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Gonzalez Vs Encarnacion
Gonzalez Vs Encarnacion
Facts:
On September 6, 1960 Gonzalez filed with the aforesaid court a complaint to
recover from Encarnacion, moral damages in the amount of P25,000 and exemplary or
corrective damages as the court may deem just and proper, allegedly sustained by the
former as a result of the filing by the latter in civil case N-151, a pleading captioned
"Reply and Answer to Counterclaim," containing words and expressions which are
allegedly highly libelous, derogatory and scurrilous to "the personal worth, integrity,
honor and reputation" of Gonzalez, as well as "impertinent, immaterial and irrelevant to
the issues". On September 28, 1960 Encarnacion filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
upon the grounds that (1) it states no cause of action, and (2) venue is improperly laid
and/or the trial court has no jurisdiction. The motion was denied by the Court in its order
of November 10, 1960. On November 21, 1960 Encarnacion moved to reconsider the
order denying his motion to dismiss, insisting on his previous grounds. Meanwhile,
Aquino also asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the very same grounds relied
upon by Encarnacion. Gonzalez takes the position that the venue of his complaint is not
improperly laid because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 1289, effective June 15, 1955, a civil action for damages in cases of written
defamation may be filed in the court of first instance of the province where the offended
party resides. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the complaint should
have been filed in civil case N-151 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite because under
the aforesaid provision of law the court where the criminal or civil action for damages is
first filed acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the venue is improperly laid and/or the trial court has no
jurisdiction.
Held:
No, the venue is not improperly laid. The language of the above quoted provision
is, to our mind, plain and clear. It establishes a general rule and an exception
thereto. Civil actions for damages in cases of written defamation "shall" be filed with
the court of first Instance of the province or city in which "any of the accused or any of
the offended parties resides." In other words, the plaintiff is limited in his choice of
venue to the court of first instance of his residence or to that of any of the accused."
Plaintiff may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated,
displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein, neither the offender nor the
offended party resides in which case the civil and criminal actions may be brought in
the court of first instance thereof." The verb "may" is permissive. Hence it does not
necessarily imply a complete abrogation of the general rule laid down in the preceding
sentence except in so far as it broadens the two (2) alternatives therein set forth, by
giving the plaintiff a third choice of venue.