Yusay vs. Court of Appeals Gr. No. 156684
Yusay vs. Court of Appeals Gr. No. 156684
Supreme Court
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
R E S O LUTIO N
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on October 18, 2002[1] and
resolution promulgated on January 17, 2003,[2] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed and set aside the order issued in their favor on February 19, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in Mandaluyong City (RTC). [3] Thereby, the CA
upheld Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, adopted by the City of Mandaluyong
(City) authorizing its then City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the
expropriation of the parcel of land registered in the names of the petitioners.
Antecedents
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated
between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay
Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and
the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only
property and only source of income.
WHEREAS, there is a parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose Fernandez Street,
Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong, owned and registered in the name of
MR. ANTONIO YUSAY;
WHEREAS, this piece of land have been occupied for about ten (10) years by
many financially hard-up families which the City Government of Mandaluyong
desires, among other things, to provide modest and decent dwelling;
WHEREAS, the said families have already negotiated to acquire this land but was
refused by the above-named owner in total disregard to the City Governments
effort of providing land for the landless;
WHEREAS, the expropriation of said land would certainly benefit public interest,
let alone, a step towards the implementation of social justice and urban land
reform in this City;
WHEREAS, under the present situation, the City Council deems it necessary to
authorize Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS to institute expropriation
proceedings to achieve the noble purpose of the City Government of
Mandaluyong.
Attested: Approved:
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step
in the Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of
Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and
without force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the
City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included
making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit
of the petitioners was premature.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition
for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the
City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available
to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the
special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances
considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-
judicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution No.
552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had
yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was
null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the
passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive
the petitioners and their heirs of their only property; that there was no due process
in the passage of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited
to the subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their
opposition; and that the purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and
the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA concluded that the
reversal of the January 31, 2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because
Resolution No. 552 deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of
regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary; that notice to
the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of the succeeding hearings conducted by the City
was not a part of due process, for it was enough that their views had been consulted
and that they had been given the full opportunity to voice their protest; that to rule
otherwise would be to give every affected resident effective veto powers in law-
making by a local government unit; and that a public hearing, although necessary
at times, was not indispensable and merely aided in law-making.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus,
they appeal to the Court, posing the following issues, namely:
1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be assailed even before its
implementation?
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, and find that certiorari and prohibition
were not available to the petitioners under the circumstances. Thus, we sustain,
albeit upon different grounds, the result announced by the CA, and declare that the
RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
1.
Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod
The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or officer must be
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial function, according to
Bouvier,[9] is the exercise of the judicial faculty or office; it also means the capacity
to act in a specific way which appertains to the judicial power, as one of the powers
of government. The term, Bouvier continues, [10] is used to describe generally those
modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as a department of organized
government, and through and by means of which it accomplishes its purpose and
exercises its peculiar powers.
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy
involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution
No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or
opinion.
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in adopting
Resolution No. 552. To demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to
differentiate between a resolution and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific
matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that is permanent in character.
[11]
No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing
but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant
circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its
discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required
the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating
an expropriation proceeding. In this regard, Section 19 of The Local Government
Code clearly provides, viz:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws:Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty
Corporation,[12] a case in which the Municipality of Paraaque based its complaint
for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so:
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was
no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU.
This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP
337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere
resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA
7160, the present Local Government Code which was already in force when
the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance
for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and
ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided
otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
xxx
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its
Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its
Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor
regarding the subject expropriation.
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged
the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy
thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In
fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. In any event,
this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioners Complaint for
expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that:
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the
Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of
action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial courts Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
[13]
(Emphasis supplied)
2.
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The special civil action for prohibition is governed also by Section 2 of Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show
that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. [18] A remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.[19]
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not
available to the petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552,
for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment
or opinion.
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering
that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to
expropriate the petitioners property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the
petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the
power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of
a verified complaint in the proper court.[22] Before the City as the expropriating
authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said
to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their
property under the power of eminent domain.[23]
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 109-116; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos (retired/deceased), with Associate
Justice Roberto A. Barrios (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine (retired), concurring.
[2]
Id., p. 136.
[3]
Id., pp. 79-81.
[4]
Id., p. 32
[5]
Id., p. 115.
[6]
Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169498, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 691, 700; Madrigal
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 133.
[7]
Republic v. Yang Chi Hao, G.R. No. 165332, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 220, 221 citing Herrera v. Barrett, 25
Phil. 245, 271 (1913).
[8]
Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112948, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 546, 553.
[9]
Bouviers Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (Rawles Revision, 1914); a similar definition is found in Blacks Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Beluso v. The Municipality of Panay (Capiz), G.R. No. 153974, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 113.
[12]
G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998, 292 SCRA 678, 687; see also Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong,
G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 137.
[13]
Id., pp. 687-692.
[14]
Magallanes v. Sarita, G.R. No. L-22092, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 575; Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164966, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 307, 314; Vergara v. Rugue, G.R. No. L-32984, August 26, 1977, 78 SCRA 312,
323; Lopez v. City Judge, G.R. No. L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616, 621-622; Navarro v. Lardizabal, G.R.
No. L-22581, May 21, 1969, 25 SCRA 370.
[15]
Commissioner of Immigration v. Go Tieng, 28 SCRA 237.
[16]
Solidum v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-16570, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 320, 325; Apurillo v. Garciano, G.R. No.
L-23683, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1054.
[17]
Solidum v. Hernandez, supra.
[18]
Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 677.
[19]
Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 678.
[20]
Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999, 315 SCRA 150; Manila
Railroad Company v. Paredes, 31 Phil 118, 135 (1915).
[21]
Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 422.
[22]
Section 1, Rule 67, Rules of Court.
[23]
Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, G.R. No. 83987, December 27,
1994, 239 SCRA 436, 444.