Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Hegel's Dialectics
Hegel's Dialectics
FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
Since the Absolute concepts for each subject matter lead into one another, when they
are taken together, they constitute Hegels entire philosophical system, which, as Hegel
says, presents itself therefore as a circle of circles (EL 15). We can picture the entire
system like this (cf. Maybee 2009: 29):
FIGURE 3
Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical method genuinely
scientific. As he says, the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific
progression (EL Remark to 81). He acknowledges that a description of the method can
be more or less complete and detailed, but because the method or progression is driven
only by the subject matter itself, this dialectical method is the only true method (SL-M
54; SL-dG 33).
FIGURE 4
In its speculative moment, then, Nothing implies presence or Being, which is the unity
of the determinations in their comparison [Entgegensetzung] (EL 82; alternative
translation), since it both includes butas a process from one to the other
also compares the two earlier determinations of Nothing, first, as pure absence and,
second, as just as much presence.
The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or formBecomingnot by a
triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothingwhich
leads Nothing to sublate itselfand by the implications of the process so far. Since Being
and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they
are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move
forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and
Nothing at the same time. Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken
to be presence (i.e., Being) implies Nothing (or absence), and that an undefined content
taken to be absence (i.e., Nothing) implies presence (i.e., Being). The next concept, then,
takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implicationsnamely, that Being
implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as
two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing
becomes Being. We can picture Becoming this way (cf. Maybee 2009: 53):
FIGURE 5
If Hegels account of dialectics is a general description of the life of each concept or form,
then any section can include as many or as few stages as the development requires.
Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)a
technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG 50; cf. section 4)we can see the process as
driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which
allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in
its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or
form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort
of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a
comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in
each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various
philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.
FIGURE 9
Since One and Many have been exhausted, the next stage, Ratio, must, necessarily,
employ a different strategy to grasp the elements in play. Just as Being-for-itself is a
concept of universality for Quality and captures the character of a set of something-others
in its content (see section 1), so Ratio (the whole rectangle with rounded corners) is a
concept of universality for Quantity and captures the character of a set of quantities in its
content (EL 1056; cf. Maybee 2009, xviiixix, 957).
In a second, common syntactic pattern, the dialectical development leads to an endless,
back-and-forth processa bad or spurious infinity (EL 94)between two concepts
or forms. Hegels dialectics cannot rest with spurious infinities. So long as the dialectical
process is passing endlessly back and forth between two elements, it is never finished,
and the concept or form in play cannot be determined. Spurious infinities must therefore
be resolved or stopped, and they are always resolved by a higher-level, more universal
concept. In some cases, a new, higher-level concept is introduced that stops the spurious
infinity by grasping the whole, back-and-forth process. Being-for-itself (cf.section 1), for
instance, is introduced as a new, more universal concept that embracesand hence
stopsthe whole, back-and-forth process between something-others. However, if the
back-and-forth process takes place between a concept and its own contentin which case
the concept already embraces the contentthen that embracing concept is redefined in a
new way that grasps the whole, back-and-forth process. The new definition raises the
embracing concept to a higher level of universalityas a totality (an all) or as a
complete and completed concept. Examples from logic include the redefinition of
Appearance as the whole World of Appearance (EL 132; cf. SL-M 5057, SL-dG 443
4), the move in which the endless, back-and-forth process of Real Possibility redefines
the Condition as a totality (EL 147; cf. SL-M 547, SL-dG 483), and the move in which
a back-and-forth process created by finite Cognition and finite Willing redefines the
Subjective Idea as Absolute Idea (EL 2345; cf. SL-M 8223, SL-dG 7334).
Some of the most famous terms in Hegels worksin itself, for itself and in and for
itselfcapture other, common, syntactic patterns. A concept or form is in itself when
it has a determination that it gets by being defined against its other (cf. Being-in-itself,
EL 91). A concept or form is for itself when it is defined only in relation to its own
content, so that, while it is technically defined in relation to an other, the other is not
really an other for it. As a result, it is really defined only in relation to itself. Unlike an
in itself concept or form, then, a for itself concept or form seems to have its definition
on its own, or does not need a genuine other to be defined (like other concepts or forms,
however, for itself concepts or forms turn out to be dialectical too, and hence push on
to new concepts or forms). In the logic, Being-for-itself (cf.section 1), which is defined
by embracing the something others in its content, is the first, for itself concept or
form.
A concept or form is in and for itself when it is doubly for itself, or for itself not
only in terms of contentinsofar as it embraces its contentbut also in terms of form or
presentation, insofar as it also has the activity of presenting its content. It is for itself
(embraces its content) for itself (through its own activity), or not only embraces its content
(the for itself of content) but alsopresents its content through its own activity (the for
itself of form). The second for itself of form provides the concept with a logical
activity (i.e., presenting its contents) and hence a definition that goes beyondand so is
separate fromthe definition that its content has. Since it has a definition of its own that
is separate from the definition of its content, it comes to be definedin the in itself
senseagainst its content, which has become its other. Because this other is still its
own content, however, the concept or form is both in itself but also still for itself at
the same time, or is in and for itself (EL 1489; cf. Maybee 2009: 2446). The in
and for itself relationship is the hallmark of a genuine Concept (EL 160), and captures
the idea that a genuine concept is defined not only from the bottom up by its content, but
also from the top down through its own activity of presenting its content. The genuine
concept of animal, for instance, is not only defined by embracing its content (namely, all
animals) from the bottom up, but also has a definition of its own, separate from that
content, that leads it to determine, from the top down, what counts as an animal.
Other technical, syntactic terms include aufheben (to sublate), which we already saw
(section 1), and abstract. To say that a concept or form is abstract is to say that it is
only a partial definition. Hegel describes the moment of understanding, for instance, as
abstract (EL 79, 80) because it is a one-sided or restricted definition or determination
(section 1). Conversely, a concept or form is concrete in the most basic sense when it
has a content or definition that it gets from being built out of other concepts or forms. As
we saw (section 2), Hegel regarded Becoming as the first concrete concept in the logic.
Although Hegels writing and his use of technical terms can make his philosophy
notoriously difficult, his work can also be very rewarding. In spite ofor perhaps
because ofthe difficulty, there are a surprising number of fresh ideas in his work that
have not yet been fully explored in philosophy.
Bibliography
English Translations of Key Texts by Hegel
[EL] The Encyclopedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences
[Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I], translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A.
Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
[LHP], Lectures on the History of Philosophy [Geschichte der Philosophie], in three
volumes, translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1974.
[PhG], Phenomenology of Spirit [Phnomenologie des Geistes], translated by A.V.
Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
[PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right [Philosophie des Rechts], edited by Allen W.
Wood and translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
[SL-dG], The Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik], translated by George di
Giovanni, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[SL-M], The Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik], translated by A.V. Miller,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
English Translations of Other Primary Sources
Aristotle, 1954, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (in
two volumes), edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(Citations to Aristotles text use the Bekker numbers, which appear in the margins of
many translations of Aristotles works.)
Fichte, J.G., 1982 [1794/95], The Science of Knowledge, translated by Peter Heath and
John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Fichtes work include
references to the volume and page number in the German edition of Fichtes collected
works edited by I.H Fichte, which are used in the margins of many translations of Fichtes
works.)
Kant, Immanuel, 1999 [1781], Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul
Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Kants
text use the Ak. numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Kants
works.)
Plato, 1961, The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters, edited by Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to
Platos text use the Stephanus numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations
of Platos works.)
Secondary Literature
Bencivenga, Ermanno, 2000, Hegels Dialectical Logic, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Burbidge, John, 1981, On Hegels Logic: Fragments of a Commentary, Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Findlay, J.N., 1962, Hegel: A Re-Examination, New York: Collier Books.
, 1966, Review of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary, by Walter
Kaufmann. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950), 16(65): 36668.
Forster, Michael, 1993, Hegels Dialectical Method, in The Cambridge Companion to
Hegel, Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130170.
Fritzman, J.M., 2014, Hegel, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Harris, Errol E., 1983, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, Lanham, MD: University
Press of America.
Harris, H.S. (Henry Silton), 1997, Hegels Ladder (in two volumes: vol. I, The
Pilgrimage of Reason, and vol. II, The Odyssey of Spirit), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company).
Hyppolite, Jean, 1974, Genesis and Structure of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit,
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, 1965, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary,
Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company Inc.
, 1966, A Reinterpretation, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (This book is a
republication of the first part of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary.)
Kosok, Michael, 1972, The Formalization of Hegels Dialectical Logic: Its Formal
Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation, in Hegel: A Collection of
Critical Essays, Alisdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press: 23787.
Lauer, Quentin, 1976, A Reading of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, New York:
Fordham University Press.
Maybee, Julie E., 2009, Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegels
Encyclopaedia Logic, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 1964 [1910], A Commentary of Hegels Logic, New
York: Russell and Russell Inc. (This edition is a reissue of McTaggarts book, which was
first published in 1910.)
Mueller, Gustav, 1958, The Hegel Legend of Synthesis-Antithesis-Thesis, Journal of
the History of Ideas, 19(3): 41114.
Mure, G.R.G., 1950, A Study of Hegels Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pinkard, Terry, 1988, Hegels Dialectic: The Explanation of a Possibility, Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Rosen, Michael, 1982, Hegels Dialectic and its Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rosen, Stanley, 2014, The Idea of Hegels Science of Logic, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Singer, Peter, 1983, Hegel, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Solomon, Robert C., 1983, In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegels
Phenomenology of Spirit, New York: Oxford University Press.
Stace, W.T., 1955 [1924], The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition, New York:
Dover Publications. (This edition is a reprint of the first edition, published in 1924.)
Stewart, Jon, 1996, Hegels Doctrine of Determinate Negation: An Example from
Sense-certainty and Perception, Idealistic Studies, 26(1): 5778.
, 2000, The Unity of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit: A Systematic Interpretation,
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Taylor, Charles, 1975, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Westphal, Kenneth R., 2003, Hegels Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the
Phenomenology of Spirit, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
Winfield, Richard Dien, 1990, The Method of Hegels Science of Logic, in Essays on
Hegels Logic, George di Giovanni (ed.), Albany, NY: State University of New York, pp.
4557.