Election Law
Election Law
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and
one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press,
impairs the peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative
to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on
airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime
limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this
Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration,
an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant
or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding an election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court
may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it,
the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of
RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it
also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even
on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to
RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right
to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it
if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was
conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails
to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall
not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court
is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying
intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers,
which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable
right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of
RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its
duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the
authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence
of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw
from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
September 1991
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
SERENO,J.:
FACTS:
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the
partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and
Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course
to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two
factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed
two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said
party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records
And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting
secretary-general, when she was not even
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she
submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was
Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its
behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the
Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records,
and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys
Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by
special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and
2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the
requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the
COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC
en banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per
curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September 2010.16 Thus,
pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file
the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28
September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly
outside the required period.
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that
the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a
necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election
laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been
settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any
candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of
the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing
his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC
with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing
the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations
Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of
these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent,
which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of
the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list
group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only
an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of
said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the
foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this
resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of
nominees.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-
general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence.
Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of
CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its
Certificate of Nomination.
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on
the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and
the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
46.
47. Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529;
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was
scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the
1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of
the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland
Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists,
commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd
paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who
is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from
his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise
by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
ABAD,J.:
FACTS:
In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won.While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same.In September 2008 he began
occupying the house.
After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election
Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters
registration record to Precinct 0051F ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan Erasmo, Sr.,
respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.After due proceedings, the
ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos opposition.
Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered
voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list
of registered voters in question.The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his
domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor.Jalosjos
appealed his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed
the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for
certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
which was granted. On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and
enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his
name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village voters list pending the
resolution of the petition.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny
due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint
resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.
While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En
Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the
elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.He was
proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.
Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for
reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy
the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred
his residence from that place toBarangayVeteransVillagein Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass
upon the question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he
has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of
that office.
HELD:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without limitation.It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution of
these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins.The Proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos
had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.Thus, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had
as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the
disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus, there then existed no final judgment
deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought.The last standing official action in his case before election day was the
ruling of the COMELEC's Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list.Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his
proclamation pending its final resolution of his case.With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for
the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET
to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of
representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the
elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.Necessarily,
Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC's failure to annul his
proclamation also fail.The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the
Constitution solely on the HRET.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474,REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections En Bancs order dated June 3,
2010, andREINSTATESthe Commissions Second Division resolution dated February
23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr.Further,
the Court DISMISSED the petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of
jurisdiction over the issues they raise.
57. Tanada, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199, October 22, 2013;
Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on
May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the
Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14,
2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not
by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been
testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification
from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation
of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of
Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that
the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was
properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner
was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10
October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to
adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting
booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas
Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court
denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court
has no jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit
involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from
its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the
premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them
from complying with their contract.
RULING:
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.
;
83. Salva v. Makalintal, G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000;
84. Tan v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353;
85. Mandalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012;
G.R. No. 190793 : June 19, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is
common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several
innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in
full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing
violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying
the laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC
En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to
participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means?
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged
participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61
of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility
of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In
exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability,
as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of
this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable.
DISMISSED
86. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010;
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs
field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
87. Phil. Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April
29, 2010;
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No.
190529. April 29, 2010]
03 Oct
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for
reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA
7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became
the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply
cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not
violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration
of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of
notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances
that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare
decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.
88.
89. Cocofed v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013;
90. ANAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013;
91. Coalitions of Associations of Senior Citizenz v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206844-45, July 23, 2013;
92. Abang-Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22,
2013;
93. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6,
2000;
Veterans Fed. Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.
7/15/2010
0 Comments
Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit
in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW,
Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan,
4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total
52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up.
Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be
settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives two for APEC and one each for
the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions
are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the
COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners
the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may
result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress. Our task now, as should have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to
craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.
"MR. MONSOD: but we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and
operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings
of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This
way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. . . ."
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would,
in effect; deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no
party can claim more than what it is entitled to . . ."
In view of the formula for determining additional seats for the first party
The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to
twice the latter's number of seats and so on.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved
in the House of Representatives.
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system
as a fallback position;
2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn
their seats within the system;
7. To ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.
The framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major
disadvantages in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this
inequality through an outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three
terms of the sectoral representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to earn
their seats through participation in the party-list system.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives,
which at present are 52. The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district
representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If in fact all seats reserved
for party-list representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact that the law limits
parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each. To maintain this ratio,
the entire number of seats for the party-list system, after deducting the number of
seats initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's fixation with designating the
highest ranking participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the
majority, assumes that the seats to be allocated to the qualified parties depend on
the seats of the so-called first party.
The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are
not the first ranking party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is
so because, with their votes being proportioned against the votes of the first
ranking party, there will never be an instance where the additional seats of these
parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941, 11 which
contemplates the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the maximum
number of seats allowed by law.
94. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589,
June 26, 2001;
95. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009;
96. Atona Paglaum, Inc., v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013;
97. Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010;
98. ABC v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193,256, March 22, 2011;
99. Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010;
100. De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760;
101. People v. Judge Inting, 187 SCRA 788;
102. COMELEC v. Silva, 286 SCRA 177;
103. People v. Judge Basilio, 179 SCRA 87;
104. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009;
105. Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999;
106. Sambarani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004;
107. Hassan v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 125;
108. Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil. 380;
109. Asistio v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010;
110. Ututalum v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335;
111. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245;
112. Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1;
113. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727;
114. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. no. 191970, April 24, 2012;
115. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013;
116. Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010;
117. Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015;
118. Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001;
119. Cassi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229;
120. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006;
121. Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997;
122. Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514;
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