Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 148063-64 June 17, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MAXIMO IBARRIENTOS y PERICO, appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the joint judgment1 dated January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in Criminal Case Nos. P-2695 and P-2696. The
RTC convicted appellant Maximo Ibarrientos,2 of two counts of incestuous rape. In each
case, he was sentenced to death and was ordered to pay P75,000 as indemnity, P50,000
moral damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, and the costs.

The information3 in Criminal Case No. P-2695 reads:

That on or about August, 1996 in Barangay Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur,

Philippines within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused who is the
Uncle of the victim, LORILIE a.k.a. LORELIE I. BRILLO, then an eight (8) years (sic)
old minor while in their house, did then and there, with lewd design willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said
Lorelie I. Brillo, who afterwards reported the incident to her Aunt, Imelda Ibarrientos,
the wife of the accused, to her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information4 in Criminal Case No. P-2696 reads:

That on or about 7:00 oclock in the morning of February 11, 1998, in Barangay
Sagurong, Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this court, the above-named accused, being the father of and having parental
authority, influence and moral ascendancy over victim JOAN IBARRIENTOS, his 7
year old daughter, while the latter was sick and sleeping in their bedroom, did then
and there, with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie on top of her and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her which she reported immediately to her
mother, Imelda, to her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.5 Trial promptly ensued
thereafter.

The prosecution presented six witnesses.

The first witness, LORELIE6 I. BRILLO, testified that the appellant Maximo Ibarrientos is her
maternal uncle.7 She tearfully recounted that on August 19, 1996 at around 8 a.m., she was
playing with the appellants children outside his home8 in Sagurong, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Appellant beckoned her, "Be, madya." ("Be, come here.").9He handed a twenty-peso bill to
his children, and ordered all of them to go buy cigarettes10 in a store located far from the
house.11
Thereafter, he told Lorelie to go inside the bedroom,12 to lie down, and remove her shorts and
underwear.13Appellant undressed himself, lay on top of her, and inserted his penis into her
vagina.14 Lorelie testified that the penetration caused her pain. 15 When he withdrew, she saw
blood come out of her private part which she wiped. 16 His lust satisfied, he told her to get out
of the room. She said she was eight years old at the time of the incident.

According to Lorelie, her Aunt Imelda, who is the appellants wife, soon arrived from the
fields. Imelda saw Lorelie crying, and asked what was wrong. Lorelie did not answer.17 But
after several days had passed,18 Lorelie related her ordeal to Imelda. Lorelie testified that this
incident was not the first time that appellant raped her. She said she kept quiet because
appellant warned her that if she told anyone what happened to her, he would bury her alive. 19

The other private complainant, JOAN IBARRIENTOS, testified that appellant Maximo
Ibarrientos is her father. According to her testimony, he raped her on February 11, 1998, at
around 7 a.m. That day she was absent from school due to a fever. Her mother left her with
her paternal grandmother20 who lived thirty meters away from them.21 While she was at her
grandmothers place, appellant called her to come home. When she reached home,
appellant whipped her for unknown reasons.22 She then went to the bedroom and slept on
the floormat next to her younger brother, Joseph,23 who was asleep.24

But Joan said she was roused from her sleep by appellant. He was sitting on the floor with
his legs outstretched, naked from the waist down.25 He undressed her and made her sit on
his lap, facing him. And, according to her testimony, he inserted his penis into her vagina. It
caused her much pain26 and made her scream.

Joan said that during this time, Joseph was sleeping.27 But her scream was loud enough for
her older brother, Jonnie, who was playing outside the house, to hear. Jonnie immediately
rushed into the bedroom. However, according to Joan, he could do nothing except look,
because appellant was armed with a balisong (knife).28

When he was finished with her, Joan said, appellant threatened her and Jonnie to keep quiet
otherwise he would kill their mother.29 Appellant immediately left. Meanwhile, Joan saw a
white sticky substance and some blood in her vagina. With a yamit (piece of cloth), she
wiped the substances off her private part.30

Despite appellants warning, however, Joan told her mother of her defilement. She showed
the yamit to her mother. As soon as he arrived home, her mother confronted appellant and
they quarreled. Joan and her mother left for Cadlan, where Joan stayed with her maternal
grandmother.31 She has transferred to a new school and had not returned to live in Sagurong
since the incident.32

IMELDA F. IBARRIENTOS testified that she is legally married to appellant, 33 and that Joan is
her daughter, while Lorelie is her niece. Imelda explained that when she first learned about
what happened to Lorelie, she told appellants mother, Eugenia T. Ibarrientos. However,
Eugenia even chastised her for believing the tales of the children. She was told not to
meddle.34 Thus, she kept silent until she learned of her own daughters rape two years later.35

Imelda recalled that Joan told her about the incident the very afternoon when it occurred.
Enraged, she confronted her husband as soon as he arrived. She cried, "You animal, why
did you do this to your daughter?" She remembered he did not mind her, and even increased
the volume of the television set he was watching.

Imelda testified that the day after the incident, she brought both Joan and Lorelie to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development36 where they related the incident to Rosa
Bona, the social worker on duty.37 In her interview, Imelda admitted that it was only on March
11, 1998, a month after Joan was defiled and over one and a half years after Lorelie was
raped, that she sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and it
was only then that she had the girls examined by a doctor.38
Prosecution witness ROSA C. BONA testified that she is a social worker of the DSWD
assigned in Pili, Camarines Sur.39 She recalled that on March 12, 1998, Imelda Ibarrientos
came to their office to complain about the appellants rape of Joan and Lorelie. She
interviewed Joan, Lorelie and Imelda, and afterwards accompanied them to the NBI for
investigation, documentation, and medical examination. 40 Afterwards, she made social case
study reports41 on her findings which the prosecution formally offered as part of the
evidence.42

For the defense, five witnesses were presented.

Appellant MAXIMO IBARRIENTOS, denied the charges against him, claiming an alibi.
According to appellant, on the day that he alleged raped Lorelie, he was actually at the
Camarines Sur State Agricultural College at San Jose, Pili, which is 500 meters away. He
said he was engaged in tilling the land of a certain Aniano Remiter.43Appellant added that his
work required him to be at the site almost everyday before 7 a.m. to around 5 p.m. 44Aside
from that he also worked on his parents farm.45 He claimed he could not have raped Lorelie,
considering his work schedule. According to him, his niece accused him because of the
instigation of his wife, Imelda, who was at odds with his parents who believed she was
having an affair with another man.46

Appellant also denied raping his daughter, Joan. He said he was not at his parents house on
February 11, 1998. He recalled that he left home early to get skates and an engine to
transport the electric posts needed in their area. The work lasted the whole day from around
6 a.m. until around 5 p.m. He remembered he saw his daughter for the first time that day,
when he reached home. He repeated that it was his wife who plotted to charge him with rape
of his daughter.

Witness ANIANO F. REMITER corroborated the story of appellant that appellant had been
working in his farm since 1975 to August 1996. However, on cross-examination, he admitted
that the farm was located only some 500 meters away from the scene of the alleged rape
and that the appellant worked in his farm for only one week in August of 1996. 47

Another witness for the defense, EUGENIA P. IBARRIENTOS, testified that she is appellants
mother,48 and that Joan and Lorelie are her granddaughters. She claimed that the charges
against appellant are false. She added that the only reason her daughter-in-law charged the
appellant was to continue her illicit relations with another man.49

Eugenia said that Joan stayed in her house on the day of the alleged rape incident from 6
a.m. to 5 p.m. to nurse her fever. She said that she left Joan in the house at 2 p.m. but when
she returned at 5 p.m., Joan had already left.50 She corroborated appellants story and said
that he dropped by at 6 a.m. but left immediately to go with his father, Maximo Sr., to get the
electric posts.51 She claimed her son did not return to the house that day. Eugenia concluded
that Lorelies complaint, like Joans, was also untrue.52

Witness VIRGINIA S. SAO testified that on February 11, 1998, the appellant dropped by
her house, which is approximately one kilometer away from his home, 53 to get some skates
for transporting electric posts. On direct examination she said that the appellant dropped by
her house at around 6 a.m.,54 but on cross and re-direct examination she clarified he picked
up the skates at around 8 a.m.55

The fifth witness for the defense, DOLORES B. BOLO, an aunt of the
appellant,56 corroborated Eugenias testimony that Joans complaint was false. She stated
that on the day Joan claimed to have been raped, she was with Joan in Eugenias house and
she stayed from early in the morning until around 4:30 p.m. 57 She never took her sight off
Joan as she observed her play. She noticed she was a bit weak due to fever.58

Dr. Wilson C. Moll Lee, the medico-legal officer of the NBI, medically examined both private
complainants. His report on Lorelie disclosed the following:

GENITAL EXAMINATION:
 Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense.
Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, short, thin, intact. Hymenal orifice, measures 1.5
cm in diameter. Vaginal walls and Rugosities, cannot be reached by the examining
finger.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the

subject at the time of examination.

2. Hymen, intact, and its orifice small (1.5 cm in diameter) as to preclude

complete penetration by an average-sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury.59

His report on Joan revealed the following:

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense.
Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, short, thin, intact. Hymenal orifice, measure 1.0
cm in diameter. Vaginal walls and Rugosities, cannot be reached by the examining
finger.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the

subject at the time of examination.

2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.0 cm in diameter) as to preclude

complete penetration by an average-sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury.60

Dr. Lee testified, however, that it was possible there had been no complete penetration in
these cases. While the orifice of both victims were 1.0 and 1.5 cm. in diameter, the normal
size of an adult Filipino males organ was 2.5 cm. in diameter. Thus, there might have been
penetration of the labia and pudendum, but not the hymen, as the reports stated that the
victims hymens were intact. He concluded that whatever external injuries and bruises the
victims may have sustained would have healed after a month from the time of the incident. 61

The trial court found that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both counts of
rape, and sentenced him to death. Its decision in its decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, joint judgment in these two (2) cases is
hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. P-2695, finding the herein accused MAXIMO

IBARRIENTOS a.k.a. MAXIMO IBARRIENTOS, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of RAPE defined and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and
hereby sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. As civil
liability he is ordered to pay the offended party Lorilie/Lorelie I. Brillo, the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, another
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages and the amount
of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos, as rape indemnity or a total
of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P175,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency;

2. In Criminal Case No. P-2696, again finding the same accused MAXIMO
IBARRIENTOS a.k.a. MAXIMO IBARRIENTOS, JR., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of RAPE defined and penalized under Article
 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in
relation to Republic Act No. 8353 and hereby sentencing him to suffer
another penalty of DEATH. As civil liability, he is also ordered to pay the
offended party Joan Ibarrientos c/o her mother Imelda F. Ibarrientos, the
amounts of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages, another
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages and Seventy-
Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as rape indemnity or a total of ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P175,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency and to pay the costs in both instances.

After promulgation, let the entire records of these two (2) cases be elevated
immediately to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant
to Section 22, of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.62

Hence, this automatic review. Before us, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:

THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH WHEN THE AGE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, ALTHOUGH STATED IN THE INFORMATIONS, WERE NOT
ALLEGED WITH SPECIFICITY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.63

Simply put, there are two issues for our resolution: (1) Whether appellant is guilty of rape in
these two cases beyond reasonable doubt. (2) Whether in each case the penalty of death
has been properly imposed.

On the first issue, appellant contends that no hard evidence was presented by the
prosecution in order to substantiate the offenses charged. Although appellants defense of
denial and alibi may seem weak, he asserts that the trial court should not precipitately
disregard it for it could really be the truth. According to him, his defense was corroborated by
two disinterested witnesses, namely Aniano Remiter and Virginia Sao. Hence, he insists the
paramount duty of the prosecution is to prove appellants guilt on the strength of its own
evidence, and not just rely on the weakness of the evidence presented by the defense. 64

For appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that appellants defense of
alibi lacks one vital element, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the alleged crime. Moreover, said the OSG, a bare denial cannot
overcome the positive identification of appellant by the victims that he was indeed their
ravisher. The OSG concludes that ultimately the issue boils down to the credibility of the
witnesses, which is best left to the judgment of the trial court for it had the opportunity to
observe the deportment of the witnesses on the stand.65

In these two cases of rape, the alleged victims were presented by the prosecution and
subjected to prolonged cross-examination by the defense. Both victims Lorelie and Joan,
stood pat in their accusation against appellant that he abused them sexually. Despite their
tender age, the private complainants withstood the grueling direct and cross-examinations
with their credibility intact. Rape victims, especially those who are of tender age, would not
normally concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of their private parts and
undergo a public trial, if they were not motivated solely by the desire to have their ravishers
apprehended and punished. As long as their testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused-appellant may be convicted on that sole basis.66

Both victims cried when they testified. As found by the trial court:

And as they were relating their traumatic experiences in open Court, both of these
minor-victims were observed by the Court to be quite stressful, tense and hardly able
to fully answer and explain all the other consequential details, and every now and
then breaking into tears as they re-lived what to them must have been quite
excruciating pain and anguish specially since their violator was a close kin to Lorelie
and the very own father of Joan who should have rightly been their protector and
shield from these reprehensible and horrendous offenses, not himself the
perpetrator.

In the case of Joan, she even graphically demonstrated how her father ravished her
when she re-enacted the deed showing how naked, she was made to sit on his
likewise naked lap until he was able to ejaculate. 67

Private complainants testimonies deserve full faith and credence. 68 In a similar case we held
that "at such tender years, they were still unfamiliar with and nave in the ways of the world
that it is quite unbelievable that they could fabricate such a sordid story of personal
defloration. Their testimonies therefore cannot be disregarded."69

We note that the physical examination of the victims took place more than one month after
the incidents subject of the complaints. Although the victims bore no evident sign of
extragenital injury, and that the hymen of each victim was intact, Dr. Lee of the NBI did not
rule out the commission of rape. As the law now stands, penetration of the victims organ is
not required for the commission of rape. A torn hymen is not an essential element of rape,
not even when the victim is an innocent child. Medical research also shows negative findings
after physical examination of the victims are of no significance, since the hymen may not be
torn despite repeated coitus. In fact, many cases of pregnancy have been reported in women
with unruptured hymens.70 In a previous case we also ruled that rape occurred despite
repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still retained an intact
hymen without signs of injury.71

We cannot accept appellants defense of alibi. In People v. Francisco,72 a case involving the
sexual abuses on a child victim by a relative, we did not give credence to the defense of
denial and alibi interposed by accused-appellant. We said that these defenses are inherently
weak. It is elementary that for alibi to prosper, the accused must not only prove his presence
in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, but he must also demonstrate
that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.73

In Crim. Case No. P-2695, appellant himself admitted that the place where he was at the
time of the alleged rape of Lorelie was a short walking distance from the place where the
offense was committed. He testified that the distance between the two places would take
around thirty minutes walk but definitely would not take more than one hour.74 Moreover,
appellant himself admitted during his testimony that one witness for the defense, Virginia
Sao, is his cousin,75 and therefore biased in his favor.

The imputation of ill motive on the part of appellants wife, Imelda Ibarrientos, would not
necessarily detract from the weight of the victims testimonies. That Imelda had a lover, and
she would like to get rid of appellant by filing the charges against him, deserves scant
consideration. From one viewpoint, the minor victims would not fabricate a tale so heinous if
only to please Imelda or to punish her husband. Despite their tender ages, the private
complainants would not expose themselves to public ridicule and the ordeal of a trial just to
please a mother or an aunt, as the case may be, if the victims were not bent on pursuing a
just and compelling cause.
From another perspective, we have previously held that no mother in her right mind would
expose her daughter to the trauma resulting from a court case unless she is truly motivated
by a desire to penalize the person responsible for her daughters defilement. 76 It is unnatural
for a mother to use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her child
to embarrassment and lifelong stigma. A mother would not sacrifice the honor of her
daughter to give vent to a grudge that would tarnish the latters reputation forever.77 These
principles are applicable in the present case, which involves not only the daughter of Imelda
Ibarrientos but her niece as well.

As to the second issue, the appellant asserts that the ages and relationships of the victims
were stated in the informations but were not alleged with specificity as qualifying
circumstances. He invokes Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure78 and People v. Alba79 and People v. Manlansing,80 to support his stance that the
two circumstances cannot be treated as qualifying circumstances but merely generic
aggravating circumstances. The appellant submits that assuming he is found to be the
perpetrator of the felonies, he should be found guilty of two counts of simple rape, not
qualified rape.81

The OSG insists that the circumstances should be appreciated as qualifying circumstances.
It cites People v. Aquino,82 which explained how aggravating and qualifying circumstances
should be alleged as required under Sec. 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Following Aquino, the allegation of circumstances in the information need not be
preceded by the word "qualified", since it is sufficient that the circumstances be specified in
the information to apprise the appellant of the charges against him.83

We agree with the OSG. The Aquino case settled already the issue on the proper allegation
of circumstances. What properly informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is
the specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a
higher category.

The new Rules on Criminal Procedure require the qualifying circumstances to be specifically
alleged in the information, in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to
allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during the trial. 84 This
requirement is satisfied as long as the circumstances are alleged in the information, even if
these are not specified as aggravating or qualifying circumstances.

In the present two cases of rape, however, the death penalty imposed on appellant is
improper and erroneous.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code states that the death penalty shall be imposed
when "the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
descendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

This is a special qualifying circumstance which must be specifically alleged with certainty in
the information, otherwise the death penalty cannot be imposed. The allegation in the
information of Criminal Case No. P-2695, that the appellant is an uncle of the victim, is not
specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. We have
previously ruled, and now we reiterate, that it is necessary to spell out in an Information for
rape that the accused is a "relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity" as
stated in Article 266-B.85Without such averment, the Information in Criminal Case No. P-2695
falls short of the statutory requirement for the imposition of capital punishment on the
offender. Factual allegations in the information do not need to be referred to as "qualifying
circumstances", in order to appreciate them as such and raise the penalty. However, these
factual allegations must be specified completely, in order to fully inform the accused of the
circumstances which warrant the imposition of a higher penalty. Otherwise, such
circumstances cannot be appreciated to qualify the offense. Since the Information in Criminal
Case No. P-2695 only states that the appellant "is the Uncle of the victim", without stating
that he is a "relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity," the qualifying
circumstance of relationship cannot be appreciated without offending settled law and
doctrine of this Court. As such the appellant can be held liable only for statutory rape.

As for Criminal Case No. P-2696, we find the information is sufficient to inform the appellant
of the qualifying circumstances present in the offense. The information properly alleged that
the victim is his daughter. Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a victims minority may
become a qualifying circumstance which could raise the penalty to death. But the victims
age must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. It must be
established with certainty that the victim was a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime of incestuous rape as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 8353, amending
Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:

ART. 266-B.

...

The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim.

...

Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be the subject of
speculation. The appellant cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on
the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and
irreversibility of capital punishment. Proof of the age of the victim cannot consist merely of
testimony. Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victims age be
considered sufficient proof of minority.86

The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.87 We stress that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to nothing less than the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence.88

In the instant case, no authentic document was presented as evidence of the victims age
other than a poor photocopy of what is claimed to be Lorelies birth certificate. The
prosecution failed to present an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth.
Neither was it shown that these were lost, destroyed or unavailable at the time of trial. Thus,
secondary evidence is inadmissible to prove the age of the victim in Crim. Case No. P-2696.
The testimonies tending to prove the victims age cannot be accepted as adequate proof
thereof.89

Much as we abhor child abuse, nevertheless, we are constrained to hold that capital
punishment cannot be imposed on appellant in these two cases. Even if we agree that the
victims are indeed minors below 12 years old, at most, appellant is liable only for statutory
rape in Crim. Case No. P-2696 as well as in Crim. Case No. P-2695. As well understood,
statutory rape is defined by law in Art. 266-A Revised Penal Code, as follows:

"Rape is committed(1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman

under any of the following circumstances:

...

(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present."
Otherwise, there being no adequate proof regarding the age of the victims in each case, the
offense committed is only simple rape. Noteworthy, under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, rape whether simple or statutory is punishable only by reclusion perpetua, and not
death.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 31, in Criminal Cases Nos. P-2695 and P-2696, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant MAXIMO IBARRIENTOS is found GUILTY of two counts of rape, and for each
count he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
also ORDERED to pay the victim in each case the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.