[G.R. No. 123555.

January 22, 1999]

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET, INC., respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action for
forcible entry with damages against its lessor file a separate suit with the Regional Trial Court
against the same lessor for moral and exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory damages
based on the same forcible entry?

On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of
land with a commercial building thereon located at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a
period of nine (9) years and three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998, with a
monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00.

Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner. As of 19 October
1992 the arrearages amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted
breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under the
above-quoted Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992 repossessed
the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by private
respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the movables on 19 August 1993 with
notice to private respondent.

On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[2] The case was raffled to Branch 40
presided over by Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
petitioner from selling private respondents properties at a public auction.

On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case and directed its transfer
to Branch 34 presided over by Judge Joselito SD Generoso. Soon after, petitioner filed an urgent
motion for the inhibition of Judge Generoso and the immediate reraffle of the case arguing that
the summary transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was not done by raffle.

The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by Judge Francisco D.
Villanueva.

Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ
preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the following:

(a) private respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
in the name of theMetropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount of P8,000,000.00 to
guarantee the payment of its back rentals;
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated bank the
amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending with the
MeTC, private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993 another action for damages against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101
presided over by Judge Pedro T. Santiago.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum
shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an order
archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for
the reason that "the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the defendants
(petitioner herein) have committed forcible entry."[5]

On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to
dismiss the suit for damages.

Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved,

private respondent filed with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint for
damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary Prohibitory and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

RTC: Judge Santiago issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting
private respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting private respondent's application for a
temporary restraining order against petitioner.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition on
the ground that Judge Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of private
respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to
engage in forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of
jurisdiction.[6]

CA: The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of 14 September 1993 which, it explained,
was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that
the elements of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages
with the RTC because despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only
damages recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property and not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC which had no direct relation
to loss of material possession. It clarified that since the damages prayed for in the amended
complaint with the RTC were those caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which
petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of private respondents
movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of damages.
[7]
 Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that
petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a prior motion for
reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling that the trial judge did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the action for damages and injunction despite the pendency of
the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did not commit
forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC were not identical with
each other.

ISSUES: (1) whether petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a
prior motion for reconsideration with the RTC;

(b) whether an action for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court by the lessee
against the lessor should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of another action for
forcible entry and damages earlier filed by the same lessee against the same lessor before
the Metropolitan Trial Court.; and,

(c) Whether private respondent did not commit forum shopping since the causes of action
before the RTC and MeTC were not identical with each other.

HELD: (1) While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting
to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to
it[8] this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case.[9] The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the
remedy of certiorariis not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law,
[10]
or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, [11] or the questions raised
on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower
court.

In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the ground
that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC between the same parties
involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue
was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the
prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a
pointless exercise

(2) Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, together with damages and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that
all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court
which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages
and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration
of possession.

This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
which states that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause is a
ground for dismissal of an action. Res adjudicata requires that there must be between the action
sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at
least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2)
preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration.[13]

It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a
party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the
same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of
omission by which a party violates a right of another.[14] These premises obtaining, there is no
question at all that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the
suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the
lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of
possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand
for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by
petitioner into the leased premises.

A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against
petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res
adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is
concerned, but also that the claim for damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual
and compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of action.Since this runs counter to
the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged
unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated
by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner
herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages
due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs
stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected
profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral
damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages
ofP20,000,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits;
and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of
the leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already
prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated
in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.

The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that
these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence is
unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed - like the unlawful taking or
detention of the property of another - there is but one single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single
complaint as constituting one single cause of action. In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the
physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or
incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In
other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of
force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or
wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of
possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one
action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and
independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of
damages. That would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.
[16]
In David v. de la Cruz[17] we observed -

Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their illegal ejectment or
removal from their landholdings, which cause of action however entitles them to two (2) claims
or remedies - for reinstatement and damages. As both claims arise from the same cause of action,
they should be alleged in a single complaint.

A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered
in one case and the rest, in another.[18] In Bachrach v. Icarangal[19] we explained that the rule was
aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the same parties in regard to the same subject of
the controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa.

What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such
rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein
included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever.

(3) In New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission [24] that there is
forum shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and
circumstances. The reason behind the proscription of forum shopping is obvious. This
unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and
financial resources of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby
adversely affecting the efficient administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has
prompted the Court to issue circulars[25]ordering among others that a violation thereof shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action
against the counsel or party concerned.

The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum shopping it pointed
out the absence of the required certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and
third amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no
other action pending between the parties involving the same causes of action although there was
actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a
pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum
shopping. While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had likewise
sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry, the fact remains that it
precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated in the second case.This is a compelling
reason to dismiss the second case.

G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989

LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO
PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

REGALAD0, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the order,
dated July 8, 1975, dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as the order, dated August 22, 1975,
denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by respondent Judge
Crispin V. Bautista of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III.

Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for
conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila.

On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to
Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.

Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the
sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating
the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a
tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction.

At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by
respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva,
tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby
forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a
result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the
cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson
and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-
delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up
truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.

On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint
impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional alternative
defendants.

Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for
indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein
impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.

On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's
claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a
release of claim releasing from liability the following parties.

On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to
her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.

Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to

Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson
and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva
already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of
amicable settlement.

Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and
Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact
that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein
petitioner.

RTC: Respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for the
reconsideration thereof was denied.
Hence, petitioner appeal by certiorari, contending that respondent judge erred in declaring that
the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and
Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case.

ISSUE: Whether here are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the
judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a
bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage.
HELD: No, there was only one cause of action involved. A cause of action is understood to be
the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at
the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct
legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of
action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the
rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only
one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit
with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate
remedies allowed by law.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved
although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not
necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a
recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in
essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act
or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On the
evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is undisputed
that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold respondents jointly and
severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded
respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of petitioner that said
allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued in his favor. There is
nothing in law or jurisprudence which would countenance such a procedure.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made by
some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner
inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors,
including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.

G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986

REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
 HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
FERNANDO CALION, respondents.

FERIA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner sued the respondents for refusing to pay him certain amount of money as
alleged in the complain which states that:
(1) the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio
Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August
to October, 1981; and
(2) the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to
January, 1982.

On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only
P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was
separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.

At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed
the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:

... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ...

Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:

Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate
sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective
of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If
any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
RTC: The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of
parties under the Rules of Court.
HELD: Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to
exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided
in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise
in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff
or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6
of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state
also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against
the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules
on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of
parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 165142 December 10, 2007
EDUARDO L. RAYO, Petitioner, - versus - METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY AND BRANCH 223 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY,
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Before us is a petition for review assailing the Resolutions dated June 15,
2004[1] and August 23, 2004[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83895 for annulment
of judgment.
Midas Diversified Export Corp. (Midas), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, obtained six (6)
loans from private respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), amounting
to P588,870,000 as evidenced by promissory notes.
To secure the payment of an P8,000,000 loan, Louisville Realty & Development Corporation
(Louisville), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, executed in favor of Metrobank, a real estate
mortgage over three parcels of land situated at No. 40 Timog Ave., Brgy. Laging Handa, Quezon
City, with all the buildings and improvements thereon. The properties are covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. N-163455, N-166349 and N-166350 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City.

When the debtor-mortgagor failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135,[3] as amended. Thereafter, in a public auction,
Metrobank was the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale[4] dated December 11, 2000 was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on December 13, 2000.

When Louisville refused to turn over the real properties, on March 17, 2001, Metrobank filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 223, Quezon City, an ex partepetition[5] for the
issuance of a writ of possession docketed as LRC Case No. Q-13915(01).

RTC: After presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC granted the petition in an
Order[6]dated July 5, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED. Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS ([P]100,000.00), let a Writ of Possession over the
properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-163455, N-166349 &
N-166350 issue in favor of the petitioner METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY to be implemented by the Deputy Sheriff of Branch 223, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City by placing the petitioner in possession over the parcels
of land with all its improvements.

On September 24, 2001, Metrobank posted the required bond. Consequently, a writ of possession
was issued on October 9, 2001. This was partially implemented as to TCT No. N-163455, as
evidenced by the Turn-Over Receipt[8] dated December 13, 2002. The writ over the two
remaining properties, under TCT Nos. N-166349 and N-166350, were subsequently implemented
as evidenced by the Turn-Over Receipt[9] dated December 3, 2003.

Meanwhile, on April 3, 2002, petitioner Eduardo L. Rayo filed a complaint [10] docketed as Civil
Case No. Q02-46514 against Metrobank for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage Contract(s)
and Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, in the RTC, Branch 99, Quezon City.

On May 13, 2004, petitioner Rayo filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition[11] for Annulment of
Judgment on the ground of absolute lack of due process. Petitioner alleged that his
predecessor, Louisville, was not notified of the proceedings and that Section
7[12] (ex parte motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of possession) of Act No. 3135 is
unconstitutional.

CA: On June 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner is neither the registered owner nor the successor-in-interest of the
registered owner; hence, not a real party-in-interest. It also ruled that there is no basis to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended as it constitutes a
collateral attack against said provision. Further, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing
Civil Case No. Q02-46514. Petitioner sought reconsideration, but was likewise denied.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, he has the legal personality to institute the annulment of judgment case against
Metrobank, considering that the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment he entered into
with Louisville and Winston Linwy L. Chua makes him a co-assignee over the subject real
properties.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: For its part, Metrobank claims that it was not a party to the
deed of assignment among Louisville, Chua and petitioner, hence, it has no privity of contract
with petitioner Rayo. Moreover, Metrobank points out that the real properties had already been
extrajudicially foreclosed when petitioner and his assignors executed the deed of assignment.

ISSUE: Does petitioner have the legal personality in the annulment of judgment proceedings?

HELD: NO. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit. A real party-in-interest is one with a present substantial interest which
means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the
substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand.

Now, is petitioner Rayo a real party-in-interest? Initially, we recognized herein petitioner

as the co-assignee of the subject real properties as shown in the March 25, 2002deed of
assignment. However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, we find
that petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment
proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of possession.

First, there was no violation of petitioners right to constitutional due process. In a long line of
cases,[18] we have consistently ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended is a ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the foreclosed property,
upon ex parte application and the posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire
possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period and with more
reason, after the expiration of the redemption period.
econd, in the deed of assignment, petitioner also acknowledged that the subject real properties
were already sold at various extrajudicial foreclosure sales and bought by Metrobank. Clearly,
petitioner recognized the prior existing right of Metrobank as the mortgagee-purchaser over the
subject real properties. [21] Actual knowledge of a prior mortgage with Metrobank is equivalent
to notice of registration [22] in accordance with Article 2125 [23] of the Civil Code. Conformably
with Articles 1312[24] and 2126[25] of the Civil Code, a real right or lien in favor of Metrobank
had already been established, subsisting over the properties until the discharge of the principal
obligation, whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be. [26] As petitioner is not a party whose
interest is adverse to that of Louisville, there was no bar to the issuance of a writ of possession
to Metrobank. It does not matter that petitioner was not specifically named in the writ of
possession nor notified of such proceedings.
Third, we also note that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case No. Q02-
46514, for nullification of real estate mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale, more than six
(6) months after the issuance of the writ of possession considering the mandate of Section 8 [27] of
Act No. 3135, as amended. Hence, even petitioners action for annulment of judgment cannot
prosper as it cannot be a substitute for a lost remedy.
[G.R. No. 161065. April 15, 2005]
EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, CELSO D. GANGAN, PACASIO S. BANARIA, SOFRONIO
B. URSAL, ALBERTO P. CRUZ, MARIA L. MATIB, RACHEL U. PACPACO, ANGELO
G. SANCHEZ, and SHERWIN A. SIP-AN, petitioners, vs. HON. GUILLERMO N.
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Chairman, Commission on Audit, HON. EMMANUEL M.
DALMAN and HON. RAUL C. FLORES, in their capacities as Commissioners,
Commission on Audit

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS: Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The above-named
petitioners basically alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law
authorizing COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions,
restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters. Petitioners further alleged that in initiating
such Organizational Restructuring Plan without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan, Pascasio S. Banaria are retired Chairmen,
while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired Commissioners of COA. All claim to
maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,[3] especially in its Organizational
Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.

The other petitioners are incumbent officers or employees of COA. Maria L. Matib and Angelo
G. Sanchez are State Auditor III and State Auditor II, respectively, assigned to the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR). Prior to the implementation of the questioned COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan, they were Resident Auditors and later Audit Team Leaders.
Petitioner Rachel U. Pacpaco is a State Auditor III assigned to CAR and a Team Supervisor,
while petitioner Sherwin A. Sipi-an is a State Auditor I also assigned at the CAR. These
petitioners claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks as Unit
Head, Team Supervisor, and Team Leader upon implementation of the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due process, in violation of Civil Service Law.
Moreover, they were deprived of their respective Representation and Transportation Allowances
(RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.
Petitioners now invoke this Courts judicial power to strike down the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or illegal.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[4] Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[5] and Information Technology Foundation of
the Philippines v. Commission on Elections[6] that where the subject matter of a case is a matter
of public concern and imbued with public interest, then this fact alone gives them legal standing
to institute the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the COA Organizational Restructuring
Plan is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a spillover
effect upon its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government
bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental
importance. Consequently, petitioners legal standing should be recognized and upheld.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Petitioners have no legal standing to file the present
petition since following our ruling in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr.,[7] they
have not shown a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an actual or potential injury that
can be redressed by our favorable decision. Petitioners themselves admitted that they do not seek
any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the said respondents
and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that
would redound to their personal benefit or gain. It is clear then that petitioners failed to show any
present substantial interest in the outcome of this case, citing Kilosbayan v. Morato.[8] Nor may
petitioners claim that as taxpayers, they have legal standing since nowhere in their petition do
they claim that public funds are being spent in violation of law or that there is a misapplication of
the taxpayers money, as we ruled in Dumlao v. Comelec.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.

HELD: No. Judicial power is the power to hear and decide cases pending between parties who
have the right to sue in courts of law and equity.[1] Corollary to this dictum is the principle
of locus standi of a litigant. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and
substantial has the standing to sue. Thus, a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of
the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant
an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial power on his behalf.

Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted that they do
not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the
respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from
respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. Clearly, they do not have any
legal standing to file the instant suit.
We are well aware of the averments of petitioners Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An that
they were demoted and unceremoniously divested of their previous designations as Unit Head,
Team Supervisor, or Team Leader; that they were deprived of their RATA; that they were
relegated to being mere Team Members, entitled to only a reimbursable transportation allowance;
and that they were denied due process.
Such averments lack merit. Actually, they were not demoted. Under Section 11, Rule VII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, a demotion is the
movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with
diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve reduction in
salary.[15] A demotion by assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has
a lower rate of compensation is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.[16]
Here, there have been no new appointments issued to Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An
under the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. Thus, their contention that they have been
demoted is baseless.
Moreover, the change in their status from COA auditors (receiving monthly RATA) to COA
auditors (receiving only reimbursable RATA) cannot be attributed to the COA Organizational
Restructuring Plan but to the implementation of the Audit Team Approach (ATAP), pursuant to
COA Resolution No. 96-305 dated April 16, 1996.
Thus, in the implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, we fail to see how
petitioners could have sustained personal injury as they have not shown to have a personal stake
therein. Accordingly, they are wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition.
Corollarily, we find no reason to delve into the constitutionality or legality of the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

(2) Whether the said civil case is a class suit.

HELD: (1) Yes. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.Under Section
16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral,
land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
(2)Yes. We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
[G.R. No. 154745. January 29, 2004]
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, petitioner,
vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER, respondent.

CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094 granting the respondents petition
forcertiorari and prohibition annulling the order of arrest issued by the petitioner, and
permanently enjoining her from deporting the respondent from the Philippines. Through its
decision, the CA virtually reversed the Summary Deportation Order[2] of the Board of
Commissioners (BOC) and its Omnibus Resolution [3] denying the respondents Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of said Order, and enjoining the petitioner from deporting the respondent.

Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent
visitor of the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent resident status was
granted.[4] The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued in favor of the respondent
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-396907 dated September 16, 1987 [5] and Immigration
Certificate of Residence No. 256789 dated February 24, 1988. [6] The Commissioner stated that
the granting of the petition would redound to the benefit of the Filipino people. [7] During his
sojourn in the Philippines, the respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes [8] with whom he
had two daughters. They had a son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away on November 13,
1995.[9] They resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where the respondent established and
managed the Bavaria Restaurant. On May 21, 1991, he was appointed Confidential Agent by
then NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim.[10]

The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in Manila
Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, informing it that the respondent was wanted by the
German Federal Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.

The Embassy requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to inform the competent
Philippine authorities of the matter.The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order
dated September 27, 1997.

When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to
then BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to
remain in the Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the
German Embassy.[15] Then Presidential Assistant Teodorico K. Imperial wrote a Testimonial
dated November 24, 1995, in behalf of the respondent addressed to Commissioner
Verceles. Nonetheless, the respondent, through counsel, filed on December 5, 1995 an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC.
 However, the BOC did not resolve the respondents motion. The respondent was neither
arrested nor deported.

Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision
dismissing the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. [18] The German
Embassy in Manila, thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent.

In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his
passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his
request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995 and
the restoration of his permanent resident status.[19] Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German
Embassy issued to the respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006.

The BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the respondents March 1, 1996 Letter. The respondent
remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the
Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment
Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa City.

In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed

office. She wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the
German police. On April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so
wanted.[20] At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended
the respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila
Office and there held in custody while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the
respondents wife[21] and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the respondent.

Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his
lawyer. The latter filed with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondents temporary
liberty.

CA: The Court of Appeals ruled that the German Embassys subsequent issuance of passport to
the respondent before the BOCs issuance of its Omnibus Resolution had mooted the September
27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order, as well as the arrest and detention of the
respondent. According to the court, it made no sense to require the respondent to leave the
country and thereafter re-apply for admission with the BOC. Furthermore, since the grounds
cited by the BOC in its Summary Deportation Order no longer existed, there was no factual and
legal basis to disqualify the respondent from staying in the country.

Aggrieved, the respondent therein, now the petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed to us for relief. The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred on a
question of law in granting the respondents petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Elucidating on his first three arguments, the petitioner
maintains that the respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals should have been dismissed because he failed to implead the real party-in-
interest as mandated by Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; in this case, the
BOC. According to the Solicitor General, this was a fatal procedural error. The inclusion of the
BOC as respondent in the case was necessary in order that its actions could be directly attacked
and for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it. The fact that Immigration Commissioner Andrea
T. Domingo was impleaded as the sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the four
Commissioners.Furthermore, the assailed Orders were issued by the Board, and not by the
Immigration Commissioner alone.

ISSUE: (1) Whether The BOC is an Indispensable Party

(2) The Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is not a Ground for the Dismissal of the
Petition

HELD:

The BOC is an Indispensable Party

We agree with the petitioners contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the
respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The
respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation
Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latters Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the
respondents immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ of
mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said
motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was
issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be
exercised by the individual members of the Commission.[44]

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined
as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
[45]
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. [46] The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to
act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. [47] The responsibility of impleading
all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.[48]
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. [49] If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.[50] The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. [51] In this case, the CA did not require the
respondent (petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the
rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca,[52] and Vivo v. Cloribel.[53] The CAs reliance on the said
rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the
Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor
even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases.

The Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is not a Ground for the Dismissal of the Petition

The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The
petition should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first.
[54]
In Salvador, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., [55] we held that this Court has full powers, apart
from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings
and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest. The Court has the power
to avoid delay in the disposition of this case, to order its amendment as to implead the BOC as
party-respondent. Indeed, it may no longer be necessary to do so taking into account the unique
backdrop in this case, involving as it does an issue of public interest. [56] After all, the Office of
the Solicitor General has represented the petitioner in the instant proceedings, as well as in the
appellate court, and maintained the validity of the deportation order and of the BOCs Omnibus
Resolution. It cannot, thus, be claimed by the State that the BOC was not afforded its day in
court, simply because only the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, [57] was the respondent in
the CA, and the petitioner in the instant recourse. In Alonso v. Villamor,[58] we had the occasion to
state:

There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose
is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They
do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an
end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice
is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.

G.R. No. 96354 June 8, 1993

LAPERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SUNBEAMS CONVENIENCE
FOOD CORPORATION,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF FILOTEO T. BANZON,

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: , Atty. Filoteo T. Banzon sought recovery of attorney's fees from Oliverio Laperal,
Laperal Development Corporation, and Imperial Development Corporation for professional
services rendered by him in several cases. On April 8, 1983, the case was decided on the basis of
a Compromise Agreement reading in part as follows:

Atty. Filoteo Banzon by this agreement, does hereby voluntarily and freely waive,
forfeit, or consider as fully paid any and all other claims of money or otherwise
that he may have against the defendants, in all cases in the Philippines that he may
have handled for the defendants in the past, including whatever money claims he
may have in the above-entitled case outside of this agreement,

On May 19, 1987, Banzon filed a complaint against Oliverio Laperal. Laperal Development
Corporation. Imperial Development Corporation, Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. and
Vicente Acsay for: 1) the annulment of the aforequoted portion of the Compromise Agreement;
2) the collection of attorney's fees for his services in the cases of: a) Imperial Development
Corporation vs. Aover, b) Republic vs. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc., et al., and
c) Laperal Development vs. Ascario Tuazon and Ascario Tuazon v. Judge Maglalang, et al.; 3)
the recovery of the amount of P10,000.00 that was adjudged payable to him as attorney's fees by
Ascario Tuazon in Civil Case No. 3918; and 4) the payment to him of nominal damages and
attorney's fees.

RTC: Docketed as Civil Case 50823 in Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
this case was dismissed on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to annul the
Compromise Agreement as approved by an equal and coordinate court. It was held that the issue
was cognizable by the Court of Appeals. An additional ground was that the Compromise
Agreement already covered the plaintiff's professional services in the aforementioned cases.

CA: On appeal, the decision was affirmed on the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
held, however, that attorney's fees were due the private respondent in the cases of (1) Laperal
Development Corporation v. Ascario Tuazon and (2) Ascario Tuazon v. Judge
Maglalang and Republic v. Sunbeams Convenience Foods. Inc.. 2

The petitioners are now before us to challenge the decision insofar as it orders them to pay
Banzon attorney's fees for his legal services in the aforementioned cases.

ISSUE: Whether the Sunbeams Convenience Food Inc., was a party defendant therein privy to
the case.

HELD: No. An examination of the list of cases for which Banzon was suing for attorney's fees
in Civil Case No. Q-34907 shows that the case of Laperal Development Corporation v. Ascario
Tuazon was included therein although it was erroneously referred to as Civil Case No. 4437.
Even if it was not mentioned in the complaint, it was nevertheless covered by the Compromise
Agreement, where Atty. Banzon waived all other claims against the
defendants * "in all cases in the Philippines that he may have handled for the defendants in the
past, including whatever money claims he may have in the above-entitled case outside of this
agreement."

Concerning the case of Republic vs. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. (G.R. No. 50464), At
the time of the execution of the compromise agreement and rendition of the judgment based
thereon on April 8, 1983, the aforementioned case bearing G.R. No. 50464 was still pending in
the Supreme Court. It was not, however, the subject of the compromise agreement (Exhibits C
and 2; Annex 2, answer, pp. 47-55, 65-66, rec.). It could not have been so because Sunbeams
Convenience Foods, Inc. was not a party defendant in the second amended complaint, although
reference was made to it in the appellant's seventh cause of action for which he has rendered
professional services but for which attorney's fees were being claimed from the herein appellee
Oliverio Laperal (Exhibits A and 1). But nothing is mentioned in the second amended complaint
and in the compromise agreement (Exhibits A and 1; C and 2) which would indicate that
Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. itself was a party plaintiff therein privy to the case. Appellee
Oliverio Laperal and Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. do not appear to be one and the same.

Notably, Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. (Sunbeams, for brevity), referred to in the
complaint as "Mr. Laperal's Corporation," was not joined by name as a party-defendant.
Apparently, the private respondent believed that Oliverio Laperal, being the president of the said
company, was directly obligated to him for the attorney's fees due him for his handling of the
case for Sunbeams.

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it. 3 It may not generally be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its
stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. 4 Conversely, a stockholder cannot be
made to answer for any of its financial obligations even if he should be its president. 5

There is no evidence that Sunbeams and Laperal are one and the same person. While it is true
that Laperal is a stockholder, director and officer of Sunbeams, that status alone does not make
him answerable for the liabilities of the said corporation. Such liabilities include Banzon's
attorney's fees for representing it in the case of Republic v. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.

Sunbeams should have been joined as a party-defendant in order that the judgment of the lower
court could legally affect it. But even if it was not impleaded, the court could still validly proceed
with the case because Sunbeams was not an indespensable party but only a proper party. A
proper party is one which ought to be a party if complete relief is to be accorded as between
those already parties. 6 A party is indespensable if no final determination can be had of an action
unless it is joined either as plaintiff or defendant. 7
The Compromise Agreement upon which the decision of the court was based was between
plaintiff Atty. Banzon and the defendants represented by Oliverio Laperal. To repeat, Sunbeams
was not a party to this agreement and so could not be affected by it.

The private respondent's claim for attorney's fees in the Sunbeam case was waived by him not by
virtue of the Compromise Agreement to which Sunbeams, not being a defendant in Civil Case
No. Q-34907, could not have been a party. What militates against his claim is his own judicial
admission that he had waived his attorney's fees for the cases he had handled from 1974 to 1981
for Oliverio Laperal and his corporations, including those not impleaded in his complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-34907.

G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013

REBECCA PACAA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAA, Petitioners,

vs.
ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES, DALLA P.
ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

JUANA CMPLEX VS FIL ESTATE LAND

FACTS: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions, instituted a complaint for
damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists
of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road,
against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping
and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a
class suit.
They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common
right or cause of action for JCHA, etal. against them since each of them has a separate and
distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others. With regard to the issuance
of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and
unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens
registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the complaint was properly filed as a class suit?
(2) Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action?
HELD: (1) Yes. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:1) the subject
matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;2) the parties
affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and3) the parties
bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz
Road. The individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so
numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as
plaintiffs in the complaint.
(2)The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The test of sufficiency of
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to
establish a cause of action

A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable

injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for
its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and
(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ to
issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown
to be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they
have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.
G.R. No. L-23136 August 26, 1974
MATHAY vs CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Facts: Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc.
(CMI).Petitioners filed a case for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action.
Petitioner salleged that in violation of the Board resolution,
the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they
were lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in
proportion to their equities established under their respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreements to
Subscribe" to the capital stock
and that the Articles of Incorporation were fraudulently amended by the defendants. The
complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that the class suit could not be
maintained because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants
were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.
Held: The action at bar is not a class suit. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class
suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all to the court.
The statute requires that the complaint should allege the existence of the necessary facts, the
existence of a class and the number of members in the said class so as to enable the court to
determine whether the members of the said class are so numerous as to make it impractical to
bring them all to court.
The complaint in the instant case failed to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders
that the trial court could not infer nor make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that they
cannot practically appear in court and that the plaintiffs are representative of the other
stockholders. The statute also requires that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common
interest to numerous persons.
In the instant case, the interest that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI
stockholders had in the subject matter of this suit was several, not common or general in the
sense required by the statute. Each one of the appellants and the CMI stockholders had
determinable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his respective portion of the stocks. No
one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was entitled.

NEWSWEEK, INC. VS THE IAC, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE

PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGANISABELA
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASSOCIACIOM DE AGRICULTORES DE LA
CARLOTA, LA CATELLANA Y
PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
J. FERIA
FACTS: Special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to annul the
decision of the IAC sustaining the Order of CFI Bacolod denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
the complaint for libel filed by private respondents

Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed a

case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province
against Newsweek Inc. and two of their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and
Barry Came.

The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by the publication of the
article "An Island of Fear" in their magazine. The article supposedly portrayed the island as a
place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who exploited the impoverished
sugarcane laborers and brutalized and killed them with impunity. They claim that the article
showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and misrepresentation of facts, putting
them in a bad light

Petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
complainant made no allegation that anything contained in the article referred specifically to any
one of them--and libel can be committed only against individual reputation OR, if is claimed to
be directed at a group, there i defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere
collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.

ISSUE: Whether there is a class suit.

HELD: No. In Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.: "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identiable, although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R.116)."

In Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen: Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in
general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the
statements are sweeping.

The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benet of
all. We have here a case where each of the plaintis has a separate and distinct reputation in the
community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.

SULO NG BAYAN VS. ARANETA

[GR L-31061, 17 AUGUST 1976]

Facts: On 26 April 1966, Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed an accion de revindicacion with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Valenzuela, Bulacan, against Gregorio Araneta
Inc. (GAI), Paradise Farms Inc., National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NAWASA),
Hacienda Caretas Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to recover the ownership and
possession of a large tract of land in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, containing an area of
27,982,250 sq. ms., more or less, registered under the Torrens System in the name of GAI, et.
al.'s predecessors-in-interest (who are members of the corporation). On 2 September 1966, GAI
filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that (1) the complaint states no
cause of action; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by prescription and laches. Paradise
Farms, Inc. and Hacienda Caretas, Inc. filed motions to dismiss based on the same grounds.
NAWASA did not file any motion to dismiss. However, it pleaded in its answer as special and
affirmative defenses lack of cause of action by Sulo ng Bayan Inc. and the barring of such action
by prescription and laches. On 24 January 1967, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the
(amended) complaint. On 14 February 1967, Sulo ng Bayan filed a motion to reconsider the
Order of dismissal, arguing among others that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action
because the subject matter of the controversy in one of common interest to the members of the
corporation who are so numerous that the present complaint should be treated as a class suit. The
motion was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 February 1967.

Sulo ng Bayan appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 3 September 1969, the Court of Appeals,
upon finding that no question of fact was involved in the appeal but only questions of law and
jurisdiction, certified the case to the Supreme Court for resolution of the legal issues involved in
the controversy.

Issue:
1. Whether the corporation (non-stock) may institute an action in behalf of its individual
members for the recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said members, among
others.
2. Whether the complaint filed by the corporation in behalf of its members may be treated
as a class suit
Held:

1. It is a doctrine well-established and obtains both at law and in equity that a corporation is a
distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from the individual stockholders or
members who compose it, and is not affected by the personal rights, obligations and transactions
of its stockholders or members. The property of the corporation is its property and not that of the
stockholders, as owners, although they have equities in it. Properties registered in the name of
the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. Conversely, a
corporation ordinarily has no interest in the individual property of its stockholders unless
transferred to the corporation, "even in the case of a one-man corporation." The mere fact that
one is president of a corporation does not render the property which he owns or possesses the
property of the corporation, since the president, as individual, and the corporation are separate
similarities. Similarly, stockholders in a corporation engaged in buying and dealing in real estate
whose certificates of stock entitled the holder thereof to an allotment in the distribution of the
land of the corporation upon surrender of their stock certificates were considered not to have
such legal or equitable title or interest in the land, as would support a suit for title, especially
against parties other than the corporation. It must be noted, however, that the juridical personality
of the corporation, as separate and distinct from the persons composing it, is but a legal fiction
introduced for the purpose of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice. This separate
personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction pierced, in
cases where it is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work -an injustice, or where
necessary to achieve equity. It has not been claimed that the members have assigned or
transferred whatever rights they may have on the land in question to the corporation. Absent any
showing of interest, therefore, a corporation, has no personality to bring an action for and in
behalf of its stockholders or members for the purpose of recovering property which belongs to
said stockholders or members in their personal capacities.

2. In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the
subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; and (2)
that the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. Here,
there is only one party plaintiff, and the corporation does not even have an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, and cannot, therefore, represent its members or stockholders who
claim to own in their individual capacities ownership of the said property. Moreover, a class suit
does not lie in actions for the recovery of property where several persons claim partnership of
their respective portions of the property, as each one could alleged and prove his respective right
in a different way for each portion of the land, so that they cannot all be held to have identical
title through acquisition/prescription.