Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Motion For Temporary Restraining Order
Motion For Temporary Restraining Order
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4 Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) .................22, 23
5 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 3328 (1982) .........................................................6
6 Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974) ..............................................................16
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Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010) ..........................................22
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Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1994) .............................................................21
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Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) ........................12
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11 Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) .....................................................23
13 Columbia River Packers Assn v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942) ..................................................6, 7
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Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co.,
15 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1996) ..........................................................................................8,9, 11
16 Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Wash. Nat. Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................9
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Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Assn, 551 U.S. 177 (2007) .................................................................17
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Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) ............................................................................13
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FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013) ......................................... passim
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21 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) ....................................................................12, 13
22 Golden State Transport Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) .................................18
26 Intl Franchise Assn, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................................5
8 N. Atl. Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1999) .....................................................22
9 NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) ...........................................................15
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NLRB v. Hearst Publns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) ........................................................................15, 18
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NLRB v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) ............................15
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NLRB v. Ins. Agents Intl Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) ..........................................................19, 20
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14 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ..........................................................15
15 NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968) ......................................................15, 16, 18
16 Pac. Aero. & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (E.D. Wash. 2003) .............................22
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Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) ......................................................................................8, 18
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Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) .......................................................................................8, 12
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Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1979).......................................................22
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10 Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................24
12 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) .........................................................5
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STATUTES
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15 U.S.C. 1 ................................................................................................................................6, 9
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29 U.S.C. 152 ........................................................................................................................14, 16
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3 the City) from implementing or enforcing Seattle Ordinance No. 124968 pending final
4 judgment in this case. The Chamber asks the Court to enter this order by April 3, 2017. To
5 maintain the status quo, the Chamber requests that this Court at a minimum temporarily enjoin
6 the Ordinance pending briefing and resolution of this motion. Unless enjoined, on April 3 the
7 Ordinance will require certain Chamber members to disclose the confidential information of for-
9 INTRODUCTION
10 In less than four weeks, the Ordinance will, absent prompt judicial intervention, wreak
11 irreparable harm that threatens the very existence of the for-hire and rideshare transportation
12 system in western Washington through compulsory production of confidential, trade secret
13 information and forced compliance with a novel regulatory scheme that is preempted by federal
14 antitrust and labor law. The Ordinance should be enjoined before it ever goes into effect.
15 For-hire drivers are independent contractors who connect with passengers through a ride-
16 referral service, e.g., a dispatch center or smartphone application (app), provided by a third-
17 party company, known under Seattle law as a driver coordinator. Out of step not only with well-
18 settled principles of antitrust and labor law but also with municipalities around the country, the
19 City attempts to treat these independent contractors as if they were employees of the driver
20 coordinators with whom they contract. Specifically, the Citys one-of-a-kind ordinance
21 authorizes drivers to unionize and collude through collective bargaining over the price terms of
22 their contracts with driver coordinators. The Ordinance turns labor law on its head, treating
23 independent businesses as employees, and flouts antitrust law, allowing independent economic
24 actors to fix prices. As such, the Ordinance is preempted by both the Sherman Act and the
25 National Labor Relations Act.
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2 and Eastside turn overby April 3, 2017their confidential list of contracted drivers (including
3 personal identifying information) so the Teamsters can attempt to unionize these independent
4 contractors. The Chamber satisfies all the criteria for obtaining an order to preserve the status
5 quo while the Court adjudicates the merits. First, the Chamber is likely to succeed on its claims
6 that the Ordinance is preempted by federal antitrust and labor law. Second, Chamber members
7 will suffer irreparable harm by being forced to comply with a preempted law, disclose
8 confidential information, and incur costs and expenses not fully compensable by money damages.
9 Third, the balance of hardships sharply favors the Chamber and its members, especially given the
10 Citys prior successful efforts to block an earlier, unaccelerated adjudication of this controversy.
12 BACKGROUND
15 taxi stands, or a physical dispatch service. Taxicab associations and limousine companies often
16 maintain dispatch centers where riders call to request service that is provided by affiliated drivers.
17 Chamber member Eastside for Hire, Inc. (Eastside) is a traditional dispatch service that
18 contracts with drivers to provide ride-referral services. See Decl. of Bashi Katar 5. The
19 company uses advertising and a client base to generate passenger transportation requests by
20 telephone or email, and refers the requests to drivers using a mobile data terminal. Id. 6. The
22 The smartphone made possible a new type of ride-referral system. Digital ride-referral
23 applications allow a potential rider to communicate her location through a smartphone, and for
24 computer systems to match that rider with an available driver who is nearby. Prominent
25 examples are the Uber App, and the Lyft App, developed by Chamber members Uber
26 Technologies, Inc. (with its subsidiaries, Uber) and Lyft respectively. See Decl. of Brooke
2 (or both) to use the respective App for transportation requests and fare-payment-processing
3 services, in exchange for paying a service fee. Steger Decl. 3, 810; Kelsay Decl. 57. All
4 drivers who use the Uber and Lyft Apps are independent contractors, and neither Uber or Lyft
5 employs drivers or operates commercial vehicles. Steger Decl. 1415; Kelsay Decl. 8, 10.
6 B. The Ordinance
7 Professing concern about the impact on driver earnings of increased competition in the
8 for-hire transportation market, and incorrectly viewing the relationship between driver
9 coordinators and drivers as akin to that of employer and employees, Seattle Council members
10 enacted Ordinance 124968. The Ordinance requires driver coordinators to collectively bargain
11 with for-hire drivers. Ordinance 1(I). A driver coordinator is an entity that hires,
12 contracts with, or partners with for-hire drivers to assist them in providing for-hire services to
13 the public. Ordinance 2. The Ordinance applies only to drivers who contract with a driver
15 independent contractorsand gives them the power to unionize and collectively bargain as if
18 Representative (QDR) to the Citys Director of Finance and Administrative Services (Director).
19 Id. 3(C). Once the Director approves a QDR, any driver coordinator that contracts with 50 or
20 more for-hire drivers in the 30 days prior to the [Ordinances] commencement date must, at the
21 demand of a QDR, disclose within 75 days of the commencement date the names, addresses,
22 email addresses, phone numbers, and driver license numbers of all qualifying drivers they hire,
23 contract with, or partner with. Id. 3(D); Directors Rule FHDR-1, http://bit.ly/2mphh8s. The
24 QDR contacts those drivers, and if a majority consent to the QDRs exclusive representation, the
25 Director must certify it as the Exclusive Driver Representative (EDR) for all drivers for that
26 particular driver coordinator. Id. 3(F)(2). This designation prevents the driver coordinator
3 Once an EDR is certified, the driver coordinator must meet with it to negotiate over
4 various subjects, including the payments to be made by, or withheld from, the driver
5 coordinator to or by the drivers, and minimum hours of work. Id. 3(H)(1). The Director
6 does not participate in the negotiation but merely determines whether to approve any agreement
7 as consistent with City policy. Id. 3(H)(2)(c). If the coordinator and union do not reach
8 agreement, the matter goes to binding arbitration, and the arbitrator submits what he believes is
9 the most fair and reasonable agreement to the Director for approval. Id. 3(I)(1)(4).
10 C. Prior Litigation
11 This Court dismissed without prejudice the Chambers prior suit challenging the
12 Ordinance, accepting the Citys argument that the case was not ripe because no QDR had yet
13 sought designation or demanded driver lists. See No. 2:16-cv-00322, Doc. 63 at 8 (W.D. Wash.
14 Aug. 9, 2016). The Chamber had opposed dismissal in part because, under the Ordinances
15 compressed timetable, waiting until a QDR has demanded driver lists would needlessly force the
16 Chamber to seek injunctive relief on an expedited basis. Id., Tr., Doc. 60, at 12 (Aug. 3, 2016).
19 17, 2017, as the Ordinances commencement date. See Seattle Ordinance No. 118793,
20 http://bit.ly/2jRlaP1. On March 3, 2017, the City designated Teamsters Local 117 as a QDR.
21 The Teamsters notified Uber, Lyft, and Eastside on March 7, 2017, that it intends to become the
22 EDR of all drivers who contract with those companies, and demanded that each company turn
23 over its confidential driver information. Kelsay Decl. 12; Steger Decl. 17; Katar Decl. 12 .
24 These companies keep this information strictly confidential and maintain it as a trade secret.
25 Kelsay Decl. 1317; Steger Decl. 17; Katar Decl. 12.] Uber, Lyft, and Eastside now have
26 until April 3, 2017, to disclose that information to the Teamsters. Ordinance (3)(D).
2 Because it authorizes independent contractors to form unions and fix prices, the
3 Ordinance is preempted by both antitrust and labor laws. If not enjoined, the Ordinance will
4 cause severe and uncompensable injury to the Chambers members. This is therefore a classic
5 case for injunctive relief: a likelihood of success on the merits, coupled with irreparable harm.
7 merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of
8 equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res.
9 Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). These factors interrelate on a sliding scale; if the
10 balance of hardships tips sharply towards the plaintiff (and the other factors are satisfied),
11 an injunction should issue if there are serious questions going to the merits. Alliance for the
12 Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011); accord Intl Franchise Assn, Inc.
13 v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 411 (9th Cir. 2015). The standard for a temporary restraining
14 order is substantially identical. Stuhlbarg Intl Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d
15 832, 389 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). These factors favor granting an injunction here.
19 or authorize private parties to commit per se violation[s] of the Sherman Act. Rice v. Norman
20 Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). The Ordinance does that by authorizing for-hire drivers
21 who are independent contractors to form unions and collectively bargain over the price terms of
22 their contracts with driver coordinators. This is horizontal price-fixinga classic per se antitrust
23 violation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the antitrust laws prohibit
24 independent contractors from forming or joining unions to collectively bargain, and the Federal
25 Trade Commission has consistently maintained that state and local enactments authorizing
3 the antitrust laws if the challenged conduct is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
4 state policy and is actively supervised by the State. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc.,
5 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (2013). But the Ordinance satisfies neither condition, because state law
6 nowhere expresses a policy of permitting collective bargaining by for-hire drivers, and no state
7 official (nor even any City official) actively supervises the collective-bargaining process.
10 of trade or commerce among the several States. 15 U.S.C. 1. Certain collusive practices are
11 condemned as per se violations, which means that they are unlawful on their face, without the
12 need for a factfinder to decide whether they are reasonable under the circumstances. Ariz. v.
13 Maricopa Cty. Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 34248 (1982). Foremost in the category of per se
15 establish the price to be paid for a good or a service. Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
16 232 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2000). And when a per se violation occurs, there is no need to
17 define a relevant market or to show that the defendants had power within the market. Id.
19 to join or form unions to collectively bargain with companies over prices for goods and services.
20 For example, independent grease peddlers violated the Sherman Act by joining a union and
21 collectively bargaining over the price at which they would resell restaurant grease to grease
22 processors. See L.A. Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 9698
23 (1962). Independent fishermen violated the Sherman Act by forming a union and collectively
24 bargaining about the terms and conditions under which they would sell fish to processors and
25 canneries. See Columbia River Packers Assn v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 14446 (1942). And
26 independent stitching contractors violated the Sherman Act by forming a union and
2 States v. Womens Sportswear Mfrs. Assn, 336 U.S. 460, 46364 (1949).
4 measures similar to the Ordinance on the grounds that collective bargaining over prices
5 amounts to per se illegal price fixing. Letter to Wash. H. Rep. Brad Benson 5 (Feb. 8, 2002),
6 http://bit.ly/2lsuMQP. For instance, the FTC concluded that Washington State legislation
7 authorizing physicians to collectively bargain with health insurers would permit precisely the
8 sort of conduct that is a per se antitrust violation: horizontal price fixing. Id. at 2. The FTC
9 reaffirmed this position when it opposed an Ohio bill allowing home health-care providers to
10 collectively bargain over insurance reimbursements. Letter to Ohio H. Rep. Dennis Stapleton 7
11 (Oct. 16, 2002), http://bit.ly/2lsvRrT. And the FTC has reiterated this in congressional testimony.
13 The Ordinance undeniably authorizes per se illegal conduct. It allows for-hire drivers
14 who are independent contractors to join together in a union (the EDR) and, through the union, to
15 agree with one another on, and collectively bargain over, the price terms of their contracts with
16 the driver coordinators. Ordinance 3(H)(1). Like the illegal grease peddlers union in Los
17 Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union, the illegal fishermens union in Columbia River
18 Packers Assn, the illegal stitchers union in Womens Sportswear, and the physicians and
19 home-health-care workers unions condemned by the FTC, this collective bargaining over
23 458 U.S. at 661, unless the City demonstrates that the conduct at issue is entitled to state-action
24 1
Because the antitrust laws apply to price fixing by sellers and buyers, Knevelbaard
25 Dairies, 232 F.3d at 986, it is per se illegal price fixing whether characterized as an agreement
over the price drivers pay coordinators to use a ride-referral service (see Steger Decl. 3; Guled
26 Decl. 4), or the price coordinators pay drivers to provide driving services.
2 imprimatur of state action fails. Under the state-action doctrine, States are immune from
3 antitrust liability when acting in their sovereign capacity. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
4 (1943). In contrast, non-state actors carrying out a States regulatory program may claim state-
5 action immunity only by satisfying a rigorous two-pronged test. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S.
6 94, 100 (1988). Their challenged conduct is immune only if it is both (1) clearly articulated and
7 affirmatively expressed as state policy, and (2) actively supervised by the State. Phoebe
8 Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1010. These requirements must be narrowly applied, for state-action
9 immunity is disfavored. Id. (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)). If
10 the otherwise unlawful conduct the Ordinance authorizes fails to satisfy either of these
14 expressed, the City must demonstrate that the state explicitly authorized the specific conduct in
15 question. See Columbia Steel Casting Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1441 (9th
16 Cir. 1996). A mere inference that the state intended to approve the conduct is insufficient;
17 there must be a forthright and clear statement. Id. at 1439. Moreover, state-law authority to
18 act is [alone] insufficient to establish state-action immunity; the City must also show that an
19 anticompetitive effect was the foreseeable result of what the State authorized the
20 municipality to do. Phoebe Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 101112; see also Columbia Steel, 111 F.3d at
21 1444. A particular anticompetitive effect is not foreseeable unless the State affirmatively
22 contemplated that the municipality would displace competition in a specific way, Phoebe
23 Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1011, and contemplated the kind of actions alleged to be anticompetitive,
24 Springs Ambulance Serv. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 745 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1984). These
25 standards must be rigorously applied because a broad interpretation of the doctrine may
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2 sanction. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Wash. Nat. Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 1996).
3 In Phoebe Putney, for example, the Supreme Court considered whether a state statute
4 clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy allowing a municipal hospital
5 authority to acquire a private competitor in a transaction that would violate the antitrust laws.
6 The statute at issue authorized the municipal hospital authority to exercise a broad range of
7 powers, including the express power to acquire other hospitals. 133 S. Ct. at 100708
8 (quotations and brackets omitted). Even this was insufficient to authorize the merger, the Court
9 unanimously concluded, because although the statute authorized hospital acquisitions generally,
10 it did not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a specific policy of allowing acquisitions
11 that will substantially lessen competition. Id. at 1012. And in Columbia Steel, the Ninth
12 Circuit held that a state agencys order approving an exchange of facilities by two electric
13 utilities to eliminate duplication within given service areas did not immunize the utilities from
14 claims that the utilities had unlawfully divided the market, because, even though the exchange
15 may have been as a practical matter, the factual equivalent of an allocation of exclusive service
16 territories, the order did not specifically and clearly authorize . . . a division of the . . . market
17 into exclusively served territories. 111 F.3d at 1441 (quotations and brackets omitted).
18 ii. Here, as in Phoebe Putney and Columbia Steel, the general authorizations of
19 Washington state law fall far short of expressly authorizing the challenged conduct or
20 affirmatively contemplating that the City would displace competition in the specific manner that
21 it did. No provision of state law even arguably authorizes municipalities to regulate the nature
22 and amount of payments between for-hire drivers and driver coordinators, Ordinance 3(H)(1),
23 let alone to permit those payments to be set through a per se anticompetitive collective-
24 bargaining process. Indeed, the Washington statutory provisions cited in the Ordinance, see
25 Ordinance 1, do not even mention driver coordinators or collective bargaining, but instead
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3 For example, the statute grants municipalities the power to control[] the rates charged
4 and the manner in which rates are calculated and collected. RCW 46.72.160(3). But this
5 refers to the rates or fares that drivers charge to passengers, not to any payments between drivers
6 and driver coordinators. And it certainly says nothing about fixing prices through collective
8 requirements, and [a]ny other requirements adopted to ensure safe and reliable for hire vehicle
9 transportation service. RCW 46.72.160(5), (6). Again, these provisions apply to transportation
10 providers, not ride-referral companies, and they say nothing about either collective bargaining or
12 The statutory provision expressing the intent of the legislature to permit political
13 subdivisions of the state to regulate for hire transportation services without liability under federal
14 antitrust laws (RCW 46.72.001) does not alter this result. This statement appears in the
15 statutes prefatory Finding and intent provision, and thus demonstrates only that the State
16 contemplated antitrust immunity to the extent that municipalities enact the sorts of regulations
17 specifically enumerated in the statutes operative provision, RCW 46.72.160. Thus, this
20 plainly insufficient to immunize the Citys delegation to private drivers the power to fix the price
23 conduct pursuant to a regulatory structure[] does not establish that the State has affirmatively
24 contemplated other forms of anticompetitive conduct that are only tangentially related. Phoebe
25 Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1016; see also Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance Auth., 843 F. 2d 1187,
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3 iii. Defendants cannot save the Ordinance by referring to language in its preamble
4 and findings stating that the Ordinance is within the Citys power to ensure safe and reliable for
5 hire vehicle transportation services because the City assumes drivers who secure better payment
6 terms from driver coordinators will be more satisfied with their economic situations and hence
7 likelier to provide safer and more reliable service. The Citys rationale makes no sense. For
8 immunity to apply, the state legislature must have made a forthright and clear statement
9 authorizing the conduct, Columbia Steel, 111 F.3d at 1439, and must have affirmatively
10 contemplated the kind of actions alleged to be anticompetitive, Springs Ambulance, 745 F.2d
11 at 1273. The Citys transparent end-run around the clear articulation requirement fails because
12 a clear statement is entirely lacking, and because the legislature could hardly have contemplated
13 that its authorization to regulate safety and reliability would be used to regulate payments
14 between drivers and driver coordinators, let alone to delegate to drivers the power to fix the
15 prices of those payments through anticompetitive collective bargaining. If, as in Phoebe Putney,
16 the power to acquire hospitals does not include the power to acquire hospitals anticompetitively,
17 then the power to regulate safety and reliability certainly does not include the power to authorize
19 The FTC has consistently rejected, in similar contexts, efforts to disguise collective
20 bargaining regimes as safety regulations. As the agency explained in testimony before Congress,
21 collective bargaining cannot solve issues regarding the ultimate safety or quality of products or
22 services that consumers receive. Testimony of David Wales, at 8 (Oct. 18, 2007),
23 http://bit.ly/2m9Pady . We do not, for example, rely on [unions] to bargain for safer, more
24 reliable, or more fuel-efficient cars. Id. Rather, [c]ollective bargaining rights are designed to
25 raise the incomes and improve the working conditions of union members, not to ensure the
2 enabling them to form drivers unions and bargain for wages like employees. The state
3 legislature plainly did not affirmatively contemplate such a sea change merely by authorizing
4 municipalities to ensure safe and reliable transportation service. Just as Congress does not
5 hide elephants in mouseholes, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), the
10 anticompetitive program; rather, it must be implemented in its specific details by the State.
11 Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 633. Actual state involvement, not deference to private price-fixing
12 arrangements . . . is the precondition for immunity. Id. This requirement ensures that the State
13 has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices
14 have been established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement
15 among private parties. Id. at 63435. The ultimate question is whether the anticompetitive
16 prices come from private parties or are instead of the States own devising. Id. at 635.
17 Under the Ordinance, collective bargaining is a private process; the Directors only role is
18 to approve or disapprove an agreement submitted to him after the parties (or an arbitrator) have
19 agreed to terms. Supra p. 4. This rubber-stamp review is not active supervision by the State.
20 As an initial matter, the Director is not a state official; he is a municipal one. But where
21 state or municipal regulation [of] a private party is involved . . . active state supervision must be
22 shown. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985) (emphasis added);
23 see also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (the active supervision requirement mandates that the State
24 exercise ultimate control (emphasis added)); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal
25 Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (the policy must be actively supervised by the State
26 itself). Municipalities are not substitutes for States and cannot simply step into the shoes of the
2 because they are not themselves sovereign. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38. The absence of any
4 Even if a municipal official can fulfill the state-supervision requirement, the Directors
5 role under the ordinance is insufficient because he does not participate in collective bargaining
6 itself. He has only a veto power, and no independent authority to specify the terms of a
8 in the mechanics of the anticompetitive price fixing scheme, Ticor, 504 U.S. at 633, and the
9 arrangement cannot be considered the States own, id. at 635. State-action immunity therefore
10 cannot shield the Defendants collective-bargaining regime from scrutiny under the Sherman Act,
12 a gauzy cloak of state involvement. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 269 (1986).
15 collectively with their employer and proscribes as unfair labor practices certain activities by both
16 employers and labor organizations. See 29 U.S.C. 157, 158. The NLRA preempts the
18 independent contractorsthat the statute leaves unregulated and subject to the free play of
19 economic forces, Machinists v. Wis. Empt Relations Commn, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)
20 (Machinists preemption), and, second, by impermissibly injecting local officials and state
21 courts into mattersdetermining whether for-hire drivers are employees under the NLRA
22 that are subject to the NLRBs exclusive jurisdiction, see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
24
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25 Some courts have assumed that municipal supervision of private parties is sufficient, but
the issue was not squarely raised or decided in those cases. See, e.g., Tom Hudson & Assocs.,
26 Inc. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1984).
2 Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). These rationales do not apply to independent contractors,
3 who do not depend on an employer for a daily wage. Instead, independent contractors boast the
5 Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2008). They are free to work or not work . . .
6 when they choose; they may moonlight by working for other [companies]; [and] they are free
7 to make their own arrangements with clients and to develop their own goodwill. Id. (quotations
8 omitted). They enjoy the opportunity for profit and related upsides of a successful business, but
9 they also bear the risk of loss if the venture fails to thrive as planned. Id. Collective-bargaining
10 schemes designed to protect economically dependent employees and guarantee stability do not
14 Congress meant to exclude independent contractors from both federal and state collective-
15 bargaining regimes. As originally enacted in 1935, the NLRA (also known as the Wagner Act)
16 did not expressly exclude independent contractors from its list of covered employees. See
17 NLRB v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 17778 (1981). The
18 Supreme Court broadly interpreted the term employee, holding that newsboys qualified even
19 thought they would likely be independent contractors under common-law standards. NLRB v.
20 Hearst Publns, 322 U.S. 111, 120, 13031 (1944). The mischief at which the Act [was] aimed,
21 the Court reasoned, was not confined exclusively to employees within the traditional legal
23 Congressional reaction to this construction of the Act was adverse. NLRB v. United Ins.
24 Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No.
25 80101, 61 Stat. 136, which amended the NLRA to specifically exclud[e] any individual
26 having the status of an independent contractor from the Acts definition of employee.
2 been a difference, and a big difference, between employees and independent contractors:
7 independent contractors are the reason Congress excluded independent contractors from the
8 NLRAs coverage. Because Congress intended independent contractors to remain free from the
10 collective-bargaining regime. Id. This legislative history confirms that Congress never intended
12 rather, Congress intended that independent contractors remain free to operate as entrepreneurs,
14 The NLRAs exemption for any individual employed as a supervisor reinforces this
15 conclusion. 29 U.S.C. 152(3). The Supreme Court has interpreted the supervisor exemption
16 broadly to preempt state labor laws relating to supervisors, and a collective-bargaining scheme
17 for supervisors would clearly be preempted. Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653,
18 662 (1974). Congress exempted both supervisors and independent contractors at the same time
19 in the Taft Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 13637, 29 U.S.C. 152(3), and the two parallel exemptions
20 should be read in pari materia and interpreted to have the same scope. United States v.
21 Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138 n.11 (1985). Not only were the exemptions
22 enacted together, but Congresss reasoning for exempting supervisors applies with greater force
23 to independent contractors: they have demonstrated their ability to take care of themselves
24 without depending upon the pressure of collective action and have abandoned the collective
25 security of the rank and file voluntarily, because they believed the opportunities thus opened to
26 them to be more valuable than the benefits of employment. H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 17.
2 whom Congress excluded from the NLRAs definition of employee: public employees,
3 agricultural workers, and domestic workers. Unlike independent contractors, these groups are
4 traditional employees, but were excluded from the Acts coverage when the NLRA was first
5 enacted, 49 Stat. 450, for very different reasons than independent contractors were later excluded.
6 The decision not to regulate the relationships between state and local governments and their
7 employees respects principles of federalism and otherwise reflects a sound congressional choice
8 to refrain from inserting the federal government between a state or local government and its
9 employees. See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Assn, 551 U.S. 177, 181 (2007) (The [NLRA]
10 leaves States free to regulate their labor relationships with their public employees.). And
11 Congress was simply indifferent about agricultural workers and domestic employees, excluding
12 them because the NLRA was meant to cover only those disputes which are of a certain
13 magnitude and which affect commerce. S. Rep. No. 79-1184, at 3 (1934). Unlike independent
14 contractors or supervisors, there is no indication that Congress intended to create national labor
15 policy for these groups, and states remain free to apply their own views of proper public policy
16 to the collective bargaining process insofar as it is subject to their jurisdiction. United Farm
17 Workers of Am. v. Ariz. Agric. Empt Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982).
18 By contrast, Congress voiced significant concerns when the Supreme Court interpreted
19 the NLRA to include independent contractors, because they are fundamentally different from
20 employees. Unlike employees, they do not work under the control of others; they work for
21 themselves and, indeed, may be deemed employers under the NLRA. See The Developing Labor
22 Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act, 6th Edition, p. 2441,
23 Bloomberg BNA (database updated 2015) (Although independent contractors are not covered
24 by the Act as employees, they are covered as employers when they fall within the definition of
25 employer contained in Section 2(2).). Their contractual arrangements have traditionally been
26 governed by market forces, and by excluding them from the NLRA, Congress intended for those
3 contractor relationships, which the NLRA leaves unregulated, the Ordinance is preempted.
4 If the City implements and enforces the Ordinance, other local governments may also
7 enacting the NLRA to leave these relationships unregulated. See Brown, 554 U.S. at 7374;
8 Golden State Trans. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 (1986); Machinists, 427 U.S.
9 at 139. Doing so would be particularly chaotic for Chamber members who operate across the
10 country, but would be problematic even for those operating in a more restricted geographic area,
11 who may be forced to follow different rules in Seattle than Tacoma. The NLRA was enacted to
12 eliminate, rather than impose, such significant burdens on commerce. See Brown, 554 U.S. at 76
13 (Congress, unlike the states, can create exceptions to federal policy in a manner that preserves
14 national uniformity without opening the door to a 50-state patchwork of inconsistent labor
15 policies); Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242 (Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy
16 for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency); Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123 (The [NLRA] is
18 national scale.), abrogated in part on other grounds by United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254.
19 Finally, the sheer novelty of the Citys attempt to regulate independent contractors should
20 raise red flags. Plaintiff is unaware of any other state or local law authorizing independent
21 contractors to collectively bargain; the Citys theory is unprecedented. Given the many decades
22 of union efforts to organize various types of workplaces, including multiple efforts to claim that
24 unions have inexplicably ignored for decades a prime opportunity to expand their membership.
25 Cf. Util. Air Regulatory Gr. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (When an agency claims to
2 The Ordinances interest-arbitration provision also conflicts with the NLRA in another,
3 independent way. By requiring the parties to submit to arbitration, the Ordinance restricts each
4 sides use of traditional tools of economic leverage. See Ordinance, 3(I); see also id. 3(K)
5 (prohibiting driver coordinators from taking certain measures in response to driver actions).
6 These requirements directly conflict with the NLRA, which states that a partys obligation to
7 bargain in good faith does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
8 of a concession. 29 U.S.C. 158(d). It also conflicts with the recognition that [t]he presence
9 of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and
10 parcel of the system that the [NLRA] [has] recognized. Ins. Agents Intl Union, 361 U.S. at
11 489. To sanction state regulation of such economic pressure deemed by the federal Act
12 desirably left for the free play of contending economic forces, is not merely to fill a gap by
13 outlawing what federal law fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an economic contest a
14 weapon that Congress meant him to have available. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 150. Accordingly,
19 the National Labor Relations Board. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236. Congress has entrusted
20 administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed
21 with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative
22 experience. Id. at 242. In granting the NLRB primary jurisdiction, Congress evidently
24 obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts
25 likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies. Id.
26 at 24243. Garmon preemption is intended to preclude state interference with the [NLRBs]
2 NLRA. Idaho Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Inland Pac. Chapter of Associated
3 Builders & Contractors, Inc., 801 F.3d 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2015).
4 Here, the Ordinance is preempted because it requires local officials and state courts to
5 decide whether for-hire drivers are employees under the NLRA. See Marine Engrs Beneficial
6 Assn v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 17785 (1962) (NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over
7 whether individuals are supervisors or employees); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261,
8 1274 (9th Cir. 1994) (question of whether workers are agricultural laborers or employees
9 preempted). The Ordinance does not apply to employees; it applies only to independent
10 contractors. See Ordinance 6. To decide whether a driver coordinator has complied with the
11 Ordinances provisions, the Director must decide whether the drivers at issue are employees
12 exempt from the Ordinances coverage, or whether they are independent contractors within its
13 scope. See 6; 3(M). As the Directors determination is subject to judicial review in the state
14 courts, id. 3(M), those courts ultimately will be required to decide whether for-hire drivers are
16 The NLRB has not resolved the employee status of for-hire drivers, and that issue is
17 currently pending before the NLRB. See Steger Decl. 14; Kelsay Decl. 8. The Ordinance is
18 therefore preempted because it injects municipal officials and state courts into matters subject to
19 the NLRBs exclusive jurisdiction before the NLRB has resolved the question. See Marine
20 Engrs Beneficial Assn, 370 U.S. at 185 (The need for protecting the exclusivity of NLRB
21 jurisdiction is obviously greatest when the precise issue brought before a court is in the process
22 of litigation through procedures originating in the Board. While the Boards decision is not the
24 3
The Ordinance is also preempted by the Washington Public Records Act,
25 RCW 19.56.070(1), which prohibits disclosure of public records containing trade secrets,
because the Citys use of the driver lists as public records to implement its Ordinance conflicts
26 with the purpose of the statute.
4 irreparable injury. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 114445 (9th Cir. 2013). The
5 government thus causes irreparable injury when it subjects a business to regulations which are
6 likely unconstitutional because they are preempted. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v. City of Los
10 otherwise, constitutes irreparable harm because, once disclosed, the status quo can never be
11 restored. N. Atl. Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1999). As this Court has
12 explained, a threat to disclose confidential information will almost always certainly show
13 irreparable harm. Pac. Aero. & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (E.D. Wash.
14 2003). Relief is therefore routinely granted to prevent such disclosure. See, e.g., HHS v. Alley,
15 556 U.S. 1149 (2009) (FOIA disclosure); Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102
16 (3d Cir. 2010) (trade secret). The Chambers members maintain the confidentiality of their
17 driver information, and disclosure threatens grave harm to their businesses. Kelsay Decl. 13
18 17; Steger Decl. 17; Takar Decl. 12. As Lyft has explained, if driver data were disclosed,
19 competitors could and would seek to undermine Lyfts business relationships with its drivers,
20 and would use the information to gain competitive insight into the strategy and efficacy of
21 Lyfts marketing activity, tactical growth, and long-term strategic plans. Kelsay Decl. 15.
22 And even if the Teamsters attempts to keep this information secure, its possession increases the
23 risk of accidental disclosure, intentional misuse by employees, and hacking by outside groups,
24 especially given that it is seeking driver information from every driver coordinator in Seattle.
25 Third, disclosure of the driver lists triggers the union election process, during which the
26 Teamsters will attempt to unionize drivers in violation of federal antitrust and labor law. As a
2 spend resources educating drivers about the consequences of voting for union representation
3 resources that cannot be recovered through a damages action. Steger Decl. 20. If disclosure
4 occurs, the unlawful election process is certain to occur, and certain to cause irreparable harm.
5 Fourth, Chamber members are incurring substantial and growing compliance costs.
6 Kelsay Decl. 1820; Steger Decl. 1820. These costs defy precise measurement and will be
7 unrecoverable from the City through compensatory damages. Fifth, forced compliance with the
8 Ordinance will threaten the very existence of Chamber members in Washington by disrupt[ing]
9 and change[ing] the business of driver coordinators in ways that most likely cannot be
10 compensated with damages. Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1058. Uber and Lyft have created an
11 innovative business model that depends on partnering with independent contractors. The
12 Ordinance will severely disrupt the relationship between Chamber members and independent
13 contractor partners, impacting driver retention, rider service, safety, and reputation, and requiring
14 seismic changes to the businesses that the business models may fail to withstand.
17 harms. The government cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful
18 practice. Rodriquez, 715 F.3d at 1145. And, in any event, the City faces no economic harm
19 from an injunction: far from causing the City to restructure its organization, an injunction will
20 merely require the city to delay implementation of the Ordinance pending resolution of this suit.
21 In fact, an injunction will benefit the City by saving it from expending resources on
22 implementing a law that will likely be struck down. Further, the basic function of a preliminary
23 injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits.
24 Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988). While the City seeks to
25 upend the status quo by implementing the Ordinance and altering the labor relationships of the
26 Chambers members, the Chamber merely seeks to preserve the status quo, a fact that
2 given the Citys prior successful efforts to foreclose earlier judicial consideration.
5 preventing the state from violating federal law, see Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006,
6 1029 (9th Cir. 2013), and in preventing the violation of a partys constitutional rights, see
7 Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, there plainly is no public
9 implementation for six to eight months, see Ordinance 3, and the City delayed it even further.
10 Also, collective bargaining will likely increase the costs of business for driver coordinators,
11 which could cause those businesses to contract with fewer drivers, resulting in fewer jobs. The
12 Ordinance may also force many drivers to unionize against their will because the City has strictly
13 limited those who can vote for a QDR, while requiring all drivers to be represented by an elected
14 EDR and abide by the contract it negotiates. Ordinance 3(F)(2). Ultimately, the
15 implementation of the Ordinance threatens the ability of driver coordinators to operate in Seattle
16 and western Washington, eliminating the extensive public benefits brought by these companies.
19 going to the merits, rather than a likelihood of success on the merits, is sufficient to warrant
20 relief. See Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. Here, the balance of hardships does tilt sharply in
21 the Chambers favor, see supra Part III, and there are, at a minimum, serious questions going to
22 the merits, see supra Part I. The Chamber is therefore entitled to preliminary relief.
23 CONCLUSION
24 The Court should grant the Chambers motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction.
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