JIMMA UNIVERSITY

JIMMA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Post Graduate Study

School Of Mechanical Engineering
M.Sc. In Mechanical System Design Engineering

Course name: Fracture Mechanics and Fatigue

Course code: DMS6022

Case study on:

Case I: Stress Corrosion Cracking Failure of the Point Pleasant Bridge
Case II: Hydro Test Failure of a 660cm Rocket Motor Casing

By:
1) Tesfaye Olana
2) Yohanis Dabesa
3) Amanuel Abebe
4) Fakada Dabalo

Submitted to: Professor, Byeong Soo LIM

Dean/Professor, School of Multidisciplinary Engineering (AAit)

Dec, 17/2016, Jimma

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 Acknowledgement
First of all foremost, our gratitude goes to Professor, Byeong Soo LIM

(Dean/Professor, School of Multidisciplinary Engineering (AAit)) for delivering us this vital

course, Fracture Mechanics & Fatigue (DMS6022) and sharing his rich experience and

knowledge without reservation. His encouragement, lecturing excellent, and critical comments

have greatly contributed to this case study seminar project. By letting us to work on such

interesting topic, he enabled us to have interesting of reading and working on a broaden our

thought to read a lots of available materials in future.

Table of contents
Title page
Acknowledgement .......i
Table of contents ....ii
List of figures.......ii
Case I: Stress Corrosion Cracking Failure of the Point Pleasant Bridge .....................................1
1. Introduction...1
2. Design of the Bridge ....2
3. What Happened and Consequences..2
4. Technical Factors Contributing To the Disaster...2
5. Conclusion.....3
1
 6. Recommendation...4
Case II: Hydro Test Failure of a 660cm Rocket Motor Casing..6
1. Introduction .6

2. Motor Case Construction .6

2.1. Design and Fabrication....

.6

2.2. Nondestructive Testing

...7

3. Failure Investigation .8

3.1. Fracture Origin Location

.9

4. Conclusion ..12

5. Recommendation 13

Reference 14
List of figures
Figure 1.1: Silver Bridge constructed in 1928..1
Figure 1.2: Point Pleasant Bridge eyebar..1
Figure 1.3: Point Pleasant Bridge..2
Figure 1.4: Stress Corrosion Cracking .....2
Figure 1.5: Fracture eyebar responsible for failure of Point Pleasant Bridge...3
Figure 1.6: Fracture surface of broken eyebar flaws.....3
Figure 2.1: portion of failed motor case as it was removed from hydrotest tower...8
Figure 2.2: Reassembled fragments from Ruptured 660-cm rocket motor casing8
Figure 2.3: Map of fracture path as viewed when looking inside surface8
Figure 2.4: Mating fracture surface of primary flaw.8
Figure 2.5: isometric drawing of showing relation of clean origin to weld deposits... 8
Figure 2.6: isometric drawing of showing relation of black origin to weld deposits. ..8
Case I: Stress Corrosion Cracking Failure of the Point Pleasant Bridge
1. Introduction
The Point Pleasant Bridge carried US Route 35 and spanned over the Ohio River connecting Point
Pleasant, West Virginia and Kanauga, Ohio. It was constructed in 1928 by the General Corporation
and the American Bridge Company and was known as the Silver Bridge as it was the countries first
and in the end, only aluminium painted bridge.
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 Figure 1.1: Silver Bridge constructed in 1928

2. Design of the Bridge

Silver Bridge (Point Pleasant Bridge) was constructed with some unique and previously untested
methods of construction such as high tension eye-bar chains, a unique anchorage system, and rocker
towers. The bridge's eye-bars were linked together in pairs like a chain while a large pin passed
through the eye and linked each piece to the next. Each chain link consisted of a pair of 2" x 12" bars
and was connected by an 11" pin. The failure of one of these bars would lead to massive amounts of
stress being transferred to the remaining bar.

Figure 1.2: Point Pleasant Bridge eyebar

The rocker towers allowed movement of the bridge due to live loads, vibrations and expansion and
contraction due to temperature changes. This movement was done by placing a curved fitting next to a
flat one at the bottom of the piers. The rocker was then fitted with dowel rods to keep the structure
from shifting horizontally.
An unusual anchorage was designed consisting of a reinforced concrete trough 60.96m long and
10.36m wide filled with soil and reinforced concrete. The huge trough was supported on 406 0.4m
octagonal reinforced concrete piles in which the cable pull is resisted by the weight of the anchorage
and by sharing the halves of the piles. These untested construction methods coupled with increased
loading and inadequate funding lead to the collapse of silver.
3. What Happened and Consequences
At 5pm on December 15, 1967 the Point Pleasant Bridge collapsed claiming 46 lives and injuring 9.
Along with the numerous fatalities, a major transportation route connecting West Virginia and Ohio
was rendered useless. A cleavage fracture in the limb of eye-bar 13 at joint C13N was followed by a
ductile fracture near the pin. Unable to support the entire weight of the structure the chain on the
opposite side of the bridge failed leading to, beginning on the Ohio side span and moving eastward
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toward the west Virginia shore complete structural collapse in less than one minute. An identical bridge
nearby was subsequently closed immediately and eventually destroyed and replaced. In 1969 a new
bridge was completed just south of the infamous Point Pleasant Bridge as a replacement.

Figure 1.3: Point Pleasant Bridge

4. Technical Factors Contributing To the Disaster

The final analysis which was conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation concluded that the
failure of the number 13 eye-bar pin on the north side had caused the eye-bar chain to drop below the
roadway on the upriver side of the bridge. As a consequence the south eye-bar chain was unable to
support the weight of the whole structure and failure ensued.
The failure of the lower limb of the eye-bar can be attributed to a minute crack formed during casting
of the steel eye-bar. Over the bridges life-span stress corrosion (cracking induced by the combined
influence of tensile stress and a corrosive environment) and corrosion fatigue (rupture of the protective
passive film of a material as a result of the combined action of alternating or cyclical stresses and a
corrosive environment, allowing acceleration of failure) allowed the crack to grow and become a
critical size flaw. A cleavage fracture formed followed by ductile failure near the pin.

Figure 1.4: A) Stress Corrosion Cracking B) Corrosion Fatigue

The casting and heat treatment of the new carbon steel would have introduced residual stresses
possibly close to the yield stress of the steal and hence microscopic cracks with an inter-granular
morphology formed. This, coupled with the corrosive environment to which the steel would have been
subjected left it susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. When the bridge was designed in 1927 this
was an unknown phenomenon in classes of bridge material used under conditions of exposure usually
encountered in rural areas. Because the bridge was subjected to alternating cyclical stresses again with
the existence of a corrosive environment, corrosion fatigue also served to decrease the life span of the

3
bridge. Again such a concept was unknown at the time but material which can be considered to have
an infinite life span can have its stress limit lowered or completely removed by corrosion fatigue.
Because both corrosion fatigue and stress corrosion are promoted by stresses in the structure the
increased weight to which the bridge was subjected over its life-span also contributed to the eventual
collapse of the structure. The bridge was designed to carry one third of the weight which it routinely
carried at the time of the collapse. Although the design engineers designed the bridge with a load
increase in mind they did not even contemplate that it would have been so great.

Figure 1.5: Fracture eyebar responsible for failure Figure 1.6: Fracture surface of broken eyebar from
of Point Pleasant Bridge Point Pleasant Bridge showing two elliptical
surface flaws

Another important cause was that the flaw was inaccessible to visual inspection. Even if the flaw could
have been accessed there was no detection equipment available at the time which would have been
capable of detecting such a flaw. The eye-bar joint would have had to be disassembled to detect it.
After removing the rust from the fracture surface, investigators found two discoloured regions covered
with an adherent oxide layer. These regions were contiguous and in the shape of two elliptical surface
flaws as shown in figure 1.4.
Portions of the whole surface were heavily corroded, and some secondary cracks were parallel to the
main fracture surface but initiated only in those regions where corrosion damage was extensive
5. Conclusion
The most common causes of bridge failure are structural and design deficiencies, corrosion,
construction and supervision mistakes, accidental overload and impact, scour, and lack of maintenance
or inspection (Biezma and Schanack 2007). In general, the collapse of the Point Pleasant Bridge can be
attributed to design deficiencies and lack of inspection. Because this bridge collapsed, the country has
an increased knowledge of structural behavior and a new set of inspection standards
Estimating the stress intensity level in the usual way, Bennet and Mindlin computed the stress level at
fracture level by considering only the larger surface flaw:
K=1.1 a /Q

K=1.1
(3 x 103)
1.92

4
 =13 K

Using the range of experimentally determined KIC values (47.1 to 56.1Mpa m , the stress level at

fracture was found to be

=615730 Mpa

This represents an upper bound range of the fracture stress, since allowance was not made for the
presence of the smaller contiguous elliptical flaw. If one assumes the crack to be elliptical with a
maximum depth of 0.3cm but with 2c=1.6cm, then a/2c=0.19 and Q = 1.05. This assumption should
lead to slight underestimate of the stress level:

K=1.1
(3 x 103)
1.05
=9.6 K

Again using the KIC range of 47.3 t0 56.1Mpa m , a lower stress range is found to be
=455 Mpa540 Mpa

It is concluded that the actual stress range for failure was

615730 Mpa< actual 615730 Mpa

It is seen that the failure stress is approximately equal to the material yield strength. Since the shank
section of the eyebar was recommended for a design stress of 345Mpa, Bennet and Mindlin concluded
that stresses on the order of the yield strength could exist at the considerable stress concentration
associated with this region.
On the basis of this detailed examination, it was concluded that the critical flow the critical flaw was
developed within a region of high stress concentration and progressed by a stress corrosion cracking
mechanism to a depth of only 0.3cm before fracture occurred.
6. Recommendations
As a consequence of the collapse a number of recommendations were made. Some of the most
important being:
1. Identify Bridge building materials susceptible to slow flaw growth by any of the suspected
mechanisms.
2. Determine critical flaw size under various stress levels in bridge building materials.
3. Develop inspection equipment capable of detecting critical or near critical flaws in standing
bridge structures.
4. Devise analytical procedures to identify critical locations in bridge structures which require
detailed inspection.

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5. Develop standards which incorporate appropriate safeguards in the design and fabrication of
future bridges to ensure protection against failure of material such as occurred in the Point
Pleasant Bridge.
6. Develop standards for the qualification of materials for future bridge structures using the
information disclosed in this investigation.
7. Devise techniques for repair, protection, or salvage of bridges damaged by internal flaws.
8. Expand the knowledge of loading history and life expectancy of bridges.

Case II: Hydro Test Failure of a 660cm Rocket Motor Casing

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 1. Introduction

In the course of a program to demonstrate the feasibility of 660cm diameter solid-rocket motors by
Thiokol Chemical Corporation, a short-length case failed during hydrotest. The large solid-propellant
rocket-motor program was initiated in 1963. Thiokol Chemical Corporation and the Aerojet-General
Corporation were selected by the U. S. Air Force to demonstrate the feasibility of 660cm diameter
solid-propellant rocket motors.

Both Thiokol and Aerojet-General were under contract to build and test two motor cases of full
diameter but only one-half the length required for the reference motor, which will produce 6 million
pounds of thrust for 2 minutes. The two short-length motors scheduled to be built and tested by
Thiokol were designated 260-SL-1 and 260-SL-2, and they were designed to produce 3 million pounds
of thrust for 2 minutes.

During hydrotest of the Thiokol 260-SL-1 motor case on April 11, 1965, the case failed at an internal
pressure of 3.74Mpa, which was about 56% of proof pressure. After the failed motor case had been
removed from the hydrotest tower, laid out in a protected area for inspection, and a preliminary
inspection and mapping of the fracture paths had been performed and although the origin and probable
cause of the failure were determined. The investigation then continued with emphasis on a detailed
metallographic study of the failure pieces in the region of the fracture origins and re inspection of most
of the welds in the failed motor case to determine if previously undetected defects could be found.

2. Motor Case Construction

2.1. Design and Fabrication

Thiokol selected the 250 grade air-melted maraging steel. The term 250 grade refers to a nominal yield
strength of 1.723Gpa for the material. The case design was based on a plate yield strength of 1.585Gpa
and a weld efficiency of 90% for a design strength in the welds of 207000 psi. Using a factor of safety
of 1.3 for the welds resulted in a nominal plate thickness of 1.85cm in the cylindrical section and
1.21cm in the hemispherical domes. In the weld area, a mismatch of 10% of the thickness was
allowed, but it was not to exceed 0.1524cm. The eccentricity of membrane forces from this mismatch
in a longitudinal weld results in an elastic stress magnification factor of 1.25.

The case fabrication procedure consisted of the buildup of three sub-assemblies. The aft subassembly
consisted of the aft closure, aft Y-ring, aft skirt, and one cylindrical section. The closure, skirt, and
cylinder were welded to the Y-ring. The center subassembly consisted of two cylindrical sections. The
forward subassembly consisted of the forward dome, forward Y-ring, forward skirt, and one cylindrical
section.

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All welds in the cylinder and the domes were accomplished by using the submerged arc process (here
in after called sub arc). The Y-rings were built up from four circumferential segments. The four
longitudinal welds used to join the Y-ring segments were accomplished by using the vertical
submerged arc process.

This process was used because of the thickness of the part at the time of welding. The
forward and aft skirts were welded to the respective Y-rings by using the multi-pass gas-tungsten-arc
(TIG) process because the geometrical configuration permitted the weld to be deposited only along the
out-side circumference.

The three subassemblies of the motor case were aged separately at 8350F for 4hrs. The subassemblies
were then joined to form the case by girth welds by using the two-pass sub arc welding procedure.
These welds were then locally aged with the same heat-treatment schedule as used for the sub-
assemblies.

Several weld repairs were made during motor case construction. The weld repairs were all made by
manual TIG welding, and they were made before aging. The welding records for the motor case
showed the total weld length to be approximately 300m. The total length of weld repairs made during
the construction was approximately 100m.

2.2. Nondestructive Testing

Nondestructive testing and inspection were generally carried out during the fabrication by four
methods:

Visual,

Liquid penetrant (PT),

Ultrasonic (UT) and

Radiographic (RT)

A very limited amount of magnetic particle (MT) inspection was also used for one weld joint. After
the motor case failure, plate specimens containing fatigue cracks were prepared for evaluation of the
sensitivity of the nondestructive testing methods (NDT).

After NDT and re inspection of Weld Areas of Hydrotest Failure, MT was not considered to be a
generally reliable NDT technique for welded maraging steel. It was utilized only in a limited way for
special cases where the other techniques were not applicable. For example, a special technique was
employed on the circumferential weld in the center of the assembled motor case to provide a survey of
intermittent centerline surface cracking first indicated by PT. In this instance, PT was not fully reliable
because cracking was partly subsurface, and the shallow, tight nature of the cracks prevented UT and
8
RT from being successful. The magnetic field for the MT inspection was provided by strong permanent
magnets with their poles contacting the opposite sides of the weld joint.

3. Failure Investigation

On failure at a gage pressure of 3.74Mpa, the motor case had shattered into several large pieces and
many smaller ones that fell into a precarious, interlocked pile within the test tower. Several days were
required to remove the pieces to a large shop where they were laid out on the floor for detailed
examination.

Figure 2.1: portion of failed motor case as it Figure 2.2: Reassembled fragments from
Ruptured 660-cm rocket motor casing. (From
was removed from hydrotest tower (From
Srawley and Esgar)
Srawley and Esgar)
Figure 2.1 is a photograph taken during this operation that shows the test tower site. A large piece
consisting of the aft head and part of the cylindrical section is resting in the framework of the tower,
and another large piece of the cylindrical section that had been removed from the tower is shown in the
foreground. In spite of the lengthy exposure in the open air, the fracture surfaces were not visibly
rusted; nor were they mechanically damaged in handling to any important extent. It was necessary to
cut two of the larger pieces with a torch to facilitate removal, but these cuts did not impair the
subsequent examination. Figure 2.2 shows the pieces laid out on the shop floor with the aft head in the
center foreground and the other pieces arranged as nearly as possible in proper relation to one another.

While the pieces were being transferred to the shop, work was started on mapping the fracture paths
throughout the entire vessel. The location and orientation of each piece could be ascertained either
from the locations of welds in the piece, or by matching fractures surfaces of adjacent pieces. A
reference grid related to the welds was marked out on the pieces, and their boundaries were then
plotted on a 1:12 scale model of the motor case made of Lucite. A plane development of the cylindrical
section of the model map is shown in figure 2.3.

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 b) Detail in immediate vicinity of primary and
secondary origins
a) Cylinders and skirts

Figure 2.3: Map of fracture path as viewed when looking inside surface

This map was obtained by tracing the fracture paths onto a piece of tracing paper wrapped around the
model. The arrowheads on this map show the directions of propagation of the fracture along the
various branches, as ascertained from chevron markings on the fracture surfaces. Figure 2.4 is a
photograph showing the typical chevron markings on either side of one of the fracture origins. The
chevrons point back to the origin, opposite to the direction of fracture propagation. Similarly well-
defined markings were found on most of the fracture surfaces and, taken together with collateral
information, these were sufficient to define the complete course of the fracture without ambiguity.

Figure 2.4: Mating fracture surface of primary flaw

3.1. Fracture Origin Location

From the fracture map (Fig. 2.3), it is clear that the fracture pattern developed from an origin close to
the W7/302 longitudinal weld and somewhat for-ward of the W8/3 aft Y-ring weld. Although they are
not shown here, the fracture paths in the skirts and the domes were completely mapped, and it was
established that they had developed from cracks running out of the cylindrical section. There were no
independent origins in these parts of the motor case, although there were one or two fracture branches
that had run from the cylinder into one of the heads and then continued on back into the cylinder.
10
Independent confirmation of the general location of the fracture origin was obtained by triangulation
based on the recorded accelerometer signals. The origin of the stress wave detected at the time of
failure was estimated to be located within a 50cm diameter circle centered at a point 20cm from the
W7/302 weld and 74cm forward of the WS/3 weld. This location, shown as a dashed circle in figure
2.3(b), is in good agreement with the position of the source of the fracture paths.

Two distinct fracture origins were discovered in the expected region, both associated with areas of TIG
weld repair on the inside surface of the W7/302 weld. One origin was oriented parallel to the weld
centerline, and the other transverse to it. The positions of these origins and sketches of their contours
are shown in the detail fracture map (Fig. 2.3(b)). Because of the obvious difference in appearance to
the naked eye, the longitudinal defect was termed the "clean" origin, and the transverse defect the
"black" origin. Photographs of the mating surfaces of the clean origin are shown in figure 2.5. The
boundary is quite distinct except for two damaged places on one of the mating surfaces that must have
rubbed against another piece of metal, but the appearance of the origin surface differs only in texture
and tone from that of the surrounding fracture: there is no suggestion of a deposit on the surface. On
the other hand, the black origin was covered with a tightly adhering, black deposit, between the two
origins is probably connected with the fact that, whereas the boundary of the black origin extends to
the outer surface of the vessel wall, the clean origin is completely submerged within the wall.

The inner and outer faces of the pieces containing the two origins were ground and etched to reveal
the positions of the fusion lines and heat-affected zones of the W7/302 weld. It was then found that
each origin was located beneath a separate manual TIG weld that had been deposited on the inside of
the vessel to replace part of the original sub arc weld. These locations are indicated in figures 2.5 and
2.6. The clean origin (fig. 2.5) was located near one edge of what appeared to be a fusion line TIG
repair weld, and the black origin (fig.2.6) was located near one end of a TIG repair, which covered the
whole width of the weld and heat-affected zones.

Figure 2.6: isometric drawing of showing

Figure 2.5: isometric drawing of showing
relation of black origin to weld deposits.
relation of clean origin to weld deposits.

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The TIG weld areas were identified by the responsible welding engineer as simulated repairs to an
originally sound sub arc weld. The simulated repairs had been made as part of an investigation
concerned with cracking that had been encountered in TIG repair welding of meridional dome welds.

There is no doubt that both origins contributed to the overall development of the fracture. Fracturing in
the aft head developed from a crack that ran longitudinally from the clean origin and branched just
before it reached the WB/3 Y-ring junction weld (see fig. 2.3(b)). Fracturing in much of the cylindrical
section and throughout the forward head, developed from cracks that ran circumferentially for short
distances from the black origin and then branched into spiral and longitudinal paths, as shown in figure
2.3. It is most unlikely, however, that the fracture started simultaneously and independently at both
origins. It is almost certain that the stress redistribution associated with propagation of cracks from one
origin brought about secondary crack propagation from the other origin.

In fact, the local fracture pattern in figure 2.3(b) can only be explained satisfactorily if it is assumed
that fracture started first at the clean origin with the initial, longitudinal crack running both aft toward
the head and for-ward toward the position of the black origin. The intensity of the stress field around
the black origin would have increased with the approach of the crack, so that secondary crack
propagation would have been triggered at the black origin before the primary crack reached it. The
subsequent intersection of the developing transverse crack by the primary crack would then have
disturbed the stress field in a way that would account for the early branching of both ends of the
transverse crack. Since the velocity of propagation of brittle fracture in steel can approach 1524m/s, it
is likely that the interval between primary and secondary crack initiation would be of the order of a
millisecond.

The alternative hypothesis, that fracture started first at the black origin, does not lead to a satisfactory
explanation of the observed fracture pattern. The development of the transverse crack from the black
origin, and of the branches stemming from it, would not have increased the intensity of the stress field
around the clean origin; if anything the stress intensity at the clean origin would have decreased as the
crack pattern developed from the black origin. There would have been no reason, therefore, for
secondary crack propagation to start at the clean origin. In this case the complete fracture pattern
should have been significantly different from that observed, and the clean origin should not have been
involved at all.

Independent support for the conclusion that the clean origin was the primary origin of the fracture is
provided by a comparison of the distances between the position of the stress wave origin calculated
from the accelerometer data and the positions of the two fracture origins. As shown in figure 2.3(b),
the distance from the center of the 50cm diameter circle representing the stress wave origin to the
clean origin is about 30cm, while the distance to the black origin is about 82cm. statistically; the
 probability of a triangulation error of 30cm is significantly higher than the probability of an error of
82cm.

In the absence of the clean origin it is quite likely that the vessel would have fractured, starting at the
black origin, at some pressure less than the intended hydrotest proof pressure. In any event, under no
circumstances would either origin have been considered a tolerable defect if its presence and
magnitude had been detected prior to the hydrotest.

4. Conclusion

One of the major conclusions drawn from the analysis of this fracture was the fact that the NDT
techniques used in the manufacture of this rocket motor casing (dye penetrant, ultrasonic, radiographic,
and visual) were much less sensitive and reliable than had been expected. The significant findings
from the hydrotest failure of the Thiokol Chemical Corporation 660cm diameter motor case can be
summarized as follows:

1. The failure originated from an undetected defect in a region of the heat-affected zone of the W7/302
longitudinal weld that had been covered by a manual TIG repair weld. The defect, which was
submerged within the vessel wall and oriented longitudinally, was approximately 3.556cm long and
had a width of about 0.254cm.

2. A second undetected defect associated with the W7/302 weld was involved as a secondary fracture
origin. This defect was also located beneath a TIG repair weld. It was somewhat larger than the
primary origin, but was oriented transversely so that the nominal stress acting across it was only about
one-half that acting across the primary origin. In the absence of the primary origin, fracture might have
originated from this secondary origin at a pressure closer to the intended proof pressure.

3. Three other undetected defects were discovered under manual TIG repair welds when the weld regions
were re inspected by nondestructive test methods after the failure. One of these defects was transverse
to the W7/10 sub arc weld. A large tension specimen that was tested to determine the severity of this
defect fractured at a gross stress of 792.9Mpa. The other two defects of substantial size were
submerged under a TIG weld repair to the W6/3 TIG weld.

4. The association of severe defects with four separate TIG weld repair regions strongly suggests that the
formation of these defects was a consequence of the TIG repair welding over a grain-coarsened
material structure resulting from the high thermal input of the welding processes used.

5. The fracture toughness of the submerged arc welds in this 250 grade maraging steel motor case was
inadequate to tolerate crack-like defects as large as those that actually occurred in the motor case. It
had been believed previously that much smaller defects could be detected with high reliability by the
nondestructive inspection procedures that were used. The fracture toughness would have been
sufficient to tolerate defects of a size that had been considered to be detectable.
6. Because none of the critical defects had been discovered by nondestructive testing prior to the
hydrotest, a limited investigation was undertaken to ascertain the sensitivity of radiographic and
ultrasonic procedures in detecting cracks. The results of this study showed that the NDT methods as
used in motor case inspection are much less sensitive and reliable than had been expected, and that
there is more to be learned about nondestructive inspection for the detection of cracks. The criticality
of the sensitivity of inspection depends, of course, on the toughness of the materials involved. In the
present state-of-the-art, the materials and welding processes selected should provide the highest
attainable toughness consistent with the requirements of the application. In general, the tougher
materials will be among those that have the lower yield strengths consistent with the requirements of
the application. The sensitivity of the nondestructive inspection procedures should be evaluated for any
specific application in relation to the toughness of the materials used.

5. Recommendation

For new motor case projects it is recommended that the sensitivity of the selected nondestructive
testing procedures be thoroughly evaluated to determine if defects of a critical size for the design loads
and materials used can be detected with confidence.

There is a possibility that the defects that were not detected during the inspection of the motor case
prior to aging might have been detected if the motor case had been re inspected just before hydrotest.
The aging heat treatment may have caused the defects to "open up" and thus become more detectable.
It is therefore recommended that pressure vessels that are to be hydro tested should be thoroughly
inspected immediately prior to the hydrotest, regardless of any previous inspections that may have
been performed.

There is no evidence that any external factors or inadvertent loads contributed to the failure. It was a
straightforward example of the weakening of a structure by a severe flaw.
References
[1]. Letter of L. L. Jemison to H. K. Griffith, 21 December 1951, WV Department of Transportation,
State Archives, Charleston.
[2]. LeRose, C. The Collapse of the Silver Bridge West Virginia Historical Society Quarterly Volume
XV, No.4 October, 2001 www.wvculture.org/history/wvhs1504.html
[3]. Highway Accident Report: Collapse of U.S. 35 Highway Bridge Point Pleasant, West Virginia,
Dec. 15, 1967 www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1971/HAR7101.htm
[4]. Silver Bridge Collapse www.corrosion-doctors.org/Bridges/Silver-Bridge.htm
[5]. Gordon, J.E. (1978) Structures or why things dont fall down London: Penguin
[6]. Biezma, Maria and Schanack, Frank. (2007). Collapse of Steel Bridges. Journal of Performance
of Constructed Facilities, ASCE, Vol. 21.
[7]. Bennett, J., and Mindlin, Harold. (1973).Metallurgical Aspects of the Failure of the Point Pleasant
Bridge Journal of Testing and Evaluation, JTEVA, Vol. 1.
[8]. Irwin, G. R.: Fracture. Vol VI of Encycl. Phys., S.Flugge, ed., Springer-Verlag (Berlin), 1958.
[9]. Paris, Paul C.; and Sih, George C.: Stress Analysis of Cracks. Fracture Toughness Testing and Its
Applications. STP No. 381, ASTM, 1965.
[10]. Srawley, John E.; and Brown, William F., Jr.: NASA TN D-2599, 1965.
[11]. Birkle, A. J.; Reisdorf, B. G.; and Salmon-Cox, P. H.: An Investigation of the Mechanical
Properties and Microstructures of 18 Ni (250) Maraging
[12]. Steel Weldments. Tech. Rept. AFML-TR-65-364. Air Force Materials Re-search and
Technology Division. Air Force Systems Command, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, Mar. 1965.