Lahom vs.

Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

RA 8552 of 1998 abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the
family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree in this case,
having been initiated by petitioner Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be
pursued. Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would
lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial
court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose
Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree
of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of
Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of
adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was
already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already
abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right
to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right
to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process
that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is
more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for
the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal
of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has
been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
 Bartolome vs. SSS
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

FACTS:
John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the governments Employees Compensation
Program (ECP).
Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS.
However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent of John
as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victims great grandfather, therefore
Bernardina cannot be considered as Johns beneficiary because she is not the deceaseds
legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three
years since the decree of Johns adoption became final.
ISSUE:
Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceaseds dependent parent and, thus,
entitled to the death benefits?
RULING:
YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioners parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by
virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the
adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
seXseXseX
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted
concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents
or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
seXseXseX
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal
or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent.
Thus, the Court rules that Cornelios death at the time of Johns minority resulted in the
restoration of petitioners parental authority over the adopted child.
 Castro vs Gregorio
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

Doctrine under the adoption: The husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The
law, however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or
her spouse.

Doctrine on Jurisdiction: In consideration of the above mentioned doctrine ,personal service of

FACTS: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Joses alleged homosexual tendencies. Their
marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth
due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly
raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larrys two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that
he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was
often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children thats why he
adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of
the TC approving Jed and Reginas adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosarios affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Reginas birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Joses illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . .
should be personally notified of the hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth
certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could not
be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.
ISSUE:

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?
RULING:

YES. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA
8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt
his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But,
the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if they are 10 years old or
older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children
to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it
never validly acquired jurisdiction.
 People vs. Dungo
199 SCRA 860 (1991)

For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that
there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

FACTS: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office
at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a
knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he
departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the accused
Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many documents from him.
Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR.

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense:

Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in deep
thought always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also
times that her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they
were not.

On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine
as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea
followed him to the store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way
home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-
law's house with people milling around. She asked her husband why he did the act, to which
Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill
the deceased in a number of days, I would die. That same day, the accused went to Manila.

Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused
was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on
the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before,
during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated
the accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered
dorm occlusive disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of
medical treatment in their clinic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged.
RULING: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least
discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the
definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In
essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act.
However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable
period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be
known by outward acts.

It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him.
But in the case at hand, the accused was able to. From this, it can be inferred that the accused
was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals.

Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the
nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory examination)
that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane
when he committed the act.

Added Note:

TESTS for INSANITY

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between
sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the
existence of insanity, namely:
delusion test;
irresistible impulse test;
and the right and wrong test

Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which
would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis.
Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no
rational person would believe.

A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has
lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency
being at the time destroyed.
Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted
condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong.