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. Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
IN RE SOTTO it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow
mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
Facts: so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed
during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
connection with the decision of this Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of
Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very
charged with contempt of court. loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as
any of the majority of the honorable members of this high an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful
Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
respondent in his defenses observe no consideration. Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? subsidiary imprisonment in
Yes case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he
Ratio: should not be disbarred.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish
as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as
such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to IN RE ALMACEN
punish for contempt
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a
of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a
and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of
which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution
said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of
and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration.
well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the
correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in resolution.
reversing or modifying its decision.
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute
reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate of
the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his
one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and profession when members of the high court are men who are
reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
case, who according to Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel knowing the reasons why and that he became one of the
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a that justice as administered by the present members of the
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
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The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens PONENTE: Mendoza
petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually
surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyers FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty.
certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge found offense
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by
him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct
this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant, contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5)
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic. days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined. in his order of Dec 17, 1993.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry without which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent
out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned
Court is to decide only those cases which present questions facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot
particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer,
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and
there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not
of Appeals opinion. overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him
that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and record or have materiality to the case."
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is
the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. MONTECILLO VS. GICA
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty
of respect to courts. JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL
MAR, petitioners,
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran vs.
lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE
which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the
of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For
the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine
his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely Bar, respondent
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FACTS: Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be
of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo suspended.
and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower
court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in
thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the
adjudged moral damages. court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court towards the court so essential to the proper administration
of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. of justice.
Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he
made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for
intimating that he thinks the CA justices knowingly the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy
rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded
rendered through negligence and that the CA allowed to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
itself to be deceived. they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of
Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then his client.
filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA
then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
not be punished for contempt.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
submit an explanation as to why he should not be
explanation.
disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to
justify his actions even stating that had he not been
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his
convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will
be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:
against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also
intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the a This Decision of this Court in the above-
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing entitled case reads more like a Brief for
injustice. Ayala
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some b [t]he Court not only put to serious
Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the question its own integrity and competence
case dismissed the same. but also jeopardized its own campaign
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against graft and corruption undeniably graft and corruption in the judiciary be
pervading the judiciary enhanced by such broad discretionary
power of courts?
c The blatant disregard of controlling,
documented and admitted facts not put in disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His
issue, such as those summarily ignored in suggestions that the Court might have been
this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these
to justify such arbitrariness and the very cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as
strained and unwarranted conclusions an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In
drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the
history of this Court records before it, and to the records alone, and not to
outside influences, much less, the influence of any
d [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an
inferior court, should know better that in any litigation,
was originally constructed for the
one party prevails, but his success will not justify
exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel-
indictments of bribery by the other party. He
Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's
should be aware that because of his accusations, he
admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as
has done an enormous disservice to the integrity
Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do
of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the
but did not even contend, is a
administration of justice in general.
manifestation of this Court's unusual
partiality to Ayala and puts to serious
question its integrity on that account. ISSUE:
e [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most Whether or not the counsels act constitute to malpractice
serious reflection on the Court's in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
competence and integrity and exemplifies provision on the use of scandalous offensive or menacing
its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a language or behavior before the courts.
blatant disregard of documented and
incontrovertible and uncontroverted
factual findings of the trial court fully
supported by the records and the true HELD:
significance of those facts which both the
respondent court and this Court did not Yes. As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to
bother to read and consequently did not be aware that the Court is not bound by the findings of the
consider and discuss, least of all in the trial court (in which his clients prevailed). But if the Court
manner it did with respect to those in did not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does
which it arrived at conclusions favorable not follow that the Supreme Court had acted arbitrarily
to Ayala. because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review
the findings of the inferior court.
f To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of
application for special membership in To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion,
BAVA which clearly state that such but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory
membership is necessary because it is a statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In
new development in their relationship with that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the
respect to its intention to give its honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and
commercial lot buyers an equal right to ethics of the legal profession."
the use of Jupiter Street without giving
any reason therefor, smacks of judicial The Court is not satisfied with his explanation that
arrogance ... he was merely defending the interests of his clients. As
held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
g [A]re all these unusual exercise of such
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the
and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
current campaign of this Court against
ethics." And while a lawyer must advocate his client's
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That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant G.R. No. L-24438 July 30, 1965
or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the thinking in
the Decision, comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse ROSAURO PARAGAS, petitioner,
what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. vs.
Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to FERNANDO A. CRUZ, Judge of the Court of First
ask for reconsideration, but as held in Laureta, litigants Instance of Caloocan City;
should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer THE CITY FISCAL OF CALOOCAN CITY and ELPO (EL
multiplication of words' ". As indicated, the movants have PORVENIR RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC.), respondents
raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and
they cannot veil that fact with inflammatory language. Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from ... . The rule of law in a
scandalous, offensive or menacing democracy should always be upheld and
language or behavior before the Courts. protected by all means, because the rule
of law creates and preserves peace and
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute order and gives satisfaction and
to a Judge motives not supported by the contentment to all concerned. But when
record or have no materiality to the case. the laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces and to the ways of the cave-men! We do
punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice. not want Verzosa and Reyes
repeated again and again, killed in the
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) premises of the Supreme Court and in
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated
effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a people should keep their temper under
fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of control at all times! But justice should be
this Resolution be entered in his record. done to all concerned to perpetuate the
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very life of Democracy on the face of the Verzosa and Reyes flashed across the
earth." mind of the undersigned as the shooting
of those two government employees must
Considering the foregoing expressions to be have resulted from some kind of
derogatory to its dignity, the Court, by Resolution dissatisfaction with their actuations while
of June 2, 1965, after quoting said statements in office. We stated or the undersigned
required Atty. Sebastian to show cause why stated that we are against the repetition of
administrative action should not be taken against these abominable acts that surely
him. disturbed the peace and order of the
community. Shall the undersigned be
June 18, 1965 - filed an "explanatory punished by this Honorable Supreme
memorandum": Court only for telling the truth, for telling
what happened before in this Country?
Our statement is clear and unmistakable,
When we said that the said
because we stated "We do not want
violation is a ground for impeachment, the
Verzosa and Reyes repeated ..." The
undersigned did not say that he would file
intention of the undersigned is likewise
impeachment proceedings against the
clear and unmistakable; he is against the
Justices who supported the resolution.
repetition of these acts of subversion and
We said only what we said. The task of
hate!
impeaching the highest Justices in this
country is obviously not the task for a
common man, like the undersigned; it is a
herculean task which only exceptional
men, like Floor Leader Jose Laurel Jr., ISSUE:
can do. In addition to this, we do not have
the time, the means and the strength for Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is guilty of contempt.
this purpose.
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It is right and plausible that an attorney, in Domingo and Yolanda Acosta, complained to her
defending the cause and rights of his client, father in the morning of of pains in the lower part
should do so with all the fervor and energy of of her abdomen. Catherine was then brought to
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be Dr. Elva Pea. Dra. Pea called for Dr. Emilio
so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to Madrid and the latter examined Catherine Acosta.
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety According to Dr. Madrid, his findings might be
and respect which the dignity of the courts appendicitis. Then Dr. Pea told Catherine's
require. parents to bring the child to the hospital in
Baclaran so that the child will be observed.
Counsel's disavowal of any offensive intent is of
no avail, for it is a well-known and established rule that At the Baclaran General Hospital, a nurse took
defamatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning blood sample form the child. The findings became
attached to them by impartial observers. known at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
the child was scheduled for operation at 5:00
A mere disclaimer of any intentional o'clock in the afternoon. The operation took place
disrespect by appellant is no ground for at 5:45 p.m. because Dr. Madrid arrived only at
exoneration. His intent must be determined by a that time.
fair interpretation of the languages by him
employed. He cannot escape responsibility by The child was feeling very well and they did not
claiming that his words did not mean what any subject the child to ECG and xray.
reader must have understood them as meaning.
The appellant Dr. Emilio Madrid, a surgeon,
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian is operated on Catherine. He was assisted by
hereby found guilty of direct contempt, and sentenced to appellant, Dr. Leandro Carillo, an
pay a fine of P200.00 within ten days from notice hereof, anesthesiologists.
or, in case of default, to suffer imprisonment not exceeding
ten (10) days. And he is warned that a subsequent
During the operation, Yolanda Acosta "noticed
repetition of the offense will be more drastically dealt with.
something very unfamiliar. Yolanda asked one of
the nurses if she could enter the operating room
but she was refused.
PEOPLE VS. CARILLO 77 PHIL. 572
At around 6:30 p.m., Dr. Emilio Madrid went
G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994 outside the operating room and Yolanda Acosta
was allowed to enter the first door. The doctor told
LEANDRO CARILLO, petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE them the child was already out of danger but the
PHILIPPINES, respondent. operation was not yet finished.
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Three (3) days later, Catherine died without services of that counsel and retained a new one, or sought
regaining consciousness. from the trial court the appointment of counsel de oficio,
during the ample opportunity given from the time Atty.
RTC: guilty of simple negligence resulting in Puerto manifested his intent to file a demurrer on 16
homicide October 1985, to the submission of the case for decision
on 25 June 1986 and before the promulgation of judgment
on 19 September 1986.
CA: affirmed the RTC; guilty of simple negligence
resulting in homicide.
During all this time, petitioner could have obtained
leave of court to present evidence in his behalf in lieu of a
He filed this petition and added an argument that
demurrer, or to submit a memorandum for the defense.
he was denied of due process.
After promulgation of the judgment of conviction, petitioner
did not seek a new trial, but permitted Atty. Puerto to
He contends that he was deprived of his right to obtain leave from the trial court to continue on bail during
have competent representation at trial, and to the pendency of the proceedings before the Court of
have his cause adequately heard, because his Appeals. Indeed, petitioner replaced Atty. Puerto as
counsel of record, Atty. Jose B. Puerto, was counsel only upon institution of the present petition.
"incompetent" and exhibited "gross negligence" by
manifesting an intent to file a demurrer to the Hence, petitioner's constitutional objection is
evidence, in failing to present evidence in his plainly an afterthought.
behalf and in omitting to file a defense
memorandum for the benefit of Judge Yuzon, after IN RE AGUAS
the latter took over the case at the end of trial and
before the Judge rendered his decision. FACTS:
Petitioner submits he is entitled to a new trial. From the record during the progress of the
trial before the Court of first instance in
Pampanga, the court had occasion to
caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due case, not to look at the attorney for
process because of his lawyers incompetence and gross the defendant but to fix his attention on the
negligence. judge who was at the time examining him.
The witness did not give heed of the
warning, thereupon the judge arose from his
seat and approach the witness, seized him by
HELD: the shoulders and using the expression
lingon ang mucha (look at me) either shook
No. An examination of the record indicates that
him, as insisted by the attorney of the
Atty. Puerto represented petitioner during trial with
reasonable competence. Except for the two hearing defendant, or only turned him about, as
sessions when witnesses were cross-examined and claimed by the judge and others. Whether the
recross-examined by Atty. Puerto, petitioner was present witness was shaken or not, at all events
during all the sessions when the other prosecution seizing him brought the action and protest
witnesses were presented and during which Atty. Puerto against the action of the judge as coercive of
extensively cross-examined them in behalf of petitioner the witness and demanded that a record be
and Dr. Madrid. made of the occurrence and that the further
hearing of the case be postponed. Two days
His counsel elicited from the two (2) expert
after the clerk of court entered a record a
witnesses for the prosecution testimony favorable to
petitioner and which was relied upon by the latter in this
recital of the incident and a statement that
proceeding. The record further indicates that if petitioner on other and prior occasion, the attorney,
indeed entertained substantial doubts about the capability Marcelino Aguas had been wanting in respect
of Atty. Puerto, he could have easily terminated the to the court by making use of improper
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phrases and by interrupting the opposing liability; separation of powers; office of the
counsel in the examination of the witness. The ombudsman
lower court adjudged the attorney to be in
QuickGuide: Where a criminal complaint against a
contempt of court and suspended him from
Judge or other court employee arises from their
practice of his profession for a period of administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
20 days. The attorney appealed but his action on said complaint and refer it to the
appeal has been denied by the lower court, he Supreme Court for determination whether said
asked to be heard in justification which was Judge or court employee had acted within the
granted. scope of their administrative duties.
ISSUE: Facts:
- Petitioner (Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding
1. WON the attorney is disrespectful to the Judge of Branch 12 of the RTC of Antique)
court or offensive to to dignity? seeks the review of the following
orders of the Office of the
2. WON the attorney had the right to protest Ombudsman:
and to demand that the incident be made a
(1) The Order dated September 18, 1991
matter of record? denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the
Supreme Court (SC) filed by petitioner; and
HELD:
(2) The Order dated November 22, 1991
The opinion of the court that the action of the denying petitioner's motion for
judge in seizing Alberto Aguas by the shoulder reconsideration and directing petitioner to
and turning him about was unwarranted and file his counter-affidavit and other
an interference with that freedom from controverting evidences.
unlawful personal violence to which every
- Respondents (Napoleon A. Abiera of
witness is entitled while giving testimony in a the Public Attorney's Office)
court of justice. Against such conduct the allegations:
appellant had the right to pretest and to
demand that the incident be made a matter of (1) Petitioner falsified his Certificate of
Service dated February 6, 1989, by
record. That he did so was not contempt,
certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
providing protest and demand were
which have been submitted for decision or
respectfully made and with due regard for the determination for a period of 90 days have
dignity of the court XXXX been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1998," when petitioner knew
*** While lawyers are prohibited to that no decision had been rendered in 5
attribute motives to a judge not supported civil and 10 criminal cases that have been
by the record, lawyers must however be submitted for decision.
courageous enough to expose
(2) Petitioner similarly falsified his
arbitrariness and injustices of courts and
certificates of service for the months of
judges February and April to August of 1989; and
those from January to September 1990.
- Petitioners arguments:
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The Court thereafter required the Rule 6.01 The primary duty
Solicitor General to comment on said motion of a lawyer engaged in public
and manifestation within ten (10) days from prosecution is not to convict
notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, but to see that justice is
1994. done. The suppression of facts
or the concealment of witnesses
In the Comment, the Solicitor General capable of establishing the
himself recommends that petitioner be innocence of the accused is
entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the highly reprehensible and is cause
same impression that a certain Rodolfo for disciplinary action. (Emphasis
Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn supplied.)
statement is an admission against interest
which may ultimately exonerate petitioner
from criminal liability. The Solicitor General
had this to say: The above duty is well founded on the
instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court
Ordinarily, it is too late at in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)
this stage to ask for a new trial. that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose
However, the sworn statement of obligation to govern impartially is compelling
Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
against his own interests under interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised not that it shall win a case, but that justice
Rules of Court and it casts doubt shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution,
on the culpability of his brother by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis
Hence, the alleged confession of supplied.) 10
guilt should be given a hard look
by the Court. The People is
inclined to allow petitioner to
establish the genuineness and Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA
due execution of his brother's 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years
affidavit in the interest of justice ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized
and fair play. to entertain a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for New discovered evidence the rationale of which
Trial by the petitioner should be granted. being:
HELD: Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the The judgment of the Court of
Code of Professional Responsibility, Appeals is conclusive as to the
prosecutors who represent the People of the facts, and cannot be reviewed by
Philippines in a criminal case are not duty the Supreme Court. Accordingly,
bound to seek conviction of the accused but to in an appeal by certiorari to the
see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Supreme Court, the latter has no
Canon 6 states: jurisdiction to entertain a motion
for new trial on the ground of
Canon 6 These canons shall newly discovered evidence, for
apply to lawyers in government only questions of fact are
service in the discharge of their involved therein.
official tasks.
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The rule now appears to have been Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since
relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent he did not want to see Samaniego.
cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People" 11 and Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to
"People v. Amparado". 12 support their daughter in a position paper. He
also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to
In both cases, the Court, opting to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with
brush aside technicalities and despite the Samaniego.
opposition of the Solicitor General, granted IBP Board of Governors imposed upon
new trial to the convicted accused concerned Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension
on the basis of proposed testimonies or for his refusal to support his daughter.
affidavits of persons which the Court Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to
considered as newly discovered and probably reduce the penalty because it will further cause
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
extreme hardship to his family of 10 children.
conviction. Being similarly circumstanced,
Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree
there is no nagging reason why herein
of morality required of a member of the bar, his
petitioner should be denied the same benefit.
prayer for reduced penalty was denied.
It becomes all the more plausible under the
circumstances considering that the "People"
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ferrer is guilty of
does not raise any objection to a new trial, for
gross immorality.
which reason the Solicitor General ought to be
specially commended for displaying once
HELD: Yes. SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of
again such statesmanlike gesture of
gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for
impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour,
6 months.
indeed.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a
New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of disciplinary action. Although it is true that
origin for reception of petitioner's evidence. Samaniego was not entirely blameless for
knowing about Atty. Ferrers wife, it does not
make this case less serious since it is immaterial
whether both are in pari delicto.
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated
CANON 7 Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.
(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and
xxxx
willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate
child)
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
FACTS: Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer
deceitful conduct.
and their lawyer-client relationship became
intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she xxxx
fell in love. They lived together as "husband and
wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times
The affair ended in 2000 and since then he failed uphold the integrity and dignity of
to give support to their daughter. the legal profession and support
Before the IBP Samaniego testified that the activities of the integrated bar.
she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship
but did not think he was already married. Atty. xxxx
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ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in pleadings that does not admit any
conduct that adversely reflects on his justification.
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, The assertion that the NLRC not being a
court, its commissioners, not being judges or
whether in public or private life, behave
justices and therefore not part of the judiciary
in a scandalous manner to the discredit and that consequently, the Code of Judicial
of the legal profession. Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing.
In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that
xxxx respondent became unmindful of the fact that
in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless
remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound
JOHNNY NG v. ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR servant of the law, whose first duty is not to
Adm. Case No. 7252 (CBD 05-1434), his client but to the administration of justice
November 22, 2006 and whose conduct ought to be and must be
CANON 12 scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Respondent has clearly violated Canons
FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
the complainants in a labor case filed with the Responsibility. His actions erode the publics
Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint. perception of the legal profession.
On appeal, NLRCs First Division upheld the
dismissal. In his Motion for Reconsideration CARMELITA FUDOT v. CATTLEYA, INC.
with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used GR. No. 171008 September 13, 2007
improper and abusive language full of CANON 12
diatribes castigating the Labor Arbiter and the
ponente of the NLRC decision. Johnny Ng, one Facts: Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land,
of the respondents, filed a disbarment case Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent)
against Alar before the IBP Commission on Bar asked someone to check, on its behalf, the
Discipline for such misbehavior. titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land
Alar contended, inter alia, that the included, which it intended to buy from the
Rules of Court/Code of Professional spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding
Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the no defect on the titles, respondent purchased
NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional
no provision on disciplinary matters for Sale on 6 November 1992. Subsequently, on
litigants and lawyers appearing before it and 30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons
that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
provides for adequate sanctions against same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale
misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing and the Deed of Absolute Sale were registered
in cases before it. Finally he asserted that the with the Register of Deeds on 06 November
Rules of Court/Code of Professional 1992 and 04 October 1993, respectively. The
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers Register of Deeds refused to actually annotate
practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a the deed of sale on the titles because of the
court and that LAs and NLRC Commissioners existing notice of attachment pending before
are not judges nor justices and the Code of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue
them, not being part of the judiciary. of a compromise agreement between the
Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was
ISSUE: Is a lawyers misbehavior before the brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the
NLRC susceptible of the provisions of the Code nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of
of Professional Conduct? Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining
three (3) lots , because the titles covering the
HELD: The MRMI contains insults and same were still unaccounted for.
diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its Later, respondent learned that the
moral and intellectual integrity, replete with Register of Deeds had already registered the
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety deed of sale in favor of petitioner and issued a
and lack of diligence. Respondent used new title herein. The respondent filed its
improper and offensive language in his
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Complaint for Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery informed the complainant that they lost
Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With because of their blunders in the prosecution
Damages before the Regional Trial Court of cases. In the manifestation and motion
Tagbilaran City. respondent prayed for the permanent
dismissal of the present administrative matter
Issue: Is the issuance of Deed of Sale valid? and requested that her complaint against
Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David be
Held: On 31 October 2001, the trial court acted upon and given due course. The court
rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or resolved to dismiss the administrative
ownership of the subject land in favor of complaint against the respondent and
respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale required Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to
between petitioner and spouses Tecson show cause why they should not be disciplined
invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the or held in contempt.
subject land in favor of respondent; (iv)
dismissing respondents claim for damages ISSUE: WON Attys. Stephen and Lanee David
against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency guilty of contempt.
of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncions claim
for damages against petitioner for lack of RULING: The SC dismissed the administrative
factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioners complaint filed against the respondent and
counterclaim for lack of the required resolved the liability of the two Attorneys. The
preponderance of evidence. complainant (Bondoc) never appeared in
court, it is reasonable to conclude that the two
lawyers crafted the complaint and
JUAN PABLO BONDOC v JUDGE DIVINA incorporated therein all the unfounded
LUZ AQUINO-SIMBULAN, accusations against the respondent in order to
A.M.No. RTJ-09-2004 | October 26, 2009 | conceal their inadequacies in the handling of
604 scra 416 their clients case. To say the least, the
CANON 12 complaint was most unfair to the respondent
who, as the record shows, was simply keeping
FACTS: This is a case filed by former faith with her avowed objective of expediting
Representative Bondoc charging Judge the proceedings in her court by, among other
Aquino-Simbulan with partiality, gross measures, requiring lawyers to be prepared at
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in all times and to be fair and candid in their
the handling of Criminal case entitled People dealings with the court. As the court held in
v Totaan. Complainant bewailed: (1) the Racines v Judge Morallos, et al., a clients
respondents attempt to have the cases cause does not permit an attorney to cross the
settled in an off-the-record huddle with the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
parties lawyers because she did not want the must always keep in perspective that since
accused to be administratively suspended; (2) they are administrators of justice, oath-bound
the respondents order to fast track the servants of society, their first duty is not to
cases because the accused had been their clients, as many suppose, but to the
suspended upon the motion of the private administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an
prosecutors. The complainant then narrated officer of the court with the duty to uphold its
the instances when his lawyers were alleged dignity and authority and not promote distrust
given a hard time and subjected to indignities in the administration of justice.
by the respondent in her desire to fast track Attys. Stephen and Lanee David
the criminal case. On the other hand, the miserably failed to come up to the standards
respondent pointed out that an examination of of these rulings. They are liable and was held
the complaint would readily show that it was in indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71
prepared by the private prosecutors, Attys. of the Rules of Court.
Stephen David and Lanee David, who wove a
tale lies and distortions regarding the
proceedings to cover up their own AUSTRIA V. MASAQUEL
shortcomings as lawyers; had they performed G.R. L-22536 August 31, 1967
their duty as officers of the court and CANON 13
members of the bar, they would have
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FACTS: Asturia was the plaintiff in a civil case Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion
involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan in about a judge, whether that opinion is
which Judge Masaquel ruled in his favor. flattering or not. A judge as a public servant
Sometime later the defendant in the civil case should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as
hired a new lawyer in the person of Atty. Sicat, to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses
a former associate of Judge Masaquel when he an honest opinion about him.
was still in the practice of law. Atty. Sicat then
filed a superdeas bond to stay the execution
of the sheriff and a motion for new trial, all of
which was granted by Judge Masaquel. IN RE SYCIP
Before the opening of one of the court
sessions, Atty Macaraeg, lawyer of Asturia saw Two firms ask that they be allowed to continue using the names of their
Judge Masaquel to his chamber and verbally firms despite the fact that Attys. Sycip and Ozaeta died.
transmitted to him the request that he inhibit
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
himself on the ground that Atty. Sicat was his 1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
associate. The Judge denied the request continuing its business under a firm name that includes the
pointing out that it was not one of the grounds name of a deceased partner. NCC 1840 explicitly sanctions
for disqualification of a judge as provided in the practice.
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the
the rules of court. During the court session, he partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof,
asked Asturia if he had authorized Atty. shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner
Macaraeg to approach him in his chambers liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership.
and whether he doubts the integrity of the 2. In regulating other professions (accountancy and
engineering), the legislature has authorized the adoption of
judge to decide fairly and impartially because firm names without any restriction as to the use of the
the lawyer of the defending party was his name of a deceased partner. There is no fundamental
associate, Asturia answered them all in the policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of
positive stating that he heard rumors that the professionals of a firm name, which includes the name of a
defendant was boasting that he would deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired
the characteristics of a "trade name."
definitely win because of his lawyer. The Judge 3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by
then declared Asturia in contempt. The Judge the continued use of the name of a deceased partner because
considered his actuations offensive, insulting Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by
and lack of respect to the the American Bar Association declares that:
The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
court. He was ordered to pay 50 pesos. Hence permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
this appeal. that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-
publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for
judge to declare Asturia to be in contempt of several days. The stationeries now being used by them carry
court. new letterheads indicating the years when their respective
deceased partners were connected with the firm.
HELD: NO. While the court consider it Petitioners will notify all leading national and international
improper for a litigant or counsel to see a law directories of the fact of their deceased partners' deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
judge in chambers and talk to him about a partner's name in a professional firm's name. There is no
matter related to the case pending in the Philippine custom or usage that recognizes that the name of
court of said judge, it is not an act of a law firm identifies the firms individual members.
contempt of court to see the judge in his 6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm
name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by
chamber and requested him to disqualify U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
himself on the ground which the respondent profession of most countries.
judge might consider just and valid. The
circumstances that led the respondent judge ISSUE & HOLDING
WON they may be allowed to continue using the current names of their
to declare the petitioner in direct contempt of firms. NO. Petitioners advised to drop the names SYCIP and OZAETA
court do not indicate any deliberate design on from their respective firm names. Names may be included in the listing
the part of the petitioner to disrespect of individuals who have been partners, indicating the years during
respondent judge. The petitioner has not which they served.
misbehaved in court or in the presence of the
RATIO
respondent judge so as to obstruct or interrupt JURISPRUDENCE
the proceedings. He simply expressed his
sincere feeling under the circumstances.
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The Deen case [1953] Court advised the firm to desist ON ARGUMENT #2
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to
Johnston, who has long been dead partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. The law
Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
Corporation [1958] In this case, the law firm of Perkins & connection with the practice of accountancy.
Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. The Court A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
in a Resolution stated that it "would like to be informed why relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is not a
the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. partnership formed to carry on trade or business or of holding property.
Perkins is already dead." The Court advised the firm to drop The use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
the name of E. A. Perkins from the firm name, and ruled that improper.
no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree
could give rise to the possibility of deception. Deen case cited Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from
in the ruling. business
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct,
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making
the legal system. The Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases much money
laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the 2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability
law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary
any partner. Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
policy shall not be countenanced. fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
The use in their partnership names of the names of deceased directly with their clients
partners will run counter to NCC 1815.
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which The right to practice law does not only presuppose in its possessor
may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a
who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
firm name shall be subject to the liability of a partner. public trust.
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Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for a writ
Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and of preliminary injunction.
the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located in No. 121,
brother- in-law. 2nd Street, 9th Avenue, Caloocan City. This property was
foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
DISSENT OF J. AQUINO after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.
The petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in The property was sold to the private respondents at a public bidding
the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that A. Sycip, after due notice to all the parties concerned. GSIS issued a
former J. Ozaeta and H. Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served conditional deed of sale stating that the private respondent is the
as partners should be stated therein. owner of the property.
The purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their The GSIS advised the petitioners that they should now pay their rent
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought and arrearages to the private respondent. But despite repeated
the legal services of Attys. Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the written demands, the petitioners failed and refused to settle their
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law accounts
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation. The retention of their
Private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner
names is not illegal per se.
with the MTC. MTC ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises
occupied and to pay certain amounts as damages.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC. IT affirmed in toto the judgment of the
MTC
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985 Petitioners filed for a review on certiorari. (CA-G.R. SP No. 07828)
On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
DACANAY V. BAKER & MCKENZIE decision dismissing the petitioner for review. Later an entry of
judgment dated February 3, 1987, was duly certified thereupon by
(super ikli lang kaya ganyan hehe) the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the judgment became
final and executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 were consequently, remanded to the respondent Regional Trial
verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other Court on February 11, 1987.
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois. On February 23, 1987, the petitioners, through their new counsel, filed
an "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit Motion For
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, Reconsideration, together with the Motion For Reconsideration
using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names With Prayer For Issuance Of Temporary Restraining Order," with
of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of the respondent Court of Appeals. They moved that the respondent
Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Court of Appeals admit their motion for reconsideration, which was
obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing the same,
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any alleging that their counsel of record abandoned them and migrated
liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed to the United States without at least informing them that a decision
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what was rendered against them.
is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. Petitioners motion was denied by the CA:
Now before this Court is an Appearance and
ISSUE: Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for Reconsideration' filed
Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice by petitioners in the above-entitled case on February 23, 1987
law in the Philippines. on the ground that their former counsel Atty. Funelas had
abandoned the case and is now abroad, together with the
HELD: corresponding Motion For Reconsideration With Prayer for
NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.
name Baker & McKenzie. Considering that the decision sought to be
RATIO: reconsidered dated December 5, 1986 had become final,
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the entry of judgment having been issued on February 3, 1987
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). and the records remanded to the court a quo on February 11,
[R]espondents use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a 1987, for which reason the said decision has become final
representation that being associated with the firm they could render and this Court has become bereft of jurisdiction to act
legal services of the highest quality to multinational business thereupon, the abovementioned Motions are hereby noted.
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This Parenthetically, and merely for purposes of record, it is
was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to observed that counsel of record of petitioners is the law office
practice law here. Funelas, Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone.
Therefore, the fact that Atty. Funelas has abandoned the case
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law and is now abroad is not a valid ground for the late filing of
under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. the motion for reconsideration.
ANTONIO V. CA The RTC earlier issued an order for a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 07828 (which the
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ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
petitioners are not aware of since their counsel left the country replacement of the damaged equipment plus damages, totalling
without a word) P435,000.00.
Petitioners, believing that they were deprived of their day in court Only Mercantile appealed from the decision.
when CA denied their motion for consideration. Hence, this IPI filed a motion for execution of the decision which public
petition. respondent judge granted.
Petitioners counsel filed an appeal claiming that the decision was
mistakenly sent by the trial court to the law firms Head Office in
ISSUES: Makati.
1. Whether the denial by the CA of the Motion for Reconsideration is Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging: : (1) the
correct? failure seasonably to file an appeal was due to excusable neglect
2. Whether the petitioners are bound by the negligence of their and slight "oversight" claiming that there was miscommunication
former counsels failure to notify them regarding the judgment of between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as to who would file the
the trial court? notice of appeal; and (2) Mercantile's timely notice of appeal should
benefit petitioner OASI, a solidary co-debtor.
HELD:
Public respondent judge denied OASI's motion for reconsideration
1. Yes. It is well-settled that after the lapse of fifteen (1 5) days from
declaring that the appeal cannot be given due course for lack of
notice of judgment, the same becomes final and the Court of
merit and ordered that the writ of execution be enforced.
Appeals loses, jurisdiction over the case. And the subsequent filing
of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal upon the
judgment nor restore jurisdiction which had already been lost. The grounds that: (1) there had been a valid service of the decision; (2)
court a quo cannot decide the case anew. decision rendered anew the decision had become final and executory as to petitioner OASI;
notwithstanding the finality of the original one is null and void. and (3) Mercantile's appeal does not inure to the benefit of
2. Yes. The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then petitioner as they do not share common defenses.
counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable, Clear and as it can be ISSUE:
seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of record Whether or not there was valid service of the decision of the
is the law office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty. trial court upon petitioner's counsel; and
Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas signed the documents in his capacity HELD:
as the representative of the said law firm. There was a valid service upon the petitioners counsel.
The client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that a copy of the
It is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to decision was served upon Atty. Catipay but that he refused to
invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving receive it:
promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his Finally, on this point, there is an uncontroverted sworn
address of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that statement of the lower court's legal aide, Mr. Jesus A. Lim, attesting
communications sent by mail addressed to his office or residence, to the fact that on February 7, 1990 he served on Atty. Ronald
may reach him promptly. Catipay a copy of the decision in the case, but that the latter 'refused
The petitioners may have submitted an affidavit of a Mr. to receive copy of the decision and instead instructed me to send the
Obligar stating that the firm was only composed of Atty. Pitty copy of the decision to the Makati Office of the law firm' and that
Funelas after being dissolved in 1986, it is considered as a mere Mr. Lim accompanied the lawyer to a place where a xerox machine
afterthought and futile. It is safe to presume that a law firm which was located, copied the decision and gave to the lawyer a xerox
registered and represented itself as such, with at least two named copy of said decision. This statement seems to find corroboration in
partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that the later allegation of Atty. Catipay that their Cebu office never
this law office was earlier dissolved, the winding up process is 'officially' received copy of the decision.
presumed to have been performed in a regular manner, with all There was no justification for Atty. Catipay of LSA-Cebu to
the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete evidence refuse the service, especially if, as petitioner now alleges, the notice
must be presented in order that these presumptions may be rebutted. should have been sent to LSA-Cebu on the theory that Atty. Catipay
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and was the lead counsel.
mandamus with preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for Petitioner's counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo
lack of merit. With costs against petitioners. and Associates (and not any particular member or associate of that
firm) which firm happens to have a main office in Makati and a
OUANO ARRASTRE SERVICE, INC.. V. ALEONOR branch office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and
branch offices operate under one and the same name, Saludo
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("IPI") filed Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public as
comprising a single firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against
pretend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute
Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. ("Mercantile") and petitioner
separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities and
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. ("OASI") for replacement of certain
responsibilities.
equipment imported by IPI which were insured by Mercantile but
In view of the unitary nature of the law firm retained by
were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegedly because of mishandling
petitioner as its counsel, we believe that the reglementary period for
by petitioner OASI.
filing a notice of appeal actually began to run on 8 February 1990.
Petitioner OASI's answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma,
However, even if the Court were to accept (which it does not) the
Saludo and Associates ("LSA") and signed by Atty. Manuel supposition that the reglementary period began to run only on 22
Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA. However, sometime February 1990, the day after the copy of the trial court's decision
thereafter, Atty. Trinidad resigned from LSA and Atty. Fidel was received by LSA-Makati, it is quite clear that the notice of
Manalo, a partner from the Makati office of LSA, filed a motion to appeal filed by petitioner's counsel on 26 June 1990 was wholly
postpone the hearing stating that the case had just been endorsed to late. By the time the notice of appeal was filed, the trial court's
him by petitioner OASI. decision had become final and executory as to petitioner and could
Atty. Manalo handled the case and t hereafter, the trial court held be executed against it.
that Mercantile and OASI are jointly and severally for the cost of
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ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack Court resolved to reconsider the Resolution issued on May 12, 1976-
of merit. Costs against petitioner. Both parties submitted their respective memorandum.
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for NO. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution of CA which denied ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of
the petitioners motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said
failure to file the Appellants Brief. firm and petitioner.
Eulogio Reyes, before his death, filed an action for damages against the Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of
Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and the petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As revealed
herein petitioner, B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. (Civil Case No. by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO &
757-R.) ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19
The trial court held that BR Sebastian should be liable for damages but February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said
absolved the other defendants. law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9
BR Sebastian, through counsel Baizas, Alberto and Associates, July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be
appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, Reyes died and was dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period.
later substituted by his heirs Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent
Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Reyes Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal,
who are now the private respondents in this present petition. a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974,
Petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said
Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9
therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply. October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a
year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief.
to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt
Respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show of the records for the respondent Court.
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the
Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. Counsel for death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to
petitioner failed to comply with the Resolution; Another Resolution file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and
was issuat ed DISMISSING the Apppeal. his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by
The BAIZAS LAW OFFICE filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of
that a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for
the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu,
of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office
of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm
established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the
the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it
believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules
Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
also left the firm. lawyer.
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration because it has been 6 Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS
months since the expiration of the original period and more than LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for
two and one-half months since counsel received the copy of the reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further
resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9
be dismissed. October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned
within the period to file a petition for review, the same became final such appearance.
and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.
court of origin for execution. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to
RTC issued a writ of execution. The respondent Provincial Sheriff and show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement
Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them
Hercules Diesel Engine and issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale. commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's
Petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal motion to reinstate its appeal.
with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner alleges that (1) CA may set aside its processes especially
in the present case which was dismissed due to the untimely death March 23, 1929
of Atty. Baizas; (2) the dismissal of the case would be tantamount to In re LUIS B. TAGORDA
denying BRSEI its day in the court.
The CA denied the Motion in its Resolution stating that the firm was Luis Tagorda is a member of the provincial board of Isabela.
not dissolved since it received the Notice to File Brief. Previous to the last election, he used placards which in a way was
Hence, the Original Petition against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B. advertising his services as a lawyer and notary public.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and He also wrote a letter to a lieutenant of a barrio in
Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed Echague,Isabela. In essence he was informing the lieutenant that
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. he will be in Echague during the weekends and the lieutenant
-Motion to suspend , and Motion for Leave to Admit Amended should convey this information to the other people in his town.
Petition were granted. ISSUE: Whether the advertising is contrary to the duties imposed upon
Present petition denied on May 12, 1976 via Resolution- MR lawyers
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CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall primarily to solicit legal business.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
render him liable.
business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
the clients request for information. necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client. The relationship of owe to themselves.
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the
violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
case and should not be left in the dark. Neither is the Court mollified by
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City Councilor of Bacolod
City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
his negligent behavior. one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that
respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his PEOPLE V. CAWILI
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To The question before us is whether or not Hospicio O. Zapata, a member
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent of the Philippine Bar, is to be subjected to disciplinary action. He was,
them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented under our resolution of August 3, 1970, given a period of ten days after
the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to receipt thereof to explain why no such action should be taken against
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant him in view of his failure to submit the brief as counsel de parte within
and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50, the reglementary period. He filed an explanation in a memorandum
000.00. Complainant also attached respondents calling card. submitted to us on August 22, 1970, admitting that he was remiss in his
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing obligation to file said brief, but seeking to minimize such failure on his
the printing and circulation of the said calling card. part with the allegation that the accused, Rodrigo Cawili, was in a state
of indigence resulting not being paid but also in his partly assuming the
ISSUE: Whether or not Tolentinos actions violated theCPR expenses entailed in such defense. After invoking such circumstances
as the expenses incident on the printing of the brief being beyond the
HELD: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do power of the wife of the accused to bear and that he was not called
or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. upon to continue spending on behalf of such client, he would have us
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of overlook his failure to file the brief as in his opinion "the mere review
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such of the record of the case will readily show that the decision is contrary
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 to law and the evidence adduced during the trial, . . ." He did tender his
should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides apology, coupled with a promise that an incident of such character will
that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any not be repeated in the future.
suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause. This rule proscribes
ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal ISSUE: Whether the memorandum filed by Zapata justifies his
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain inability to file his pleadings within the reglementary period
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty. HELD: No. It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the
In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails
evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons disciplinary action. The recital of the circumstances on which counsel
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that would seek to reduce its gravity do not call for exculpation. He could
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from have sought the permission to file a mimeographed brief, or, at the very
referrals suits. Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice least, he could have informed us of the difficulties attendant on
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation defending his client. For him to blithely assume that a mere reading of
on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a the record would suffice to discharge an obligation not only to his client
more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly but to this Court is to betray a degree of irresponsibility. It is not in
solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 keeping, even, with the minimal standards expected of membership in
of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of the bar to be so lacking in elementary courtesy that this Court was not
solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the even informed of his inability to comply with what was incumbent on
Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues him. His conduct was therefore inexcusable, although the explanation
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective he tendered and the difficulties under which he worked would, to a
client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this certain degree, invite less than full punishment.
jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the WHEREFORE, respondent Hospicio O. Zapata is hereby reprimanded
nobility of the legal profession .Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal for his failure to submit his brief within the reglementary period, and
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admonished to be much more careful in the fulfillment of his The motion to admit the motion for reconsideration was
obligations to his client and to this honorable Tribunal. considered an appeal and eventually was elevated to public
respondent NLRC for adjudication.
NLRC ordered that the previous order be set aside. Petitioners
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.,V. NLRC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution.
NLRC denied.
Petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a restraining order Petitioners argue that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse
and/or preliminary injunction. of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
giving due course to the Motion to Admit Motion for
Private respondents Virgilio Malinao, Rosemilo Gacusan and Reconsideration which was already filed out of time, and in
Dominador Loriaga filed a Complaint for regularization, sick ordering the hearing on the merits of the case despite the
leave pay, vacation leave pay and night shift differential pay presence of supervening events, both in violation of the
against petitioners American Home Assurance Company and/or constitutional rights of herein petitioners.
Leslie Mouat before the National Capital Region Arbitration
Branch of public respondent National Labor Relations ISSUE: Whether the counsels failure to file the motion of
Commission (NLRC). consideration on time due to poverty is excusable
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss insofar as private
respondents Malinao and Gacusan were concerned. The motion HELD:
alleged that petitioner and private respondents Malinao and The supposed extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable
Gacusan have settled the case by way of a compromise excuse for the failure of his counsel to file a motion for reconsideration
agreement. on time. It is not disputed that the counsel for respondent Malinao
Malinao and Loriaga filed an Amended Complaint for illegal received a copy of the Order of April 30, 1992 during the hearing held
dismissal and service incentive leave. before the labor arbiter on August 10, 1992. Evidently, the supposed
Private respondents Malinao and Gacusan filed an Opposition to extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable excuse for the failure of
the Motion to Dismiss. They averred that petitioners, using his counsel to file the motion for reconsideration on time under the
"undue influence and trickery considering their educational circumstances. Instead, there was gross negligence on the part of Atty.
backgrounds," deluded them into signing the compromise Montesclaros in the discharge of his duty and this cannot be
agreement. A Supplemental Opposition was subsequently filed countenanced if we are to have an orderly administration of justice. It
by said private respondents has always been the judicial policy and an accepted rule that the client
Petitioners filed a Rejoinder to private respondents Malinaos and shall be bound by the acts of his lawyer, and no compelling reason
Gacusans opposition to the motion to dismiss. exists in this case to sanction a deviation therefrom.
LA ordered the parties submission of their position papers and
the return of the money received for settlemet.
Before private respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga could REGALA v SANDIGANAYAN G.R. No. 105938
submit their respective position papers, petitioners filed an (consolidated with Hayudini v Sandiganbayan G.R.
Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondents No. 108113 September 20, 1996)
Malinao and Gacusan failed to comply with Labor Arbiter
Caday s directive to return the money they received by virtue of
the compromise agreement. Petitioners: Teodoro R. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Private respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga "by Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan,
themselves, having been neglected by their counsel on record" Victor P. Lazatin and Eduardo U. Escueta
filed an Opposition to [the] Urgent Motion to Dismiss. Respondents: The Honorable Sandiganbayan, First
LA rendered the case to be Dismissed with Prejudice, as against Division, Republic of the Philippines, acting through the
Gacusan and Malinao Presidential Commission on Good Government, and Raul
Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement and S. Roco
Revision of Title of the Case, praying" [f]or a revision of the title
of the case at bar so that it will reflect only the name of
Dominador G. Loriaga, as the sole complainant in the light of the Date of Promulgation: September 20, 1996
dismissal with prejudice of the claims of complainants Rosemilo
Gacusan and Virgilio Malinao Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Atty. Albert G. Fanoga served notice with Labor Arbiter Caday
that he was withdrawing as counsel of record for private
respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga.
In the hearing, Atty. Cornelio G. Montesclaros, new counsel of
record for private respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga, FACTS:
was furnished with a copy of the Order dated April 30, 1992.
Likewise on even date, private respondent Loriaga moved that
The matters raised in the present case are an
"the case be dismissed as against him (sic) without prejudice,
however, to refiling the same at a future date." The motion was offshoot of the institution of the PCGG against
granted by Labor Arbiter Caday in an Order dated August 11, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
1992. defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
More than four months later, or on December 14, 1992, private
several corporations in PCGG Case No. 33,
respondent Malinao filed a Motion to Admit the Motion for
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo
Reconsideration. On December 22, 1992, petitioners filed a
Cojuangco, et al. Petitioners in this case are all
Motion to Deny Due Course to Complainant Malinaos Motion
partners in ACCRA Regala, Angara, Cruz,
to Admit.
Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and
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Hayudini (hereinafter ACCRA LAWYERS). lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality
Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a of information obtained during such lawyer-client
partner in ACCRA. relationship.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers fiduciary duty may
associations and/or organizations, with the be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients
correlative and incidental services where its (name of ACCRA LAWYERS' clients) under the facts and
members acted as incorporators, or simply, as circumstances obtaining in the instant case? YES.
stockholders.
The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged
that the ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in
HELD/RATIO:
setting up through the use of coconut levy funds
the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, The lawyer-client relationship is more than that
UNICOM and others and that through insidious of the principal-agent and lessorlessee. In
means and machinations, ACCRA, using its modern day perception of the lawyer-client
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
relationship, an attorney is more than a mere
Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing agent or servant, because he possesses special
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
as of 31 March 1987. by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as
The PCGG wanted to establish through the the judge of the court, thus his powers are
ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client entirely different from and superior to those of
and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also
monies to the subscription payment; hence,
occupies what may be considered as a quasi-
ACCRA LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the
others, to be used as instrument in accumulating Court and exercises his judgment in the choice
ill-gotten wealth through government of courses of action to be taken favorable to his
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross client.
abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust enrichment,
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship,
Republic of the Philippines. there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a Motion to breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary
Admit Third Amended Complaint which duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO from the exacting and confidential character, requiring a
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party- very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that
defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still were is required by reason of necessity and public
included still as defendants.
interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence
ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their
Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to
ROCO.
his client that distinguishes him from any other
PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the
professional in society.
ACCRA LAWYERS on the following conditions:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from
lawyer-client relationship; and the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901.
ACCRA LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids
covering their respective shareholdings. counsel, without authority of his client to reveal
any communication made by the client to him or
SANDIGANBAYAN RULING:
his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment.
DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in
PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of
PCGG. Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently
ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are prohibited from worded provides:
revealing the identity of their principal under
their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as
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revealed that she had advised her client to count plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she
the votes correctly, but averred that she could was riding, owned by respondent corporation,
not remember whether her client had been, in collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was
fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against
for her refusal to reveal his clients identity defendant corporation and the owner of the
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts second cab, identified in the information only as
contempt orders, the state supreme court held John Doe. The attorney of defendant
that under the circumstances of the case, and corporation came to know the name of the
under the exceptions described above, even the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of
name of the client was privileged. the insurance company, prior to the institution of
legal action, came to him and reported that he
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig involved federal grand was involved in a car accident. It was apparent
jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of under the circumstances that the man was the
the Sandino Gang, a gang involved in the owner of the second cab. The state supreme
illegal importation of drugs in the United States. court held that the reports were clearly made to
In connection with a tax investigation in the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court
November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to said:
Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce
documents and information regarding payment o That his employment came about
received by Sandino on behalf of any other through the fact that the insurance
person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to company had hired him to defend its
divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the policyholders seems immaterial. The
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non- attorney in such cases is clearly the
disclosure under the facts and circumstances of attorney for the policyholder when the
the case, held: policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would
o A clients identity and the nature of that be used in an action or claim against
clients fee arrangements may be him.
privileged where the person invoking the
privilege can show that a strong o All communications made by a client to
probability exists that disclosure of such his counsel, for the purpose of
information would implicate that client in professional advice or assistance, are
the very criminal activity for which legal privileged, whether they relate to a suit
advice was sought pending or contemplated, or to any other
matter proper for such advice or aid; x x
Baird v. Koerner. While in Baird Owe enunciated x And whenever the communication
this rule as a matter of California law, the rule made, relates to a matter so connected
also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that with the employment as attorney or
the Baird exception applies to this case. counsel as to afford presumption that it
was the ground of the address by the
client, then it is privileged from
o The Baird exception is entirely consonant
disclosure. x x x. It appears . . . that the
with the principal policy behind the
name and address of the owner of the
attorney-client privilege. In order to
second cab came to the attorney in this
promote freedom of consultation of legal
case as a confidential communication.
advisors by clients, the apprehension of
His client is not seeking to use the
compelled disclosure from the legal
courts, and his address cannot be
advisors must be removed; hence, the
disclosed on that theory, nor is the
law must prohibit such disclosure except
present action pending against him as
on the clients consent.
service of the summons on him has not
been effected.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged.
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining
Company, the lawyer involved was required by a
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted lower court to disclose whether he represented
the NY Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim certain clients in a certain transaction. The
to the effect that he could not reveal the name purpose of the courts request was to determine
of his client because this would expose the latter whether the unnamed persons as interested
to civil litigation. In the said case, Neugass, the parties were connected with the purchase of
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ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
properties involved in the action. The lawyer o The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
refused and brought the question to the State that, a lawyer could not be forced to
Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to reveal the names of clients who
divulge the names of his clients the court held: employed him to pay sums of money to
the government voluntarily in settlement
o We feel sure that under such conditions of undetermined income taxes, unsued
no case has ever gone to the length of on, and with no government audit or
compelling an attorney, at the instance investigation into that clients income
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only tax liability pending. The court
his retainer, but the nature of the emphasized the exception that a clients
transactions to which it related, when name is privileged when so much has
such information could be made the been revealed concerning the legal
basis of a suit against his client. services rendered that the disclosure of
the clients identity exposes him to
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case possible investigation and sanction by
against an attorneys client unless, by revealing government agencies. The Court held:
the clients name, the said name would furnish
the only link that would form the chain of The facts of the instant case
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a bring it squarely within that
crime, the clients name is privileged. exception to the general rule.
Here money was received by the
In Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by government, paid by persons
the accountants and the lawyer of certain who thereby admitted they had
not paid a sufficient amount in
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be
taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a income taxes some one or more
years in the past. The names of
favorable position in case criminal charges were
brought against them by the U.S. Internal the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose
Revenue Service (IRS).
to ascertain which taxpayers
think they were delinquent, so
o It appeared that the taxpayers returns
that it may check the records for
of previous years were probably
that one year or several years.
incorrect and the taxes understated. The
The voluntary nature of the
clients themselves were unsure about
payment indicates a belief by
whether or not they violated tax laws
the taxpayers that more taxes or
and sought advice from Atty. Baird on
interest or penalties are due
the hypothetical possibility that they
than the sum previously paid, if
had. No investigation was then being
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
for non-payment of taxes,
Subsequently, the attorney of the
though whether it is criminal
taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of
guilt is undisclosed. But it may
$12,706.85, which had been previously
well be the link that could form
assessed as the tax due, and another
the chain of testimony necessary
amount of money representing his fee
to convict an individual of a
for the advice given. Baird then sent a
federal crime. Certainly, the
check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in
payment and the feeling of guilt
Baltimore, Maryland, with a note
are the reasons the attorney
explaining the payment, but without
here involved was employedto
naming his clients.
advise his clients what, under
the circumstances, should be
o The IRS demanded that Baird identify the done.
lawyers, accountants, and other clients
involved. Baird refused on the ground Other situations which could qualify as exceptions
that he did not know their names, and
to the general rule.
declined to name the attorney and
accountants because this constituted
Content of any client communication to a
privileged communication.
lawyer relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
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Where the nature of the attorney-client in the form of, among others, the
relationship has been previously disclosed aforementioned deeds of assignment
and it is the identity which is intended to covering their clients shareholdings.
be confidential, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire o There is no question that the preparation
transaction. of the aforestated documents was part
and parcel of ACCRA LAWYERS legal
Summarizing these exceptions, information service to their clients. More important,
relating to the identity of a client may fall it constituted an integral part of their
within the ambit of the privilege when the duties as lawyers. ACCRA LAWYERS,
clients name itself has an independent therefore, have a legitimate fear that
significance, such that disclosure would identifying their clients would implicate
then reveal client confidences. them in the very activity for which legal
advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
In the case at bar, the instant case falls
aforementioned corporations.
under at least two exceptions to the
general rule. (Exception 1 & 3)
o Furthermore, under the third main
exception, revelation of the clients
o First, disclosure of the alleged clients
name would obviously provide the
name would lead to establish said
necessary link for the prosecution to
clients connection with the very fact in
build its case, where none otherwise
issue of the case, which is privileged
exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird,
information, because the privilege, as
that would inevitably form the chain of
stated earlier, protects the subject
testimony necessary to convict the
matter or the substance (without which
(client) of a . . . crime.
there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
An important distinction must be made between
o The link between the alleged criminal (1) a case where a client takes on the
services of an attorney for illicit purposes,
offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly established in seeking advice about how to go around the
law for the purpose of committing illegal
the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three activities and (2) a case where a client
thinks he might have previously committed
specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes ACCRA something illegal and consults his attorney
about it.
LAWYERS ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:
o The first case clearly does not fall within
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its the privilege because the same cannot
clients; be invoked for purposes illegal.
o From these conditions, particularly the o The second case falls within the
third, we can readily deduce that the exception because whether or not
clients indeed consulted the ACCRA the act for which the client sought
LAWYERS, in their capacity as lawyers, advice turns out to be illegal, his
regarding the financial and corporate name cannot be used or disclosed if
structure, framework and set-up of the the disclosure leads to evidence,
corporations in question. In turn, ACCRA not yet in the hands of the
LAWYERS gave their professional advice
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In fine, the crux of ACCRA LAWYERS objections Cases on the lawyers fiduciary
ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the relationship with his/her client
prosecution has a case against their clients, the Commingling of funds; delivery of funds;
latters case should be built upon evidence borrowing or lending
painstakingly gathered by them from their own
sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their Aro vs. Naawa 27 SCRA 1090
clients, information which unavoidably reveals
much about the nature of the transaction which
may or may not be illegal.
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
The fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and diligence
his client therefore imposes a strict liability for Javellana vs. Lutero 20 SCRA 717
negligence on the former. The ethical duties
owing to the client, including confidentiality,
Adarne vs. Aldaba 83 SCRA 735
loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the In Re: Filart 40 Phil. 205 no digest
responsibility to keep clients informed and Villafuerte vs. Cortez, A.C. No. 3455 14
protect their rights to make decisions have been April 1998
zealously sustained. Alcala vs. De Vera 56 SCRA 30
Bernardo vs. CA 275 SCRA 413
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the
protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and lawyers loyalty to his client is
evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but Attorneys Fees
extends even after the termination of the Reparations Commission vs. Visayan
relationship. Packing 193 SCRA 540 for digest pa
Conclusion
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Agustin vs. CA 186 SCRA 375 to the plaintiffs in full settlement of their
Perez vs. Scottish Union 76 Phil. 320 claim, as share in
the properties left by their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay, if having been agreed by
herein petitioner and Atty. de los Reyes an
REGINO B. ARO, petitioner, vs. d the spokesman of the defendants that fo
THE HON. ARSENIO NAAWA, r the purpose ofsaid amicable settlement,
Presiding Judge ofBranch IV, Court of the plaintiffs or one of them and herein
First Instance of Laguna, LUIS petitioner would go to Sta.Maria, Laguna,
MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY,AURELIA on October 23, 1964.
MARTINEZ, GREGORIO LONTOK, On October 28, 1964, petitioner
MARIA MENDOZA, MAXIMOPORTO and received on the said day a second motion
ROSARIO ANDAYA, respondents to dismiss datedOctober 26, 1964,
together with Annex 'A' of said motion,
Cases on the lawyers fiduciary which is entitled KASULATAN
relationship with his/her client NGPAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA HUKUMAN
Commingling of funds; delivery of funds; AT PAGPAPALABI, dated October 23,
borrowing or lending 1964at Sta. Cruz, Laguna and signed by
the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia
Martinez (the three beingnow respondents
FACTS: That the services of herein in this case), it having been made to
petitioner, as practicing attorney, was appear that the plaintiffs and
engaged by respondents LuisMagtibay and defendantAurelia Martinez had made an
Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their extrajudicial partition of the properties of
claim, as heirs, in the estate of the deceased LucioMagtibay and the said
theirdeceased uncle Lucio Magtibay. Luis Aurelia Martinez adjudicating to the
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay agreed with plaintiffs one-fourth (1/4) share inthe
herein petitioner to avail of his services properties of the spouses and three-fourth
and entrust the prosecution of their claim (3/4) share of the defendant Aurelia
on a contingent basis.The petitioner took Martinez, butmaking it appear also that
the necessary steps to gather the needed said plaintiffs waived their share in favor
papers and documents for the filingof a of Aurelia Martinez, . . .,thru which
petition to litigate as pauper and a fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was
complaint in the Court of First Instance of deprived of his contingent fees, agreed
Laguna, inwhich respondents Luis upon.Petitioner filed his opposition to the
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay were the second motion to dismiss and prayed,
plaintiffs and the otherrespondents, among others,invoking the provisions of
excepting the respondent Judge, were the Section 5(d) and Section 6, Rule 135 of the
defendants.on October 24, 1964, there Revised Rules of Court,for the protection
was a conversation which took place of the rights of herein petitioner as an
between herein petitioner andthe attorney officer of the Court. The respondentJudge,
of the defendants, Atty. Rustico de los instead of denying the second motion to
Reyes, Jr., in the civil case and one who dismiss and fixing his attorney's fees in
wasthen acting as a sort of spokesman for the saidcase and recording the same as
the defendants (Ex-mayor Cordova of Sta. lien, .. dismissed the case and refused to
Maria, Laguna)for the amicable settlement give herein petitionerany kind of
of the case between the plaintiffs and the immediate protection to safeguard his
defendants to the effect thata certain rights.Upon these facts, petitioner tries to
property of the spouses Lucio Magtibay make out before this Court a case of
(deceased) and respondent Aurelia certiorari for graveabuse of discretion on
Martinez,worth P3,000.00, would be given the part of respondent Judge in dismissing
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the case on the basis of thecompromise petitioner, since they instituted their case
agreement of the parties, entered into at as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was
the back of petitioner, notwithstanding aware of the terms of their contract of prof
thereservation made in his favor to file an essionalservices with petitioner, said
action against both parties "with respect clients had no right to waive the portion of
to his allegedattorney's fees," as well as a their such acknowledgedrights in favor of
case of mandamus "to order and their opponent to the extent that such
command the said respondent judge" waiver would prejudice the
to take cognizance of and resolve stipulatedcontingent interest of their
his opposition and counter- motion for lawyer and their aunt-in- law had no right
the court to fixthe compensation he to accept such waiverunqualifiedly.Under
should be paid. the circumstance extant in the record, it is
clear that the compromise agreement
RULING: While We here reaffirm the rule inquestion falls short of the moral
that "the client has an undoubted right to requirements of this quoted article of the
compromise a suitwithout the intervention Civil Code. If for thisreason alone, it should
of his lawyer," We hold that when such not be allowed to prejudice the rights of
compromise is entered into infraud of the petitioner. Accordingly, as all ofthese
lawyer, with intent to deprive him of the circumstances were presented to
fees justly due him, the compromise respondent judge before he issued the
must be subject to the said fees, and that challenged order ofdismissal and all the
when it is evident that the said fraud is co parties were heard thereon, it was
mmitted inconfabulation with the adverse incumbent upon His Honor, in equity
party who had knowledge of the lawyer's andto avoid multiplicity of suits,
contingent interest orsuch interest particularly, because the amount claimed
appears of record and who would benefit by petitioner is onlyP1,000.00, to have
under such compromise, the directly passed upon petitioner's claim,
better practice is to settle the matter of and not having done so, it would appear
the attorney's fees in the that the court a quo abused its discretion
same proceeding, after hearing all gravely enough to warrant the writ of
theaffected parties and without prejudice certiorari herein prayed for in so far as the
to the finality of the compromise in so far questioned orders prejudiced petitioner's
as it does notadversely affect the rights of right to the fees for the professional
the lawyer. Under Canon 12 of the Canons services which appear to have
of Professional Ethics,"in fixing fees, it been creditably rendered by
should not be forgotten that the profession him. Respondents allege that the
is a branch of the administration of justice judgment of dismissal in question is
and not a mere money-getting trade."In already final because no appeal was taken
the case at bar, by entering into the therefrom, but since We hold that the
compromise agreement in question and same was rendered with enough grave
even insertingtherein a prayer to the court abuse of discretion to warrant the
to dismiss their case filed by petitioner, certiorari prayed for, such alleged finality
petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed could not have materialized;
him. In other words, through the services obviously, petitioner could not have
of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, appealed, not being a party in the case.
arecognition, which had been previously The orders of the respondent court dated
denied by their aunt-in-law, that they were November 21, 1964 and January 9, 1965
entitled to a1/4 share in the estate left by in Civil Case No. SC-525 are hereby
their uncle. We hold that under these set aside in so far as
circumstances, and since itappears that they prejudice the payment of petitioner's
said clients have no other means to pay claim of attorney's fees in the form of
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and that a reopening of the case would his pleasure. This attitude on his part is
cause the private respondent no real censurable as it reveals more than just a
injury. modicum of disrespect for the judiciary
and the established machinery of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Hautea was
negligent in his duties as a lawyer.
ADARNE vs ALDBABA
HELD: A counsel for any in a judicial A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
controversy, by mandate of the canons of diligence
legal ethics, and with due regard for the
elementary standards of fair play, is duty FACTS:
bound to prepare for trial with diligence Spouses Cumpio filed an action
and deliberate speed. This norm of for forcible entry against herein complaint
conduct is no less applicable in a detainer Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and Miguel
case, such as the one at bar, even if the Inokando with the justice of the peace
issues are essentially simple and of Alang-alang Leyte.
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the Attys Isauro Marmita represented the
counsel for the petitioner-appellant has defendants who raised the issue of
been in this respect. ownership of theland in questions
The case was set for trial six times. Justice of the peace dismissed
This it was postponed at the behest of the the complaint for lack of jurisdictions
said counsel. The last postponement was plaintiffs again appealed to the Court
granted on July 24, 1963 with the of First Instance of Leyte
unequivocal admonition by the judgment Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso
that no further postponement would be Casimpan filed the answer for the
countenanced. The case was reset for defendants.
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means At the hearing of the case on August 7,
that the appellants counsel had more 1961, Cesario Adarne, noting that his
than a months time to so adjust his attorneys had not yet arrived, prevailed
schedule of activities as to obviate a upon the respondent Atty. Damian
conflict between his business transactions Aldaba, who was present in court to
and his calendar of hearings. Came attend the trial of an electoral case, to
August 27, and neither he nor the appear as counsel for them
appellant appeared at the trial. His The respondent, who is a third degree
absence on the latter date was not cousin of the complainant, agreed, and
occasioned by illness or some other entered aspecial appearances. Upon
supervening occurrence which noticing that the plaintiffs and their
unavoidably and justifiably prevented him counsel were not also present in court, the
from appearing in court. respondent, instead of asking for a
It was bounden duty of the said postponement, moved for the dismissal of
counsel, under the circumstances, to give the case. This motion was granted and the
preferential attention to the case. As case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the
things, he regarded the municipal court as plaintiff filed a motion for
a mere marionette that must ever await the reconsideration of the order, to which
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Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging 3. That the complainants were driven from
in substance: their lands, and their houses were
destroyed, by order of the court.
1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of
Pangasinan he received of them the sum
of P111 as fees for drafting a
memorandum in connection with ISSUE: Whether or not the facts are
Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540; sufficient to support the complaint, and
recommends dismissal of the case.
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and
negligence in prosecuting the appeal to
the Supreme Court, he having practically
abandoned the case. HELD: We agree to the extent that
such gross misconduct or negligence
In connection with point No. 1, even has not been shown as warrants
admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal disbarment or suspension pursuant
received such a sum of complainants, to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of
which respondent denies, Filart seems to Civil Procedure. "That part of the
have had a legal right to receive profession," said Lord Mansfield in Pitt vs.
compensation as an attorney, the office of Yalden, ([1767], 4 Burr., 2060), "which is
deputy provincial fiscal not being carried on by attorneys is liberal and
specifically included in section 36 of the reputable, as well as useful to the public,
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act when they conduct themselves with honor
No. 1702, as an official who shall not and integrity; and they ought to be
engage in private practice. It is also to be protected when they act to the best of
noted that Filart did not take up the case their skill and knowledge. But every man
of his own volition but was ordered by the is liable to error; and I should be very sorry
court to defend the rights of petitioners that it should be taken for granted that an
because the attorney they formerly attorney is answerable for every error or
retained was almost always in a state of mistake. . . . A counsel may mistake as
intoxication. well as an attorney. . . . Yet no one will
say that a counsel who has been mistaken
In connection with point No. 2, the shall be charged. . . . Not only counsel but
following facts are important: judges may differ, or doubt, or take time
to consider. Therefore, an attorney ought
1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal, not to be liable in case of reasonable
and having engaged in the practice of law, doubt." "No attorney," said Chief Justice
complainants asked Filart to prosecute the Abbott, "is bound to know all the law;
appeal of their case; God forbid that it should be imagined that
an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge,
2. That Filart received from complainants is bound to know all the law."
sums of money, P780 according to (Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113.)
complainants, and P160 according to
respondent; The court, having in mind the many
appeals which have been dismissed
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HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in office to examine and verify the deposit in
this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had the LBP in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust
been remiss in his duties as counsel for for MTMSI. The Articles of Incorporation of
Alcala because he failed to update him of MTMSI was signed by Bernardo and he
the status of the case, however, it appears became one of its incorporators and was
that Alcala did not sustain any damage by elected as member in the Board of
reason of such negligence. But this is not Directorsand as Treasurer. He never
to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. opened an account with the LBP for the
The lack of damage to Alcala will only corporation though he was elected
serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Treasurer and in the meantime he was
Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty promoted Assistant Branch Manager of
of simple negligence and he was severely LBP. Because of this, LBP filed a formal
censured for his negligence. Atty. De charge against Bernardo for gross neglect,
Veras failure to notify his clients of the grave misconduct, and serious violation of
decision in question manifests a lack of the CSC rules namely engaging in a
total dedication or devotion to the private business without the permission
clients interest expected of Atty. De and authority required by the CS rules and
Vera under the lawyers oath. regulations.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that After the formal investigation, the
not all negligence by counsel entitles the hearing officer issued a resolution finding
client to collect damages from the Bernardo guilty and be meted out with the
negligent lawyer. penalty of forced resignation. The LBP
approved the recommendation which was
affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MPSB). The CSC likewise affirmed
ARMANDO BERNARDO V. COURT the penalty but based its findings on a
OF APPEALS/ CSC / LBP different ground, that he made use of his
being an employee of LBP to do an
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and irregular act of depositing and
diligence withdrawing the paid up capital without
the resolution of the Board of Directors of
the Company. Bernardo filed an MR
FACTSl: Armando Bernardo entered the alleging that the acts used as basis for
government service as Claims Adjuster of finding his guilt was not raised in the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and formal charge thus violating his right to
became the Head of the Loans and due process and that his acts were not
Discount Divisions. He also maintained a violative of the CSC rules and regulations.
Savings Account with the LBP. He The CA dismissed the petition for lack
deposited P500,000 in his own account of merit thus the case at bar.
and photocopied the page reflecting this
in his passbook and on the same day
withdrew the same. He then executed, as
Treasurer-in-Trust of Markay Trading and ISSUE: Whether Bernardo violated the
Manpower Services (MTMSI) a treasurers CSC rules and regulations.
certificate certifying that 25% of the
authorized capital stock has been
subscribed and 25% of the subscription,
which was P500,000 had been paid and HELD: YES. The evidence on record
received y him. He also executed a letter- shows that not only was he an
authority to the SEC authorizing their incorporator, he was also a member of
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2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme HELD: Yes. Exhibit D should be given its
Court struck down the proposed national full force and effect. A written contract
computerized identification system for services shall control the amount to be
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, paid thereof unless found by the court to
we said: be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Rule
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore of Court 127, section 22.) The arson case
that the right to privacy does not bar all required several days of trial. The gravity
incursions into individual privacy. The of the situation confronted by the
right is not intended to stifle scientific and appellant after the rendition of the
technological advancements that enhance judgement of the court of first instance is
public service and the common good... shown by the fact that he was sentenced
Intrusions into the right must be to undergo imprisonment for the period of
accompanied by proper safeguards that from ten to twelve years and to pay an
enhance public service and the common indemnity of P101,115. That the plaintiff
good. had handled appellants defense with
Historically, it has mostly been in the competence and success cannot be
areas of legality of searches and gainsaid, it being enough to state that the
seizures, and the infringement of privacy appellant was acquitted in the Court of
of communication where the constitutional Appeals before which the plaintiff orally
right to privacy has been critically at argued, in addition to a 78-page brief
issue. Petitioners case involves neither which had filed therein. We are thus not
and, as already stated, his argument that prepared to rule that the amount of
his right against self-incrimination is in P6,000 is excessive or unjust, especially
jeopardy holds no water. because said fee is in a sense contingent
upon the acquittal of the appellant, since
no insurance money (P6,000 of which was
PEREZ v. SCOTTISH UNION (and National ceded to the plaintiff under Exhibit D) was
Insurance Co.) of course forthcoming if the fire which
destroyed the insured property could be
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BARREDO, J.:
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agreed with herein petitioner to 9. That on the very day of and after
avail of his services and entrust the the hearing of the motion to dismiss,
prosecution of their claim on a or on October 24, 1964, before
contingent basis as shown in the receipt of a copy of the said order
agreement, copy of which is hereto (Annex 'G'), there was a
attached as Annex 'A' and is made conversation which took place
an integral part hereof.2 between herein petitioner and the
attorney of the defendants, Atty.
4. That by virtue of said agreement, Rustico de los Reyes, Jr., in the civil
herein petitioner took the necessary case and one who was then acting
steps to gather the needed papers as a sort of spokesman for the
and documents for the filing of a defendants (Ex-Mayor Cordova of
petition to litigate as pauper and a Sta. Maria, Laguna) for the amicable
complaint in the Court of First settlement of the case between the
Instance of Laguna, in which plaintiffs and the defendants to the
respondents Luis Magtibay and effect that a certain property of the
Pablo Magtibay were the plaintiffs spouses Lucio Magtibay (deceased)
and the other respondents, and respondent Aurelia Martinez,
excepting the respondent Judge, worth P3,000.00, would be given to
were the defendants, .... the plaintiffs in full settlement of
their claim, as share in the
5. That said petition to litigate as properties left by their deceased
pauper filed by herein petitioner for uncle Lucio Magtibay, it having been
respondents Luis Magtibay and agreed by herein petitioner and Atty.
Pablo Magtibay was granted by the de los Reyes and the spokesman of
respondent Judge as per the order the defendants that for the purpose
dated September 10, 1964, ..... of said amicable settlement, the
plaintiffs or one of them and herein
6. That to plaintiffs' complaint in petitioner would go to Sta. Maria,
Civil Case No. SC-525, the Laguna, on October 23, 1964.
defendants in said case interposed a
motion to dismiss dated September 10. That having given notice to the
29, 1964....3 plaintiffs (now respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay) at
7. That to the said motion to dismiss their given address in Calauag,
herein petitioner, as attorney for the Quezon to come to Candelaria for
plaintiffs (now respondents Luis the purpose of going to Sta. Maria,
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay) filed Laguna on October 23, 1964,
an opposition dated October 5, petitioner had waited for said
1964.....4 plaintiffs to go to his office on or
before said date for the engagement
8. That after the hearing of the mentioned, but due to their
motion to dismiss filed by the (plaintiffs') failure to come to
defendants and the opposition Candelaria, petitioner had to send a
thereto by the plaintiffs, which telegram to Ex-Mayor Cordova
finally took place on October 24, notifying him of his (petitioner's) and
1964, the respondent Judge issued plaintiffs' not being able to go to
its resolution or order dated October Sta. Maria because of the failure of
24, 1964, denying the motion to any of the plaintiffs to come to
dismiss, ....5 Candelria, ....
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11. That it was only on October 28, Rules of Court, for the protection of
1964, when herein petitioner the rights of herein petitioner as an
received a copy of the order dated officer of the Court, to wit:
October 24, 1964 (Annex "G") and to
his surprise he also received on the (a) to deny the second motion
said day a second motion to dismiss to dismiss and get aside and
dated October 26, 1964; together annul the deed of extrajudicial
with Annex "A" of said motion, which partition and waiver dated
is entitled KASULATAN NG October 23, 1964;
PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA
HUKUMAN AT PAGPAPALABI, dated (b) to fix the compensation of
October 23, 1964 at Sta. Cruz, herein counsel in the
Laguna and signed by the plaintiffs proportion of one-third (1/3) of
and defendant Aurelia Martinez (the the shares of plaintiffs, if in
three being now respondents in this land, or in the amount of
case), it having been made to P1,000.00, if in cash, and to
appear in said Annex "A" of the record the same and expenses
second motion to dismiss, among advanced by him for the
others, that the plaintiffs and plaintiffs in the sum of P22.15
defendant Aurelia Martinez had as lien in favor of herein
made an extrajudicial partition of claimant-petitioner over the
the properties of the deceased Lucio properties in litigation,
Magtibay and the said Aurelia particularly over the one-
Martinez adjudicating to the fourth (1/4) share of the
plaintiffs one-fourth () share in the plaintiffs in all the properties
properties of the spouses and three- of the spouses;
fourth (3/4) share of the defendant
Aurelia Martinez, but making it xxx xxx xxx
appear also that said plaintiffs
waived their share in favor of Aurelia (d) as an alternative to prayer
Martinez, ..., thru which fraudulent (a) above, to grant the second
waiver, herein petitioner was motion to dismiss, subjecting,
deprived of his contingent fees, however, the properties in
agreed upon, as evidenced by Annex litigation and subject-matters
"A" of this petition.6 of the extrajudicial partition
and waiver to the lien for
xxx xxx xxx attorney's fees and expenses
in favor of herein claimant-
14. That petitioner filed by petitioner, after fixing said
registered mail, on November 4, attorney's fees as prayed for
1964, his "OPPOSITION TO THE in (b) above.
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND
COUNTER-MOTION OR PETITION TO xxx xxx xxx
SET ASIDE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
PARTITION AND WAIVER DATED 15. That on the day f finally set for
OCTOBER 23, 1964 AND TO RECORD the hearing of the second motion to
ATTORNEY'S LIEN", dated November dismiss, as well as of the counter-
3, 1964, wherein he (petitioner) motion or petition, or on November
prayed, among others, invoking the 21, 1964, because of the inquiries or
provisions of Section 5(d) and interpellation made by respondent
Section 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Judge to herein petitioner as to
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suit without the intervention of his might have protected his interests
lawyer. by entering an attorney's lien under
section 37 of the Code of Civil
Though there is a valid Procedure.
agreement for the payment to
the attorney of a large The petition for a writ
proportion of the sum of certiorari was therefore properly
recovered in case of success denied. So ordered.
this does not give the attorney
such an interest in the cause The difference We perceive, however,
of action that it prevents between petitioner's case, on the one
plaintiff from compromising hand, and that of Atty. Rustia, in the above
the suit. (4 Cyc. 990, and decision, on the other, is that in the
authorities cited in Note 6; see latter's case, neither the court nor the
also Louque vs. Dejan 129 La. party adverse to his clients were aware of
519; Price vs. Western Loan & the exact agreement as to his fees,
Savings Co., 19 Am. Cas. 589 whereas in the case of petitioner, both the
and Note.) court and the other parties knew the
terms of the contract for professional
In the present instance the clients services between petitioner and his
did nothing that they did not have a clients, the Magtibay brothers, because
perfect right to do. By appearing the written contract therefor, Annex A,
personally and presenting a motion was made part of the complaint, and none
they impliedly dismissed their seriously disputes its authenticity. Besides,
lawyer. The petitioner's contingent the court had already dismissed the case
interests in the judgment rendered when Atty. Rustia raised the question of
did not appear of record. Neither as his fees before the court; in petitioner's
a party in interest nor as and instance, he opposed the motion to
attorney was he therefore entitled to dismiss and pleaded with the court to
notice of the motion. protect his rights as officer of the court
before the first order in question was
As to the second proposition that the issued by respondent judge. Were it not
court below could not dismiss the for these differences, We would have
case after the bill of exceptions had inclined towards denying the herein
been approved, it is very true that petition in line with the Rustia ruling that,
upon such approval the lower court in any event, certiorari is not the
loses its jurisdiction over all appropriate remedy, the American
contentious matters connected with authorities cited by petitioner not
the issues in the case. But there is withstanding.
nothing to prevent all of the parties
by agreement to withdraw the bill of Withal, there is another Philippine case
exceptions with the consent of said which Us to sustain petitioner. In the case
court and resubmit the case to the of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 440, Atty.
jurisdiction of the court. That was all Claro M. Recto found himself practically in
that was done in this case. A valid the same situation as petitioner herein.
agreement between the parties to a After Atty. Recto had rendered services to
case is the law of the case in Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden in a
everything covered by the protracted suit against her husband for
agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091; the purposes of securing an increase of
Compania General de Tabacos vs. her and her daughter's monthly support,
Obed, 13 Phil. 391.) The petitioner (the spouses were separated), to
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with the adverse party who had Such implied dismissal appears to Us to
knowledge of the lawyer's contingent have been made without justifiable cause,
interest or such interest appears of record none is urged anywhere in the record, and
and who would benefit under such so, the above-quoted provision of Section
compromise, the better practice is to 26, Rule 138 applies here. The terms of
settle the matter of the attorney's fees in the compromise in question, as spelled
the same proceeding, after hearing all the out in Annex A of Annex I of the petition,
affected parties and without prejudice to indicate clearly that Aurelia Martinez, the
the finality of the compromise in so far as defendant aunt in-law of petitioner's
it does not adversely affect the rights of clients, acknowledged that the rights of
the lawyer. Surely, "the client cannot, by said clients were practically as alleged by
setting, compromising or dismissing his petitioner in the complaint he filed for
suit during its pendency, deprive the them. In other words, through the services
attorney of his compensation for the of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect,
agreed amount, unless the lawyer a recognition, which had been previously
consents to such settlement, compromise denied by their aunt-in-law, that they were
or dismissal", (Legal and Judicial Ethics by entitled to a share in the estate left by
Martin, 1967 Rev. Ed p. 121) for the, their uncle. We hold that under these
attorney is or "Shall be entitled to have circumstances, and since it appears that
and recover from his client - a reasonable said clients have no other means to pay
compensation (not more) for his services, petitioner, since they instituted their case
with a view to the importance of the as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was
subject-matter of the controversy, the aware of the terms of their contract of
extent of the services rendered, and the professional services with petitioner', said
professional standing of the attorney", clients had no right to waive the portion of
(Sec. 24, Rule 138, on Attorney and their such acknowledged rights in favor of
Admission to Bar) albeit, under Canon 12 their opponent to the extent that such
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, "in waiver would prejudice the stipulated
fixing fees, it should not be forgotten that contingent interest of their lawyer and
the profession is a branch of the their aunt-in-law had no right to accept
administration of justice and not a mere such waiver unqualified. The Civil Code
money-getting trade." enjoins that:
True it is also that "a client may, at ART. 19. Every person must, in the
anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute exercise of his rights and in the
another in his place", (Sec. 26, Rule 138) performance of his duties, act with
but it must be emphasized that the same justice, give everyone his due, and
provision, which is an incorporation of observe honesty and good faith.
Republic Act 636 into the Rules of Court,
also provides that "if the contract between Under the circumstance extant in the
client and attorney had been reduced to record, it is clear that the compromise
writing and the dismissal of the attorney agreement in question falls short of the
was without justifiable cause, he shall be moral requirements of this quoted article
entitled to recover from the client full of the Civil Code. If for this reason alone, it
compensation ..." In the case at bar, by should not be allowed to prejudice the
entering into the compromise agreement rights of petitioner. Accordingly, as all of
in question and even inserting therein a these circumstances were presented to
prayer to the court to dismiss their case respondent judge before he issued the
filed by petitioner, (see footnote 6, ante) challenged order of dismissal and all the
petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed parties were heard thereon, it was
him. (Rustia vs. the Court, etc., supra.) incumbent upon His Honor, in equity and
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manifested that the witnesses and the desired postponement and the reason
evidence for the plaintiff were ready for therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at
presentation on that date. The verbal the time; that he exercised utmost
motion for postponement was denied and diligence and precaution in the sense that
the plaintiff was directed to adduce his while in Manila he sent a telegram to the
evidence. During the presentation of the respondent judge, asking for
plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court postponement; and that notwithstanding
received a telegram from Atty. Hautea all the foregoing, the municipal court
requesting postponement of the hearing. nevertheless proceeded with the trial in
The trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on his absence and that of his client, allowed
the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, the the private respondent to present his
court on the same date rendered evidence ex parte, and rendered a
judgment for the plaintiff and against the decision against the petitioner, thus
defendant. The latter's counsel received a depriving the latter of his day in court.
copy of the decision on September 9, Counsel for the petitioner further asserted
1963. On the following September 11, he that his client has a good and substantial
filed a motion to set aside judgment and defense, which is, that the complainant
for new trial. This motion was denied on had given his client an option to buy the
September 26; a copy of the order of premises subject-matter of the complaint
denial was received by him on the same below, and that a reopening of the case
date. would cause the private respondent no
real injury.
On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days
later, the defendant thru his same counsel This petition was given due course, the
filed a petition for relief (from the respondents were required to file their
judgment of the municipal court)with the answers, and a cease-and-desist order
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying was issued as prayed for. On February 22,
that the decision in question be set aside, 1964, after due hearing, the Court of First
that the detainer case be set for trial on Instance rendered judgment dismissing
the merits, and, pending determination of the petition.1wph1.t
the petition, that an injunction issue
restraining the enforcement of the Hence the present recourse.
decision. Counsel for the petitioner
averred that his absence on the date of From the perspective of the environmental
the trial was excusable as he attended to circumstances obtaining in this case, the
a very urgent business transaction in present appeal is palpably devoid of merit.
Manila; that before his departure for the
A counsel for any party in a judicial
latter city, he verbally informed the
controversy, by mandate of the canons of
respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
legal ethics, and with due regard for the
might be delayed and that he might not
elementary standards of fair play, is duty
arrive on time for the trial of the case as
bound to prepare for trial with diligence
set; that he called at both the law office
and deliberate speed. This norm of
and the residence of the counsel for the
conduct is no less applicable in a detainer
private respondent to inform him of the
case, such as the one at bar, even if the
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issues are essentially simple and It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the disquisition that the petitioner-appellant
counsel for the petitioner-appellant has was not deprived of his day in court, and
been remiss in this respect. that the respondent municipal judge did
not err in proceeding with the trial,
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice allowing the private respondent to present
it was postponed at the behest of the said his evidence ex parte, and thereafter
counsel. The last postponement was rendering decision for the plaintiff-
granted on July 24, 1963 with the appellee. It follows that the petitioner was
unequivocal admonition by the judgment not entitled to the remedy of a petition for
that no further postponement would be relief.
countenanced. The case was reset for
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means Moreover, after the denial of his motion to
that the appellant's counsel had more set aside judgment and for new trial, the
than a month's time to so adjust his appellant had ample time to appeal;
schedule of activities as to obviate a instead he allowed the judgment to
conflict between his business transactions become final and executory. His argument
and his calendar of hearings. Came August that an appeal would have been futile as
27, and neither he nor the appellant there was no evidence upon which such
appeared at the trial. His absence on the appeal could be based, merits scant
latter date was not occasioned by illness consideration. An appeal from the decision
or some other supervening occurrence of a municipal court to the Court of First
which unavoidably and justifiably Instance has the effect of vacating the
prevented him from appearing in court. decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of
Court; sec. 9, Rule 40, of the old Rules),
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the and the action is to be tried de
said counsel, under the circumstances, to novowithout regard to the proof presented
give preferential attention to the case. As in the municipal court or the conclusions
things were, he regarded the municipal reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs.
court as a mere marionette that must ever Sison, 56 Phil. 344, 351; Lizo vs.
await his pleasure. This attitude on his Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Crisostomo vs.
part is censurable as it reveals more than Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). To grant
just a modicum of disrespect for the the appellant's petition for relief would
judiciary and the established machinery of amount to reviving his right to appeal
justice. which he had irretrievably lost through the
gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa
Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by vs. Yatco, etc., et al., L-16435, Jan. 31,
the appearance in court on August 27 of 1963, and the cases therein cited). This in
another attorney who verbally moved for law cannot be done.
postponement nor by his telegram
received by the municipal judge on the Accordingly, the decision appealed from is
same date asking for continuance. These affirmed. As this appeal is patently
circumstances, upon the contrary, frivolous and dilatory, this Court, under
emphasize his presumptuousness vis-a- the authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of
vis the municipal judge. the Rules of Court, hereby assesses treble
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costs against the petitioner-appellant the issue interposed by the appellants, the
Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by Judge of the Court of First Instance found
his counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea. that the Justice of the Peace Court has
jurisdiction over the case and returned the
same to the lower court for trial on the
merits. After trial on the merits, the Justice
A.M. No. 801 June 27, 1978 of the Peace again dismissed the case and
the plaintiffs again appealed to the Court
CESARIO ADARNE, complainant, vs.
of First Instance of Leyte where the case
ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent.
was docketed anew as Civil Case No, 632.
Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso
Casimpan filed the answer for the
CONCEPCION JR., J.: defendants. 1
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At the hearing of the case on October 23, mga ibang abogado na nabibili, lalala
1964 before the Court of First Instance of and sakit naito sa profession ng mga
Leyte, the respondent was again prevailed abogado, at lilikha ng maraming api, at
upon by the complainant to appear in his habang naghahari and pang-aapi,
behalf. The respondent entered a "special lalaganap and kriminalidad ng walang
appearance" for the complainant and tigil, at walang katahimikan ang ating
thereafter argued that the interest of Demukrasya, at kung magkakagayon ang
justice would best be served of the mga mamamayan at sapilitan sa
defendants were allowed to file an action kumunista sasamba.
for quieting of title and the case heard
jointly with the pending action for forcible The respondent denied that he ever had
entry. Finding merit in the argument, the any agreement with the complainant with
court ordered the defendant Cesario respect to the handling of the latter's case
Adarne to file an action for quieting of title in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to Carigara Branch, except for the "special
answer the same within the reglementary appearance" that he entered for the
period, after which both cases would be complainant on August 7, 1961 and
tried jointly. The hearing was deferred until October 23, 1964, in view of the non-
after the filing of the action for quieting of availability of the complainant's lawyers
title. 5 on said dates.
On June 17, 1965, the court declared the The case referred to the Solicitor General
defendants in default for their failure to for investigation, report and
8
appeal at the hearing set for that day and recommendation, after which a
directed the plaintiffs to present evidence complaint for the disbarment of the
to support their claim. 6 On September 17, respondent attorney was filed. 9
1965, the court rendered a decision and a
writ of execution was issued thereafter. 7 The judgment by default rendered against
the complainant cannot be attributed to
Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the the respondent attorney. The blame lies
present complaint against the respondent with the complainant for having engaged
Atty. Damian V. Aldaba on August 3, 1967, the services of several lawyers to handle
praying: his case without formally withdrawing the
authority he had given to them to appear
Dahil dito, isinusumbong ko po ang aking in his behalf as to place the responsibility
Abogado ng "Mal practice" pabaya at upon the respondent. To add to the
pahamak sa kliente at sinisingil ko po siya confusion, the complainant had also
ng pinsala katumbas sa sinisingil sa kin ng requested the clerk of court of the Court of
akin kalaban. O kaya lakarin niya na First Instance of Leyte that he
mapigil and decision ng Hukom sa C.F.I. at (complainant) be furnished with summons
ulitin and hearing sa Forcible Entry. Kung and subpoena accorded to him. 10 He also
hindi niya magagawa ito, ipinauubaya ko filed a motion by himself, 11 thus implying
na po sa kataas taasan Hukoman and that he was handling his case personally.
paglapat ng parusa. Sapagkat kung hindi p
susugpo-in and masamang gawa naito ng
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It appears that there have been three neither gross negligence nor omission to
changes made of the attorneys for the have entertained such belief. An attorney
complainant in the forcible entry case. The is not bound to exercise extraordinary
complainant was originally represented by diligence, but only a reasonable degree of
Atty. Isauro Marmita who, upon his care and skill, having reference to the
appointment to the Department of Labor, character of the business he undertakes to
engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his do. Prone to err like any other human
place. 12 Then came Atty. Arturo Mirales being, he is not answerable for every error
and later, Atty. Generoso Casimpan. or mistake, and will be protected as long
However, no formalities whatever were as he acts honestly and in good faith to
observed in those changes such that the the best of his skill and knowledge.
respondent entered a "special
appearance" for the complainant in order It is well settled that in disbarment
that he could ask for the dismissal of the proceedings, the burden of proof rests
case for the failure of the adverse party to upon the complainant and for the Court to
prosecute. The rule followed on matters of exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
substitution of attorneys as laid down by against the respondent attorney must be
this Court is that no substitution of established by convincing proof. In the
attorneys will be allowed unless there be instant case, there is no sufficient proof to
filed: (1) a written application for such warrant the disbarment of the respondent
substitution; (2) the written consent of the attorney. Neither is there culpable
client; (3) the written consent of the malpractice to justify his suspension.
attorney substituted; and (4) in case such
written consent can not be secured, there WHEREFORE, the present administrative
must be filed with the application proof of complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
service of notice of such motion upon the
SO ORDERED.
attorney to be substituted, in the manner
prescribed by the rules. Unless the
foregoing formalities are complied with,
substitution will not be permitted, and the filart_1919 September 27, 1919
attorney who properly appeared last in the
cause, before such application for In re the complaint against Attorney
substitution, will be regarded as the ANACLETO FILART.
attorney of record and will be held
responsible for the proper conduct of the Acting Attorney-General Feria for the
cause. 13 Government.
The respondent in his own behalf.
Besides, the respondent honestly believed
that he had appeared for the complainant MALCOLM, J.:
only for a special purpose and that the
complainant had agreed to contact his These proceedings were instituted at the
attorney of record to handle his case after instance of thirty-seven residents of
the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that Asingan, Pangasinan, who filed a
he did nothing more about it. 14 It was complaint against attorney Anacleto
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Filart for malpractice, alleging in 3. That the complainants were driven from
substance: their lands, and their houses were
destroyed, by order of the court.
1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of
Pangasinan he received of them the sum The facts which support the allegation of
of P111 as fees for drafting a fraud and negligence on the part of
memorandum in connection with respondent are:
Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;
1. The lapse of fifty-one days between the
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and receipt of notice of denial of motion for a
negligence in prosecuting the appeal to new trial (March 7, 1917) until the filing of
the Supreme Court, he having practically the bill of exceptions (April 27, 1917)
abandoned the case. when the statutory period is only thirty
days (Act No. 2347), sec. 26);
In connection with point No. 1, even
admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal 2. Failure to perfect a satisfactory bill of
received such a sum of complainants, exceptions after repeated amendments
which respondent denies, Filart seems to and re-amendments;
have had a legal right to receive
compensation as an attorney, the office of 3. Failure to file a bond in order to prevent
deputy provincial fiscal not being execution;
specifically included in section 36 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act 4. Assurances made by respondent that all
No. 1702, as an official who shall not was right.
engage in private practice. It is also to be
1. This is explained by the fact that the
noted that Filart did not take up the case
record was not in the clerk's office. The
of his own volition but was ordered by the
date when the answers to Filart's
court to defend the rights of petitioners
questions from the Land Registration
because the attorney they formerly
Office reached Filart, which were to be
retained was almost always in a state of
made a part of the bill of exceptions, does
intoxication.
not appear in the record. Filart also alleges
In connection with point No. 2, the he made an oral motion to extend the
following facts are important: period fixed by law for the filing of the bill
of exceptions, but that motion appears to
1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal, have been overlooked by the judge;
and having engaged in the practice of law,
complainants asked Filart to prosecute the 2. The parties are agreed that the bills of
appeal of their case; exceptions are voluminous. Respondent
further pleads pressure of work in his law
2. That Filart received from complainants office;
sums of money, P780 according to
complainants, and P160 according to 3. Respondent says that he believed
respondent; execution would not be valid until after
certiorari proceedings were decided;
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and omissions; and let a copy hereof be "reconveyance" (Civil Case No. 83-
filed with his personal papers in this court. 18877). During their initial meeting,
So ordered. complainant tried to reconstruct before
respondent lawyer the incidents of the
case merely from memory prompting the
latter to ask complainant to instead return
at another time with the records of the
case. On 30 January 1987, complainant
again saw respondent but still sans the
records. Complainant requested
respondent to accept the case, paying to
the latter the sum of P1,750.00
representing the acceptance fee
of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee for
January 1987. Respondent averred that he
[A.C. No. 3455. April 14, 1998] accepted the money with much reluctance
and only upon the condition that
ARSENIO A. complainant would get the records of the
VILLAFUERTE, complainant, case from, as well as secure the
vs. ATTY. DANTE H. withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose
CORTEZ, respondent. Dizon, the former counsel of
complainant. Allegedly, complainant never
showed up thereafter until November
1989 when he went to the office of
RESOLUTION respondent lawyer but only to leave a
copy of a writ of execution in Civil Case
VITUG, J.:
No. 062160-CV, a case for ejectment,
which, according to respondent, was never
Feeling aggrieved by what he
priorly mentioned to him by
perceives to be a neglect in the handling
complainant. Indeed, said respondent, he
of his cases by respondent lawyer, despite
had never entered his appearance in the
the latter's receipt of P1,750.00
aforenumbered case.
acceptance and retainer fees, complainant
Arsenio A. Villafuerte seeks, in the instant
In its report, IBP-CBD concluded that
proceedings, the disbarment of Atty. Dante
the facts established would just the same
H. Cortez.
indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of
duty on the part of respondent. The CBD
From the records of the case and the
rejected the excuse proffered by
Report submitted by the Commission on
respondent that the non-receipt of the
Bar Discipline ("CBD") of the Integrated
records of the case justified his failure to
Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"), it would
represent complainant. The IBP-CBD,
appear that sometime in January 1987,
through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo,
complainant, upon the referral of Atty.
recommended to the IBP Board of
Rene A. V. Saguisag, went to the office of
Governors the suspension of respondent
respondent lawyer to discuss his case for
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from the practice of law for three months respondent lawyer has somehow been
with a warning that a repetition of similar remiss in his responsibilities.
acts could be dealt with more severely
than a mere 3-month suspension. The Court is convinced that a lawyer-
client relationship, given the
On 30 August 1996, the IBP Board of circumstances, has arisen between
Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96- respondent and complainant. Respondent
191 which - lawyer has admitted having received the
amount of P1,750.00, including its nature
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it and purpose, from complainant. His
is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the acceptance of the payment effectively
Report and Recommendation of the bars him from altogether disclaiming the
Investigating Commissioner in the above- existence of an attorney-client relationship
entitled case, hereinmade part of this between them. It would not matter really
Resolution/Decision as Annex `A;' and, whether the money has been intended to
finding the recommendation therein to be pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or
fully supported by the evidence on record to include Civil Case No. 062160-CV, there
and the applicable laws and rules, being no showing, in any event, that
Respondent Atty. Dante Cortez is hereby respondent lawyer has attended to either
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for of said cases. It would seem that he hardly
three (3) months with a warning that a has exerted any effort to find out what
repetition of the acts/omission complained might have happened to his client's
of will be dealt with more severely."[1] cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of
his client requires him to be ever mindful
Both respondent lawyer and of the responsibilities that should be
complainant filed with the IBP-CBD their expected of him.[3] He is mandated to
respective motions for the reconsideration exert his best efforts to protect, within the
of the foregoing resolution. bounds of the law, the interests of his
client. The Code of Professional
On 23 August 1997, the Board of
Responsibility cannot be any clearer in
Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-66
its dictum than when it has stated that a
that -
"lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence,"[4] decreeing
"RESOLVED to CONFIRM Resolution NO.
further that he "shall not neglect a legal
XII-96-191 of the Board of Governors
matter entrusted to him."[5]
Meeting dated August 30, 1996
SUSPENDING Atty. Dante Cortez from
Complainant, nevertheless, is not
the practice of law for three (3)
entirely without fault himself. He cannot
months with a warning that repetition
expect his case to be properly and
of the acts/omission complained of will
intelligently handled without listening to
be dealt with more severely."[2]
his own counsel and extending full
cooperation to him. It is not right for
The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD in
complainant to wait for almost two years
its findings and conclusion that
and to deal with his lawyer only after
receiving an adverse decision.
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A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974 Civil case 2478 was an action for
annulment of a sale of two parcels of land
JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA
(lots Nos. 1880 and 1883 covered by TCT
IMPERIAL, petitioners, vs.
Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
by the vendee, Ray Semenchuk, against
the vendors, spouses Alcala, on the
ground that lot 1880 "could not be located
MUOZ PALMA, J.:p or did not exist", and for the recovery of
damages and attorney's fees.
On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now
deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial, Respondent attorney, whose legal services
filed this present petition for disbarment were engaged by complainants, filed an
against respondent Honesto de Vera, a answer denying the material allegations of
practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay, who the above-mentioned complaint and
was retained by them as their counsel in setting up a counterclaim for the balance
civil case 2478 of the Court of First of the purchase price of the lots sold, the
Instance of Albay, entitled: "Ray expenses of notarials, internal revenue,
Semenchuk vs. Jose Alcala". registration, etc. plus damages and
attorney's fees.
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On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered and that since no appeal was taken, a writ
judgment rescinding the contract of sale, of execution was issued by the trial court
on the ground that the vendee Semenchuk on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
was not able to take material possession
of lot 1880 it being in the possession of a On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala
certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers instituted civil case 2723 for damages
who have been occupying the land for a against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having
number of years. The dispositive portion of failed to inform them of the decision in
the judgment reads: case 2478 as a result of which they lost
their right to appeal from said decision.
WHEREFORE, judgment is The trial court that heard case 2723 found
hereby rendered: for a fact that respondent did not inform
his clients of the decision rendered in case
(a) Declaring the deed of sale 2478; however, it denied damages for lack
(Exhibit A) rescinded; of proof that the spouses Alcala suffered
any damage as a result of respondent's
(b) Directing the plaintiff to failure to notify them of the aforesaid
deliver to the defendants the decision. The judgment in case 2723 was
possession of lot No. 1883. appealed to the Court of Appeals 1 by
respondent herein but the same was
(c) Ordering the defendants to
affirmed by said appellate court.
return to the plaintiff the sum
of P1,000.00 after deducting Not content with having filed case 2723,
the amount of P250.00 which complainants instituted this complaint for
is the consideration in the disbarment against their former counsel.
deed of sale of Lot No. 185;
and 1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of
interest" of respondent in the handling of
(d) Without pronouncement as complainants' defense in civil case 2478.
to costs. (p. 11, rollo)
The basis of this particular charge is the
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de alleged failure of Atty. de Vera to present
Vera received a copy of the decision but at the trial of case 2478 certain
he failed to inform his clients of the documents which according to the
judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, complainants could have proven that lot
a sheriff came to complainants' house to 1880 actually existed, to wit: a sketch of
serve a writ of execution issued in said lot 1880 prepared by the vendee,
case. Totally caught by surprise, Jose Semenchuk, himself (Exh. L-Adm. Case);
Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court technical description of lot 1880 taken
and inquired for the status of case 2478. from complainants' certificate of title (Exh.
The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply M-Adm. Case); sketch plan of lot 1880 in
dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that relation to the adjoining lots prepared by
the case was decided on April 17, 1963, surveyor Miguel N. Romero (Exh. N-Adm
that a copy of the decision was received Case); a receipt for P10.00 issued by
by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, surveyor Romero for the preparation of the
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sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-Adm. Case) all of inform his clients of the decision;
which documents were turned over by complainants insist the contrary.
Jose Alcala to respondent before the trial
of case 2478. We agree with the Solicitor General that
there is sufficient evidence on hand to
We agree with the Solicitor General that prove that respondent neglected to
there is no merit to this particular charge. acquaint his clients of the decision in case
2478.
The records of case 2478 show that upon
agreement of the parties and their As stated in the Solicitor General's report,
attorneys, the trial court appointed a the reaction of complainant Jose Alcala
commissioner to relocate lot 1880 and when the writ of execution in said civil
after conducting such relocation, the case was served upon him and his wife by
commissioner reported to the Courtthat a sheriff was such that it betrayed a total
the lot existed, but that the same was in unawareness of the adverse decision. The
the possession of other persons. Inasmuch evidence shows that when he was told
as the existence of lot 1880 had already about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala
been verified by the commissioner, it was immediately inquired from the trial Court
therefore unnecessary for respondent the reason for the writ of execution and it
attorney to introduce in evidence Exhibits was only then that he was informed that a
"L", "M", "N", and "O", the purpose of decision had been rendered, that his
which was merely to prove the existence lawyer received a copy thereof since April
of said lot. If the complaint for rescission 19, 1963, and because no appeal was
prospered it was because of complainant taken the judgment became final and
Alcala's failure to comply with his executory. Alcala then sought the help of
obligation of transferring the material or his brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila
physical possession of lot 1880 to the and the latter wrote to respondent
vendee and for no other reason; hence, inquiring as to what steps were taken, if
complainants had nobody to blame but any, to prosecute an appeal from the
themselves. The fact that the plaintiff, decision in question but respondent chose
Semenchuk, was not awarded any not to answer the letter. Thereafter, Alcala
damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows instituted an action for damages and filed
that respondent attorney exerted his the instant complaint for disbarment.
utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General:
2. Gross negligence and malpractice
committed by respondent for failure to Again, we do not think
inform his clients of the decision in case petitioner Alcala would have
2478: felt so aggrieved and
embittered by the loss of his
The matter in dispute with respect to this right to appeal the decision in
specific charge is whether or not Civil Case No. 2478 so as to
respondent notified his clients, the take all these legal steps
complainants herein, about the decision in against respondent, with all
case 2478. Respondent claims that he did the attendant trouble and
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advers n.
e to (Tuzon
him vs.
which Donat
becam o, 58
e final O.G.
by 6480).
reason "
of the
allege (Exh.
d fault "D", id.
or ; pp.
neglig 33-34)
ence
of his Significantly, petitioners did
lawyer not appeal from the above
must decision, which is an implied
prove acceptance by them of the
his correctness of the findings
loss therein. Instead, it was
due to respondent Atty. De Vera who
the appealed said decision to the
injustic Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
e of 35267-R), and the latter Court,
the although agreeing with the
decisio finding of the trial court that
n. He respondent really did not
cannot inform petitioners of the
base decision in Civil Case No. 2478
his (Exh. "T"), affirmed, however,
action the lower court's finding that
on the petitioners were not entitled to
unsubs the damages claimed by them
tantiat by reason of respondent's
ed and failure to notify them of the
arbitra decision in Civil Case No.
ry 2478. ... While the rule of res
suppos judicata in civil or criminal
ition of cases is not, strictly speaking,
the applicable in disbarment
injustic proceedings, which is neither
e of a civil or a criminal proceeding
the intended to punish a lawyer or
decisio afford redress to private
grievances but is a
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At the outset, let it be clarified that the liquidated estate among the persons
matter at issue is not a question of entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is
jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by in the nature of an action of partition, in
appellants that the trial court had which each party is required to bring into
completely no authority to pass upon the the mass whatever community property
title to the lands in dispute, and that its he has in his possession. To this end, and
decision on the subject is null and void as a necessary corollary, the interested
and does not bind even those who had parties may introduce proofs relative to
invoked its authority and submitted to its the ownership of the properties in dispute.
decision because, it is contended, All the heirs who take part in the
jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties distribution of the decedent's estate are
to an action can not vest, extend or before the court, and subject to the
broaden it. If appellants' contention is jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and
correct, then there can be no exception to incidents necessary to the complete
the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been settlement of such estate, so long as no
stated in the case of Cunanan v. interests of third parties are affected.4
Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: In the case now before us, the matter in
"Determination of title to property is controversy is the question of ownership
within the jurisdiction of Courts of First of certain of the properties involved
Instance. The responding Soriano's whether they belong to the conjugal
objection (that the probate court lacked partnership or to the husband exclusively.
jurisdiction to order the delivery of the This is a matter properly within the
possession of the lots to the estate) jurisdiction of the probate court which
relates exclusively to the procedure, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only partnership in order to determine the
personal rights to a mode of practice (the estate of the decedent which is to be
filing of an independent ordinary action) distributed among his heirs who are all
which may be waived". Strictly speaking, parties to the proceedings, including, of
it is more a question of jurisdiction over course, the widow, now represented
the person, not over the subject matter, because of her death, by her heirs who
for the jurisdiction to try controversies have been substituted upon petition of the
between heirs of a deceased person executor himself and who have appeared
regarding the ownership of properties voluntarily. There are no third parties
alleged to belong to his estate, has been whose rights may be affected. It is true
recognized to be vested in probate courts. that the heirs of the deceased widow are
This is so because the purpose of an not heirs of the testator-husband, but the
administration proceeding is the widow is, in addition to her own right to
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the conjugal property. And it is this right
the residue among the heirs and legatees. that is being sought to be enforced by her
Liquidation means determination of all the substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is
assets of the estate and payment of all the being asserted is one belonging to an heir
debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, to the testator and, consequently, it
distribution is made of the decedent's complies with the requirement of the
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exception that the parties interested (the permitted to complain if the court, after
petitioners and the widow, represented by due hearing, adjudges question against
dents) are all heirs claiming title under the them.6
testator.
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that
Petitioners contend additionally that they appellees are estopped to raise the
have never submitted themselves to the question of ownership of the properties
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the involved because the widow herself,
purpose of the determination of the during her lifetime, not only did not object
question of ownership of the disputed to the inclusion of these properties in the
properties. This is not borne by the inventory of the assets of her deceased
admitted facts. On the contrary, it is husband, but also signed an extra-judicial
undisputed that they were the ones who partition of those inventoried properties.
presented the project of partition claiming But the very authorities cited by
the questioned properties as part of the appellants require that to constitute
testator's asset. The respondents, as estoppel, the actor must have knowledge
representatives or substitutes of the of the facts and be appraised of his rights
deceased widow opposed the project of at the time he performs the act
partition and submitted another. As the constituting estoppel, because silence
Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of without knowledge works no estoppel. 7 In
them must be deemed to have submitted the present case, the deceased widow
the issue for resolution in the same acted as she did because of the deed of
proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can donation she executed in favor of her
not be heard to insist, as they do, on the husband not knowing that such deed was
approval of their project of partition and, illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if
thus, have the court take it for granted mortis-causa, as it has not been executed
that their theory as to the character of the with the required formalities similar to a
properties is correct, entirely without will.
regard to the opposition of the
respondents". In other words, by WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
presenting their project of partition Appeals being in accordance with law, the
including therein the disputed lands (upon same is hereby affirmed with costs against
the claim that they were donated by the appellants. So ordered.
wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of
G.R. No. L-30712 February 6,
ownership of the properties which is
1991
well within the competence of the probate THE REPARATIONS
court and just because of an opposition COMMISSION, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION
either their appearance or the issue from and THE FIELDMENS INSURANCE CO.,
the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, INC., defendants-appellants.
there is here a waiver where the parties Panfilo M. Manguera & Associates for
plaintiff-appellee.
who raise the objection are the ones who
set the court in motion.5 They can not be BIDIN, J.:
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This is an appeal originally filed with the "SONIA" and M/S "ANA LARES", 75 G.T.
Court of Appeals but certified to this Court and one (1) Fishing Boat M/S "SALVADOR
for disposition since it involves purely "B"", 100 G.T.; including all its
questions of law, from the decision of the corresponding accessories and
then Court of First Instance of appurtenances. These reparations goods
Manila, * Branch IX, dated June 23, 1964, were delivered to the defendant Vispac, on
in Civil Case No. 51712, ordering the May 30, 1960 (Exhibit "A-2").
defendants-appellants herein to pay, Attached with said contract and forming
jointly and severally, to the plaintiff- part thereof is the questioned Schedule of
appellee the sum of P124,242.47, with Installment Payments, herein reproduced,
interest at the legal rate from the date of as follows:
the filing of the complaint until fully paid SCHEDULE OF INSTALLMENT
and denying plaintiff s prayer for PAYMENTS
attorney's fees. With respect to the cross- NAME OF USER VISAYAN PACKING
claim of Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the CORPORATION
said court ordered Visayan Packing
Corporation to pay Fieldmen's Insurance ADDRESS Bacolod City
Co., Inc. such amount which the latter may NATURE OF CAPITAL
pay to the plaintiff-appellee with interest GOODS/SERVICES One (1) Cannery
at 12% per annum until fully paid, and Plant and appurtenances; Two (2)
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the Fishing Vessels, 75 G.T. M/S "SONIA"
amount, paid by Fieldmen's Insurance Co., and M/S "ANA LARES" and one (1)
Inc. to the plaintiff-appellee. With costs fishing vessel "M/S SALVADOR B",
against the defendants-appellants. 100 G.T., together with all equipment
As gathered from the records, the and appurtenances.
antecedent facts of this case are as
follows: DATE OF
Plaintiff Reparations Commission COMPLETE May 30,1960
(Repacom, for short) is a government DELIVERY
entity created by virtue of Republic Act No. TOTAL F.O.B.
1789, with offices at the 5th Floor, P1,242,424.67
COST
Development Bank of the Philippines
Building No. 2, Port Area, Manila while the AMOUNT OF (10% of FOB
defendants, Visayan Packing Corporation FIRST COST
(Vispac, for short) and the Fieldmen's INSTALLMENT P1,24,242.47)
Insurance Co., Inc. (FICI, for short) are
DUE DATE OF
corporations duly organized and registered
1ST May 30,1962
under the laws of the Philippines, with
INSTALLMENT
offices in Bacolod City, Philippines and
Singson Bldg., Plaza Moraga, Manila, TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL YEARLY
respectively. INSTALLMENTS
On May 19, 1960, plaintiff Repacom
RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT
adopted Resolution No. 262 awarding to
(3%) PER ANNUM
the defendant Vispac by way of a contract
of conditional purchase and sale NO. OF
subsequently executed on November 15, INSTALLMEN DATE DUE AMOUNT
1960 (Exhibit "A") the following TS
reparations goods with a total F.O.B. value
of P1,242,424.67 (Exhibit "A-2"): one (1) May 30,
1 P131,085.07
Cannery Plant, divested from M/S 1963
"Estancia"; two (2) Fishing Boats M/S 2 " " 1964 P131,085.07
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fishing boats, M/S "Sonia" and M/S With respect to the cross-claim of
"Ana Lares", 100 G.T. including all its defendant Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
corresponding accessories and Inc., the Court hereby orders
appurtenances, which is the subject defendant Visayan Packing
matter of a Contract of Conditional Corporation to pay defendant
Purchase and Sale dated November Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., such
15, 1960 entered into by and amount which the latter may pay to
between the plaintiff Reparations the plaintiff by reason of this
Commission as Conditional Vendor judgment, with interest at 12% per
and the defendant, The Visayan annum until fully paid, and
Packing Corporation as Conditional attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of
Vendee, the legality and due the amount paid by Fieldmen's
execution of which is not disputed Insurance Co., Inc., to the plaintiff.
by the herein parties, a copy of With costs against the defendants.
which contract together with its From said decision, Vispac and FICI filed on
annex "B" were introduced in July 24, 1964 and July 27, 1964,
evidence by plaintiffs as Exhibits "A" respectively, a motion for reconsideration
and "A-1" respectively and were of the said decision. On August 8, 1 964,
admitted by the Court without the court a quo issued its order denying
objection on the part of the the said motion.
defendants. That, likewise, there Feeling aggrieved, Vispac and FICI
were introduced in evidence and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,
admitted by the Court without docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 34552-R.
objection on the part of the After the parties have submitted their
defendants as additional exhibits, respective briefs, Repacom on April 28,
Exh. "A-2" (Date of complete 1965; Vispac on January 2, 1965; and FICI
delivery as it appears in Annex "B" on January 15, 1965, the case was
[May 30, 1960]; Exh. "A-1"; Exh. "A- submitted for decision on September 6,
2", amount due in the sum of 1965. In a resolution promulgated June 14,
P124,242.47; Exh. "A-4", date of first 1969, the Court of Appeals ** certified the
installment as it appears in Annex instant case to this Court for proper
"B" (Exh. "A-1") and as Exh. "B", FICI disposition for being pure question of law.
Bond No. 4122. While Vispac and FICI raised several
On the basis of the said Stipulations of issues, the focal issue involved in the
Facts and the pleadings submitted by the instant case, as correctly stated by the
parties, the court a quo rendered trial court and the Court of Appeals, is the
judgment, the dispositive portion of which interpretation of the Schedule of Payments
reads as follows: (Exhibit "A-1 ").
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the It is the contention of the Repacom that
Court hereby renders judgment under the abovequoted Schedule of
ordering the defendant to pay, Payments, the amount of P124,242.47
jointly and severally, to the plaintiff representing the 1st installment without
the sum of P124,242.47 with interest, which is equivalent to 10% of the
interest at the legal rate from the entire F.O.B. costs, has already become
date of filing of the complaint until due and demandable on May 30, 1962.
fully paid. The plaintiffs prayer for However, Vispac and FICI argue that as
attorney's fees is denied, inasmuch there are two dates given for the first
as there is no showing that the installment in the said Schedule of
defendants were motivated with bad Payment, the lst installment should be on
faith in failing to pay plaintiffs claim. May 30, 1963 considering that it was
Repacom which prepared the contract and
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therefore such ambiguity should be taken 3% per annum. Said schedule of payment
against the latter which caused the for the balance i.e., after payment of the
ambiguity. first installment is, in turn, payable in ten
The petition is devoid of merit. (10) equal yearly installments, as follows:
Section 12, Republic Act 1789, reads as Term: Ten (10) equal yearly
follows: installments
Section 12 Terms of Sale Rate of Interest: Three per cent
Capital goods and complimentary (3%) per annum
services disposed to private parties No. of
as provided for in sub-section (1) of Date Due Amount
Installments
Section 2 hereof, shall be sold on a
cash or credit basis under the rules 1 May 30, 1963 P131,086.07
and regulations as maybe 2 " " 1964 P131,086.07
determined by the
Commission. Sales on credit basis 3 " " 1965 P131,086.07
shall be paid in 4 " " 1966 P131,086.07
installments. Provided that the lst
installment shall be paid within 24 5 " " 1967 P131,086.07
months after complete delivery of
6 " " 1968 P131,086.07
the capital goods and the balance
within a period not exceeding 10 7 " " 1969 P131,086.07
years. (Emphasis supplied)
8 " " 1970 P131,086.07
As indicated in the Schedule of Payments,
Exhibit "A-1", the amount of P124,242.47, 9 " " 1971 P131,086.07
now being claimed by the Repacom from
Vispac, represents the 1st installment or 10 " " 1972 P131,086.07
initial payment without interest as said While it is a statutory and decisional rule
amount is equivalent to 10% of the total in this jurisdiction that the contract is the
F.O.B. cost of the reparation goods law between the contracting parties (Art.
received by Vispac which is 1306, Civil Code; Phoenix Assurance Co.,
P1,242,424.67. Exhibit "A-2" of the Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674
Schedule of Payments specifically states [1968]; Phil. American General Insurance
the date when the reparations goods in v. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22 [1974]; Herrera v.
question were delivered which was on May Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA 360
30, 1960. This particular date was not [1986]; Syjuco v. CA, 172 SCRA 111
denied by Vispac as per their Stipulation of [1989]), there is a proviso that nothing
Facts. Consequently, as reflected in the therein must be contrary to law, morals,
Schedule of Payments, Exhibit "A-1 ", the good customs public policy, or public order
1st installment without interest in the (Art. 1306, Civil Code; Lagunsad v. Soto,
amount of P124,242.47 representing 10% 92 SCRA 476 [1979]). To sustain the
of the F.O.B. cost of reparations goods, contention of Vispac and FICI that the 1st
became due and demandable on May 30, installment should be due on May 30,
1962, or exactly 24 months from the date 1963, instead of May 30, 1962. would
of the complete delivery of the reparations render the said installment payment
goods to Vispac. unenforceable as it would run counter to
The rest of the schedule clearly refers to the provision of the said law (Section 12,
the payment of the balance of the sales on R.A. 1789) which specifically provides that
credit which in accordance with law "the 1st installment shall be paid within 24
(Section 12, Rep. Act 1789) must be paid months after complete delivery of the
within a period not exceeding ten (10) capital goods", or on May 30, 1962, the
years, and chargeable with interest at
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complete delivery thereof having been good morals, good customs, public order
made on May 30, 1960. or public policy (Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco,
Finally, it is basic that a contract is what 30 SCRA 187 [1969]; Social Security
the law defines it to be, and not what it is Commission v. Almeda, 168 SCRA 474
called by the contracting parties [1988]).
Novesteras v. CA, 149 SCRA 48 [1987]). Considering, therefore, that the 20%
Having disposed of the main case, attorney's fees provided under the parties'
discussion of other ancillary issues raised Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI") is
by the appellant Vispac becomes not contrary to the existing jurisprudence
unnecessary.1wphi1 on the matter *** and is not considered
As to the issue of FICI's liability arising excessive nor unconscionable, the same
from its issuance of Surety Bond No. 4122 should be awarded to FICI.
dated May 30, 1960, it will be noted that WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
FICI interposed for the first time, on is Affirmed with the modification that the
appeal, the defense that Surety Bond No. amount of the attorney's fees due from
4122 has already expired. FICI did not Vispac to FICI should be 20% of the
allege any defense to the effect that amount due as per Indemnity Agreement.
Surety Bond No. 4122 has already expired SO ORDERED.
either in its answer to the complaint dated
October 26, 1962 nor in the entire
proceedings below. In fact, it adopted as
its own whatever defenses its co-
defendant-appellant Vispac may interpose
(Rollo, Record on Appeal, FICI, p. 25; p.
44). It is settled jurisprudence that an
issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the
court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal as it would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process Dihiansan v. CA, 153 SCRA 713
[1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434
[1987]; Dulos Realty & Development Corp.
v. CA, 157 SCRA 425 [1988]; Ramos v. IAC,
175 SCRA 70 [1989]; Gevero v. IAC, G.R. [G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
77029, August 30, 1990).
Anent the contention of FICI that the trial ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs.
court erred in ordering Vispac to pay to HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
FICI attorney's fees equivalent to only 10%
MINOR MARTIN JOSE
of the amount due despite the fact that
Vispac bound itself to pay to FICI PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
total amount due but in no case less than ANGELA
P200.00 as per their Indemnity Agreement PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
(Exhibit "1-FICI"), it has been held that a
stipulation regarding the payment of DECISION
attorney's fees is neither illegal nor
immoral and is enforceable as the law CORONA, J.:
between the parties (Santiago v.
Dimayuga, 3 SCRA 919 [1961]), as long as
such stipulation does not contravene law,
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he acknowledge Martin as his child. The trial court denied the motion to
According to Arnel, he could not get dismiss the complaint and ordered the
through Fe and the discussion became so parties to submit themselves to DNA
heated that he had no alternative but to paternity testing at the expense of the
move on but without bumping or hitting applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed
any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel the trial court.
claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed Thus, this petition.
to him in the acknowledgment of Martins
birth certificate were falsified. The CTC In a nutshell, petitioner raises two
erroneously reflected his marital status as issues: (1) whether a complaint for
single when he was actually married and support can be converted to a petition for
that his birth year was 1965 when it recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity
should have been 1964.[10] testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, constitutional right to privacy and right
2002, Arnel vehemently denied having against self-incrimination.[15]
sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.[11] The petition is without merit.
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved First of all, the trial court properly
for the issuance of an order directing all denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
the parties to submit themselves to DNA because the private respondents
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of complaint on its face showed that they
the Rules of Court.[12] had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The elements of a cause of
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right
his constitutional right against self- and the defendants corresponding primary
incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
the complaint for lack of cause of action, omission of the defendant, by which the
considering that his signature on the birth primary right and duty have been violated.
certificate was a forgery and that, under The cause of action is determined not by
the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled the prayer of the complaint but by the
to support if not recognized by the facts alleged.[16]
putative father.[14] In his motion, Arnel
manifested that he had filed criminal In the complaint, private respondents
charges for falsification of documents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with
against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) the petitioner, as a result of which she
and a petition for cancellation of his name gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his
appearing in Martins birth certificate answer, petitioner admitted that he had
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). sexual relations with Fe but denied that he
He attached the certification of the fathered Martin, claiming that he had
Philippine National Police Crime ended the relationship long before the
Laboratory that his signature in the birth childs conception and birth. It is
certificate was forged. undisputed and even admitted by the
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parties that there existed a sexual recognition with an action for support,
relationship between Arnel and Fe. The such was valid and in accordance with
only remaining question is whether such jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of
sexual relationship produced the child, Appeals,[20] we allowed the integration of
Martin. If it did, as respondents have an action to compel recognition with an
alleged, then Martin should be supported action to claim ones inheritance:
by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and
Martin are strangers to each other and In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate
Martin has no right to demand and child, to be entitled to support and
petitioner has no obligation to give successional rights from the putative or
support. presumed parent, must prove his filiation
to the latter. We also said that it is
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the necessary to allege in the complaint that
main issues. the putative father had acknowledged and
recognized the illegitimate child because
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin such acknowledgment is essential to and
as his own child and denies the is the basis of the right to inherit. There
genuineness and authenticity of the childs being no allegation of such
birth certificate which he purportedly acknowledgment, the action becomes one
signed as the father. He also claims that to compel recognition which cannot be
the order and resolution of the trial court, brought after the death of the putative
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino,
effectively converted the complaint for therefore, is not the absence of a cause of
support to a petition for recognition, which action for failure of the petitioner to allege
is supposedly proscribed by law. According the fact of acknowledgment in the
to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized complaint, but the prescription of the
child, has no right to ask for support and action.
must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283[17] in Applying the foregoing principles to the
relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code case at bar, although petitioner contends
and Section 1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of that the complaint filed by herein private
Court. respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of
The petitioners contentions are without the deceased and is actually a claim for
merit. inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to
The assailed resolution and order did compel recognition. Further, that the two
not convert the action for support into one causes of action, one to compel
for recognition but merely allowed the recognition and the other to claim
respondents to prove their cause of action inheritance, may be joined in one
against petitioner who had been denying complaint is not new in our
the authenticity of the documentary jurisprudence.
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if
the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel
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STR analysis, and which was appreciated authorized the examination of a womans
by the court a quo is relevant and reliable genitalia, in an action for annulment filed
since it is reasonably based on by her husband, to verify his claim that
scientifically valid principles of human she was impotent, her orifice being too
genetics and molecular biology. small for his penis. Some of these
procedures were, to be sure, rather
Significantly, we upheld the invasive and involuntary, but all of them
constitutionality of compulsory DNA were constitutionally sound. DNA testing
testing and the admissibility of the results and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,
thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA [35]
are now similarly acceptable.
samples from semen recovered from a
rape victims vagina were used to Nor does petitioners invocation of his
positively identify the accused Joel Kawit right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the Torres,[36] where we struck down the
compulsory extraction of his blood sample proposed national computerized
for DNA testing, as well as the testing identification system embodied in
itself, violated his right against self- Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
incrimination, as embodied in both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the In no uncertain terms, we also underscore
Constitution. We addressed this as follows: that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The
The contention is untenable. The kernel of right is not intended to stifle scientific and
the right is not against all compulsion, but technological advancements that enhance
against testimonial compulsion. The right public service and the common good...
against self-incrimination is simply against Intrusions into the right must be
the legal process of extracting from the accompanied by proper safeguards that
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It enhance public service and the common
does not apply where the evidence sought good.
to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence. Historically, it has mostly been in the
areas of legality of searches and seizures,
[37]
Over the years, we have expressly and the infringement of privacy of
excluded several kinds of object evidence communication[38] where the constitutional
taken from the person of the accused from right to privacy has been critically at
the realm of self-incrimination. These issue. Petitioners case involves neither
include photographs,[28] hair,[29]and other and, as already stated, his argument that
bodily substances.[30] We have also his right against self-incrimination is in
declared as constitutional several jeopardy holds no water. His hollow
procedures performed on the accused invocation of his constitutional rights
such as pregnancy tests for women elicits no sympathy here for the simple
accused of adultery,[31] expulsion of reason that they are not in any way being
[32]
morphine from ones mouth and the violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused
tracing of ones foot to determine its whose very life is at stake can be
identity with bloody footprints. compelled to submit to DNA testing, we
[33] [34]
In Jimenez v. Caizares, we even see no reason why, in this civil case,
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not the father of the child, or if the court order the mother, her child and the
finds that an acknowledgment is invalid alleged father to submit to one or more
because it was executed on the basis of genetic marker or DNA tests of a type
fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, generally acknowledged as reliable by an
the court shall vacate the accreditation body designated by the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall secretary of the federal department of
immediately provide a copy of the order to health and human services and performed
the registrar of the district in which the by a laboratory approved by such an
childs birth certificate is filed and also to accreditation body and by the
the putative father registry operated by commissioner of health or by a duly
the department of social services pursuant qualified physician to aid in the
to section three hundred seventy-two-c of determination of whether the alleged
the social services law. In addition, if the father is or is not the father of the
mother of the child who is the subject of child. No such test shall be ordered,
the acknowledgment is in receipt of child however, upon a written finding by
support services pursuant to title six-A of the court that it is not in the best
article three of the social services law, the interests of the child on the basis of
court shall immediately provide a copy of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or
the order to the child support enforcement the presumption of legitimacy of a
unit of the social services district that child born to a married woman. The
provides the mother with such services. record or report of the results of any such
genetic marker or DNA test ordered
(c) A determination of paternity made by pursuant to this section or pursuant to
any other state, whether established section one hundred eleven-k of the social
through the parents acknowledgment of services law shall be received in evidence
paternity or through an administrative or by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of
judicial process, must be accorded full rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil
faith and credit, if and only if such practice law and rules where no timely
acknowledgment meets the requirements objection in writing has been made
set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social thereto and that if such timely objections
security act. are not made, they shall be deemed
waived and shall not be heard by the
(emphasis supplied) court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in
or DNA test or tests indicate at least
the New York Family Court Act:[42]
a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity, the admission of such
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests;
record or report shall create a
admissibility of records or reports of test
rebuttable presumption of
results; costs of tests.
paternity, and shall establish, if
a) The court shall advise the parties of unrebutted, the paternity of and
their right to one or more genetic marker liability for the support of a child
tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own pursuant to this article and article
motion or the motion of any party, shall four of this act.
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(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker test that he was not the childs
marker or DNA test pursuant to this father. In this case, G.G. only requested
section, a report made as provided in the tests after the Department of Social
subdivision (a) of this section may be Services, six years after G.G. had been
received in evidence pursuant to rule adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil increase in his support obligation to her.
practice law and rules if offered by any
party. In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan
Supreme Court while ruling on the
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant constitutionality of a provision of law
to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, allowing non-modifiable support
in the first instance, paid by the moving agreements pointed out that it was
party. If the moving party is financially because of the difficulty of determining
unable to pay such cost, the court may paternity before the advent of DNA testing
direct any qualified public health officer to that such support agreements were
conduct such test, if practicable; necessary:
otherwise, the court may direct payment
from the funds of the appropriate local As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy
social services district. In its order of with which paternity can be proven has
disposition, however, the court may direct increased significantly since the parties in
that the cost of any such test be this lawsuit entered into their support
apportioned between the parties agreement(current testing methods can
according to their respective abilities to determine the probability of paternity to
pay or be assessed against the party who 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the
does not prevail on the issue of paternity, time the parties before us entered into the
unless such party is financially unable to disputed agreement, proving paternity
pay. (emphasis supplied) was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support.
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the The first reported results of
Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were modern DNA paternity testing did not
used to prove that H.W., previously occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first
thought to be an offspring of the marriage reported results in 1985, DNA matching
between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually has progressed to 'general acceptance in
the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at less than a decade'"). Of course, while
the time of conception, maintained an prior blood-testing methods could exclude
adulterous relationship. some males from being the possible father
of a child, those methods could not
In Erie County Department of Social affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as
Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg being the father. Thus, when the
G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York settlement agreement between the
Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed present parties was entered in 1980,
G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s establishing paternity was a far more
father by default, to have the said difficult ordeal than at present. Contested
judgment vacated, even after six years, paternity actions at that time were often
once he had shown through a genetic no more than credibility contests.
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testing is a valid means of determining 6499; civil case No. 3048, Court of First
paternity. Instance of Sorsogon; and administrative
case, Mitre vs. Arambulo). The defendant
WHEREFORE, in view of the Miguel H. Mitre acknowledges the
foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. execution of Exhibit D and the fact that
The Court of Appeals decision dated the plaintiff had rendered professional
January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 services, but it is alleged, at the same
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. time, (a) that the stipulated fee in the
case of arson (P550) had been fully paid,
Costs against petitioner. Exhibit D being a simulation conceived by
the plaintiff and intended merely to bar all
SO ORDERED.
claims to the insurance proceeds arising
from defendant's criminal liability; (b) that
the stipulated fee in CA-G.R. No. 6398 and
C.A. No. 8977 March 22, 1946 CA-G.R. No. 6499 was P100 each, of which
a total of P100 had already been paid in
TORIBIO P. PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee, said cases; (c) that civil case No. 3048 was
vs. not a litigation of the defendant Miguel H.
SCOTTISH UNION AND NATIONAL Mitre who was included therein for being
INSURANCE CO., defendant. the husband of the principal defendant
MIGUEL H. MITRE, appellant. Maria Perez de Mitre; and (d) that the
plaintiff undertook to handle the
Nicodemus L. Dasig for appellant. administrative case against Arambulo as
Bonto and Gutierrez Lora, Gregorio part of the arson case.
Sabater, Jesus Salazar, Alfredo S.
Rebueno, Francisco Muoz, and Geronimo The judgment of the Court of First Instance
P. Vibal for appellee. of Albay, from which only the defendant
Miguel H. Mitre has appealed, is in favor of
the plaintiff and orders the Scottish Union
and National Insurance Co. to pay, out of
PARAS, J.: the proceeds of policy No. 5518308, first,
to the Collector of Internal Revenue the
The plaintiff is seeking to recover (1) sum of P1,205.15, as sales tax due from
P6,000, as attorney's fees in a criminal the defendant Miguel H. Mitre, and,
case for arson against the defendant secondly, to the plaintiff the sum of
Miguel H. Mitre who, in a written contract P7,640.51, covering P6,000 (attorney's
(Exhibit D), had covenanted to pay the fees in the arson case) and P1,640.51
same out of the proceeds of a fire (unpaid attorney's fees in four other
insurance policy (No. 5518308), for cases), with legal interest and costs. The
P12,000, issued in his favor by the plaintiff was absolved from the
defendant Scottish Union and National counterclaims of the defendants, Miguel H.
Insurance Co., and (2) P1,485, unpaid Mitre and Scottish Union and National
balance of attorney's fees owing by the Insurance Co., for damages in the
defendant Miguel H. Mitre in four other respective amounts of P500 and P1,000
cases (CA-G.R. No. 6398; CA-G.R. No.
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conviction in the lower court. This would proven to have resulted from incendiarism
have been the propitious opportunity for for which the appellant was criminally
the appellant to give an end to plaintiff's liable.
alleged insistence to be in the arson case.
His failure to do so engenders the We need not seriously consider the
implication that the contract (Exhibit D) implication that the appellant wishes to
was binding on him and that he continued bring out by mentioning the facts that the
to have confidence in plaintiff's ability. plaintiff was admitted to the bar in 1933,
Fourthly, the appellant does not appear to that he was a justice of the peace with a
be so ignorant as to be easily and blindly monthly salary of P157, that the highest
inveigled into accepting the services of a fee ever previously collected by him was
lawyer whose capacity he doubted, and only P1,500, and that he had to borrow
into signing an agreement which would money from the Philippine National Bank
deprive him of P6,000. and Saturnino Benito, a circumstance not
indicative of a lucrative practice. "The
Exhibit D should be given its full force and income of a lawyer is not a safe criterion
effect. "A written contract for services of his professional ability. Many very good
shall control the amount to be paid thereof lawyers earn but small incomes while
unless found by the court to be lawyers of inferior ability may prosper
unconscionable or unreasonable." (Rule of financially. Neither is the length of time a
Court 127, section 22.) The arson case lawyer has practiced a reliable measure of
required several days of trial. The gravity his ability; his competency must be judged
of the situation confronted by the by the character of his work." (Moran,
appellant after the rendition of the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 669, citing
judgment of the court of first instance is Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil., 350;
shown by the fact that he was sentenced Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil., 419;
to undergo imprisonment for the period of Panis vs.Yangco, 52 Phil., 499;
from ten to twelve years and to pay an Bachrach vs. Teal and Teal Motor Co., 53
indemnity of P101,115. That the plaintiff Phil., 631; Ingersoll vs. Malabon Sugar Co.,
had handled appellant's defense with 53 Phil., 745; De Guzman vs. Visayan
competence and success cannot be Rapid Transit Co., 68 Phil., 643.)
gainsaid, it being enough to state that the
appellant was acquitted in the Court of The validity of Exhibit D having been
Appeals before which the plaintiff orally upheld, appellant's claim that plaintiff's
argued, in addition to a 78-page brief stipulated fee was only P550 which had
which had filed therein. We are thus not already been paid, necessarily becomes
prepared to rule that the amount of untenable. We may add, however, in
P6,000 is excessive or unjust, especially plaintiff's favor that judicial actions for the
because said fee is in a sense contingent recovery of fees, unless righteous and well
upon the acquittal of the appellant, since founded and unless forced by an
no insurance money (P6,000 of which was intolerable attitude assumed by clients,
ceded to the plaintiff under Exhibit D) was are seldom, if ever, resorted to, because
of course forthcoming if the fire which they cannot fail to create the impression,
destroyed the insured property could be however wrong it may be, that the lawyer
instituting them are mercenary.
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Upon the other hand, we are inclined to RINCONADA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
believe that the fees sought to be HON. CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, IRIGA TELEPHONE
recovered for professional services in four COMPANY INC. and FRANCISCO
other cases are not supported by a IMPERIAL, respondents.
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appear to have been filed on April 19, 1978 and the In view of respondent judge's recognition of Atty. Santos as new
Record on Appeal only on June 7, 1978, and not on counsel for petitioner without even a valid substitution or
February 4, 1978, which was the last and 30th day withdrawal of petitioner's former counsel, said new counsel
reglementary period for interposing the contemplated. logically awaited for service to him of any action taken on his
motion for reconsideration. Respondent judge's sudden change
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his of posture in insisting that Atty. Maggay is the counsel of record
discretion in denying it the right to appeal. is, therefore, a whimsical and capricious exercise of discretion
that prevented petitioner and Atty. Santos from taking a timely
appeal from said order. Clearly, respondent judge committed
Held:
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying petitioner's notice of appeal. While it is desirable that
The right of client to terminate his relations with his counsel is the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed,
universally recognized.1wphi1 Such termination may be with courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not
or without cause. The light of a client to terminate the authority really impair the administration of justice especially when such
of his counsel includes the right to make a change or strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself.
substitution at any stage of the proceedings. To be valid, any If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of
such change or substitution must be made: a) upon written litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is
application; b) with written consent of the client; c) upon written the protection of substantive right of the parties.
consent of the attorney to be substituted; d) in case the consent
of attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained there must be at
ACCORDINGLY, the writs prayed for are GRANTED
least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution has been
served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules (Section
26, Rule 138, Rules of Court). TUMBAGAHAN V. CA
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Salise and Jose Amarga such that service on them of and requested the respondent to return the documents
processes and notices would no longer bind him. and papers entrusted to him upon which the complaints
in the collection cases are based;
HELD:
Respondent refused to return the documents on which
NO he claimed to have a lien unless his stipulated
There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel attorney's fees be paid;
of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as
such counsel (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The In view of the respondent's refusal to return the
withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the dismissal by the client documents, the complainant asked the Justice of the
of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the Peace Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato, to issue
case Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this a subpoena duces tecum requiring the respondent to
case, the termination of the attorney-client relationship between appear and produce in court the documents referred to;
the petitioner and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the
same relations between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only
Justice of the Peace denied the motion for the issuance
Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made
of a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the
with regard to the other counsel.
documents are privileged and the respondent as
The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until
attorney has a lien on them;
there is a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as the
opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues
until the end of the litigation (Visitacion vs. Manit 27 SCRA Justice of the Peace Court entered an order requiring
523). Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the the respondent to appear and show cause why
conduct of the case (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 31) a subpoena duces tecum should not be issued to compel
him to bring to court the documents in his possession;
A.C. No. 408 September 30, 1963
Gervacio Dauz filed in this Court a petition, dated and
GERVASIO DAUZ, complainant, vs. NAPOLEON O. verified on the 12th day of December 1958, charging
FONTANOSA, respondent the respondent with malpractice and praying for his
disbarment or suspension.
FACTS:
o (1) respondent's refusal, without cause, to
This is a disbarment proceedings against Atty. Napoleon O. return or surrender the documents above
Fontanosa of Kidapawan, Cotabato, for malpractice. referred to unless his attorney's fees be paid
first;
It appears that the respondent on behalf of the
o (2) laxity in the performance of his duties by
complainant filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, three separate complaints asking for and agreeing to numerous
against Sergio Orfrecio, Mariano Abellera and postponements of the trial of the cases
Demetria Abellera) and Hadji to collect from them entrusted to him, to the damage and prejudice
P190.00, P280.00 and P150.00, respectively, the of his client;
unpaid balance of the purchase price of sewing
machines, interest thereon, attorney's fees and costs; o (3) an attempt by the respondent to induce the
complainant's common law-wife to execute an
The complainant and the respondent entered into affidavit and state therein that the complainant
intended to kill, the respondent if the latter
written contracts whereby for and in consideration of
would not return the documents; and failing,
P100 for each collection case, the latter undertook to
in this attempt, the respondent succeeded in
represent the former in court in the three collection
inducing for a consideration the complainant's
cases, and the complainant bound himself to pay the
common-law wife to run away with the trunk
stipulated attorney's fees even if the cases be settled
belonging to the complainant "containing
amicably before trial (
valuables relative to his business" (Annex G);
and
The complainant terminated the services of the
respondent, engaged the services of another attorney
o (4) conspiring with the Municipal Treasurer of error, the complainant should have appealed from the order of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, to prosecute him dismissal without prejudice of the complaints, and as such order
(complainant) criminally, for his failure to pay of dismissal is vacated after the appeal had been perfected and
his municipal license for the 2nd to the 4th the cases would be tried de novo in and by the Court of First
quarters of 1958 (Annex H). Instance, the complainant could have renewed, repeated or
reiterated his motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
o Upon the admissions made by the respondent tecum. This the complainant or his attorney failed to do.
in his answer and the evidence presented
during the investigation, the investigator N VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the charges preferred against
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. attorney Napoleon O. Fontanosa by Gervacio Dauz are
dismissed.
The Solicitor General is, however, of the
opinion that the respondent violated his
INTON V. MATUTE:
lawyer's oath by refusing without cause to
return the documents entrusted to him in
Facts:
connection with the cases in which his service
as attorney had been engaged unless his
Julian Villanueva Matute, as newly appointed co-
attorney's fees be paid first; and was lax or
administrator of the Testate Estate of Amadeo Matute
remiss in the performance of his duties by Olave, filed a motion with the probate court, praying
asking for and agreeing to numerous that Atty. Antonio Enrile Inton be ordered to surrender
postponements of the hearing of the cases and deliver to him (movant) all certificates of title,
entrusted to him to the prejudice of his client's plans, documents, and papers belonging to the Estate
interest, and recommends that the respondent and which were in the possession of said lawyer, in
be reprimanded with a warning that a order that they may be kept in the office of the Estate
in Davao City and be ready for inspection should the
repetition of the acts or conduct complained of management of the properties require It.
will be dealt with more severely. As to the This motion was opposed by Atty. Antonio Enrile
other charges, the Solicitor General believes Inton, who alleged that he was the counsel for the
that there is no sufficient evidence to prove or Estate and the former administrator, Celestino Alonzo;
support them. that for said legal services, he filed with the probate
court on October 10, 1962, a claim for payment of his
Held: lawful fees from November 26, 1958 to October
26,1962, at the rate of P1,200.00 a month or a total of
P72,500.00, excluding the compensation for handling
The fact that the hearing of the cases had been postponed the defense against various claims filed in the testate
several times not all upon the petition of the respondent because proceed-ing, which should be on quantum meruit
it was also continued upon petition of the adverse party and in basis;
several instances upon joint motion of the parties is not enough That he came into possession of 20 certificates of
to support the charge of laxity in the performance by the title2 in the course of his work as counsel for the
respondent of his duties as attorney.1awphl.nt Estate and the former administrator.
Oppositor, therefore, contended that until his claim
for attorneys f ees is settled, he will be exercising a
Likewise, the refusal of the respondent to return the documents retaining lien over the aforesaid documents belonging
or receipts that had come into his possession as attorney, whose to the Estate. After the issues were joined, the court a
professional service had been engaged by the complainant to quo by order of January 7, 1963, granted the motion of
bring the action against the latter's debtors, may not be the the co-administrator and ordered Atty. Enrile Inton to
proper conduct, but is not devoid of justification because the deliver the 19 documents listed in the Opposition and
respondent believed he was entitled to retain them unless his admitted by the latter to belong to the Estate. Atty.
Enrile Inton filed the present appeal, which calls only
fees agreed upon in writing be paid first.
for the determination of whether or not he has the right
to retain the titles and documents in question, until his
So that if the Justice of the Peace was of the opinion that the claim or attorneys fees is finally settled.
respondent could not retain possession or withhold production
or presentation of the documents, he could have issued HELD:
such subpoena duces tecum, and if disobeyed by the respondent,
could have punished him for contempt. Nothing appears to have Section 37 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
been done further in the premises. According to the complaint
(par. 9) the Justice of the Peace refused to issue the subpoena SEC. 37. Attorneys liens.An attorney shall have a lien upon
duces tecum. If such refusal by the Justice of the Peace was an the funds, documents and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, x x x. petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Thereunder, there is no question that a lawyer has a retaining
lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client that may
have come lawfully into his possession, until his lawful fees are
duly paid. [G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990]
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
In the present case, it is not disputed that appellant was COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
commissioned to render, as in fact he did render, legal services APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and
to the former administrator of the Estate, Celestino Alonzo. ASSOCIATES, respondent.
Thus, said administrator certified:
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.:
SEPAN TODOS POR LA PRESENTE:
NATURE: Review on certiorari annul the decision of Court
of Appeals ordering Metrobank to pay Arturo Alafriz and
Sirvase tomar nota que efectivo el dia 15 de Noviembre de
Associates P936,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of
1958 he nombrado el Abogado Sr. Antonio Enrile Inton como
quantum meruit.
mi unico abogado por el Administrator en Davao de Amadeo
Matute Olave, para representarme en el procedimiento y demas
PROCEDURAL FACTS:
otros litigios, en donde la Testamentaria Amadeo Matute
Arturo A. Alafriz and Associates (AAA) handled the civil
cases of Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983.
It is clear therefrom that appellant was appointed by Alonzo as o All the cases were declaration of nullity of certain
his lawyer, to represent him in all suits affecting the Estate
deeds of sale, with damages.
under his trust. This appointment, however, was not in
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
pursuance to any court order, nor was it approved by the probate
Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by
court. It was an act personal to the administrator. The creation of
the professional relationship between appellant and the Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about 10
administrator did not, therefore, make the Estate also a client of hectares.
the said lawyer. o Properties were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank
to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo
Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation.
And, it may be stated in this connection, that for legal services o Javier defaulted. Metrobank foreclosed the properties.
rendered to the administrator, the estate under administration
o Alejandro, on the other hand, alleging deceit, fraud
cannot be directly held liable for payment of the corresponding
attorneys fees. In the case of Uy Tioco v. Imperial and Panis,3 and misrepresentation committed against him by
this Court ruled thus: Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought suits
against Javier et al., and included Metrobank as
defendant therein.
x x x The services for which fees are claimed are supposed to o AAAs services were already acquired here.
have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him
While the case was pending, Metrobank sold the
in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not held
properties to its sister company, Service Leasing
the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the
Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of
executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability
P600,000.00. SLC, on the other hand, sold the property to
for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the
another company and the cycle went on.
fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is
o Metrobank, no longer the possessor of the properties,
entitled to reimbursement f rom the estate. Such payments
should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement moved for substitution of party on July 28, 1983.
therefor settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the o AAA had no knowledge about this. AAA only knew
Code of Civil Procedure.4 (See Church on Probate Law and when Metrobank filed its motion. Thus, they filed on
Practice, pp. 15701588 and authorities therein cited; Woerner August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the
on the American Law of Administration, 2d ed., sections 515 records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien,
and 516.)" pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of
the actual and current market values of the
It follows as a necessary consequence that the lawyer for the
litigated properties as its attorney's fees.
administrator or executor cannot claim to have a retaining lien
o This was granted by the TC because of Metrobanks
over any funds, papers, or documents belonging to the Estate,
failure to appear.
even if these properties may have come into his possession in
o The Alejandro case was subsequently dismissed as
the course of his work as such counsel for the administrator.
well.
On May 28,1984, AAA filed a motion to fix its attorney's
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
precipitated an exchange of arguments between the
parties. (dismissal of the Alejandro case, etc.)
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for
provides: the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon notify him that the lawyer performing the task is expecting to be
all judgments for the payment of money, and paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, device to prevent undue enrichment based on equitable postulate
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for
and after the time when he shall have caused a it. (Agpalo, R. (2010). LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS. QC:
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon Rex Printing Company, Inc
the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure the 53 GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS v NALDOZA
payment of his just fees and disbursements.
An estafa case was filed against Naldoza. It was Complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
later on dismissed, but he was held liable for the bar, alleged that:
amount of $2,555. On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to
your attention and appropriate sanction the
Naldoza seeks that he not be suspended in the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
practice of law. number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date
& place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he
Issue:
has been using this for at least three years
already, as shown by the following attached
W/N Atty Naldoza should be punished for his acts? sample pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997.
This matter is being brought in the context of
Held: Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only
a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in
Yes. good and regular standing, is entitled to
Atty. Primo Naldoza is DISBARRED, not just practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
suspended. Section 10 which provides that "default in the
On the first issue: payment of annual dues for six months shall
o Complainant has failed to present proof warrant suspension of membership in the
regarding the status of the appeal. Neither Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
has there been any showing that the appeal for one year shall be a ground for the removal
was dismissed on the ground that the of the name of the delinquent member from
POEA Decision had become final and the Roll of Attorneys."
executory. Worse, there has been no Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates
evidence that respondent knew that the "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
case was unappealable. Indeed, the records indicate any PTR for payment of professional
of this Court shows that the Petition for tax.
Review was dismissed for petitioners Finally, it is relevant to note the track record
(Gatchalians) failure to submit an Affidavit of of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed 1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per
Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-
on. CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in
On the next two issues: SCRA )
o When Naldoza paid P10,000 and issued a 2........his conviction for estafa per Decision
check to complainant as his moral dated June 30, 1994
obligation, he indirectly admitted the Complainant filed a certification, by the then president of the
charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier,
one who is falsely accused of appropriating that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
the money of another. This is an admission of Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
misconduct. (RC Note: Naldoza claims that membership fees up to the present."
Gatchalian owes him P180T in attorneys fees, Respondent alleged:]
and after accounting, he paid him P10T as his Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule
moral obligation) 138, only an admitted member of the bar who
o the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the
attorneys lien. He demanded the money
undersigned was no longer in good standing,
from his client on the pretext that it was
were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
needed for the Petition before the Supreme
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the
Court, but he actually converted it to his
February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
personal gain.
Article 316 RPC, concealment of
Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him;
encumbrances. Chief
he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of dismissal decision was set aside and reversed
this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not and respondent was even promoted from City
deserve to continue being a member of the bar. Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995
decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
SANTOS V. LLAMOS appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still
pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings
if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
was never set aside and reversed, and also had complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
the decision of conviction for a light felony, Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The records also show a "Certification dated
Undersigned himself would surrender his right March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
or privilege to practice law. President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was
respondent had been delinquent in his dues. in 1991."
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it While these allegations are neither denied nor
clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the categorically admitted by respondent, he has
present, that he had only a limited practice invoked and cited that "being a Senior
of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
principal occupation is a farmer of which he under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432
is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
is located at Calauan, Laguna. taxes, income taxes as an example."
Moreover, and more than anything else, ....
respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, The above cited provision of law is not
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act applicable in the present case. In fact,
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the respondent admitted that he is still in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an practice of law when he alleged that the
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made
believe in view of his detachment from a total it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, present time that he had only a limited
the subsequent payment by him of dues with practice of law."
the Integrated Bar is covered by such Therefore respondent is not exempt from
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted the Philippines
upon. On the second issue, complainant claims that
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of respondent has misled the court about his
being covered by the exemption and if only to standing in the IBP by using the same IBP
show that he never in any manner wilfully and O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
deliberately failed and refused compliance years and therefore liable for his actions.
with such dues, he is willing at any time to Respondent in his memorandum did not
fulfill and pay all past dues even with discuss this issue.
interests, charges and surcharges and First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged
penalties. He is ready to tender such in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996,
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality membership and receipt number for the years in which those
for him to pay such dues despite his candor pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
and honest belief in all food faith, to the engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith
contrary. that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
In December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and Rule 139-A provides:
approving the report and recommendation of Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of
the Investigating Commissioner which found the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
respondent guilty, and recommended his as the Board of Governors shall determine
suspension from the practice of law for with the approval of the Supreme Court. A
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the collections from each Chapter shall be set
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members
a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of deceased members thereof.
Court, this case is here for final action on the Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. -
decision of the IBP ordering respondents Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
suspension for three months. Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows: for six months shall warrant suspension of
On the first issue, Complainant has shown membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
"respondents non-indication of the proper IBP in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP
delinquent member from the Roll of dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He
Attorneys. contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in
Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his
the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable profession and he did not practice the same while in the US.
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His
that year," the exemption does not include payment of removal from the profession because of non-payment of the
membership or association dues.
same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had bereft of due process of the law.
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in ISSUE:
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, HELD:
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any NO.
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice. The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit necessary consequence for being a member of the
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the subsists for as long as one remains to be a member
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus,
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is fee dues is denied.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the In re Atty. Marcial Edillon:
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
in the land. o Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
B.M. No. 1370 Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers
Dues granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
Chico-Nazario,
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
J.
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
FACTS:
o But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not offended party is the very person whom the offender was
a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must pledged to defend and protect his own client.
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance
responsibilities. in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he evidently
considered himself insulted by Mrs. Barrera and was obfuscated
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership because she clearly indicated her lack of confidence in him, by
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read the papers
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide to her; and (2) he required her to do something really harmless.
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the Still, it cannot be denied that his intent in placing the gun on his
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. lap was to intimidate his client.
Issue:
4 They agreed that complainant would
WON Atty. Laput is guilty of gross misconduct in deliver her child in Manila, where Daarol
office. admitted to her that he is not capacitated
Held: to marry because of the previous
marriage. But he promised to fix things.
Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are, Later on, Victoria decided to deliver the
they become more so when we consider that they were child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
performed by a man dealing with a woman 72 years of age. The Dipolog City. During her stay here in
offense in this case is compounded by the circumstance that, Manila and later in Cebu City, the
being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the respondent defrayed some of her
offender should have set the example as man of peace and a expenses; that she filed an administrative
champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and The former employees waived their right to reinstatement
then she instituted the present disbarment among others. The Province of Cebu released
proceedings against respondent. P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty.
Sesbreno as Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. The
ISSUE: amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and
gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten employees filed
Should Daarol be disbarred? manifestations before the trial court asserting that they
agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from
their back salaries. The lower court issued two orders,
with which petitioner complied, requiring him to release
P10,000.00 to each of the ten private respondents and to
Holdings: retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining to the latter out
of the P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980,
the trial court fixed the attorneys fees a total of 60% of all
monies paid to the employees. However, trial court
1 Victoria was never informed of the status of Daarol and modified the award after noting that petitioners attorneys
was led to believ that he is single. It was deception that lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have
Daarol promised to marry her when he knew as an been only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the Court of
Attorney that he is not capacitated to marry. Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services but was
even further reduced to 20%.
2 Daarols claim that he embraced the Muslim religion
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to
does not excuse him since his first marriage is under
reduce the amount of attorneys fees awarded to petitioner
the Christian religion, therefore it follows the Civil
Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, notwithstanding the contract for
Code. This is also contradicting to his reason to
professional services signed by private respondents
Victoria that he will be charged with bigamy if he
marries her. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of
professional services entered into by the parties 6
3 Grounds for his disbarment: authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the
employees back salaries only. The trial court, however,
a Deceit and grossly immoral conduct under Section fixed the lawyers fee on the basis of all monies to be
27 of Rule 138 awarded to private respondents. Fifty per cent of all
monies which private respondents may receive from the
b Lack of good moral character under Section 2 of provincial government, according to the Court of Appeals,
Rule 138. is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to
the contract of professional services. What a lawyer may
charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to
judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyers compensation
in a written contract for professional services ordinarily
controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer
may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated
Bernabe vs Beltran amount unreasonable unconscionable. A contingent fee
arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally
Tabas vs Malicden
recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in
Sesbrano vs CA an express contract. if the attorneys fees are found to be
excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances.
FACTS: Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserves, is
and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and used as the basis for determining the lawyers professional
backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court
later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The employees and Atty. averred that in balancing the allocation of the monetary
Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorneys award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50%
fees and 20% as expenses taken from their back salaries. to be allocated among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in
Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a
the Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It
salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court of would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired
Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of
agreement was entered into by the parties in April 1979.
the total amount collectible by these employees. 20% is a Held: NO. PNB was not a signatory to such agreement. It
fair settlement. is a separate and distinct personality from NIDC. NIDC
was in no position to state that Komatsus direct obligation
Petition is DENIED. PNB has been fully paid.
veracity of the reports. Media reports done by Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio President shall be rotated among the nine [9] IBP regions. One who has
and Mr. Locsin in the newspapers opened the avenue for investigation served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-
on the anomalies in the IBP Elections. The following violations are, President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for presidency among the nine [9] regions shall have been completed;
president, executive vice-president, the officers or candidates for the whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
House of Delegates and Board of Governors, Use of PNB plane in the 5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
campaign, Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and Section 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
alternates, Formation of tickets and single slates, Giving free hotel shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the
accommodations, food, drinks, and entertainment to delegates, Board of Governors from among nine [9] regional governors, as much
Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon, Paying the as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio
dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws), Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by
page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws), Causing the President with the consent of the Board.
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those 6. Section 33[b], Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By- [b] The President and Executive Vice-President of the IBP shall be the
Laws) and Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates.
vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). The The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by
prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically Article I, the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" 7. Section 33[g] of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman,
character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Sergeant-at-Arms of the
acts and practices relative to elections and Section 12[d] of the By- House of Delegates, is hereby repealed.
Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: Any 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the Section 37. Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of
Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar nine [9] Governors from the nine [9] regions as delineated in Section 3
shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one [1] Governor
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates
upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar. from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in the 9. Section 39, Article V, is hereby amended as follows:
Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one [1]
June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a month before the national convention. - The delegates from each
travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined region shall elect the Governor for their region, the choice of which
in Section 4 of the By-Laws. shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33 [a], Article V, is hereby amended by adding the following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
DECISION: It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
provision in the 1987 Constitution [See. 8, Art. VIII] providing for a
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year.
Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven [7] members among
11. Section 39 [a], [b], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] of Article VI
whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate
should be, as they are hereby, deleted.
in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
All other provisions of the By-Laws, including its amendment by the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 [Bar Matter No. 287]
attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the
caused the corruption of the IBP elections. The decision are:
nine [9] IBP regions within three [3] months, after the promulgation of
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
the Court's Resolution in this case. Within thirty [30] days thereafter,
annulled.
the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the
to elect from among themselves, the IBP National President and
House of Delegates [approved by this Court in its Resolution of July 9,
Executive Vice-President. In these special elections, the candidates in
1985 in Bar Matter No. 287] of the following national officers:
the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly
identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of
[a] the officers of the House of Delegates;
Tickets and Single Slates", as well as those identified in this Resolution
[b] the IBP president; and
as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidates for any
[c] the executive vice-president,
position.
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker Board shall be appointed
the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in
President elected by the Board of Governors [composed of the
due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the
governors of the nine (9) IBP regions] from among themselves [as
premises.
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws] should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term
[which was abolished by this Court's Resolution dated July 9,1985 in Berenguer vs. Carranza
Bar Matter No. 287] should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice- Facts: A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza
President shall automatically succeed to the office of President. The was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception practiced on the
incoming Board of Governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-
President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the
falsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer
executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to
own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he
or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter- of must not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly
fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.
and one son, father of the complainant, he introduced the
same in evidence.3 Respondent is reprimanded.
petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further are not granted ; averred that denial of his petition will
hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for make the Court as superfluous as a hole in the head;
the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former broadly hinted that he will then give the media news of
associate. Respondent announced before the start of the the most nauseating kind involving the Court and made
hearing that Atty. Austria is guilty of contempt and was other irresponsible charges and insinuations that
ordered to pay 500.00. besmiorch the higher tribunal and undermine popular faith
in its integrity.
Issue: WON the action of respondent in declaring Austria
guilty of contempt is proper. Issue: WON the statement of Jacinto is contemptuous.
Ruling: No. We do not agree with the respondent Judge. It Held: The Court suspended Atty. Jacinto. The above
is our considered view that when the petitioner requested statements are clearly contemptuous. Every lawyer is
respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further trying the expected to maintain the proper decorum in his dealings
case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite with the courts of justice and is never justified in using
party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, scurrilous and threatening language in pleading his clients
petitioner did so because he was impelled by a justifiable cause. While criticism of jusidical conduct is not
apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant forbidden and zeal in advocacy is in fact encouraged, the
who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his lawyer must always act within the limits of propriety and
adversary; and that the petitioner made his request in a good taste and with deference for the judges before whom
manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or he pleads.
offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also Where publicity was focused on the responsibility of the
deaf and dumb. Government instead of guilt of accused.Where the
publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens rather on the responsibility of the Government for what
petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to was claimed to be a massacre of Muslim trainees, there
ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender is no trial by publicity which would prejudice the right
his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he of the accused to a fair and impartial hearing. If there was
chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be a trial by newspaper at all, it was not of the petitioners
permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary but of the Government.
action should be taken against him . . . in an open and
public hearing. He said he preferred this considering that Same; Same; Same; Same; Judge must be unduly
the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and influenced by the publicity.In order to warrant a finding
Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic. of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined. simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute FACTS: Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result
accept every case or write full opinion for every petition of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some
they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper the island of Corregidor.
role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification
parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition of the President of the general court-martial, following the
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had
there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one received such an amount of publicity in the press and
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the other news media and in fact was being exploited for
Court of Appeals opinion. political purposes in connection with the presidential
election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is challenge.
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the
court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly case had received, no proof has been presented showing
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality
of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has "integrity, experience and background" of the members of
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the the court.
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross ISSUE:
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
WON the publicity given to the case against the
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a
petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair
veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
trial
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party
of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and
will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to HELD:
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.
NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the
Marcelino vs Alejandro guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of
the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre"
Syllabus: Political law; Constitutional law; Right of of Muslim trainees.
accused to fair and impartial hearing; Trial by publicity;
If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the their case or the lack of it. Had he done so, petitioners
petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a could have realized the futility of filing the present case
showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the and spared them the need to spend their hard earned
accused from massive publicity encouraged by those money by way of court fees (P 4,000+). Atty. Revelo
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure failed in his duty to his clients, to be mindful of their
to control the release of information or to remove the trial welfare and interest. The present petition is a sham and
to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of clearly unmeritous. He also failed in his duty to the court
prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we to promote and enhance instead of defeat and frustrate the
cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held objectives and policies of society. The court says that in
under circumstances which did not permit the observance delaying the execution of the judgment, Atty. Revelo was
of those imperative decencies of procedure which have encouraging other squatters to continue in breaking the
come to be identified with due process. law as relief from the courts could easily be delayed.
plaintiff-appellant Salazar as the owner of informed them not only about the
the parcel of land. The CA likewise futility of such efforts, which was
declared the deed of sale executed by bad enough, but also the barrier
Bienvenido c. Libres in favor of Bernardo thus interposed against a fair,
O. Salazar as valid and legal. speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As a
ISSUE:
member of the bar and an officer
W/N the claim of De Castrodes et al is of the court, he owes such
tenable? minimum obligation to this
Tribunal. Unfortunately, he failed
RULING: to live up to it. He should not
escape responsibility.
No. The claims of the defendants are
nothing more than a form of harassment PAJARES VS ABAD SANTOS
being totally bereft of any support in law.
The appeal was found to be made too late FACTS:
by the Court and runs contrary to the
Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a case against
elementary principle that the Supreme
Gloria Pajares for recovery of money
Courts jurisdiction is limited to questions
(collection case). It was alleged that
of law given that the grounds stated in the
Pajares, in the business of buying/selling
appeal are merely factual in nature. As the
merchandise in her stall in Sta. Mesa
Court stated:
Market, ordered ready-made goods from
It is thus apparent that on its Udharam. She made partial payment but
face the brief for defendants- failed to pay the balance of P 354.85.
appellants is notable only for its Pajares, instead of filing an answer, moved
flagrant and obvious disregard of for a bill of particulars; requesting an
what the proprieties, not to say itemization of goods, purchase dates,
the decencies, of such a serious person who received the goods and
matter as an appeal to the purchase price. The MTC Judge Estrella
Tribunal requires. Even if due Abad Santos denied the motion for a bill of
regard be had for the state of particulars. She filed for certiorari to the
mind under which claimants to a CFI, alleging grave abuse of discretion of
piece of land, possessed of more Judge Abad Santos in denying the motion
than an ordinary degree of for a bill of particulars. Udharam filed a
obduracy, might be laboring motion to dismiss petition for certiorari on
under, still respect for the rule of the ground that (1) the allegations of the
law ought to have cautioned complaint are clear, specific and sufficient
defendants in attempting, to prepare defendant for her defenses and
perhaps thoughtlessly, to delay (2) the things prayed in the motion of a
unduly the termination of a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters
pending litigation and thus beyond the nature of such motion. The CFI
accord respect to the just claims denied the certiorari. Thus, she elevated
of others. Nor is their counsel free the issue to the SC.
from blame when he could have
ISSUE:
W/N the allegations in the complaint years. Had the counsel of Pajares (Atty.
sufficiently appraise Pajares of the nature Moises Nicomedes) advised her to
of cause of action against her. confessed judgment and ask for
reasonable time to pay the debt, there
W/N the items prayed for in the bill of
would have been no reason to incur
particulars constitute evidentiary matters.
litigation expenses and filing feels, as well
RULING: as loss of time. Now, she incurred all of
them, in addition to the accumulated
Yes to both. The complaint filed by interest of her original debt. Lawyers
Udharam contained complete ultimate should remember that there should be
facts constituting the cause of action to faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of
appraise Pajares. In addition, it was the Rules of Court, which provides that
improper for appellant to request a bill of any pleading filed in court, should have
particulars, specifying in detail the goods, good ground to support it and it is not
the purchase price, the purchase dates interposed for delay. Pajares is ordered to
and the person whom received such pay the debt and costs of litigation. The
goods. These are all evidentiary matters case shall be noted in the personal record
and do not come within the scope of a bill of the Pajaress counsel.
of particulars. It was observed that
Udharam was one of Pajares creditors ECONOMIC VS UY
whom she used to buy on credit ready-
FACTS:
made goods. Pajares does not need
evidentiary particulars to prepare her DOCTRINE: That procedural rules are
answer to the complaint. She cannot intended as an aid to justice, not as a
pretend ignorance and require a detailed means for its frustration.
itemization and purchase of the goods. It
1. A complaint for Ejectment was filed
was also found out that a month before
by Uy Realty against Economic Insurance.
Udharam filed a complaint, it gave a
Economic Insurance then filed an answer
demand letter to Pajares, requesting for
with counterclaims, seeking dismissal of
the balance of payment. Pajares,
such a suit as well as a counterclaim for
acknowledging her indebtedness, reason
reimbursement in the amount of
that she sustained financial losses in her
P15,000.00 for alleged improvements
operation. She requested that she be
made on the leased premises and for
allowed to pay the debt in installments;
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 for
P10 every 15th and end of the month.
alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor.
There was no error of law or grave abuse
of discretion by the Judge Abad Santos in 2. The decision of the City Court of
denying the motion for bill of particulars. Manila ordered the defendant and those
The circumstances surrounding the claiming under him to vacate the premises
litigation is frivolous and merely a plain as well as to pay the sum of P4,100.00
trick to delay payment and prolong representing rents in arrears plus the sum
litigation. It was supposed to be just a of P1,500.00 a month beginning
simple collection case. But due to the September, 1966 for the use and
actions of Pajares, it dragged on for 7 occupation of such premises.
MENDOZA V. DUAVE
Whether or not the appeal has merit.
FACTS:
HELD:
Mendoza filed a case of forcible entry
No. It is obvious that the purpose of the
against Duave in the Justice of Peace
filing is just to delay and prolong the
Court. Duave contested the allegations
and claimed ownership of the land. The did not have certain papers needed to
summary judgment was rendered in favor prepare him for trial.
of Mendoza, making Duave appeal to the
ISSUE:
Court of First Instance (CFI). In CFI, Duave
was declared in default for failure to W/N the motion for reconsideration by
submit an answer. A default judgment and Duave should be granted.
writ of execution was rendered against
him. However, upon finding out that the RULING:
cause of Duaves failure was the ignorance
No. There was sufficient time for Atty.
of legal procedure (the notice of docketing
Deloso to procure the documents from his
was served on Duave, not his counsel),
client. Atty. Deloso entered as counsel on
the default judgment was set aside and
Sept 12, 1962. The hearing was on Nov
court gave him another chance to file
28, 1982. There was a two months
his answer. Before the hearing,
difference, ample time to get the papers.
defendants counsel filed a motion for
The court also presumed that Atty. Deloso
postponement but was denied. On the day
discussed the case when he accepted
of hearing, both parties failed to appear.
Duaves case, making him ready for trial.
Plaintiffs counsel reason that the bridge in
In addition, he could not have declared his
Bagsit, Zambales was impassable. Thus,
readiness for trial if he did not have all the
the hearing was reset to another day.
papers required. Even on technical
However, it was again postponed to the
grounds, the denial of motion for
motion of defendants counsel on the
postponement was valid, considering that
ground that he just recovered from an
counsel did not specify what papers he
illness and cannot make the trip to
needs to secure. Under the Rules of Court,
Zambales. As the hearing was reset for
a motion must be supported by an
2nd time, defendants counsel again filed
affidavit showing materiality of the
a motion to postpone the hearing on the
evidence and due diligence in securing
ground that he need to secure certain
that evidence, which defendants counsel
documents from his client. But the court
failed do to so. Defendants counsel even
denied such motion as the case was
failed to attend the hearing, believing the
already submitted for decision. The court
motion for postponement is surely to be
discovered that the land in question was
granted. It should be stressed that a
inherited by Mendoza from their mother,
motion for postponement is up to the
Emiliana Tuason. It was also found out that
sound discretion of the court. Lawyers
Mendoza already declared the land for
should not assume that the postponement
taxation and that Duave grabbed
would be granted and deliberately be
possession of the land from Mendoza.
absent on the day of hearing. It should
Judgment was rendered against Duave.
also be considered that the case was one
Duave asked for a motion for
of forcible entry. It has the nature of
reconsideration. He argues that his
summary procedure. Any kind of
counsel, Atty. Amor Deloso was the 3rd
postponements are not encouraged to
lawyer to represent him. He adds that
protect the real possessors of the land.
when Atty. Deloso accepted the case, he
The case was expected to be done
expedient and efficient manner. The claim
that the trial court erred in reinstating its demanded the sum of P500,000.00
judgment in default on the ground that the in exchange for the robbed
defendant is no longer in default is a mere documents. CHING, LEGASPI and
technicality. The decision would not be any Agent DAHIROC insisted on seeing
different were the court to render a new the documents first and to talk with
decision, because it would still be in favor Atty. MAGAT's clients before they
of plaintiff. The lawyer is admonished for negotiate the terms of the return of
such dilatory tactics that undermine the the documents. The meeting was
nature of the action. The decision of the reset on 15 August 1977 at 3:00
CFI is affirmed. p.m., during which Atty. MAGAT
informed them that their demand
UY CHENG SENG VS MAGAT
was reduced to P300,000.00 on a
FACTS: "take it or leave it" basis. Atty.
MAGAT's "clients" who brought in
On March 27, 1979, Uy Chung Guan Seng the robbed documents turned out to
and Ching Uy Seng filed a verified be the suspects in the robbery of the
Complaint for Disbarment against office/residence of Complainants on
respondent Atty. Jose C. Magat alleging 2 June 1977, Atty. MAGAT insisted
that the following circumstances that HENRY CHING produce
warranted his exclusion from the Roll of P30,000.00 to show his good faith in
Attornies: pushing through with the
negotiation. It was at this juncture
On 22 August 1977 (should be 11
that the NBI Agents confronted the
August 1977), Complainant CHING
group and brought them to the NBI
UY SENG a ROBERT CHING received
office together with the robbed
a letter from Respondent Atty. JOSE
documents for investigation.
C. MAGAT, threatening to report him
to the government authorities if he On June 5, 1979, upon consideration of the
would not get in touch with him Complaint and the Comment, this Court
(MAGAT) and his clients with respect resolved to suspend respondent from the
to a bunch of documents and papers practice of law effective immediately upon
pertaining to Complainants' notice, and until further orders.
business. Such documents turned
out to be a part of the articles which ISSUE:
were stolen from the
Whether or not the acts of the respondent
office/residence of Complainants on
constitute gross misconduct.
2 June 1977. In the morning of 13
August 1977, UY CHUNG GUAN HELD:
SENG a HENRY CHING; his lawyer,
Yes. The actuations of respondent Atty.
Atty. ELISEO LEGASPI; and NBI Agent
Magat constitute malpractice and gross
RODOLFO DAHIROC went to the
misconduct.
Office of Atty. MAGAT at Room 512
Madrigal Bldg., Escolta, Manila, in Writing and sending the letter Exhibit C
response to the above-mentioned and demanding from the complainants the
letter. Atty. MAGAT initially amount of P500,000.00, later on reduced
to P300,000.00, with P30,000.00 as down dishonesty in his profession but also for
payment to show good faith, in his gross misconduct which shows him to
consideration for the return of anomalous be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
invoices and documents, is highly privileges which the law confers upon him
reprehensible. Such acts constitute not (In Re Puno, 19 SCRA 439).
only threat but extortion.
It has been repeatedly ruled that the
He knew too that the decree of Cruz and purpose of disbarment is to protect the
his group to extort money from the courts and the public from the misconduct
complainants in exchange for the of officers of the court and to ensure the
anomalous documents was illegal. Despite administration of justice by requiring that
such knowledge and awareness, he those who exercise this important function
connived with his clients in violating the shag be competent, honorable and
law. And for what? It is in consideration of trustworthy men in whom courts and
the one-third share he would receive from dents may repose confidence (Santos vs.
the proceeds of the transaction. The Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). In the case at bar,
assistance he extended to his clients' respondent has not exercised honesty and
dishonest scheme and his connivance with trustworthiness and has failed to have up
them in violating the law render the to the high standards of the law
respondent guilty of unprofessional profession.
conduct which warrants his disbarment or
suspension. It is the duty of a member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety and
The promoting of organizations, with
his actuations should be beyond suspicion.
knowledge of their objects, for the
It is true that an attorney enjoys the legal
purpose of violating or evading the laws
presumption of innocence until the
against crime constitutes such misconduct
contrary is proved, but this presumption
on the part of an attorney, an officer of the
has been rebutted by the clear and
court, as amounts to malpractice or gross
convincing evidence presented by the
misconduct in his office, and for which he
complainants and their witnesses.
may be removed or suspended (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 21). The assisting of a The dismissal of the criminal complaint for
client in a scheme which the attorney Light Threats against respondent by the
knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at City Fiscal's Office (Exhibits "2", "2-A", "2-
a violation of law, are acts which justify B" and "3", pp. 81-84, Record) will not
disbarment. (In Re Terrel 2 Phil. 266, 267- preclude the fact that respondent has not
268; Emphasis supplied). exhibited honesty nor show
trustworthiness in the discharge of his
The grounds for disbarment or suspension
duties as a member of the Bar. The
enumerated in the statute should not be
dismissal of the criminal complaint does
taken as a limitation of the general power
not exonerate him of profession al
of the courts to disbar or suspend a
misconduct.
lawyer. For the power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted. A lawyer may The proper disciplinary action against
be removed not only for malpractice or respondent is disbarment for malpractice
intervene, he had signified his intention to W/N Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the
appear as counsel for respondent Acero, New Code of Judicial Conduct.
but which was objected to by petitioners.
HELD:
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to Yes. A judge should endeavor diligently to
intervene on the ground of legal interest in ascertain the facts and the applicable law
the matter under litigation. unswayed by partisan or personal
interests, public opinion or fear of
Under those facts and circumstances, the criticism. He should not have allowed
Court is constrained to find that there has himself to be swayed into issuing an order
been an indirect appearance as counsel fixing bail for the temporary release of the
before anadministrative body. In the accused charged with murder, without a
hearing, which is contrary to established
opinion of the Court, that is a
principles of law. It has been an
circumvention of the Constitutional established legal principle or rule that in
prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII cases where a person is accused of a
(now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention capital offense, the trial court must
was an afterthought to enable him to conduct a hearing in a summary
appear actively in the proceedings in proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
some other capacity. opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all evidence it may
WHEREFORE, respondent desire to produce to prove that the
Commissioner's Order granting Atty. evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong, before resolving the issue of bail
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene
for the temporary release of the accused.
in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed
and set aside. The temporary Restraining A judge should not only render a just,
Order heretofore issued is hereby made correct and impartial decision but should
permanent. do so in a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality
LIBARIOS VS DABALOS and integrity.
upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
by the latter. However, he was said rule. The police were not present at
immediately detained and denied his right the time of the commission of the offense,
of a preliminary investigation unless he neither do they have personal knowledge
executes and sings a waiver of the on the crime to be committed or has been
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised committed not to mention the fact that
Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for petitioner was not a prisoner who has
immediate release on recognizance or on escaped from the penal institution. In view
bail and proper preliminary investigation of the above, the allegation of the
on the ground that his warrantless arrest prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a
was unlawful and no preliminary waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
investigation was conducted before the the Revised Penal Code before a
information was filed, which is violative of preliminary investigation may be
his rights, the same was granted but later conducted is baseless. In this connection,
onreversed by the lower court and petitioner has all the right to ask for a
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The preliminary investigation to determine
appellate court in sustaining the decision whether is probable cause that a crime
of the lower court held that petitioner's has been committed and that petitioner is
warrantless arrest was valid in view of the probably guilty thereof as well as to
fact that the offense wascommitted, the prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and
petitioner was clearly identified and there aggravation brought by a criminal
exists valid information for murder filed proceeding. This reason of the accused is
against petitioner substantial, which he should not be
deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner
did not waive his right to have a
Hence, the petitioner filed this present preliminary investigation contrary to the
petition for review on certiorari before the prosecutor's claim. The right to
Supreme Court. preliminary investigation is deemed
waived when the accused fails to invoke it
ISSUE: before or at the time of entering a pleas at
arraignment. The facts of the case show
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of
that petitioner insisted on his right to
herein petitioner was lawful, and
preliminary investigation before his
2. Whether or not petitioner waived his arraignment and he, through his counsel
right to preliminary investigation denied answering questions before the
court unless they were afforded the proper
HELD: preliminary investigation. For the above
The general rule on arrest provides that reasons, the petition was granted and the
the same is legitimate if effected with a ruling of the appellate court was set aside
valid warrant. However, there are and nullified. The Supreme Court however,
instances specifically enumerated under contrary to petitioner's allegation,
the law when a warrantless arrest may be declared that failure to accord the right to
considered lawful. Despite that,the preliminary investigation did not impair
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner the validity of the information charging the
only subvert the independence of the required to be observed by members of the Bench.
They constitute gross misconduct which is
judiciary but also undermines the people's punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
faith in its integrity and impartiality Court
***END***
TAN V. ROSETE
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica
Facts: Dimatulac, petitioners vs. Hon. Sensinando
Villon, et. al., respondents.
Before the cases were decided, respondent
judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk Facts:
to complainant. The staff member told SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his
complainant Tan that Judge Rosete was asking for residence in Pampanga. A complaint for
P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of murder was filed in the MTC and after
the cases. She was shown copies of respondent preliminary investigation, Judge Designate
judges decision in the criminal cases, both still David issued warrants of arrest against the
unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused.
accused. She was told that respondent judge Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were
would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon arrested and it was only Yambao who
as she remits the amount demanded. submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David
Complainant, however, did not accede to then issued a resolution finding reasonable
respondents demand because she believed that ground that the crime of murder has been
she had a very strong case, well supported by committed and that the accused is probably
evidence. The criminal cases were eventually guilty thereof.
dismissed by respondent judge. Though it was not clear whether Pampanga
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia
Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon
motion of the private respondents, she
Held: conducted a reinvestigation and resolved
that the Yabuts and Danny were in
We have repeatedly admonished our judges conspiracy, along with the other accused,
to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. and committed homicide.
They must be the embodiment of competence, Before the information for homicide was filed,
integrity and independence. The exacting the Petitioner appealed the resolution of
standards of conduct demanded from judges are Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice.
designed to promote public confidence in the However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because ordered for the release of David, Mandap,
the peoples confidence in the judicial system is Magat, and Naguit. An information for
founded not only on the magnitude of legal homicide was also filed before the Regional
knowledge and the diligence of the members of Trial Court.
the bench, but also on the highest standard of Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected Yabuts and recalled the warrants of arrest
to possess. When the judge himself becomes the against them.
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a
he places his office in disrepute, encourages Motion to issue hold departure order and
disrespect for the law and impairs public Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Roura deferred the resolution of the first
judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a Motion and denied the second. He also set
judges personal behavior both in the performance the arraignment of the accused.
of his duties and his daily life, be free from any The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond Roura for hastily setting the date for
reproach. arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ
and for prejudging the matter. They also
Respondents act of sending a member of filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court
his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of Appeals.
of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and
litigants outside the office premises beyond office Comment with the trial court and opposed
hours violate the standard of judicial conduct the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that
he will no longer allow the private the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal once
prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura an information is filed.
voluntarily inhibited himself and was
replaced by Judge Villon. Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a discretion for deferring the resolution to the motion
Manifestation submitting documentary for a hold departure order. Since the accused were
evidence to support their contention that out on bail, the Motion should have been granted
the offense committed was murder. since they could have easily fled. Though he is not
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have
arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of perused the documents submitted.
not guilty. The petitioners then filed a
Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment. The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the discretion for setting aside its order. In doing so, it
appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also has relinquished its power of control and
ruled that treachery was present. supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal
they have already been arraigned and they of the case is null and void and double jeopardy
would be put under double jeopardy. cannot be invoked by the accused.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order ***END***
and the appeal was held not and academic
due to the previous arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside
arraignment. The motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, this petition for FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY
certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Facts:
Despite the lapse of more than 10 years,
Issues:
respondent judge failed to render judgment in the
case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff.
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion in After Hamoy was transferred, complainant learned
he brought the records of the case to his new
reinvestigating the case without having the
respondents within the custody of the law station. Hamoys excuse was that his utility aid
mixed the records up and because the dockets
and for filing the information pending the
appeal of the resolution with the DOJ. were congested with so many family-cases his
court being the only family court in the area. He
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding with the also failed to comply with the directives of the
OCA. Also, he was able to collect his salary when
arraignment and for denying the Motions to
set aside the arraignment. he claimed in his certification that he had no
pending cases.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering
Held:
his order.
Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from
liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel.
Decision: Judges are charged with the administrative
responsibility of organizing and supervising his
Petition is GRANTED. court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, requiring at all times the
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted
with grave abuse of discretion for conducting a observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity.
reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts
were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states More importantly, judges have a duty to
decide their cases within the reglementary period.
that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of
the judge who conducted the investigation, the On meritorious grounds, they may ask for
additional time. It must be stressed, however, that
resolution should be based on the review of the
record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she their application for extension must be filed before
the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his
should have sustained the recommendation since
all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their transfer to another post, respondent Judge should
have asked the permission of the Court
counter-affidavits. It is impossible for Alfonso-
Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the Administrator to bring the records of the cases to
his new assignment or should have apprised the
DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in parties of his action with respect thereto.
Furthermore, respondent Judge should be even of society at large. His severely abusive and
held liable for his failure to obey directives from outrageous acts, which are an affront to women,
this Court and the Court Administrator. Needless to unmistakably constitute sexual harassment
say, judges should respect the orders and because they necessarily ". . . result in an
decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
Court from which all other courts should take their the employees. Let it be remembered that
bearings respondent has moral ascendancy and authority
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than over complainants, who are mere employees of the
a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent court of which he is an officer. The Court
Judge must bear in mind that the exacting concludes with moral certainty that he acted
standards of conduct demanded of judges are beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
designed to promote public confidence in the propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His
A judge who fails to decide cases within the gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.
prescribed period but collects his salary upon a ***END***
false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting
to gross misconduct and deserves the
condemnation of all right thinking men. In view of
the primordial role of judges in the administration IN RE JUDGE MARCOS
of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity
and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers. Facts:
***END*** Two complaints were filed by Romeo T.
Zacarias and a concerned citizen of Gerona,
Tarlac. These Complaints identically charged Judge
Martonino R. Marcos (Formerly of the Municipal
DAWA V. DE ASA Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) and Clerk
of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5 th Municipal
Facts: Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with immoral
Presiding judge Armando de Asa was conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants.
charged with sexual harassment and/or acts of Zacarias alleged that, on two occasions, Judge
lasciviousness by Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro- Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money from him
Barreto and Noraliz Jorgensen. Dawa and Barreto in exchange for a favorable decision in a criminal
were employed as stenographic reporters while case against Zacarias and for his provisional
Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of release. He further alleged that upon some
the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the inquiries, he was informed that the respondent
Office of the Clerk of Court. They charged de Asa Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe
for allegedly forcing himself on them and kissing money and that the respondents are engaged in an
them on the lips. illicit love affair which is common knowledge to
municipal and court personnel and as well as to
Issue: the people of Gerona.
Whether de Asa violated Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics Issue:
Whether respondents violated the Code of
Ruling. Judicial Conduct
Yes.
Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid Ruling:
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in Yes.
all activities. He should behave at all times as to The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
promote public confidence in the integrity and a magistrate should avoid impropriety and the
impartiality of the judiciary. It is therefore appearance of impropriety in all activities and
paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both should be the embodiment of competence,
in the performance of his duties and in his daily integrity and independence. Since appearance
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as and reality fuse in the performance of judicial
to be beyond reproach. functions, the judge -- like Caesars wife -- must not
In the present case, the Court found totally only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion. The
unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge actions of respondent judge were not free from all
in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates appearances of impropriety. His conduct lacked
all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful
lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It
respondent judge fall short of the exacting is the kind of behavior for which he must be
standards for members of the judiciary; they stand administratively dealt with, as it erodes public
no chance of satisfying the standards of decency confidence in the judicial system.
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS,
equally remiss in the performance of her duties. with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
By her own admission, she required complainant to or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
post the cash bond, even though she had not been severely.
instructed to do so by respondent judge. She ***END***
thereby arrogated judicial power unto herself. The
determination of whether to require a cash bond,
like the approval of bail or the release of the
accused, is purely a judicial function. It was SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA
certainly not among the mandated duties of
respondent clerk. It has been stressed that the Facts:
conduct and behavior of everyone charged with Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge
the dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the
trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored misconduct in the performance of official duties,
in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men graft and gross ignorance of the law. The
and women who work therein, from the judge to complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed
the lowliest clerk. by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons
***END*** Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San
Carlos City RTC. Complainant averred that there
was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in
the criminal case, the decision that had acquitted
LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered
only on the tenth month after the case was
Facts: submitted for decision. Respondent judge was also
Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health cited for impropriety by complainant because he
Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante,
charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent
Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jose judge would even use at times.
Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse
of judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly Issue:
compelling her to sign a death certificate even Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2
though she was not the attending physician. of the Code of Judicial Ethics
According to Lachica, during a party, Judge
Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened Ruling:
to file an administrative case against her if she will Yes.
refuse to sign the death certificate. The Investigating Justice has seen
impropriety on the part of respondent judge in his
Issue: close association with a counsel for a litigant.
Whether respondent-judge is guilty as The Court shares the view and disquisition
charged of abuse of judicial position and of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be
intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of extra prudent in associating with litigants and
Judicial Conduct counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even
a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It
Ruling: is not expected, of course, that judges should live
Yes. A judges official conduct should be free in retirement or seclusion from any social
from the appearance of impropriety, and his intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in instance, that they continue, time and work
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his commitments permitting, to relate to members of
everyday life, should be beyond reproach. the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields
From all the foregoing, as well as the of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the
evidence on record, this Court is convinced that noble aims and objectives of the legal
the charge of misconduct against the respondent profession. In pending or prospective litigations
judge has been established by substantial before them, however, judges should be
evidence, which is the quantum of proof required scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may
in administrative cases. His undue interest in tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal,
having complainant sign the Death Certificate is social or sundry relations could influence their
highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his objectivity, for not only must judges possess
inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior proficiency in law but that also they must act and
during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is behave in such manner that would assure, with
reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the
to disciplinary action. Respondent was FINED in the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
The respondent was ADMONISHED to constantly be greater import, as far as the general public is
circumspect in his conduct and dealings with concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
lawyers who have pending cases before him. The first step towards the successful
SAMSON V. CABALLERO implementation of the Courts relentless drive to
purge the judiciary of morally unfit members,
Facts: officials and personnel necessitates the imposition
This is an administrative complaint for of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The
dishonesty and falsification of a public document Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because,
against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero. being the visible representation of the law, they
Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that should set a good example to the bench, bar and
respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not students of the law. The standard of integrity
have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the imposed on them is and should be higher than
constitutional qualifications of proven competence, that of the average person for it is their integrity
integrity, probity and independence, and for that gives them the right to judge.
violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council Respondent was DISBARRED for violation
(JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of
applicant for judgeship with a pending the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
administrative case. name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
According to the complainant, respondent, ***END***
during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed
the fact that he had pending administrative
charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf
of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), DIMO REALTY V. DIMACULANGAN
Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative
charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct Facts:
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent,
violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
against respondent in the Office of the specific performance against Dimo Realty &
Ombudsman on July 23, 2003. Development, Inc. (Dimo Realty) and spouses
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners. The
allegedly committed certain improprieties and complaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968,
exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of petitioners engaged the services of respondent as
Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted. geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision
lots) 2 parcels of land situated in Barrio Namuco,
Issue: Rosario, Batangas. As payment for respondents
Whether respondent violated the Code of services, petitioner agreed to give him 1
Judicial Ethics subdivision lot at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay him
P9,200.00 in cash. After the completion of
Ruling: respondents work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00
Yes. Since membership in the bar is an in installments and delivered to him possession of
integral qualification for membership in the bench, the lot. However, despite respondents demands,
the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot,
fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the prompting him to file with the RTC a complaint for
basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath specific performance and damages. The trial court
as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents issued an order dismissing the complaint for
dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to do improper venue. Respondent then filed a motion
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in for reconsideration with motion for inhibition
court. alleging partiality on the part of the presiding
It cannot be denied that respondents judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA denied the
dishonesty did not only affect the image of the motion for inhibition.
judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious
doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the Issue:
practice of law. Possession of good moral character Whether the CA erred in denying the motion
is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar for inhibition
but also a continuing requirement to the practice
of law. If the practice of law is to remain an Ruling:
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, No. Suffice it to state that whether judges
those counted within its ranks should not only should inhibit themselves from a case rests on
master its tenets and principles but should also their own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated,
accord continuing fidelity to them. The inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of
requirement of good moral character is of much the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown
acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of