves credit since she could not answer
many questions and appeared to have been coached by her grandmother, Diana.

RULING:
1. The accused Rama faults the trial court for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the
insufficiency of evidence. This fact, however, does not militate against the story of the prosecution. It is well-
settled that the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense and the
matter of choosing witnesses to present lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case.
Besides, the prosecution adequately explained that the parents of the two children, Bryan and Benjamin,
reneged on their willingness to have their children testify after the wife of the accused talked to them for fear of
their safety. Likewise, as correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief, nothing could have prevented the
defense from presenting Bryan and Benjamin as its own witnesses in order to discredit the testimony of
Roxanne, the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution. The presumption of suppressed evidence does
not apply when the same is equally accessible or available to the defense.
2. We cannot subscribe to the accused's contention. The Rules of Evidence provide in Rule 130, Secs. 20
and 21:
"Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
x x x ..
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and relating them truthfully."
In Dulla v. Court of Appeals and Andrea Ortega,22 the Court, citing the above provisions, gave credence to the
testimony of a three-year old witness. It held:
"It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is
examined. In the 1913 decision in United States v. Buncad, this Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point says: 'But this much may be
taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the
capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.' (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)

The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity
of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient
intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such
determination." (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, while the five-year old witness, Roxanne, was not able to answer some questions such as
which was her left and her right, she was straightforward in identifying the accused Rama as the culprit. The
Supreme Court find no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the child witness,
Roxanne. The determination of the competence and credibility of a child as a witness rests primarily with the
trial judge as he had the opportunity to see the demeanor of the witness, his apparent intelligence or lack of it,
and his understanding of the nature of the oath. As many of these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record
of the case, the trial judge's evaluation will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the record that
his judgment is erroneous.

This conclusion is in accord with the spirit and letter of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (the
"Rule") which became effective last December 15, 2000. The following provisions are apropos:

"Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. --Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of
child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all
criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses." (emphasis supplied)

"Section 3. Construction of the Rule. --This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the
child and to promote the maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional
rights of the accused." ( emphasis supplied)
"Section 6. Competence. --Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct
a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party , when it finds that substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
x x x
(a) Proof of necessity. --A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of
competence examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination."
(emphasis supplied)
In view of the positive identification made by Roxanne, the accused's defense of denial and alibi must fall.
Well-settled is the rule that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the defense of denial and
alibi. Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, it must be shown that there was physical impossibility for the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime. The defense has failed to satisfy this requirement. The trial court took
judicial notice of the fact that Gayaman where the accused supposedly was at the time Joyce Ann
disappeared is only about five to six kilometers away from the plaza where Joyce Ann was playing.

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity

[BULLECER] People v. Obogne, G.R. No. 199740 (Resolution), March 24, 2014
People vs. Obogne
FACTS:
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as follows: That on or
about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga, province of
Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously . . . succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA", 1 a
12-year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said "AAA". When arraigned on
December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court did not consider "AAA's" mental
retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of
"AAA's" mental disability. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of "AAA" deserves no credence because she was incapable of intelligently
making known her perception to others by reason of her mental disability.
HELD:
NO. Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. SaIEcA
In this case, "AAA" is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental condition. As
correctly observed by the trial court: During the continuation of AAA's testimony . . . she was able to recall
what [appellant] did to her . . . .
"AAA" recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him
because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought "AAA" to his house and while
inside, 'he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the
knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.'
In the same vein, the appellate court found "AAA" qualified to take the witness stand, viz.: CIAHDT
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that "AAA" was shown to be able to perceive, to
make known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents. Her narration of
the incident of rape given in the following manner is worthy of note:
xxx xxx xxx
Private complainant "AAA" provided a clear, convincing and competent testimonial evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
As found by the trial court, the testimony of "AAA" was replete with consistent details,
negating the probability of fabrication.
We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant's assertions, mental retardation per se does
not affect a witness' credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness.

[BULLECER] Dulla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123164, February 18, 2000
Dulla vs. CA
FACTS:
Andrea Ortega was at birth entrusted to the care of her grandaunt, Iluminada Beltran, by her mother, Leslie
Dulla Ortega. On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with bruises on
her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private
part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part
of her body to demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her.
Later, with the aid of two policemen from the WPD Police Station No. 1, Lumaban and his party were able to
take petitioner to Precinct 1 and later to Precinct 7. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her
organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on
and that she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her.
Viewed from the foregoing, the court is convinced that although the accused had a lewd design on the child,
and that he had removed his pants, and apparently lain on top of her swaying his hips to and from, he never
intended to enter her, as clearly shown by the fact that he did not remove her panty. In other words, even if the
"big penis" of the accused was erect and he was thrusting it into the private parts of the child, he could not
have plunged it inside because of the panty protectively shielding it from such an illegal entry. Because of the
panty worn by the child it cannot even be said that the sexual organ of the accused and that of his victim were
in close contact, so that rape in its legal conception, would have been committed. That no crime of rape took
place, is further shown by the medical certificate of Dr. Maximo Reyes stating that the victim's hymen (sic) is
annular, thin, narrow and intact. While rape was not committed, this court is nonetheless convinced that the
accused had committed an act of lasciviousness on the child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in considering and giving credence to the testimony of Andrea Ortega.
HELD:
NO. The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Under Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only
children who, on account of immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses.
In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified. Despite her young age,
however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She answered "yes" and "no" to questions and,
when unable to articulate what was done to her by petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During
her interrogation, she showed an understanding of what was being asked. She was consistent in her answers
to the questions asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.
The determination of the competence and credibility of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial judge
who has the opportunity to see the witness and observe his manner, his apparent intelligence or lack of it, and
his understanding of the nature of the oath. As many of these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record of
the case, the trial judge's evaluation will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the record that his
judgment is erroneous. 13
In this case, the defense did not even object to the presentation of Andrea as a witness, nor questioned her
competence to testify. On the contrary, the defense cross examined her, and the result of her examination
showed that she was intelligent and could make her answers known to others.
Nonetheless, we think the trial court correctly convicted petitioner of acts of lasciviousness. Andrea told the
court that petitioner's penis was never inserted in her vagina, nor was there even a touching of her external
organ by petitioner's penis. There could, therefore, be no rape.
The lewd design of petitioner is thus evident and, although the information filed was for the crime of rape, he
can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.

[BULLECER] People v. Golimlim, G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004

People vs. Golimlim

FACTS:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero,
left for Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody
of her (Amparo's) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay
Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon. Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing,
leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private complainant to
sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object
which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant
fell asleep. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not
believe her and in fact she scolded her. Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn's
half-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow
her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to
appellant's home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila. A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with
her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought
her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and
ultrasound examination. Lorna's suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was
indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant
had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape 16 against appellant
before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision, convicted appellant as charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of a mental retardate should be given weight and credence.
HELD:
YES. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of
truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to
others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, 24 where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private
complainant's testimony regardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and
ambiguity," this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally
accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection
to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. 25
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate
what he or she knows. 26 If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn's credibility. To be
sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeble mindedness.
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol
Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with
an IQ of 46, 30 she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
[CANA] People v. Maceda, G.R. No. 138805, February 28, 2001
PEOPLE VS. MACEDA
FACTS: Complainant Maribeth Quinto is a 32-year old mental retardate. She lived with her mother Editha at
Group 5, Area B, Payatas, Quezon City, while her siblings lived elsewhere in the neighborhood. In the morning
of February 18, 1998, complainant's mother went to wash clothes for her employer in Camarin, Caloocan City.
Complainant was left in the care of her sister, Veronica. When night came, Veronica left the victim alone in the
house as she expected her mother to arrive soon. Editha, however, was unable to go home that night because
her employer had some problems.
Alone in the house, complainant fell asleep while waiting for her mother to arrive. She was awakened by the
barking of the dog at around 1:30 a.m. of February 19, 1998. She heard someone knocking at the door. When
she went to open the door, she found it was her neighbor, accused-appellant Edgardo "Boboy" Maceda,
asking where complainant's youngest brother Nonoy was. When complainant answered that her brother was
not there, accused-appellant got inside the house, closed the door behind him, and told complainant not to
make any noise. Accused-appellant then forced her to lie down and started kissing her on the lips and neck.
Complainant got scared and began to cry. Accused-appellant then pulled down her panty, spread her legs,
and had sexual intercourse with her. Afraid, complainant covered herself with a blanket as soon as accused-
appellant left.
Complainant's mother arrived home at around 11 o'clock in the morning on February 19, 1998. She noticed
that the victim was quiet, but, thinking that the latter was just being moody, did not pay attention to her. After a
while, complainant, who was crying, approached her mother and told her what had happened. Describing
what she felt while being raped, complainant told her mother, "tulo ng luha ko. Hirap hirap ako." (My tears just
ran down. It was very difficult for me.) On the same day, Editha took her daughter to the barangay captain and
reported the incident. Following the advice of the barangay captain, they went to Camp Crame and had
complainant physically examined by a medico-legal officer. The following day, February 20, 1998, Editha and
complainant went to the police station and gave their sworn statements on the basis of which accused-
appellant was arrested and detained at the Quezon City Jail.
After conviction, one of his arguments is that the complainant's mental condition rendered her testimony so
vague, uncertain, and incoherent that it cannot be understood. This is not so. Her testimony is
understandable. Nor is there any question that she is competent to testify on what she had experienced.|||
ISSUE: Whether or not the victim is disqualified to testify.
HELD: No. Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provide:
SECTION 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to another, may be witnesses.
SECTION 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot
be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental conditions, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
The defense and the prosecution stipulated during pre-trial that complainant is a mental retardate. But,
although the trial court observed that she had some difficulty expressing herself, she was nonetheless able
to intelligently and clearly make known to the court, beyond dispute, that she was raped by accused-
appellant. It has been held that the mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to be testified to
occurred affects only her credibility. As long as the witness can convey ideas by words or signs and give
sufficiently intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent witness even if she is a mental
retardate.
A reading of complainant's testimony in its entirety shows that she repeatedly stated what accused-appellant
had done to her. Only if such testimony is read in parts and the portions thereof are isolated or taken out of
context and no allowance is made for complainant's mental condition can accused-appellant's reading of it be
justified. Inconsistencies or lapses in her testimonies do not affect the substance of her statements. They do
not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole nor reflect adversely on complainant's
credibility.

[CANA] People v. Lagarto y Petilla, G.R. Nos. 118828 & 119371, February 29, 2000
PEOPLE VS. LEGARTO y PETILLA
FACTS: At 5:10 p.m. on 2 August 1994, PO3 Edgardo E. Ko of the Western Police District Command,
Directorate for Investigation, Crimes Against Persons Division, Philippine National Police, Manila, received an
information from PO3 Mabilisan of Station 11 that a dead body in a sack was found at around 4:30 p.m.
floating in the flooded street of Del Pan near the corner of Lavizares St., Binondo, Manila. Residents
discovered the corpse wrapped in a round yellow tablecloth tied with a nylon cord inside a sack. The
responding policemen PO3 Ko, SPO1 Edgardo Manuel, and PO3 Rosalie Fernandez noticed the
victim's feet and left hand protruding from the sack and round yellow tablecloth. They untied the sack and
nylon cord and saw the victim, a young girl, wearing nothing but her duster, with gaping wounds on the left ear
and chin, her genitals lacerated, her eyes missing, and her head bashed in. They immediately brought the
body to the police morgue at Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel.
A certain Romezen Alquiza called the police station, inquiring about the body recovered from Del Pan, Tondo,
Manila, whose description matched his sister Angel who had been missing since the night of 1 August 1994.
He was advised to proceed to the Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel. Together with his mother Zenaida and some
family members, Romezen went to said mortuary to look at the body. Indeed, it was Angel Alquiza. He then
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Officer to autopsy Angel's body. Said office
also issued a Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, which was signed by Romezen. The autopsy was
conducted by NBI Medico-Legal Officer Ludivino J. Lagat, who concluded that Angel Alquiza died due to
multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries.
The prosecution relied mainly on the statements and testimonies of, among others, Herminia Barlam. During
the trial, prosecution witness Herminia Barlam categorically pointed to accused-appellants as among the three
men (the other one being the deceased Lagunday) she saw in the warehouse at Kagitingan St. at around 2:00
a.m. on 2 August 1994. She narrated how accused-appellants stabbed the face and genitals of Angel, hit her
with a piece of wood, raped her as she bled, and eventually killed her. She saw how they tied her hands and
feet, wrapped her lifeless form in a yellow tablecloth, and put her inside a sack. Because of her hearing
impairment, the defense sought to disqualify Barlam on the ground of incompetence. She was referred to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) upon repeated motion of defense counsels to determine if she was
competent to testify.
ISSUE: wether or not Barlam is qualified to be a witness.
HELD: Yes. Herminia Barlam adequately met the minimum requirements for qualifying as a witness under the
Rules. She could certainly perceive and make known her perception to others. Even if she is deaf, she saw
what happened on 2 August 1994. She related what she saw to the police, to the psychiatrists who examined
her at NCMH, and to the trial court.
The Supreme Court opined that Barlam's testimony adequately established the liability of accused-appellants
for raping and killing the victim. She not only proved to be competent but also truthful in her narration of what
transpired on 2 August 1994. Her sworn statement might not entirely jibe with her oral testimony, but the Court
has ruled that in case of conflict between the contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open court, the
latter generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because by their nature,
they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than the affiant. She repeatedly pointed to accused-appellants
as she spoke, and slapped, boxed, and glowered at them when she was asked by the court to identify the
malefactors. Neither can the Court discount the psychiatric report, which gave Barlam a clean bill of mental
health. For three days, professional psychiatrists examined her, but her story remained the same. It was the
same story she narrated in court, albeit with some minor inconsistencies. It must also be noted that Barlam
absolutely had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellants. Furthermore, accused-appellants'
denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification and assertions of Barlam. The Court, therefore,
affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification as to the damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage

[CASTILLEJO] Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Maximo Alvarez.
Maximo Alvarez is the accused in a criminal case for arson for burning the house of Susan Ramirez, sister of
Maximos wife, Esperanza Alvarez.
The prosecution in the criminal case called Esperanza to witness against the accused, his husband.
Maximo through counsel filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule
130 of the RC on marital disqualification.
Trial court disqualified Esperanza for further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.
CA reversed RTC

Issue: W/N Esperanza can testify against her husband in the criminal case?

Held:
YES.
Sec. 22 of 130 provides:
Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct
descendants or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and
his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the
major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well
that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the
harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal
act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact
that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a
case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law
aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
(People v. Castaeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification
Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship
between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months
before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

[CASTILLEJO] People v. Quidato, Jr., G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998

FACTS:
Quidato was charged with parricide of his father, Bernardo Quidato Sr., together with co-accused Siblings
Reynaldo and Eddie Malita (who were charged murder in a separate information).
They were tried jointly.
Prosecution presented as witnesses Quidatos brother, wife and Patrolman Lucrecio.
Extrjudicial confessions by the Malita siblings were not admitted for lack of counsel assistance during
custodial investigation.
Gina Quidaro, wife of accused, testified that on the evening before the killing, her husband and the Malita
brothers were drinking tuba at their house and overheard them planning to go to her father-in-laws house to
get money from the latter.
Quidato objected to his wifes testimony on the ground of marital disqualification rule in Section 22 or Rule 130
of the Rule of Court.
RTC judge acknowledged the applicability of the so-called rule, but allowed said testimony only against
accused appellants co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

Issue: w/n the RTC correctly ruled on the applicability of the wifes testimony?

Held: YES.
As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify
in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellants case. This
testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial
notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. What cannot be
done directly cannot be done indirectly is a rule familiar even to law students.
Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidatos testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddies
extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused-
appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellants defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the
demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his fathers house on the strength of the latters verbal
threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return home
immediately, his failure to seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him
immediately after the incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita
brothers as the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no
matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on
the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every
circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.

[CASTILLEJO] People v. Pasensoy, G.R. No. 140634, September 12, 2002

FACTS:
This is a murder case against Roberto Pasensoy for killing Hilario Inovero.
Roberto Pasensoy is the legal husband of Analie Pasensoy.
Analie has been in a live in relationship with a guy named Hilario Reyes y Inovero for 3 months before the
incident happened.
Roberto Pasensoy has no knowledge of the affair and whereabouts of Analie and Hilario before the killing of
the latter.
Roberto, a security guard, on his way home, was told by a certain Amadong Bisaya about seeing his wife with
their youngest child and Tisoy (referring to HIlario) board a jeep going to Lumang bayan (where Analie and
Hilario are renting a house together).
He then asked Bisaya to accompany him to the place. Roberto having with him his service gun, used the
same in killing Hilario with a single shot on the head.
The prosecution offered Analie and the deceased neighbor as witnesses.
No objection was raised on Analies testimony.
Accused was judged guilty of the crime.

ISSUE: w/n it violates the marital disqualification rule?

HELD:
NO. The testimony was admitted.
As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analies testimony would have been disregarded had appellant timely
objected to her competency to testify under the marital disqualification rule.Under this rule, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latters direct descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to
testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally.
The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness. In
this case, the incompetency was waived by appellants failure to make a timely objection to the admission of
Analies testimony.
We note that Rogelio was presented to corroborate Analies testimony, but he gave a rather confusing account
of what he allegedly saw or heard on the night of the shooting. During his direct examination, he claimed that
he heard a gunshot, but on cross-examination he claimed that he opened the door of his house and actually
saw appellant shoot Hilario. In any event, it is well-settled that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible
and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused.

Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party

[CASTILLEJO] Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125861, September 9, 1998

FACTS:
Private respondent, in his complaint claimed that he bought the subject properties from Mr. Tan Keh in 1954,
built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his favor in view of his foreign
nationality at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan
Keh turned over to private respondent the owners duplicate copy and, in addition, executed a lease contract in
favor of private respondent for a duration of forty (40) years. However, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject
properties to Remigio Tan, his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject
properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of private respondent and that Remigio would
execute the proper documents of transfer in favor of private respondent should the latter at anytime demand
recovery of the subject properties. TCT No. 35656 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 53284 was
issued in the name of Remigio. Another contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor
of private respondent to further safeguard the latters interest on the subject properties, but private respondent
never paid any rental and no demand whatsoever for the payment thereof had been made on him. Remigio
was killed in 1968. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of private respondents ownership of the subject
properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to private respondent who by then had already
acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners, however, never made good their promise to convey
the subject properties despite repeated demands by private respondent. In fact, petitioners had the subject
properties fraudulently transferred to their names. Thus, the filing of the complaint for recovery of property.
petitioners filed a Motion To Dismiss claiming that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) the cause of
action has long prescribed; (3) the cause of action has long been barred by a prior judgment; and, (4) the
claim has been waived, abandoned and/or extinguished by laches and estoppel.
An Opposition to Motion To Dismiss with Memorandum was filed by private respondent on November 29,
1993. In turn, petitioners on December 1, 1993 filed their Memorandum of Authorities
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order dismissing private respondents complaint, acceding to all the
grounds set forth by petitioners in their motion to dismiss. Dissatisfied, private respondent appealed to public
respondent CA which set aside the dismissal and ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent CA in its Resolution.
Now before us via this petition for review, petitioners insist on the propriety of the trial courts order of
dismissal, and reiterate, by way of assignment of errors, the same grounds contained in their motion to
dismiss.

Issue: w/n the dead mans statute applies?

Held:
YES.
Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the subject properties.
On the other hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that he is entitled to the properties by
virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely
on parol evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the Dead
Mans Statute found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms
of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
Clearly then, from a reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto and relevant laws and
jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause of action.

[CASTILLEJO] Sanson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who
died on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of
P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate
claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with the deceased
which is evidenced by six checks issued by him before his death, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank
for payment but were dishonored due to the closure of his account.
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased issued five
checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt.
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles, testified that
on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed money from her husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as
shown by three checks issued by the deceased.
Melecia Sy, as administratrix denied all claims raising the deadmans statute on the testimonies of the
witnesses.

Issue: w/n the deadmans statute applies to relatives of the parties who were their witnesses?

Held:
NO.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Deadmans Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule
renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons
not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from
testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active
part therein.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case
at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be
excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth
of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony
of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe
checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses
to each others claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Mans Statute; besides, the
administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each others
favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in
his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law
speaks of parties or assignors of parties to a case. Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each
others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the
original and emphasis supplied)
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a
third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One
is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim
which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.Since
the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims
can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

[DLC] Garcia v. Vda. de Caparas, G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013

FACTS:
Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a farm in Malolos, Bulacan being tilled by Eugenio
Caparas (Eugenio) as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was
succeeded by her nephews and niece, namely Amanda dela Paz-Perlas (Amanda), Justo dela Paz (Justo)
and Augusto dela Paz (Augusto). On the other hand, Eugenio's children Modesta Garcia (Garcia), Cristina
Salamat (Salamat) and Pedro succeeded him.
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died,
Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan",followed by an Agricultural
Leasehold Contract, covering the land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. SETaHC
 Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas
(Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee.
On July 10, 1996, the landowners Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one hand, and Pedro's sisters
Garcia and Salamat on the other, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby Garcia and
Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro's co-lessees.
On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for nullification of
leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro's heirs, represented by his surviving
spouse and herein respondent Dominga.
In their Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed that when their father Eugenio died, they entered into
an agreement with their brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the land on a "per-season basis"; that
the landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement; that when Makapugay passed away, Pedro reneged on
their agreement and cultivated the land all by himself, deliberately excluding them and misrepresenting to
Amanda that he is Eugenio's sole heir; that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing him as sole
agricultural lessee in their 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that when Amanda learned of Pedro's
misrepresentations, she executed on July 10, 1996 an Affidavit stating among others that Pedro assured her
that he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights"; that in order to correct matters,
Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed in their favor the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing
them as Pedro's co-lessees; that when Pedro passed away, Dominga took over the land and, despite
demands, continued to deprive them of their rights as co-lessees; that efforts to settle their controversy proved
futile, prompting the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee to issue the proper certification authorizing the
filing of a case; and that they suffered damages as a consequence.
In her Answer, respondent Dominga claimed that when her father-in-law Eugenio died, only her
husband Pedro succeeded and cultivated the land, and that petitioners never assisted him in farming the land;
that Pedro is the sole agricultural lessee of the land; that Amanda's July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date between her and the petitioners are self-serving and violate the existing 1979
Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that under Section 38 RA 3844, petitioners' cause of action has prescribed.
Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in possession of the land even while Eugenio lived; that
petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed the land even for a single cropping; that Pedro has been the
one paying the lease rentals as evidenced by receipts; that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his
rights as lessee by operation of law, and that she had been remitting lease rentals to the landowners since
1985; and that petitioners had no right to institute themselves as her co-lessees.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) held that Amanda's act of executing the July 10,
1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro's landholding and
rights without cause; that for failure to timely question Pedro's leasehold, his rights were transferred, by
operation of law, to Dominga upon his death. Finally, the PARAD held that petitioners' July 10, 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void.
It appears that sometime after the execution of the July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
and during the pendency of the case, petitioners entered the land and began tilling the same. For this reason,
Dominga filed a Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board||| (DARAB) Case for maintenance of
peaceful possession with injunctive relief, against the landowners and petitioners. On petitioners' motion, the
case was dismissed.
DARAB upheld PARADs decision. Petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, which was
denied. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
W/N he alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas (Pedro) that he entered into a sharing of
leasehold lights with the petitioners can be used as evidence against herein respondent

HELD:
NO. Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an understanding about it and he did not
have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights." Petitioners have no other evidence, other than
such verbal declaration, which proves the existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such
agreement exists, nor have they shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No
receipt evidencing payment to the landowners of the latter's share, or any other documentary evidence, has
been put forward.
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda's declaration in her
Affidavit covering Pedro's alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible
for being a violation of the Dead Man's Statute, which provides that "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." 30 Thus,
since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda's declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the
1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is now
the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro's surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-
interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair
situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-
declarant Pedro's prior death.
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual agreement with
Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they should have confronted Pedro or
sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-lessees of the land; and
they should have done so soon after the passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996,
or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came
forward to question Pedro's succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on
their rights, and are thus precluded from questioning Pedro's 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.

[DLC] Intestate Estate of Tongco v. Vianzon, G.R. No. 27498, September 20, 1927

FACTS:

Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on
July 8, 1925, leaving Anastacia as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named
administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in
a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal
partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in
the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, when she presented a motion for a
revision of certain decrees within the one-year period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was
joined by the administratrix of the estate. A decision was rendered by Judge of First Instance Rovira
annulling the titles and ordered that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title be issued as the
exclusive property of Anastacia Vianzon, free from all encumbrances and liens. Sometime later, a motion for
a new trial was presented with accumulated affidavits by counsel for the losing party. This motion was
denied by the trial judge.
On July 19, 1926, the administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia Vianzon for the
recovery of specified property and for damages. Judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in the
following language: "Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint in
this case, and only declares that one-half of the value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito
Rural de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which
one-half interest must appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino
Tongco." The motion for a new trial was denied. The administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco has
appealed.

ISSUE:
W/N the widow was competent to testify

HELD:
YES.
The Code of Civil Procedure in section 383 (7) provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an
action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person . . . upon claim or demand against the estate
of such deceased person . . . , cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death and purpose
of this stature is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in
question on the part of the surviving party. The law designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth.
The law does not apply and a witness is competent to testify when the actions were not brought
"against" the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. The law twice makes use of
the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they
brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to
enforce a demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was
presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.

[EVIDENTE]
Babao v. Perez, G.R. No. L-8334, December 28, 1957

PLAINTIFFS ALLEGATION

Plaintiff is the judicial administrator of the estate of the late Santiago Babao while defendant Florencio Perez is
the judicial administrator of the estate of the late Celestina Perez. The other defendants are purchasers and
actual owners of portions of the land which is sought to be recovered in the present litigation.

The complaint alleges that Celestina Perez was in her lifetime the owner of the parcel of land in question
which was not registered either under Act 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage law: that sometime in 1924
when the deceased Santiago Babao married Maria Cleofe Perez, niece of Celestina Perez, the latter and the
former entered into a verbal agreement whereby [:]

Santiago Babao bound himself to improve the land by leveling and clearing all the forest trees standing
thereon and planting in lieu thereof coconuts, rice, corn and other crops such as bananas and bamboo trees,
and
to act at the same time as administrator thereof during the lifetime of Celestina Perez, all expenses for labor,
and materials to be at his cost, in consideration of which Celestina in turn bound herself to

convey to Santiago Babao or, his wife of land, together with all the improvements thereon upon her death;
that pursuant to said verbal agreement, Santiago Babao in 1924 left his job as administrator of the Llana
Estate in San Juan, Batangas for which he was receiving a salary of P150 a month, and started leveling and
clearing the land having planted in an area of 50 hectares 50,000 coconuts trees, and rice and corn in another
area of 70 hectares, leaving out only 50 hectares unimproved, all of which having been administered by him
from 1924 to 1946;

that for clearing and improving the portions of land above-mentioned, he incurred expenses amounting to
P7,400 which added to his salary as administrator from l924 to 1946 at rate P150 a month mounting to
P39,600, makes a total of P47,000;

that in the violation of the aforesaid verbal agreement, Celestina Perez, acting through Leovigildo Perez, to
whom she extended a power of Attorney to sell, sold few days before she died about 127 __ hectares of the
land in question in consequence of which Santiago Babao was deprived of the possession and administration
thereof from 1945.
that said sales are fictitious and were made clear violation of the oral agreement made between Celestina
Perez and Santiago Babao and as such the same are null and void;

that Celestina Perez died on August 24, 1947 as a result of which intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of her estate and one Florencio Perez was named as judicial administrator;

that Santiago Babao died on January 6, 1948 and as a consequence in estate proceedings were instituted for
the settlement of his estate and Bienvenido Babao failed to recover the portion of the lane herein litigated,
said estate would suffer an irreparable damage of not less than P366,700 representing fruits which it has
failed to receive during the last 20 years.

Wherefore, plaintiff prayed for the conveyance of portion of the land in question and for annulment of the
sales of the portion for having been made fictitiously, and in the alternative, for judgment in plaintiff's favor for
the sum of P47,000 representing the amount of useful and necessary expenses incurred by Santiago Babao
in improving the land in line with the oral agreement.

DEFENDANTS VERSION

Defendants denied plaintiff's claim that a verbal agreement was entered into between Celestina Perez Babao
relative to the clearing, improving and administering the land belonging to the former having an area of 156
hectares, as well as the other claim that Santiago Babao had actually cleared and improve a great portion
thereof at the cost at around P7,400.

They alleged in 1924 and for many years prior thereto, the land in question had already been cleared and
cultivated for agricultural purposes with an exception of a portion of 50 hectares:

that said land was cleared and cultivated due partly to the effort made by Celestinas husband, Esteban de
Villa, her overseers and tenants, and partly to the "trusco" system employed by them whereby persons were
allowed to clear the land and plat thereon and from the harvest were compensated according to a graduated
scale of division varying from year to year;

that the coconut trees, banana plants and bamboo trees now standing thereon were planted not by Santiago
Babao nor at his expenses but by the tenants of the spouses Esteban de Villa and Celestina Perez who were
dully compensated according to the "trusco" system;

that although Santiago Babao and Maria Cleofe Perez were married in 1924, the former did not have anything
to do with the land in question to Esteban de Villa was then still living and actively managed the same with
help of his overseer and tenants until he died in 1930;

that it was only in that year when Santiago Babao began administering the land in the capacity of a nephew of
Celestina until 1935 when Celestina disgusted with the conduct of Santiago, left the company of Santiago and
his wife and went to live with her nephew Bernardo Perez until her death in 1947;

that since then Celestina Perez prohibited Santiago from interfering with the administration of the land and
designated another person in his place, and for the work he did from 1930 to 1935, he was more than
compensated because the proceeds of the harvests during said years were all given only to him and his wife
and Celestina was given only what was barely sufficient for her maintenance.

Defendants also alleged that the sales made by Celestina Perez through her attorney-in-fact Leovigildo Perez
of several portions of the land were not fictitious is alleged but were made with full knowledge and authority of
Celestina who executed in favor of Leovigildo Perez a power of Attorney under the authority notary public in
the presence of Santiago Babao himself who did not interpose any objection to the execution of said power of
attorney and, therefore, said sales are real, valid and genuine, having been executed in accordance with law.

Defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed with costs, after awarding to them moral damages in the
amount that the court may deem proper to fix.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged verbal agreement falls within the prohibition of the Statute of frauds.

Held:
This statute, formerly incorporated as Section 21 of Rule 123 of our Rules of Court, is now found in Article
1403 of the new Civil Code, which provides, in so far as pertinent to this case, as follows:

In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or
some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent,
evidence therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its
contents;

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) An agreement . . . for the sale of real property or of an interest therein.

Appellants contends that the alleged verbal agreement falls under the paragraphs (a) and (c) above-quoted
because the same may be considered as an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making thereof, or one which involves a sale of real property or of an interest therein. If this
premise is correct, appellants contend, then the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of parole evidence
to prove the alleged agreement over the vigorous objection of counsel for appellants.

That the alleged verbal agreement is one which by its terms is not to be performed within one year is very
apparent from the allegations of the complaint. Thus, it is therein alleged that the agreement was allegedly
made in 1924 and by its terms Santiago Babao bound himself

All that is required in such case is complete performance within the year by one party, however many years
may have to elapse before the agreement is performed by the other party. But nothing less than full
performance by one party will suffice, and it has been held that, if anything remains to be done after the
expiration of the year besides the mere payment of money, the statute will apply." 1 (Emphasis supplied). It is
not therefore correct to state that Santiago Babao has fully complied with his part within the year from the
alleged contract in question.

When, in an oral contract which, by its terms, is to be performed within one year from the execution of the
contracting parties has complied within the year with obligations imposed on him by said contract, the other
party cannot avoid the fulfillment of those incumbent on him under the same contract by invoking the statute of
frauds because the latter aims to prevent and not to protect fraud. (Shoemaker vs. La Tondea, Inc. 68 Phil.,
24.).

The rule that the court will not specifically enforce a contract for the sale of land unless its terms have been
definitely understood and agreed upon by the parties, and established by the evidence, is especially
applicable to oral contracts sought to be enforced on the ground of part performance. An oral contract, to be
enforced on this ground, must at least have that degree of certainty which is required of written contracts
sought to be specifically enforced.

The parol contract must be sufficiently clear and definite to render the precise acts which are to be performed
thereunder clearly ascertainable. Its terms must be so clear and complete as to allow no reasonable doubt
respecting its enforcement according to the understanding of the parties. (101 A.L.R., pp. 950-951).

Having reached the conclusion that all the parol evidence of appellee was submitted in violation of the Statute
of Frauds, or of the rule which prohibits testimony against deceased persons, we find unnecessary to discuss
the other issues raised in appellants' brief.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the case is dismissed, with costs against appellee.

[EVIDENTE]
Hko Ah Pao v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September 27, 2006

Facts:
The spouses Aristeo Mayo and Salud Masangkay sold for P70,000 the property subject of this case which is
located at 1723 Vasquez St., Malate, Manila to Arsenio Ting. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63991 was
subsequently issued in the name of Arsenio Ting on June 14, 1961.

Arsenio Ting was the son of Teng Ching Lay by his first marriage. At the time of the sale, Arsenio was a
practicing lawyer and, being a Filipino, was qualified to acquire and own real property in the Philippines.
Arsenio was likewise the manager and controlling stockholder of Triumph Timber, Inc. in Butuan City. Teng
Ching Lay, on the other hand, was a Chinese citizen, and although his name did not appear in the corporate
records of Triumph Timber, Inc., he was the one making business decisions for the company.[3] He became a
naturalized Filipino citizen on January 18, 1966.
A colonial-style house was standing on the disputed lot when it was bought. Teng Ching Lay occupied the
same, together with his second wife, petitioner Hko Ah Pao, and their children, petitioners Henry and Anna
Teng. Arsenio also stayed in the same house

Several years later, Arsenio married Germana Chua. They moved to a new house that was erected on the
same lot behind the old colonial house. Germana bore three sons, respondents herein, namely, Laurence,
Anthony and Edmund, all surnamed Ting.

Later, Arsenio and his family relocated to Butuan City but they would stay in their old house in Malate
whenever they came to Manila. A caretaker was hired to oversee it. TengChing Lay also transferred to Butuan
City. Petitioners remained in the colonial house, and Teng Ching Lay would join them each time he went to
Manila.

Arsenio died in 1972, predeceasing his father, Teng Ching Lay, and leaving as compulsory heirs, the surviving
spouse, Germana, and respondents who were all minors at that time.

Two years later, trouble brewed between Teng Ching Lay and his daughter-in-law, Germana, concerning the
properties in Manila and Butuan City, as well as the stocks of Triumph Timber, Inc. which involved millions of
pesos. On April 28, 1981, Teng Ching Lay filed before the City Court of Butuan a motion to recall Germanas
guardianship over her minor children for her failure to give him, as the paternal grandfather of the minors,
notice of the guardianship proceedings pursuant to Articles 344 and 355 of the Civil Code.[4] He added that
Germana sought the guardianship merely to seek authority to sell the properties of the wards. On her part,
Germana averred that Teng Ching Lay had raised this issue only as a leverage against her in their case
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pertaining to the liquidation of the assets of Timber
Triumph, Inc.

Issue:
WHETHER SECTION 42 (2ND SENTENCE), RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
THE HOLDINGS IN SEVERAL CASES MAY BE APPLICABLE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ANGEL
SEMBRANO RELATIVE TO THE DECLARATION, AS WELL AS ACTION, OF THE LATE TENG CHING LAY
THAT THE LATTER OWNED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.

WHETHER SECTION 38, RULE 130, OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE MAY BE APPLICABLE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF ANGEL SEMBRANO AFFECTING THE DECLARATION TO HIM OF ARSENIO TING,
I.E. BIBILI SI TATAY NG BAHAY SA MAYNILA AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
WHETHER SECTION 34, RULE 130, OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE MAY BE APPLICABLE TO
RESPONDENT ANTHONY TINGS ADMISSION AS EXTANT IN THE RECORD TO SHOW SPECIFIC
INTENT, HABIT AND THE LIKE ON THE PART OF TENG CHING LAY IN HAVING HIS SON, ARSENIO
TING, ACT AS HIS TRUSTEE OF SEVERAL PROPERTIES.

WHETHER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF EVIDENCE (ON ADMISSION AGAINST
INTEREST) AND SECTION 4, RULE 129 (ON JUDICIAL ADMISSION) OF THE SAME RULES MAY BE
APPLIED TO RESPONDENT ANTHONY TINGS ADMISSION AS EXTANT IN THE RECORD, I.E., THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS OWNED BY TENG CHING LAY.

Held:
The records will show that, indeed, petitioners failed to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence.

In civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by a preponderance of evidence is on the party who is
asserting the affirmative of an issue. Preponderance of evidence means probability of truth. It is evidence that
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Petitioners primarily rely on Angel Sembranos testimony to substantiate their claim. The latters testimony,
however, consists mainly of hearsay, which carries no probative value. He did not have personal knowledge
as to the execution of the contract of sale between Arsenio and the Masangkay spouses nor the alleged
agreement between the former and Teng Ching Lay. He could only testify as to what the deceased had
allegedly told him. Thus, any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its evidentiary weight is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand.

Time and again, the Court has held that it will not interfere with the trial courts assessment regarding the
credibility of witnesses, absent any showing that it overlooked, misapplied or misunderstood some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance or that it gravely abused its discretion. Here, both the RTC and the CA
were not convinced of the truthfulness of Sembranos bare testimony. He did not present any documentary
proof to support his statements, particularly with regard to the P200,000 check that he supposedly gave to
Arsenio for the payment of the property in question.

Furthermore, Sembranos testimony on behalf of petitioners is about an alleged declaration against an interest
of a person who is dead in an action that is in effect a claim against his estate. Such a testimony if coming
from a party would be barred by the surviving parties rule, or the dead mans statute, in the Rules of Court:
Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind.

[FULLANTE] Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, October 2, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Zenaida M. Santos is the widow of Salvador Santos, a brother of private respondents
Calixto, Alberto, Antonio, all surnamed Santos and Rosa Santos-Carreon. Spouses Jesus and Rosalia Santos
owned a parcel of land registered under TCT No. 27571 with an area of 154 square meters, located at Sta.
Cruz Manila. On it was a four-door apartment administered by Rosalia who rented them out. The spouses had
five children, Salvador, Calixto, Alberto, Antonio and Rosa. Jesus and Rosalia executed a deed of sale of the
properties in favor of their children Salvador and Rosa. Rosa then sold her share to Salvador which resulted in
the issuance of a new TCT No. 113221.
Despite the transfer of the property to Salvador, Rosalia continued to lease and receive rentals from the
apartment units. Jesus, Salvador and Rosalia died. Petitioner Zenaida, claiming to be Salvadors heir,
demanded the rent from Antonio Hombrebueno, a tenant of Rosalia. The latter refused to pay, thus Zenaida
filed an ejectment suit against him with the MTC of Manila. The trial court ruled in favor of Zenaida. Private
respondents instituted an action for reconveyance of property with preliminary injunction against petitioner in
the RTC of Manila, where they alleged that the two deeds of sale executed on were simulated for lack of
consideration and that they were executed to accommodate Salvador in generating funds for his business
ventures and providing him with greater business flexibility. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the private respondents.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can invoke the "Dead Man's Statute?
Held: No. Petitioner in her memorandum seeks to expunge the testimony of Rosa Santos-Carreon before the
trial court in view of Sec. 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "Dead Man's
Statute." It is too late for petitioner, however, to invoke said rule. The trial court in its order dated February 5,
1990, denied petitioner's motion to disqualify respondent Rosa as a witness. Petitioner did not appeal
therefrom. Trial ensued and Rosa testified as a witness for respondents and was cross-examined by
petitioner's counsel. By her failure to appeal from the order allowing Rosa to testify, she waived her right to
invoke the dean man's statute. Further, her counsel cross-examined Rosa on matters that occurred during
Salvadors' lifetime.
In Goi vs. CA, 144 SCRA 222, 231 (1986) we held that protection under the dead man's statute is effectively
waived when a counsel for a petitioner cross-examines a private respondent on matters occurring during the
deceased's lifetime. The Court of appeals cannot be faulted in ignoring petitioner on Rosa's disqualification.
Petition is DENIED.

[FULLANTE] Sunga-Chan v. Chua, G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001

Facts: Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business partnership with Jacinto. Respondent
and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, under the name of Jacinto as
a sole proprietorship. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of
the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of
Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for
accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners
failed to comply.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending that they are not liable for
partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does
not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim,
petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for
respondent. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership
existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written
document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts
were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged
partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's
Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners thus implore this
Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted
to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render respondent's testimony
and that of Josephine inadmissible.
Held: No. The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule
can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted;
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person
of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind."
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court,
and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of
the Dead Man's Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of
the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased. Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple
reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does
not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which
has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then,
Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

[FULLANTE] Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112443, January 25, 2002

Facts: The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square
meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situated on the
corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno
Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.
In 1947, an extra-judicial partition, written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of
land and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses
is Nicanor Jaymes house, which his family occupied since 1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with the RTC Cebu an
amended application for the registrations of the lot described with the following boundaries.
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land owned
by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land
was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is
applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission. Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay
filed their opposition contending that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947
extra-judicial partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application, seeking the issuance of a
Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme.
In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an Original Certificate of Title over the
herein subject lot. She caused the subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the
conveyance of the two parcels thereof. Private respondents, however, claimed ownership over the same lot by
virtue of an extrajudicial partition made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaint to declare void the
Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles issued. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by
petitioner in obtaining the Free Patent, declared said free patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
However, the purchaser and mortgagee of the two parcels conveyed were declared in good faith, hence,
upheld their rights over the property.
Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the CA, which affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. It ruled that private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner should
be ordered to reconvey only 1/3 of the lot to the private respondents. Petitioner contends that the testimonies
given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her
mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man's statute.
Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and
Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in
the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Dead Mans Statute.
Held: No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact
coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness. Since the claim of private respondents and the
testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned
testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court. Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private
respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare
allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations.
Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.

[FULLANTE] Londres v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136427, December 17, 2002

Facts: The present case stemmed from a battle of ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333 both located in Barrio
Baybay, Roxas City, Capiz. Paulina Arcenas originally owned these two parcels of land. After Paulinas death,
ownership of the lots passed to her daughter, Filomena VidaI. The surviving children of Filomena, Petitioners,
namely, Sonia Fuentes Londres Armando V. Fuentes, Chi-Chita Fuentes Quintia, Roberto V. Fuentes,
Leopoldo V. Fuentes and Marilou Fuentes Esplana now claim ownership over Lots.
On the other hand, private respondents Consolacion Alivio and and Elena Alovera Santos anchor their right of
ownership over Lots on the Absolute Sale executed by Filomena. Filomena sold the two lots in favor of
Consolacion and her husband, Julian Alovera, Elena is the daughter of Consolacion and Julian (deceased).
Petitioners filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of contract, damages and just compensation.
Petitioners sought to nullify the Absolute Sale conveying Lots.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that as the surviving children of Filomena, they are the owners of Lots.
Petitioners claimed that these two lots were never sold to Julian. Petitioners doubt the validity of the Absolute
Sale because it was tampered. The cadastral lot number of the second lot mentioned in the Absolute Sale was
altered to read Lot 1333 when it was originally written as Lot 2034. Petitioners pointed out that Lot 2034,
situated in Barrio Culasi, Roxas City, Capiz, was also owned by their grandmother, Paulina.
Petitioners alleged that it was only recently that they learned of the claim of private respondents when
Consolacion filed a petition for the judicial reconstitution of the original certificates of title of Lots. Upon further
inquiry, petitioners discovered that there exists a notarized Absolute Sale. The private respondents copy of the
Absolute Sale was tampered so that the second parcel of lot sold, Lot 2034 would read as Lot 1333. However,
the Records Management and Archives Office kept an unaltered copy of the Absolute Sale. This other copy
shows that the objects of the sale were Lots 1320 and 2034.
In their Answer, private respondents maintained that they are the legal owners of Lots. Julian purchased the
lots from Filomena in good faith and for a valid consideration. Private respondents explained that Julian was
deaf and dumb and as such, was placed in a disadvantageous position compared to Filomena. Julian had to
rely on the representation of other persons in his business transactions. After the sale, Julian and Consolacion
took possession of the lots. Up to now, the spouses successors-in-interest are in possession of the lots in the
concept owners. Private respondents claimed that the alteration in the Absolute Sale was made by Filomena
to make it conform to the description of the lot in the Absolute Sale. Private respondents filed a counterclaim
with damages.
The trial court ruled that the Absolute Sale is valid. Private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in continuous possession of Lots for nearly 30 years in good faith and with just title. The trial court
gave more credence to the explanation of private respondents as to why the Absolute Sale was altered.
Consolacion noticed that the lot number of the second parcel of and sold to them by Filomena under the
Absolute Sale appeared to be Lot 2034 and not Lot 1333. Together with her husband, Julian, Consolacion
went to Filomena. It was Filomena who erased Lot 2034 in the deed of sale and changed it to Lot 1333.
However, the copies of the document in the custody of the Notary Public were not correspondingly corrected.
Consequently, the copies kept by the Records Management and Archives Office still referred to the second
parcel of land sold as Lot 2034.
Based on its factual findings, the trial court held that private respondents are the legal owners of Lots. The trial
court held that petitioners filed the action in good faith, believing that they were the real owners of the two lots.
The Court of Appeals sustained the factual findings of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the admissibility of the testimony of Consolacion on the ground that it violates the Dead
Mans Statute.
Held: NO. Petitioners contend that Consolacions testimony as to how the alteration of the Absolute Sale took
place should have been disregarded since at the time that Consolacion testified, death had already sealed the
lips of Filomena, precluding petitioners from refuting Consolacions version.
The contention is without basis. The Dead Mans Statute then embodied in Section 20 (a) of Rule 130 of the
1988 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. - The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind;
The foregoing prohibition applies to a case against the administrator or representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person. The present case was not filed against the administrator of
the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate since it was the heirs of Filomena who filed the
complaint against private respondents. Even assuming that Consolacions testimony was within the purview of
the Dead Mans Statute, the fact that the counsel of petitioners failed to timely object to the admissibility of
Consolacions testimony is a waiver of the prohibition.

[MACAVINTA] Cequena v. Bolante, G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000

Facts:
A petition for certiorari was assailed wherein a parcel of land situated in barangay bangad, binangonan,
province of rizal is in dispute.

The land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of the
respondent. But an affidavit shows that the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso was cancelled and
subsequently declared in the name of margarito mendoza. Sinforoso died in 1930.

Petitioners were the daughters of margarito mendoza who was the brother of sinforoso. While respondent is
the present occupant of the land.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners stating that such land in dispute is owned and covered in the name of
Margarito Mendoza who are the petitioners herein based on the affidavit of tax declaration presented.
The CA however reversed the TC because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit had not
been sufficiently established. And that no notary public or any witness was presented in the execution of the
affidavit nor any expert or competent witness attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.

Hence this petition the SC. petition has no permit

Issue: WON th the CA was correct in not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that an
affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand.

Held:
Petitioners dispute the CAs ruling that affidavit was not the best evidence of their fathers ownership of the
disputed land because the affiant was not placed on the witness stand (affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence unless affiants are placed on the witness stand)

The petitioner's allegations are untenable, before a private document offered as authentic can be received as
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. Since the father is already deceased, a
document before being admitted as exceptions to hearsay under the dead mans statute there must be
compliance with the following elements:

a) That the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify

b) That the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant
c) That at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his
interest
d) That circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify

In thisi case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still ALIVE and who testified that the
signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is
available to testify as a witness.

[GO] Goi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27434, September 23, 1986

Facts: TABACALERA owned 3 parcels of land known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria
situated in Bais, Negros Occidental. The late Praxedes T. Villanueva offered to purchase said lots. However,
as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to
sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly
because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty
private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.
Villanueva then contracted or promised to sell to Vicente fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro
Goni. Soon, Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus
went to private respondent Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to sell However, as the
amount of P12,460.24 had already been debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4
and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a
period of five (5) years starting with crop-year 1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of the gross income, said
rent to be deducted from the money advanced by private respondent and any balance owing to Villanueva
would be delivered by Vicente together with the lots at the end of the stipulated period of lease.
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor
of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente after the 1949-
1950 milling season in January and February, 1950.
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted on his properties where Goni
acted as administrator. private respondent Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes
Villanueva. On April 25, 1956, private respondent Vicente amended his complaint anew to include as parties-
defendants the heirs of the late Praxedes Villanueva and damages representing the produce of field no. 3
from 1949-50 until delivery thereof to him.
the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, agreeing, among others, on the costs of production and produce
of the three fields in question. Defendants presented Genaro Goni, who testified on the alleged verbal lease
agreement.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to
execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente, to pay the latter actual or
compensatory damages in the amount of P 81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross income of field no.
3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-59. CA affirmed

Issue: MAY RESPONDENT GASPAR VICENTE TESTIFY ON MATTERS OF FACT OCCURRING BEFORE
THE DEATH OF PRAXEDES T. VILLANUEVA, WHICH CONSTITUTES A CLAIM OR DEMAND UPON HIS
ESTATE. IN VIOLATION OF RULE 123, SEC, 26, PAR. (C), NOW RULE 130, SEC. 20 PAR. (A)

Ruling: Yes, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had
been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs
are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right
by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are
called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased
might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if
living.

Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's
lifetime. It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent
Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for
recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and
13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the
estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in
cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be
confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The contract/promise to
sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva.
He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either
confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The
inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer
has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently
sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goi could and
did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

[GO] Asturias v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17895, September 30, 1963

Facts: In order to pay his debt to the Philippine National Bank, Nicolas Miras, on November 1, 1928, obtained
from the spouses Laureano Asturias and Julia Orozco, a loan of P500.00 at 3% interest per month secured by
a mortgage in a private document of the land in question. Upon failure to pay, Miras, with the request of the
parties. executed a written document of sale with the right of repurchase within seven years covering the
same property for the amount of P830.00. Miras remained in possession of the land, cultivating the portion not
occupied by the coconuts and raising therein other plants. In payment of the interest, the spouses agreed that
Miras can cultivate the coconuts found in the land.
After Laureano Asturias died in 1934, and before the death of his widow, Julia Orozco in 1937, Miras offered
to redeem the property but the latter requested him to postpone the same to a later date as she had not yet
sufficiently benefited from the capital invested, as the price of copra unexpectedly went down after 1930. Upon
Julia Orozco's death in July 1937, Miras made the same offer to redeem the property from petitioners herein,
successors-in-interest of the spouses, who made the same request as their deceased mother, and to which
request Miras once more agreed.
one year after Julia Orozco's death, petitioners discovered the document in the form of a sale, they agreed to
partition the land among themselves. Amparo, Romeo and Apolonia Camilon, children of the deceased
Constancia Asturias, one of the heirs of the creditor spouses, reconveyed to respondent Nicolas Miras their
one-fifth (1/5) portion of the property in question, upon receipt from him of the sum of P210.00, their share of
the credit against Miras.
When the petitioners attempted to enter the property and tried to fence the same, in order to exclude Nicolas
Miras therefrom, the latter filed an action for forcible entry and prevented the petitioners from continuing their
act. In the same year, because of petitioners' continued refusal to have the property redeemed, Miras filed the
present case.
Issue: whether or not the testimony of Miras is admissible as evidence.

Ruling: Yes, The contention that under the rule of survivorship disqualification, the testimony of respondent
Miras is inadmissible to vary the terms of the pacto de retro sale, untenable because, as found by the Court of
Appeals, no timely objection has been made against the admission of such evidence. Furthermore, one of the
petitioners (Fell Asturias) was made to testify on such prohibited matters overed by the exclusion rule (t.s.n.,
May 27, 1953, PP. 65 70-71). In view of this, petitioners are correctly deem to have waived the benefit and
protection of the rule.1
As a consequence, the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after considering and evaluating the
evidence thus properly admitted, that the contract in question is one of a loan with usurious interest and
therefore is null and void, is conclusive upon us and can not be reviewed.

[GO] Fitzsimmons v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. of Manila, G.R. No. L-2016, August 23,
1949
Facts:
Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company of Manila. Under his agreements with the company should he die without having fully paid for the
said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by
returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding number of
the company's shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.
Soon after the Japanese army occupied Manila in January, 1942, it seized and took possession of the office
and all the properties and assets of the appellant corporation and interned all its officials, they being American
citizens.
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, special proceeding was subsequently instituted in the CFI of
Manila for the settlement of his estate.
The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila resumed business operation in March, 1945.
The company claimed the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the
amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of
P63,868.67 from the amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate.
the administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of the deceased to the claimant, expressed his conformity
to the refund of P64,500 by the claimant to the estate and the retransfer by the latter to the former of the 545
shares of stock, and set up a counterclaim of P90,000 for salaries allegedly due the deceased from the
claimant corresponding to the years 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944, at P36,000 per annum.

Issue: whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or
administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person, under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court,

Ruling: The weight of authority sustains appellant's first assignment of error. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of
Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or
stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party
to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person.
It results that the trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of Messrs. Belden and Garmezy. It is not
necessary, however, to remand the case for the purpose of taking the testimony of said witnesses because it
would be merely corroborative, if at all, and in any event what said witnesses would have testified, if permitted,
already appears in the record as hereinabove set forth, and we can consider it together with the testimony of
the chief accountant and the assistant accountant who, according to the appellant itself, were "the only ones
in the best of position to testify on the status of the personal account" of the deceased Fitzsimmons.
We have no reason whatsoever to doubt the good faith of Messrs. Samuel Garmezy and Henry J. Belden,
president and vice-president-treasurer, respectively, of the claimant corporation, in presenting the claim of
P63,000 against the estate of Fitzsimmons, nor the good faith of the administrator Mr. Marcial P. Lichauco in
opposing said claim. They are all men of recognized integrity and of good standing in society. The officers of
the claimant corporation have shown commendable fairness in their dealings with the estate of Fitzsimmons.
They voluntarily informed the administrator that Fitzsimmons had paid P64,500 on account of the purchase
price of 545 shares of stock of the company, and not P45,000 only, as the administrator believed. Likewise,
they voluntarily informed him in connection with his claim for Fitzsimmons' back salaries that Fitzsimmons'
annual salary was P36,000 and not P30,000, as the administrator believed. We can therefore readily assume
that Messrs. Garmezy and Belden believed in good faith that the books of the corporation showed a debit
balance of around P63,000 as of the outbreak of the Pacific war on December 8, 1941.
[GO] Icard v. Masigan, G.R. No. 47442, April 8, 1941

Facts:
For services rendered in connection with the development and location of certain mining claims, Joseph K.
Icard filed a claim of P2,000 against the estate of his deceased father George M. Icard. The claim having been
allowed by the commissioner on claims, the administrator appealed to the Court of First Instance, where it was
likewise allowed. The administrator's appeal to this Court rests mainly on the theory that the probate court
erred in allowing the claimant to testify to the services rendered by him in favor of his father, because the
action being one against the administrator of a deceased person, plaintiff cannot be allowed to testify as to
any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person

Issue: Whether or Not Joseph Icard can be allowed to testify as to any matter of fact which occurred before
the death of such deceased person

Ruling: No, Rule 123, section 26, paragraph (c), of the Rules of Court, is designed to close the lips of the party
plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the
temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. Where, as in the instant
case, the purpose of the oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim than what might be warranted by clear
written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the estate of the deceased, the law has certainly no reason for its
application.
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication

[MACAVINTA] Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., G.R.
No. 204700 (Resolution), November 24, 2014

Facts:
This is for resolution wherein respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management filed a motion for
reconsideration on this court (SC) over its resolution which reversed and set aside the CAs resolution and
ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase agreement (LSPA) including its annexes and
attachments if any, in order that petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same.

This motion for reconsideration raises the following points:

The LSPA is privileged and confidential document

Issue:
WON the LSPA is a privileged and confidential document

Held:
The court held that, the respondents invocation of the LSPA as privileged and confidential is untenable. The
court held that privileged communication under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to
protect a trust relationship. It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of
the foregoing categories present in sec 24 of rule 130 if the Rules of Court.

Further, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of showing that the LSPA is a privileged document. The
respondent failed to present and law or regulation that considers bank documents such as the LSPA as
classified information.

[LINGAHAN] Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from
being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.

Facts:

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation
services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of
manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioners total
outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be
fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a
Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its
previous sale of four items. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the
names and labels of such goods. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright about the
identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of.

Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held between
petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent would return to
petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter from the
respondent, demanding payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of
respondents Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the
ingredients and chemical components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the
petitioners motion.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose
the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner
endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge.

The RTC gave credence to respondents reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court
of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before SC.

Issue:

W/N CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioners motion to subject respondents products to
compulsory disclosure.

Held:

No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure. The
Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial
basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical
composition of its products.

The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized
restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution. SC said that the drafters
of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence
information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as
well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or
process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade
having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to determine if an
information is a trade secret, to wit:

(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employers business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must
not be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and
inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is,
books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not be received in
evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically described, and must
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in the partys
possession, custody or control.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true
that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their
general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to
respondent. Respondents specialized lubricants namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic
Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound are not consumer
products.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondents products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled
that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual findings are generally not
reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.

The revelation of respondents trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case
pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are
defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest
of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests between
the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater
protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily
ascertainable by the public.

a. husband and wife

[LINGAHAN] Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.

The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

[LINGAHAN] Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

Facts:
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil
case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos (Barrientos). In the motion for
Reconsideration filed by the counsel, it was stated that the resolution of the court is "an abhorrent nullity. And
that there is a legal monstrosity on the part of the RTC;that the mistakes are very patent and glaring. Thus, it
was Horrible and Terrible."

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held in contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30
July 2001 motion. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows
beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not
actually or actively participate in this case.

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with
imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way
out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan mo
na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed
the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years with whom she
entrusted her whole life and future.[17] This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba
drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law. An administrative case
was filed against the spouses Jacoba.

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the
suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation,
except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty. Velasco-Jacoba is administratively liable for the signing of the motion which she did not
prepare.
2. Whether or not the marriage privilege rule in evidence applies in this case.

Ruling:
1) There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion.
Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him x x x.
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be
meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal
effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husband's
request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others
pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is
[their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the
number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other. By Velasco-Jacobas own admission,
therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in
itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.

2) The marital privilege rule does not apply in this case. Despite the fact that his name in does not appear in
the 30 July 2001 motion, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife's
account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns and
fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to
its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba
who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba is suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon
finality of this Decision. Likewise, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacobais suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
months.

[LINGAHAN] United States v. Antipolo, G.R. No. L-13109, March 6, 1918

Facts:
1. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of theProvince of Batangas,
charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal.

2. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he wasappealed

3. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trialjudge to permit Susana
Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom theappellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witnesson
behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations.

4. Upon asking question to the witness, the fiscal objected. I object to the testimony of this witness. She has
just testified that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she is not
competent to testify under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the
consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this
witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.

5. Defense: The disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a
husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a
criminal case are the Government and the accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the
witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and
therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage.

6. Objection was sustained.

To this objection counsel took exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which
he expected to establish by her testimony.

Issue: Whether or not the Lower Court erred in excluding the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta.

Held: Yes. The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to
testify on behalf of the defense or the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased
concerning the cause of his death.

Ratio:
A. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither
husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to
which one or both shall be parties.

B. This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of
section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the
marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have
been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.

C. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement
regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense
confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be
communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his
death

D. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him
confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication
made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him.

E. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof
may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement. The wife may testify for the
state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. It can not be contended that the dying
declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the
contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified
to in the prosecution of the defendant.

[MACAVINTA] People v. Carlos, G.R. No. 22948, March 17, 1925

Facts:
This is for the murder of Dr. Pablo Sityar(herein referred to as the deceased) in Mary chiles hospital.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On or before march 3 1924, Dr sityar performed surgical operation on the wife of Fausto V. Carlos (herein
referred to as defendant). This was for pain caused by appendicitis and other certain ailments. After her
release, the wife of the defendant was required to go back to the clinic of the deceased for purposes of
dressing the wounds caused by the operation.

Soon after, the deceased asked for the immediate settlement of the account for the professional service
rendered to the wife of the defendant. Hence on one of the occasions the defendant went to the office of the
deceased and there found him alone. According to the evidence ot he prosecution the defendant without any
preliminary quarrel attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice.

The defendant made his escape but surrendered himself tot eh constabulary at balolos bulacan in the evening
of the following day.

The defendant claims self defense as he was only trying to protect dignity of his wife, as he claims that the
deceased made such statements in an insolent and contemptuous matter that greatly raged the defendant.
This was where the defendant asked the deceased to settle the argument in a fistfight downstairs but the
deceased right then and there took out a pocket knife from the center drawer attacking the defendant and
forcing him out of the office, making his use of his knowledge of FENCING the defendant grabbed the knife
and stabbed the deceased and fearing for retaliation stabbed the him a second time.

The RTC ruled that such act of homicide is qualified by evident premeditation based on a letter found on the
body of the defendant stating that the wife feared that the defendant might contemplate on resorting to
physical violence against the deceased.

The counsel argued vigorously that such letter was privileged communication between husband and wife and
inadmissible in evidence. The RTC however ruled that:
the numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one
spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary
disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if
otherwise competent, becomes admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and authorities there cited.) Such is the view of
the majority of this court.

Issue:
WON letter is protected by privileged communication between husband and wife

Held:
The court answered in the affirmative, the letter must be excluded, the court ruled that the wife who wrote the
letter was not put in the witness stand and was not offered for such purpose.

Second, the letter is nothing but pure hearsay since the defendant did not show any answer or otherwise had
indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter, the fact that the letter is in his possession is no
indication of acquiescence of assent on his part.

Hence with the letter excluded, premeditation is not sufficiently proved hence he is only guilty of simple
homicide.

by and client

[OFALSA]
Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949

FACTS
Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado
Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced
Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal
opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco
opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information was relayed
to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilados story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win
in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however,
when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty.
Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal
documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of
action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter
as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilados case. Atty.
Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed
because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any,
Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in
court for four months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD:
Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty.
Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latters consent. As ruled by the Supreme Court, to
constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established. Section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty
"to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client."
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said
in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to
the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause. We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed.

[OFALSA] Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 108113, September 20, 1996
G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996.
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO
A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996.

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33. Among the defendants named in the case
are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S.
Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations,
with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to
its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said
shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the
ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization
and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.
Respondent Presidential Commission on Good government (PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant. PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco
as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. In its "Comment," respondent PCGG
set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity
of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission
of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.

ISSUE
WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.

HELD
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
The general rule in our jurisdiction is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name
or identity of his client. The general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG
documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed
in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link,
"that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime." It is clear then
that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in
the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose
the identities of their clients.

[PATAWARAN] Saura, Jr. v. Agdeppa, A.C. No. 4426, 4429 (Resolution), February 17, 2000
FACTS: The two (2) complaints are related and arose from the handling of the respondent of a settlement
case involving a piece of property owned in common by the petitioners with their other siblings, Macrina,
Romeo and Amelita, all surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of the said property of the late
Ramon E. Saura who died intestate on May 15, 1992.

Petitioners Ramon Jr., Raymundo and Helen Baldoria discovered that the administrators of the property
(Macrina, Romeo and Amelita) had with the assistance of herein respondent Atty. Agdeppa, and who in fact
notarized the deed of sale, sold the property to Sandalwood Real Estate and Development Corp. without
the knowledge and participation of the petitioners as co-heirs and co-owners of the property.
Petitioners further alleged that despite repeated demands, the vendors and their counsel, Atty. Agdeppa,
refused to disclose the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds.

The case was referred to the IBP by the Supreme Court. However, the return was unserved showing that the
postmasters notation indicated as Unclaimed.

At the scheduled hearing, Atty. Esguerra-Ochoa filed an entry of appearance for the petitioners. There was no
appearance for the respondent. Atty. Ochoa then furnished the court of the respondents new address and
was ordered by the court to deliver the copy of the petition and notice of appearance to the respondents new
address. Atty. Ochoa complied. However, Atty. Agdeppa still refused to comply nor serve an answer.

For her continued defiance, the court imposed a penalty of P10,000 and a suspension of 1 year from the
practice of law in each of the 2 administrative cases pending against her.

Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the petitions should be dismissed because
she was not accorded her right to due process and that she was unable to file her answers in the
administrative charges because the disclosure of the amount of sale is in violation of the attorney-client
privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Agdeppa should be held liable.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Agdeppa is liable. Penalized with a fine of P2,000 to be paid within 10 days. Failure to pay
would result to the penalty of imprisonment of 5 days,

Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:
"SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer
the charges against him, to produce witness in his behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusations, the court may proceed to determine the
matter ex parte."

Since respondent repeatedly ignored the notices sent to her by this Court, we cannot be expected to wait
indefinitely for her answer. While respondent may have changed her address and did not, thus, receive the
previous notices, still, on March 2, 1998, she came to know of the Supreme Court Resolution dated June 19,
1995. The prudent thing for her to do was to file an answer immediately and not to delay the matter any
further. Sadly, the respondent ignored the Resolution of the Supreme Court ordering her to file an answer.
Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity."

The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking for the disclosure of
the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the right to ask for such
information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators of
the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such information to them and hide behind the cloak
of the attorney-client relationship.

[PATAWARAN] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner Joel Sanvicente was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong Chua.
Petitioner fatally shot Chua outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Ave. after the latter allegedly tried to
rob him of a large amount of cash he had just withdrawn from an automatic teller machine.Responding
policemen found the lifeless body of Chua, 5 empty .45 caliber shells and an ATM card in the name of Violeta
Sanvicente.
Subsequently, the police authorities located the petitioners car, a Mercedes Benz and took custody of the
same.

Petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, turned over to the police station the petitioners .45 caliber Mark IV pistol
and wrote a letter to Private Majoy Diaz, the station commander of PNP Station 9 which read as follows:
This is in connection with the alleged death of one Dennis Wong that occurred, in
Katipunan Ave., Q.C., in the afternoon of June 11, 1995.
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above he just
withdrew from the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of
cash. On his way out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him to grab the
money he has just withdrew (sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed
with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot upwards. Still the deceased continued
his attack and grabbed his gun. After a brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot
the deceased in the defense of his person and money. My client will submit a formal
statement during the proper preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my client's car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU 736) was
taken by your operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and [is] now in your
custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and depression
and was advised to undergo medical treatment and confinement at the Delos Santos
Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no objection if you assigned
police escort/guard under your supervision pending his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender,
without admission of guilt on the part of my client.

During arraignment, the petitioner pled NOT GUILTY.

During trial, it was established from the ballistics report that the slugs recovered from the crime and the
cartridge cases fired from petitioners gun were from the same gun. The Medico-legal who conducted the
autopsy failed to appear and in order to dispose with her testimony, the petitioner admitted the due execution
and genuineness of the medico-legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits
including the letter of Atty. Valmonte to P/Major Diaz marked as Exhibit LL.

The prosecution asked Atty. Valmonte to testify regarding the execution and genuineness of the letter but
REFUSED to do so stating that it was within the scope of privileged communication. it would, more
importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.|

Petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and was GRANTED by the trial court. Hence,
the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds of: (1) the lack of positive identification of the
accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal and (2) prosecutions evidence are totally
hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible. The Trial Court DISMISSED the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.

The Prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was DENIED by the trial court on the ground that
double jeopardy has set in. Prompting the prosecution to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
NULLIFIED the order of the trial court. Petitioners Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant
petition.
In reversing the trial courts decision, the CA ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of
Exhibit LL which positively identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the letter marked as Exhibit LL constitutes as a valid confession.
(2) Whether or not Atty. Valmonte may be required to testify.

HELD: (1) NO, the letter cannot be considered as a confession. An admission is defined under Rule 130,
Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A
confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession "is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission
of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact
by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged." In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges
his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.

There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession, because of the
unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt on
the part of my client. . . .

(2) NO, Atty. Valmonte may not be compelled to testify. Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment nor can
an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity; . . .

It cannot be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting
communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business for
which petitioner retained the services of the latter. More specifically, said communication was relayed by
petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in relation to the subject
matter of the employment, or to explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice
his client or manage the litigation.

c. person authorized to practice medicine and patient

[TAN] Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998

Facts:
Petitioners in this case are the siblings of Ricardo Abad who died unmarried and are seeking the settlement of
their brothers intestate estate.
While the case was pending, respondents filed a motion to declare themselves as the heirs of Ricardo,
claiming that the deceased had a common law marriage with their mother, Honoria w/c produced Cecilia and
Marian and another woman w/c produced Rosemarie.
Petitioners argued that they could not have been the children of their brother because the husband of their
mother, Jose Libunao was still alive at the time of their birth and so are Joses legitimate children.
Of the many evidence presented, one was an affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abads physician,
declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that
the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof. This was presented by petitioners.
As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[11] The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment
given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between
the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given
by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the
information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.

Issue: WON the respondents are the children of Ricardo Abad on the basis of the doctors affidavit.

Held:
Yes. The SC held that As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being
privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment
given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between
the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given
by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the
information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently
forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly
blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the
attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the
reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains
inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The privilege of
secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an
established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby
would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a
patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his
name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of
the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the
quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private respondents
overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.

[TAN] Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91114, September 25, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Sim were married until the latter filed for annulment on the ground that petitioner
has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present."
During the trial, respondent presented as a witness Dr. Acampado who had examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Petitioner filed a motion to oppose the testimony claiming that the doctor would divulge privileged
communication pertaining to petitioner w/c was covered by doctor-patient confidentiality.
Respondent said that Dr. Acampado would only be appearing as an expert witness and would not testify on
any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.

Issue: WON Dr. Acampado should be allowed to testify.

Held:
Yes. The SC held after a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampados testimony, We find no declaration
that touched or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the
period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined and
interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview
and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered
an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and had no bearing to whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained from attending the patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert
concerning a patients ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and
make answer solely on facts related in the hypothetical question.
Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question as to cause of illness of a person whom he
has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential
information related to him in his professional capacity while attending to the patient.
The rule on privilege communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the fundamental
assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is
not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be implied according to
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the occasion of the
consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts
necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information given."
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a
privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.

[MACAVINTA] Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

Facts:
On february 6, petitioner josielene filed before the RTC of makati a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent johnny for failure to care for and support his family and that a psyhciatrirst diagnosed
him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.

In his defense, johnny denied the claim and stated that it was josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
the marriage he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly
held him by both arms while another gave him an injection.

The case got worse when josielene was filed with an unrelated criminal case and was only released after such
case ended. It was at that time the marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of subpoena decus
tecum addressed to medical city, covering johnny;s medical recordes when he was confined.

Johnny opposed the motion arguing the medical records were covered by phsycian-patient privilege.

RTC sustained and opposed joseilenes motion

CA affirmed the RTC decision stating that if they were to allow production of medical records, then patients
would be left with no assurance that whatever disclosures they may have made to their psysicians would be
kept confidential.

Issue:
WON the ca erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena ducus tecum
covering johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of
physician-patient communication
Held:
The court ruled that, the physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician
who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation.

The case however presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to admission of evidence, such
as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician's
testimony or an independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patients
health problems. (in short the procurement of the subpeona is made prematurely since the case is only
in pre-trial)

Petition DENIED

[PERENA] Krohn v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108854, June 14, 1994

FACTS:

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and
Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one.
In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort
however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and
signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among
others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying
his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of
due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed
and pronounced "Final and Definite."

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued
an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in
her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."

At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.

Issue: Whether or not Edgar Krohn may be allowed to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report.

HELD:

The Court ruled that Edgar Krohn is allowed to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report.

Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he
was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither
can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the
force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

d. minister or priest and person making the confession

e. public officer

f. Others

Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, December 15, 2000
[PERENA] Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate issued various Senate
Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal.

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and
testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

Issue: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by
executive privilege.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the communications elicited by the 3 questions were covered by executive privilege.

In Chavez v. PCGG, this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v. PEA, there is
also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in
closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is
fully discussed.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

In the cases of Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Here, the record is bereft
of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the
answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same
Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v. Nixon that
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents generalized
interest in confidentiality. However, the present casesdistinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon,
there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due
process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the
reason why the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope of its decision. It stressed that it is not concerned
here with the balance between the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and
congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of
executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the
context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need
to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary
Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in
relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception
only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated
with the peoples right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an
exercise of the peoples right to information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v.
Ermita:

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information
on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory
force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.
These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.

RA 1405, An Act Prohibiting Disclosure Of Or Inquiry Into, Deposits With Any Banking
Institution And Providing Penalty Therefor

[RAMOS] Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco, G.R. No. L-18343, September 30, 1965

Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing
an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

Facts:
Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required
the Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez,
former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under
investigation for unexplained wealth.
PNB refused to disclose his bank deposits, invoking Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405. On the other hand,
the prosecutors cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly Section 8 therewith, to wit:
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of RA 1379, a public
official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other
persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful
income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and
unmarried children of such public official, may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. PNB then filed an action for
declaratory judgment in the CFI of Manila which ruled that Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is
under investigation for unexplained wealth

Held :

Yes. While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are absolutely confidential and
may not be examined, inquired or looked into, , the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank
deposits shall be taken into consideration notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
While No reconciliation is possible between Republic Act No. 1405 and Republic Act No. 3019 as the two laws
are so repugnant to each other. Thus, while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits
are absolutely confidential and, therefore, may not be examined, inquired or looked into, except in those
cases enumerated therein, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-graft law) directs in mandatory terms that
bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary. The only conclusion possible is that Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is
intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against
the disclosure of bank deposits.
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is
enough to point out that while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 declares bank deposits to be absolutely
confidential, it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of
the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject of the litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why
these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as
to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office
is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so
far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

[RAMOS] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima, G.R. No. 56429, May 28,
1988
The inquiry into illegally acquired property or property not legitimately acquired , under the
exception under RA 1405 extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or
recorded in the name of other persons. This proposition is made clear by RA 3019 which quite
categorically states that the term legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee shall
not include property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its
being recorded in the name of, of held by, respondents spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives
or any other persons.

Facts:

The Bureau of Internal Revenue accused Customs special agent Manuel Caturla before the
Tanodbayan of having illegal acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income. During the preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, commanding its representative to appear at a specified time at the Office
of the Tanodbayan and furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records in all its branches and
extension offices of the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking transactions, in the names of
Caturla, his wife, Purita, their children, and/or Pedro Escuyos.

Caturla moved to quash the subpoena for violating Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1405 which was denied by the
Tanodbayan. In fact, the Tanodbayan issued another subpoena which expanded its scope including the
production of bank records not only of the persons enumerated above but of additional persons and entities
as well. The Banco Filipino filed an action for declaratory relief with the CFI of Manila which was denied by the
lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits precludes production by subpoena duces tecum
of bank records of transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and friends of a special agent of the
Bureau of Customs accused before the Tanodbayan of having allegedly acquired property manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and other lawful income in violation of RA 3019.

Held:

The inquiry into illegally acquired property or property not legitimately acquired extends to cases
where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other persons. This proposition
is made clear by RA 3019 which quite categorically states that the term legitimately acquired property of a
public officer or employee shall not include property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its
ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, of held by, respondents spouse, ascendants,
descendants, relatives or any other persons.

In PNB v. Gancayco, we ruled that: while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are
absolutely confidential and, therefore, may not be examined, inquired or looked into, except in those
cases enumerated therein, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-graft law) directs in mandatory terms that
bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary. The only conclusion possible is that Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is
intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against
the disclosure of bank deposits.

To sustain the petitioners theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or in the name of the
government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light of the
provisions of the statutes in question, and would make available to persons in government who illegally
acquire property an easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all they have to do
would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of persons other than their spouse and
unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not ascribe to the lawmakers.

[UY] People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009

Facts: 3 cases (plunder, illegal use of alias and perjury were consolidated in this case against Estrada.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued. An
order for the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of
plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada. At the trial, the People
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder,
illegal use of alias, and perjury. Officers of PCIB declared that Estrada opened an account with them signed
Jose Velarde. The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the
Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution. Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence on the
following grounds,

1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa
Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the
name Jose Velarde;

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be
gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are
banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper
procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

Sandiganbayan had several points on its resolution,

1. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is
described in the Information.
2. the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the offense.
3. The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous
accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that
a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities.

Issue: WON there was insufficiency of evidence presented & if the Ursua Ruling holds value in this case

Held: The Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of
these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to
evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue
of whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these
differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the
leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of
discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on
the application of Ursua.

In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its petition that
Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to
continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition to the name Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias
was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was designed to
cause and did cause confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the
requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use
of the alias was public.

In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now examine within
the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The
prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied
the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.

RA 10365, An Act Further Strengthening The Anti-Money Laundering Law, Amending For
The Purpose Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known As The Anti-Money Laundering Act Of
2001, As Amended
[UY] Pentagon Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174141, June 26, 2009

Facts: The petitioner, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of G.I. wire and nails, employed respondent
Perfecto Balogo (the respondent) since September 1, 1979 in its wire drawing department. Respondent has
been absent from work on Aug 7 2002 without prior notice. Numerous number of letter were sent to the
address of the respondent requiring his explanation for his absence however no respond therefore petitioner
considered him AWOL. A complaint was filed by respondent with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for
underpayment/nonpayment of salaries and wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave, 13th
month pay, separation pay, and ECOLA. He further explained that his absence from work was due to a flu and
diarrhea and when he was gonna go back to work petitioner refused to take him back despite the medical
certificate. (2x bumalik, ayaw pdn ni petitioner) During the conciliation, petitioner required him, however, to
submit himself to the company physician to determine whether he was fit to return to work in accordance with
existing policies. Respondent presented a medical certificate issued by the company physician; according to
the petitioner, the respondent refused to return to work and insisted that he be paid his separation pay. The
petitioner refused the respondents demand for separation pay for lack of basis. Therefore respondent formally
amended his complaint to include his claim of illegal dismissal.

LA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal

NLRC vacated and set aside the ruling of the LA. Petitioners defense of abandonment has no legal basis
since there was no clear intent on the respondents part to sever the employer-employee relationship. The
NLRC found it difficult to accept the petitioners allegation that the respondent absented himself for unknown
reasons; this kind of action is inconsistent with the respondents twenty-three (23) years of service and lack of
derogatory record during these years. As a consequence, the NLRC held that the respondent was illegally
dismissed. MR was denied
CA special civil action certiorari for grave abuse of discretion. CA affirmed the NLRCs finding that the
dismissal was illegal, but modified the challenged decision by adding reinstatement and the payment of full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. CA held that the
respondent was constructively dismissed when the petitioner repeatedly refused to accept the respondent
back to work despite the valid medical reason that justified his absence from work. The CA concluded that the
respondent complied with the petitioners directive to submit a written explanation when the former presented
the medical certificate to explain his absences. Also held that to deny the respondent the benefits due from his
long service with the company would be very harsh since his long service would not be amply compensated
by giving him only separation pay. MR denied.

Issue: Can any of the statement used during the conciliation maybe used as evidence?

Held: No. Based on Art 233 of the Labor Code, Information and statements made at conciliation proceedings
shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission.
Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at
conciliation proceedings conducted by them.
Also in the case of Nissan v. Sec of Labor, the SC pointedly disallowed the award made by the public
respondent Secretary; the award was based on the information NCMB Administrator Olalia secured from the
confidential position given him by the company during conciliation.
Therefore it was said since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to
buy his or her peace without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any
communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged.

Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege

Art. 215, Family Code

[UY] Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010

Facts: Spouses Lee & *Keh entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. This gave
resulted to 11 kids. Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan, supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another
property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. One of the spouses died, Lee-Keh children learned that
Tius children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and
Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate the
matter. This was the NBIs report

It is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much
younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK
SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of
making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family
and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the
father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK
CHENG

By the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age
when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the
respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the RTC of Caloocan City in
Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of
Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers
name. Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. But invoked parental
privilege therefore RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering
that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting
that she was Emma Lees mother. MR denied hence the special civil action. CA rendered a decision, setting
aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying.
The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand
the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do. CA denied Emma Lees MR so she filed
the present petition.

Issue: Can the parental/filial privilege granted be applicable here?

Held: No! But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma
Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants,
a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
Invoking Art 965: The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family
with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. Therefore
she can be compelled to testify.

[UY]People v. Invencion y Soriano, G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003

Facts: Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime
before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia,
and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his
father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. Eddie Sucat also
testified to what Elven had seen. Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of
Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. And out of the
relationship, it bore them 6 kids. One of her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went
to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been
sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia. Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial
Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six
months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could
have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part. Atty. Florencio
Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her mother, complained
before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She then
executed a written statement. The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de
parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. trial court convicted Artemio
in Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence. Hence
this appeal.

Issue: WON Elvens testimony may be admissible and nor violative of parental and filial relationship

Held: No. As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The
rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly
observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth.