Professional Documents
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Civil Procedure Case Digests
Civil Procedure Case Digests
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION HGC filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition imputing grave abuse of discretion
Vs. against the RTC for not dismissing the case and for granting R-II Builders application for receivership.
R-II BUILDERS INC., and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY Petition denied and HGCs MFR was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
G.R. No. 192649 March 9, 2011 Issues
1 WON RTC a quo had jurisdiction to proceed with the case. (NO jurisdiction)
2 (TOPICAL) WON the admitting of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint is
Amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the proper. (NO)
purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the
case yet to properly attach, CA erred in upholding respondent RTCs admission of respondents R-II Ruling : 1. A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing
Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original and docket fees. R-II Builders original complaint was initially docketed before RTC Manila Br. 24, a
complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment designated Special Commercial Court. With HGCs filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the
thereof affirmative defenses asserted in its answer and R-II Builders filing of its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, said court issued an order ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the finding that the same
Facts: is not an intra-corporate dispute. With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, RTC Manila
March 19, 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents NHA Br. 24 should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter
and R-II Builders for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.
Project (SMDRP) which was amended and restated after 11 months. 11 August 1994, JVA was aimed At the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already acted on the case and had in
at implementing a 2-phase conversion of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into a habitable housing fact issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point,
project inclusive of the reclamation of the area across Radial Road 10 (R-10) R-II Builders, as there was absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order
developer, was entitled to own 79 hectares of reclaimed land and the 2.3 hectare commercial area at that was supposed to have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of
the Smokey Mountain. NHA, as landowner/implementing agency, was entitled to own the 2,992 absence of jurisdiction. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same
temporary housing units agreed to be built in the premises, the cleared and fenced incinerator site subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the
consisting of 5 hectares, 3,520 units of permanent housing to be awarded to qualified on site other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.
residents, the industrial area consisting of 3.2 hectares and the open spaces, roads and facilities The jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the
within the Smokey Mountain Area. regular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct
September 26, 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty docket fees. Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its
Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the PNB as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust continuing stake is, in the first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or
Agreement which provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project. January 29, 2001, transfer of possession of the same properties sought in the original complaint and Amended and
subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300M into the project, the issuance of the SMPPCs and the Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for which appropriate docket fees computed on
termination of PNBs services, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution of Planters the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid.
Development Bank (PDB) as trustee. October 24, 2002, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that
maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack matter, its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order,
of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call it stands to reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach.
on HGCs guaranty and to execute in the latters favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of
the entire Asset Pool. 2. Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored
RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders. In the meantime, HGC, and liberally allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no
having filed its answer to the complaint, went on before the SC to move for the conduct of a jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction
preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, CA erred in upholding
improper venue and the then pendency entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, et respondent RTCs admission of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the
al., a case which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and its subsequent docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear
amendments. R-II Builders filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which intent to evade payment thereof.
deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. Manila RTC
Branch 24 issued a clarificatory order holding that R-II Builders complaint was an ordinary civil action In view of respondent RTCs non-acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, it clearly had no
and not an intra-corporate controversy and that it did not have the authority to hear the case. authority to grant the receivership sought by R-II Builders. It needs pointing out though that the
Undaunted, HGC filed its MFR of the foregoing order, arguing that: (a) the case is real action prayer for receivership clearly indicates that the R-II Builders sought the transfer of possession of
and the docket fees paid by R-II Builders were grossly insufficient because the estimated value of property consisting of the assets of the JVA from HGC to the formers named Receiver. As already
properties in the Asset Pool exceeds P5B; (b) a complaint cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction noted, said transfer of possession was sought by respondent R-II Builders since the very start, overtly
when the court had none; (c) the RTC should have simply denied the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for at the first two attempts, covertly in the last, the successive amendments betraying the deft
Annotation of Lis Pendens instead of rendering an advisory opinion thereon. R-II Builders opposed the maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees.
foregoing motion and on the theory that the Asset Pool was still in danger of dissipation, filed an
urgent motion to resolve its application for the appointment of a receiver and submitted its nominees CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Branch 22s & 24s Orders are NULLIFIED.
for said position. Respondent RTC issued its second assailed order which (a) denied HGCs motion for The complaint of R-II Builders first before Br. 24 and thereafter before Br. 22 both of the RTC Manila is
reconsideration; (b) granted R-II Builders application for appointment of receiver and, for said DISMISSED.
purpose: appointed Atty. Danilo Concepcion as Receiver and, directed R-II Builders to post a bond in
the sum of P10M. 4. INRE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF
LEGAL FEES
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
February 11, 2010 This case stemmed from the filing of a petition for nullity of marriage by the Respondent
against the Petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The former upon knowing that the
FACTS: latter was already a resident of Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he nevertheless alleged in
his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where she may be served with summons. Comes now the
controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court, which provides issuance of summons by the clerk of court at the address stated in the petition which was served by
that the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the the sheriff together with the said petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995. The said summons
legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled as well as the petition was received by the petitioner through her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III
corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. However, the petitioner failed to file and answer to the
said petition, thus, the respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default which
The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997), providing was granted by the court upon failure of the Petitioner to appear during the hearing of the said
for the exemption of GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. motion. Because of that, the respondent was allowed to testify and adduced evidence in his behalf.
Thereafter, the said petition was granted by the court and issued an Order declaring the marriage of
The GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees to preserve and the herein parties void ab initio. The petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the
maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds for the benefit of its members. Court of Appeals for the annulment of the Order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings. The
petitioner contends that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in
Required to comment on the GSIS petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the his petition that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
petition should be denied. Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the latter knew very well that the former was residing at
Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. Also, it was claimed by the petitioner that such act
The Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the deprives her of her right to be heard. Furthermore, the petitioner contends that the order of the trial
GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for court was null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person and it was due to extrinsic fraud made
exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. Read in its proper and full context, by the respondent.
Section 39 intends to preserve the actuarial solvency of GSIS funds by exempting the GSIS from
government impositions through taxes. Legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not taxes. The OCAT Issues:
further posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the payment of legal
fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this Court. 1 WON the condition precedent required under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was complied
with, in order to annul a judgment or final order of the court, in the instant case based on extrinsic
ISSUE: fraud.
Whether or not the congress may exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees.
2. WON the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the Original Petition and amended petition
HELD: of the Petitioner for annulment of the assailed order of the RTC grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
NO. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules the person of the latter
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Held:
Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement. Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision 1 No, in this case, the condition precedent required under Rule 47 of the Rules of
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Court was not complied with. If the annulment of judgment or final orders or resolutions in civil
actions of the RTC is based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely,
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner
one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under
by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence. It is not
enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. In this case,
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and
the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended
Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein
legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did
not explain why she failed to do so.
5. MARIETTA B. ANCHETA vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA 2 Yes, the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the
G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004 petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. It must be noted that in a case where a petition for
Facts: annulment of a judgment of a final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of a new accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case, it
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, is notable that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases
unless by laches. In this case, the original petition and the amended in the Court of Appeals, in light for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par.
of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689.
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to
serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in
the said summons and complaint. Besides, it is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction is acquired by a exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on
trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not
the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend warrant the application of the exception.
himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void. Furthermore, 2. Yes. The lower court acquires jurisdiction over the case. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains
jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
6. Chester De Joya vs. Sandoval Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, and Judge Placido a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
Marquez in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40 Manila RTC petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
G.R. No. 162416 January 31, 2006 b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued
by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
Facts: c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03- d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings
219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the
probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused. pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
The documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge tend to show that litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question,
therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which
Development Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial
in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant, jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the
purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and
directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions. Justice Regalado continues to explain: In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the
case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it
Despite seeking relief through a petition, the defendant refuses to surrender and submit to has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or
the lower courts jurisdiction in the belief of lack of probable and improper issuance of a warrant. property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of
summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process
Issues: requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or
1. Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in issuing a warrant of arrest proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.
2. Whether or not the lower court acquires jurisdiction over the case
3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to relief from Courts even if he continuously refuse to 2. No. Petition is dismissed. The petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the Court nor from
surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
Held: There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts
without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the lower
1. Yes. The Supreme Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 documents to courts jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent
support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It finds that the judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows intent to circumvent and frustrate
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the courts jurisdiction
the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized that before issuing must first submit to its jurisdiction.
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an
7. MELINA P. MACAHILIG, petitioner, vs. taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized potential
The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT, respondents. jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when
G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000 it issued the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
Facts: 2 The CA ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued a
Writ of Execution ordering the delivery of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit. The records show that the
On February 5, 1965, Pepito Magalit, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M. Magalit (now substituted by fishpond application of petitioners husband was rejected by the BFAR, and that petitioner did
her heirs as respondents in view of her recent demise), filed with the then Philippine Fisheries not present any other evidence to prove her right of possession over the disputed
Commission now Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Fishpond Application No. property.On the other hand, Dr. Magalit claim was based on the Decision in the Fishpond
24400. The application was for eleven 11 hectares of land situated in the Municipality of Batan, Case, which upheld her right as the surviving spouse of the applicant to possess the ten
Province of Aklan. On April 13, 1972, Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, filed with hectares of land awarded to him, including Lot 4417 which covered an area of more or less
the BFAR Fishpond Application No. 29972 for five of the eleven hectares which Magalit had previously 2.0805 hectares. The disputed lot was included in the area awarded to Dr. Magalit because of
applied for. On February 28, 1972, BFAR rejected Macahiligs application for his failure to submit all the the report of the commissioner appointed by the trial court to settle the issue. Petitioner had
requirements. Undaunted, Macahilig protested Magalits application (in what will be referred to as the not objected either to the said appointment or to the Report.
Fishpond Case) on November 8, 1976, contending that for a period of 20 years, he had been in actual
possession of the five-hectare area included in Magalits application. On August 22, 1979, the director 8. G.R. No. 144934 January 15, 2004
of BFAR ordered the Committee on Fishpond Claims and Conflict to hear and determine the rights of ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA, petitioners,
Macahilig and Magalit over the disputed area. The Committee concluded that the former was merely vs. FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her co-respondents), and her
the latters laborer and caretaker. On October 9, 1992, Dr. Magalit filed a Petition for Contempt Against children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA, ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and ELOISA, all
Melina Macahilig, alleging that on November 29, 1985, Bernardo Macahilig had refused to turn over surnamed DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Lot 4417 to her.
Petitioner Dr. Grace M. Magalit is in the actual possession of Lot-A with an area of 99,114 FACTS:
square meters or 9.9 hcts. which is a fully developed fishpond, and without any question from the On May 16, 1983, Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito, and Eloisa, executed a Special Power
respondent. However, as per Order of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources dated June 6, of Attorney[3] in favor of their mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her to sell, lease,
1980, that portion labeled Parcel-A in the sketch with an area of 2.3 hcts. has to be excluded because mortgage, transfer and convey their rights over Lot No. 1083-C. [4] Subsequently, Fidela
it is needed for forest purposes. So if we deduct 2.3 hcts. from the 9.9 hcts. the remaining area for the borrowed P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in the early part of 1987. To secure the loan, she and Mariano
petitioner will only be 7.6 hcts., that is why the Bureau of Fisheries has to include Lot 4417 and Lot Rivera agreed to execute a deed of real estate mortgage and an agreement to sell the
5216, in order that the area of 10.0 hectares in said order will be satisfied. land. Consequently, on March 9, 1987, Mariano went to his lawyer, Atty. Efren Barangan, to have three
In the Order of June 18, 1993, the trial court adopted the Commissioners Report and ruled in documents drafted: the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage [5], a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell)[6], and a
favor of Dr. Magalit in finding from the Commissioners Report and the sketch submitted that the Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
questioned Lot 4417 with an area of 20,805 square meters is actually in the possession of Petitioner The Kasunduan provided that the children of Mariano Rivera, herein petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia
Melina Macahilig but which was given to the respondents husband and let a writ of execution be and Jose, would purchase Lot No. 1083-C for a consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase price
issued in favor of the respondent and against petitioner Melina Macahilig for the delivery of Lot 4417. was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon the signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000 on
As regards Lot 5216, the report of the commissioner states that the same is covered by an August 31, 1987, and P1,141,622.50 on December 31, 1987.[8] It also provided that the Deed of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-19359 in the name of Julie Cawaling. The petitioner is hereby directed Absolute Sale would be executed only after the second installment is paid and a postdated check for
to desist from occupying this lot until the original certificate of title in the name of Julie Cawaling shall the last installment is deposited with Fidela. [9] As previously stated, however, Mariano had already
have been passed upon by a competent court. caused the drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan, the said deed stipulated a
Failure on the part of the petitioner to deliver the said area covered by Lot 4417 to the respondent, the purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a certain Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C.
[10]
court declared her in contempt. This deed, as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage [11], was signed by
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in the Order of July 14, 1993, which Marianos children, petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, as buyers and mortgagees, on March 9, 1987.
[12]
held that she had no valid reason to possess the disputed lot, considering that her husbands
application therefor had been rejected. Although Fidela intended to sign only the Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she
Unfazed by the unfavorable turn of events, petitioner filed with the CA, on August 12, 1993, a Petition inadvertently affixed her signature on all the three documents in the office of Atty. Barangan and
for Certiorari alleging that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders Mariano then gave Fidela the amount of P250,000. While Mariano was making payments to Oscar,
dated June 18 and July 14, 1993. Fidela entrusted the owners copy of TCT No. T-50.668 (M) to Mariano to guarantee compliance with
the Kasunduan.
Meanwhile, the Riveras, representing themselves to be the new owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were
Issues: also negotiating with the tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latters tenurial right. When
Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give
1 Whether or not said orders are void for lack of jurisdiction. 4,500 sq. m. in exchange for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he accepted. Subdivision Plan
No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made on August 12, 1992. Later, it was inscribed on TCT No.
2 Whether or not the court commit grave abuse of discretion 158443 (M), and Lot No. 1083-C was divided into Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint [19] in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Held: asking that the Kasunduan be rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with
damages. They also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the
1 The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M), and the reconveyance to them of the
Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents predecessors in interest. Without entire property with TCT No. T-50.668 (M) restored.[20]
Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended to enter into a deed of sale at the time of its Petitioners also contend that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case because it
execution and that she signed the said deed on the mistaken belief that she was merely signing copies involves an agricultural tenant. They insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038,
[35]
of the Kasunduan. They argued that given Fidelas advanced age (she was then around 72 at the time) it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction. [36]
[21]
and the fact that the documents were stacked one on top of the other at the time of signing, Fidela Petitioners contention lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
could have easily and mistakenly presumed that she was merely signing additional copies of involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
the Kasunduan. agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. [37] However, the cause of
Petitioners likewise argued that respondents cause of action had been barred by laches or action in this case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable parties, for rescission of
estoppel since more than four years has lapsed from the time the parties executed the Deed of the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano
Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time respondents instituted their complaint on February 18, Nieto was impleaded merely as a necessary party, stemming from whatever rights he may have
1993. acquired by virtue of the agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding TCT
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial courts that have jurisdiction over the case.
As to the second issue, petitioners cite Articles 1383, [40] 1389[41] and 1391[42] of the New Civil
The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine, but found that Code. They submit that the complaint for rescission of the Kasunduan should have been dismissed, for
Fidela never intended to sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar differences between respondents failure to prove that there was no other legal means available to obtain reparation other
the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial court concluded that the Riveras were guilty of than to file a case for rescission, as required by Article 1383. Moreover, petitioners contend that even
fraud in securing the execution of the deed and its registration in the Registry of Deeds. [24] This assuming respondents had satisfied this requirement, prescription had already set in, the complaint
notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the validity of TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano having been filed in 1992 or five years after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in March 10,
Nieto since there was no fraud proven on Nietos part. The trial court found him to have relied in good 1987.
faith and that his rights, according to the trial court, were akin to those of an innocent purchaser for Obviously, the Kasunduan does not fall under any of those situations mentioned in Article
value. 1381. Consequently, Article 1383 is inapplicable. Hence, the court ruled in favor of the respondents.
Coming now to the matter of prescription. Contrary to petitioners assertion, we find that
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment was AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION prescription has not yet set in. Article 1391 states that the action for annulment of void contracts shall
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 is declared null and void only insofar as Lot No. be brought within four years. This period shall begin from the time the fraud or mistake is
1083-C is concerned, but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot No. 1083-A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid discovered. Here, the fraud was discovered in 1992 and the complaint filed in 1993. Thus, the case is
insofar as Lot No. 1083-A is concerned and should not be annulled, and increasing the amount to be well within the prescriptive period.
paid by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for the 4,500 square meters of land given WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Deed of Absolute
to Feliciano Nieto to P323,617.50. Sale in question is declared NULL and VOID in its entirety. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay
respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency 9. SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
in the amount of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an agricultural TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO, respondents. D E C I S I O
tenant is involved in the case N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
2 Whether or not the respondents cause of action barred by prescription
This is a petition for review assailing the Orders dated June 27, 2001and July 26, 2001[2] of the
HELD: Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-24925.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not validly acquired because the filing On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent
fees respondents paid was only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land that was spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and Marites Huguete-Embudo a complaint for Annulment of TCT
worth P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid filing No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees,
fees amounting to P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the doctrine in Sun docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion[31] and attach a certification[32] from the Clerk of Court of the alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-
RTC of Quezon City. square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, for a
Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid the correct amount of docket fees when consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue
they filed the complaint. If the assessment was inadequate, they could not be faulted because the of a deed of sale, after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that
clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment, respondents argue. Respondents also add despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
that since petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of docket fees in the lower court, On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
they cannot raise the same on appeal. jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the total assessed value of the subject
We rule in favor of respondents. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the complaint. In Sun land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court,
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[34] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or pursuant to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the subject matter of the action
insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as
duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment.The party filing the provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.
case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied on July 26, 2001.
ISSUE: WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Whether or not the not the RTC decision and the writ of demolition must be annulled due to
Held: No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering the court's lack of jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution.
that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the Held:
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
(Caiza vs CA). And in Singsong vs Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that: No. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be considered a lack of jurisdiction over their
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary person or over the subject matter of their claim where in fact, the lower court duly acquired
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or jurisdiction over them upon their filing of the complaint claiming for the annulment of the decision of
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of the MTC, accion reinvindicatoria, and quieting of title. The RTC has the power to direct the ejectment
pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first of the petitioners and order them to vacate the disputed land and it can also adjudicate its possession
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something in respondents favor. The writ was issued well within its authority.
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the 11. PNB vs. Rittrato Group, Inc., et.al.
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by GR No. 142616 July 31, 20001
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square Facts:
meter portion of the property which they purchased from the respondents. Their cause of action is Petitioner Philippine National Bank is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
based on their right as purchaser of the subject land from respondents. They pray that they be Philippine law. Meanwhile, respondents Ritratto Group, Inc., Riatto International, Inc. and Dadasan
declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any General Merchandise are domestic corporations, likewise, organized and existing under Philippine law.
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within On May 29, 1996, PNB International Finance Ltd. (PNB-IFL) a subsidiary company of PNB
the jurisdiction of MTC. organized and doing business in Hong Kong, extended a letter of credit in favor of the respondents in
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary the amount of US$300,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages constituted over four (4) parcels of
before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed land in Makati City. This credit facility was later increased successively in September 1996 to February
to petitioners. 1997; and decreased in 1998. Respondents made repayments of the loan incurred by remitting those
amounts to their loan account with PNB-IFL in Hong Kong.
10. Capacete vs Baroro However, as of April 30, 1998, their outstanding obligations stood at US$1,497,274.70.
G.R. No. 154184 Pursuant to the terms of the real estate mortgages, PNB-IFL, through its attorney-in-fact PNB, notified
July 8, 2003 the respondents of the foreclosure of all the real estate mortgages and that the properties subject
thereof were to be sold at a public auction on May 27, 1999 at the Makati City Hall.
On May 25, 1999, respondents filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of
Facts: a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued a 72-hour temporary
Respondents application for a free patent over a parcel of land, opposed by petitioners who restraining order. On May 28, 1999, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The trial
were then the possessor of the same, was subsequently denied by the Bureau of Lands. Respondent judge then set a hearing on June 8, 1999. At the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction,
commenced an action in MTC for unlawful detainer against the petitioners contending that the latter petitioner was given a period of seven days to file its written opposition to the application. On June 15,
took possession of the disputed property in 1957 by mere tolerance from them. Petitioners justified 1999, petitioner filed an opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction to which the
their occupancy of the land claiming that they bought it from respondent in 1956. The MTC decided in respondents filed a reply. On June 25, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
favor of respondent. failure to state a cause of action and the absence of any privity between the petitioner and
respondents. On June 30, 1999, the trial court judge issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of
Upon failure to appeal within the allotted time, petitioners filed a complaint against preliminary injunction, which writ was correspondingly issued on July 14, 1999. On October 4, 1999,
respondent with the RTC for accion reinvindicatoria, claiming that they bought the land from the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court judge for lack of merit.
respondent. The latter alleged that she owns the land by virtue of her possession of it and that the Issues:
same had been declared for taxation purposes by her father and declared it in her own name. The RTC 1 WON there was a cause of action that exists against petitioner which is not a real party in
decided in favor of respondent. interest being a mere attorney-in-fact authorized to enforce an ancillary contract.
2 WON the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the trial to issue in excess or lack of jurisdiction a
Upon failure to appeal with the CA, petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC for a writ of writ of preliminary injunction.
injunction to restrain the respondents from dispossessing them of the land but the same was Ruling:
dismissed ruling that it cannot interfere with the judgment of another branch. Petitioners then repaired 1 No. There was no cause of action that exists against petitioner which is not a real party in
to Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, which was also dismissed for their failure to submit the interest in the case. The parent-subsidiary relationship between PNB and PNB-IFL is not the
certified true copies of the assailed orders and decision of the lower court. significant legal relationship involved in this case since the petitioner was not sued because it
is the parent company of PNB-IFL. Rather, the petitioner was sued because it acted as an
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the judgment in the RTC on the attorney-in-fact of PNB-IFL in initiating the foreclosure proceedings. A suit against an agent
ground that it was rendered with extrinsic or collateral fraud or lack of jurisdiction but the same was cannot without compelling reasons be considered a suit against the principal. Under the Rules
dismissed. of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules. In mandatory terms, the Rules
Issue: require that "parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had, an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants." In the case at bar, the injunction suit is
directed only against the agent, not the principal. Respondents do not have a cause of action one can be held liable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the
against the petitioner as the latter is not privy to the contract the provisions of which person subject of the complaint must be shown to have committed the act in bad faith. The Office of
respondents seek to declare void. the Ombudsman did not find private respondent in bad faith, hence, the important element for the
above offenses is wanting. Under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be a judge,
2 The issuance of the preliminary injunction must be lifted as it is a mere provisional remedy however in this case the alleged offender is a hearing officer of the SEC.
but adjunct to the main suit. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive The Office of the Solicitor General observed that aside from the allegation that private respondents
remedy that may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests decision cannot be possibly made in good faith for the case did not involve complex questions of law,
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. The dismissal of the petitioner did not show other facts which warrant a conclusion of malice and bad faith. Further, due to
principal action thus results in the denial of the prayer for the issuance of the writ. Further, the policy of non-interference with the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and
there is no showing that respondents are entitled to the issuance of the writ under Section 3, prosecutory powers, the Ombudsmans finding of absence of bad faith cannot be disturbed. This is not
Rule 58, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be only in recognition of the authority of the Ombudsman mandated by the Constitution, but for
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot practicality as well, for otherwise the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
be remedied under any standard compensation. Respondents do not deny their assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
indebtedness. Their properties are by their own choice encumbered by real estate complaints filed before it, in much the same way that courts would be swamped if they could be
mortgages. Upon the non-payment of the loans, which were secured by the mortgages compelled to review the exercise of discretion by the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys on whether to
sought to be foreclosed, the mortgaged properties are properly subject to a foreclosure sale. file an information in court or dismiss the complaint by a private complainant. Hence the petition is
Moreover, respondents questioned the alleged void stipulations in the contract only when dismissed for lack of merit.
petitioner initiated the foreclosure proceedings. Clearly, respondents have failed to prove that
they have a right protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of said right. The Court is not unmindful of the findings of both the trial court and 13. SUI MAN HUI CHAN AND GONZALO CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR MEDALLA
the appellate court that there may be serious grounds to nullify the provisions of the loan GR NO. 147999, FEBRUARY 27, 2004
agreement. However, as earlier discussed, respondents committed the mistake of filing the
case against the wrong party, thus, they must suffer the consequences of their error FACTS:
12. Ban Hua U. Flores v Office of the OMBUDSMAN and Atty. Enrique L. Flores, Jr. Private respondent OSCAR MEDALLA filed a complaint on March 30, 1999 for collection of a
GR No. 136769 Sept. 17, 2002 sum of money arising from breach of a contract of lease and damages, against petitioners Sui Man Hui
Facts: Chan and Gonzalo Co.
A complaint against the Ban Hua Flores for accounting and turnover of corporate funds of UBS
Marketing was instituted by Johnny K. H. Uy with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner The complaint alleged Napoleon C. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as lessee entered into a Lease
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was denied. Likewise Contract over a hotel building located at No. 29 Abanao Street, Baguio City. Chan would use the leased
denied was the appeal filed with the SEC en banc. A judgment was rendered in favor of the premises as a restaurant named Cypress Inn. Pertinently, the parties agreed on the following:
complainant. Petitioner Flores and company then appealed to the SEC en banc which reversed the
decision except the order of accounting. A criminal complaint was then filed by the petitioner alleging 1. The period of lease shall be for ten (10) years or from 15 July 1988 to 15 July 1998.
that Hearing Officer Enrique Flores rendered an unjust judgment under Art. 204 of the RPC and
violating Sec. 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which was dismissed by the Office of 2. The payment of the realty taxes due to the government on the leased premises shall be for the
Ombudsman for insufficiency of evidence ratiocinating that there was no showing that the decision account of the Lessee.
was rendered maliciously and deliberately to do an injustice to the complainant and that the error was
committed in good faith pursuant to the principle of regularity in the performance of official functions. 3. The agreement is binding upon the heirs and/or successors-in-interest of the Lessor and the Lessee.
It was well settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion is not
criminally liable for any error which he commits provided he acts in good faith. Even though the Petitioner Gonzalo Co was employed by Ramon Chan as the general manager of Cypress Inn and acted
complainant had been inconvenienced because of the decision of the respondent, such inconvenience as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon Medalla.
did not amount to causing undue injury under Sec. 3 of RA 3019, not only because there is no showing
of evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence but because the decision appealed to the SEC en banc On August 5, 1989, Ramon Chan died and was survived by his wife, petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan and
was immediately corrected, hence said decision did not become final and executory. Petitioner moved on July 17, 1996, Napoleon Medalla died and among his heirs is private respondent Oscar Medalla,
for the reconsideration which was likewise denied. Hence this petition where petitioner contends that who succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises.
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, alleging that the
decision was not made in good faith since the case did not involve a complex question of law but was Petitioners failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased premises. Despite several Statements
a plain violation of simple rules of procedure and that petitioner and her family suffered undue injury of Accounts sent by Medalla, petitioners failed to pay the rentals due but, nonetheless, continued to
as result of the decision, making respondent liable under Sec. 3 of RA 3019. use and occupy the leased premises.
Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint against private respondent for violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section On February 26, 1997, Medalla sent a letter addressed to Ramon Chan, indicating that (1) the contract
3 (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. of lease would expire on July 15, 1998, and (2) he was not amenable to a renewal of said contract
Ruling: after its expiration.
The instant petition emerged as a procedural concern captioned as a petition for review by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the arguments raised refer to alleged grave abuse of Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners and to settle the unpaid rentals, pay the unpaid real
discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the instant petition is considered estate taxes, and vacate the leased premises.
as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the assailed resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing the complaint against private respondent was legally justified because before
On January 1999, petitioners vacated the premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
taxes. Aggrieved by petitioners refusal to pay the amounts owing, which had reached P4,147,901.80 inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
by March 1999, private respondent Medalla instituted Civil Case No. MC99-666. accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES: ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party in interest. 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
2. Whether or Not the claim of the private respondent should have been filed against the estate of Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Ramon Chan. HELD:
Yes, the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
HELD: Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. Having
1. YES, It is undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and, together with petitioner concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
Co, was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the late Ramon Chan. Both continued to to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
operate the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are real parties-in-interest in the case filed Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
by private respondent, notwithstanding that they are not signatories to the Contract of Lease. another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to
their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a 16. MICHELLE I. PINEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) and the
party does not excuse non-performance of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by Assistant Secretary CAMILO MIGUEL M.
and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Similarly, non- MONTESA
performance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in G.R. No. 181643, November 17, 2010
the subject matter of the contract. Facts:
On May 14, 2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Lakandula High
2. NO, Petitioners contention that any claim should have been filed before the estate proceeding of School represented by its principal, Dr. Alice B. Blas , for a five-year lease of the school canteen with a
Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 86, the trial court found that the unpaid rentals sought to monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an additional P4,000.00 monthly for the schools feeding program as
be claimed were for the period April 1993 to December 1998. Note that Ramon Chan, the original well as medicines for the school clinic.
lessee, died on August 5, 1989. In other words, as the unpaid rentals did not accrue during the lifetime On August 5, 2004, the faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School
of Ramon Chan, but well after his death, his estate might not be held liable for them. Hence, there is Superintendent, Dr. Ma. Luisa Quiones , questioning the validity of the May-MOA. Dr. Blas sent a letter-
no indubitable basis to apply Section 5, Rule 86, of the Revised Rules of Court as petitioners urge reply on September 17, 2004 and an exchange of correspondence followed. Meanwhile, on August 14,
respondents to do. 2004, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA) superseding the May-MOA. This time,
the August-MOA followed the standard form under Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998 or the
14. Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives.
15. G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 On February 11, 2005, respondent DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, Gascon, declared the August-MOA null and void ab initio and ordered it cancelled. Pineda was also
vs. ordered to cease and desist from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES et. al., respondents. the management and operation of the canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of
the School. This prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
FACTS: order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascons decision. DepEd, represented by Usec. Gascon,
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former Dr. Quiones and Ms. Olympiada Camilo, who succeeded Dr. Blas as School Principal, sought the
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. dismissal of Pinedas petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter failed to state a cause of
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the action. On June 7, 2005, the trial court denied its motion. For said reason, DepEd, this time
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, represented by Assistant Secretary Camilo Miguel M. Montesa, filed a petition for certiorari before the
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The CA seeking to set aside the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005 orders of the RTC.
House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order of the RTC denying DepEds motion to dismiss but
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary reversed its March 14, 2005 order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks Injunction.
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Issue:
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Whether or not the preliminary mandatory injunction was valid.
HELD:
Held:
1 NO. Petitioners herein do not have legal interest over the said land as they have donated it
No. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts
already to Renato and his wife at the death of their father. Petitioners are deemed estopped
sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. The DepEd already prohibited
for claiming interest therein and as not being indispensable parties cannot file for relief of
Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision,
judgment.
since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTCs preliminary writ
2 NO. Rule 13 Section 11. States,
should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it
Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
explained: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Status quo is defined as the
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be
last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is
cause to consider the paper as not filed. (n)
existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its
Petitioners failed to state their reason for usage of the said service of filing thus making it
injunctive relief to alter such status.
void.
In this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of
the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reason,
the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said status. 3 NO. It appears that petitioners did not appeal from the Court of Appeals resolutions denying
the first petition for annulment of compromise judgment and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration brought by petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 64952, as a result of which the same
became final. Basic is the rule that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
17. G.R. No. 150159 July 25, 2003
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an
TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, LAILANIE VILLAREAL MACANDOG, RODELO VILLAREAL, ELY
appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or resolution final and executory. 16 Hence,
VILLAREAL, NOELITO VILLAREAL and LUISITO VILLAREAL, as represented by his attorney-
petitioners are precluded from resurrecting any issue relative to these resolutions after they
in-fact, TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, petitioners,
have lapsed into finality by operation of law.
vs.
18.
SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIA RICAFORT, respondents.
19. GR NO. 160053
August 28,2006
FACTS:
The herein respondents are co-owners of Abelardo Villareal, the predecessor in interest of Spouses Renato and Angelina Lantin, Petitioners
Renato and Teresita Villareal. However, Abelardo, during his lifetime acquired an OCT in violation of Vs.
his agreement with respondents. When Abelardo died, Renato and Teresita Villareal as heirs acquired a Hon. Jane Aurora Lantion, et.al., Respondents
TCT.
Respondents filed an action for annulment of the said TCT. During the course of the
proceedings, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Renato and Teresita shall grant one-half FACTS:
of the land and the cost of the suit to respondents after the formers admission of the agreement made
by their predecessor. Spouses Lantin took several dollar and peso loans from Planters Development Bank (PDB) and
Not long after the approval of the compromise agreement, the respondent filed for contempt executed mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. The Lantins defaulted on their loans so
against the two due to failure to comply with the agreement. Before the proceedings upon the PDB foreclosed on the properties to partially satisfy the Lantins debt. Subsequently, the Lantins filed a
motion, herein petitioners filed for intervention and substitution of the defendant as the latter waived Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance,
their interest on the land. Upon realizing that the compromise was really final, petitioners sought for Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City,
relief of judgment by their co-heir Luisito, who according to them learned of the judgment much later Batangas against PDB. According to the Lantins, the REM only covered the peso loans which they have
that them and is yet time barred. already paid off, and not the dollar loans. PDB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
The motion for intervention and substitution was denied and no M.R. was filed. The said venue since according to their agreement, the venue of any suit should be Metro Manila. Judge (Jane
petition for relief was then filed by Luisito but was denied for lack of affidavit of merit and filing Aurora) Lantion dismissed the complaint because of improper venue. Lantins asked for a
beyond 6 mos. after judgment. reconsideration which was denied. Lantins claim that since they are assailing the validity of the loan
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment before the C.A but was denied for not stating the documents, then the stipulation stating that Metro Manila should be the venue of any suit is also in
reason for mailing and so is their M.R. for not stating the material dates. No appeal was filed. question. They also argue that the venue stipulated in the agreement is not the exclusive venue
Another petition for annulment was filed before the CA but was denied against because they stipulation covered by Section 4(b) of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
were unable to move for a new trial or a petition for relief from judgment through no fault attributable
to them. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the stipulation on the loan agreement is an exclusive venue stipulation under Sec.
ISSUE/S: 4(b) of the Rules
WON the CA erred in attributing fault to petitioners simply because of the RTCs denial of the latters
petition for relief.
WON the CA erred in considering their original petition as not having been filed under Rule 13 Section HELD:
11.
WON the CA erred in denying their M.R. for failure to state the material dates. Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed orders dated May 15, 2003 and September
15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas, in Civil Case No. 2002-0555 are AFFIRMED.
RATIONALE: Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on 21.
venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed 22.
in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not 23. ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89,
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation APPEALS,
should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.
G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions
Under the agreement, it is clear that the Lantins and PDB agreed that any suit arising from the
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant
contract should be brought exclusively in the proper Makati court (or to any court that PDB wants to),
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
as the Lantins had waived the right to choose the venue of the action. The Lantins only assailed of the
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
coverage of the loan agreement and the validity of the loan agreement itself. Since the issues of
resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be no question by now that what determines the
whether the mortgages should be properly discharged and whether these also cover the dollar loans,
nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
arose out of the said loan documents, the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto.
made by the plaintiff in this case.
Facts:
20. PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DELFINO TECSON, respondent. On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent
[G.R. No. 156966. May 7, 2004] Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also
Facts: Delfin Tecson applied for 6 cellular phone subscriptions with PILTEL on various dates in 1996, married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
which were all approved and later on covered by 6 mobiline service agreements. However, in 2001,
Tecson filed with the RTC of Iligan City a complaint against PILTEL for Sum of Money and Damages. Private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
PILTEL, Moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue, citing a common Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without
provision in the mobiline service agreements to the effect that - jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. The court ruled in favor of Private respondent
"Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the Zorayda. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that since Tamano and Zorayda were
relationship between PILTEL and subscriber shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila. both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested
Subscriber hereby expressly waives any other venues. in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly
RTC of Iligan denied the motion to dismiss and required PILTEL to file an answer on the cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. It also denied PILTELs subsequent Motion For accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of
Reconsideration. Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
PILTEL appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC and denied the subsequent MFR Issue:
filed by PILTEL. Whether or not shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject
and nature of the action.
ISSUE: WON the provision in the mobiline service agreements fixing the venue of all suits arising from
the contract is clear and binding and that the venue of the complaint was improperly laid. Held:
We affirm the decision of the RTC. The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to
Held: hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita
Yes, the provision is clear and binding, and the venue was improperly laid. Section 4, Rule 4, and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to agree and stipulate in writing, before the made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of any litigation between them. Such an agreement would reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of
be valid and binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement
intent, that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the filing of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
of the suit. Also, in the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents
herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the
In the case at bar, respondent secured six (6) subscription contracts for cellular phones on Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD
various dates. It would be difficult to assume that, during each of those times, respondent had no No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were
sufficient opportunity to read and go over the terms and conditions embodied in the agreements. married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first
Respondent continued, in fact, to acquire in the pursuit of his business subsequent subscriptions and mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
remained a subscriber of petitioner for quite sometime. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original and
A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to comply fully and not exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception.
24. THOMAS M. GONZALEZ, plaintiff and appellant, WON the case against CRS be filed in Manila where they hold their principal office.
vs. Held:
DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION and VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendants and appellees. Yes. It is clear that the damage is based upon tort and not upon a written contract. Under par. (b)(3)
G.R. No. L-18726 August 31, 1966 Sec. 1 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "the action is not upon a written contract, then in the municipality
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be served with summons." In
Corporation law, it is settled that the residence of the corporation is the place where the principal
office is established. Since CRS' principal office is in Manila, then the suit against it shall be filed in
Facts:
Manila. Furthermore, the Court held in Evangelista vs. Santos, et al., that the laying of the venue of an
On September 6, 1960 Gonzalez filed with the aforesaid court a complaint to recover from
action is not left to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. Applying
Encarnacion, moral damages in the amount of P25,000 and exemplary or corrective damages as the
the provision of the Rules of Court, the venue in this case was improperly laid.
court may deem just and proper, allegedly sustained by the former as a result of the filing by the
latter in civil case N-151, a pleading captioned "Reply and Answer to Counterclaim," containing words
and expressions which are allegedly highly libelous, derogatory and scurrilous to "the personal worth,
26. Rebecca T. Cabutihan vs Lancenter Construction & Development Corporation
integrity, honor and reputation" of Gonzalez, as well as "impertinent, immaterial and irrelevant to the
G.R No. 146594, June 10, 2002
issues". On September 28, 1960 Encarnacion filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds
that (1) it states no cause of action, and (2) venue is improperly laid and/or the trial court has no
Facts:
jurisdiction. The motion was denied by the Court in its order of November 10, 1960. On November 21,
On December 3, 1996 Land center Construction & Development Corporation and petitioner
1960 Encarnacion moved to reconsider the order denying his motion to dismiss, insisting on his
Rebecca Cabutihan entered into an Agreement. The agreement states that Respondent Corporation is
previous grounds. Meanwhile, Aquino also asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the very same
the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated at Kay-biga, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
grounds relied upon by Encarnacion. Gonzalez takes the position that the venue of his complaint is not
The petitioner facilitates and undertakes for the recovery of the property and the compensation for the
improperly laid because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
undertaking of the facilitatorand that petitioner is entitled of 20% of the total area of the property thus
1289, effective June 15, 1955, a civil action for damages in cases of written defamation may be filed in
recovered for and in behalf of respondent corporation, Forro 10%, Radan 4% and Anave 2.5% and a
the court of first instance of the province where the offended party resides. On the other hand, the
total of 36.5%.
defendants contend that the complaint should have been filed in civil case N-151 of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite because under the aforesaid provision of law the court where the criminal or civil
On February 11, 1997 upon accomplishment of the Agreement and Undertakings, petitioner
action for damages is first filed acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
demanded to execute the corresponding Deed of Assignment of the lots in the subject property, as
Issue:
compensation for the services rendered however the respondent corporation refused to act on the
Whether or not the venue is improperly laid and/or the trial court has no jurisdiction.
said demand.
Held:
No, the venue is not improperly laid. The language of the above quoted provision is, to our
On October 14, 1999, petitioner filed specific performance with damages against respondents.
mind, plain and clear. It establishes a general rule and an exception thereto. Civil actions for damages
Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the appropriate
in cases of written defamation "shall" be filed with the court of first Instance of the province or city in
document assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her favor.
which "any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides." In other words, the plaintiff is
limited in his choice of venue to the court of first instance of his residence or to that of any of the
Respondent filed dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of (1) the venue is improperly laid because
accused." Plaintiff may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated,
since petitioner seeks to recover property, then the case is an action in rem which should be (2)the
displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein, neither the offender nor the offended party
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because Forro, Radan, and Anave are not named as
resides in which case the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the court of first instance
plaintiffs, and petitioner is not named/does not included in the cause of action(3) it was imperative for
thereof." The verb "may" is permissive. Hence it does not necessarily imply a complete abrogation of
petitioner to pay the appropriate docket or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim
the general rule laid down in the preceding sentence except in so far as it broadens the two (2)
and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a third choice of venue.
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Issue: Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over the case
disputed resolutions, denying the petitioner for his motion for a bill of particulars
Held:
HELD: The Court of Appeals held that judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the petition
and declaring that the honorable respondent court is without jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
Yes. The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is against defendants Senen B. Dizon and Relita P. de los Santos and the authority of Senen B. Dizon to
perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner enter into a mortgage contract as this falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the Securities and Exchange Commission, and ordering the suspension of further proceedings until said
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what issue shall have been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. On the other hand,
petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, Metrobank cannot be faulted for relying on the Secretary's Certificate. It is in good faith and unaware
and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to of any flaw and on the presumption that the ordinary course of business had been followed and that
be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's the Corporate Secretary had regularly performed her duties.
name does not even appear in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and
Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to The Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the lower Court only with respect to
petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions Metrobank. It dismissed the case against Dizon and de los Santos, since either this two persons had
unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a committed ultra vires acts or the acts fall outside the powers that are specifically listed in a corporate
bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and charter or state law is an intra-corporate matter which falls within the original and exclusive
for trial. jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 5 of Presidential Decree
902-A, as amended. Pending the outcome of the case that would be filed in the Securities and
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, Exchange Commission, however, the Court of Appeals directed the suspension of the proceedings
dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular against Metrobank.
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as
would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the 11. GR 102603 SPS DONATO vs. CA AND HEIRS OF ROSARIO FONTANILLA
contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the FACTS:
complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to
the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The land in dispute is Lot 5145, CAD, 325-D of the Alaminos Cadastre, located at Brgy. Inerangan,
Alaminos, Pangasinan. The said land is an unregistered riceland with an area of 4,280 square meters
and used to be owned by Rosario Fontanilla, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, as her paraphernal execution. In view of the various discrepancies found by the trial court, 6 it lacks the veracity to entitle
property. Said Rosario Fontanilla died in 1971 in Davao City and is survived by her five (5) children to it to any degree of credibility.
wit: Rodolfo, Plotarco, Ernesto, Edgardo, and Lolita, all surnamed Rarang as her heirs. All of the said Finding no truth to the petitioners' claim of validity of the instrument from which their title emanates
children were born in Inerangan, Alaminos, Pangasinan. However, between 1957 and 1967, Rosario and their argument of title by prescription, the court considers it unnecessary to discuss at length or
Fontanilla and her children migrated separately to Davao City. to determine the other issues presented, they being immaterial to the resolution of this appeal.
For reasons indicated, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
Sometime in 1982, Sps. Villamor and Luzonia Donato (defendants) purchased the land, denominated Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. With costs.
as Lot No. 5303, CAD, 325-D of Alaminos Cadastre, from the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Inc. after the
said bank foreclosed the mortgage constituted thereon by one Carolina Abrigo. Believing that the land 12. G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992
which they purchased from the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo is Lot 5145, CAD, 325-D of Alaminos PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM PLASTICS, INC., vs.
Cadastre, defendants occupied the said land in 1982 and are still in possession of the same up to this SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON.
date. COURT OF APPEALS
In the complaint, private respondents (Fontanillas) claim ownership over the parcel of land in dispute FACTS:
allegedly inherited by them from their late mother, Rosario. They contend that petitioners herein own A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American General
a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5535 and denominated as Lot No. 5303, Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet Lines,
CAD, 325-D, as appearing in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan, which is not the same nor is it Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line (The
identical with the land in dispute. Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo,
In their answer, however, petitioners maintain that Lot No. 5303 was originally applied for titling by seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees
one Carolina Abrigo on the strength of a Deed of Sale executed by Jose Ochave as her vendor. and costs allegedly due to defendants' negligence.
According to the petitioners, Jose Ochave's ownership over the same parcel finds support in the Deed
of Sale executed by Basilio Rarang, who allegedly derives his authority as Rosario's agent from a
Special Power of Attorney duly executed in his favor.
In or about March 1977, a vessel belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier, took on
During the trial on the merits, private respondents, through Rodolfo Rarang who is the lone witness,
board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2) consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for
disputed the validity of the Special Power of Attorney. The rest of their evidence consisted of
transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400
documents.
bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company
Petitioners countered and presented the Notary Public who notarized the Deed of Sale between Basilio
of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were
Rarang and Jose Ochave. Among the documents presented by the petitioners were the controverted
covered, respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier (Exhs. E
Deed of Sale and the Special Power of Attorney said to have been executed by Rosario Fontanilla-
and F). The necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well as the Commercial Invoices
Rarang in favor of Basilio Rarang.
(Exhs. C and D) accompanied the shipment. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics
The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents (Heirs of Rosario) for finding the petitioners
Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc., (Exh. G).
(Donatos) claim of ownership, devoid of merit and that the Court is not convinced as to the validity of
In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port of Manila
the sale of the land in question in 1967 by Basilio Rarang in favor of Jose Ochave. Article 1874 of the
for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and made use of the
Civil Code provides that:
services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier.
When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be
void. On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of the
The trial court held that the Power of Attorney is not a sufficient authority. The person who appeared, consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977 upon the instance of the plaintiff. The survey
signed, and acknowledged the said Power of Attorney before the notary public was Basilio Rarang (the shows unreasonable shortages, damages and losses during the discharge from the vessel.
agent) and not Rosario Rarang (the principal) and was not also signed by the supposed notary public
Anastacio D. Deluao of Davao City. Of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags
This decision was affirmed by the Respondent Court of Appeals. were delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss
Hence, this petition. from this particular shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Special Power of Attorney is null and void
HELD:
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and
Yes. The court finds no cogent reason to fault the findings of the trial court that the Special Power of
defendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the claim
Attorney is null and void. This being the case, all subsequent transactions involving Lot 5145 and
against them. Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs' motion to
springing from the Special Power of Attorney are also null and void. Consequently, on this alone,
dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig was
petitioner's claim of ownership should be rejected outright.
consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs."
The Supreme Court hold that the appellate court did not commit a mistake.
While it is true that Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the rule on implied
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document subject of an action or defense, the The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners. Defendant Sweet Lines Inc.
same is not without exception. One such exception is when the adverse party does not appear to be a and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc. are directed to pay jointly and severally, the
party to the instrument. 5 Private respondents Lolita and Ernesto were mere witnesses to the Special plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with legal interest thereon from April 28, 1978 until fully paid.
Power of Attorney in question and as such, they cannot be considered as parties to the instrument.
Moreover, the same document should not be afforded a presumption of genuineness and due
Respondents then appealed the trial courts decision with the Court of Appeals. The respondent court while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the observations of the trial court
has reversed the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription, in effect dismissing the complaint quoted at the start of this opinion.
of herein petitioners, and the denial of their motion for reconsideration. ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the
complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment is
Hence this petition. hereby AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
13. A.M. No. 1288 July 29, 1974
FLORAIDA BANARES, complainant, vs.ATTY. ROSALINO C. BARICAN, respondent.
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision
The verified complaint riled by Floraida Lopez de Banares who accuses Atty. Rosalino C. Barican of
"abandoning" her case (referring to Special Proceeding 7500 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
HELD:
Branch II), alleges specifically that she engaged the services of the respondent lawyer for the purpose
of acquiring the custody of her minor children from the spouses Francisco Banares and Ester Macam;
On the said issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
that the respondent did file the appropriate petition for habeas corpus, but that except for the initial
appealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in
hearing the respondent failed to appear in court at the succeeding scheduled hearings resulting in the
support thereof and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and
dismissal of the petition on November 7, 1973.
for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that the
Required to comment, the respondent explained, under oath, that it was not the complainant, but her
existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not been established,
mother, Percida Vasquez, who did engage but later terminated his legal services. His version of the
petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they can possibly comply therewith. 12 In refutation,
material events is as follows: he was the lawyer of the Baron Express, a transportation firm whose bus
SLI avers that it is standard practice in its operations to issue bills of lading for shipments entrusted to
figured in an accident which cause the death of Rolando Banares, alleged husband of the complainant;
it for carriage and that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor with proof
in August 1973 the complainant's mother, Percida Vasquez, who wanted compensation for the death
of their existence manifest in the records of the case. 13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the propriety of
of her son-in-law, was referred to him; he advised her that no settlement could at the time be
the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitioners' failure to prove its direct responsibility for the
discussed because Francisco Banares, the father of the deceased, had filed a similar claim with the
loss of and/or damage to the cargo.
Office of Civil Relations at Camp Aguinaldo, whereupon, she assured the respondent that she would
cause her daughter (the complainant) to thresh out the matter with her in laws; a week later the
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so complainant and her mother informed the respondent that the Banares family, who had the custody of
considered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the the complainant's daughter, would not forego their claim as they refused to recognize the complainant
court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face as the lawful wife of the deceased on September 5, 1973 Percida Vasquez informed the respondent
of relevant pleadings. 16 In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably that they could not avail of the services of their lawyer, one Atty. Oligarion, in the matter of their claim
raised by SLI in its answer, 17 except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally for compensation from the Baron Express and for recovery of the custody of the complainant's
offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be daughter, for lack of expense money; she pleaded with the respondent who, moved by her insistence
maintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere and also by his (respondent) wife's intercession, agreed, to help in the recovery of the child's custody;
references thereto. on another visit, the complainant and her mother proposed to the respondent that, because they did
not have money to pay for litigation expenses, the Baron Express assist them financially, and any
financial assistance it would extend was to be deducted from whatever compensation was due them
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained
for Rolando's death; the respondent referred the proposal to the management of the Baron Express,
in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the
which accepted the proposal and consequently advanced a sum of money to the complainant;
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, 18 and the genuineness and
thereafter, the respondent prepared the petition for habeas corpus; on September 16, 1973, the
due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse
complainant and her mother were given the petition but they did not file it for lack of funds; the
party. 19 The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or defense
respondent again interceded with the Baron Express, which again extended monetary assistance, and
based on said documents.
the petition was thereafter filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal; the case was set for initial
hearing but was re-set to October 24, 1973 because Francisco Banares manifested in court that the
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of
complainant was not the lawful wife of his deceased son; on the day of the initial hearing, the
the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by
complainant's mother intimated to the respondent that her daughter's common-law husband, one Mr.
the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
Hilado, was furious with her and her daughter for soliciting the services of the respondent, whereupon
conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown
the latter, on confirmation by the complainant and her step-father of the information given to him,
to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 23 Moreover, when
advised the complainant that it was best that they retain the services of another lawyer; it was then
the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse
agreed that the complainant would confer with her common law husband, after which if she believed
party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
that the respondent's appearance would still be necessary, she would accordingly notify the
formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
respondent before October 24, 1973, submit to the respondent pertinent documents from the hospital
where she allegedly gave birth, and arrange a conference between the attending physician and the
respondent, but the complainant did none of these; on October 18, 1973 Percida Vasquez tearfully
Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish the stage in informed the respondent that she was terminating his services as counsel, as her daughter and her
the course of the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. What can only be common-law husband had forbidden her from interfering with the case because they had replaced the
inferred from the factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to respondent with another lawyer, one Atty. Fortaleza; in the respondent's presence Percida Vasquez
DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the same could not have possibly occurred instructed her other daughter (who came with her) to fetch the complainant in order to clarify matters
with the respondent; on October 22, 1973 Percida Vasquez informed the respondent that her daughter
would no longer avail of his services as she had decided to retain the services of another lawyer G.R. No. L-47847
chosen by her common-law husband; and for all his bother the respondent was not compensated a July 31, 1981
single centavo.
In reply to the foregoing comment, the complainant denied that she had solicited the respondent's
services and alleged that on the contrary the respondent had volunteered his services; denied that the Facts:
professional services of the respondent were contracted gratis et a more and averred that he had
agreed to a contingent-fee arrangement; denied that she failed to contact the respondent because in Respondent Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance an application for confirmation of
fact she did call him by phone and advised him of the next hearing; averred that the respondent had imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots which were allegedly inherited from her parents and from her
promised to appear but did not; admitted that she was able to secure "vales"" or cash advances from aunt, without any surviving heir except herself. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the
the Baron Express on three occasions thru the help of the respondent; alleged that during the initial application on the ground that applicant respondent and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title
hearing the respondent talked to her and suggested that they live together as husband and wife, and in fee simple nor imperfect title under the Public Land Law over the lots in question. No other persons
promised to provide her with life's comforts, and later reminded her of their "date" the following filed opposition to the application.
Saturday at "Jack's Place" in Caloocan City; asserted that she did not appear at the designated place,
and that thereafter the respondent turned indifferent to her case and consequently failed to appear at Respondent presented a certification from the Land Registration Commission stating that one
the later court hearings. of the lots was declared public land in a Cadastral Case and further submitted another certification
The respondent filed a rejoinder wherein he stressed that it was not the complainant but her mother, from the same Commission that five lots were the subject of a decision in a Cadastral Case, although
Percida Vasquez, who engaged his services; denied the allegation that he had suggested that he and no decree of registration has as yet been issued. The CFI granted her application for registration. The
the complainant live together and he would provide her with luxuries; and further denied the Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals but the court affirmed the decision of the trial
allegation that he had reminded the complainant of a supposed "data." court.
Upon the allegations of the parties, the charge that the respondent abandoned the habeas corpus
case of the complainant Floraida Banares would appear to merit investigation, but the apparent On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral
joinder of issues is unreal, for rather than frontally meeting or directly traversing the allegations of the Case constitutes res judicata as to the nature of the lots in question and therefore, a bar to
respondent that are material to the existence of a cause of action for abandonment of a client's case, respondents application.
the complainant evades or does not categorically or completely deny said allegations.
If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed
admitted. (1 Moran 332-334). Issue:
The material determinative allegations of the respondent and the statements of the complainant
thereon are as follows: Whether or not the decision rendered in Cadastral Case constitutes res judicata and a bar to
1. The complainant neither admits nor denies the respondent's allegation that it was the respondents application.
complainant's mother, and not she, who engaged his professional services, but simply states that he
volunteered his services.
2. To the allegation that the complainant agreed (but failed) to notify the respondent before Held:
October 24, 1973 if, after conferring with her common-law husband, the respondent's appearance in
court would still be necessary, the complainant states that she did call the respondent by phone about No. The Supreme Court held that the decision in Cadastral Case does not constitute a bar to
the necessity of his appearance and the respondent allegedly promised to appear, but the the application of respondent Manuela Pastor. A decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot
complainant fails to state whether or not she had conferred with her common-law husband on the public land is not the final decree contemplated in the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration that
matter of the dismissal or the further retention of the respondent as her counsel. It is to be noted that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
the agreement that the complainant would inform the respondent before the October 24, 1973 judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions
hearing as to the necessity of his appearance was predicated on the facts (a) that the complainant's of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable.
common law husband have objected to the respondent's being retained as counsel, and (b) that the However, the Director of Lands did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res judicata
respondent had, in deference thereto, advised the complainant to secure the services of another with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor is a procedural infirmity which
lawyer. cannot be cured on appeal. All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an
3. The complainant does not deny the respondent's allegation that although she had agreed to answer are deemed waived and cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal.
present pertinent hospital records to the respondent and to arrange a conference between the doctor
and the respondent, she failed to do so. 15. G.R. No. 139588 March 4, 2004 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
4. The allegation that the complainant's mother went twice to see the respondent to inform him the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA B. VDA. DE NERI, et.al., respondents.
that his services would no longer be availed of by her daughter as she and her common-law husband FACTS:
had already replaced the respondent as counsel, is not at all denied by the complainant. The heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr. filed an application with the CFI of MIsamis Oriental for judicial
In sum and substance, the complainant's non-categorical statements on the material issues amount to confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. They prayed that, after due process, judgment be
an admission (requiring no proof) that the respondent did not "abandon" her case, and, instead, that rendered in their favor. Thereafter, they filed an amended application in the same case on December
she, by herself and thru her mother, dismissed the respondent as her lawyer. 17, 1974. On January 27, 1975, the Court, through the Land Registration Commission, issued a notice
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed. No costs. of initial hearing addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Solicitor General and the
Bureau of Forest Development. The notice was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were
sent by ordinary mail to the persons named therein; the copies intended for the Director of the Bureau
of Lands and the Office of the Solicitor General were sent by special messenger. The Solicitor General
and the Director of the Bureau of Lands failed to file any opposition thereto.
14. Director of Lands vs CA
The court rendered judgment granting the application. The Office of the Solicitor General, as well as The CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the CFI holding that: (a) the petitioner failed to
the Director of the Bureau of Lands, failed to appeal the same. Thus, the court issued Decree No. N- prove the material allegations of its complaint; and, (b) the personnel of the CFI and the Land
361749, on the basis of which OCT No. 0662 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro Registration Commission are presumed to have performed their duties as the law mandated. The CA
City. denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
On January 5, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, for and in behalf of the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed with the court a quo a complaint for ISSUES:
annulment of OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of the property covered by the said title against herein 1. WON the Court may review the decision of the appellate court on the issues raised herein.
respondents. In its complaint, the petitioner alleged inter alia that it is the true owner of a parcel of 2. WON the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown trial, based solely on the
land of the public domain surveyed as Lot No. 2821 (subject lot) situated in Cagayan de Oro City. pleadings of the documents appended to their memorandum.
Despite the fact that the Solicitor General and the Director of the Bureau of Lands were not served 3. WON the decision of the trial court was made in accordance with law.
copies of the respondents application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in LRC Case No. N- RULINGS:
531, in violation of Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the said case was set for initial hearing 1. The rule is that only questions of law may be reviewed in this Court on a petition for review
on June 18, 1975. Petitioners also averred that although the survey plan of the subject lot, was on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also been held that the finding of
processed and approved by the Land Registration Commission, it was not submitted to the Director of facts of the appellate court may be questioned in this Court, where as in this case, the latters
the Bureau of Lands for re-verification and approval as required by Sections 2 and 3 of Presidential judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, or such findings are contrary to the admissions
Decree No. 239. As such, according to the petitioner, the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the of the parties, or when certain relevant facts are overlooked, which, if property considered, would
property. justify a different conclusion.
The petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying the proceedings in LRC No. N-531, as well
as the courts decision therein, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as well as the 2. NO. The trial court dispensed with a full-blown trial because, precisely, the parties themselves
property subject matter of the case. This is in view of the courts failure to comply with Section 51 of agreed thereto, on the claim that the issues raised may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, the
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioner also prayed OCT No. 0662 issued in favour of the private memoranda and the appended documents, without need of presenting witnesses thereon. A party
respondents be declared null and void. may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary evidence and
In the private respondents answer, they averred that the subject lot had been theirs and their thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence.
predecessors private and exclusive property for more than fifty years. According them, even if there In this case, no less than the petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General through
were deficiencies on the part of the administrative officials in complying with the procedures relative Special Attorney Vicente Seria, agreed to dispense with a full-blown trial.
to land registration, the same was not jurisdictional, but merely a procedural flaw. As such, the failure
of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission to comply with the law did not result in 3. NO. The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents and that
nullifying the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-531. The respondents countered, the action of the the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the same. As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the
petitioner had long since prescribed. private respondents had the burden of complying with the statutory requirement of serving the
The private respondents filed a motion in LRC Case No. N-531 for the issuance of a writ of possession Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application and amended application, and to show
and the demolition of the houses of the occupants. The court granted the motion. The Director of the proof of their compliance thereon. However, we also agree with the CA that it was the burden of the
Bureau of Lands, likewise, prayed for the suspension of the enforcement of the writ pending final petitioner in the trial court to prove the material allegations of its complaint.
resolution of Civil Case No. 7514. The court refused to suspend the enforcement of its decision. In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
On November 19, 1981, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court. On March 18, 1985, this Court rendered a allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter.
decision dismissing the petition without prejudice to the outcome of the petitioners action against the
private respondents in Civil Case No. 7514. The decision of the Court became final and executory. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
During the hearing of March 27, 1989, the parties agreed to forego a full-blown trial and to instead file overcome the prima facie case created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail;
their respective "Memorandum of Authority" and to submit evidence in support of their respective it does not shift the burden of proof. In this case, the personnel of the Land Registration Commission
contentions. The court issued an order on the said date, giving the parties thirty days to submit their and the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531 are presumed to have performed their duty of serving a copy of the
respective memoranda and evidence. application and its appendages to the petitioner. It was thus the burden of the petitioner to prove that:
The trial court declared that the requisite copies of the notice of initial hearing had been transmitted (a) it was not served with a copy of the application of the private respondents and its annexes; (b) the
to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Bureau of Lands as confirmed by Josefina Bacarusso, the private respondents failed to append to their application the survey plan of Lot No. 2821, duly
incumbent Branch Clerk of Court when LRC Case No. N-531 was being heard. The court further stated approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. Nos. 1529 and 239. Unless the
that the petitioner failed to adduce at least prima facie evidence to prove the material allegations of same were admitted by the respondents, the petitioner should have adduced in evidence the relevant
the complaint. The presumption then is that the personnel of CFI and the officers of the Bureau of portions of the records of LRC Case No. N-531, including the decision of the trial court, to prove that
Lands performed their duties in accordance with law, there being no evidence to the contrary. The the Director of the Bureau of Lands was not served with a copy of the application and the amended
court even noted the fact that the petitioner, through counsel, agreed to dispense with the trial and to application
submit the case for decision after the submission of the parties respective memoranda and
documentary evidence. The CFI committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners complaint and in not rendering
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the trial court acted arbitrarily when it rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. In turn, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
judgment based on the pleadings. They contend that the trial court should have conducted a full- CFI.
blown trial instead of allowing the parties to forego with the same. The private respondents, for their
part, admitted that the Land Registration Commissions survey plan had not been re-evaluated much IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the
less approved, by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. They averred, however, that the same was Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 7514 is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Court
merely a procedural defect. of First Instance appealed from is also SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Court hereby nullifies Original
Certificate of Title No. 6662 under the names of the private respondents and orders the reversion of What the Court finds especially questionable here is the choice of the venue for the civil action.
the property covered by the said title to the petitioner. Although both parties appear to be residents and running their affairs in Metro Manila, the private
respondent filed his complaint in Catarman, Northern Samar in an obvious attempt to inconvenience
16. G.R. No. 75379 March 31, 1989 the petitioners. The lower courts should have taken this matter into consideration if only for reasons of
Spouses REYNALDO and ESTELITA JAVIER, petitioners, equity. Legally, of course, the lack of proper venue was deemed waived by the petitioners when they
vs. failed to invoke it in their original motion to dismiss. Even so, the motivation of the private respondent
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEON S. GUTIERREZ, JR. should have been taken into account by both the trial judge and the respondent court in arriving at
their decisions.
Facts: Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments for harassment and the circumvention
Private respondent was charged with estafa under BP Blg 22 in the RTC of Makati for issuing to the of the law through cunning manipulations of the procedural rules by counsel who may be too clever
petitioners a check that was subsequently dishonored and not made good despite the required notice for their own good. Rules of procedure are intended to expedite rather than complicate, and much less
of dishonor. In private respondents complaint filed in RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar, he alleged to obstruct, the administration of justice. There is no excuse why the bench and the bar should not
that the petitioners have inveigled him into signing the very check subject of the criminal case for know this principle by now.
which he is now facing prosecution. Petitioners motion to dismiss the civil case filed by the WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court and its resolution are SET ASIDE and Civil Case filed
respondent on the grounds of lack of cause of action and litis pendentia was denied. The civil case was by the private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar is DISMISSED, with
set for trial despite the petitioners second motion for reconsideration based on the original two costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
grounds and alleging the additional ground of improper venue. The petitioners questioned the trial
courts decision in denying their motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in the Intermediate 17. Evangeline Alday, petitioner vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, respondent.
Appellate Court which affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence this petition for review on certiorari GR No. 138822, January 23, 2001
under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent can raise his reason for issuing the very check subject of the Facts:
criminal case against him in a separate civil action for damages and against the petitioners in another On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the Regional
court. Trial Court of Makati alleging that petitioner Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated
Ruling: cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred by petitioner in the course
As the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted with the of her work as an insurance agent for respondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages,
criminal case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The applicable provision is Rule 111, Section 1, of attorney's fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her
the Rules of Court. right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney's fees, litigation
Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by
cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a first lien respondent.
on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party Respondent filed a "Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To
without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court. Declare Defendant In Default" because petitioner's answer was allegedly filed out of time. However,
As the civil action based on the same act was also deemed filed in the RTC of Makati, it was also the trial court denied the motion and similarly rejected respondent's motion for reconsideration. A few
before that same court that he could offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the weeks later, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim, contending that the trial
petitioners. The counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by
upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action. petitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from
A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having
are present: (1) that it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence failed to answer such counterclaim.
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) that it does not require for its adjudication The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim and
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has consequently, denied petitioner's motion. The court found petitioner's counterclaim to be merely
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. All these circumstances are present in the case before the Regional permissive in nature and held that petitioner's failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from
Trial Court of Makati. acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The trial court similar denied petitioner's motion for
This being so, it was improper for the private respondent to file his civil complaint in the Regional Trial reconsideration. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
Court of Northern Samar alleging the very defense he should be making in the Regional Trial Court of Issues:
Makati. It is, of course, not possible for him now to invoke a different defense there because he would 1. WON the respondent is estopped from questioning the petitioners non-payment of docket
be contradicting his own verified complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Northern Samar. In effect, fees.
therefore, he is arguing that both courts have jurisdiction to consider the same claim of deception he 2. WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal filed by petitioner.
is making in connection with the same transaction and involving the same parties. 3. WON the counterclaim of the petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature.
private respondent is now seeking to make amends by filing a separate civil action based on the same Ruling:
matter in the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar. 1. No. Petitioners claim that respondent is estopped from questioning her(petitioner) non-
The principal reason of the respondent court in sustaining the trial judge is that Civil Case filed by the payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it filed the motion
private respondent is not barred because it was filed not by the petitioners but by the private to strike out answer with compulsory counterclaim and to declare defendant in default is
respondent. If such logic were accepted, every accused could file his own civil complaint against the unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right
offended party based on the same transaction involved in the prosecution, but in another court. The within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
effect would not only be multiplicity of suits but delay and frustration of the criminal case. has abandoned or declined to assert it.15 In the case at bar, respondent cannot be
considered as estopped from assailing the trial court's jurisdiction over petitioner's charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out
counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself - the body of business, filed a suit for damages before the RTC. Respondent filed an answer with Counterclaim,
where the action is pending - even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties denying its alleged wanton appointment of other distributors and that petitioner Calibre filed the
and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court. damage suit to avoid paying its overdue accounts. It also moved that petitioner Sebastians be
impleaded as co-defendants, considering that they bound themselves as solidary debtors under the
2. It is significant to note that this objection to the appellate court's jurisdiction is raised for the distributorship/dealership agreement.
first time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue before the appellate Issue:
court. Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a WON petitioner Calibre is entitled to an award of damages.
party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very Held:
proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in the event No, petitioner Calibre is not entitled to an award of damages. No form of damages can be awarded to
that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent Calibre for it miserably failed to prove its right to the reliefs it sought. The Court agrees with the CAs conclusion
actively took part in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals by filing its appellee's brief that there is no adequate proof that Bayerphil was guilty of abusing its rights. Good faith is presumed and that
with the same. Its participation, when taken together with its failure to object to the appellate the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same. In civil cases, the law requires that the party
court's jurisdiction during the entire duration of the proceedings before such court, who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it, which Calibre
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case by such tribunal and failed to establish.
accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of
Appeals' assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal.
19. G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987
3. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
vs.
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is
merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioner's claims differs from that
needed to establish respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from Facts:
petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent's Herein petitioner and respondent RepaCom entered into an agreement denominated "Contract of
claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that Constitutional Purchase and Sale of nterparation Goods" wherein the former bound itself to pay the
conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort purchase price in ten equal yearly installments with interest of the cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant,
of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection and three (3) filing boats sold to it by the latter. Prior to the due of the first installment, respondent
between the parties' claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own RepaCom sent to the petitioner a written remainder thereof which was responded by it with two
admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging ambiguity in the contract between the parties
own, was not based upon the Special Agent's Contract. However, petitioner's claims for consisting in the agreements failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the
damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are first installment would arise. Respondent RepaCom subsequently filed a civil action for collection
compulsory. based on what it deemed to be the due date. In turn, petitioner move for said actions dismissal where
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the it alleged that the pendency of the actions for declaratory relief yields no cause of action could be
other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive deemed to exist in favor of respondent RepaCom for collection. The trial court denied the motion and
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent the sum claimed by it. Aggrieved, the decision was
Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need appealed to the CA, which later on affirmed the collection suit. Thus, this action. The petitioner now
to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the asserts that the collection of the money claims is barred because it should have been set up as a
court acquire jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, which the respondent failed to do so and
petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and instead, filed it in a separate suit.
malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If Issue:
respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result WON the failure to set up the money claim in the declaratory relief actions barred its
in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint. collection in a separate civil case?
18. G.R. No. 161431 October 13, 2010 Held:
CALIBRE TRADERS, INC., et. al., petitioners, No. Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
vs. proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent. complaint. Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed
and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer.
Facts: This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and were decided on the merits. The final verdict
Petitioner Calibre was one of respondents distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within the was that the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without foundation
Pangasinan and Tarlac provinces effective from 1989-1991. However, petitioner Calibre failed to settle its and, in the light of all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct
obligation making respondent to stop from delivering stocks to it. Several letters were communicated by the and delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was decreed in
parties to reach a settlement which eventually failed due to petitioner Mario Sebastians expressed the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of
discontent in respondents refusal to credit his claims in full and underscored the alleged inaction of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial justice to
respondent in reconciling petitioner's accounts. Petitioner Calibre, accusing respondent of maliciously pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules
breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating its accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it,
of procedure are after all laid down in order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the
achievement of that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance. FACTS:
Beatriz g. Vda De dios, Plaintiff-Appellee filed an action for recovery of possession of land was filed on
January 24, 1963 against Leandro Balagot, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch.
She alleged in her complaint that she is the registered owner of parcel of land that she had purchased
20. G.R. No. 105751 June 30, 1993
from J.M. Tuason& Co., that defendant has been in possession of a portion of said parcel of land,
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
without the knowledge and tolerance of J.M. Tuason & Co., and that in spite of demands on him by
vs. RUFINO CO, HIGHLINE MERCANTILE, INC., LUCITA VELOSO YAP, CLOVERLEAF
plaintiff and her predecessor-in-interest, defendant has failed and refused to vacate the land and re-
SUPERMARKET, INC., SAN ANDRES COMMERCIAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
move his house and other construction thereon.
The defendant filed an answer with a counterclaim. Alleged therein were that the portion of land
FACTS: occupied by defendant, an area of 700 square meters owned by Telesforo Deudor in 1873; that from
Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action as plaintiff in the court below to recover Pedro Deudor, successor-in-interest of Telesforo, he bought the portion of land, that right after the
a sum of money arising from a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted sale, he took possession of the land, subsequently constructing thereon a house; that pursuant to an
to defendant Rufino Co, and from certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor by his co- agreement between J.M. Tuason & Co., and the Deudor heirs dated March 16, 1953, defendant's right
defendants Highline Mercantile, Inc., Lucita Veloso Yap, Cloverleaf Supermarket, Inc., and San Andres to the land has preference over the sale in favor of plaintiff; that, therefore, plaintiff should reconvey
Commercial. After defendants' Amended Answer to Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was the portion of the land involved herein to defendant or pay him P4,900.00 for the land, P40,000.00 for
admitted, the case was set for Pre-Trial Conference. For various reasons, however, the conference was his house, and P5,000.00 for attorneys fees and damages.
repeatedly reset. On 19 December 1989, counsel for plaintiff, petitioner herein, failed to attend the Plaintiff answered defendant's counterclaim. Prior to this scheduled hearing date, defendant filed a
Pre-Trial Conference. Consequently, defendants moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice. The motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, attaching the same to the motion, against J.M. Tuason
motion was granted thus the plaintiff's representative and counsel having failed to appear for & Co. and Pedro Deudor, for payment of the value of the house and lot in case of eviction and the said
today's setting, Atty. Luis Vera Cruz, Jr., for the defendants moved that the above-entitled case be motion was denied by the court for lack of merit.
dismissed, without prejudice. Finding merit in said motion, the same is hereby granted.On 22 January Hence this petition.
1990, private respondents moved to set the reception of their evidence in support of their ISSUES:
counterclaim. Petitioner opposed the motion. (1) Whether Or Not the third-party complaint admissible.
On 2 April 1990, the trial court denied the motion of private respondents, prompting them to (2) whether or not order denying the admission of the third-party complaint be appealed from at this
elevate the order of denial to the Court of Appeals which, on 18 December 1991, reversed the stage of the proceedings..
questioned order and directed the trial court to set the reception of their evidence on their HELD:
counterclaim. Its motion for reconsideration having on 2 June 1992 been denied, petitioner instituted 1. As a rule the admission of a third-party complaint is left to the discretion of the trial court.
the instant petition.Petitioner contends that the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal In the first case, the vendor is summoned by being made a co-defendant; in the second, by being
of the counterclaim. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that their compulsory counterclaim made a third-party defendant. From this it can be seen that a third-party complaint filed after the
should not have been included in the dismissal. answer but before trial is not late; Article 1559's time-limit does not apply thereto. And Sec. 2 of Rule
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. 12 of the old Rules of Court, then applicable, provided that after service of his ans wer, defendant may,
Ruling: with notice to plaintiff, move for leave as third-party plaintiff to file a complaint against a third-party
YES. The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication defendant.
by the court." This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original As adverted to above, in this case, the third-party complaint, as against Pedro Deudor, seeks
suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial enforcement of the warranty against eviction. The same is thus required by law to be resorted to
court no longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case, as when it dismisses instead of being left to be filed as a separate action. If not raised in the action for eviction, the same
the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal controversy, must will not prosper and the vendor will be released from his warranty. Not only does the admission of the
likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the grant of any relief under the third-party complaint against Pedro Deudor, avoid multiplicity of suits; it is necessary for defendant to
counterclaim. enforce said warranty against his vendor.
For the guidance of Bench and Bar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules As regards J.M. Tuason & Co., and defendant, however, no relationship of vendor and vendee obtains
of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory and the third-party complaint does not partake of the nature of an enforcement of a warranty against
counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for the dismissal of the complaint; instead, he eviction; rather, it seeks to enforce the Tuason-Deudor agreement. As such, the trial court properly
should only move to have plaintiff declared non-suited on the complaint so that the latter can no disallowed the same. Article 1558 of the Civil Code requires defendant in eviction to summon to the
longer present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be declared as in default on suit his vendor, in this case Pedro Deudor; non-parties to the sale, such as J.M. Tuason & Co., do not
the compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on his counterclaim. have to be summoned therein; hence, there being no necessity for inclusion of J.M. Tuason & Co., the
This will enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his compulsory counterclaim, disallowance of the third-party complaint against it was not erroneous.
which is intertwined with the complaint, because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the complaint 2. As to the appealability of the order disallowing the third-party complaint against Pedro Deudor,
and of the whole case. The non-dismissal of the complaint, the nonsuit notwithstanding, provides the suffice it to reiterate that the same would finally dispose of defendant's right to enforce his warranty
basis for the compulsory counterclaim to remain active and subsisting. against eviction, since a separate action for the same, without having thus summoned to the suit the
vendor, would not prosper . After said disallowance, nothing further was left to be done in the court a
21 quo, as regards defendant's right to enforce against Deudor the warranty of eviction. Said denial was
therefore appealable.
22. G.R. No. L-24103, August 10, 1967
BEATRIZ G. VDA. DE DIOS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEANDRO BALAGOT, PETITIONER- 23. GR No. 137359 September 13, 2004
APPELLANT, VS. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., AND PEDRO DEUDOR, OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES. Edwin N. Tribiana vs Lourdes Tribiana
FACTS: Herein respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of HELD: No. There is no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower court
Bacoor, Cavite against her husband who left their conjugal home with their child and has the effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous
since then deprived the former of lawful custody of the child. It was found out that order of dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of
the child was being withheld by respondents mother-in-law. Petitioner moved to the intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the
dismiss the petition on the ground that respondent failed to allege that a case without notice to and consent of the intervenor has the effect of putting to rest only the
compromise was made before the filing in court as requires under Art. 151 of the respective claims of the said original parties inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the claim
Family Code. Lourdes however showed proofs of prior efforts at a compromise which of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original
failed together with the Certificcate to file action from their barangay. Edwins parties. When an intervenor has become a party to a case, it is error for the court to dismiss the action
motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration thereafter was denied. The court to the latters prejudice.
ordered that the child be surrendered to Lourdes, the child being below 7 years old
and as according to law must not be separated from the mother. Petitioner filed a No. The granting of leave to file an amended pleading, in this case an intervention complaint, is a
petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA but was denied matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court subject only to limitations that
also even after a motion for reconsideration. Hence the petition. the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or
ISSUE: WON the RTC and appellate court should have dismissed the that it was made to delay action. In the case at bar, the amended complaint shows only that it merely
petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of action.
condition precedent under Art. 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. Although it is true that Art. 151 of the Family
Code provides that an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation vs. Philippine Infrastructures, Inc.,
condition precedent and a ground for dismissal, such rule does not apply to cases
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., The Solid Guaranty, Inc., B.F. Homes, Inc., Pilar Development
which may not be the subject of a compromise. In fact, even if such rule be followed,
Corporation and Tomas F. Aguirre
respondent herein has presented evidence through a Certificate to file Action, that a
compromise proceeding was availed to which petitioner failed to oppose. In
25. G.R. No. 120384. January 13, 2004
addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a
Facts:
jurisdictional defect and can only be subjected to an amendment. Noreover, in a
The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of
habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child, it is
their Deed of Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation
paramaount to immediately resolve the issue. The court also cited Section 412 of
provided by PNB to respondent which upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner
the Local Government Code providing that where a person has been deprived of
was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the respondent. Upon filing of the complaint to collect the
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus, the parties may go directly to the court.
said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action on the part of the
petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of
24. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Vs RTC Manila, Raycor Aircontrol System Inc
the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed
and CA
a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the
GR No. 89909 September 21, 1990
dismissal of the case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA
denied the motion to set aside the decision of RTC and its motion for reconsideration.
FACTS: Good Earth Emporium executed formerly a deed of chattel mortgage over certain air
Issue :
conditioning units installed in its GEE building. Such building was later on subjected to a foreclosure
Whether or not the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
wherein Uniwide Sales and BPI and other banks ,collectively called as BPI Consortium, acquired.
Herein petitioner filed a replevin case to recover the mortgage airconditioners or if not to be paid by
Held:
Uniwide,BPI and others the unpaid obligations on the units.
Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the
On July 17 1986 private respondent herein. Raycor, filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging it has
complaint of the petitioner emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner
direct and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that it will either gain or lose
once it fails to comply with paying its creditors by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents
by the direct legal operation and effect of judgment. The motion and intervention complaint was
obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or
admitted.
liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for
On March 15, 1988, Metrobank and BPI Consortium filed a joint motion to dismiss. The court dismissed
petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents
the complaint with prejudice.
Private respondent, Raycor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
with prejudice claiming that it was not notified of the dismissal in due time. On June 2, 1988, the
respondent court granted the motion filed by the intervenor RAycor. Private respondent filed a motion 26. [G.R. No. 153777. April 15, 2005]
to admit amended complaint to which Metrobank filed an opposition. The respondent court admitted PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT
the said amended complaint in intervention. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus CORPORATION, respondent
with respondent CA contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion by letting
the intervention suit survive and admitting the amended intervention complaint. The CA dismissed FACTS:
the petition. Hence petition to the highest court. On December 16, 1996, The LHDC, and PDB entered into a Loan Agreement in the amount
of P40,000,000.00, to finance the ongoing construction of the seven-storey AGZ Building at San
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent courts erred in letting the intervention suit to survive despite the Fernando City, La Union. To secure the loan, the LHDC executed a real estate mortgage over the 589-
dismissal of the main action. sq m. lot where the AGZ Building was then being constructed. Subsequently, the latter executed two
Whether or not the respondent courts erred in admitting the amended complaint in (2) promissory notes payable on or before February 24, 2012 in favor of the PDB .Thereafter, the LHDC
intervention. executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the PDB, wherein it assigned to the latter all its rental
incomes from its AGZ Building, as payment of its obligations. application thereof by the petitioner to the perceived loan deficiency of the respondent are germane
For non-payment of loan, non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the Deed of to, and are in fact, intertwined with the cause of action of nullification of the real estate mortgage and
Assignment, and failure to comply with the conditions of the promissory notes, the PDB caused the the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof, as well as the sale at public auction. They are, likewise, germane
extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. It was sold to the PDB as the highest bidder. and related to the respondents claim in its original complaint that it remained the owner of the
On April 5, 1999, the PDB filed with the (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint against the LHDC for property despite the sale at public auction; hence, it is entitled to lease the property and collect the
Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure, Mortgage Contract, Promissory Notes and for Damages. It was rentals therefrom. By its supplemental complaint, the respondent merely enlarged its original causes
alleged, that the real estate mortgage was Void because it was executed on December 16, 1996, a of action on account of events that transpired after the filing of the original complaint and prayed for
day after TCT No. T-45337 was issued by the Register of Deeds, and two months before the execution additional reliefs. The principal and core issues raised by the parties in their original pleadings remain
of the promissory notes; the first page was unsigned by the parties; and it never received the the same.
proceeds of the loan in the amount of P40,000,000.00.
The LHDC alleged that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was void
because the LHDC did not, in any way, violate the said deed, and the PDB even failed to take into
27. G. R. No. 156747 February 23, 2005
account the remittances made under the promissory note. Before the pre-trial, the LHDC filed a Motion
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners,
for Leave to file a Supplemental Complaint. It alleged that after the filing of the original complaint, it
vs.
agreed to enter into a contract of lease with AMA Computer College, but the latter required it to first
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.
secure the petitioners consent. The LHDC wrote to PDB, requesting its consent to the said lease.
Facts:
However, the latter gave unreasonable conditions in its reply. This prompted the AMA Computer
College to back-out from the contract. Furthermore, the PDB wrote every tenant of the LHDC,
Petitioners were charged with the crime of libel before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioners filed a
demanding that they directly remit their respective rentals to it. Worse still, the PDB, which was
Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
leasing a space in the same building, had ceased paying its monthly rentals since November 1999, on
offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private
the pretext that it was setting-off the same against the loan deficiency of the LHDC.
respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
The PDB opposed the supplemental complaint; it argued that the supplemental matters involved
Article 360 of the RPC. The public prosecutor argued that the RTC of QC had jurisdiction over the case.
therein would bring into the case new causes of action, distinct from those mentioned in the original
He maintained that during the time material to this case, the complainant was a resident of both QC
complaint. On July 27, 2000, over the opposition of the PDB, the trial court issued an Order, admitting
and Marikina as shown in his Reply-Affidavit filed during his preliminary investigation of the case. The
the supplemental complaint. The PDB moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the
petitioners contended that the complaint-affidavit executed by complainant and
motion. Dissatisfied, the PDB sought redress in the CA via a petition for certiorari.
th e i n f o r m a t i o n fi l e d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s t a t e t h a t c o m p l a i n a n t s r e s i d e n c e i s
i n Marikina, thus the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined
ISSUE:
solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information. The trial court rendered an Order
dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction and it held that the editorial box of Abante is in Manila
(1) Whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion; and (2) Whether or not
and that the address of complainant is in Marikina as provided in the information. The complainant
LHDCs supplemental complaint bring into the case new causes of action, distinct from those
then filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article was
mentioned in the original complaint.
published, he was actually residing in QC. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a
resident of Marikina at the time of
RULING:
publication but he rectified the error by his supplemental affidavit which indicated QC as his actu al
res id en ce at the time o f pu blication of th e d efamator y ar ticle. However , th e motion for
(1) No; the CA rendered a Decision, finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the reconsideration was denied. Respondents file a notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. The CA
trial court in admitting the supplemental complaint of the LHDC. The CA ratiocinated: reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
The original complaint for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory notes denied by the CA, hence this petition before the Supreme Court.
and for damages was founded on the same transaction the loan and contract of mortgage as security
for such loan as that of the supplemental complaint. The original complaint sought the annulment of Issue:
the promissory note and the contract of mortgage. Thus, the acts complained of under the
supplemental complaint, namely: that petitioner imposed unreasonable conditions in giving its Whether the RTC of QC had jurisdiction.
consent to a pending lease agreement between respondent and a third party and that petitioner
demanded that rentals on the property be made directly to it are acts calculated to exercise Ruling:
petitioners rights, validly or invalidly, as the obligee and mortgagor in the transaction sought to be
annulled in the original complaint. The RTC o f Q C h a d no jurisdiction. The
(2) No; The supplemental complaint is based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t f o r jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. the offense should have been committed o r an y one of its ess ential ingred ients to ok place
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribes the manner and substance of filing with in the territor ial jurisdiction of the court. In libel cases, the criminal action and civil action for
supplemental pleadings: SECTION 6. Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous ar ticle is
setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading pr in ted and fi r st pub lish ed or where any of th e off ended parties actu ally resides at the
sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of time of the commission of the offense. In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at
the order admitting the supplemental pleading. the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the
The issue as to whether the petitioner stopped the payment of rentals and the application City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at
thereof on the perceived loan deficiency of the respondent, is a new matter that occurred after the the time the purported libelous article was printed. A perusal, however, of the information involved in
filing of the original complaint. However, the relief for damages, the collection of the rentals and the this case easily reveals that the alleg ations con tain ed th erein are utterly insuffi cient to
ves t ju risdiction on the RTC o f Q u e z o n ultimate objective the goal of all rules of procedure of achieving substantial justice as expeditiously as
C i t y. O t h e r t h a n p e r f u n c t o r i l y s t a t i n g Q u e z o n C i t y a t t h e beginning of the infor possible.
mation, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared theinformation did not bother to indicate whether 2.
the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either becau se Ab ante was p rinted in th at Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states:
p lace o r pr ivate respo ndent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.
came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of
in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the informa tio n rend ers the this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
latter fatally d efective. Sad ly fo r priva te res pon den t, the informa tio n fi led b efore the The rule suggests the preferential mode of serving pleadings and other papers personally on the other
trial co urt fa lls wa y shor t o f th is party to ensure (and prove) the latters receipt thereof. The preference is apparent from the phrase
req uirement. Th ea s s i s t a n t c i t y p r o s e c u t o r s f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y l a y t h e b a s i s f whenever practicable. It is then incumbent upon the court to use its discretion in determining whether
o r i n v o k i n g t h e jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to substantial justice will be served (or rights unjustifiably prejudiced) if it resolves to dismiss a petition
take cognizance of this case. because of non-compliance with a mere directory rule. We say directory because of the use of the
word may.
28. [G.R. No. 144533. September 23, 2003]
JIMMY L. BARNES a.k.a. JAMES L. BARNES, petitioner, vs. TERESITA C. REYES, ELIZABETH C. 29. G.R. No. 140158
PASION, MA. ELSA C. GARCIA, IMELDA C. TRILLO, MA. ELENA C. DINGLASAN and RICARDO P. FERNANDO T. BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ISAGANI PALAD,
CRISOSTOMO, respondents. Presiding Judge, Branch 53, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, and CATALINA BAGASINA,
Facts: respondents.
This case emanated from a complaint for ejectment filed by siblings Teresita C. Reyes, Elizabeth C. Facts:
Pasion, Imelda C. Trillo. Ma. Elena C. Dinglasan and Ricardo P. Crisostomo against petitioner Jimmy Petitioner Fernando Baltazar and private respondent Catalina Bagasina were both candidates for the
Barnes. position of municipal mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga during the May 11, 1998 local elections. The
Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Teresita and her co-parties. On appeal to the Regional Trial Municipal Board of Canvassers declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor of the municipality. On
Court, the said decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was reversed. Respondents Teresita C. Reyes June 29, 1998, Private respondent filed with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, an election protest.
and her siblings filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the petition. The Summons was served on petitioner on July 7, 1998. Thereafter, Petitioner filed with the trial court his
verification and certification on non-forum shopping was signed only by one of the six petitioners Answer with Counter-Protest. Private respondent filed a Motion to Expunge from the Records Of this
without any showing that the signatory (Teresita C. Reyes) was duly authorized to bind her fellow Case Protestee's Answer And Counter-Protest on the ground that the same was filed out of time or
petitioners. three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period.
Teresita filed a motion for reconsideration attaching therewith the Special Power of Attorney executed The trial court granted private respondents motion and declared that it has no jurisdiction to entertain
by the other five petitioners specifically authorizing her to sign the verification and certification page the belatedly filed Answer with Counter-Protest. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by
of their petition and file it on their behalf, which petitioner opposed. The Court of Appeals found the trial court. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC. He alleged that his Answer
respondents motion for reconsideration meritorious and reinstated their petition for review. petitioner with Counter-Protest was actually filed on July 13, 1998 as evidenced by a certification; and that the
moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of the Court of Appeals.CA denied petitioners registry receipt was stamped the date July 14, 1998 because it was posted past two oclock in the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition. afternoon of July 13, 1998. The envelope, however, which contained the answer was postmarked July
Issue: 15, 1998.
WON the subsequent filing of the Special Power of Attorney by respondents showing the authority of Public respondent COMELEC issued the challenged Resolution dismissing the petition reasoning, that
Teresita to file the petition in their behalf did not cure the fatal defect. the date postmarked on the envelope is conclusively presumed to be the date of mailing, and the
WON respondents failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil same cannot be overcome by a mere certification by the Operations Manager that the same was
Procedure requiring that pleadings and other papers must be personally served on the other party. actually received on July 13, 1998, sent on July 14, 1998 but postmarked July 15, 1998.
Held: Issue:
1. WON THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides: WON THE ANSWER WITH COUNTER PROTEST WAS FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF FIVE
x x x The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory (5) DAYS.
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously WON THE COMELEC AND THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ANSWER WITH
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such COUNTER PROTEST WAS MAILED ON JULY 14, 1998
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete Held:
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar 1. Petitioner cannot insist that he was denied due process because he sought a reconsideration of
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the trial courts assailed order.
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
compliance applies. While this section requires that it be strictly complied with, in essence, what it ruling complained of.
means is that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. But 2. A close scrutiny of the record shows that the envelope which contained petitioners Answer
it does not thereby rule out substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances. The rule against with Counter-Protest was filed postmarked July 15, 1998. It is, therefore, clear that the pleading was
forum-shopping was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly filed three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period within which to file the same, considering
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its that summons was served on him on July 7, 1998.
It would be a legal absurdity for the Court to allow a mere certification, whose author has not been guilty to the charge. Josalie Baguio has remained at large.The evidence for the prosecution show that
presented to testify on its veracity, to overthrow the evidentiary value of an uncontroverted petitioner was formerly an area manager of Rodsons Collection Center which sells various personal
documentary exhibit such as the Registry Receipt and the postmark actually stamped on the envelope products, such as ladies T-shirts and perfumes, mens cologne, care soap and shading strip. On
itself to prove the actual date of mailing of the pleading. December 18, 1995, petitioner and Josalie Baguio withdrew from the Rodsons Collection Center
3. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which several items consisting of mens cologne, soap, and other sundries worth P1,583.00. Both signed the
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of required trust receipt agreement.However, petitioner and Josalie failed to remit the proceeds of the
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training. i[7] However, when an sale despite Rodsons Collection Centers several demands, hence, they were charged with
administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre- estafa.Petitioner contends that while she signed the trust receipt agreement, however, she did so only
existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally for the purpose of identifying her as the area manager of Josalie Baguio. She denied receiving any
determine what the law means.ii[8] Thus an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by item. The stocks withdrawn were for the account of Josalie. in finding petitioner guilty as charged, the
the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of MTCC ruled that inasmuch as she signed the trust receipt agreement, she is bound by the terms
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. iii[9] stipulated therein. Her failure to remit the proceeds or to return the goods to Rodsons Collection
In the case at bar, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of Center constitutes estafa under Article 315(1) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Regional Trial
the COMELEC conforms rather than conflicts with the governing statute, implementing rules and Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City, affirmed the MTCC Decision. Petitioner then elevated the matter
controlling case law on the matter. to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. petition for being insufficient in form, not being accompanied by duplicate original or certified true
copies of the documents and material parts of the record that would support the allegations.
30. Boiser v Judge Aguirre, Jr Moreover, there was no written explanation why service of the petition was not done personally.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court.
May 16, 2005 Hence, the instant petition.
FACTS: ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to comply with Section 2, Rule 42 and
The case stems from an ejectment case filed by Petitioner Boiser against one Julleza, which was Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
decided in favor of Boiser by the MTC. When the case reached the RTC on appeal by Julleza, Julleza HELD
filed a motion to release bond which was granted by Respondent Judge. Boiser then filed the instant
administrative case against Respondent Judge for ignorance of the law, alleging that the motion did
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition.
not state that he was furnished a copy of the motion thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
After it was found out by Boiser that Respondent Judge held in his favor in the decision of his Section 2, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides:
ejectment case, Boiser withdrew his administrative complaint. The administrative complaint was still "SEC. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original
placed under investigation with the CA which held to dismiss the case; the case was raised to the copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full
Supreme Court for instant review. names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time;
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case is moot, the petitioner having withdrawn the case (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
RULING: No, mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
administrative complaint against any member of the bench originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the
The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
may warrant, an erring respondent. Even the retirement of respondent does not oust the Court of its
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to
petitioner herself admits that the only documents attached to the petition in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482
hold office during the pendency of respondents case.
were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC and the MTCC. There were no copies of the
On deciding the main issue, the Court held that the Motion to Release Bond was defective, not having
pleadings filed below or other material portions of the record which would support the allegations in
a proper notice of hearing. Not to mention the fact that the date and time of the hearing were not
the petition. Indeed, this is contrary to Section 2, Rule 42 quoted above.
specified, and that neither complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof. These were
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
never controverted by respondent judge. A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere
"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed."
31. ERTRUDES THE vs. THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
Again, petitioner admits that she failed to comply with the above provision. She contends, however,
G.R. No. 141180
that no prejudice was caused to the parties by her non-compliance.
January 11, 2005
Clearly, petitioner violated both provisions quoted above which warrants the dismissal of her petition
by the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
32. SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM and ROSARIO T. LIM vs. PEPITO M. VERA CRUZ
Petitioner Gertrudes Teh and Josalie Baguio were charged with estafa before the Municipal Trial Courts G.R. No. 143646
in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not April 4, 2001
33. GOMEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO AND MARIANO TROCINO
FACTS GR NO. 127692
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are: 18 March 2004
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by petitioner[4] against private
respondents[5] before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case FACTS:
No. 195-M-94, alleging that he has been in possession since 1960 of a 200 square meter portion of Lot
4204 situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan covered by TCT No. 191498 of the Registry of Deeds of Sometime in 1975, spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged 2 parcels of land to Dr. Yujuico in
Bulacan in the names of Turandut, Traviata, Marcelita, Pacita, Marlene, Mathews, Victoria and Rosary, Cebu City. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. Respondent-spouses Trocino sold the lands to
all surnamed Aldaba; that on January 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to him said 200 square meter petitioner-spouses, who in turn redeemed the lands from the mortgagee. However, the spouses
portion, which is included in the formers one-eight share in Lot 4204, consisting of 1,732 square Trocino refused to deliver the titles to petitioner-spouses. Thus, spouses Gomez sued spouses Trocino
meters; that a complaint for ejectment was filed against him in 1993 by private respondent Henry Lim, for delivery of the titles. The husband Trocino died before the suit was filed, thus his children, including
who claims to be the owner of the property occupied by him, being a portion of the parcel of land Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino, were impleaded in the suit. Summons was served, and it was only
covered by TCT No. T-16375 registered in his name; that judgment was rendered against him in the received by Caridad Trocino in behalf of the children. The trial court rendered judgment against the
ejectment case, which he elevated to the appellate court, and that upon investigation, he discovered spouses Trocino and their heirs. Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the
that TCT No. T-16375 in the name of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, by fraud and/or judgment of the RTC with the CA, alleging that no jurisdiction was acquired over them. At that time,
clever machination. On the other hand, private respondents maintained that their title is valid and Adolfo Trocino was a resident of Ohio, USA while Mariano Trocino was a resident of Talibon, Bohol, and
legal. both were not found in Cebu City at the time summons was served.
Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT T-16375.
A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by private respondents on the grounds that said ISSUES:
notice was designed solely to molest them/or it is not necessary to protect petitioners rights. The 1. What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of the service of summons should be
same was opposed by petitioner insisting that the notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to based?
protect his right over the property covered by TCT No. T-16375 and to avoid sale of property pending 2. WON there was a valid service of summons?
the execution of the judgment in the case. HELD:
On July 22, 1998, respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated at 1. The action was an action in personam. While it is a real action because it affects title to or
the back of TCT No. T-16375 upon the posting by private respondents of an indemnity bond in the possession of land, it does not automatically follow that the action is one in rem. In a personal action,
amount of P2,000,000.00. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of
7, 1998. damages. A real action is one affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. An action in personam is
Procedure, assailing the Decision dated January 25, 2000 and Resolution dated June 9, 2000 of the an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action
Court of Appeals which set aside the order of the trial court cancelling the notice of lis pendens. against the thing itself, instead of against the person. The present case is an action in personam,
ISSUE because it is an action against persons, on the basis of their personal liability of non-delivery of titles.
WON Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in Thus, personal service of summons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the court to
cancelling the notice of lis pendens acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
HELD 2. No. There was none. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing
No. The CA did not erred in holding that trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. In
the notice of lis pendens. substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof. explained in the proof of service. Where the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who
With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within
part of it. For such notice serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the the State is essential to acquire jurisdiction over his person. An exception was accorded in Gemperle
particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same unless of course, he v. Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-residents wife, who was a resident of the
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.Based on this principle as well as the express Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case
provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case. In an action in
property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only the 200 square rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
meter portion of the entire area is embraced by the notice of lis pendens. In causing the annotation of jurisdiction on the court provided the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must
such notice, respondents aim is to protect his right as an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling be served upon the defendant for purposes of due process.
of the trial court that the notice of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, and:
restriction of petitioners right of dominion over the entire 5,432 square meter lot covered by TCT 1. the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
16375 in their names is, therefore, an erroneous conclusion. It was also observed that the trial judge 2. the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the
was convinced that the cancellation of the lis pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should not have defendant has or claims a lien or interest;
required petitioners to post a bond of P2,000,000.00.Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules 3. the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the
of Civil Procedure, as amended, earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two Philippines; or
grounds: a) after a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party; or 4. the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines, summons may be served
b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded. It bears extrajudicially by:
emphasis that respondent caused the registration of the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 195-M- a. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
94 for quieting of title to his, 200 square meter lot, not in the ejectment case. Consequently, the b. publication, also with leave of court; or
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-16375 must stay. c. any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
The manner of service of summons must be distinguished between Adolfo Trocino and Mariano For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-
Trocino. Since Adolfo Trocino is a resident of a foreign country, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the
over his person and validly try and decide the case against him; the action being in personam. truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a
Mariano Trocino is a resident of Bohol and not of Cebu City. Thus, summons must be served on him corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another.
personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such Also, the law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be made
impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof a party to a suit. Under paragraph 1, Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation:
of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be xxx shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time
stated in the proof of service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business
34. G.R. No. 81123February 28, 1989 for which it was established.xxx
CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN REBOLLIDO,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents. 2. Yes. Section 13, Rule 14 mandates:
36
37. G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005 38. Erlinda Velayo-Fong vs Spouses Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent. G.R. No. 155488 December 6, 2006
Facts: FACTS:
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry Spouses Raymond and Maria hedy Velayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, spouses Velayo alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident of Hanolulu,
complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title Hawaii,USA. Since Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, Spouses Velayo
(OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827 prayed for a writ to attach Velayo-Fongs properties found in the Philippines.
square meters. On January 9, 1999 the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained However, before the application for the writ can be acted upon by the RTC, spouses Velayo filed an
entry into the petitioners property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence Urgent Motion praying that the summons be served to Velayo-Fong at her Two Condominium
thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the Suites.One at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and another, at Burgos Street, Towers Condominium,
boundary line. Makati. Subsequently, the RTC granted the said motion.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was Then, the Process server indicated on his Officers Return that after several failed attempts to serve the
apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, the copy of summons and complaints issued at the given address of Velayo-Fong, Finally, the Process
brother of respondent, who received the same. The MTC rendered judgment ordering the respondent server was able to serve personally the summons together with the copy of the complaint upon
and all persons occupying the property for and in the latters behalf to vacate the disputed area. Velayo-Fong, not at her two addresses but at the lobby of a hotel, right in the presence of a lobby
Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment counter personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign in the receipt thereof.
of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve Later, the RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-Fong
the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired upon knowing the order of the RTC, filed a Motion to set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was
prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents, complaint
because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officers; return, no summons was served 1. Whether or not petitioner's certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy and not a petition
upon her; that she was has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents material allegation. for review under Rule 45.
The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs order.
Now, Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon her as
2. Whether or not the petition was not properly verified because while the verification was
she did not remember that a man hurled some papers at her while she was entering the elevator and
dated September 15, 2004, the petition was dated September 30, 2004.
not knowing what the papers were all about, she threw back the papers to the man she has a valid
and meritorious defense to refute the material allegations of respondents; complain.
She also argued that the summons should have been served through extraterritorial service since she 3. Whether or not the service of summons on private respondent thru her husband was valid.
is a non-resident.
ISSUES:
Whether or not service of summon may be effective on a non-resident. Held:
RULING: 1. Yes. A petition for certiorari is proper when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
NO. Under Sec.17, Rule 14 when the defendant is a non-resident and he is not found in the country adequate remedy at law.
summons may be served extraterritorially. This kind of service of summons applies only where the
actions is in rem because in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken
defendant is not a prerequisites to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires only from a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken
jurisdiction over the res. from (a),b),c),d),(e),(f),(g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
Where the action is in personam and when the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
summons within the states is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h). In all
be done, however, if the defendant is not physically presents in the country, and thus the court cannot the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
acquire jurisdiction over the person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In the present case, spouses Velayos cause of action and their prayer that actual and moral damages,
plus attorneys fees, be awarded in their favour affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a
judgement therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded, thus, it is an action in final order because it terminates the proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the
personam. As such personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these
court to acquire jurisdiction over their person. defendants is still pending. Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
law, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve
the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.
39. G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
LEAH PALMA, petitioner 2. Yes. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of
vs the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. In this
HON.DANILO P. GALVEZ, Presiding Judge, instance, petitioner attached a verification to her petition although dated earlier than the filing of her
RTC Br. 24, Iloilo City, and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO, private respondent petition. Petitioner explains that since a draft of the petition and the verification were earlier sent to
her in New York for her signature, the verification was earlier dated than the petition
for certiorari filed. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition for certiorari be verified, this is
Facts: not an absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions
The herein petitioner filed with RTC an Action with Damages against the Phil. Heart Center raised are mainly of law.[15] In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.
and its two doctors. Defendants subsequently filed their answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of the herein private 3. Yes. The service of summons under Sec. 16, Rule 14 in relation to Sec. 15 which provides for the
respondent Agudo as additional defendant. As per process servers return, the summons was served extraterritorial service of summons uses the word may and also, hence, it is not mandatory. In Montalban v.
upon private respondent thru her husband MR. AGUDO who received and signed the same in behalf of Maximo the Supreme Court held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7,
his wife who was out of the country. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court
On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion over such defendant.
for Extension of Time to File Answer. On March 15, 2004, another Motion for Extension of time to file
Answer was filed by the said counsel because the draft answer would be sent to private respondent for Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country and makes no issue
her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland. as to the fact that the place where the summons was served was her residence, the service of
summons thru her husband who is presumably a person of suitable age and discretion and therefore
On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] on the ground that the RTC competent to receive such court process on the formers behalf is valid under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was Rules of Court.
temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. The court granted the said motion based on the ground raised by the private The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered for the setting aside the Orders of the
respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. RTC and directed the private respondent to file her answer within the reglementary period from receipt
of the SCs decision.
Issue:
40. Florentino Gonzales, Edgardo Santos, LeopoldoRosete. Et.al
vsBalikbayanKilusang Bayan saPananalapi,Inc. To stave off the impending eviction of petitioners, this Court issued a restraining order on
G.R. NO. 150859, March 28, 2005 April 28, 1986 directed against the reviewing authority and private respondent until further orders.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the court of origin acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners
FACTS even though the statutory norms of the service of summons has not been complied with by the person
Sometime in November 7, 1997, petitioner Florentino Gonzales together with other petitioners who effected the service.
Edgardo Santos, LeopoldoRosete, Felina Victoria and Cristetadela Cruz obtained a loan of P150, 000.
On a promissory note, they bind themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan in monthly 2. Whether or not the fact that the petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land
amortizations of P6,250 for two years starting November 7, 1997 up to November 7, 1999. Petitioner other than the realty claimed by private respondent deserves consideration on appeal by certiorari.
Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands, respondent filed then a case for sum of
money and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue. Summons were thereafter served and the 3. Whether or not the execution pending appeal which was granted without any prior notice
case was set for hearing on September 29, 2000. On the scheduled hearing, defendants appeared but to them is valid.
because they failed to file their answer to the complaint, the court declared them in default and
thereafter allowed the presentation of respondents evidence ex-parte on October 6, 2000. Held:
On January 23, 2001, the court a quo rendered its decision finding for the respondent and against the 1. Yes. Even, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of
petitioners and ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally to the former the sum of P128,953.45 summons have not been strictly complied with in as much as the proof of service of the summons
with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per annum from the time demand was made until upon petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting
fully paid. to substituted service, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were
nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed
a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution. Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to
Petitioners appealed to Regional Trial Court of Bocaue contending that the court a quo erred when it
voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the
declared them in default as they were not notified of the respondents motion to declare them in
Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is
default but the Regional Trial court affirmed the decision of MTC.
equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner
Petitioners elevated the case on Court of Appeals.
was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners substantially complied with the certification on non-forum
2. No. It deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is
shopping and on attachment of certain relevant documents
proscribed by the second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Furthermore,
2. Whether or not the judgement by default is void for lack of jurisdiction over the petitioners
counsel for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal filed with respondent judge that the grievance
who were not serve with summons properly.
to be elevated to the Supreme Court will focus "fully on a question of law" is a self-defeating posture
RULING:
and operates as a legal bar for the Supreme Court to dwell into the truth or falsehood of such factual
1. No. Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners did not satisfactory explain upon failure of the
premise
other petitioners to sign the certification of non-forum shopping nor did it cure the said
defect, hence the petition was appropriately and validly to dismiss.
3. Yes. Petitioners stance that the execution pending appeal which was granted without any
prior notice to them is invalid erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of
2. No, the records showed that after the court a quo issued the default order, the petitioners did
the immediate enforcement of the appealed decision. A contrario, it is the prevailing party moving for
not file any pleading at all questioning its validity. They merely waited for the decision to be
execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court who is obliged to
rendered, and when it was adverse to their interest, they began questioning it. On the other
serve a copy of such motion on the adverse partys counsel, which, on the face of the subject motion,
hand, there was no showing at all that petitioners ever questioned the jurisdiction of the MTC
was effected by personal delivery.
over them, except when the judgment in default was already rendered. Court of Appeals
ruled that to properly avail of the defense of invalid service of summons, petitioners should
The SC ordered for the dismissal of the petition and the lifting of the Restraining Order.
have questioned it and the MTCs exercise of jurisdiction over them from the very start.
CASE NO. 1
41. G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.
G.R. No. 127692 March 10, 2004
DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, et, al., petitioners,
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
vs.
HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS, respondents.
COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.
Facts:
FACTS: Sometime in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land. The
The private respondent filed a suit for desahucio (unlawful detainer) against petitioners.
mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. The respondent spouses Trocino sold the property to
Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
petitioners spouses who in turn, redeemed the lands from mortgagee. The spouses Trocino, however,
them in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to submit the corresponding answer,
refused to convey ownership of the properties to petitioners; hence, spouses Gomez sued spouses
judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary procedure. Upon learning of said decision,
Trocino for delivery of titles. The husband Trocino died before the suit was filed, thus his children
petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were never served notice of the
Adolfo and Mariano impleaded in the suit. Summons was served and it was only received by Caridad
conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They insist that private
Trocino in behalf of the children. The RTC rendered judgment against the spouses Trocino and the
respondent was referring to a different piece of realty and that Dolores' husband should have been
heirs.Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the judgment of the RTC with the CA
impleaded. Upon appeal, the RTC Br. 19 presided over by herein respondent judge, granted private
alleging that no jurisdiction was acquired over them. At that time Adolfo Trocino was already residing
respondents motion for execution pending appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a
supersedeas bond.
in Ohio, U.S.A and Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol. And both were not found in Cebu City at the The lower court denied the motion, holding that there was proper service of summons because the
time summons were served. defendant continued its existence for 3 years from the date of dissolution.
The CA ruled that there was no valid service of summons, and that the service of summons should be
ISSUE: made upon the private respondent itself in accordance with Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
1 What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of the service of summons It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the private respondent be summoned and be
should be based? given its day in court.
2 Was there a valid service of summons? ISSUES:
3 If personal service were impossible to comply what should have been done? 1 Whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in interest to whom
RULING: summons should be served in the civil case for damages;
1. The action was an action in personam, while it is a real action because it affects title or 2 Whether or not there was valid service of summons through Nanette Sison, allegedly the
possession of the land, it does not automatically follow that the action is one in rem. But it is an action secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
against a person on the basis of the personal liability of non delivery of the titles. Thus, personal HELD:
service of summons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the court to acquire 1 YES. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-
jurisdiction over the person. defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner
2. There was no valid summons. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by existed as a corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of
tendering it to him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In another. The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be
substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be made a party to a suit. It shall be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the
explained in the proof of service. time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if the defendant is not physically which it was established. The right of action of the petitioners against Pepsi Cola and its
present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore driver arose not at the time when the complaint was filed but when the acts or omission
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs. constituting the cause of action accrued.
Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-residents wife, who was a resident of the
Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case 2 YES. There was a valid service of summons to bind Pepsi Cola. Whomsoever Miss Sison was
filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case. acting for in receiving the summons there is no question that the notice of the action was
The manner of summons must be distinguished Adolfo Trocino being a non-resident, the court promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or PEPSICO with whom she is admittedly connected.
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against him. The action We rule, as in G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals (supra), that there was
being in personam. On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol not in Cebu City to substantial compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 because the purpose of notice was satisfied.
validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him personally, or through
substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such impossibility, and why At the time of the issuance and receipt of the summons, Pepsi Cola was already dissolved.
efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The The Court is of the opinion that service is allowed in such a situation. Since our law
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of recognizes the liability of a dissolved corporation to an aggrieved creditor, it is but logical for
service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on the law to allow service of process upon a dissolved corporation. Otherwise, substantive
jurisdictional grounds. rights would be lost by the mere lack of explicit technical rules. The Rules of Court on service
3. Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to state the facts and circumstances of summons upon a private domestic corporation is also applicable to a corporation which is
showing the impossibility of personal service of summons upon respondents within a reasonable time, no longer a going concern. Service upon a dissolved corporation may be made through any of
petitioners should have sought the issuance of an alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the the persons enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14.
Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued when the original summons is returned without being
served on any or all of the defendants. Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and
the consequences of their lack of diligence. proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
CASE 2 representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with
REBOLLIDO, ET AL VS. HONORABLE CA AND PESICO INC., the legal papers served on him. In other words, 'to bring home to the corporation notice of
G.R. NO. 81123 the filing of the action.
FEBRUARY 28, 1989
FACTS: Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the CASE 3
Philippines Inc. and Alberto Lava before the RTC, involving a vehicular accident. On September SPS. VENTURANZA VS. HONORABLE CA, ET AL
21,1984, the sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the defendants. It was G.R. NO. 77760 DECEMBER 11, 1987
received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to be the authorized person receiving court FACTS: Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against spouses Violeta
processes as she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, for
The RTC heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for collection of sums of money in the aggregate amount of P9,711.50, representing several loans
damages. PEPSICO Inc., a foreign corporation organized under the State of Delaware, USA, held offices evidenced by promissory notes which had become due and demandable but unpaid despite repeated
here for the purpose of settling Pepsi Colas debts, liabilities and obligations, opposed the motion for demands. On June 10, 1985, summons was issued against the petitioners on Augusto Soan, father of
execution filed by the petitioners, and moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of petitioner Violeta S. Venturanza, at 3412 B.A. Tan Street. Barrio Obrero Tondo, Manila, the address of
jurisdiction due to invalidity of the service of summons to a mere clerk. petitioners stated in the complaint. The court a quo rendered a decision ordering Venturanza to pay
jointly and severally the private respondent.
On September 22, 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past (OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827
Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there had been no proper and valid square meters of which petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the
service of summons upon them and that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the person of boundary line. The MTC rendered the decision in favour of the petitioner.
the petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was served is the residence of The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.
Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the residence or dwelling house of the Then, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the
petitioners. The telephone directory of the Asian Development Bank where defendant is employed, annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs
also indicates that the defendant is a resident of Tondo, Manila. failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never
The court a quo denied the motion for lack of merit since the defendants motion that they have been acquired jurisdiction over her person. The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint
residing at Aurora St., Pasay City since April 1985, was not supported by any other competent and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because he was
evidence. merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant of the house
On appeal to RTC, decision by the MeTC was affirmed with slight modification as to the amount of being leased to Eduardo Gonzales. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Jensen and against
damages. On a petition for review, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence this petition for defendant Domagas declaring the previous decision of the MTC of Calasiao, as null and void, for lack
certiorari. of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and the subject matter. The trial court declared that
ISSUES: there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent Jensen the defendant in
1 WON Metropolitan Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners when the Civil Case No. 879, considering that she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway,
summons was served upon Augusto Soan, father of petitioner Violeta S. Venturanza at 3412 and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and
B.A. Tan St., Bo. Obrero Tondo, Manila, which address is no longer the residence nor the place in her behalf.
of business of petitioners.
2 Whether or not the provisions of Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was legally complied
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming the appealed
with by the Sheriff in serving the summons upon the father of one of the petitioners.
decision of the RTC with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one
HELD:
for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant
1 No. The MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners. The action for
therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been
collection of sum of money, being an action in personam, requires the personal service of
served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
summons on the defendants to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It was
Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court
admitted by Venturanza that they were actual residents of Tondo, Manila in 1984 , but
and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the
transferred in April 1985 to Pasay City. There was also an affidavit of Augusto Soan
CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent,
stating that he never told the sheriff that the defendants were residing in his house
the defendant in Civil Case No. 879. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
at Tondo, Manila, sufficiently negating the conclusion of the court a quo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was validly served with summons and the complaint by
substituted sevice.
2 No. It is only when a defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a
HELD: No. There is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno
reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of, the same to be effected in the
was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the
following manner: a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants' dwelling house or
Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out
residence, with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b) by
that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business, with some competent
premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place
person in charge thereof. For a substituted service to be valid, summons served at the
where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where
defendant's residence must be served at his residence at the time of such service and not at
he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
his former place of residence.
The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident of the same
barangay cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo
It is required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the
Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee and
summons and after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant,
the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on during the
and the same must be reflected in the proof of service. Upon careful examination of the
said service of complaint and summons. In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with
sheriff 's Return in this case, which purports to serve as proof that summons had been served
summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the
upon the defendants, together with a copy of the complaint, through Augusto Soan, no
MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC
statement is made that an effort or attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on
in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact, said Return does not even indicate the
address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to have been served. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective. CASE NO. 5
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG vs. SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY VELAYO
CASE NO.4 G.R. NO. 155488 December 6, 2006
FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN
G.R. No. 158407. January 17, 2005 FACTS: On August 9, 1993, Raymond Velayo (Raymond) and his wife, Maria
Hedy Velayo (respondents) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for
FACTS: preliminary attachment against Erlinda R. Velayo-Fong (petitioner), Rodolfo R. Velayo, Jr. (Rodolfo Jr.)
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry and Roberto R. Velayo (Roberto). Raymond is the half-brother of petitioner and her co-
against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her defendants. Respondents cause of action in Civil Case No. Q-93-17133 is anchored on the claim that
complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title petitioner, a resident of 1860 Alamoana Boulevard, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and her co-defendants
maliciously instituted a criminal complaint before the NBI and a petition before the SEC which accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and then she must show that she has a valid and meritorious
prevented the respondents from leaving the country and paralyzed the latters business transactions. defense.
Respondents pray that actual and moral damages, plus attorneys fees, be awarded in their favor.
In this case, petitioner failed to show that her failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident,
Before respondents application for a writ of preliminary attachment can be acted upon by mistake or excusable neglect. Except for her bare unsupported allegation that the summons were only
the RTC, respondents filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons addressed to petitioner be thrown to her at the elevator, petitioner did not present any competent evidence to justify the setting
served to her at two condominiums in Pasay City and in Makati. In its Order dated September 13, aside of the order of default. Petitioner contented herself with stating in her affidavit of merit that the
1993, the RTC granted the said motion. The Process Server submitted the Officers Return stating that cases against respondent Raymond were filed at the instance of her father. Such allegation is a
he was able to personally serve upon defendant Erlinda Velayo the copy of summons together with the conclusion rather than a statement of facts showing a meritorious defense. The affidavit failed to
thereto attached copy of the complaint, not at her two (2) given addresses, but at the lobby of controvert the facts allegedby the respondents. Petitioner has not shown that she has a meritorious
Intercontinental Hotel, Makati, Metro Manila, right in the presence of lobby counter personnel by the defense.
name of Ms. A. Zulueta, but said defendant refused to sign in receipt thereof. Upon ex-parte motions
of respondents, the RTC in its Order, declared petitioner and her co-defendant in default for failure to CASE NO. 6
file an answer and ordered the ex-parte presentation of respondents evidence. The RTC rendered its Palma vs. Galvez
Decision in respondents favour. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default G.R. No. 165273 March 10, 2010
claiming that she was prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against
respondents complaint because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officers Return, no Facts:
summons was served upon her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents On July 28, 2003, Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine
material allegations. Respondents opposed said Motion. Heart Center, Dr. Giron, Dr. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault,
negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the
In its Order dated May 29, 1995, the RTC denied petitioners Motion ruling that the same and the tissues extracted from her during her surgery; and that although the specimens
presumption of regularity in the discharge of the function of the Process Server was not sufficiently were subsequently found, Palma was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the
overcome by petitioners allegation to the contrary; that there was no evident reason for the Process label therein pertained that of somebody else. Later, Palma filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Server to make a false narration regarding the service of summons to defaulting defendant in the Amended Complaint, praying for inclusion of some nurses, one of which is respondent Agudo.
Officers Return. Then, respondents filed a Motion for Execution but the petitioner filed an Opposition to The RTCs process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons,
Motion for Execution contending that she has not yet received the Decision and it is not yet final and together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon Agudo thru
executory as against her.In its Order, the RTC, finding that the Decision and the Order were indeed her husband Alfredo, who received and signed the same since Agudo was out of the country.
not furnished or served upon petitioner, denied respondents motion for execution against petitioner Agudos counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
and ordered that petitioner be furnished the said Decision and Order. The RTC issued an Order stating that he was just engaged by Alfredo Agudo, as respondent Agudo was out of the country
directing the issuance of the writ of execution against petitioners co-defendant. and the Answer was already due.
Two weeks later, counsel again filed a Motion for Another
On May 23, 1996, petitioner, through her counsel, finally received the Decision and the Order. Extension of Time to File Answer, stating that the draft answer was finished but would be sent to
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA questioning the propriety and validity of the service of summons Agudo for clarification/verification before the Phil. Consulate in Ireland. Two weeks later, Agudo
made upon her. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the Decision and Order of the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari she was not property served with summons since she was temporarily out of the country. Palma
under Rule 45. filed her Opposition to the MTD, arguing that a substituted service of summons on Agudos
husband was valid and binding on her, that the service of summons under Sec. 16, Rule 14 was
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner was not validly served with summons. not exclusive and maybe effected by other modes of service.
2. Whether or not RTC should have set aside the order of default. RTC granted Agudos MTD. RTC found that while summons was served at Agudos house and
received by her husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as
HELD: 1. Yes. In the present case, The action instituted by respondents affect the parties alone, not she was out of the country at the time it was served. Palma thus filed this petition for certiorari
the whole world. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is under Rule 65.
an action in personam. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Petitioners bare allegation that the Issues:
statement in the Officers Return that she was personally served summons is inaccurate is not
sufficient. A process servers certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the 1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari under 65 is proper
certificate. Between the claim of non-receipt of summons by a party against the assertion of an official 2. Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on Agudo
whose duty is to send notices, the latter assertion is fortified by the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed. To overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official Held:
functions in favor of such Officers Return, the evidence against it must be clear and
convincing. Petitioner having been unable to come forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the 1. A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
contrary, the presumption of regularity of performance on the part of the process server stands. quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or plain,
2. No. Petitioners argument that the RTC should have set aside the order of default and applied the speedy and adequate remedy. Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of CivPro states that
liberal interpretation of rules with a view of affording parties their day in court is not tenable. While where a judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
indeed default orders are not viewed with favor, the party seeking to have the order of default lifted appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
must first show that her failure to file an answer or any other responsive pleading was due to fraud,
2. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decisions of the Regional Trial Court and
by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue, Bulacan are hereby AFFIRMED.
authority of the former. Agudo was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country at
the time of the service of summons, thus service of summons on her is governed by
Sec. 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
CASE NO. 8
G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.
DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, NICOLAS DELOS SANTOS and RICARDO DELOS SANTOS,
CASE NO. 7
petitioners,
vs.
G.R. No. 150859 March 28, 2005 HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS, respondents.
FLORENTINO GONZALES, EDGARDO SANTOS, LEOPOLDO ROSETE, FELINA VICTORIA and
CRISTETA DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, FACTS: This is a suit for desahucio (an action for eviction/ejectment) initiated by herein private
vs. respondent against petitioners to which the court of origin ordered petitioners to vacate the lot in
BALIKATAN KILUSANG BAYAN SA PANANALAPI, INCORPORATED, respondent. question. Upon appeal, the Regional Trial Court presided over by herein respondent judge, granted
private respondents motion for execution pending appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a
FACTS. Sometime in November 7, 1997, petitioner Florentino Gonzales obtained a loan of P150,000 supersedeas bond.
with the other petitioners Edgardo Santos, Leopoldo Rosete, Felina Victoria and Cristeta dela Cruz as Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly owns a lot a portion of
co-makers. Petitioners signed a promissory note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the which petitioners entered and occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction.
loan in monthly amortizations of P6,250 for two years starting November 7, 1997 up to November 7, Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
1999. When petitioner Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands, respondent filed a Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to
case for sum of money and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue. Summons were thereafter submit the corresponding answer, judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary
served and the case was set for hearing on September 29, 2000. On the scheduled hearing, procedure.
defendants appeared but because they failed to file their answer to the complaint, the court declared Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were
them in default and thereafter allowed the presentation of respondents evidence ex-parte on October never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They
6, 2000. MTC ruled in favor of the respondent thereby ordering the petitioners to pay jointly and insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of realty because petitioners actually
severally the amount owed plus corresponding interests. Unhappy of the decision, petitioners occupied a different lot owned by Nicolas delos Santos. Moreover, petitioners' counsel moved to re-
appealed MTCs decision to the RTC but the latter court AFFIRMED the decision of the court a quo. examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate
Petitioners thereafter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review. The execution.
CA dismissed the petition. ISSUE: WON the service of summons was strictly complied with
ISSUE. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE HELD: At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable
PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT SERVED WITH SUMMONS PROPERLY and should thereby be dismissed response from the court in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not
HELD. In this regard, petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted service.
defendants voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Further, the Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. not been strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and
the court. If he does not wish to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution. Indeed, such demeanor is
thereto. tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section
As the records would show, summons and copies of the complaint were served on the 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant
petitioners and the case was set for hearing by the MTC on September 29, 2000, upon the motion of or his lawyer is equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of
the respondent. The petitioners appeared before the court on the scheduled hearing, as evidenced by counsel for petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
their signatures in the minutes. Their voluntary appearance cured the defect, if any, in the service of defendant.
summons. CASE NO. 9.
Petitioners ought to be guided by Rule 15, Section 2, which provides that "[a]ll motions shall be in G.R. No. 159139 June 15, 2005
writing exceptthose made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial." Moreover, every written INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant, with the exception of motions which the court might vs.
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. As a general rule, a notice is required COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC
where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion. Principles of natural justice demand CONSORTIUM, Respondents.
that his right should not be affected without an opportunity to be heard. Such, however, does not
appear to be the situation here. FACTS: Before us is the Commission on Elections "Most Respectful Motion for Leave to Use the
In this case, the motion to declare petitioners in default was, to reiterate, made in open court and in Automated Counting Machines in the Custody of the Commission on Elections for use in the August 8,
their presence. By their presence, notice to them is fairly constituted. What the law really eschews is 2005 Elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)," dated December 9, 2004.
not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were not The Motion alleges that "information technology experts," who purportedly supervised all stages of the
without such opportunity to contest the motion for and the order of default then and there at the trial software development for the creation of the final version to be used in the ACMs, have unanimously
court. confirmed that this undertaking is in line with the internationally accepted standards for software life
cycle processes, "with its quality assurance that it would be fit for use in the elections.
Recall that our previous Decision declared COMELEC to have acted with grave abuse of discretion decision had become final and executory, properties of defendant Farrales were levied and sold at
when, by way of its Resolution No. 6074, it awarded the Contract for the supply of automated counting public auction.
machines (ACMs) to private respondents. It did so, not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence,
but also with inexplicable haste and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures; Petitioner filed for a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession and the same was
particularly the mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. The motion for reconsideration granted. However, the judge declared the previous decision being null and void. Petitioner now claims
was likewise denied. that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
Notwithstanding our Decision and Resolution, the present Motion claims, inter alia, that the ARMM courts decision declaring null and void the sale of Faralles properties and that their liability was
elections are slated to be held on August 8, 2005, and are mandated by RA 9333 to be automated; merely joint and not solidary.
that the government has no available funds to finance the automation of those elections; that
considering its present fiscal difficulties, obtaining a special appropriation for the purpose is unlikely;
that, on the other hand, there are in Comelecs custody at present 1,991 ACMs, which were previously ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has been barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule in not questioning
delivered by private respondents; that these machines would deteriorate and become obsolete if they the joint and solidary nature of his liability in his motions.
remain idle and unused; that they are now being stored in the Comelec Maxilite Warehouse along UN
Avenue, at "storage expenses of P329,355.26 a month, or P3,979,460.24 annually." HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioners erred in arguing that respondents motions did
Private respondents contend that since the subject ACMs have already been delivered to, paid for and not question respondents liability. The three motions filed by respondent were directed at the acts of
used by Comelec, the Republic of the Philippines is now their owner, without prejudice to Mega Pacific execution against his personal properties but respondent realized after that he was being made to
eSolutions, Inc.s claim for damages in the case pending before the RTC of Makati; and that, answer on the entire liability as a solidary debtor and filed his Omnibus Motion questioning the Writ of
consequently, as far as private respondents are concerned, the question of using the subject ACMs for Possession and all incident orders and proceedings relevant thereto. This realization dawned on him,
the ARMM elections is dependent solely on the discretion of the owner, the Republic of the Philippines. because his real property was levied and sold despite the previous sale of his personal property. Only
Petitioners assert that there is no longer any live case or controversy to speak of an existing case or at this point was he in a position to assert his objections to the auction sale of his real property and to
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not merely conjectural or anticipatory; and put up the defense of joint liability among all the respondents.
that Comelecs allegations in its Motion do not amount to an actual case or controversy that would
require this Court to render a decision or resolution in the legitimate exercise of its judicial power. Prior to his Omnibus Motion, respondent was not yet being made to pay for
Assuming arguendo that the present Motion might somehow be justified by the governments fiscal the entire obligation. Thus, his objection to his being made solidarily liable with the other respondents
difficulties, petitioners further argue that permitting Comelec to use the ACMs would nevertheless was not yet available to him at the time he filed the Motions referred to by petitioner. Not being
allow it to do indirectly what it was not permitted by this Court to do directly. They argue that the available, these objections could not have been deemed waived when he filed his three earlier
instant Motion is merely a subterfuge on the poll bodys part to resurrect a lost case via a request for Motions, which pertained to matters different from those covered by his Omnibus Motion. The
an advisory opinion. Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in a single opportunity to
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion must be denied. avoid multiple piecemeal objections. But to apply that statutory norm, the objections must have been
HELD: YES. although it professes utmost respect for the finality of our Decision of January 13, 2004 -- available to the party at the time the Motion was filed.
an inescapable and immutable fact from which spring equally ineludible consequences -- granting it
would have the effect of illegally reversing and subverting our final Decision. Plainly stated, our final CASE NO. 11
Decision bars the grant of the present Motion. DELTA MOTORS VS CA AND STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.
Apparently, COMELEC has simply filed the present Motion asking permission to do what it has G.R. NO. 121075
precisely been prohibited from doing under our final and executory Decision. If law and jurisprudence JULY 24, 1997
bar it from using the subject ACMs during the last elections, why should it even propose to use these
machines in the forthcoming ARMM elections? True, these elections are important. But they cannot be FACTS: State Investment House, Inc. brought an action for a sum of money against Delta in the RTC
more important than the 2004 national elections. Note that the factual premises and the laws involved where Delta was declared in default, and ordered to pay State Investment its total outstanding
in the procurement and use of the ACMs have not changed. Indeed, Comelec has not even alleged, obligation. The decision, however, could not be served on Delta, either personally or by registered
much less proven, any supervening factual or legal circumstances to justify its Motion. mail, due to its earlier dissolution. However, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National
The Motion has not at all demonstrated that technical requirements have been addressed from the Bank (PNB) in the meantime. State Investment moved for service of the decision by way of publication
time our Decision was issued up to now. In fact, COMELEC is merely asking for leave to use the and execution of the judgment, which the trial court granted. The writ of execution was issued and
machines, without mentioning any specific manner in which the foregoing requirements have been properties of Delta in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold.
satisfactorily met. Delta then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA insisting that the trial court did
Assuming arguendo that the foregoing formidable legal, financial and technical obstacles could be not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant since there was no valid/proper service of
overcome or set aside, still, the Motion cannot be granted because it is vague; it does not contain summons, thus rendering the decision null and void, hence never became final and executory. The CA
enough details to enable this Court to act appropriately. ruled against Delta. Both Delta and State Investment filed for a motion for reconsideration but the
CASE NO. 1O same were denied.
PH Credit Corporation vs CA State Investment appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the case, Delta
G.R. No. 109648 filed an Omnibus Motion with the CA but the same was denied. Delta raised the case to the Supreme
November 22, 2001 Court.
FACTS: PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H. Van Sebille ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the summons was validly served to Delta.
and Federico C. Lim, for sum of money with the RTC. After service of summons upon the defendants, 2.Whether or not the Omnibus Motion was valid.
they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period, hence were declared in default. The
court rendered decision ordering defendants being solidarily liable and to pay PH Credit Corp. After the HELD: The Court of Appels held that no records shows that a copy of the assailed judgment had been
properly served on P.N.B., which assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's dissolution. That the
service by publication did not cure the fatal defect Thus, the judgement of the trial court has did not were to be used as the site for a new municipal building. PARAAQUE claimed that it offered to buy
become executory and has not yet attained finality. the property for P54,520,800.00 based on the fair market value stated in the tax declarations, but
PIRC refused to sell. PARAAQUE deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of P8.1
1 No. The Supreme Court held that if Delta intended such orders to be challenged in the CA million, or fifteen percent (15%) of P54,520,800.00, pursuant to Section 19 3 of the Local Government
case, it could have explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160, hereinafter LGC). It then filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
prayed for the corresponding affirmative relief therefrom, and if this course of action initially writ of possession which was granted by the RTC. PARANAQUE was placed in possession of the lots.
proved unavailing then Delta could and should have moved for reconsideration on that
aspect. After the finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the
The civil case was then returned to Branch 61 of RTC Makati presided by Judge Gorospe, Jr.
issue had become procedurally impermissible.
PIRC moved for reconsideration of the order of the RTC of Paranaque that PARANAQUE be ordered to
2 The issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed during the pendency of
vacate the lots on a number of grounds including lack of jurisdiction because the lots were also subject
said case by way of amendments to the petition. The Court of Appeals could only consider
of an action pending before the Sandiganbayan. The RTC of Makati also granted PIRCs motion for
errors raised by petitioner which were limited to the trial court's orders. These were the only
recognition and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction as the lots to be expropriated were
errors Delta argued extensively in its brief. To allow Delta's Omnibus Motion which it filed
in custodia legis, being sequestered by the PCGG and involved in a case pending before the
more than eight months from promulgation of the decision or long after finality of said case,
Sandiganbayan. It also set aside the previous order granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
would result in abandonment of sound judicial process.
possession. PARANAQUE filed a motion for reconsideration and on the other hand, PIRC filed an urgent
ex parte motion for an order directing PARANAQUE to vacate the lots and surrender them to PIRC.
CASE NO. 12
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518
Judge Gorospe, upon PARAAQUE's motion, inhibited himself and ordered the case re-raffled.
January 15, 2004
The case was eventually assigned to Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati, presided by Judge Mendiola.
Attys. VILMA HILDA D. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. ARUGAY vs. Judge RALPH S.
Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati denied PARAAQUE's motion for reconsideration and directing
LEE and Sheriff JUSTINIANO C. DE LA CRUZ JR
PARAAQUE and its agents to vacate the lots and surrender possession to PIRC within five days from
FACTS: The complainants are counsels for the defendants in Civil Case No. [38]-28457 entitled Star
notice. PARAAQUE filed its Notice of Appeal from the order setting aside the grant of the writ of
Paper Corporation vs. Society of St. Paul and Fr. Leonardo Eleazar for Sum of Money with Prayer for
possession and the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Branch 133 gave due course to
Preliminary Attachment. Their clients were served a copy of the complaint and a Writ of Attachment by
PARANAQUEs appeal and ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the civil case to the CA for
Sheriff Dela Cruz based on the plaintiffs allegation that the defendants contracted a debt in bad faith
further proceedings.
with no intention of paying the same. A printing machine was levied and delivered to the plaintiffs
warehouse instead of keeping the same in the custody of the sheriff.
PIRC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate and the
Judge Lee granted the defendants Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. Thereafter, an Urgent Ex-
appointment of a special sheriff. Forthwith, and on even date, the RTC of Makati (Branch 133) gave
Parte Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed, without notice to the defendants and despite failure
PARAAQUE a period of five days from receipt of the order within which to file its Comment/Opposition
of the plaintiff to set such litigious motion for hearing and contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence
to the motion. , PARAAQUE manifested 11 that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case "after
which was then granted by the respondent judge.
November 6, 1993 with the perfection of [PARAAQUE's] appeal by the filing of its notice of appeal on
An administrative complaint was charged against the latter for granting the withdrawal of cash
27 October 1993 before the 15-day period for appeal expired." Hence, no longer could the court act on
deposit in favour of the plaintiff even before judgement was rendered and for granting another Verified
PIRC's motion for an order to vacate, which PARAAQUE pointed out, was not a motion for execution
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring plaintiff as non-suited.
pending appeal; and even assuming otherwise, no good reason was cited in the motion to justify its
ISSUE: WON the respondent judges granting of of the plaintiffs motion for the withdrawal of cash
grant. Nevertheless, PARAAQUE asked the trial court "should [it] be [so] minded, before transmittal of
deposit is a violation of the Rules of Court amounting to gross ignorance of the law/ procedure.
the entire records to the Court of Appeals, to reverse or reconsider its appealed order due to the
HELD: Yes the respondent judge made an erroneous order upon granting the motion for the
supervening event of a Sandiganbayan denial of the PCGG motion for reconsideration of its decision
withdrawal of cash deposit in favour of the plaintiff even before judgment is rendered. As long as the
lifting the sequestration.
judgment remains unsatisfied, it would be erroneous to order the cancellation of a bond filed for the
A day after, PARAAQUE filed a manifestation calling the trial court's attention to the fact that up to
discharge of a writ of attachment. Furthermore, the rules mandate that every written motion shall be
said date, the record of the case had not been transmitted to the CA. Branch 133 issued an
set for hearing by the applicant. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants and shall
order denying PARAAQUE's "prayer for reversal or second reconsideration contained in its
specify the time and date of the hearing. The motion and notice shall be served at least three days
Manifestation but granting PIRC's motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate
before the date of hearing and without proof of its service the court cannot act upon it.
which the court deemed a motion for execution pending appeal. It then ordered the issuance of a writ
For failure of the plaintiff to address the notice of hearing and for the lack of proof of service,
of execution upon PIRC's filing of a bond of P1 million, and appointed a special sheriff to implement the
respondent should have not acted upon said motion. The rules on notice of hearing and proof of
writ by ejecting PARAAQUE from the subject property and placing PIRC in physical possession thereof.
service should have been observed by both the plaintiff and the respondent judge.
However the latters poor judgment fell short of gross ignorance of the law/ procedure since the
PARAAQUE then filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to
erroneous act should have been committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or bad faith
annul the orders of the trial court. The SC referred the case to the CA. It was about 2 months before
which have not been convincingly shown in the instant case for the respondent judge corrected said
the RTFC transmitted to the CA the records of the case. PARAAQUE claims in its Memorandum
error by reversing himself before the adverse party incurred any damage.
dated 8 December 1995 that the said appeal remained undocketed "pending elevation by the trial
CASE NO. 13
court of the complete records to the Court of Appeals notwithstanding efforts made by Paraaque to
PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES INC. VS. CA AND MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE
expedite the appeal.
GR NO. 119328, JULY 26, 1996
CA rendered its original decision, dismissing the petition on the ground of forum shopping.
PARANAQUE moved for reconsideration. CA rendered its amended decision granting the petition for
FACTS: PARAAQUE filed Civil Case with the RTC of Makati for the expropriation of certain parcels of
the certiorari and prohibition, hereby annulling the order of RTC and permanently enjoining the RTC
land located at Likod Ibayo, Barangay Sto. Nio, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Paraaque. Likod Ibayo,
from further acting in said case, without prejudice to the final decision in the appeal.
Barangay Sto. Nio, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Paraaque, Metro Manila. These lots belonged to PIRC and
ISSUES: 1. WON the trial court had authority to act upon PIRCs motion for the issuance of a writ prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order. [1] A motion for reconsideration was filed but
implementing the order to vacate. the same was likewise denied. Hence this petition.
2. WON the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion for a writ to implement the order to vacate. ISSUE: whether or not there was a valid service of summons to acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioners
RULING: 1. Yes. There can be no question as to the trial court's authority to act upon PIRC's motion,
filed within the period to appeal, for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate. Such a HELD: Jurisdiction was never acquired over them by the lower court. Secs. 7 and 8 provide -
motion cannot be characterized as anything but a motion for execution pending appeal, and pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such may be filed before the expiration of the period to
Sec. 7. Personal service of summons. - The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
appeal.
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
It is settled that a court may take cognizance of a motion for execution pending appeal filed
Sec. 8. Substituted service. - If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
by a party within its period to appeal, as the filing of an appeal by a losing party does not
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
automatically divest the adverse party of the right to ask for execution pending appeal. Thus,
defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
the trial court's order giving due course to PARAAQUE's appeal and for the transmittal of the
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
record of the case to the CA was inconsequential, for, despite that, PIRC had the right to file a
competent person in charge thereof.
motion for the execution of the order to vacate on or before 6 November 1993, and the trial
court could validly act thereon even after the expiration of the period to appeal or perfection
of the appeal, but before the transmittal of the record of the case to the CA. However, they are deemed to have waived any flaw in the court's jurisdiction arising from a defective
service of summons. For, instead of entering a special appearance questioning the propriety of the
2.Yes. SCs examination of PIRC's motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to service of summons, hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over petitioners, they filed a
vacate and the appointment of the special sheriff shows that it contained no notice of hearing motion for additional time to file answer on 24 February 1993, which was beyond the reglementary
to PARAAQUE. The notice was a request directed to the Clerk of Court to submit the motion period. In effect, they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, whatever
to the court for its consideration and approval immediately upon receipt thereof. defect there was in the mode of service of summons was deemed waived and the court acquired
A notice of hearing addressed to the Clerk of Court, and not to the parties, is not notice at all. jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners by their voluntary submission thereto.
Accordingly, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to the adverse party is
nothing but a mere scrap of paper. 43 The Clerk of Court did not even have the duty to accept
it, much more to bring it to the attention of the Presiding Judge. Yet, the former did. Worse, DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
the latter not only gave it undue attention, forthwith on the date the motion was filed he
issued an order giving PARAAQUE five days from receipt of the order within which to file its Resultantly, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 18
comment/opposition to the motion, after which the motion would be deemed submitted for October 1994 as well as its resolution of 20 January 1995 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
resolution, with or without such comment/opposition.
By overlooking the mandatory rule on notice to the adverse party in Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, a positive duty imposed upon the movant, and by according value to a mere
scrap of paper by "curing" its fatal defect by means of the order to serve as notice to
PARAAQUE, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion.
To these must be added the palpable absence of any good reason to justify execution
pending appeal.
CASE NO. 15
CASE NO. 14
[G.R. No. 118696. September 3, 1996] RAMON S. OROSA, JOSE S. OROSA, LIZA O. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY G.R. No. 157801
TRINIDAD, MYRNA D. DESTURA and ALFREDO S. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF GROUP, INC.,
APPEALS, BERTAN PRESS and ANTONIO J. BERTOSO, respondent Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,*
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,**
CALLEJO, SR.,
FACTS: Private respondents Bertan Press and Antonio J. Bertoso filed a complaint for a sum of money
TINGA, and
against petitioners Ramon S. Orosa, Jose S. Orosa, Liza O. Trinidad, Myrna D. Destura and Alfredo S.
HON. LYNDON D. JUNTILLA, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Mendoza before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Accordingly, the trial court issued the
in his capacity as HOUSING AND
corresponding summons to be served upon petitioners through their secretary and to Mendoza
LAND USE ARBITER of HLURB,
through his employee.
Region VII, Cebu City, and Promulgated:
Petitioners filed a motion for additional time to file answer,however, upon urgent ex-
TERESA C. AGUILAR,
parte motion by private respondents the trial court declared petitioners in default for failure to answer
Respondents. June 8, 2005
within the reglementary period. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and at the same time
filed their answer but the court denied the motion for reconsideration and expunged petitioners'
FACTS: In 1996, Teresa C. Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc.
answer from the records. RTC ruled in favour of private respondent. Petitioners filed petition for
(PPGI) covering a contract that PPGI should deliver a condominium unit on June 1998 to Aguilar.
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before respondent Court of Appeals which rendered the
Thereafter, Aguilar paid by installment the purchase price of the condominium unit in the total amount
assailed decision dismissing the petition and denying the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
of P727,921.82. Two years after the signing of the contract to sell, Aguilar saw that the construction of
the building, where her supposed condominium unit was to be located, had barely even started. themselves and on behalf and for the benefit of FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY
Believing that PPGI would not be able to deliver the unit to her by June 1998, she demanded in writing CORPORATION, respondents.
the rescission of her contract to sell with PPGI and the refund of what she had paid. When PPGI FACTS: Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty, for brevity) was registered with the
refused, she filed a complaint against PPGI for the rescission of the contract to sell and damages with SEC on June, 1951, with Felix Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy Go Tiong, Pedro Gochan, Tomasa Gochan,
the HLURB. Esteban Gochan and Crispo Gochan as its incorporators.
HLURB then rendered its decision in favor or Aguilar. PPGI then appealed the decision to Felix Gochan Sr.s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in
HLURB Board of Commissioners, which the latter affirmed and declared final and executory. The Gochan Realty from the former.
HLURB then issued a writ of execution ordering the ex-officio sheriff to execute its decision against Alice died in 1955, leaving the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr.In 1962, the Regional Trial
PPGI with address at the Penthouse, Century Citadel, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City. Court of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children, herein [respondents] Richard Young,
The sheriff then levied on the several propertiesof PPGI, one of which is, Condominium Unit No. 3301 David Young, Jane Young Llaban, John Young Jr., Mary Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas Young.Having
in Makati Prime Citadel at P. Burgos, Makati City. Before the scheduled auction of the said earned dividends, these stocks numbered 179 by 20 September 1979.Five days later (25 September),
condominium, Michael OPallick served a copy of his third- party claim to the sheriff, yet the latter at which time all the children had reached the age of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan
proceeded with the public auction where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder. Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and
With the failure of PPGI to redeem the property, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of [herein respondents].
favor of Aguilar, which the latter declared for taxation purposes and has then filed a motion for a On 17 October 1979, respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal
motion for a writ of possession to the HLURB, whose copy was served to the PPGIs address. After the granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation.On 21, 1990, [sic] John, Sr. died,
granting of the writ of possession to Aguilar, and serving it to the companys address, PPGI filed a leaving the shares to the [respondents].On 8 February 1994, [respondents] Cecilia Gochan Uy and
motion for reconsideration with the contention that it was not served with a copy of the motion for the Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners,
issuance for the writ of possession of Aguilar as it was served in its old office address. PPGI further nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of
averred that despite its earnest efforts to secure copies of the aforementioned motion of Aguilar, the officers and directors and damages against respondents. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated as
HLURB Arbiter refused to furnish it with such copies and thus prayed for the recall and setting aside of [sic] real properties of the corporation.
the implementation of the order. HLURB then denied the said motion for reconsideration for lack of On 16 March 1994, [herein petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1) the SEC
merit as it was already enforced and thus rendering it moot and academic. ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-in-
PPGI then filed its petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the reversal of the decision of the interest and ha[d] no capacity to sue; and (3) [respondents] causes of action [were] barred by the
HLURB in granting the writ of possession to Aguilar, CA then denied the PPGIs, now petitioner, motion Statute of Limitations.The motion was opposed by herein [respondents].On 29 March 1994,
for reconsideration for lack of merit. Thus, this petition for review. [petitioners] filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. [Respondents] opposed the said
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the HLURBs action in ordering the writ of possession motion.
when PPGI was not informed nor duly notified of the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the said On 9 December 1994, the SEC, through its Hearing Officer, granted the motion to dismiss and ordered
writ thereby depriving PPGI with its constitutional right to due process the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated upon the titles of the corporate lands. In its
HELD: No, the CA did not err in affirming the HLURBs action. Based on the records of the HLURB and order, the SEC opined:
those of the respondents, the principal office still remained at the old address provided by PPGI,
where the motions were served, and where in fact one of its employees has received it, in which the
In the instant case, the complaint admits that complainants Richard G. Young, David G. Young, Jane G.
petitioner failed to dispute the authority of the said employee.
Young Llaban, John D. Young, Jr., Mary G. Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas G. Young, who are the
Further, the motion for the issuance of the writ of possession is an ex parte motion and thus
children of the late Alice T. Gochan and the late John D. Young, Sr. are suing in their own right and as
does not need a notice of hearing nor a hearing per se, as it is not a litigated motion but only a mode
heirs of and/or as the beneficial owners of the shares in the capital stock of FGSRC held in trust for
to inform the party that the writ of execution has not yet been implemented. As the court puts it,
them during his lifetime by the late John D. Young. Moreover, it has been shown that said
there is no need for a hearing of such motion because it is not a litigated motion and that the court
complainants ha[d] never been x x x stockholder[s] of record of FGSRC to confer them with the legal
may act thereon causing no prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The writ of possession is but
capacity to bring and maintain their action.Conformably, the case cannot be considered as an intra-
an implementation of the writ of execution. Thus, it is well- settled that the procedure in a motion for
corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of this Commission.
the issuance of a writ of possession being summary in nature provides a proceeding wherein relief is
The complainant heirs base what they perceived to be their stockholders rights upon the fact of their
granted without an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. The
succession to all the rights, property and interest of their father, John D. Young, Sr. While their heirship
issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. Therefore, the HLURB may grant the
is not disputed, their right to compel the corporation to register John D. Youngs Sr. shares of stock in
motion even in the absence of the judgment obligor, herein petitioner, PPGI.
their names cannot go unchallenged because the devolution of property to the heirs by operation of
law in succession is subject to just obligations of the deceased before such property passes to the
CASE NO. 16 heirs. Conformably, until therefore the estate is settled and the payment of the debts of the deceased
is accomplished, the heirs cannot as a matter of right compel the delivery of the shares of stock to
them and register such transfer in the books of the corporation to recognize them as stockholders. The
[G.R. No. 131889. March 12, 2001]
complainant heirs succeed to the estate of [the] deceased John D. Young, Sr. but they do not thereby
VIRGINIA O. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, MAE GOCHAN-EFANN, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN,
become stockholders of the corporation.
ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN JR., DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN, FELIX O. GOCHAN III, MERCEDES R. GOCHAN,
Moreover, John D. [Young Sr.s] shares of stocks form part of his estate which is the subject of Special
ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, ANGELINA R. GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MARIA MERCED R. GOCHAN,
Proceedings No. 3694-CEB in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch VIII, [par. 4 of the complaint]. As
CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR., MARION R. GOCHAN, MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT
complainants clearly claim[,] the Intestate Estate of John D. Young, Sr. has an interest in the subject
CORPORATION and FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioners,
matter of the instant case. However, actions for the recovery or protection of the property [such as the
vs. RICHARD G. YOUNG, DAVID G. YOUNG, JANE G. YOUNG-LLABAN, JOHN D. YOUNG JR.,
shares of stock in question] may be brought or defended not by the heirs but by the executor or
MARY G. YOUNG-HSU and ALEXANDER THOMAS G. YOUNG as heirs of Alice Gochan; the
administrator thereof.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOHN D. YOUNG SR.; and CECILIA GOCHAN-UY and MIGUEL C. UY, for
Complainants further contend that the alleged wrongful acts of the corporation and its directors
constitute fraudulent devices or schemes which may be detrimental to the stockholders. Again, the
injury [is] perceived[,] as is alleged[,] to have been suffered by complainants as stockholders, which As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by
they are not. Admittedly, the SEC has no jurisdiction over a controversy wherein one of the parties the allegations in the complaint. [8] For purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss, Cecilia Uys averment
involved is not or not yet a stockholder of the corporation. [SEC vs. CA, 201 SCRA 134]. in the Complaint -- that the purchase of her stocks by the corporation was null and void ab initio is
Further, by the express allegation of the complaint, herein complainants bring this action as [a] deemed admitted. It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of
derivative suit on their own behalf and on behalf of respondent FGSRC. anyone; it cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. [9]Thus, Cecilia
Section 5, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Procedure in the Securities and Exchange Commission remains a stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Although she
provides: was no longer registered as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before
the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide stockholder of Felix
Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as between said parties.
Section 5. Derivative Suit. No action shall be brought by stockholder in the right of a corporation
In any event, the present controversy, whether intra-corporate or not, is no longer cognizable by
unless the complainant was a stockholder at the time the questioned transaction occurred as well as
the SEC, in view of RA 8799, which transferred to regional trial courts the formers jurisdiction over
at the time the action was filed and remains a stockholder during the pendency of the action. x x x.
cases involving intra-corporate disputes.
2.) Petitioners contend that the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is not an indispensable party, as
The rule is in accord with well settled jurisprudence holding that a stockholder bringing a derivative there is no showing that it stands to be benefited or injured by any court judgment.
action must have been [so] at the time the transaction or act complained of [took] place. (Pascual vs. It would be useful to point out at this juncture that one of the causes of action stated in the
Orozco, 19 Phil. 82; Republic vs. Cuaderno, 19 SCRA 671; San Miguel Corporation vs. Khan, 176 SCRA Complaint filed with the SEC refers to the registration, in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan
462-463) The language of the rule is mandatory, strict compliance with the terms thereof thus being a Young, of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. Young Sr. Since all the shares
condition precedent, a jurisdictional requirement to the filing of the instant action. that belonged to Alice are still in his name, no final determination can be had without his estate being
Otherwise stated, proof of compliance with the requirement must be sufficiently established for the impleaded in the suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of action
action to be given due course by this Commission. The failure to comply with this jurisdictional dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of Alice.
requirement on derivative action must necessarily result in the dismissal of the instant complaint. (pp. Petitioners further claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. was not properly represented. They
77-79, Rollo) claim that when the estate is under administration, suits for the recovery or protection of the property
or rights of the deceased may be brought only by the administrator or executor as approved by the
court.[14] The rules relative to this matter do not, however, make any such categorical and confining
[Respondents] moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied for being pro-
statement.
forma.Respondents] appealed to the SEC en banc, contending, among others, that the SEC ha[d]
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which is cited by petitioner in support of their position,
jurisdiction over the case.[Petitioners], on the other hand, contend that the appeal was 97 days late,
reads:
beyond the 30-day period for appeals.
On 3 March 1995, the SEC en banc ruled for the [petitioners,] holding that the [respondents] motion
for reconsideration did not interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion was pro-forma. Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
[4]
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Aggrieved, herein respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be
Court of Appeals ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case as far as the heirs of Alice
sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Gochan were concerned, because they were not yet stockholders of the corporation. On the other
hand, it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia Gochan Uy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held
that the intestate Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party. Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with administrators, states:
The appellate court further ruled that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles of
the corporate real estate was not justified. Moreover, it declared that respondents Motion for
Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. - For the recovery or
Reconsideration before the SEC was not pro forma; thus, its filing tolled the appeal period.
protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend,
Hence, this Petition.[5]
in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive.
ISSUES:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring
A Whether or not the Spouses Uy have the personality to file an action before the SEC against
suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules
Gochan Realty Corporation.
are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
B Whether or not the intestate estate of John D. Young Sr. is an indispensable party in the SEC
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
case considering that the individual heirs shares are still in the decedent stockholders name.
already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot
RULING:
be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
1.)Petitioners argue that Spouses Cecilia and Miguel Uy had no capacity or legal standing to bring the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
suit before the SEC on February 8, 1994, because the latter were no longer stockholders at the violated or dissipated.
time. Allegedly, the stocks had already been purchased by the corporation. Petitioners further assert The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
that, being allegedly a simple contract of sale cognizable by the regular courts, the purchase by speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [15] They cannot be interpreted in
Gochan Realty of Cecilia Gochan Uys 210 shares does not come within the purview of an intra- such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of
corporate controversy. the decedent, this Court has in previous instances [16] recognized the heirs as proper representatives of
the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no
administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs immoral conduct is only suspension from the service. Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure
as the proper representatives of the deceased.Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from question of law. We need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we will be able to
representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the determine whether the penalty of dismissal is in order.
institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of
John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC.
CASE NO. 18
CASE NO. 21
CASE NO. 20
(G.R. No. 124204. April 20, 2001)
NORMA V. MANALO, ET. AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, SEC. OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
(G.R. No. 139068, Jan 16, 2004)
SPORTS ET.AL
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA BALANCED FOOD, NILO LETADA, et.
al , petitioners, vs. PINAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, SY TIAN TIN, et. al, respondents.
FACTS: The Congress enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 412, converting the Cebu School of Arts &Trade
into the Cebu State College of Science and Technology (CSCST) including Abellana National School and
all other Schools in Cebu City. On May 26, 1988, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6655, or the Free Public
FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the petition of the union members of the Malayang Samahan
Secondary Education Act of 1988. It vests in the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
ng Manggagawa sa Balanced Food (petitioner union), who filed with the management of
(DECS) the establishment, renaming, conversion, integration, separation, administration, supervision
Pinakamasarap Corporation (respondent company). They sought the ouster of Rolando Reyes,
and control of all public secondary schools and public secondary teachers and other school personnel,
companys Production and Assistant Manager. Respondent claimed that petitioner union members &
including the payment of their salaries, allowances and other fringe benefits as well as those provided
officers abandoned work and picketed. That, although, the employees resumed their work,
by local government.
nonetheless persisted with their illegal activities, causing the companys operations and production
Secretary Quisumbing issued DECS Order No. 5 setting forth the guidelines and procedures in the
severely paralyzed.
implementation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6655.
Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practices (ULP) and damages
Plaintiff Romeo Reyes filed with the RTC Cebu a complaint for TRO enjoining defendants from
against petitioners, for violation of Art. 282 of the Labor Code and their (CBA). Petitioners answered
enforcing or implementing DECS Order No. 5 for being issued not in accordance with law. However, the
with motion to dismiss, claiming they left their workplace to testify at a barangay hearing with the
trial court dismissed the complaint.
permission of respondent companys Assistant Manager, respondent Tan.
DECS, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the CSCST. The MOA provided for
The Labor Arbiter declared the forfeiture/ loss of employment status of the union officers.
the Transfer of the secondary education program of Abellana College of Arts and Trade (ACAT), its
Petitioners appeal to (NLRC), which uphold the illegality of the strike by petitioners, but ordered their
personnel, facilities, as well as the funding of its operation, and gradually phasing out its college
reinstatement. Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration but were denied by the NLRC. Both
offerings or integrating them into the main campus. The MOA is based on R.A. No. 6655 which
parties filed a petition for certiorari, but was similarly dismissed. The Resolution became final and
mandated the nationalization of public secondary schools and their transfer to the DECS.
executory.
On Oct. 1990, Bonilla and other superintendents of CSCST filed with the RTC, Cebu City, a
On petitioners motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to reinstate to
petition for the issuance of preliminary injunction restraining the DECS from continuing with the
their former positions. Thereupon, respondent filed an appeal to the NLRC praying that the writ of
implementation of the rules and regulations separating the high schools from CSCST. It also argued
execution be quashed. It alleged that there have been supervening events which rendered unjust the
that R.A. No. 6655 is a general law which cannot supersede B.P. Blg. 412, which is a special law.
reinstatement of petitioners to their former positions. Among the supervening events was the hiring
However, The trial court, likewise, dismissed the petition. It ruled that DECS orders implementing R.A.
by respondent company of new regular employees in place of petitioners. Thus, the Arbiter granted
6655, are valid and legitimate acts of the Secretary of Education. Corolarilly, prohibition and/or
the motion and quashed the alias writ of execution.
injunction will not lie against the herein respondents. The Court further states that R.A. 6655 modified/
The NLRC remanded the case to the Arbiter for immediate implementation of the alias writ of
repealed BP 412.
execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent filed a petition
On May 1992, Abucay and other CSCST faculty members filed with the RTC Cebu another
for certiorari.The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the final and executory Decision of the
petition for Declaration of Nullity of the MOA with preliminary injunction and restraining order. But
NLRC. The CA upheld the illegality of the strike by petitioners, however, it modified the NLRC Decision
again, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust
reinstating them to the service by declaring that they have lost their employment status.
administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of action.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition for review
On February 4, 1993, Petitioners Manalo, and other faculty members, registrar, librarian, janitor
on certiorari.
and other personnel of CSCST filed with the RTC Cebu a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of MOA
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the strike
with Preliminary Injunction; questioning the validity of the MOA entered by DECS and CSCST.
illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners.
Respondent Bacalso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. Respondent
insisted that the case repeated the very same issue already decided three times by the Regional Trial
HELD: The Court of Appeals declared that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
Court of Cebu. The appeal to the Supreme Court from one of these decisions was dismissed, which
declared the strike illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners. Truly, the Appellate Court
dismissal had become final and executory.
modified what should otherwise have been an irreversible Decision.
Indeed, the same court disregarded the doctrine of res judicata. Applying the said doctrine,
the issue of whether petitioners should be reinstated to their former positions despite the
The trial court finds that respondents motion to be meritorious. Hence it dismissed the Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 33674 on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was guilty of
petitioners complaint. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied. forum shopping because the amount involved in the case was also the issue filed in RTC Daet
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The CA also dismissed petitioners complaint. Hence, this petition. Camarines Sur and that the complaint stated no cause of action because as judgment debtor in Civil
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata is Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa has lost all rights over the funds deposited under its Savings Account since
meritorious. the same had already been garnished by RTC, Branch 39, in favor of the judgment creditor, Sa Amin.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds respondents Motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration whereas Sta.
meritorious. Rosa filed a motion to declare petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer. RTC likewise denied
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or the motion for reconsideration and granted petitioners motion to declare petitioners in default.
matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as Later petitioners became involved in Civil Case No. 6014 as a forced intervenor when the Daet court
to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have ordered the continuation of garnishment of the funds despite the TRO and preliminary injunction
been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. Res issued earlier by the SEC. Due to conflicting claims, it elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the which dismissed the petition and upheld the order of garnishment of the Daet court.
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals,
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; (d) there which seasonably set aside the order of default of the lower court and directed the latter to admit
must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of petitioners Answer and proceed to hear the case on the merits.
action. Petitioners not satisfied with CAs decision elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
All these requisites were present in this case. The parties in Civil Case No. CEB-11735 and in Civil Issues: 1. Whether or not Sta. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping;
Case No. 13562 were faculty members and personnel of the CSCST. They represented the same
interest in both actions which referred to the nullity of the MOA. As observed by the appellate court,
2. Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought.
of action; and
The order is conclusive on the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement, which will bar a
3. Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed on the ground of res
subsequent action on the same subject matter. If allowed, it would result in the re-litigation of the
judicata.
same cause involving the same issues, parties, and subject matter.
RULING:
The judgment of either court will constitute a bar to the other. It has been held that where a
1 No. For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in
litigant sues the same party against whom the same action or actions, for the alleged violation of the
one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
same right, and the enforcement of the same relief are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
one case is a bar to the other; and a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus,
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
would cause the dismissal of the rest.
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
"Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties are bound by such final decision,
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. There
otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an
is no identity of parties since the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6014, Sa Amin, is not a party in
end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated, and an individual should not
Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is the
be vexed twice for the same cause.
plaintiff while petitioners are the defendants. Apparently, the parties represented different
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
interests in these cases. Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought. In Civil
is AFFIRMED.
Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa is defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where
petitioners are the intervenors, while in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is asserting its
right as a depositor to file a damage suit against the defendant, now petitioner bank. The two
CASE NO. 22 proceedings are far from identical.
2 No. The respondents allegations would suffice to constitute a cause of action against
G.R. No. 143556 March 16, 2004
petitioners. That petitioners have a valid defense is another matter. At any rate, matters such
EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK and RAFAEL B.
as the propriety of refusal to release the funds by petitioners and the actual date of receipt of
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
the restraining order, among others, are matters for trial. They require evidentiary proof and
vs.
support that can be better threshed out not upon a motion to dismiss but in a full blown trial
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SANTA ROSA MINING CO., INC., respondents.
on the merits. These matters, indeed, would not yet go into the question of the absence of a
cause of action as a ground to dismiss.
FACTS: Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc. filed before the RTC Quezon City a complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioners Philippine Commercial International Bank alleging that it lost income
opportunity from its joint venture with Sa Amin sa San Jose Panganiban, Inc. Respondent alleged that it
opened a savings account with the said bank and informed the latter of its intention to convert its 3 No. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been
account into a savings/current/time deposit account and sought to obtain checkbooks pursuant adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
thereto on October 26, 1993 which the bank refused due to a restraining order issued by the conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Respondent alleged that in refusing to issue checkbooks, the same cause. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
Lota, the bank manager was guilty of misrepresentation as verification with SEC showed that the bank (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
received the SEC order on October 27, 1993. Respondent averred that such refusal resulted to its over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
prejudice and its joint venture partner, Sa Amin. (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. In the present case, while the first three requisites may be present, the fourth requisite
is absent. As stated earlier, there is no identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action filing or re-filing of an information lies within the discretion of the prosecutor who must
between Civil Case No. 6014 and Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. act independently of the affected parties.
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up
this defense in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
CASE NO. 23
state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
Branch 66, Regional Trial Court of Makati and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusion or
G.R. No. 106922 April 20, 2001
interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial
notice."
FACTS: After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d etat, the DOJ headed by Franklin Drilon,
Private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action for certiorari is not
requested for investigation of Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup. The
the proper remedy for a defendant whose motion to dismiss has been denied by the trial
Prosecutors issued a subpoena to Enrile with an order to submit his counter-affidavit to the letter-
court for the reason that the order does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose
complaint. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, Enrile filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal of the
of the contentions of the parties. In its decision affirming the trial court's denial of the
charge against him.
motion to dismiss, the appellate court sustained this contention. However, as correctly
On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
pointed out by the petitioners, the rule admits of an exception. Thus, where the denial of
City on Information charging private respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and
the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
frustrated murder. Enrile then filed a complaint accusing the petitioners of bad faith in filing the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as in the case at bar, the aggrieved party may
information for rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder.
assail the order of denial on certiorari. A wide breadth of discretion is granted in certiorari
On October 9, 1990, Drilons group filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the Complaint to
proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to prevent a substantial wrong. In the Drilon
state a cause of action. They claimed that there was no allegation of any actionable wrong
case, we also held that the denial by the trial court of the motion to dismiss of herein petitioners
constituting a violation of any of the legal rights of private respondent.
based on the same grounds as in the instant petition constituted grave abuse of discretion for the
On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss
reason that "this (private respondent's baseless action) would unjustly compel the petitioners to
and requiring petitioners to file their answer and to present evidence in support of their defenses in a
needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the court with one more futile and
full-blown trial inasmuch as the defense of good faith and immunity from suit does not appear to be
inconsequential case." 32 The appellate court therefore erred in not ruling that the trial court
indubitable. Drilons motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition.
committed a grave abuse of discretion when the latter refused to dismiss the case as against herein
Going now to the crux of the petition, Drilons group contend that the complaint sets forth no
petitioners, notwithstanding the obvious insufficiency of the complaint against them.
cause of action against them. They allege good faith, regularity in the performance of official duties
and lack of ultimate facts constituting an actionable wrong. On the other hand, Enrile argues that a
CASE NO. 24
cause of action has been sufficiently pleaded and that the defenses of good faith and performance of
[G.R. No. 138945. August 19, 2003]
official duties are best disposed in a judicial hearing.
FELIX GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION and STA. LUCIA REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners,
ISSUE: The main question in the instant petition is whether the allegations in the complaint
vs.
sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold Drilons group liable for damages.
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BABA, namely, BESTRA BABA, MARICEL BABA, CRESENCIA BABA,
ANTONIO BABA, and PETRONILA BABA, represented by Attorney-in-fact VIRGINIA
HELD: The petition of Drilons group is granted.
SUMALINOG, respondents.
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismissmust appear on the face of the complaint
itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other.
FACTS:
The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge's
Lot No. 3537 is a conjugal property of spouses Raymundo Baba and Dorotea Inot. After Raymundo
attention. Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states:
died, an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was executed among the heirs of Raymundo, namely,
xxx xxx xxx 14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-existent crime
Dorotea Inot and his 2 children, Victoriano Baba and Gregorio Baba. On December 28, 1966, Dorotea,
had severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's name and reputation and forever stigmatized his
Victoriano and Gregorio sold said property to petitioner Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation
stature as a public figure, thereby causing him extreme physical suffering, serious anxiety, mental
(Gochan Realty) which thereafter entered into a joint venture agreement with Sta. Lucia Realty and
anguish, moral shock and social humiliation."
Development Corporation Inc. for the development, of said lot into a subdivision.
is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts. It does not,
Respondents Bestra, Maricel, Crecencia, Antonio and Petronila, all surnamed Baba, filed a complaint
therefore, aid in any wise the complaint in setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners.
for quieting of title and reconveyance with damages against petitioners with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City
alleging that said transaction was fraudulent and is void because they never consented to the said
However, we hold that the said allegations still fail to maintain a cause of action against
sale and extrajudicial settlement.
Drilons group. To reiterate, a cause of action exists if the following elements are present:
RTC dismissed respondents complaint on the ground of prescription and laches. CA reversed the
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
decision. Hence the petition.
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
ISSUE:
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
WON respondents complaint is dismissible on the ground of prescription and laches.
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff
RULING:
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 29 In the case at bar,
1. A. Re prescription:
we fail to see any right of the Enrile supposedly violated by the petitioners. Nowhere in
No. Applying Article 1410, the court stated that a claim of prescription is unavailing where the assailed
the statute books is a prospective accused given the right to be notified beforehand of the
conveyance is void ab initio with respect to those who had no knowledge of the transaction. The case
filing of an information against him. Likewise, the withdrawal of the information and the
involved a fraudulent sale and extrajudicial settlement of a lot executed without the knowledge and
subsequent re-filing of the same do not constitute an actionable wrong inasmuch as the
consent of some of the co-owners. This is based on the principle Nemo dat quod non habet which
means No one can give more than what he has. Assuming that the allegations in respondents International Bank (now Equitable-PCIB), Rafael B. Buenaventura (PCIBs former President), and
complaint are true, their claim that the execution of the extrajudicial settlement and the deed of sale Cynthia F. Lota (Cubao Branch manager).
involving Lot No. 3537, which led to the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Gochan Realty, On October 21, 1993, Sta. Rosa opened Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 with PCIB Cubao
was without their knowledge or consent, gives rise to an imprescriptible cause of action to declare by depositing a check amounting to PHP6,389,071.35, plus PHP100.00 cash. The next day, October
said transactions inexistent on the ground of absence of legal capacity and consent. Hence, the 22, it informed the bank of its intention to convert its newly opened account into a
dismissal of respondents complaint on the ground of prescription was erroneous. savings/current/time deposit account, and on October 26, sought to obtain checkbooks. The bank
refused to issue the checkbooks due to an alleged restraining order issued by SEC, enjoining the
B. Laches officers of Sta. Rosa from withdrawing the funds deposited under Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1.
No. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do Sta. Rosa accuses Lota guilty of misrepresentation, and their refusal to release funds caused undue
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or harm and prejudice to its stockholders, and social development projects of its joint venture partner, Sa
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to Amin. Sta. Rosa asks for PHP9,238,800.00 for total damages.
assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it. On October 6, 1995, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was
The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Though laches applies even to guilty of forum shopping, because the amount involved in this case is the same that was involved in
imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which Civil Case No. 6014, filed before the RTC Branch 39. Also, that the complaint has no cause of action
could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to because as judgment debtor in the aforesaid civil case, Sta. Rosa lost all rights over the funds
dismiss. deposited under the Savings Account, since the same has been garnished by RTC Branch 39, in favor
of the judgment creditor, Sa Amin.
-Case remanded to RTC for trial and judgement on the merits. Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the
annulment of the garnishment order issued by the Daet Court. Petitioners refused to comply with
order due to an earlier TRO issued by SEC. The CA dismissed the petition and upheld the order of
garnishment of the Daet court.
CASE NO. 25 On November 7, 1995, the RTC of Quezon City denied herein petitioners motion to dismiss. It
G.R. No. 108991 stated that defiance of the garnishment order caused inconveniences not only to Sa Amin, but also to
March 20, 2001 Sta. Rosa, since garnishment would indirectly benefit Sta. Rosa.
WILLIAM ALAIN MIAILHE On November 28, 1995, petitioners filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES order, whereas Sta. Rosa filed a motion to declare petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer.
On March 5, 1996, petitioners filed a consolidated Motion to set aside the order of default and
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance and damages against herein for reconsideration, which was denied on June 26, 1996 for lack of merit.
respondent for the property in dispute, which is alleged by the petitioner that due to threat and On October 14, 1996, petitioners filed for Relief from the order of default, which was also
intimidation employed during the Marcos regime caused them to sell the property to the respondent. denied in an order dated March 4, 1998. Petitioners then filed for petition for Certiorari, prohibition and
The latter denied the allegation and filed its answer raising as Special and affirmative defense and mandamus before the CA, which set aside the order of default of the lower court, and directed the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed. Trial court denied the petition. On latter to admit petitioners Answer, and proceed to hear the case on the merits thus, the order of the
appeal, CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition. public respondent dated March 4, 1998 is RESCINDED and AVOIDED.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners action had prescribed
HELD:
Yes. Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when ISSUES
the parties pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on 1 Whether or not Sta. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping, in which case its claim for damages
the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or would be deemed waived, since the funds in doubt of release were already a subject of
even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even litigation in Civil Case No. 6014, and Sta. Rosa cannot file another case for claims of damages
if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or involving the same parties, the same cause of action, and the same object, in a different
where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating court.
the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; 2 Whether or not Sta. Rosa has no cause of action against petitioners, since the latter insisted
either in averments of the plaintiffs complaint or otherwise established by the evidence. on acting in good faith, and releasing the funds after the denial of their petition for Certiorari,
were it not for the motion for reconsideration filed by SEC, among other accusations of the
CASE NO. 26 respondent.
EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, and 3 Whether or not res judicata is present, with respect to the issue regarding the entitlement
RAFAEL B. BUENAVENTURA over the savings account.
VS. HELD
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and 1 NO. For a party to be guilty of forum shopping, he must have repetitively availed of the
SANTA ROSA MINING CO., INC. several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously, or successively, all substantially
GR No. 143556 founded on the same transactions, and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
March 16, 2004 raising substantially the same issues, either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by
some other court.
FACTS In the cited case, there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in Civil Case NO. 6014,
On September 19, 1995. Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc., filed before the RTC of Quezon City Sa Amin, is not a party in case at bar. Also, the parties represented different interests in these
Branch 222, a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioners Philippine Commercial case.
2 If, the following factual allegations in the Complaint be deemed admitted, Sta. Rosa has Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
established her cause of action, and may be entitled to relief, to wit: action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground
(a). On October 21, 1993, Sta. Rosa opened a savings account with petitioner PCIB, Cubao for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the
Branch; same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
(b). On October 22, 1993, respondent conveyed interest to convert said account into a judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers
savings/current/time deposit accounts; (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
(c). Sta. Rosa sought to obtain checkbooks from petitioner bank, but was denied allegedly Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases
due to a restraining order from SEC; filed. Cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
(d). Such restraining order was verified to have been received by PCIB only on October 27, The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly
1993, at 1:45p.m.; and falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodlands right to the mortgaged property.
(e). The refusal of the petitioners to issue checkbooks and to release funds to Sta. Rosa It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the
prejudiced the latters livelihood. same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for
Hence, the test of sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is, whether or not, the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment. These allegations the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the
would suffice a to constitute a cause of action against petitioners, and that the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction
petitioners may have a valid defense is another matter. against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains
3 NO. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has the same the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be deemed to have been finally forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
and conclusively settled, if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties, prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in
and for the same cause/s. as stated earlier, there is no identity of parties, subject matter and the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.
causes of action between Civil Case No. 6014, and Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. While the CASE NO. 28
deposit in Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 was involved in both cases, causes of actions TEODORO B. VESAGAS, and WILFRED D. ASIS, vs. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS and
and reliefs prayed for are entirely different. DELFINO RANIEL and HELENDA RANIEL
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The decisions of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 1999, G.R. No. 142924 December 5, 2001
are AFFIRMED.
FACTS: The respondent spouses Delfino and Helenda Raniel are members in good standing of the Luz
CASE NO. 27 Villaga Tennis Clud, Inc. (club). They alleged that petitioner Teodoro B. Vesagas, who claims to be the
ASIA UNITED BANK Vs. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC. club's duly elected president, in conspiracy with petitioner Wilfred D. Asis, who, in turn, claims to be its
G.R. No. 191388 duly elected vice-president and legal counsel, summarily stripped them of their lawful membership,
March 9, 2011 without due process of law. Thereafter, respondent spouses filed a Complaint with the Securities and
FACTS: Respondent Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage Exchange Commission (SEC). Before the hearing, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
(REM) over two parcels of land in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured that the SEC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The motion was denied by SEC, as
the obligation amounting to P250 million of Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI), doing business as well as, the CA.
Smartnet Philippines, to AUB. Goodland then filed a Complaint for the annulment of the REM on the Hence, the present course of action where petitioner alleged that since its (the Corporation)
ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties verbal agreement inception in the 1970's, the club in practice has not been a corporation. They add that it was only the
(Annulment Case). respondent spouses, motivated by their own personal agenda to make money from the club, who
While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB, surreptitiously caused its registration with the SEC. They then assert that, at any rate, the club has
prompting the latter to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were sold in already ceased to be a corporate body. Therefore, no intra-corporate relations can arise as between
public auction to AUB as the highest bidder. It was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was registered the respondent spouses and the club or any of its members. Stretching their argument further,
with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba on November 23, 2006. Before AUB could consolidate its title, petitioners insist that since the club, by their reckoning is not a corporation, the SEC does not have the
Goodland filed on November 28, 2006 another Complaint to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin power or authority to inquire into the validity of the expulsion of the respondent spouses.
the consolidation of title in favor of AUB (Injunction Case). Goodland asserted the alleged falsified Consequently, it is not the correct forum to review the challenged act. In conclusion, petitioners put
nature of the REM as basis for its prayer for injunction. respondent spouses to task for their failure to implead the club as a necessary or indispensable party
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (Injunction Case) to the case.
On March 15, 2007, the trial court acted favorably on petitioners motion and dismissed the Injunction Issues:1. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction to try and hear the case
Case with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia. 2. Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
Ruling of the Court of Appeals1 (Injunction Case) merely upheld the theoretical power of the SEC Hearing Officer to issue a subpoena and to cite a
Goodland appealed the same to the CA. person in contempt (actually a non-issue of the petition) while it shunted away the issue of whether
On June 5, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, which ruled in favor of Goodland and that hearing officer may hold a person in contempt for not obeying a subpoena where his residence is
ordered the reinstatement of the Injunction Case in the trial court. Hence, the instant petition. beyond fifty kilometers from the place of hearing and no transportation expense was tendered to
ISSUE: WON the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum shopping. him."
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in HELD:
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions 1 YES. First we now resolve whether the dispute between the respondents and petitioners is a
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either corporate matter within the exclusive competence of the SEC to decide. In order that the
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." The different ways by which forum commission can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the
shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: following relationship:
a) between the corporation, partnership or association and its of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications
stockholders, partners, members, or officers; of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest.
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the state as far Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal
as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title No.
The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the
670 and all other titles emanating therefrom. The subject property is a vast tract of lands where the
parties involved are the stockholders and the corporation, does not necessarily place the
petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed such parcels. The whole property covered by
dispute within the loop of jurisdiction of the SEC. Jurisdiction should be determined by
OCT No. 670 was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1024 in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago the mother
considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the
of herein respondent. Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of
question that is the subject of their controversy.
nullity of respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious and
Also, the alleged failure of the respondents to implead the club as a necessary or
also Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject
indispensable party where the Petitioners contend that the original complaint should be
Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate.
dismissed for not including the club as one of the respondents therein. Dismissal is not the
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses.
remedy for non-joinder of parties. Under the Rules, the remedy is to implead the
Respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the
non-party, claimed to be necessary or indispensable, in the action, thus:
Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then
OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible
"SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither
and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world. Furthermore, He pointed out that any
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action.
action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners.
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a
as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C.
proceeded with separately."
Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert
to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the
2 The other issue is with regard to the alleged oppressive subpoenas and orders issued by
Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the
Hearing Officer Soller, purportedly without or in excess of authority. In light of PD 902-A's
other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far
repeal, the need to rule on the question of the extent of the contempt powers of an SEC
submitted to the trial court.
hearing officer relative to his authority to issue subpoenas and orders to parties involved in
RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of
intra-corporate cases, or potential witnesses therein has been rendered academic. The
this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to
enactment of RA 8799 mooted this issue as SEC hearing officers, now bereft of any power to
bring before this Court the instant complaint. Defendants title especially so with the mother title OCT
resolve disputes, are likewise stripped of their power to issue subpoenas and contempt orders
670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having
incidental to the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers.
been questioned by any party. Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are
At any rate, it taxes our credulity why the petitioners insist in raising this issue in the
on the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly
case at bar. The so-called oppressive subpoenas and orders were not directed to them. They
sealed their fate.
were issued to the club's secretary, Purita Escobar, directing her to appear before the
The MR of the petitioner are likewise dismissed. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence
Commission and bring certain documents of the club,that were supposedly under her
the reason of this petition.
possession or control. It is obvious that the petitioners are not the proper parties to assail the
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Petitioner has the capacity to sue
oppressiveness of the subpoenas or the orders, and impugn their validity. Elementary is the
2. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are
principle that only those who expect to be adversely affected by an order can complain
in possession of subject land, can be subject of prescription.
against it. It is their addressee, Purita Escobar, who can assail their alleged oppressiveness.
Held: No. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to
Petitioners' protestation has therefore no legal leg to stand on.
remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that
CASE NO. 29
they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA,
their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal
C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES,
of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court
SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest,
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS, Petitioners. vs. CARMELINO
and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
M. SANTIAGO
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their
Principle laid down by SC:
Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the
does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or action.
representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue
upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a CASE NO. 30
cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account
SUI MAN HUI CHAN and GONZALO CO, petitioners jurisdiction. The function of a petition for certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within the
vs. bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, acts which courts or judges have
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR D. MEDALLA, respondents. no power or authority in law to perform. Certiorari is not designed to correct erroneous findings and
G.R. No. 147999 February 27, 2004 conclusions made by the court. At any rate, we find no merit to petitioners contention that they are
not real parties-in-interest since they are not parties nor signatories to the contract and hence should
not have been impleaded as defendants. It is undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon
Chan and, together with petitioner Co, was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the
FACTS: On March 30, 1999, private respondent Oscar Medalla filed a complaint before the RTC of
late Ramon Chan. Both continued to operate the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are
Mandaluyong City for collection of a sum of money arising from breach of a contract of lease and
real parties-in-interest in the case filed by private respondent, notwithstanding that they are not
damages, against petitioners Sui Man Hui Chan and Gonzalo Co. The complaint alleged that on
signatories to the Contract of Lease.
November 14, 1988, Napoleon C. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as lessee entered into a Lease
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
Contract3 over a hotel building located at No. 29 Abanao Street, Baguio City. Chan would use the
AFFIRMED.
leased premises as a restaurant named "Cypress Inn". Petitioner Gonzalo Co was employed by Ramon
Chan as the general manager of "Cypress Inn" and acted as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon
Medalla. When Ramon Chan died, he was survived by his wife, petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan, who CASE NO. 31
continued to operate the restaurant. On July 17, 1996, Napoleon Medalla died. Among his heirs is G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
private respondent Oscar Medalla, who succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises. TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
The contract was neither amended nor terminated after the death of the original parties but was EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband
continued by their respective successors-in-interest pursuant to the terms thereof. Petitioners Chan BEDA UNGOS, petitioners
and Co, the latter, in his capacity as agent and general manager, continued to deal with private vs.
respondent Medalla in all transactions pertaining to the contract. On various occasions, petitioners COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased premises. Despite several Statements of Accounts ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
sent by Medalla, petitioners failed to pay the rentals due but, nonetheless, continued to use and ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents
occupy the leased premises. Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners, but the latter still failed
to pay the unpaid rentals. He also found out that petitioners had not paid the realty taxes due on the FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real
leased premises since 1991, amounting to P610,019.11. Medalla then asked petitioners to settle the properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza, whom he married in 1960. They had seven
unpaid rentals, pay the unpaid real estate taxes, and vacate the leased premises. On January 1999, children. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour,
petitioners vacated the premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty taxes. Aggrieved petitioner Teodora, and their children, co-petitioners in this case.
by petitioners refusal to pay the amounts owing, which had reached P4,147,901.80 by March 1999, On November 14, 1995, respondents discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
private respondent Medalla instituted Civil Case No. MC99-666. and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. Corresponding certificate of titles
were issued to them. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
In their Answer to the Complaint, petitioners denied owing private respondent the amounts
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
claimed by the latter. They alleged that the late Ramon Chan had paid all the rentals due up to March
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
15, 1998. On July 19, 1999, petitioners filed a Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
that they were neither parties nor privies to the Contract of Lease, hence they are not the real parties-
praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of the decedent be issued upon him.
in-interest. Private respondent filed a Reply and Opposition to petitioners Supplemental Answer with
Pending such proceeding, respondents also filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
Motion to Dismiss dated August 2, 1999, praying for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss for having
Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
been belatedly filed in direct contravention of Section 1, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles against petitioners. Petitioners filed their Answer
Procedure.4 He further alleged that petitioner Chan, as the owner of the business and petitioner Co as
interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement
the agent of petitioner Chan, are clearly real parties-in-interest in the case. Private respondent pointed
pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora and the titles thereof were
to their continuous dealings with him in all transactions relating to the contract after the death of
delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
Ramon Chan and even after the expiration of the Contract of Lease. The RTC denied petitioners
name. They also raised the defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest in view of the
Motion to Dismiss. Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a
pendency of the administration proceedings.
special civil action of certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the RTC Orders.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error in law in affirming the
interest. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but was likewise denied. Petitioners appealed before
RTC Orders denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
the CA, but the CA discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
HELD: No. Prefatorily, it bears stressing that petitioners Motion to Dismiss was filed after an Answer
by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for
had already been filed. This alone warranted an outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed
hearing in view of its discretionary nature. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
in contravention of the clear and explicit mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Civil
petition for review.
Procedure. Under this section, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the
ISSUE: WON the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. 9 Here, petitioners filed their Supplemental
administrator.
Answer with Motion to Dismiss almost two months after filing their Answer, in clear contravention of
HELD: Yes. Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for
the aforecited rule. The Court of Appeals stated that the grant or denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate
interlocutory order, and it cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. The
of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing
proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered, the CA said. A writ
on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. Sec. 5, Rule 16 provides that, Any of the
of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed. The provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. It a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise, the
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to
sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not
alleged, which would require evidence and therefore, must be raised as defenses and await
The lower court cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the
the trial. In other words, to determine sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
respondents as heirs to bring the suit. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
alleged in the complaint, and no other should be considered. The respondent Judge departed
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of private
with the provision of Article 777, the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
respondent's affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action
death of the decedent. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
The determination of sufficient of cause of action can be trace out only in allegation in the complaint
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
and no other should be consider.
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated. Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two CASE NO. 33
exceptions: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
G.R. No. L-27187 July 22, 1971
defendant. Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
ANTONIO MONTEJO and CONSOLACION BIBERA, plaintiffs-appellants,
of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being
vs.
when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
VICENTA UROTIA, as heir of JUANA BIBERA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
(and 8 other cases consolidated herein)
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
FACTS: The issues in these nine cases are substantially the same, hence decided jointly.
L-27187. On July 2, 1962, plaintiffs Montejo and Bibera filed a complaint with the CFI of
CASE NO. 32
Leyte, seeking a) to prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on several parcels of land they claim to
own in common with the defendants; b) to have said parcels of land partitioned among its co-owners;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN, LAGUNA vs COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS GARCIA c) the release, from the aforementioned mortgage, of the said personal; and d) the collection of
G.R.No. L-94733 certain sums of money allegedly due from the defendants. There were 24 defendants under the
original complaint, which was amended to include 20 additional defendants. More a year later, 17
FACTS: The petitioner herein filed a civil case against respondents for unlawful detainer, with defendants had not been summoned. Said court then issued an order, directing the plaintiffs to exert
preliminary mandatory injunction in MTC Binan, Laguna. The said petitioner alleged that there is no efforts to cause said defendants to be summoned. Over two years later, the court dismissed the case
renewal of 25 years lease of contract however, private respondents opposed to petitioner contending for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with said order.
that the 25 years lease of contract had not yet expired. Assuming that it was expired, indicated L-29098. A case was filed for the collection of a sum of money before the City Court of
thereof the "renewal for 25 years lease of contract. Petitioner reply to respondent and thereby Manila against defendants Arcellana and the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. Judgment was
respondent filed Motion for Preliminary Hearing as the Dismiss has been Filed" on the ground that rendered in favor of the plaintiff, People's Car Inc. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., appealed to the
complaint states no cause of action. CFI of Manila. On October 24, 1967, CFI issued a notice to the parties, advising them that the appealed
After some further exchange of opposition between petitioner and respondent, MTC render its case had then been docketed in said court. Counsel for the appellant received, on December 18, 1967,
judgment in favor to petitioner ordering respondent to vacate the premises. Respondents filed a a notice that a pre-trial would be held on January 4, 1968. He, however, failed to appear at said pre-
Notice of Hearing in RTC however petitioner filed Motion for execution pending appeal which was trial. Hence, the Court dismissed the appeal and the judgment appealed from revived, for failure to
granted by presiding judge and enforce judgment. prosecute on the part of said appellant.
Private respondent filed in Court of appeals for issuance of writ of Preliminary Injunction L-29373. An action for the recovery of a sum of money was filed before the City Court of
assailing that petitioner failed to furnish him a copy of the motion that contrary to Section 6, Rule 15 Manila against defendants Bandayrel and Boquer. Boquer was declared in default, while Bandayrel and
of Rules of Courts. Hence, this petition. plaintiff Bolivar submitted a written "stipulation of facts and compromise agreement," The court
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acted in abuse of discretion for not complying the rules under rendered judgment in favor of Bolivar. Bandayrel appealed to the CFI Instance of Manila, which set the
Section 6, Rule 15 of Rules of Court. case for pre-trial on February 22, 1967. Both parties submitted a motion stating that they are trying to
RULING: Yes, The Court of Appeals found out that MTC acted with serious abuse in discretion which is settle the case amicably. The court granted them until Feb. 29, 1967 to submit their amicable
tantamount lack of excess of jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. Section 5, Rule of settlement or a negative manifestation. The hearing was reset to April 8, 1967. On this date, both
the Rules of Court pertinently provides: Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - Any of the parties appeared before the court. However, counsel for the plaintiff-appellee manifested that the
grounds for dismissal provides for in this Rule, except improper venue, preliminary hearing may be defendants have not submitted any proposed settlement terms and moved that the appeal be
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.Further, CA said that the error committed by the dismissed, which was granted immediately.
court is correctible by ordinary appeal and the failure to state cause of action is not necessary in the L-29454. An action to restrain the defendants "from performing any and all acts which will
case as ruled in "Heirs vs Genato". tend to prejudice" the alleged rights of plaintiff Pagadian Iron Mines over a given iron lode claim as
well as to recover damages was filed before the CFI of Zamboanga. After the issues were joined, the
case was set for trial. Six days before the trial, the same was cancelled upon motion of the parties who
.respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private
alleged that there are negotiations for amicable settlement. The same was several times reset for
respondent's affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based
hearing, often postponed mostly upon the same ground. After thirteen (13) postponements, the case
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to
was, set for hearing on December 8, 1966, which both parties moved again to be postponed for the
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself.
same reason. However, the case had been pending for over six (6) years; the court ordered the case
Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
dismissed "for failure to prosecute." A reconsideration of this order was later denied.
admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render
L-29542. On August 28, 1963, Maderazo brought an action to recover a sum of money from -versus-
defendant Lim Lian Khoan, before the Pasay City Court. Said court dismissed the case. Maderazo, JOSE ARCELLANA, and THE CAPITAL
appealed to the CFI of Rizal, which notified the parties that the appeal had been docketed with said INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., INC.,
court and that the period to file pleadings would commence from receipt of said notice. However, the Defendants,
case was ordered dismissed "for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time." THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND
L-30711. An action for the recovery of a sum of money against Antonio Buhat, was instituted SURETY CO., INC.,
in the Municipal Court of General Santos. The case having been dismissed upon the ground of as Defendant-Appellant.
prescription, plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of First Instance. Both parties
were notified that the record of the case had been received by the latter court, which, on January 30, FACTS: On April 20, 1966, appellee initiated a case for the collection of a sum of money against
1969, dismissed it upon the ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the same for an defendants JOSE ARCELLANA and THECAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO.,INC., the herein appellant.
unreasonable length of time. Judgment for plaintiff People's Car Inc., having been rendered, on September 7, 1967, defendant
L-30744. , Plaintiff Santos seeks to recover from defendant Taniongon the possession of a Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., appealed to the Court of First instance of Manila. On October 24,
parcel of land. She filed a complaint before the CFI of South Cotabato. Defendant filed, on August 3, 1967, the latter issued a notice to the parties, advising them that the appealed case had then been
1967, his answer with a counterclaim, to which plaintiff replied, on August 14, 1967 with an answer to docketed in said court. Counsel for the appellant received, on December 18, 1967, notice to the effect
the counterclaim. On January 23, 1969, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, plaintiff that a pre-trial would be held on January 4, 1968. He, however, failed to appear at said pre-trial. The
having done nothing in the meantime. said counsel alleged that his failure to appear at the pre-trial, on January 4, 1968, was due to the fact
L-30933. The complaint for reconveyance filed by plaintiffs Gudmalin and Sabijon filed with that he then had to attend the trial of another case; that he had filed, on December 27, 1967, a
the CFI of Zamboanga del Sur, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.Plaintiffs then filed, on March motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground; and that, although the motion was
31, 1962, their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. When the latter was considered denied on December 29, 1967, notice of the order to this effect was not received by him until January
for approval, counsel for the defendants pointed out that its caption did not set forth the full names of 12, 1968, or eight (8) days after the scheduled pre-trial. Hence, the Court forthwith ordered the appeal
all parties. Thereupon, the Judge stated that the court will approve the record on appeal. Plaintiffs dismissed and the judgment appealed from revived, for failure to prosecute on the part of said
claim to have later amended the same "by inclusion of all parties in handwriting duly initialed" in the appellant.
original Record on Appeal, although without giving respondents the notice required in Section 7 of Rule ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI erred in dismissing the appeal based on the ground of failure to
41 of the Rules of Court. Over five (5) years later, the appeal was dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs prosecute despite the fact that the reason the appellant failed to appear during pre-trial was because
to submit an amended record on appeal, in accordance with said provision of the Rules of Court. the Order for the denial of the Motion for Postponement was received by the latters counsel (8) days
L-31072. Petitioner Olilang filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition after the scheduled pre-trial.
and mandamus, with the CFI of Manila, on September 2, 1967, to annul and set aside a decision of HELD: No, the CFI was correct in dismissing the appeal.
respondent Conrado F. Estrella, as Governor of the Land Authority, approving the sale of a parcel of Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court, which is a reproduction of Section 3 of Rule 30 of
land, to private respondent Nocon, after said lot had been allegedly sold to Olilang, and to require said the Rules of Court effective July 1, 1940, reads:
Governor Estrella to allocate the disputed land to Olilang. The court issued an order setting the case Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial,
for hearing on February 6, 1969, but, despite notice given to counsel for Olilang, he did not appear or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
before the court on that date. Thus, the case was dismissed. Olilang's counsel filed a motion for Relief these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion
or Reconsideration upon the ground that, in making the memorandum of said hearing, his office of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the
secretary had erroneously made the corresponding entry for February 11, 1969, instead of February 6, effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
1969. This motion was denied. As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-quoted
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the action due to failure to prosecute is warranted. provision, it was ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case"; that "the
HELD: Yes. Section 3 of Rule 17 reads, If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to sound discretion of the court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed, in the
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of absence of patent abuse"; and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon
the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action."
This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by Appellants late receipt of the Order denying his of Motion for Postponement which allegedly caused
court. Construing this provision, it was held that the dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rests his non-appearance on the date of trial is insufficient to warrant a reversal of the order appealed from.
upon the sound discretion of the court. As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," it Appellant was represented by the "Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm, on behalf of which
"depends upon the circumstances of each particular case." Thus, the Court refused to disturb orders of Atty. Sabino P. Palomares, Jr. had appeared. If Atty. Palomares had another case set for trial on January
dismissal for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute for a period of four (4) years, about three (3) 4, 1968, any of the three (3) members of the law firm could have and should have appeared at the
years, over a year, less than a year, and even less than three (3) months, as well as for failure of the pre-trial of the case at bar. Moreover, in the absence of an order granting said motion for
plaintiffs to comply, for less than two (2) months, with an order directing him to file a bill of postponement, appellant's counsel was not justified in assuming that the motion would be
particulars. granted.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from in each one of these nine (9) cases are hereby Motions for postponement are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and unless
affirmed, with costs against the respective appellants, except appellant in L-30711, which is the there be an abuse of such discretion the appellate court will not interfere with the
Government. exercise of that discretion.
The order appealed from was affirmed.
CASE NO.34
CASE NO. 35
CASE NO. 3
G.R. No. 139337 August 15, 2001
MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS
Case No. 4
International Container Terminal Services Inc. vs Court of Appeals, C.F. Sharp Inc.,
FACTS: On November 4, 1997, petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Roxas filed with the Regional Trial Court of
G.R. No. 90530
Paraaque City, Civil Case No. 97-0523, which is an action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband, Jose Antonio F. Roxas, private
Facts:
respondent herein, with an application for support pendente lite for their four (4) minor children. The
Respondent Sharp Inc. filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
case was raffled to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City presided by Judge Rolando
against petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) where the trial court issued a writ of
C. How. But the petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC Branch 257 a Notice of Dismissal
preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a bond issued by the Integrated Bonding and
dated November 20, 1997, to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to the provision of
Insurance Co. Petitioner filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp claiming that
Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been
as a consequence of the complaint and the writ of preliminary injunction, it had suffered injuries. The
served and no responsive pleading has yet been filed.
PPA, together with petitioner, filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint where the same was granted
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed on November 25, 1997. It
by the court and further resulting to the dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner filed a motion for
was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City presided by
reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
decision stating that the counterclaim for damages being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee
On May 13, 1998, when the case was called for a pre-trial conference, the matter of plaintiffs
has been paid, was correctly dismissed after the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner then filed a
(petitioners) application for support pendente lite of their four (4) minor children was taken up. On
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
May 19, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort, issued an Order granting the application for support pendente
lite. On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint operated to dismiss the counterclaim.
private respondent in contempt of court after the latter failed to comply with the said Order. Private
respondent, filed a counter-manifestation and motion praying that the manner and mode of payment
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of
of his contribution to the expenses of his minor children be modified such that he will pay directly to
the complaint, hence it did not object to the dismissal of the respondents complaint. The compulsory
the entities or persons to which the payment for such expenses are intended. On September 23, 1998,
counterclaim was so intertwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for independent
Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order directing the private respondent "to comply fully with the
adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in
Order within 10 days otherwise, he would be cited for contempt of court.
the first place. As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint on the petitioners own motion will
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the Orders of the
also dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint.
trial court. The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the reason
The Rules provides that, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
that the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior filing of Civil Case
service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge Rolando C. How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice.
defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by
Hence this appeal.
the court.
The fact that petitioner caused the dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not
ISSUES: Whether or not the case at bar requires a certification of non-forum shopping.
object to, but actually moved for, the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioner cannot undo that act.
Petitioner should have had objected to the dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to
HELD: NO. Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been prosecute it.
rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or Case No. 5
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et.al
favorable disposition. Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of GR No. 125468, October 9, 2000
obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to
FACTS:
Petitioner Producers Bank filed a complaint with a prayer for preliminary attachment. It was filed GR NO. 103185 CONRADO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS
before the RTC of Makati and the latter granted the writ. Petitioner also filed a motion for issuance of MANUFACTURERS BANK, respondents.
summons, which the RTC granted. Only private respondent Wilson Kho was served through substituted FACTS
service. The whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown. A complaint for a collection of a sum of money was filed by private respondent against
The Bank moved for reinstatement of the writ. It was at this time when the trial court observed Calalang who filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. Respondent's bank failed to appear during
that there were no returns of the service of summonses from the three other defendants. Without any the first two scheduled hearings for pre-trial causing the dismissal of the case. The dismissal was set
manifestation from either parties, nor any application for service of summonses by publication, the aside upon respondent's motion for reconsideration. On the two scheduled dates of hearing, counsel
RTC deferred deliberations on the motion to reinstate the writ of attachment until the summonses for defendant Hugo Arca failed to appear. The court informed the plaintiff that it shall not consider
were served. When Respondent Kho moved that pre-trial be set without having to wait for the service Acropolis trading Corp as having brought under their jurisdiction in view of improper service of
of summonses upon the other defendants, the RTC ruled to deny the motion. summons. Calalang filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent bank failed to prosecute
There was also inordinate delay during pre-trial proceedings. In four instances, specifically on the case for an unreasonable length of time. The court resolved that if plaintiff was not able to cause
August 3, 1991, September 17, 1991, May 8, 1992, and July 13, 1992, pre-trial conferences were re- service of alias summons then this court will dismiss the complaint. At the pre-trial conference, the
set either because Banks counsel for witnesses could not appear. Finally, when trial commenced, the case had been dismissed for failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear despite notice and considering
Bank moved for postponements for three times. that his case had been pending for 7 years. A motion for reconsideration was filed citing that said
The Banks counsel filed a motion for postponement of the hearings scheduled. He cited as reason counsel arrived late due to heavy traffic. Such motion was denied and so respondent bank appealed in
his having to leave for the province to arbitrate a peaceful settlement of a land dispute among the CA which reversed the decision and ordered the case to be remanded to the court of origin for
members of his family. In his stead, he sent Atty. Cotaco to attend the hearing and to inform the court further proceedings.
about his predicament. Kho opposed any further postponements and undue delays and prayed for the ISSUE: WON the acts of respondent bank manifest lack of interest hence respondent court's decision
dismissal of the case. to set aside the dismissal of said case an abuse of discretion.
The RTC finding no merit in the reasons for postponement and finding Kho's opposition well taken, HELD: No. petitioner's contention that the fact that respondent bank had not caused service of
issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure of the petitioner to prosecute the case. A summons on the two other defendants, the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, for
subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the Bank was denied. The Bank appealed to the Court almost seven years after the complaint was filed on April 29, 1980 indicated "abuse of judicial
of Appeals. The CA issued the assailed decision, dismissing the appeal and affirming the order of the leniency and tolerance" is bereft of merit. Summons is issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of
lower court. the complaint. When it was informed later on by Judge Alikpala, Jr. in his Order dated March 6, 1987
that there was an improper service on defendants Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo
Salceda, respondent bank, in compliance therewith, filed a motion for alias summons, as permitted by
the law. Considering the judicial reorganization which took place during the pendency of this case and
ISSUE: WON the CA erred and abused its discretion when it affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the
the numerous instances raised by both petitioner and respondent bank as contributing to the delay,
complaint for failure to prosecute.
petitioner cannot now claim that respondent bank's "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance is the
single greatest component of this delay". The acts of the respondent bank do not manifest lack of
HELD: No. The CA did not err nor abuse its discretion when it upheld the RTCs dismissal of
interest to prosecute, in the absence of proof that it indeed abandoned or intended to abandon its
complaint for failure to prosecute for five years. The RTC in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in
case against petitioner and the other defendants. Admittedly there was delay in this case, but such
affirming the RTC, applied Section 3, of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states that: Sec. 3. Failure
delay, the SC held that, is not the delay warranting dismissal. To be a sufficient ground for dismissal,
to prosecute. - If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an
delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may
processes. While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion such discretion must be exercised
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case. If facts obtain that serve
Undoubtedly, five years have been an unreasonably long time for a defendant to wait for the
as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set
outcome of a trial which has yet to commence and on which his family, fortune and future depend. In
aside, especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent
a number of previous cases, the SC have consistently warned that courts must ensure that litigations
and no injury results to defendant. It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement
are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. SC also held that although the grant or denial of
and the setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally upon the sound discretion of the
postponements rests entirely on the sound discretion of the judge, SC cautioned that the exercise of
judge to whom they are addressed, but always predicated on the consideration that more than the
that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised. Postponements should not be allowed except
mere convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
on meritorious grounds, in light of the attendant circumstances. Deferment of the proceedings may be
served thereby. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
allowed or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party.
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
"The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate
CASE NO. 7
loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in the plaintiff's being non-suited or of the
defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment." While a court can dismiss a case
on the ground of non-prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the G.R. No. 151215 April 5, 2010
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC., Petitioner,
promptitude. vs.
To declare the dismissal in this case without prejudice would open the floodgate to possible ANTONIO C. MILAN, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of "A. MILAN TRADING," and
circumvention of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on dismissal with prejudice for failure to LAURA M. MILAN, Respondents.
prosecute. SC held that the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is with prejudice and should have the FACTS:
effect of adjudication on the merits. Petitioner filed on February 18, 2000 a Complaint for Sum of Money against herein
respondents Antonio and Laura Milan, alleging that it extended loans on different dates to respondents
Case No. 6 for which Deeds of Assignment were duly executed by respondents. Under the terms of the Deeds,
respondents sold, assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing the formers rights to various checks for and
in consideration of the various amounts obtained and in case of default or nonpayment of the checks, misuse of court processes. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court states that: If, for no
respondents were obligated to pay the face value of the checks, interests and late payment charges. justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence
Petitioner then presented the checks for payment but were dishonored for different reasons. It in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
thereafter demanded from respondents to settle its obligations, but the latter failed to do so comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
prompting the petitioner to institute the complaint in the RTC of Quezon City to enforce payment of motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
the total loan obligation. The RTC issued summons to respondents, addressed to their place of defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
residence as stated in the complaint yet it was for naught because the respondents had already shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the
transferred to an unknown location thus, returned unserved. Petitioner filed a motion to archive the court. The Court thus found that the RTC grievously erred in dismissing Civil Case No.
case for it was conducting an investigation in order to ascertain the whereabouts of the respondents, Q-00-40010 because the dismissal were due to the absence of petitioners counsel at the
subject to its reinstatement after the same was determined. It was however denied because the hearing scheduled for that day and due to the directive of the RTC to petitioner to "take the
circumstances of the case were not within the purview of the provisions of paragraph II (c) of necessary steps to actively prosecute its case, otherwise, the same shall be dismissed."
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases). The RTC then ordered the While trial courts have the discretion to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for
petitioner "to take the necessary steps to actively prosecute the instant case within ten days from tardiness or absence at hearings, such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and
receipt" under pain of dismissal of the case "for lack of interest." The petitioner filed motion for should still conform to the dictates of justice and fair play. It does not escape this Courts
issuance of alias summons but both were denied and the case was subsequently dismissed due to the notice that PCI Leasing failed to successfully prosecute the case for several months due to
absence of the counsel for the latter during the hearing for the second motion filed by it. Subsequent the difficulties it encountered in locating respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for
motion for reconsideration and ex-parte motion for reconsideration were also denied by the court. A changing addresses and refusing to accept court processes. Under these circumstances, the
notice of appeal was filed by the petitioner in attempt to challenge the order rendered by the trial delay in the trial court proceedings was not entirely the fault of PCI Leasing. Verily, it can
court which the latter later on dismissed because the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. hardly be said that PCI Leasing engaged in a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
Petitioner then assailed the above Resolution before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for case or committed a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but it was dismissed outright holding that its appeal had
been taken out of time. Citing Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
CASE NO. 8
the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time. It
FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and
further holds that it has no jurisdiction over the petition since it only involves question of law. Thus,
FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners,
the instant petition.
vs.
ISSUE:
ELIZABETH BALISING et al.,respondents
1 WON the appeal was filed out of time.
G.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000
2 WON the petitioner is deprived of \ its right to recover the sums it had loaned to the
FACTS:
respondents.
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and
HELD:
Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa2 filed by the private respondents.
1 YES. The Court hold that the conclusion of the RTC that PCI Leasing belatedly filed its appeal
The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.After the petitioners
was correct, but the premise therefor was evidently mistaken. In accordance with Section 3,
were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,3 they filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC shall be taken
aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Said period
of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In Neypes v. Court of
Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal. The municipal trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
Appeals, the Court had the occasion to clarify the rule regarding the period within which an
on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong
appeal may be taken should a motion for new trial or reconsideration be filed. Thus: To
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
dismissing the cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order,
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Contrary to the
deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. On November 13, 1995, the municipal
findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should be reckoned
trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice,
from the date which denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of PCI Leasing. As PCI
pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Then, private respondents
Leasing was not able to file the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period allowed
through counsel, filed a motion to revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners,
therefor, the RTC Order dismissing the case should be deemed final and executory.
stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.
2 NO. Notwithstanding the doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the Court finds, after a
Petitioners filed a comment and opposition to motion to revive claiming that the Order of the
thorough review of the records, that compelling circumstances are extant in this case, which
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and
clearly warrant the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Invariably, rules of procedure
executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
revive . The municipal trial court issued an Order granting private respondents' motion to revive.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even
municipal trial court. Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a
the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing the Order, dated March 18, 1996 of the
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
municipal trial court. The regional trial court, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
itself had already declared to be final. It will not serve the ends of substantial justice if
of the aforementioned decision for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
the RTCs dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality
upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural
if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case; and
lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by counterclaims for failure of Meliton to pay the docket fees, hence the said dismissal does not
motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory. constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint.
HELD: The CA reversed the RTC's decision and ordered the dismissal of the case stating that the
failure of the respondents to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an
appeal therefrom rendered the dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their
1.YES. An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or
counterclaim by another action.
appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, 32 we stated, thus:
Issues:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal
1. Whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature
order was any less final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without
prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order
2. Whether or not petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the
but a final disposition of the complaint.
order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from asserting the same in
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision
another action.
or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the
lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or
Held:
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot
1. The counterclaims of petitioner are compulsory in nature.
be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. After the order of dismissal of a case
Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises
without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and
out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
Thus, the regional trial court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without
prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be
The "one compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged in
reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they involve
2.) NO. The action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice cannot be revived by motion many of the same factual and/or legal issues.
after the order of dismissal had become final and executory.
Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim are present.
is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived The counterclaims are logically related to the complaint. Private respondents complaint was for
only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required rescission of the contract of lease due to petitioner's breach of her obligations under the said contract.
under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived On the other hand, Petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of the
by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the premises, as well as for the
reconsideration has lapsed. Moreover, It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies filing of that civil suit which is contended to be clearly unfounded.
to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same
is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously. To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival Both the claims arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as
of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would well as their potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation. That
prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with finality, thereby undermining the contract of lease pleaded by private respondent constitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both
stability of our judicial system. parties for recovery of their respective claims.
CASE NO. 9 2. Petitioners are not barred by res judicata.
SPS. LYDIA AND VIRGILIO MELITON VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 101883 DECEMBER 11, 1992 In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been
Facts: rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must
In June 1988, Nelia Ziga filed a complaint for rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
land before RTC Naga, Branch 27 against Lydia Meliton on the ground of breach of contract. She subject matter, and of causes of action.
alleged that Meliton failed to pay the monthly rentals due, constructed a concrete wall and roof on the
leased premises and subleased the property without her consent. The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion of private respondent, plaintiff
Meliton filed an answer and set up counterclaims for the recovery of the value of her therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17. Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when otherwise
kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by Ziga. stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the court. The order
In May 2009, Ziga filed a motion to dismiss her complaint alleging that her cause of dismissal of the first case was unqualified, hence without prejudice and, therefore, does not have
of action had become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract. The RTC dismissed the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a
the complaint. The counterclaims of Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. counterclaim duly interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits thereof.
In December 1989, Meliton filed a complaint against Ziga for the recovery of the amounts
involved in her counterclaims. Ziga filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause In the order of dismissal of the complaint, the counterclaims of herein petitioners were dismissed by
of action was barred by prior judgment. reason of the fact the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the dismissal of the counterclaims in the docket fees. The said dismissal was without prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of
earlier case is not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata, there having been no consideration and adjudication of Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, and ALBERTO
the case on the merits. MAGDATO, respondents.
G.R. No. 118691. July 5, 1996
The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and
leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had
Facts:
not been commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on
On 16 June 1973, petitioner Alejandro Bayog and private respondent Alberto Magdato
the same subject matter. Evidently, therefore, the prior dismissal of herein petitioners' counterclaims
entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot with an area of 0.8 hectares located in
is not res judicata and will not bar the filing of another action based on the same causes of action.
Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique, with Bayog as the LANDOWNER-LESSOR and Magdato as TENANT-
LESSEE. On 19 April 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 3844,
CASE NO. 10
and P.D. No. 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold to Magdato. On 3 September 1990,
G.R. No. 159699. March 16, 2005
Bayog, in consideration of P250,000.00, executed a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of
ACANCE VS CA
redemption within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. In a letter dated 19 October 1992, Bayog
asked Magdato to remove his house from Bayog's land. As Magdato did not comply, Bayog and Jorge
FACTS: Angela Quijano got married to Jesus Acance in 1990 after her former husband's death in 1989.
Pesayco, Jr. filed with the Third MCTC for Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for
Upon death of Jesus, his children, together with Angela registered the disputed property on the Acance
Demolition. Magdato had then ten days from service of summons to file his Answer, but he filed it 13
siblings name who are all resideing in the U.S. Upon knowledge of such, the children of Angela with
days after. Magdato alleged that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, It being an agrarian
her first spouse, the Quijano siblings, herein respondents, filed an amended complaint in the RTC. The
dispute. On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order holding that since Magdato's Answer was
complaint was to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of deceased Jesus Acance. The
filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its
quijanos claim that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of their deceased father
jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Magdato filed a petition for relief from judgment with
and Angela. Petitioners failed to file an answer and was declared in default. The Acances, through their
injunction and prayer to litigate as a pauper with the RTC. Bayog filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTCs
attorney in fact, Rosalino Acance, filed a motion to lift/set aside the order of default. Rosalno alleges
decision is to set aside the MCTCs decision and let the case be remanded back to that court for proper
non-receipt of the complaint THe motion was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA for grave abuse of
disposal, thus, this petition by certiorari.
discretion. They maintained that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners
because no valid extraterritorial service of summons was made on them. The CA denied for their
omission of the motion for reconsideration with the lower court. Hence the petition. Issue: Whether or not the MCTC could take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed.
Held: Yes. The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely, on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of
Issue: WON petitioners were served a valid extraterritorial service of summons. simply adopting a strange theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed
without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said
HELD: NO. The procedural requirement that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before section which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule on Summary
resorting to the special civil action of certiorari may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice Procedure, as well as its predecessor, does not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary
and, among other recognized instances, when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of
the only adequate and speedy remedy available.4 Among other remedies, a petition for certiorari to default if a defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that Magdato's defense of
declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available if the trial court improperly declared a party in lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on
default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The Answer asserted that the MCTC
attended such declaration had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between Bayog and
Magdato, which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court " Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant Agricultural Leasehold issued in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant view of Magdato's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing,
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC
by personal service as under Section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer."
There was obviously no proof of service presented by respondents. While the respondents claimed
that they had complied with the service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation,10 it does not appear that they had presented to the court a quo the "affidavit of the
CASE NO. 12
printer, his foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager" of the
"Remate," where the publication was allegedly made, to prove such service by publication. The failure
to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the G.R. No. 146262 January 21, 2005
summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. Petition granted. HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity
CASE NO. 11 as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO,
FACTS: parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or
Sandoval and Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title before the RTC of Pasig proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution
City. The land registration court issued an order of general default and hearings on the application thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate
followed. The land registration court granted the application. The decision became final and executory, description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
the National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued Decree in the names of Sandoval registered.
and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao. Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887. The
Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., et. al heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC alleging remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. and The Court stated that petitioners position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have
praying that the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of the decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-interest
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in procedure.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT in favor of Sandoval and Furthermore, petitioners filed both motion to consider the deed of sale in the registration and
Ozaeta and their spouses only. motion to have the decrees declared viod, long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final
Petitioners filed another motion to declare void Decree. Petitioners questioned the and executory.
inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator Consequently, Petitioners failed to lift the order of general default. Records disclosed that
denied the request and explained the inconsistencies. without first filing a motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as
Petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court, petitioner
pendens at the back of OCT on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants whose personality as far
motion to declare OCT void, however the ROD of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that the order of default has not
notice of lis pendens. been lifted.
Thus, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. The LRA agreed with the Register of In Lim Toco v. Go Fay A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of
Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be
of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the court,
of lis pendens relative to the pending case. unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in what is now
The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
a proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in the case. Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, The SC hold that the motion filed by
Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land registration proceedings for purposes of
PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of general default. filing an application of a notice of lis pendens.
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for review. The appellate court dismissed the The SC stated that Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act between the objective of the
petition for lack of merit. Reiterating the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding and
personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Hence, this petition. the strict requirements for a notice of lis pendens. .The facts in this case show that petitioners have
not complied with the requirements.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING WHEREFORE, The SC DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the CA. SO ORDERED.
THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
CASE NO. 13
HELD:
The SC held that the petition has no merit. Petitioners have not complied with the requisites.
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens because G.R. No. 88954 October 29, 1992
petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not DATU SAMAD MANGELEN, petitioner,
parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite vs.
pleading to the ROD of Marikina. The Supreme Court hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO HABALAYUS and HABALAYUS ENTERPRISES,
the application for a notice of lis pendens. INC., respondents.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession
of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his
FACTS:
answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property
Assailed in this petition for review is the Resolution of the public respondent Court of Appeals
is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
reversing its previous Decision which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
Manila in favor of herein petitioner ordering private respondents to pay the former the sum of
province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
P600,000 plus 12% interest and moral damages (P50,000), exemplary damages (P10,000) and
purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have
attorneys fees (P100,000).
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
The controversy arose from a compromise settlement between the parties regarding a
parties designated by their real names.
logging concession of the plaintiff (herein petitioner) located somewhere in Datalblao, Columbia,
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
Sultan Kudarat which appears to be included in the logging concession located on same general
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to
vicinity granted to private respondent, Habalayus Enterprises. It is stated therein that the
quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other
consideration for the Compromise Agreement would be the waiver on the part of the plaintiff (herein
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation
petitioner) of whatever rights he may have over his logging concession in favor of the defendants
thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse
(herein private respondents) and that private respondents shall pay petitioner the total amount of
any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the
P600,000.00, one fourth of the amount of P150,000.00 shall be paid and/or delivered on February 28, a result consistent with the theory of private respondents. Besides, the interpretation of the
1983 and the remaining balance of P300,000.00 shall be paid in three (3) equal installments. Compromise Agreement involves a question of law; the remand of the case would thus serve
no useful purpose.
3 YES. Whether private respondents had a valid or good defense is entirely irrelevant
Private respondent refused to issue checks in compliance therewith, thus prompting
considering the circumstances obtaining. CA gravely erred in "reversing" its decision of 30
petitioner to complain to the Bureau of Forest Development which directed Habaluyas Enterprises,
January 1989 on the basis of respondents "good and valid defenses".
Inc., to refrain from continuing with the logging operation inside the area complained of by the
Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
petitioner. Thereafter, private respondent issued two (2) post-dated checks in favor of the petitioner
Sec. 3 Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after
but both checks were dishonored on the ground of insufficiency of funds. Demands were made but
discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
there was no favorable response. Plaintiff was thus constrained to write a formal demand letter yet it
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, and
still did not heed the demands of the petitioner. The latter was compelled to initiate two criminal
meritorious defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
complaints for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in RTC.
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, private respondent submitted a
A meritorious defense, which public respondent considers as synonymous to a "good and
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue, a supplemental motion to dismiss on the
valid defense," is not the only basis for the lifting of an order of default; it is merely one of
ground of pendency of another case in the RTC Quezon City and a second supplemental motion to
two requisites which a party must comply with. The first is the existence of fraud, accident,
dismiss on the ground of lis pendens-- all of which were denied. Although they received a copy of the
mistake or excusable neglect. Needless to say, these two requisites must concur.
denial order, private respondents still did not file any answer to the complaint. Consequently,
While it is not required for the court to inquire into the nature, character and quality of the
petitioner filed a motion to declare defendants in default and to be allowed to present evidence ex-
defense interposed by private respondents, it should nevertheless be stated here that such a
parte, which the trial court granted.
defense relates to the interpretation of the provision in the Compromise Agreement regarding
Private respondent filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold in abeyance
the purpose of the P600,000.00 consideration.
further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a
petition for certiorari raising the issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia
which it also denied. Still unable to accept the verdict, private respondent filed a motion to reconsider CASE NO. 14
the decision. Court of Appeals then reversed its earlier decision stating that Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. HUTAMA-RSEA/SUPERMAX PHILS., J.V., Petitioner,
has good and valid defenses as amplified in their motion for reconsideration and remanded the case to vs.
the lower court for further proceedings. KCD BUILDERS CORPORATION, represented by its President CELSO C. DIOKNO,Respondent.
Hence, this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 173181
ISSUES: W/N the trial courts decision (declaring private respondents in default for failure to answer
the complaint within the reglementary period in view of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and the Facts:
motion for reconsideration, and authorizing the petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte) was On 10 December 2001, appellee KCD Builders Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money
correct? against appellants before the RTC of Makati. Its cause of action arose from a written contract which
1 W/N Court of Appeals seriously erred in remanding the case to the Lower Court for was the Notice to Proceed executed by the parties whereby appellant [Hutama] as principal contractor
further proceedings? contracted with appellee [KCD] as sub-contractor for the said project. The final billing was submitted
2 W/N the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that herein respondents have a valid to appellant Charles H.C. Yang, and despite a joint evaluation by the parties through their respective
and good defense? representatives who agreed on the amount [of] P2,967,164.71 as HUTAMAs total obligation to appellee
RULING: [KCD], and a letter of demand, appellant corporation [Hutama] failed and refused to pay.
Summons was served on appellants which was received by their secretary, Ms. Evelyn
Estrabela in behalf of the two defendants [Hutama and Yang]. On 21 February 2002, their counsel filed
1 YES. The pleadings disclose facts which, as earlier summarized, clearly reveal respondents'
an Entry of Appearance and Motion for Extension of time to File Responsive Pleading. They were given
attempt, through different procedural maneuvers, to delay a simple case. It is obvious that
a 20-day extension period to file the responsive pleading, or until 16 March 2002.
they were unmoved by any sense of urgency to protect their interests. It appeared, that the
filing of the petition much later was but part of a well-planned strategy to gain more time to
On 11 April 2002, appellee [KCD] filed a Motion to Declare Defendant/s [Hutama and Yang] in
delay the case. If the trial court aborted such strategy, private respondents have only
Default for failure to file the responsive pleading within the extended period, and set the same for
themselves to blame. The trial court acted correctly and in accordance with Section 1, Rule
hearing on 26 April 2002.
18 of the Rules of Court in declaring private respondents in default and in authorizing
On 23 April 2002, appellant Charles H.C. Yang filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the
petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.
complaint to state a case of action against him, On the same date, appellant HUTAMA filed an Urgent
Motion to Admit Attached Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, together with the said answer.
2 YES. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further
During the hearing on appellees motion to declare defendant/s in default, the trial court
proceedings, placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The trial court
noted the filing of appellants respective motion to dismiss and answer with counterclaim but noted
would not know what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified
that the filing thereof on 27 March 2002 was too late considering that they were only given an
the order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be
extended period up [to] 16 March 2002 to do the same. Thus, the trial court granted the motion to
hard pet at finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution.
declare defendants in default and directed, upon appellees motion, the presentation of evidence ex-
parte before the branch clerk of court who was appointed as commissioner to received evidence.
Petitioner claims that it is for the waiver of his rights over a portion of a logging concession Appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default. During the hearing, the trial
mentioned in the Compromise Agreement; on the other hand, private respondent claim that court ordered appellee to file an opposition or comment. After the Manifestation filed by appellee on
it is for the maintenance of peace and order by the petitioner. Both the trial court and the 24 June 2002, the trial court set anew the hearing on the motion to set aside order of default on 22
public respondent in its 30 January 1989 decision upheld the theory of the petitioner. The August 2002, but appellants failed to appear. The trial court then denied the said motion in the Order
Supreme Court is thus unable to see how further proceedings by the trial court could produce dated 19 September 2002.
During the ex-parte presentation of evidence, appellees witness Celso C. Dioko testified that
there was a contract executed between appellants and appellee regarding the construction of Package CASE NO. 15
2 Site Works in Philips Semiconductor Phils. Inc., Calamba, Laguna where appellee was the sub- GR No. 120496
contractor as evidenced by a Notice to Proceed.After the completion of the project, he [Dioko] billed FIVE STAR BUS CO., INC. and CARLOS SALONGA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
them the total amount of P3,009,954.05. After they received the bill, they asked him [Dioko] to have a REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KALOOKAN CITY, BR. 129 and PEDRO and LYDIA SANTOS,
joint evaluation by their engineer and his engineer on site. The authorized engineer to evaluate the Respondents.
amount arrived at was Engr. Jose De Asis. Thus, their authorized engineers came out with the total
amount of P2,967,164.71 as cost of the project. After the joint evaluation, he [Dioko] again sent the FACTS:
bill to appellant Charles H.C. Yang and wrote a letter to HUTAMA to pay the final billing. The appellants, Sps. Salonga filed a suit against herein petioner, Five Stat Bus Co. For breach of carriage and
however, failed to comply with the demand. Upon the filing of this case, appellee paid P30,000.00 damages for the indemnification of the death of their son who died aboard in the accident met by the
acceptance fee and P3,000.00 per appearance fee and a contingency of 15% of the total amount due bus along the way. Subsequently trial court set the pre-trial and instructed counsels for both parties to
as attorneys fees. notify their respective clients and file pre-trial brief. Nevertheless, on the day of the pre-trial, petitioner
Engr. Jose De Asis testified that he is an employee of appellee corporation and knows the failed to appear and file a pretrial briefs which caused to declare them as default and present their
appellants to be the representatives of HUTAMA. He and appellants were present when the agreement evidence. On the next schedule pre-trial the defendants failed to appear and declared in default and
was prepared and the amount agreed upon was promised to be paid to Dioko. to present evidence ex-parte by the plaintiff. The trial court rendered in favour of the respondents. On
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower. Hence this petition.
Issues: ISSUE: WON the counsels served with notice of pre-trial is charged with the duty of notifying the party
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR, represented by him.
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT ABANDONED THE PROJECT AND HELD: YES. The SC ruled that when the court schedule a case for pre-trial, notices must be served
IT IS THE LATTER (sic) LIABLE TO PETITIONER; on the party separately from his counsel which may be made directly to both party and counsel. It is
preferred, however, that service of such notice on a party be made through or care of his counsel at
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR, counsels address "with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of
WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHTS TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF the date, time and place of pre-trial conference." It is the duty of counsel upon whom a pre-trial notice
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS; AND is served to see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial.
CASE NO. 16
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR,
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING;
WON CA COMMITED A SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR, IF NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CASE NO. 17
IN DENYING PETITIONER[S] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHOUT STATING CLEARLY AND Meralco vs La Campana
DISTINCTLY THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS THEREOF. GR No. 97535, Aug 4, 1995
Facts:
Held: A complaint filed by la campana against meralco for recovery of money w/ prelim injunction
A petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law. As a rule, findings of after it receive a notice of disconnection and for alleged non payment of the following: differential
fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule admits of billing of 65k as value of electric energy used but it was not registered in the meter due to alleged
only a few exceptions. tampering discovered on sept 22 1986 and the underbilling of 169k (w/ balance of 28k) due to meter
The RTC acted within the confines of its discretion when it issued the order of default upon the motion multiplier failure. Summons and copy of complaint was received by meralco on aug 23 1990. RTC
of KCD when Hutama failed to file an answer within the extended period. The RTC did not hastily issue judge QC Lopez inhibited and was reraffled to Judge Dayaw. Meralco filed a motion for extension of
the order of default. It gave Hutama the opportunity to explain its side. On August 22, 2002, the time of 15 days within which to file an answer at the clerk, allegedly refused the same. And the motion
motion to set aside the order of default was set for hearing, but neither Hutamas counsel, nor any not acted upon bec it did not contain a notice of hearing as req at sec 4 &5 Rule 15. Meralcos Answer
other representative of petitioner corporation, appeared. w/ counterclaim was received on Sept 21 1990.(beyond the period to answer. La campana filed
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations exparte motion to declare meralco in default, (granted) Instead of appealing to CA, Meralco filed on
therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party dec 3 1990 a motion to set aside judgement by default and/or for new trial that it filed it answer and
does not need to sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personally the judgement by default was obtained by fraud. Denied by Judge Dayaw, that the motion for
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. The power of a extention did not containany notice of date and place of hearing, also stated that the motion to set
corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was a pro forma motion because it did not set forth the
However, it is settled and we have so declared in numerous decisions that the president of a facts and circumstances which allegedly constituted the fraud upon which the motion was grounded.
corporation may sign the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping. Meralco filed a notice of appeal, but opposed by la campana on gorund of out of time and since the
The CA ruled that it found no plausible reason to depart from its earlier decision wherein all the issues motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial did not stop the running of the period to
had been exhaustively passed upon. That ruling contained a sufficient legal reason or basis to deny appeal, which expired on Dec 14, 1990, or 15 days from the time Meralco received the decision on
the motion. There was no need for the CA to restate the rationale for its decision that the petitioner Nov 29, 1990. TC denied notice of appeal and granted the execution of la campana. Meralco filed the
wanted reconsidered. instant petition for certiorari and profibitionclaming judge commited grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October Issue: W/N judge dayaw commited grave abuse of discretion in its order.
14, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78262 are Held: No. The case of Gozon, et al vs CA: It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion which
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act Held:
upon. Meralco was aware of the importance of such a notice since it insisted in its motion to set aside NO. THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE SUMMON IS NOT VALIDLY EFFECTED.
judgment by default and/or for new trial that it should have received notice of hearing of the motion to It is all too obvious that no earnest efforts were exerted by Deputy Sheriff Cruz to effect the
declare it in default which La Campana filed ex parte. When it filed in Branch 78 its answer with personal service of summons. Deputy Sheriff Cruz resorted to a substituted service on his first and
counterclaim on Sep 21, 1990, fourteen days after the expiration of the period within which to file an only attempt to effect a personal service. Upon being informed that the petitioners were not around
answer, Meralco was already in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of at that time, he immediately resorted to a substituted service through Josephine Areola, a person
being in default. It chose to play it safe. Under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is whose age he did not even know or attempt to discover. He did not even inquire about the
the order of default, an interlocutory order which is, therefore, not appealable, and not the judgment whereabouts of the petitioners, the time they were expected to return home, the hours of the day they
by default, which is a final disposition of the case and appealable to the CA. Notice that in the could be contacted at their house or the location of their offices, if any, in order that he could faithfully
following pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly state that what may be set aside is the order of comply with the requirement of personal service.
default, while the judgment itself may be appealed to a higher court: sec 3 relief from order of default, It must be noted that the substituted service should be availed only when the defendant
Sec 9 Service upon party in default and Sec 2 judgement or orders subject to appeal. While a motion cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
for new trial grounded on fraud, thisMeralco's motion likewise fails to convince. Meralco claims that efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to oppose it, made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
knowing that defendant actually filed its answer." But how could La Campana have known about the usual method of service.
answer with counterclaim when it was actually received only on Oct, 1990, as evidenced by the Since the substituted service of summons in this case was not validly effected, the trial court
registry return receipt attached to Meralco's Annex "H,"while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco in did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners. The order of default, the judgment by
default was filed much earlier on Sep 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or default, the writ of execution issued by it, as well as the auction sale of the petitioners' properties
collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or levied on execution are, therefore, all null and void.
presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the
controversy."Meralco's failure to go to trial in this case is solely attributable to its failure to comply CASE NO. 19
with the Rules of Court. Judge correct a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt the running of the period REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
to appeal. Accordingly, having received the decision on Nov 29, 1990, Meralco had until Dec 14, 1990, vs.
within which to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it filed on Jan 28, 1991, was clearly HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
filed out of time. Hence, Dismissed (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-
CASE NO. 18 MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA
G.R. No. 101256. March 8, 1993. ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
SPOUSES PEPITO AND LORETO LAUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
SALVADOR C. CEGUERA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 82; NILO SM. CABANG, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City Facts:
and CONSUELO P. TORRES, respondents. Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the OSG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. In said case,
Facts: petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in
This case arises from the complaint filed by Private Respondent Conseulo P. Torres against the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5
herein petitioner for a collection of sum of money. 10 October 1989, Deputy Sheriff Nilo Cabang then million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as
went to petitioners' address at 122 Molave Park Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila to serve the income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
summons and a copy of the complaint. Failing to serve the summons personally upon the petitioners Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before
after waiting for ten (10) minutes, he resorted to a substituted service through one Josephine Areola, the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated
who purportedly represented herself to be the maid of the said petitioners. Petitioner did not file an December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
answer. Consequently, upon the motion of the plaintiff, the petitioner-defendant was held in default Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent
and subsequently the trial court rendered judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff. It is only On 2 Marcos children filed a motion for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof.
February 1990, before receiving a copy of the 22 January 1990 decision, petitioners, by way of a Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
special appearance, filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. They Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the
allege that the service of summons was ineffective because it was not indicated in the return that the partial implementation of said agreements. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or
sheriff had first exerted efforts to serve the same personally before resorting to substituted service. judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later
They alleged that Josephine Areola is not known to them. The motion was dismissed as well as the MR, adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. The Sandiganbayan denied
thus, the petitioner-defendant appealed in Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the rulings of the RTC petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the
citing that the motion is rather too late in the day for the defendants-petitioners' motion to dismiss to motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary
be considered by the respondent Court. A motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no judgment." Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants is proper only when made within the reglementary party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds
period for filing a responsive pleading and before such responsive pleading is filed. Hence, this present with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-
petition. trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000,
respectively, the case was set for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
petitioners by virtue of the substituted service of summons effected by Deputy Sheriff Issue: Whether or not the respondents admission made during the pre-trial tenders no genuine
Cruz issue or controversy as to any material fact in present action, thus warranting the rendition of
summary judgment.
Held: No, there was no genuine issue raised. The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the
three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully CASE NO. 21
acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired Alberto G. Pinlac vs CA
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the G.R No. 91486 September 10, 2003
truth of their allegations. It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit
their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a FACTS:
brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of The controversy is this case stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by petitioners
documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 is covered by TCT No. 5690, while
testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March 21,
addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put 1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners and against the defendants who
forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal were declared in default, including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose
identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and properties were within Lot No. 2. The dispositive portion of which reads:
submit them to the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action. Mrs. 1 Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty.
Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners
of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription,
testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. with the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title
And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. belonging to the non-defaulted respondents
Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no 2 Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register
genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment. of Deeds of Quezon City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of
those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio
CASE NO. 20 3 Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT
G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001 No. 3548 as well as the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating therefrom, with the exception
MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO, LEON, VICTORINA, of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;
TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA, respondents. 4 Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as
well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the
FACTS: area in excess of said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
Petitioners filed a complaint for partition of land against defendants. Shortly after defendants respondents, as null and void ab initio
filed their traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff Tomasa 5 Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs subsequently issued based
De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had become an unwilling co- on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those
plaintiff. The Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on June 18, 1992 titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents;
at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned
out that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence, upon plaintiffs Vilma, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the trial court,
motion, defendants were declared as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence which was granted in a decision Petitioners filed motion for reconsideration of the said decision and
ex-parte. The defendants alleged upon filing their Motion for Reconsideration that they received the but it was denied for lack of merit and affirming the Judgment of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed
Notice in the afternoon of the scheduled date, giving them no chance to appear. Plaintiffs contended a Motion for Reconsideration contending, inter alia, that Lot no. 3 should not be annulled because the
however, as evidenced by a Postal Delivery Receipt, that defendants' counsel received the notice 1 petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed
day before the pretrial. The RTC denied the MR. CA ruled in favor of respondents and ruled that they that the January 19, 2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals be
were not in default. reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is concerned.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not finding respondents in default. On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution partially granting petitioner's motion for
HELD: reconsideration by reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the trial court's Partial
No. The case happened in 1992, hence, the applicable rule was Sec. 1, Rule 20, which mandates for Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3,
the separate service of notice upon the parties and the counsels. While service of such notice to party On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority
may be made directly to the party, it is best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-
through or care of his counsel at counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring:
obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference. Hence, before 1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court
being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel must be shown to have had already rendered;
been served with notice of the pretrial conference.[10]Moreover, if served only on the counsel, the 2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the 3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;
pretrial conference. In this case, although the Notice was also sent to their counsel, it did not contain 4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are
any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of the pretrial conference. Such belated receipt of null and void; and
the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to a lack of notice. WHEREFORE, the 5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the
Petition is DENIED. hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and other interested parties
***applicable provision now is Sec. 3, Rule 18 The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid and existing title. The Republic likewise prays for
such other relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not intervention is allowed notwithstanding the rendition of the judgement by the trial
court
2 Whether or not the judgment of annulment in partial decision in OCT No. 333 null and void. 2. Whether or not the requisites for intervention are present.
Held:
HELD: 1. Petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, insist that their cause of action springs from the
1 Yes, intervention is allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment were bloated and exaggerated claims of respondents so that nothing will be left to answer for their own
already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. Clearly. The rule on intervention, like all claims. Thus, they should be allowed to intervene, even if it is only to oppose the claims of the
other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely manning agent and crewmen. The Court finds no merit in this argument.
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims 2. No. The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. The intervention of the consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government properties located and delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding
projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be or not. Petitioners failed to meet both requirements.
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by Legal interest, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Petitioners'
the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against remedies as unpaid mortgagees remain preserved as the collection case will not preclude the
arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its properties. foreclosure of the vessel. Also, that petitioners would be adversely affected by the disposition of the
property is contingent upon two eventualities: 1) the successful foreclosure on the vessel; and 2) the
2 The Court of Appeals held that the annulment of the trial courts Partial Decision with respect proceeds of the sale being insufficient to cover the loan amount. Clearly, the outcome of the collection
to the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a case has no "direct" effect on petitioners.
quo concerning Lot No. 3, renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it affects Lot No. As for the second requisite for intervention, petitioners' rights were already protected through their
3, also void. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 47, Section 7 thereof, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, while on the other hand, the rights of the manning agent and
a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution crewmen, who are the original plaintiffs, have been unduly delayed or prejudiced. The decision of the
and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being re-filed in RTC, rendered in October 30, 1987, has not attained finality, even though the actual judgment obligors
the proper court. did not appeal. The only parties prolonging the case are the intervenors, in the persons of petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that a lien or statutory right of preference clothed them as intervenor with an
CA noted that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which portions are in excess of the 4,574 interest in the subject-matter in litigation. Petitioners herein prayed that they be allowed to intervene,
square meter area of OCT No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non- on the basis of their secondary right as unpaid mortgagees. The SC found no merit for such claim
defaulted respondents. Neither did the body of the trial courts decision state the metes and because petitioners prayer was merely to oppose the claims of respondents and not for the purpose
bounds that would serve as basis in implementing the dispositive portion thereof. Verily, the of enforcing their own claims.
flaw goes into the very identity of the disputed land Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null Petitioner further claimed that their intervention was in the nature of an intervention pro interessesuo,
and void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no decision arguing that intervention pro interessesuo is a mode of intervention wherein a stranger desires to
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right which is the subject matter of litigation without
the law on which it is based. Hence, the November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant. The SC found no merit for such claim since petitioners
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision should be modified. wanted only to oppose the claims of respondents without asserting their unpaid mortgage.
CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 111159 July 13, 2004
NORDIC ASIA LIMITED and BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, petitioners, CASE NO. 23
vs. Francisco vs House of Representatives
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et. Al., respondents. GR No 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts: FACTS:
When the day that an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was initiated by herein An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice HilarioDavide and seven Associate Justices
petitioners-mortgagee over the vessel M/V Fylyppa against the mortgagor Sextant Maritime, was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003
respondents Nam Ung Marine Co., Ltd, manning agent of the vessel, and 27 of its crew members filed for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix
a collection case before the RTC against the M/V "Fylyppa" (the vessel), Maritime (the registered owner Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant
of the vessel), P.V. Christensen Lines (time-charterer of the vessel), TheilBolvinkel Shipping, A.S. (ship petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that the filing of the
manager) and Jibfair Shipping (the alleged local ship agent of the vessel) second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI
Upon learning of the collection case, petitioners filed with the RTC a motion for leave to of the Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
intervene in the collection case, alleging that they hold a mortgage over the vessel and that their than once within the period of one year.
intervention is only for the purpose of opposing the crew members' unfounded and grossly Among those who filed the petitions are Atty. Jaime Soriano, who filed a "Petition for Leave to
exaggerated claim. The RTC eventually rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiff, against the Intervene"; Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. who filed a
defendants and the petitioner- intervenor. Petitioner elevated his case to the CA and, aggrieved with Motion for Intervention; and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. who also filed a
its decision, elevated the same to the SC. The SC on its June 10, 2003 decision dismissed the petition "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
based on two grounds: 1) Petitioners have no right to intervene because the complaint-in-intervention Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene and Comment,
fails to state a cause of action and because the requisites for intervention are not present; and 2) praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
Petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration. issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of
Issue: the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where
1. Whether or not the complaint-in-intervention state a cause of action
the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of installment basis 35 units of buses and 2 units of engines from Delta, secured by 16 promissory notes .
the Constitution." When CBLI defaulted on its payments, it entered into a restructuring agreement with Delta. It provided
for new schedule of payments and a management takeover clause. Delta executed a Continuing Deed
ISSUE: Whether or not the interventions must be admitted. of Assignment of Receivables in favor of SIHI as security for the payment of its obligations to SIHI per
the credit agreements. CBLI continued having trouble meeting its obligations to Delta. This prompted
HELD: Delta to threaten CBLI with the enforcement of the management takeover clause. To pre-empt the
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in take-over, CBLI filed on May 3, 1982, a complaint for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 0023-P.
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, Delta executed a Deed of Sale assigning to SIHI five (5)
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of of the sixteen (16) promissory notes. SIHI demanded payment from CBLI for the five promissory notes,
the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the but the latter replied informing SIHI of Civil Case No. 0023-P and of the fact that Delta had taken over
courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing its management and operations.
intervention. Thereafter, Delta and CBLI entered into a compromise agreement. CBLI agreed that Delta
would exercise its right to extrajudicially foreclose on the chattel mortgages over the 35 bus units. On
the other hand, SIHI applied for a writ of preliminary attachment and was thereafter followed by a
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
motion to sell the buses. The trial court ruled that the best interest of the parties might be better
join petitioner Francisco invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if
served by denying further sales of the buses and to go direct to the trial of the case on the merits.
this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this
The trial court discharged CBLI from liability. The CA reversed this decision. On appeal, CBLI
Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
contends that the compromise agreement discharged the subject five promissory notes. It argues that
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions were of transcendental importance, World War
SIHI is estopped from questioning the compromise agreement because SIHI failed to intervene in Civil
II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
Case No. 0023-P after CBLI informed it of the takeover by Delta of CBLIs management and operations
to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
and the resultant impossibility for CBLI to comply with its obligations in the subject promissory notes.
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON SIHI is estopped from questioning the compromise agreement because it failed to
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et
intervene in Civil Case No. 0023-P.
al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter
HELD:
in litigation the respective motions to intervene were granted.
No. The assignment of the promissory notes had the effect of separating the five promissory
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
from CBLIs other obligations with Delta. Thus, any breach of these independent obligations gives rise
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges
to a separate cause of action in favor of SIHI against CBLI. Considering that Deltas assignment to SIHI
that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
of these five promissory notes had the effect of removing the said notes from Civil Case No. 0023-P,
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment
there was no reason for SIHI to intervene in the said case. SIHI did not have any interest to protect in
are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
Civil Case No. 0023-P. Moreover, intervention is not mandatory, but only optional and permissive.
interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
Notably, Section 2, Rule 12 of the then 1988 Revised Rules of Procedure uses the word may in
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand,
defining the right to intervene. The present rules maintain the permissive nature of intervention in
his Motion to Intervene was granted.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In light of the foregoing, SIHIs refusal to intervene in Civil Case No. 0023-P in another court
As to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts does not amount to an estoppel. This is especially so since it does not appear that a separate
an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits. In proceeding would be inadequate to protect fully SIHIs rights. Indeed, SIHIs refusal to intervene is
praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will precisely because it considered that its rights would be better protected in a separate and
result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper independent suit.
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
CASE NO. 25
51 SCRA 363
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Reyes vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118492, August 15, 2001
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional.
RULING: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which Facts:
were approved by the House of Representativesare are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second Godofredo, Casheir of the Philippine Racing Club (PCRI), went to respondent bank to apply for a
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 demand draft in the amount AU$1,610.00 payable to the order of the 20th Asian Racing Conference
of Article XI of the Constitution. Secretariat of Sydney, Australia. He was attended to by respondent banks assistant cashier, Mr. Yasis,
who at first denied the application for the reason that respondent bank did not have an Australian
dollar account in any bank in Sydney. Godofredo asked if there could be a way for respondent bank to
accommodate PRCIs urgent need to remit Australian dollars to Sydney. Yasis of respondent bank then
CASE NO. 24
informed Godofredo of a roundabout way of effecting the requested remittance to Sydney thus: the
G.R. No. 147950. December 11, 2003
respondent bank would draw a demand draft against Westpac Bank in Sydney, Australia (Westpac-
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC, vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.
Sydney) and have the latter reimburse itself from the U.S. dollar account of the respondent in Westpac
Bank in New York, U.S.A. (Westpac-New York).
FACTS: However, upon due presentment of the foreign exchange demand draft, the same was
State Investment House, Inc.(SIHI) granted Delta Motors Corporation(Delta) a credit line dishonored, with the notice of dishonor stating that there is No account held with Westpac.
for P25,000,000.00. Meanwhile, petitioner California Bus Lines, Inc. (hereafter CBLI), purchased on Meanwhile, Wespac-New York sent a cable to respondent bank informing the latter that its dollar
account in the sum of AU$ 1,610.00 was debited. In response to PRCIs complaint about the dishonor taking of his deposition. The process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the
of the said foreign exchange demand draft, respondent bank informed Westpac-Sydney of the defendant before it; or a compliance with its demands. Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or
issuance of the said demand draft, drawn against the Wespac-Sydney and informing the latter to be action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue.
reimbursed from the respondent banks dollar account in Westpac-New York. The respondent bank on In this case, respondent knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither had
the same day likewise informed Wespac-New York requesting the latter to honor the reimbursement complainant commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was
claim of Wespac-Sydney. Upon its second presentment for payment, the demand draft was again issued. Respondent, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a
dishonored by Westpac-Sydney for the same reason, that is, that the respondent bank has no deposit subpoena to the complainant.
dollar account with the drawee Wespac-Sydney. Gregorio Reyes and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes arrived in Respondent is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
Sydney on a separate date and both were humiliated and embarrassed in the presence of of the Service.
international audience after being denied registration of the conference secretariat since the foreign
exchange draft was dishonored. Petitioners were only able to attend the conference after promising to CASE NO. 27
pay in cash instead which they fulfilled [G.R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001]
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, petitioner,
Issue: Whether or not respondent bank is liable for damages due to the dishonor of the foreign vs.
exchange demand drafts. THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, THE BOARD OF REGENTS/HON. RICARDO
GLORIA (DECS Secretary) Chairman, DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, Vice Chairman and USP
President, and NEDA DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, JR., Member, and EVA M. ANTEPUESTO, USP
Held: Yes. The evidence also shows that the respondent bank exercised that degree of diligence
PTA-LABORATORY SCHOOL PRESIDENT, ET AL., respondents.
expected of an ordinary prudent person under the circumstances obtaining; the respondent bank
advised Westpac-New York to honor the reimbursement claim of Westpac-Sydney and to debit the
FACTS:
dollar accountof respondent bank with the former. The degree of diligence required of banks, is more
than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors is concerned. In other words banks are duty bound to treat the deposit accounts of their This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
depositors with the highest degree of care. But the said ruling applies only to cases where banks act appeal of Ma. Vilma S. Labad herein petitioner, and the Resolution denying the motion for
under their fiduciary capacity, that is, as depositary of the deposits of their depositors. But the same reconsideration of petitioner.
higher degree of diligence is not expected to be exerted by banks in commercial transactions that do
not involve their fiduciary relationship with their depositors. The case at bar does not involve the
Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of Southeastern Philippines (hereafter
handling of petitioners deposit, if any, with the respondent bank. Instead, the relationship involved
respondent) Laboratory (high school). Sometime in February 1996, the officers and members of
was that of a buyer and seller.
respondent universitys Parents Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the president of
respondent university, charging petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Unfitness as a
Teacher. Petitioner denied the charges against her. The Office of the President of respondent university
then created an Investigating Committee to investigate the complaint which later recommended
penalty of dismissal from the service through the non-renewal of petitioners probationary status on
the ground of dishonesty and misconduct, which the universitys Board of Regents subsequently
CASE NO. 26
approved.
LORENA O. COLLADO vs. TERESITA G. BRAVO, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court of
Petitioner appealed said decision to the Civil Service Commission but it affirmed the decision of
Naguilian, La Union
respondent universitys Board of Regent. A motion for reconsideration was filed but likewise denied.
A.M. No. P-99-1307
April 10, 2001
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Period to File Petition for
FACTS Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 to do so.
Complainant Collado charged respondent Bravo with Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct On January 12, 1999, petitioner filed her Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. However,
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service when the latter issued a subpoena directed to the former petitioner through counsel received a copy of the CA Resolution dated January 28, 1999, granting an
to appear before the court but with no complaint having been filed against Collado. The complainant extension of 15 days from December 26, 1998, or until January 10, 1999, to file the petition for review
claimed that she felt humiliated, harassed and experienced extreme nervousness as a result of the which meant that petitioner was already 2 days late in the filing of her petition for review.
issuance of the subpoena. Respondent averred that her only purpose in issuing the subpoena was to Because of this, a resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals, dismissing Labads petition for
enable the complainant and the Baterinas, the labor recruiter of complainants son, to settle their review. A motion for reconsideration was filed but likewise denied.
differences. Hence the petition.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint be docketed as Petitioner contends that since December 26, 1998 was a Saturday, it was on the next business day,
an administrative matter and respondent be fined P5k for Grave Misconduct with a Warning that the December 28, 1998 which was a Monday, that petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Period to File
commission of a similar act would merit a more serious penalty. Petition for Review instead of filing her petition for review.
She insists that the 15-day extension was timely sought since December 28, 1998, a Monday should
ISSUE: WON the subpoena was properly issued. be considered as the fifteenth day of filing her appeal, not December 26, 1998, which was a Saturday.
In support of her claim, petitioner relies on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
No. The subpoena was issued without power nor authority.
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the ISSUES:
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the
1 whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by filed six (6) days late from the requested extension of time. Petitioner received her copy of
petitioner before it on the ground that the petition was filed late the June 18, 2007 Resolution on July 18, 2007. On July 27, 2007, petitioner filed by registered mail
2 When should the 15-day extension be reckoned, should it be counted from December 26, her MR and admission of her amended petition. She pointed out in her motion that the petition was
1998 or December 28, 1998? filed within the extended reglementary period.
RULING: The appellate court, however, in the assailed August 26, 2008 Resolution, denied petitioners
1 YES. motion. It ruled that the MR was filed only on October 4, 2007, or 63 days after the expiry of the
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases, reglementary period for the filing thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to this
where the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the CA were filed
next working day. In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the well within the reglementary period for the filing thereof.
next business day to move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the
last day for petitioner to file her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for HELD:
extension filed on December 28, 1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before the Yes, the petition and MR were filed within the reglementary period for the filing thereof.
expiration of the time sought to be extended It must be noted that petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007.
2 It should be from December 28, 1998. Following the Rules of Court, she had 15 days or until April 28, 2007 to file her petition for review
The extension should be tacked to the original period and commence immediately before the CA. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides the time for filing an appeal stating in part that: the
after the expiration of such period. Petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted an petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
extension of 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her to file her reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning the commencement of the additional 15 judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
days should have been from December 28, 1998, and not December 26, 1998. Thus, the and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
petition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998, exactly 15 days grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
from December 28, 1998, was filed on time. further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
Petitioner would be outright denied her right to appeal if the original period of fifteen (15) days.
December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15day extension period. While the right to On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed before the CA, via registered mail, her motion for
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial extension of time to file the petition for review. She pleaded in her motion that she be granted an
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to additional 15 days, counted from the expiry of the reglementary period. Petitioner likewise attached to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper her motion postal money orders representing the docket fees. Fifteen days from April 28, 2007 would
and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. May 14, 2007, the following day, was a legal holiday
that is the holding of the national and local elections. Section 1 of Rule 22 on how to compute time
states that: in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of
CASE NO. 28
time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
Russel vs. Ebasan & Austria court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
G.R. No. 184542 April 23, 2010 Therefore, when petitioner filed her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15,
2007, the same was well within the extended period for the filing thereof. Petitioners MR was likewise
FACTS: filed on time. She received a copy of the June 18, 2007 CA Resolution on July 18, 2007. Under Section
The petition stems from a complaint for forcible entry filed by petitioner Russel against 1 of Rule 52, she had 15 days from notice, or until August 2, 2007, to file an MR. Petitioner filed by
respondents Ebasan and Austria. The MTCC of Iligan City heard the ejectment proceedings and registered mail her MR on July 27, 2007. The fact of mailing on the said date is proven by the registry
rendered judgment on in favor of petitioner. The trial court ordered respondents to vacate the property return receipt, the affidavit of service, and the certification of the Office of the Postmaster of Iligan
involved and to pay attorneys fees and costs.Prejudiced by the ruling, respondents appealed to the City. Section 3, Rule 13 of the ROC provides that: if a pleading is filed by registered mail,
RTC. The RTC, in its March 28, 2007 Decision, reversed the ruling of the MTCC and ordered the then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the
dismissal of the complaint. court actually receives the mailed pleading. Thus, in this case, as the pleading was filed by registered
Petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007. Inclined to appeal the mail on July 27, 2007, within the reglementary period, it is inconsequential that the CA actually
adverse ruling to the CA, petitioner, on April 20, 2007, filed a motion for an extension of 15 days received the motion in October of that year.
from the expiry of the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. Petitioner attached to
her motion postal money orders representing the filing and docket fees. She consequently
filed via registered mail her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15, 2007.
In the assailed June 18, 2007 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal on several grounds,
one of which is that the petition is filed out of time, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 42. Even if petitioners
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review were granted, the Petition would have still been
i
ii
iii