Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crim Pro Cases 3
Crim Pro Cases 3
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED
of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE
December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE
of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS
Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION;
responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND
Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION
NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL
of the supposed positive identification of two alleged PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL
eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE
attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT
the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO
come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE
their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity. CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres- II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL
Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[5]
suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have
warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the
promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be
a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was
arrested by the NBI agents on that day.[1] However, criminal probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D.
charges were filed later against the two student suspects.[2] No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special First. In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that
Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, [3] which produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the
makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
prosecution of criminal offenders. when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are
provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
On May 18, 1995, an information[4] was filed against them, reads:
alleging that:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU - Vice personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested
Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO - Asst. Legal Counsel; and has committed it;
COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN - Chief, Security Force, all of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a being transferred from one confinement to another.
certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and
criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS There is no question that this case does not fall under
CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case did not
suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students
graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from
Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation and confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies
prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing said because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents
suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and
another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above Taparan were probably guilty.
acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite
their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal
slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their
prosecution and conviction. investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested
were the perpetrators of the crime.[6] They invoke the ruling
CONTRARY TO LAW. in People v. Tonog, Jr.[7] in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
they apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been things to be seized.
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with
effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their
gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was
that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators. illegal.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for
the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c), the Office of the Ombudsman
on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at
the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable
admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused.It is ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated
clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's
that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively
invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not
pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the just ignore this positive identification. In fact, respondents do not
accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the
was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same clubbing of Dennis Venturina.
day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the
crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending
"personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be
officers from arresting the SJ members on the ground that the
arrested had committed it."
warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest opinion, an illegal arrest. While this justification may, at best, show
Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the
their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had
crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might
reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested
indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the
committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive
crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of
identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on the
two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest
alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on
without a warrant by the NBI.
respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the
apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members
We have already explained what constitutes "personal positively identified.
knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under warrantless arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting
Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the warrantless
means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The arrest effected was valid; he having the quasijudicial authority to rule on
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual this matter. Of course, there are various remedies under the law which
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested,
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A may have filed against the arresting NBI agents.However, it appears
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement
arrest.[8] agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members
pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these Dennis Venturina.[9]
agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When
respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable
Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. The question is
doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a
doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained,
the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided
called to put an end to the violence on the campus. in Rule 113, 5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could
not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts
warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The could decide the question of probable cause since the students
determination of the existence of probable cause that the were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As the Special
persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in
make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:
citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing
or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night
the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we of December 12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to
are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters
consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being
arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides: sought to be made on campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then
present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and students on campus.
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs.
probable cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is
defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs.
respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al.
(Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the
accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et
show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the
accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
bounds of law.[10]
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs.
Castelo, L- 6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
provision of P.D. No. 1829:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial The victim did not confide to her family about these
Court, Branch 12, Bulacan, finding accused-appellant Agustin incidents because she was very afraid of accused-appellant and
Gopio guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to suffer the of what her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim was
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the ashamed and worried that her friends would spread the news
victim in the amount of P3,727.00 as actual regarding her unfortunate experience.[6]
damages, P30,000.00, as moral damages, and to pay the costs
of the suit. To corroborate the testimony of the victim, Luzviminda
Millano initially testified that her daughter, who was born on
The information against accused-appellant charged:[2] February 7, 1985, was 10 years old at the time of the rape
incident, as evidenced by the victims birth certificate (Exh. D).
[7]
That sometime in the year 1995, in the municipality of Obando, On cross-examination, Luzviminda recalled that when the
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this victim came back from the store, she observed that her daughter
Honorable Court, the said accused Agustin Gopio y Arcillas, by looked pale and worried. She also noticed that her daughter had
means of violence, force and intimidation, did then and there changed her clothes. However, Luzviminda did not bother to ask
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the her daughter what happened to her because she had several
said Ma. Princess Millano y San Diego, 11 years of age, against things to do and was very busy preparing for lunch. The victim
her will. did not eat lunch on that day and ate supper ahead of
them. Luzviminda added that since the time of the incident, the
victim had become inattentive and withdrawn. She started getting
Contrary to law.
noticeably low grades in school.[8]
T: Humigit-kumulang, gaano ba katagal na ginawa sa iyo ni Q: Why do you know that this incident took place between the
Jhun ang bagay na yun? months of May and June, 1995?
S: Humigit kumulang po sa isang (1) minuto. A: Because there was an occasion then, Maam.
T: Nang pinasok ni Jhun ang kanyang ari sa iyong ari ano ang Q: What occasion?
naramdaman mo?
A: Our barangay fiesta, Maam.
S: Masakit po ang ari ko.
....
T: Hindi ka ba sumigaw o humingi ng saklolo para matigil ang
gingawa sa iyo ni Jhun? Q: So what happened when he dragged you inside his
bedroom?
S: Hindi po dahil natakot po ako sa kanya.
A: He advised me to undress, Maam.
T: Hindi ka ba tinakot ni Jhun?
Q: When he advised you to undress, did you follow his order?
S: Tinakot po ako pagkatapos ng ginawa sa akin ng Huwag
daw po akong magsusumbong kahit kanino dahil may A: Yes, Maam, because he threatened me.
masamang mangyayari sa akin.
S: Bibili po ako sa tindahan nila at nakita ko po na sarado ang A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina, Maam.
tindahan tapos po pauwi na po ako tinawag po ako ni
Jhun at pinapasok ako sa bahay nila at may sasabihin
Q: What did you do when he inserted his penis inside you
daw po siya sa akin.
vagina?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Madam witness, you also stated that you are going to buy the incident took place, the prosecution also presented the birth
cooking oil and you saw that the house of the accused certificate of the victim.
was closed. Now, why despite the fact that the house of
the accused was closed then you still went there at his Accused-appellant interposes a number of defenses.
store?
First. Accused-appellant claims that in May and June of
A: I was about to go back home when he called me and when 1995, he was in Novaliches selling fish. This defense merits no
I came to him, he suddenly pulled me inside his house, consideration. Accused-appellant has not shown that it was
sir. physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. Moreover, other than the
Q: Miss witness, you said that the accused called you. Where testimony of accused-appellant and his wife that the latter never
was the accused then when he called you at that time? leaves their house, no evidence was presented to substantiate
his defense of alibi.
A: By the door of his house, sir.
In contrast, the victim positively identified accused-appellant
.... as the perpetrator of the crime and categorically testified that she
had been raped by accused-appellant in the latters house to
Q: Madam witness, you also stated that your vagina bled. Is it which she was taken between the months of May and June
not a fact that you were very afraid at that time? 1995. It has been held that when a rape victims testimony is
straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination
and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
A: I became afraid because of his threat not to tell my family
points, the same must be given full faith and credit. [23] Thus, this
or bad things will happen to me and to my family, sir.
Court said in one case:[24]
Q: What did you think of your blood coming from your vagina
Alibi as a means of defense is weak when not substantiated by
at that time, Madam witness?
the testimony of a credible witness. Courts have always looked
upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always
A: I became very afraid worried that something might happen received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and
to me which was bad, sir. unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. Alibi as basis
for acquittal must be established with clear and convincing
.... evidence. The accused must convincingly demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
Q: Madam witness, when you went back home and bought the crime at the time of its commission. And, where accused was
again another cooking oil as your mother have told you positively identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill
at that time, were you wearing the same clothes at that motive against the rapist, as in this case, the defense of alibi
time - were you wearing the same clothes when you must fail.
came from the house of Gopio back to your house and
then went out again to buy cooking oil? Between the positive assertions of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative averments of accused-appellant, the
A: No, sir, I changed my clothes. former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to
greater evidentiary weight.[25]
COURT:
The defense further argues that accused-appellant could
Q: Why did you change your clothes? not have committed the crime in his house between those
months because, as testified to by accused-appellants wife, she
was always there tending the store and taking care of their two
A: My mother might notice the blood on my panty and she
small children. The trial court correctly gave credence to the
might scold me, your honor.
victims testimony that there was no one in accused-appellants
house when she was raped by the latter. As she testified:[26]
The age of the victim at the time was likewise proven by the
prosecution. In fact, it has not been raised as an issue in this
FISCAL:
case.
....
The trial court in its decision observed:[21]
Q: You said that he inserted his penis inside your vagina and
. . . . The penal code penalizes carnal knowledge by a man of a
you said that it took place between May and June. My
woman under twelve years of age, under any circumstance,
question to you now is, where did this takes place?
whether force or intimidation is used or not, whether or not she is
deprived of reason or consciousness, or even if the girl
consented or herself was the one who initiated the act. She is A: In his house, Maam.
presumed by law not in any position to give either consent or
resistance because of her young age, and no man is allowed by Q: And when you said in his house, where is his
law to have sex with her unpunished. house? Where is this house located?
In People v. Alegado,[22] it was held that, under 39 and 40 of A: At Brgy. San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan, Maam.
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy in respect to the Q: Now, how come that you were in his house at this time?
pedigree of any of its members may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, A: I was then going to his house because he has a store,
either by consanguinity or affinity. The word pedigree includes Maam.
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, and the
dates when, the places where these facts occurred, and the
Q: And what will you suppose to do in that store?
names of the relatives. Hence, the testimonies of the victim and
her mother are sufficient to prove the victims age. In addition,
aside from the testimonies of the victim and her mother that the A: I would buy something, Maam.
former was born on February 7, 1985 and was 10 years old when
Q: And do you still remember what you were suppose to buy What accused-appellant did to complainant would not have
that time? been discovered by the latters parents were it not for the fact that
she complained of pains in her navel which prompted her mother
A: Yes, Maam. to bring her to Dr. Bautista for a medical check-up. There it was
found that the victim was no longer a virgin. Only then did the
Q: What will you suppose to buy? victim confess that she was raped by accused-appellant. Had it
not been for that medical examination, the victim would not have
told them about the rape committed by accused-appellant. This
A: Cooking oil, Maam.
explains the delay in reporting the crime in this case.
BUENA, J.:
Regarding his arrest, while accused-appellant claimed that
he protested when he was imprisoned by the police authorities,
he failed to raise objections to his arrest at the earliest possible Before the Court, for its automatic review, is the
opportunity. The record shows that he voluntarily entered a plea Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan, Branch
of not guilty when he was arraigned on March 7, 1997, thereby 2, in Criminal Case No. 2511-599, which has found herein
waiving his right to question any irregularity in his arrest. By accused-appellant, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, guilty beyond
pleading guilty, accused-appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-
the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest, for the year old daughter. The death sentence having been decreed by
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the trial court, the records of the case have, accordingly, been
his person. Furthermore, any such irregularity will not negate the elevated to this Court.
validity of his conviction duly proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution.[39] Rodolfo Oling Madraga was charged with two (2) counts of
rape committed against his own 16-year old daughter, Fe C.
Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that accused- Madraga. One was committed on May 19, 1995 (Crim. Case No.
appellant Agustin Gopio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the 2511-599), and the other one on August 24, 1996 (Crim. Case
crime of statutory rape. No. 2515-602).[2]
At the arraignment on November 4, 1996, accused- Fe Madraga was brought to the doctor, and her medical
appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Antonio D. Banico, entered examination confirmed that she was sexually molested
separate pleas of not guilty for each case. Thereafter, the trial (Ibid; Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and B).
proper of the cases was set to November 18, 19, and 20, 1996.[3]
Fe Madraga, reported the matter to the police authorities (Ibid, p.
On November 18, 1996, Atty. Banico, counsel for the 13).[6]
accused, moved that they be given time up to December to talk
with complainants mother so that the accused will plead guilty to On December 10, 1996, the trial court rendered its
the first case, but will seek for the dismissal of the second Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
case. The complainants mother, who was in Court, manifested
that she does not agree to the proposition. Trial of the cases was WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
re-set to December 2, 3 & 4, 1996.[4] accused, RODOLFO OLING MADRAGA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the said crime of RAPE against
On December 2, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested his own daughter, who is only more than 16 years old at the time
that the accused was willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crime of the commission of the offense. And hereby sentences said
of rape, which was committed in the month of May, 1995, accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH.
provided that the other case be tried on another date.
The plea of guilty of the accused being offset by his being drunk
Thus, accused pleaded guilty in Criminal Case No. 2511- during the commission of the crime, which according to the
599 upon the following complaint: complainant, her father is not a habitual drinker, cannot be taken
into consideration in his favor.
The undersigned complainant, a minor of sixteen (16) years of
age, under oath, accuses her father, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, of The penalty imposable for the crime of Rape especially if it is
the crime of Rape, committed as follows: committed by the accused against his children is really harsh. In
fact this Presiding Judge was a little bit reluctant to impose that
That sometime in the month of May, 1995, and within the extreme penalty of death upon the accused, but since it is the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Barrio Militar, mandate of the law, then the Court when the evidence warrant
Barangay Menzi, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, must have to obey its command. And besides, the Court cannot
Philippines, the above-named accused who was under the cleanse its conscience if the perpetrator of the crime of rape
influence of liquor, entered the room of the undersigned committed against his own blood would be able to escape the
complainant, who was then sleeping, and by means of force and punitive sanction of the law.
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously remove the short pant (sic) and panty of the And as this Court had repeatedly pronounced over and over
undersigned complainant, lay on top of her and insert his penis again, under no circumstance, shall a father use his own
inside her vagina, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of daughter as a vehicle to satisfy his bestial instinct for it is his
the undersigned complainant, against her will. moral and legal responsibility to take care, to nourish, and to
educate his children to become useful citizens of this country. But
Contrary to law.[5] since the accused herein had chosen to place the honor and the
dignity of her (sic) daughter into shame, into disgrace, and into ill-
Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence which repute, then the heavy burden of the law that catches upon him
consisted of the private complainants testimony and the medical cannot show him any mercy.
certificate issued by Dr. Nilo Barandino.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 2515-602, for the same
Private complainants testimony revealed that: offense of Rape committed by the same accused, against the
same complainant, the hearing thereof is hereby set to the
Fe Madraga, 16 years old, is the daughter of Rodolfo Madraga, a January calendar of this Court.
tricycle driver (TSN, December 2, 1996, pp. 4-5). Her mother,
Flordelina Madraga, was in Sabah, Malaysia, working as a SO ORDERED.
domestic helper.
Two Appellants Brief were filed with this Court -- one filed by
When her mother left for Malaysia, Fe and her brothers and the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti Death Penalty Task
sisters stayed with their grandfather, Luis Cotamco Sr., at Calle Force, and another one filed by Public Attorney Antonio D.
Bisaya (Ibid., p. 5). On the other hand, Rodolfo Madraga Banico, appellants counsel, before the court a quo.
remained at the family residence at Barrio Militar, Menzi, Isabela,
Basilan Province (Ibid, p. 6). The Appellants Brief filed by the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG), submits the following assignment of errors:
Sometime in January 1995, Rodolfo Madraga took his children
from their grandfather and forced them to stay with him at the I
family residence (Ibid, pp. 6 & 7).
Accused-appellant was denied due process.
Sometime in May 1995, at 12:00 midnight, Rodolfo Madraga
sexually abused her (sic) 16-year old daughter, Fe Madraga, in II
one of the rooms of the family residence. (Ibid, pp. 7-8)
The plea of guilt of accused-appellant is null and void as the trial
On the third night after the rape, Rodolfo Madraga repeated his court violated Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
bestial act toward her (sic) own daughter and did it every night Procedure.
thereafter (Ibid, p. 9).
On the first assigned error, appellant contends that he was
On August 24, 1996, Flordelina Madraga arrived from Malaysia illegally arrested, because there was no warrant of arrest issued
(Ibid, p. 10). The presence of her mother gave Fe Madraga for his arrest. Worse, appellant avers, his right to preliminary
enough courage to report to her the sexual abuses committed investigation was not observed, although there is no showing that
against her by her father (Ibid). he waived his right thereto. Appellant further alleges that there
was irregularity in the filing of the information in that a criminal
complaint was filed on September 10, 1996. However, in the
Order of the Court dated October 7, 1996, it mentioned an In the recent case of People vs. Bali-Balita,[17] the Court,
information not attached to the records of the case. The trial court through Madam Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, reiterated
directed the prosecution to submit the resolution which became the ruling in Buhat vs. Court of Appeals[18]that: xxx the real
the basis for the filing of the alleged information. A resolution nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
dated October 8, 1996 was submitted by the prosecution on or the preamble of the information, nor from the specification of
October 17, 1996 in compliance with the Order dated October 7, the provision of law alleged to have been violated xxx, but from
1996. The resolution was issued only on October 8, 1996, hence, the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the
appellant concludes that the same could not have been the basis information.
for the alleged information (assuming such information exists)
which was obviously filed earlier.[8] We should now discuss the issue of whether or not the
prosecution was able to prove appellants guilt beyond
The contentions have no merit. reasonable doubt, and the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
appellant. But first, the manner in which appellant entered his
In the recent case of People vs. Galleno, [9] this Court held plea of guilt should be tackled.
that an accused, as in this case, is estopped from questioning
any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the Accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty, but it appears
quashing of the information before the trial court, or if he from the records of the proceedings before the court a quo that
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the same was a conditional plea, because appellants counsel
entering a plea, and by participating in the trial. argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
drunkenness should be appreciated in favor of the appellant.
[19]
With regards to the absence of preliminary investigation, Said counsel was apparently unaware that the mitigating
this Court ruled in Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People[10] and cited in circumstances of plea of guilty, and the fact that the appellant
Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals,[11] that the absence of preliminary was drunk when he committed the crime, cannot be appreciated
investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the in the latters favor because a plea of guilty would not, under any
case. Nor does it impair the validity of the (complaint) or, circumstance, affect or reduce the death sentence.
otherwise, render it defective.
As heretofore discussed, the appellant pleaded upon a
On the second issue, appellant, through the FLAG, argues charge of simple rape. The penalty for simple rape under Art. 335
that the trial judge failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, a single
voluntariness and full comprehension of the accuseds plea of indivisible penalty. It appears that said counsel is also not aware
guilty to the capital offense, as mandated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 [12] of that under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in
the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, this case should be which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
remanded to the court of origin for further and appropriate applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
proceedings, citing People vs. Estomaca.[13] circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed (except where there is a privileged mitigating circumstance
This contention[14] of the FLAG would have been correct of minority of the accused under Art. 68, and when the crime
were it not for the circumstance that accused-appellant did not, in committed is not wholly excusable under Art. 69 neither of which
fact, plead guilty to a capital offense in the first place. On this is the case here[20]). While the records do not show that appellant
matter, Atty. Banico correctly pointed out that only the first entered his plea with the proviso that a certain penalty be
paragraph of the complaint mentions the age of the private imposed upon him, this can be inferred from the arguments made
complainant and the relationship of the accused to the private by his counsel during the hearing on December 2, 1996, and in
complainant, i.e., that the accused is the father of the private the appellants brief filed by said counsel, asking that appellant be
complainant. Atty. Banico is correct in arguing that the first entitled to the benefit of the plea.[21]
paragraph of the complaint is not part of the allegation of the
charge for rape to which appellant pleaded guilty. Therefore, said We would, thus, assume that appellant made a conditional
complaint charges only simple rape under Art. 335, for which the plea because this assumption would be more favorable to the
penalty is only reclusion perpetua, and not for rape under R.A. accused. A conditional plea of guilty, or one entered subject to
7659, qualified by the circumstance that the offender is the father the provision that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is
of the victim who is a minor, for which the penalty is death.[15] equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a
full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.[22] The question
In other words, since the appellant did not plead guilty to a now arises: Was a full-blown trial conducted?
capital offense, he cannot properly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 116,
and People vs. Estomaca, to have this case remanded to the We answer in the affirmative. The prosecution presented
trial court for compliance with said rule. evidence to prove the commission of the crime as charged in the
Complaint. The victim testified and was cross-examined. An
In order for rape to be punishable with death, the examination of the victims testimony shows that she testified in a
information/complaint must properly allege the qualifying categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and
circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim, remained consistent. Also, we find the victims testimony to be
and the latters minority, and the same must be proved beyond natural and consistent with human nature and the normal course
reasonable doubt, in the same manner that circumstances that of things. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical,
qualify a killing to murder, must be alleged in the information, and straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
also proved beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. Failure to consistent, is a credible witness.[23] Although no other evidence
allege the fact of filiation and minority in the information for rape was presented by the prosecution, in rape cases, the accused
is fatal and consequently bars conviction of its qualified form may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided
which is punishable with death.[16] that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
[24]
We, therefore, find that the trial court correctly found the
In the case at bar, such relationship is not stated in the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
cause of the accusation, or in the narration of the act or omission
constituting the offense, but only in the preamble or opening
statement of the complaint. The complaint upon which the The victim is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00 in line with
appellant was arraigned does not state in the specifications of the prevailing jurisprudence[25] in addition to moral damages in the
acts constitutive of the offense, that he is charged as the father of amount of P50,000.00. Award of moral damages to a rape victim
the victim. Such omission is prejudicial to the right of the accused is proper even if there was no proof presented during the trial as
to be informed of the nature of the accusations against him. basis therefor.[26]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED On August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was
insofar as it finds the accused-appellant Rodolfo Oling Madraga conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to cross-
guilty of the crime of rape, with the MODIFICATION that the examine Dr. Gonzales.
penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the
accused-appellant is directed to pay the victim P50,000.00 by On August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine private
way of indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages. respondent Go in a hospital without the prosecution having
cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.
SO ORDERED.
On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la
Pea was presented as a witness for the prosecution. Presiding
Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels
[G.R. No. 135045. December 15, 2000] each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the
conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied.
GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and
VICENTE GO, respondents. Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their
right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face
DECISION trial.
b) Order dated November 10, 1997, the dispositive portion On August 3, 1998 petitioner OSG filed a petition
of which reads: for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby grants
bail to accused Vicente Go which is fixed at P50,000.00, after On August 12, 1998, said petition of petitioner OSG was
taking into consideration, and this fact has not been disputed, dismissed by public respondent Court of Appeals, the pertinent
that said accused is presently confined in the hospital and is portions of the resolution read:
suffering from the following ailments:
The Court notes that said petition is practically a reproduction of
a) Ischemic Heart Disease, S/P Coronary the petition earlier filed by complainant Guadalupe Galan, which
Angiogram, Single Vessel Disease, LAD, was dismissed on March 26, 1998. The dismissal was reaffirmed
Chronic Stable Angina; by the Court in its resolution dated June 18, 1998, copy of which
was received by the OSG on June 29, 1998.
b) Essential Hypertension;
Instead of seeking, on time, the amendment of the first petition or
c) NIDDM a review of the resolution dismissing it, the OSG has come to this
Court through the instant petition which not only raises the same
d) Hypercholesterolemia; and matters ventilated in the same petition but also was filed beyond
the 60-day period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
e) Respiratory Tract Infection
As pointed out by Judge Gako, Jr., accused Go had already The ground of partiality is not one of the grounds enumerated in
been arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge the first paragraph of the just quoted provision that would per
Jacinto on July 9, 1991 which gave the trial court jurisdiction over se disqualify a judge from sitting in a case. Jurisprudence is clear
that partiality is a recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of
the judge under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1, 2000]
[31]
In this case, Judge Gako, Jr. has already ruled in the assailed
Order dated January 20, 1998 that he will not inhibit himself. JESUSA M. SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE
EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, MCTC Alcala-
To overturn the ruling of Judge Gako, Jr. and rule for his Bautista, Pangasinan; ADORACION R.
disqualification, there must be clear and convincing evidence to MARCOS, Clerk of Court, MCTC Alcala-
prove the charge of partiality. Material to this issue are the Bautista, Pangasinan; and CELESTINA B.
following parameters we have set in disqualifying a judge: mere CORPUZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial
suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; that Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, respondents.
there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; that
there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or MARGARITA SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE
otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that to be EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, MCTC, Alcala-
disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have Bautista, Pangasinan, respondent.
stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on
the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
DECISION
his participation in the case.[32]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Santiago further alleges that the MCTC of Alcala-
resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals dated August Bautista, Pangasinan failed to forward to the MTC of San
12, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The order dated November 10, 1997 of Ildefonso, Bulacan the bail bond allegedly posted by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 is SET ASIDE for Madera despite the letter dated August 8, 1996 of the clerk
being void in so far as it grants bail to the accused and the of court of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the
accused is ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on Order dated August 23, 1996 of Judge Domingo. Instead,
the bail application. The order dated May 23, 1997 denying the the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan received from Clerk of
re-raffle of Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous Court Adoracion R. Marcos a letter dated September 3,
Crimes Court and the resolution dated January 20, 1997 ruling 1996 stating that the Order dated August 23, 1996 could not
against the inhibition of presiding Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr. are be complied with due to the cancellation of Maderas bail
hereby AFFIRMED. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with bond. Attached to the letter was the Order dated August 28,
dispatch in the disposition of this case. 1996 of Judge Jovellanos stating that:
SO ORDERED.
For failure of the accused Violeta Madera to register her bailbond in proper authority emanating only from the Court. This stress aims to
accordance with Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal establish that she was not in a position to perform her duty of
Procedure, this Court hereby orders the cancellation of the order of transmitting the questioned bailbond of the accused after its approval by
release previously issued for her provisional liberty.[1] the Court to the MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan because of the following:
Santiago likewise assails the authority of Judge a) That she has no knowledge of the bailbond alluded to, much less to
Jovellanos to issue the Order of Release dated July 3, 1996 its appendages, i.e. release order, receipts, tax declarations, etc., and that
in connection with Criminal Case No. 6663. She avers that she never saw the bailbond presented to her nor to the Judge in the 8th
a warrant of arrest was issued against Madera on July 1, MCTC, Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, during the required office hours
1996. On July 2, 1996, Madera was arrested and detained in that it should have been presented. This fact can be proven by the
San Ildefonso, Bulacan but was released from custody on answer/comment of her co-respondent Clerk of Court of MTC,
the basis of said Order of Release. Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
On July 29, 1996, Judge Domingo issued an Order b) That she only learned of the existence of such bailbond when she
directing the clerk of court of the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, received the letter dated August 8, 1996, Annex B, of the Clerk of Court
Pangasinan to forward Maderas bail bond to the MTC of of MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, requesting for the transmittal of the
San Ildefonso, Bulacan.Upon receipt thereof, Judge bailbond being referred to. She replied to the request through her letter
Domingo noted that: dated August 15, 1996, Annex C, explaining therein that she was not
aware of the presentation and approval of said bailbond.
On August 6, 1996, this court received the Bail Bond posted by the
accused with the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Alcala, Pangasinan, xxx
together with the original of the Order of Release dated August 5, 1996.
d) Annex F which is an order of the Court dated August 28, 1996
The Court notes that the subject Bail Bond and the Order of Release are cancelled the release order and the bailbond for that matter, due to the
dated August 5, 1996, whereas the Order of Release signed by the same failure of the accused to register her bailbond. As ordered by the Court,
Judge which was the basis for the release of the accused from detention the undersigned respondent transmitted the same, WITH DISPATCH, to
is dated July 3, 1996.[2] the Clerk of Court, MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan x x x. [4]
In his Answer/Comment dated August 5, 1997, Judge For her part, respondent Corpuz, Clerk of Court,
Jovellanos cites Section 19, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, denies having facilitated
Criminal Procedure and argues that an accused must be the approval of Maderas bail bond. She adds that:
released upon approval of the bail by any judge, who shall
forward the release papers to the court where the case is The truth of the matter was that as far as her recollection, when the bail
pending. He further explained that: bond alluded to was presented to Respondent Judge Eduardo
Jovellanos, all the documents as well as the order for the Release of the
x x x Since the accused is from Pangasinan, she can go to any accused were all prepared and since it was already nighttime, the family
available Judge especially so that it was nighttime when her of the accused begged that they be accompanied [to] the house of
bailbond was presented to said respondent judge. Respondent Judge so that the said Order maybe signed and since herein
Respondent knew personally the accused and her family being
x x x [S]ince the warrant of arrest against the accused as claimed townmates and knowing that Respondent Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
by the complainant was issued on March 26, 1996, it is very certainly would be of help and nothing is wrong if said bailbond would
highly probable that accused was already aware of its existence be approved and the subsequent Order of Release be issued, the herein
and she was able to secure her bailbond. Thus, the release order Respondent obliged thereby she accompanied the family of the accused
dated April 3, 1996 was chronologically correct. [to] the residence of the Judge for the approval of the said bailbond. [5]
x x x [T]he failure to send the bailbond on time to the MTC San She also complied with the instructions of respondent Judge
Ildefonso was due to the fact that the accused failed to register her Jovellanos that the original copy of the Order of Release
bailbond within ten (10) days from the date the order of release dated April 3, 1996 and its attachments be sent to the MTC
was issued by the respondent. Non-compliance with the order to of San Ildefonso.With respect to Criminal Case No. 6663,
register the bailbond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation she did not give any comment since there was no mention
of the property bond (Sec. 14, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal of her participation therein.
Procedure).It is the policy of herein respondent not to send the
bailbond to the Court where the case or cases are pending unless In her verified complaint, complainant Margarita
and until the bailbond is registered within ten (10) days from the Sanchez alleges that she is the private complainant in
time the order of release was issued. Criminal Case No. 3712 entitled People of the Philippines
vs. James H. Orallo pending before Branch 53 of the
xxx Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan. Orallo
was arrested and detained at Rosales, Pangasinan and later
Approval of bailbonds is a ministerial duty for any judge as long as the transferred to the Balungao District Jail in Balungao,
requirements are fully satisfied. When the said bailbond was presented Pangasinan. Despite the pendency of said case before the
to herein respondent, he examined it carefully and he saw no reason RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, Orallo posted a property bond
why the same should not be approved taking into account that it was with the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, and thus, released from
sufficient in form and in substance. custody by virtue of an Order of Release dated December 6,
1996 issued by respondent Judge Jovellanos.
In view of the failure of the accused James Orallo to register his x x x It is also the conclusion of this Court that the Order of
bailbond in accordance with Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Release dated April 3, 1996, was issued without any approved
Criminal Procedure, this Court hereby orders the cancellation of the property bond. Judge Jovellanos deliberately lied when he said he
Order of Release and the bailbond previously issued for his provisional cancelled the property bond posted by the accused for her failure
liberty.[6] to register the property within ten (10) days to the proper
office. No property bond had reached the Court [that] issued the
Having secured a copy of the foregoing Order, Sanchez and warrant of arrest. Judge Jovellanos had taken advantage of his
Mrs. Pulido proceeded to Branch 53 of the RTC of Rosales, position as Presiding Judge, MCTC, Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan,
Pangasinan and gave a copy of the same to its staff for knowing fully well that he issued an order for the release of a
comment. However, the staff explained that they could not detained person, ordered the release of Violeta Madera under
act on the Order because they do not have the Order of Release dated April 3, 1996 even without the approved
records. Sanchez, Mrs. Pulido and Atty. Fernando again property bond. Judge Jovellanos deliberately lied again when he
contacted Judge Jovellanos, who informed them that the issued an Order of Recall of Order dated April 3, 1996 for failure
records of Orallos bail bond were not yet in the possession of accused Madera to register the bailbond in accordance with
of Branch 53. He then assured them that if Atty. Asuncion Sec. 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
will not forward the records of the bail bond, he or his Procedure. Recall order dated August 28, 1996 is another instance
representative will do so.Notwithstanding these assurances, of dishonesty. When unable to produce the property bond, He
Sanchez, Mrs. Pulido and Atty. Fernando learned that, as of (Jovellanos) thought of another lies by issuing said Order dated
January 7, 1997, the records of the bail bond have not yet August 28, 1996. The fact that the record of Criminal Case No.
been transmitted to the RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan. 6663 was forwarded from MTC San Ildefonso, Bulacan to RTC,
Bulacan does not render the propriety of issuing the Order of
In response to Sanchez complaint, Judge Jovellanos Release without property bond, moot and academic. The Order of
alleged that: Release on the basis of property bond is valid unless revoked by
the Appellate Court.
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the Insofar as respondent Corpuz is concerned, she has
accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his evidently been remiss in the performance of her
case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or duties. Although she claims that she followed the
municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, instructions of respondent Judge Jovellanos and transmitted
the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending, or in the records of Maderas bail bond to the MTC of San
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch Ildefonso, Bulacan by registered mail, the MTC of San
of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the Ildefonso, Bulacan has yet to receive the same. As pointed
accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where out by the investigating judge, respondent Corpuz failed to
his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial secure a registry return card or, in the absence thereof, a
court in the province, city, municipality where he was arrested. When certification from the post office to show that said records
no regional trial judge is available, he may file bail with any were mailed. Indeed, even in the absence of a registry return
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial card or certification, the Court is certain that the
judge therein. [documents] will reach the addressee if really mailed.
[15]
This circumstance leads us to doubt whether respondent
Corpuz actually transmitted the records to the MTC of San
Interestingly, almost all the cases wherein respondent Judge approved
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and more importantly, whether Madera
bail bonds and issued release orders were not pending before his
indeed posted a bail bond for her temporary liberty in DECISION
Criminal Case Nos. 6333-6336 and 6360-6362. We have
BUENA, J.:
consistently held that the conduct required of court
personnel must always be beyond reproach and is
This is an appeal from the joint decision [1] dated March 28, 1995,
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. [16] This
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, [2] finding
Court cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc guilty of two
those involved in the administration of justice which would counts of murder and imposing upon them two terms of reclusion
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish, or perpetua. Accused-appellants were ordered to reimburse the heirs of the
even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the victims, Jernie Sumagaysay and Oscar Celis, of actual expenses, and to
judiciary.[17] pay compensatory and moral damages, and costs.[3]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
As to the penalty that should be imposed on
The two informations[4] charging accused Gio Concorcio @ Jun,
respondents Judge Jovellanos and Corpuz, we find the
Edwin Yungot, Rommel Magpatoc and Josel Ayala @ Dodong Lanay,
recommended penalty of dismissal too harsh. In Yaneza, we with two counts of murder read:
meted upon respondent judge therein the penalty of
dismissal considering the number of times he exceeded his Criminal Case No. 15,377-87
authority in approving applications for bail outside his
territorial jurisdiction and his persistence in doing so despite That on or about May 24, 1987, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
the pendency of the administrative complaint against within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
him. This was further aggravated by his summary approval accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and
of an application for bail in a case where the penalty helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
imposable was life imprisonment. However, in the case at unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation,
bar, similar circumstances are wanting. and during nighttime, suddenly attacked, assaulted and stabbed one
Jernie Sumagaysay, with the use of said bladed instrument, thereby
afflicting [upon] the latter stabbed (sic) wounds which directly caused
For similar conduct, less severe penalties were his immediate death.
imposed upon two (2) erring judges, thus -
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
[18]
1. In Paz v. Tiong, we imposed upon respondent
therein, a judge of the MTC of Bolinao, Pangasinan, a fine Criminal Case No. 15,378-87.
of P3,000.00 for signing the bail bond and the order of
release of an accused whose case was pending before the That on or about May 24, 1987, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan absent any showing that the within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
judge having jurisdiction over the same was unavailable. accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation,
2. In Adapon v. Domagtoy,[19] we fined respondent and during nighttime, suddenly attacked, assaulted and stabbed one
judge of the MCTC of Santa Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Oscar Celis, with the use of said bladed instrument, thereby afflicting
Norte in the amount of P10,000.00 for ordering the release [upon] the latter stabbed (sic) wounds which directly caused his
of an accused whose cases were pending before the MCTC immediate death.
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte notwithstanding the fact that the
accused was neither arrested nor did he surrender to the CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
authorities before the order of release was issued, and that
the judge having jurisdiction over the cases was likewise Accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc were
unavailable. arrested on September, 1991[7] and February, 1993,[8] respectively. The
two (2) other accused remained at large.
Considering the advanced age and poor health of When arraigned on October 21, 1991, Yungot pleaded not guilty
respondent Judge Jovellanos and the long years of service in to both charges. Immediately, a joint trial for the two counts of murder
the judiciary of respondent Corpuz, we find that suspension ensued against him. On the other hand, subsequent to his arrest in 1993,
from the service will be sufficient punishment for their acts Magpatoc also pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment.
[9]
An urgent motion for bail was filed by Magpatoc on March 1,
complained of.
1993. After the hearing[10] on the said motion, the trial court issued an
Order dated June 16, 1993, denying the motion for bail. [11] Since the
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Adoracion prosecution had already finished presenting its evidence-in-chief against
Marcos is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Judge Yungot, and had rested its case against Yungot at the time of Magpatocs
Eduardo U. Jovellanos is hereby SUSPENDED, without arrest, Magpatoc was given a separate trial whereupon the prosecution
presented its evidence-in-chief against Magpatoc. After the prosecution
pay, for a period of one (1) year while respondent Celestina
rested its case against Magpatoc, a joint trial was conducted for the
Corpuz is likewise SUSPENDED, without pay, for a period defense, rebuttal and surrebuttal.
of four (4) months, with the WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with The prosecution presented the following witnesses against
more severely. Yungot: Delilah Celis Banderado, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Romeo
Sumagaysay, SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Jonathan
Abellana, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. The following
SO ORDERED. witnesses testified against Magpatoc: Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon,
Jr.,[12] SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Sgt. Virgilio
Jaranilla, Delilah Celis Banderado and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. Notably,
except for Jose Oyson, the foregoing witnesses also testified against
Yungot. On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled witnesses Jose Oyson and
Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, and in addition, presented Ruth Dionson and
Democrito Madiclum as witnesses. On surrebuttal, Yungots defense
[G.R. Nos. 121201-02. October 19, 2001] counsel presented Lorna Surbito as a witness.
On the other hand, in his defense, Magpatoc presented Allen
Ledesma, Noel Cahiwat, Ysmael Cahiwat and himself as witnesses;
while Yungot, along with Bernardo Bajenteng and Leovigildo Bautista
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GIO testified in court.
CONCORCIO @ JUN, EDWIN YUNGOT, ROMMEL
MAGPATOC and JOSEL AYALA @ DODONG The prosecution adduced the following evidence against Yungot
LANAY, accused. during his trial. Prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. testified that he
knew the deceased Oscar Celis, who was his former classmate and the
EDWIN YUNGOT and ROMMEL MAGPATOC, accused- other deceased, Jernie Sumagaysay,[13] whom he had met at
appellants. school. According to Lagamon, Jr., on May 24, 1987, he had a drinking
spree with Oscar Celis, Jernie Sumagaysay and Ben Hur Barol at the Autopsy Report No. N-040-87[32]
Davao Fiesta.[14] Around 9 or 10 p.m.,[15] after consuming four (4) or
five (5) bottles of beer, Lagamon, Jr. and his companions paid their bill POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
and proceeded home. While walking along Claveria St., Lagamon, Jr.,
who was walking alongside Ben Hur Barol some five (5) to six (6)
meters ahead of Oscar Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay, heard a 1. STABBED WOUND 1.5 cm. long, gaping, running
commotion at his back.[16] He immediately turned around and saw medially downward, edges cleancut, sharp edge
accused-appellant Edwin Yungot stab Oscar Celis two (2) or three (3) inferiorly medially, located in the right side of the chest,
times at the left side of his chest, while three (3) or four (4) other 4 cm. from the anterior median line, 12 cm. from the
persons were holding Celis.[17] He also saw another person thrust a knife right nipple, penetrating the skin and muscles in the
at the right side of the chest of Jernie Sumagaysay while riding at the 2nd intercostal space, right, cutting the pulmonary artery.
latters back.[18] He tried to assist his friend but the latters assailant CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE
threatened to stab him as well. [19] His companion, Ben Hur Barol did HEMORRHAGE DUE TO STAB WOUND, CHEST,
nothing because he was in shock. In his estimation, about five (5) to six RIGHT.[33]
(6) persons were involved in the stabbing incident, three (3) or four (4)
of whom were armed.[20] He was then about a meter away from Celis In Dr. Pagsaligans opinion, each stab wound which caused the death of
and Sumagaysay. He further testified that the place was well- Celis and Sumagaysay was inflicted using a single-bladed weapon.
lighted. After the incident, the assailants scampered away. Lagamon, Jr. [34]
He further opined that the assailants might have used two (2)
and Barol flagged down a jeepney and brought Celis to the Davao weapons.[35]
Doctors Hospital.[21] Lagamon, Jr. did not notice where Jernie
Sumagaysay had gone after the latter was stabbed. On cross- Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, presented the
examination, he testified that he is a member of the Philippine National death certificate of Celis [36] and testified on the actual expenses
Police (PNP) and that he joined the Philippine Constabulary in 1988; amounting to P13,990.00, which they incurred due to the death of Celis.
[37]
but in 1987, when the stabbing incident occurred, he was a bet-taker. She further testified that at the time of his death, her brother was 24
[22]
He insisted that he saw the assailants of Celis and Sumagaysay years old and had just graduated from an Electrical Engineering course
because the place where the stabbing incident occurred was well-lighted at the University of Mindanao.[38]
with fluorescent lamps.[23] He could not remember what kind of knife
Romeo Sumagaysay, father of Jernie Sumagaysay, proffered the
was used by Yungot in stabbing Celis but recalled that it was about six
death certificate of Jernie, [39] and testified that he incurred P12,000.00 as
(6) to seven (7) inches long.[24] He was not summoned by the police
funeral and burial expenses arising from the death of Jernie. He also
authorities for an investigation; neither did he report what he had
testified that at the time of Jernies death, Jernie was a second year
witnessed to the police authorities.
college student at the University of Mindanao.[40]
Jonathan Abellana, who was serving sentence for murder,
[25] As pointed out earlier, after the prosecution rested its case against
testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 9 p.m., he was at a dance in
Yungot, the other accused, Rommel Magpatoc was arrested and given a
Roxas St., in front of the Holy Child School, and between Roxas and
separate trial only insofar as the presentation of the prosecutions
Claveria Sts., with Dodong Lanay, Allen Ledesma, Jun-jun Oyson,
evidence-in-chief against him. A joint trial, however, was subsequently
Edwin Yungot and Omi Magpatoc. [26] They proceeded to Barrio Fiesta
conducted for the defense of both accused-appellants as well as for
for a drinking spree upon the invitation of a certain Jun. After the group
rebuttal and surrebuttal.
consumed two (2) cases of beer, Abellana went back to the dance. Later,
the rest of the group[27] also returned to the dance. Subsequent to his arrest and arraignment, accused-appellant
Rommel Magpatoc filed a motion for bail dated March 1, 1993. [41] At
P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, a member of the Philippine National
the hearing[42] on the said motion, the prosecution presented as
Police (PNP), assigned at the Homicide and Arson Section of the San
witnesses, Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. The defense, however, did
Pedro Patrol Station, testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 12
not present any evidence.[43]
midnight, he received information regarding a stabbing incident which
took place at Claveria St. Together with the members of the Mobile At the said hearing, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that he came to know
Patrol, he went to the San Pedro Hospital and Davao Doctors Hospital, Sumagaysay at the Davao Fiesta where they started drinking at around 8
where the stabbed victims were brought, and conducted an p.m., on May 24, 1987.[44] He was with Celis, Sumagaysay and Ben
investigation. From the said hospitals, they proceeded to the scene of Hur. He reiterated his testimony at Yungots trial that they left Davao
the crimes and continued with the investigation. Based on his Fiesta between 9 and 10 p.m.; and walked towards RCBC, with himself
investigation, P/Cpl. Erispe learned that one (1) of the victims was and Ben Hur about two (2) meters ahead of Celis and
stabbed near RCBC while the other victim was able to run towards the Sumagaysay. Upon hearing footsteps behind them, he turned around
Martinez Pawnshop. From the hospital records, he was able to identify and saw Celis being stabbed. [45] When asked by the trial judge if he
the stabbed victims as Oscar Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay.[28] knew the person who stabbed Celis, Lagamon, Jr. answered that he
could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis because it happened
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, of the Criminal Record Branch,
so suddenly.[46] But when asked by the prosecutor if he could identify
Metrodiscom, PNP, brought the Record of Events of the San Pedro
the assailants if he were to see them again, he answered, I could
Patrol Station, dated May 24, 1987, [29] showing the entry of the stabbing
recognize them by face.[47] He further recalled that about four (4)
incident involving Celis and Sumagaysay.
persons attacked his companions, two (2) or three (3) of whom were
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, Medical Specialist II, Regional Health Office armed with knives. He also declared that Sumagaysay was stabbed in
No. XI, Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, performed the the same manner that Celis was stabbed, i.e., the assailants left hand
autopsy on the victims cadavers on May 25, 1987 and issued Autopsy was placed on the victims shoulder, while the formers right hand
Report Nos. N-039-87 and N-040-87, showing the following findings: stabbed the victim.[48] He admitted that he could not clearly recognize
Sumagaysays assailant because the incident happened suddenly;
[49]
however, he maintained that Magpatoc was one of those who killed
Autopsy Report No. N-039-87[30] his companions.[50] On cross-examination and upon query by the trial
court, Lagamon, Jr. pointed to Magpatoc as the person who stabbed
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS Celis,[51] contrary to his testimony during Yungots trial that Yungot was
the one who stabbed Celis. When asked if he could recognize the person
1. STABBED WOUND 3.5 cm. long, gaping, running who attacked Sumagaysay if in court, he replied, [h]e is not here. [52]
medially and slightly upward, edges cleancut, sharp The prosecution also presented Jose Oyson as a witness at the
edge inferiorly, located in the left chest, 10 cm. from the hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail. [53] Oyson testified that on May
anterior median line, 4 cm. from the left nipple at the 24, 1987, at about 8:30 p.m., he was drinking at the Davao Fiesta in
level of the 3rd intercostal space, penetrating the skin Claveria St., along with Jun Concorcio, Jun Laos, Edwin Yungot, Omie
and muscles and the heart through and through. Magpatoc,[54] Allen Ledesma, Joe Dalman alias Idi, Jun Suaner alias
2. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter below Siquio and Jose Dodong Cahiwat. [55] He recounted that Jun Concorcio
the right eye along the outer canthus of the right eye, 7 pointed at the group of Celis, Sumagaysay and two (2) others, who were
cm. from the anterior median line and 6 cm. from the laughing at him.[56] Corsiga[57] told them to birahan (to do some harm to)
right ear. Celis, Sumagaysay and the two (2) others. [58] At about 10 p.m., when
Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions left Barrio Fiesta,
3. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter, slightly Oysons group followed them.[59] Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2)
above the right mandible, 2 cm. from the anterior companions went towards Land Bank in Claveria St. Celis and
median line and 10 cm. from the right ear. Sumagaysay were walking behind their two (2) companions. Edwin
Yungot, Josel Ayala alias Bobong Lanay[60] and Omie Magpatoc rushed
CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE towards Celis and Sumagaysay. Edwin Yungot stabbed Oscar Celis.
HEMORRHAGE DUE TO STAB WOUND, CHEST, [61]
Oyson could not ascertain who between Magpatoc and Ayala
LEFT.[31] actually stabbed Jernie Sumagaysay.[62] Yungot, Ayala and Magpatoc
were armed with knives. [63] One (1) of the stabbed victims fell on the
ground while the other victim was able to run away. Oyson was about Magpatoc. He stated that Magpatoc had been active in community
seven (7) meters away from the place where the stabbing incident activities and had demonstrated leadership in the youth activities for the
occurred. The said place was lighted with a fluorescent bulb. After the IKP chapel. According to Cahiwat, at the time of Magpatocs arrest, the
incident, Oyson and his companions ran away and proceeded to the latter was an elected Sangguniang Kabataan member.
dance on Roxas Avenue. [64] On cross-examination, Oyson testified that
the group which followed Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) On the other hand, in his defense, Edwin Yungot testified that in
companions from Barrio Fiesta, included himself, accused-appellants, the evening of May 24, 1987, he operated the radio phono at the benefit
Edwin Yungot and Omie Magpatoc, Joe Dalman, Allen Ledesma, Josel dance held at the back of the Aldevinco Center.[87] He operated the said
Ayala, Jun Laos, Edic, Jun Suaner alias Siquio, and Dodong Cahiwat. radio phono, without anybodys assistance, until the benefit dance ended
[65]
They were all members of the Looban Young Killer (LYK) gang. at 1 a.m. of the following day. He confirmed that Magpatoc was at the
[66]
Oyson recalled that three (3) among his companions on the night of benefit dance and that Magpatoc left when the dance ended at 1 a.m. [88]
May 24, 1987, were armed with knives, namely, Yungot, Ayala and Bernardo Bajenteng, a neighbor of Yungot and former president
Magpatoc, because they were [walking] ahead of the group. [67] They of the Pag-asa Youth Movement, corroborated Yungots testimony that
followed Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions in order to on May 24, 1987, he (Yungot) operated the sound system from 8 p.m.
do harm to them.[68] until 1 a.m. of the following day.[89] However, according to Bajenteng,
As pointed earlier, the prosecution adopted the foregoing Yungot was assisted by the son of the owner of the sound
testimonies of Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. during the hearing on system. Furthermore, Bajenteng insisted, on cross-examination, that
Magpatocs motion for bail, as part of its evidence-in-chief against Yungot did not leave the benefit dance from 8 p.m. until 1 a.m. of the
Magpatoc. In addition to the foregoing testimonies, the prosecution following day, except at one instance, that is, at about 9 p.m., Yungot
presented anew five (5) witnesses, namely, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, left, but after five minutes, he returned back to the dance. [90]Bajenteng
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Dr. Jose Pagsaligan and acted as the emcee at the dance.
Delilah Celis Banderado, whom it had earlier presented during Yungots Leovigildo Bautista,[91] a youth organizer associated with the
trial. These five (5) witnesses respective testimonies at Magpatocs trial Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), issued a
were substantially identical with their testimonies at Yungots trial. certification confirming that Yungot was a bonafide member of the Pag-
At Magpatocs trial, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe further testified that asa Youth Movement.
while he was at the Davao Doctors Hospital, he was able to talk with On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Jose Oyson, who refuted
the two (2) companions of the stabbed victim who was brought there.He Yungots testimony that he was the operator of the phonograph system
identified these two (2) companions as Ben Hur and Joe Lagamon. [69] At used at the benefit dance held on the night of May 24, 1987; and
the San Pedro Hospital, hospital employees gave him two (2) declared that it was Ruth Dionson, granddaughter of the owner of the
identification cards of Jernie Sumagaysay for safekeeping, which he phonograph system, who operated the said system. [92] Oyson further
subsequently turned over to the desk officer at the station. [70] claimed that Yungot and Magpatoc were at the Davao Fiesta in the
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, the medical specialist from the Regional evening of May 24, 1987.[93] He maintained that he saw Yungot,
Health Office No. XI of the Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, Magpatoc and Ayala stab Celis and Sumagaysay.[94] On cross-
who performed the autopsy on the two victims cadavers on May 25, examination, he asserted that at 7:30 p.m., on May 24, 1987, he left the
1987, and issued Autopsy Report Nos. N-039-87 and N-040-87, also dance and went to the Davao Barrio Fiesta with accused-appellants,
testified that because of the trajectory of the wound which Sumagaysay Edwin Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc, Jossel Ayala, Jun Laos, Allen
sustained, his assailant was most probably at his back, holding the Ledesma, Jun Suaner, Edi (Edic in footnote 65), Jose Dalman and
bladed weapon.[71] Dodong Cajiwat.[95] After three (3) hours, all of them left the Barrio
Fiesta, and returned to the dance after the stabbing incident had
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, testified anew on occurred.[96]
the actual expenses amounting to P13,990.00, which they incurred due
to the death of Celis. Still on rebuttal, Ruth Dionson disputed Yungots testimony that he
operated the sound system at the benefit dance held on May 24, 1987,
With leave of court, accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc and claimed she operated the said sound system with her aunt, Melanie
filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence, [72] which, however, were Guinagao.[97]
denied by the trial court in an Order dated November 10, 1993. [73]
The prosecution also recalled Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla who testified
Subsequently, a joint trial was conducted for the presentation of that a week after May 24, 1987, as investigator, he went to the house of
evidence for the defense. Rommel Magpatoc, in his defense, testified Yungot but failed to find Yungot.
along with Allen Ledesma, Noel Cahiwat and Ysmael Cahiwat; while
Edwin Yungot, also in his defense, presented Bernardo Bajenteng, On April 17, 1995, the trial court promulgated its joint decision
Leovigildo Bautista and himself as witnesses. dated March 28, 1995, finding both Yungot and Magpatoc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos.
According to accused-appellant Magpatoc, on May 24, 1987, at 15,377-87 and 15,378-87, imposing upon them two terms of reclusion
about 7:30-8:00 p.m., he went with his girlfriend to the dance held at the perpetua, and the payment of actual, compensatory and moral damages,
back of the Aldevinco building.[74] Together with three (3) others, and costs. The dispositive part of the said decision reads:
namely, his girlfriend, Noel Cahiwag and the latters friend, Magpatoc
left the dance at around 11 p.m. and went home. [75] He denied having WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15,377-87, finding the accused
gone to Barrio Fiesta on that night.[76] Rommel (Umi) Magpatoc and Edwin Yungot guilty beyond reasonable
Allen Ledesma, a friend of Magpatoc, testified that on May 24, doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the
1987, at 10 p.m., he was inside the disco house at Aldevinco Shopping Revised Penal Code with no attendant circumstance, both are hereby
Center with Magpatoc and Dodong Abellana. [77] At around 10:30 p.m., sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the cost; to pay
he went to the Davao Fiesta with Dodong Abellana upon the latters the offended party jointly and severally the amount of P12,000.00 as
invitation, leaving behind Rommel Magpatoc, who stayed in the disco actual damages; each to indemnify the offended party the amount of
house.[78] Ledesma and Abellana joined six (6) others at the Davao P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
Fiesta. After consuming three (3) bottles of beer, Ledesma left Davao damages.
Fiesta with a certain Anak, [79] bought some cigarettes and went back to
the disco house. Among the six (6) persons left behind at the Davao In Criminal Case no. 15,378-87, finding the two (2) accused Rommel
Fiesta were Dodong Cahiwat, a certain Caloy and a certain Lanay. (Umi) Magpatoc and Edwin Yungot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
[80]
Jose Oyson was later identified as one of the six (6) persons, the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
[81]
whom Ledesma and Abellana joined at the Davao Fiesta.Likewise, Penal Code with no attendant circumstance, both are hereby sentenced
Edwin Yungot was at the Davao Fiesta when they arrived there. [82] to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the cost; to pay the
offended party jointly and severally the amount of P13,990.00 as actual
Noel Cahiwat testified that on the night of May 24, 1987, he was damages; each to indemnify the offended party the amount of
at the dance held behind the Aldevinco Shopping Center, with Rommel P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
Magpatoc, Allen Ledesma and several others. At about 9:30 p.m., a damages.[98]
certain Jun Driver invited them to drink at the Davao Fiesta. He went to
the Davao Fiesta with Dodong Siquio and another person whose name
he could not remember.[83] Rommel Magpatoc and the others were left at Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant Edwin Yungot raises the
the disco house.[84] At 10 p.m., Noel Cahiwat left the Davao Fiesta with following assignment of errors:[99]
a companion and went back to the dance hall. [85] At the dance hall, I
Dodong Lanay told him that Jun Driver stabbed somebody. [86] On cross-
examination, he admitted that in the evening of May 24, 1987, Jose
Oyson was at the Barrio Fiesta with his group. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT YUNGOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
Ysmael Cahiwat, barangay captain of 33-B Poblacion, Davao MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT THEREOF
City, testified to prove the good moral character of accused-appellant WAS NOT DETERMINED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II Claveria St. to drink beer and found inside Oscar Celis and Jermie
Sumagaysay and Ben Hur. Ben Hur was his former classmate and
AT ANY RATE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN Jermie Sumagaysay was also known to him for they already met in the
APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF school.
TREACHERY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS
NOT PROVEN DURING THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN. After paying for the beers they drank, they proceeded home along the
Claveria St., he and Ben Hur were walking a few meters ahead of Oscar
Accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc, on the other hand, raises the Celis and Jermie Sumagaysay who were trailing closed (sic) behind. He
following assignment of errors: heard a commotion at his back and when he turned around, he saw Celis
and Sumagaysay were being stabbed. Three persons ganged up at Celis,
I the two holding Celis while the third one stabbed Celis at his breast
while Celis was facing the assailant sidewise. He pointed to the accused
THE TRIAL COURT HAD PREJUDGED THE GUILT OF Edwin Yungot as the person who stabbed Oscar Celis. The place where
THE ACCUSED BY REASON OF HIS DEFENSE OF the stabbing incident occured (sic) was well lighted by [f]luorescent
ALIBI. light so that he could fully recognized (sic) the faces of the assaillants
II (sic). The person who stabbed Sumagaysay was different from the
person who stabbed Celis and he could also identify the assaillant (sic)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE of Sum[a]gaysay. He looked around the [c]ourtroom when asked to
TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES TESTIMONIES identify the assaillant (sic) of Sumagaysay and answered that he is (sic)
DESPITE MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL not in the [c]ourt room. [L]et it be noted that he testified before the
INCONSISTENCIES. arrest of Rommel Magpatoc. xxx xxx. [105]
III
The above findings of the trial court are fully supported by the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING records. As shown by the transcripts, Lagamon, Jr. testified as follows:
THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
ACCUSED.
xxx xxx.
IV
Q: Who were with you walking?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED DESPITE THE STRENGTH OF THE A: Ben Hur, myself, Sumagaysay and Celis.
DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
Q: How far were Celis and Sumagaysay?
This Court is not persuaded.
A: About 5 to 6 meters.
Accused-appellant Edwin Yungots arguments, in fine, revolve on
the matter of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In particular, xxx xxx.
Yungot cites several instances of inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. For instance, on direct Q: What happened while you were walking?
examination at Yungots trial, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that Yungot stabbed A: We were walking towards the direction of Land Bank when
Celis. However, during the hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail at suddenly there was a commotion at the back.
Magpatocs trial, Lagamon, Jr. asserted on both direct and cross-
examinations that he could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis Q: What did you do when you heard the commotion?
because the incident happened suddenly; but immediately thereafter, he
declared that he could recognize Celis assailants only by face, [100] and in INTERPRETER:
open court pointed at accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc as the Witness demonstrating that Ben Hurs arm was around him at the
person who stabbed Celis.[101] Yungot argues that the [s]aid back and when a commotion ensued he turned immediately
inconsistencies in the testimony of Jose Lagamon, Jr. should not have his back and that he saw somebody thrust a knife.
been overlooked by the trial court, for it not only puts to doubt the
identity of the assailant[s] in the crime[s] but likewise casts doubt as to PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
the credibility of the said witness, the very foundation of the crime for
which ... [he] stand[s] to lose his liberty.[102] Q: You said you turned your back, what did you see?
The argument is plainly unmeritorious. Well-settled to the point of A: When I turned my back I saw the commotion at the back and
being elementary is the rule of procedure that in rendering its somebody was stabbing Celis and Sumagaysay.
judgment, the court must consider only such evidence, duly
Q: How far were you when you turned your back from Celis and
presented during the trial, for or against any party to the
Sumagaysay?
action, and made the sole basis of the decision therein. [103] Thus,
Lagamon, Jr.s testimony in the separate trial of Magpatoc cannot, at this A: Very near.
stage, be used by Yungot to exculpate himself. Under Section 1(f), Rule
115 of the Rules of Court, xxx xxx. [e]ither party may utilize as part of Q: Can you estimate?
its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of, or
COURT:
cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial The distance between?
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him. Thus, A: Between me and Sumagaysay, about a meter away.
the only instance when Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at the separate trial of
Magpatoc could have been utilized as part of Yungots evidence was if PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
the said witness was deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be xxx xxx.
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify,
which was not proved at all in this case. Q: How about Celis? Did you see and demonstrate?
Please demonstrate how he was stabbed?
The trial court found Lagamon, Jr.s testimony to be clear,
straightforward, convincing and rigning (sic) with sincerity. A: Celis was pushed and he turned around and 3 persons were
[104]
According to the trial court: ganging up on Celis and stabbed him.
COURT:
There were two prosecutions witnesses, namely, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and
Jose Oyson who were in the scene of the crime when it happened and Q: The persons whom you saw stabbed Sumagaysay also stabbed
actually witnessed the stabbing incident and saw who were the Celis?
perpetrator[s].
A: No, sir, different persons.
Jose Lagamon, Jr. testified twice, during the presentation of the PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
prosecutions evidence against Edwin Yungot and in the hearing of the
petition for bail of Rommel Magpatoc. Q: But that happened at the same time?
A: Yes, simultaneous.
Jose Lagamon, Jr. was a classmate of the victim Oscar Celis, both
graduated from the same school. On that night of September (should Q: Will you be able to identify the assailants?
have been May) 24, 1987, he went to the Davao Barrio Fiesta place at
A: Yes, sir. prosecution, Jose Oyson. In other words, Yungots conviction was based
not only on Lagamon, Jr.s testimony but also on the testimony of
xxx xxx. another eyewitness, Jose Oyson, who categorically testified that:
Q: You said you can identify the assailants. With regard to PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Celis, can you identify the persons who stabbed him?
xxx xxx.
A: Yes, because the place was well lighted.
Q: Accused Yungot also declared before this court that on said date
Q: Look around this courtroom and see if any of the assailants May 24, 1987 during the benefit dance held at the back of
is in Court? Aldevinco Shopping Center, he did not leave the dancing
INTERPRETER: place during the duration of the dance party. What can you
say to that declaration?
The witness is looking around the courtroom and after looking
for a while pointed to a person wearing a t-shirt with a A: That is not true.
print Free and when asked his name answered that he is Q: If you know, where did Yungot go on the said date?
Edwin Yungot.
A: They were at the Davao Fiesta.
xxx xxx.
Q: What time did he go to the Davao Fiesta? On May 24, 1987?
Q: Earlier, you pointed to a person who answered by the name
of Edwin Yungot. What is his participation in the stabbing A: About 8:30.
of Celis.
Q: 8:30 in the evening?
A: He was the one who stabbed first.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What do you mean by bira?
Q: When you said we, who were your companions who went to the
A: He was the one who stabbed first. The other persons were Davao Fiesta on May 24, 1987 at 8:30 in the evening?
holding on (sic) Celis.
A: Alias Jun Driver, Edwin Yungot, Rommel Magpatoc, Jun Laos,
COURT: Joe Dalman, Jun Suaner, Edi, Allen Ledesma, Dodong
Cahiwat and me.
Q: Who were the other persons? How many were they?
COURT:
A: 3 or 4 persons held Celis.
Q: What time was it when you and the group you mentioned left the
Q: And so, while those 3 or 4 persons held Celis this Edwin dancing place in order to go to the Barrio Fiesta?
Yungot stabbed Celis from the back?
A: About 7:30.
A: From the back.
COURT:
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Proceed.
Q: Please demonstrate how Edwin Yungot stabbed Celis?
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
INTERPRETER:
Q: 7:30 in the evening?
The witness is demonstrating that Celis was stabbed at the left side
of the body. A: Yes, sir.
COURT: Q: So the declaration of the other accused Magpatoc that they never
left the dancing (sic) party during the whole duation (sic) of
Q: You mean the body of Celis was facing sidewise Edwin Yungot May 24, 1987 in the evening is also not true?
when the latter stabbed Celis at his breast?
A: Not true.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The 2 accused Yungot and Magpatoc declared before the Court
Q: So the one who stabbed Celis was Yungot? that they have no participation in the stabbing incident on the
A: Yes, sir. evening of May 24, 1987 which resulted to (sic) the death of
Oscar Celis and Gernie Sumagaysay which incident is now
Q: How many times did you see Celis hit by Yungot? subject of these 2 criminal cases. What can you say to that?
Q: While Yungot was stabbing Celis, the 3 or 4 companions of It is not covered by the offer. The offer is only to rebut the
Yungot were holding Celis? testimony that they never left the dancing place.
The witness demonstrating that 2 or 3 persons held the backside of It is in the record, Your Honor.
the deceased Celis and he was twisted so that his left side was
facing the assailant Edwin Yungot. STENOGRAPHER:
xxx xxx. (emphasis supplied)[106] (Reading back the offer of testimony by the Public Prosecutor and
the last question propounded by the Public Prosecutor.)
Even assuming arguendo that Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at
Magpatocs trial could be considered as part of Yungots evidence, we COURT:
have previously ruled that [c]ourts are not bound to accept or reject the It is there.
whole of the testimony of a witness. They may believe one part and
disbelieve the other part of the testimony. If there are conflicts in the A: That is not true.
testimony which cannot be so reconciled as to admit every witness
swearing the truth, the Court adopts that testimony which it believes to PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
be true, taking into consideration the general character of the witness, Q: You said the declaration of the 2 accused is not true. What is the
his manner and demeanor on the stand while testifying, the consistency participation of Edwin Yungot to that stabbing incident which
or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or improbability, his resulted to (sic) the death of Oscar Celis and Jernie
ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of Sumagaysay?
knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear a falsehood. [107] As it
were, the trial court aptly found the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. to be A: They were really the ones who stabbed. The three (3) of them.
clear, straightforward, convincing and ringing with sincerity.
Q: Who were the three (3) who stabbed?
Nonetheless, even if we were to consider Lagamon, Jr.s entire
testimony as unreliable, unworthy of belief and undeserving of credence A: Edwin Yungot, Rommel Magpatoc and Josel Ayala.
because of some inconsistency in his testimony, particularly regarding
Q: Did you see these three (3) stab the victims?
the identity of Celis assailant, Yungots active participation in the crimes
charged was positively asserted by another eyewitness for the A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far were you from the stabbing of the 2 victims? Conspiracy of both the two accused and the others who participated in
the stabbing was clearly proven by the evidence independent of the
A: About seven (7) meters. crime itself. It was shown that there was a unity of purpose of the two
Q: The scene of the stabbing incident, was it well-lighted? (2) accused and the others and the intention to stab the two victims
simultaneously. When the two accused left the Davao Barrio Fiesta with
A: Yes, sir. the others immediately after the two victims and their two companions
left said place, there was already the intention and plan to inflict injury
xxx xxx. (emphasis supplied)[108] upon the two victims. xxx xxx.[113]
Furthermore, the following circumstances, duly established by the
evidence for the prosecution, which Yungots defense of alibi could not Conspiracy, as alleged in the informations, was convincingly
surmount, proved that Yungot was one of those who participated in the established. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
killing of Celis and Sumagaysay and is, therefore, guilty beyond agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
reasonable doubt: it.[114] Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
1. Yungot was positively identified by his companions on the night of
action and community of interest. [115] In this case, the prosecution
May 24, 1987, Jonathan Abellana and Jose Oyson, as one of those who
established that accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc, and their
were drinking with them at the Davao Barrio Fiesta; and by Jose
companions left the Davao Barrio Fiesta right after Celis, Sumagaysay
Lagamon, Jr. who was also drinking at the Davao Barrio Fiesta with
and their companions left the said place, with the intention to do harm
Celis and Sumagaysay.
to Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions. Coming from
behind, Yungot stabbed Celis while three (3) others held and restrained
2. Yungot and his companions left the Davao Barrio Fiesta after three him; and simultaneously or almost at the same time, Magpatoc rode on
hours. Sumagaysays back and stabbed him. Yungot and Magpatoc each
inflicted one fatal stab wound which caused the death of the
3. Celis, Sumagaysay, Lagamon, Jr. and Barol left the Davao Barrio victims. These concerted actions of accused-appellants reveal their
Fiesta and walked towards Claveria St. common intent to harm Celis and Sumagaysay, if not cause them death.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court
4. Yungot was one of the five or six persons involved in the stabbing that the prosecution witnesses are more credible, that their testimonies
incident, three or four of whom were armed. were clear, straightforward, convincing and rigning (sic) with sincerity
and that there was, as well, no reason for them to testify falsely against
5. Celis and Sumagaysay each died of a stab wound inflicted using a the accused-appellants, specially since the trial court had the
single-bladed weapon. opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand, hence, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses,
is entitled to great respect. It may not be amiss to reiterate that on the
6. Immediately after the commission of the crimes, Yungot and
issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the
Magpatoc resorted to flight.
findings arrived at by the trial court, which was certainly in a better
position to rate the credibility of the witnesses after hearing them and
7. Prosecution witnesses Jose Oyson, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Jonathan observing their deportment and manner of testifying during the
Abellana were not shown to have any cause to testify falsely against trial. This rule stands absent any showing that certain facts and
Yungot. circumstances of weight and value have been overlooked,
misinterpreted or misapplied by the trial court which, if considered,
The inconsistencies between the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. and would affect the result or outcome of the case. [116] There is no such
Jose Oysons testimony, particularly, the manner how Celis and showing in this case, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of counsels for
Sumagaysay were attacked,[109] and the number of persons involved in accused-appellants to create such an impression.
the stabbing incident,[110] as further pointed out by Yungot, are more
In like manner, accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc, in his
apparent than real, if not altogether immaterial and
defense, submits that the credibility of prosecution witnesses, Jose
insignificant. Concededly, some inconsistencies may be noted; they are,
Lagamon, Jr. and Jose Oyson, are suspect, pointing out several material
however, not so material and substantial as to affect the credibility of
and substantial inconsistencies in their respective testimonies which
the said witnesses; thus there is no compelling reason to disturb the
were simply overlooked and not considered by the trial court.
findings of the trial court in this regard.
As to Lagamon, Jr.s testimony, Magpatoc cites the following
We now tackle the issue of whether treachery and conspiracy
inconsistencies: first, the distance between Lagamon, Jr. and the two
attended the commission of the crimes. Yungots allegation that the trial
victims at the time of the stabbing incident; second, the number of
court erred in appreciating the presence of treachery and conspiracy, is
persons who attacked the victims; third, the number of assailants who
not supported by the records.
were armed with knives; fourth, the act of the person who pointed a
In People vs. Rivera,[111] we held that: knife at Lagamon, Jr.; fifth, the identity of the person who stabbed Oscar
Celis; and sixth, Lagamon, Jr.s reaction when he was threatened by one
of the assailants.[117] As to Jose Oysons testimony, Magpatoc points out
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the following inconsistencies: first, the identity of the
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
assailants; second, the number of assailants; third, the unusual incident
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
or conversation at the Barrio Fiesta; and fourth, the activities/purpose of
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
the Looban Young Killers group.[118] Magpatoc likewise cites the
make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying
inconsistency between Oysons testimony and that of Dr. Pagsaligan as
circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2)
to the relative positions of the victims and their assailants at the time of
conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
the stabbing incident.[119]
position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by After a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record,
him.[112] particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, the Court notes that these
alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and
Indeed, the foregoing requisites were evidently present in the case at insignificant details and slight variations. In People vs. Alolod,[120] we
bar. Accused-appellant Yungots attack, coming from behind, on the held that:
unarmed Oscar Celis, was sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and
deliberate. To ensure or afford impunity, three (3) other persons were xxx xxx. Recollection of different witnesses with respect to time, place
holding Celis while he was being stabbed by Yungot. Clearly, under and other circumstances of a criminal event would naturally differ in
these circumstances, Celis was in no position and without any means to various details. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed
defend himself. The attack was done in a manner which directly and in the same manner and it is but natural that in relating their
specially insured the execution of the act without any risk to Yungot impressions, they disagree on the minor details and that there be
arising from the defense which Celis might have made. Thus, as contradictions in their testimonies. Witnesses cannot be expected to
correctly held by the trial court, treachery was present in this case, recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is
qualifying the crime to murder. especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in
rapid succession, attended by flurry and excitement. The testimony of
We are also in agreement with the trial courts finding that there
each witness should not be expected to be identical to and coinciding
was conspiracy between the accused-appellants, as alleged in the
with each other. It is enough that the principal points covered by their
informations. As enunciated by the trial court:
testimonies are established although they do not dovetail in all details
xxx xxx. which would even prove well-rehearsed and studied declarations. If
witnesses should agree as to every detail of a transaction which
occupied a considerable space of time, and should undertake to tell all LOPE LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, accused-appellant.
that occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the same incident
as the other in precisely the same words, that fact would be of itself a DECISION
suspicious circumstance.[121]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The alleged inconsistencies bear no materiality to the commission
of the crimes imputed against accused-appellants. As pointed out by the Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his co-
Solicitor General, xxx xxx. [t]hese [seeming] discrepancies may be accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, were charged with the
attributed to the fact that the witnesses were called to relate the incident crime of highway robbery with multiple rape in an Information [1]which
almost five years after it transpired. It is not unusual for a witness to a reads, thus:
startling occurrence, not to vividly and exactly remember minute details
of the occurrence, such as [the] number and location of the wounds
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1992, in the Municipality of
inflicted on the victim[s] especially, when he was called to testify only
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
after a lapse of almost five years. xxx xxx.[122] Trivial incongruities
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an icepick,
within a testimony and between testimonies likewise do not impair the
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
credibility of the witness/witnesses. Minor lapses are to be expected
one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
painful to recall. In fact, the discordance in the testimonies of witnesses
take, rob and divest from the complainant, Corazon Hernandez y Delfin
on minor matters heightens their credibility and shows that their
the amount of P60.00; That on the occasion thereof, the above-named
testimonies were not coached or rehearsed, especially where there is
accused, conspiring and confederating together and each of them
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
mutually helping and aiding one another and by means of force and
identification of the assailant.[123]
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Moreover, accused-appellant Magpatoc bewails the supposed one at a time have carnal knowledge of the said complainant, inside the
failure of prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. to promptly report the Levitown Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, against her will and
crimes to the authorities; and assails the delay of prosecution witness consent;
Jose Oyson in testifying before the trial court.
That accused Randy Simbulan y Garcia, who is allegedly 14 years old,
The contention is untenable. has acted with discernment in the commission of the offense; and
This Court has already taken judicial notice of the actuality that
witnesses in this country are usually reluctant to volunteer information That the aggravating circumstance of that means employed or
about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effect of
criminal investigations.[124] The initial reluctance to volunteer the act where one of the accused, by means of force and intimidation,
information about a criminal case and/or the unwillingness to be caused the victim to suck his penis made the effect of the crime more
involved in a criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are common humiliating to the victim, attended the commission of the offense.
and have been judicially declared to have no effect on credibility.[125]
Finally, Magpatoc alleges that the trial court erred in disregarding CONTRARY TO LAW.
evidence of his good moral character. The allegation has no
merit. In People vs. Cerelegia,[126] we ruled that xxx xxx. [i]t is true that During the arraignment, all of them pleaded not guilty to the
the good moral character of an accused having reference to the moral charge. Accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil were earlier
trait involved in the offense charged may be proven by him. But an released on recognizance, and were later ordered rearrested for their
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous failure to appear at the scheduled hearings. However, the warrants for
good moral character and exemplary conduct if the Court believes he is their arrest were not implemented. Trial on the merits, thus, ensued only
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or against accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura.
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether
the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond Complainant Corazon Hernandez was on her way home to
peradventure of doubt.[127] After reviewing the evidence in this case, we Paraaque at around 1:00 oclock in the early morning of April 27,
are convinced that the prosecution has satisfactorily overcome the 1992. Upon reaching the tricycle terminal at Doa Soledad St., Better
presumption of innocence accorded to every accused and that accused- Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, she was offered by
appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of tricycle driver Ramil Vendibil a special trip, which means that she
the crime charged; thus, evidence of good moral character will not would be brought right in front of her house. She agreed and boarded
prevail. the tricycle.While they were about to leave, Randy Simbulan and Lope
Liwanag also rode the tricycle behind the driver. When they reached
Regarding accused-appellants mutual defense of alibi, we rule India Street, Lope Liwanag entered the sidecar and sat beside
that the trial court correctly rejected their alibi since it was not complainant. He immediately grabbed complainants shoulder, pointed
physically impossible for both accused-appellants to be at the scene of an instrument at the side of her neck, and declared a hold-up. Surprised
the crime at the time of its commission. We have ruled, time and again, and fearing for her life, complainant told accused-appellant that she
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and cannot stand against strong only had sixty pesos (P60.00) in her bag. Accused-appellant Lope
and positive identification, as in this case. [128] Liwanag instructed Randy Simbulan to get her bag.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of While the tricycle was traversing the road leading to the
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case municipal building of Paraaque, accused-appellant informed
Nos. 15,377-87 and 15,378-87, finding accused-appellants, Edwin complainant that since they could not get anything from her anyway,
Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of she might as well submit herself to them. Then, accused-appellant
murder on two counts, and sentencing each of them to reclusion began kissing complainant and touching her private parts. Randy
perpetua for each count, and ordering them to pay the offended partly, Simbulan, meanwhile, inserted his finger into complainants vagina.
jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case and the amount of As they were entering Levitown Subdivision, accused-appellant
P12,000.00 and P13,990.00 as actual damages in Criminal Cases Nos. ordered complainant to act naturally while they passed the
15,377-87 and 15,378-87, respectively, is hereby AFFIRMED. guardhouse. Once they got through, accused-appellant asked her to give
in to his desire, and then, he again began touching her private
SO ORDERED. parts. Complainant answered that she would rather be killed than accede
to his desire. This prompted accused-appellant to hit her with an icepick
on the abdomen.
Upon reaching a vacant lot, accused-appellant ordered Vendibil to
stop the tricycle. He then tried to strangle complainant, causing her to
fall down from her seat and lose consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she was forced to board the tricycle. Again, they rode
around the village. Accused-appellant tried to strangle her with a
[G.R. No. 120468. August 15, 2001] bandana and ordered her to remove her underwear. When she refused,
accused-appellant himself removed her underwear, opened his pant
zipper and forced her to sit on his lap. Complainant struggled, so
accused-appellant ordered the tricycle to stop and dragged complainant
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE out. Accused-appellant then brought complainant to a grassy vacant lot
LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, SANDY SIMBULAN y and forced himself on her. After satisfying his lust, they again boarded
GARCIA and RAMIL VENDIBIL y CASTRO, accused. the tricycle and accused-appellant informed complainant that his
companions would follow. Complainants pleas were in vain. After a few
minutes of driving around, they came upon another vacant lot where rape was committed, a situation which calls for the imposition of death
accused-appellant and Vendibil dragged complainant. There, Vendibil penalty under Presidential Decree No. 532 but which penalty was still
forced complainant to put his penis into her mouth. Unsatisfied, proscribed at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the
Vendibil forced her to lie down and succeeded in having sexual Information, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
intercourse with her while accused-appellant and Simbulan reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower in degree (People v. Miranda,
watched. Thereafter, Simbulan took his turn. After he satisfied his lust, 235 SCRA 202). He is further ordered to indemnify the complainant
they talked of killing complainant. Corazon Hernandez of the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) representing moral damages; P20,000.00 as litigation
Complainant pleaded for her life and, in desperation, she offered expenses and attorneys fees and to return the P60.00 taken from
them money in exchange for her life. Accused-appellant asked her if she her. Filing fees due on the award shall be a lien on the amount which
can produce P10,000.00, but she said she could not. Accused-appellant may be recovered by the complainant from the accused.
lowered his demand to P5,000.00. They negotiated until they finally
agreed on the sum of P2,000.00. Accused-appellant instructed
complainant to deliver the money at Guadalupe, Makati. She was to As to the two other co-accused, Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil,
place the amount inside a bag together with a sandwich she was to buy trial of the case shall therefore continue.
at Burger Machine. They agreed to meet at 11:30 that same
morning. When they finally let go of her, complainant proceeded to a Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, accused-appellant
church. At daybreak, she went home and told her mother the whole interposed the instant appeal assigning as errors the following:
incident. Together, they proceeded to the Fort Bonifacio police station
and reported the matter. The police, in turn, devised an entrapment 1. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding
operation. the fact that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective and
At the appointed hour, complainant went to Guadalupe, Makati, competent counsel, and, consequently, other constitutional rights
bringing with her an envelope containing pieces of plain afforded an accused;
paper. Accused-appellant arrived after 45 minutes. Complainant handed
the envelope to him, then she ran away. Accused-appellant also ran and 2. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding
boarded a bus, but he was collared and arrested by the police. that there was no sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crime charged;
Dr. Louella Nario, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation conducted an examination on the complainant and
issued a medical certificate[2] with the following findings: 3. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the
inconsistencies that tainted the evidence for the prosecution;
Extragenital Physical Injuries:
4. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the
improbability of the manner by which the crime was allegedly
Abrasions, linear, leg, right, upper third, anterior aspect, 4.8 cms., in committed;
length and left, lower third, anterior aspect, 4.7 cm. in length.
5. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant inspite of
Contused abrasion, epigastric region, 2.4 x 0.3 cm. complainants failure to offer any resistance prior to and even during her
alleged rape; and
Contusions, reddish, mandibular region, right side, 1.8 x 1.5 cm. and
left side, 2.0 x 1.0 cms.; neck, lateral aspect, right side, 5.5 x 0.5 cms., 6. The trial court erred in disregarding the defense of accused-appellant
and 9.8 x 0.5 cms. and 2.5 x 0.5 cms. deltoid region, left side, 2.4 x 1.3 as a mere alibi.
cms. purplish, deltoid region, left side, 4.2 x 2.5 cms.
Accused-appellant submits that he was deprived of his
Genital Examination: constitutional right to counsel under Article III, Section 14, (2) of the
1987 Constitution which provides, thus:
Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and minora,
gaping. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa, congested, with fresh In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
superficial abrasion at the fossa navicularis. Hymen, thick, short, until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
intact.Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube, 2.0 cms., in diameter himself and counsel, x x x. (Italics supplied)
with moderate resistance. Vagina walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
As a consequence, accused-appellant claims that from the time he
Conclusion: was arrested up to the time of his conviction, he was deprived of his
other constitutional rights, particularly his right to be secure in his
1. The above-described extragenital physical injuries noted on the body person against unreasonable searches and seizures, [4] his right to
of the subject at the time of examination. preliminary investigation,[5] and his right to bail.[6]
In addition, accused-appellant claims that the assistance extended
2. Genital injury present. to him by his former counsel was ineffective to the extent that private
complainant, as well as prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla
Accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed and Editha Hernandez, were hardly cross-examined, while Dra. Louella
that at around 12:00 oclock midnight of April 27, 1992, he was at his Nario was not cross-examined at all.
house at Texas Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. His uncle, Emilio Changco, dropped by and, together with In any case, accused-appellant claims that he could not have
Ponciano Buenaventura and Hermenegildo Liwanag, they had a committed the crime being imputed to him as he was engaged in a
drinking session up to 3:00 oclock in the morning. At around 4:00 drinking session at the very moment when the alleged crime was
oclock in the morning, Changco left and accused-appellant went to committed.
sleep. He woke up at 7:30 in the morning to prepare for his trip to San Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in
Miguel, Bulacan to see his grandfather. convicting him because: 1) the prosecution failed to provide sufficient
He alleged that while waiting for a ride in front of Jollibee at evidence positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime; 2)
Guadalupe, Makati, he was arrested by policemen in civilian clothes for inconsistencies tainted the prosecution evidence; 3) the manner by
being a rebel soldier, based on a mark on his right fist indicating his which the crime was committed was improbable; and, 4) complainant
membership in the Guardians Luzon, an association of soldiers. He was failed to offer any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape.
brought to Fort Bonifacio where he allegedly met for the first time This appeal revolves primarily on the issue of whether accused-
Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil. He claimed that the three of them appellant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by
were beaten and subjected to electric shocks. He also claimed that himself and counsel. He argues that his right to be heard through his
policemen forced his co-accused to point to him. counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel
On April 17, 1995, a decision [3] was rendered by the Regional throughout the proceedings, from the time he was arrested up to the
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, the dispositive portion of which time judgment is rendered.
reads: The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the
trial court, accused-appellant was represented by counsel de officio,
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys Office. In the middle of the
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Presidential trial, accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de parte Atty.
Decree No. 532, known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered
Law of 1974. Considering that on the occasion of the highway robbery, the judgment of conviction, Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on
behalf of accused-appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to file the deficient, which requires a showing that counsel was not functioning as
appellants brief because of the refusal of accused-appellants mother to the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2)
transmit the entire records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a
was required to manifest whether he still desired to be represented by showing that counsels errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
Atty. Brioso in this appeal. Upon accused-appellants failure to reply, of a fair trial, a trial which result is reliable. Accused-appellant claims
Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed counsel de officio. that the assistance afforded him by his counsel during the course of the
trial was ineffective since the counsel de officio failed to safeguard his
There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a rights necessary for the reversal of his conviction.
counsel de officio who assisted him during the arraignment and
conducted the cross examination of all prosecution witnesses as well as One of the rights which accused-appellant contends his
his direct examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined counsel de officio failed to safeguard was his right to be secure in his
up to the presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a person against unreasonable searches and seizures as enshrined in the
counsel of his choice. Bill of Rights. He claims that his right was violated when he was
arrested without a warrant which his counsel should have contested.
Accused-appellants citation of People v. Holgado[7] and Powell v.
Alabama,[8] insofar as the right to be heard by counsel is concerned, is Accused-appellants argument is not well-taken. As reiterated
misleading. Both cases only defined the right to be heard by counsel as in People v. Costelo:[13]
the right to be assisted by counsel. It cannot be inferred from these cases
that the right to be heard by counsel presupposes the right to an [A]ppellants failure to quash the information, his participation in the
intelligent counsel. The requirement is not for counsel to be intelligent, trial and presenting evidence in his behalf, placed him in estoppel to
but to be effective. make such challenge. He has patently waived any objection or
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of effective counsel only in irregularities and is deemed as having submitted himself to the
the light of Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which refers jurisdiction of the court. It should be noted that the legality of arrest
to the right of persons under custodial investigation. In People v. affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
Lucero,[9] the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by this accused.Consequently, if objection on such ground is waived, the
Court, to wit: illegality of the arrest is not sufficient reason for setting aside an
otherwise valid judgment rendered after the trial, free from error. The
technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the the State of its right to convict the guilty when the facts on the record
commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have point to the culpability of the accused. (Italics supplied)
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against
the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions
from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them Any objection involving a warrant of arrest must be made before
inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. [14]
case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not Accused-appellant, likewise, claims that he was deprived of his
mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The right to a preliminary investigation. Had his counsel de oficio been
requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage effective, he should have filed the proper motion on his behalf.
before arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions which may There is no merit in this contention.
taint them and render them inadmissible. (Italics supplied)
Considering that accused-appellant submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, he is deemed to have waived his right to
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 preliminary investigation.
Constitution requires that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel. The reason for the latter provision was As aptly stated in People v. Buluran:[15]
explained in People v. Holgado, thus:
The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is did not impair the validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction
that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due of the trial court. While the right to preliminary investigation is a
process of law, and that all accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the
himself and counsel. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed
unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to entering a plea at arraignment. It appearing that appellants only raised
be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated may have no the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during appeal, their right
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, to a preliminary investigation was deemed waived when they entered
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but their respective pleas of not guilty.[16]
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for Accused-appellant next contends that he was deprived of his right
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so to bail. He contends that had his counsel de officio been effective, he
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so would have filed the proper motion.
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not The contention is without any merit. As ruled by this Court
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is in People v. Manes:[17]
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
The issue of bail has been rendered academic by the conviction of the
attorney of his own.[10] (Italics supplied)
accused. When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death,
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a
right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an matter of right nor of discretion.
accused is not denied the collateral right to due process, a fundamental
right which cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for
In the case of Strickland,[18] the United States Supreme Court:
due process is the concept of fairness, without which there can be no
justice. In other words, there can be no due process accorded an accused
if he is not given the right to be heard through counsel or assisted by Judicial scrutiny of counsels performance must be highly deferential. It
counsel. It follows that in order to be heard, and therefore be accorded is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsels assistance
due process, the assistance given by counsel must be effective as after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court,
implied in the rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this examining counsels defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
Court subscribes to American jurisprudence when it held that [t]he right conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other reconstruct the circumstances of counsels challenged conduct, and to
rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective evaluate the conduct from counsels perspective at the time. Because of
assistance of counsel.[11] the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of
In the light of the above ratiocination, accused-appellant contends reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
that the right to be heard by counsel is the right to effective assistance of the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
counsel. Citing Strickland v. Washington,[12] accused-appellant contends might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to
that the assistance rendered by counsel is ineffective or is defective if provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
the following elements are present: (1) that counsels performance was defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
In showing the ineffectiveness of the assistance rendered by xxxxxxxxx
counsel de officio, accused-appellant points out the following:
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
The private complainant, whose testimony was the principal basis of the him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
conviction, was hardly cross-examined. The same is true with debatable under the law;
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and Editha
Hernandez.In fact, prosecution witness Dra. Louella Nario was not (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
cross-examined at all. him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
As a result of the insufficient cross-examination of the witnesses for the statement of fact or law;
prosecution, particularly the private complainant, the defense of the
accused-appellant failed to bring to the attention of the trial court xxxxxxxxx
several matters which amplify the improbability, if not impossibility, in
the complainants testimony on how the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, the defense was not able to highlight several crucial (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause
points, among which are: (1) the impossibility that the alleged crime, of the defenseless or oppressed;
particularly the rape, was committed in a populated area - an inhabited
and well-developed subdivision in Paraaque, with a 24-hour store (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
(Burger Machine) at that - without being noticed; (2) the fact that, honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of
assuming that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end
complainant, the latter did not offer any form of resistance; and (3) the that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
impossibility that after the crime charged was allegedly committed, law. (Italics supplied)
accused-appellant and his co-accused gentlemanly accompanied
complainant to a place of her choice (the church). The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
likewise, provide:
Moreover, several questions remained unanswered. For example (1)
What time did the complainant report the incident to the police?; (2) Canon 2 -- A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an
How long did the police plan the alleged entrapment?; (3) Were there efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence,
other officers involved in the entrapment?; and (4) Why was the money integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
and other materials used for entrapment not presented in evidence?
xxxxxxxxx
Furthermore, there were also no attempts to impeach the testimony of
the private complainant on the scene of the crime through the use of
contradictory evidence as provided in the Rules. For instance, accused- Canon 12 -- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
appellants counsel could have presented a resident of the subdivision assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
where the crime was allegedly committed to describe the area. Such
witness can establish: (1) whether or not the area where the crime was xxxxxxxxx
allegedly committed was indeed too dark for anyone to notice the
commission of the alleged crime; (2) whether or not the houses in the Canon 17 -- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
subdivision are indeed too far apart that occurrences outside one house shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
would not be discernible from within; and (3) whether or not the
location of the houses in the subdivision is such that it would indeed be
useless for a woman, faced with the threat of rape to even attempt to ask Canon 18 -- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
for help. diligence.
We referred this case on 17 January 2001 to the Presiding Justice, A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the
Court of Appeals, for assignment who would conduct an investigation certification of the investigating officer as to the existence of probable
and thereafter submit a report and recommendation within ninety (90) cause[13] making him administratively liable. We can do no less in the
days from notice.[4] case of herein respondent who issued the subject warrant of arrest
without even such certification to rely upon, and worse, merely at the
In his Report and Recommendation[5] Associate Justice Salvador instance of the Criminal Docket Clerk who mechanically typed the
J. Valdez, Jr. recommended that respondent Judge be adjudged guilty as Warrant of Arrest for his signature.
charged and fined Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the
improvident issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in Crim. Case No. Br. 20- ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC-
1373. Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela, is FINED P10,000.00 for improvidently
issuing the Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April 2000 in Crim. Case No. Br.
We find the recommendation to be well-taken and adopt the same. 20-1373 in violation of the constitutional requirement of personal
determination by the issuing judge as to the existence of probable
cause. He is WARNED that any repetition of the procedure he had
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant
heretofore observed in the issuance of warrants of arrest will merit a
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
more severe sanction.
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized."[6] Interpreting the words SO ORDERED.
"personal determination" we said[7] that it does not thereby mean that
judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to
unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) [G. R. Nos. 140900 & 140911. August 15, 2001]
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutors report and require the
vs. RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in @ TUNGKOY/UNYOK, PEDRO MABANSAG @
determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow PUTOL (At large), ALEX PLACIO (At large), JOJO
SAJORGO (At large), ALLAN PLACIO (At large), NOEL While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of
DELOS REYES (At large), DODONG ADOLFO (At left-over food into the back of his Tamaraw FX service vehicle, three
large), and BENJIE MABANSAG (At large), accused, men approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he asked
what they wanted. The men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and
RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA @ a .38 revolver. None of the men wore any masks.[8]
TUNGKOY/UNYOK, accused-appellants.
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from
DECISION the store. The men refused to get money from the store. Without any
warning, one of the mens guns went off. When Manaysay heard the
PER CURIAM: shot, she came out and asked the men what they wanted. She told them
that they could get money from the store, but they refused to do so.
[9]
Instead, complainants were made to board the rear of the Tamaraw
This is an automatic review of the Consolidated Decision, [1] dated
FX.[10] Two of the mens companions were already seated in the front
September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina
seat. The man in the drivers seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle.
City, finding accused-appellants Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara [11]
The three other men also boarded the vehicle with the
guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal
complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one
Code, as amended, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death
of his five abductors.[12]
by lethal injection and to indemnify private complainants in the amount
of P100,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages, and the additional Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they
amount of P20,000.00 for Private Complainant Joseph Co as actual were made to wear caps over their heads as the vehicle reached Quezon
damages. Accused-appellants were acquitted of the crime of Robbery. Avenue in Quezon City.[13] After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the vehicle
stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the voices of people
The Information[2] for Kidnapping for Ransom against accused-
approaching the vehicle.
appellants and their other co-accused charged -
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of
That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named light materials and which had no ceiling. [14] They were made to sit on
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, the floor.[15] Then, they were transferred to another room where the
armed with a handgun and with evident premeditation, did then and covers of their eyes were removed and their feet were tied. Manaysay
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and testified that she saw accused-appellants in the house after the masking
intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANAYSAY tape was removed from their eyes. [16] Cos wallet which contained
for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P10 million at P5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysays necklace and earrings
Goodies Pares Mami House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St., were taken from them.[17] A person was left to guard them inside the
Sampaloc, Manila, owned and managed by the aforementioned victim room, whom both complainants identified as accused-appellant Roberto
Co and thereafter took them with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX Lara.[18]
likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang Bakal,
Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to
where they were kept under detention against their will until they were urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if Manaysay could go outside to do
able to escape the following day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on it.[19] The guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which
August 11, 1998. he gave Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard and pleaded with him to let tem
CONTRARY TO LAW. go. But the guard replied that he was just following orders. Co offered
him some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the money
The Information[3] for Robbery charged - and instead threw it away.[20]
The guard later fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow
That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang, managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside their
Marikina City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the room.[21] After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a
above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with intent to gain, house. An old woman living in the house allowed them to use the
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, by means of telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and Headquarters.[22] The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St.,
feloniously take and divested JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA Twinriver Subdivision, Parang, Marikina.[23] Two police officers from
MANAYSAY of the following personal properties after forcible taking the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT team.
[24]
them as hostages for ransom, to wit: Complainants case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) for investigation.[25]
1. Wallet of Co containing his drivers license, original copy On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the
of official receipt (OR), certificate of registration PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina where
(CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans; Co and Manaysay had been held captive. [26] A man seen running away
was arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr.[27] Upon being questioned, the
2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch; man identified himself as accused-appellant Roberto Lara. [28] SPO3
Fajardo identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs shown to
3. Casio G-Shock watch; him in court as the man he arrested. [29] Lara pointed to accused-
appellant Licayan as one of his companions and told the PAOCTF
members that Lara was hiding in his (Laras) uncles house at the back of
4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The PAOCTF members thereafter
proceeded to the house and were able to arrest accused-appellant
5. P10,000.00 cash Licayan.[30]
Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF
to the damage and prejudice of said victim as owners thereof headquarters in Camp Crame where they were identified by Co and
against their will. Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF
members.[31]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Thomas Cos brother, testified
that he was twice called in his office by unidentified persons who
The facts are as follows: demanded P10 million for the release of complainants. [32] The
kidnappers were of course frustrated as complainants were able to
Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies
escape.
Pares Mami House with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc.
[4]
Cos regular routine was for him and the other complainant, Linda Accused-appellants defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan
Manaysay, the restaurants cashier and accounting officer, to make the claimed that on August 11, 1998, at around 7:00 p.m., he was at home in
rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of left-over Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas
food and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in the Salvivia, a dump truck driver; [33] that on the next day, August 12, 1998,
evening and last until early in the morning of the next day. [5] The he was arrested by members of the PAOCTF while he was having
prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainant went drinks with Salvivia and Salvivias father at the latters residence in Sta.
to the Goodies Valenzuela Branch where they stayed until midnight. Cecilia Village;[34] and that when he was arrested, he was not informed
[6]
From there, they proceeded to the Cubao branch where they stayed of the charges against him. He said he only learned that he was arrested
until about 12:45a.m., August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the for the kidnapping of complainants after he had been brought to Camp
Sampaloc branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.[7] Crame.[35]
In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and abductors. The following testimony on cross-examination of
made to stand in a police-line up. They were not assisted by counsel. complainant Joseph Tomas Co is cited:
[36]
The complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group who
kidnapped complainants.[37] Licayan claimed he only saw complainant ATTY. LARACAS:
Co for the first time when he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame. [38] You were not able... Mr. Witness, the person who investigated you
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker, did not require you to prepare any sketch of these three
testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in persons who were in front of you at the FX?
his place of work in Antipolo. [39] At 7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he WITNESS:
went home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro
Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina. Mabansag had driven Laras family out No maam.
of his house and Lara had gone there to get his childs belongings.
[40]
However, before he could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina ATTY. LARACAS:
Police at Greenheights.[41]
Because you cannot very recall what their faces?
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. [42] The
WITNESS:
police beat him up and told him that they would go to Salvivias
house. He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a No maam.
plastic bag and he was again beaten up. [43] The police found Salvivia
and Licayan in Salvivias house and ordered the two to drop to the xx xx xx xx
ground.[44] The police poked a gun to Laras head and told him to
ATTY. LARACAS:
identify his companions, otherwise he would be killed. Thus, according
to Lara, he pointed to Licayan.[45] Now, Mr. Witness, you were seated at the rar (rear[sic]) portion of
the FX, you cannot see the faces of the person driving the FX
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were
and that man seated at the front portion.
identified by complainants in a police line-up, they were forced to sign
a statement.[46] They were not informed of their right to remain silent WITNESS:
and to be assisted by counsel.[47] Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B.
Sansano, who appeared to have assisted him in making his statement, Yes maam.[50]
actually assisted him.[48]
With respect to complainant Manaysay, the following portion of
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City, her answer on cross-examination is cited:
rendered its decision acquitting accused-appellants of robbery but
convicting them of kidnapping and sentencing them to death and to pay ATTY. LARRACAS:
damages to complainants. The dispositive portion of its decision states: Of course, Madam Witness when you were seated at the place
where you said you were seated, you cannot see the faces of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding RODERICK the persons at the two section of the FX?
LICAYAN and ROBERTO LARA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 267 of A: The person in front of us I was able to see, maam.
the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, and imposing upon Q: The person who you saw which you said was seated in front of at
both of them the penalty of death by lethal injection and the solidary the back of FX is not of the two persons who are inside the
payment to each of the victims the amount of One Hundred Thousand courtroom?
(P100,000.00) Pesos as moral and exemplary damages and an additional
amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Joseph Co as actual A: None, maam.
damages for the valuables taken from him.However, both accused are
acquitted for the crime of robbery for the reasons previously discussed xx xx xx xx
in keeping with the constitutional presumption of innocence of any man Q: So Madam Witness, you said that there was a curtain which
whose guilt is not within the standard of moral certainty. The cases separates the room and the curtain was always spread out
against the other accused Pedro Mabansag @ Tata Pandak, Jose during that time that you were inside?
Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Noel Delos Reyes, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie
Mabansag who all remain at large are ordered archived and let alias A: Yes, maam.
warrants for their arrest be issued.
ATTY. LARRACAS:
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants contend that - Q: So you did not see the faces of the persons outside that curtain?
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING A: Just their feet maam. [51]
FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THE Whether or nor complainants saw the faces of any or all the
MANIFEST INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR abductors while they were inside the vehicle is immaterial. What is
TESTIMONIES. important is that complainants positively identified accused-appellants
as among those who abducted them on August 10, 1998. Complainant
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT Co said that accused-appellant Lara guarded them in the kidnappers
RULING THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS safehouse on August 10, 1998, while Licayan guarded them the next
WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED, AND THE day, August 11, 1998.[52] In the police line-up conducted on the same
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY WERE day that complainants escaped, complainant Co was able to identify and
ARRESTED DO NOT FALL UNDER THE point to accused-appellants as part of the group of men who took part in
WARRANTLESS ARREST. their kidnapping.[53] On the other hand, complainant Manaysay
positively identified accused-appellant Licayan as one of two persons
III. ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-
she saw when the tapes placed over their eyes were removed in the
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A
safehouse.[54] Like Co, she identified accused-appellant Lara as the
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
person who guarded them in their room when they first arrived there
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ACTED IN
and as the person who brought her a half-gallon container in response to
CONSPIRACY WITH THE OTHER CO-
her request to go out so she could urinate. [55] She said she and Co tried
ACCUSED AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
to offer accused-appellant Lara money to help them escape, but he
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PARTICIPATION IN
refused the money and threw it away.[56] And like Co, Linda Manaysay
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AS MERE
was also able to identify and point to accused-appellants during the
ACCOMPLICES.
police line-up in Camp Crame as their abductors.[57]
The Court finds the appeal to be without merit.
Having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
First. As in all criminal cases where conviction or acquittal deportment and manner of testifying, [58] the trial court had reason to
depends almost entirely on the victims positive identification of the declare:
culprit, the basic issue presented in the case at bar deals with the
credibility of the complainants. For this purpose, the assessment of the [Complainants] assertions as to the identities of the accused were made
evidence by the trial court is given the highest degree of respect because in a clear straightforward and frank manner and their testimonies are
of the judges opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the compatible on material points and should be respected considering the
witnesses on the stand.[49] lengthy visible exposure of the accused to the victims from the time of
the kidnapping and up to the time of their escape x x x[59]
Accused-appellants make much of complainants failure to
remember the physical features and characteristics of their
In the light of complainants positive identification of accused- An award in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to each
appellants, the latters defense of alibi must fail. Alibi is an inherently of the complainants is proper, consistent with the current case law.
[68]
weak defense and must be rejected when the accused's identity is However, no award of exemplary damages can be made considering
satisfactorily and categorically established by the eyewitnesses to the the absence of aggravating circumstances. [69] Under Art. 2230 of the
offense,[60] especially when there is no showing that such eyewitnesses Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal offenses may be made only
had any improper motive to testify falsely. [61] In the case at bar, the when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
defense failed to show that Co and Manaysay were motivated by ill will circumstances. The award of actual damages in this case should
in testifying against accused-appellants. It is noteworthy that accused- likewise be disallowed. Actual damages must be proved with certainty
appellants self-serving testimonies were not corroborated by other and cannot be presumed. No evidence to sustain this award has been
witnesses. presented in this case.
Second. Accused-appellants contend that their arrest was illegal WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused- 272, Marikina City finding accused-appellant RODERICK LICAYAN
appellants had committed a crime. Their arrest, according to accused- and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
appellants, was based only on the information given by complainants. Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is
[62]
Accused-appellants argue that their warrantless arrest does not fall AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each of the accused-
under any of the cases enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised appellants is ORDERED to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to each
Rules of Criminal Procedure under which warrantless arrests may of the complainants. The award of P20,000.00 as actual damages made
validly be made. In addition, accused-appellants claim that after their in favor of complainant Joseph Co is deleted. Costs against accused-
arrest, they were already under custodial investigation and, therefore, appellants.
should have been informed of their constitutional rights, which the
arresting officers did not do. In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the
We likewise find no merit in this contention. records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty without
moving to quash the information on the ground that their arrest was SO ORDERED.
invalid. Accused-appellants are, therefore, estopped from questioning
the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity attendant to accused-
appellants arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the trial.[63]
Anent the claim that they were not assisted by counsel during [G.R. No. 130805. April 27, 2004]
their custodial investigation, suffice it to say that the trial court held:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TOKOHISA
Further, the admission of participation in the commission of the crime KIMURA and AKIRA KIZAKI,[1] respondents.
by accused Roberto Lara was made voluntarily, as attested by counsel
de officio who legally assisted him in giving his sworn statement at the DECISION
office of the latter, has shown compliance with the constitutional
requirements on pre-interrogation advisories. Albeit an extra-judicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of the co-accused (People vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA Appellants Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki seek reversal
119).[64]
of the decision[2] dated June 27, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 94-
5606, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66), Makati
Third. Accused-appellants contend that even assuming that the
City, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
prosecutions version of the facts is true, they can only be found guilty as
accomplices to the crime [65] because the record does not clearly show Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
that they acted in conspiracy with the other accused. They maintain that R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
it was never shown that they directly conspired in abducting the 1972, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
complainants nor that they were the ones who called and demanded of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
ransom from Benjamin Co. Accused-appellants assert that, if at all, their
participation was limited only to their act of guarding the victims in the
The Information dated August 8, 1994 against the accused
safehouse. They are mere accomplices since there is no showing that
they knew beforehand the criminal design of their co-accused. alleges:
On June 29, 1994, appellant Kizaki while having dinner with Let the marijuana, the subject matter of this case be immediately
his friends at the Nippon Ichi Restaurant located at Mabini, forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
Malate, Manila[27] was arrested by another NARCOM group led by
Maj. Jose F. Dayco.[28] SO ORDERED.[38]
Appellants defense is denial and alibi. In support thereof, In convicting appellants, the trial court made the following
both appellants were called to the witness stand. findings:
Appellant Kimuras testimony is as follows: In the afternoon The settled jurisprudence is that alibi is inherently a weak defense. Like
of June 27, 1994, Kimura was in the house of his co-appellant the defense of alibi, denial by the accused of the offense charged against
Kizaki at Dian Street, Makati City, together with Koichi Kishi, Luis him is also inherently a weak defense. It is also the settled jurisprudence
Carlos and a certain Sally and Boy.[29] In the evening of the said that the defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper over the positive
date, Kimura borrowed the car of Kizaki in order to get his identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to
(Kimuras) television from his house located in Evangelista Street, prosper, the accused must show that it was impossible for him to have
near the Cash and Carry Supermarket, and bring the same to a been at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of its
repair shop.[30] On their way to Kimuras house, Koichi requested commission.
Kimura to pass by Cash and Carry Supermarket because Koichi
Akira testified that on the evening of June 27, 1994, he was in his house trial were positively identified by the arresting officers as those
located at Dian Street corner Ampil Street, Makati City, Metro Manila, seized from the car of the appellants; that the contention of
which is a walking distance to Cash and Carry Supermarket, the scene appellant Kizaki that his warrantless arrest two days after the
of the offense. It was not therefore impossible for accused Akira Kizaki alleged incident, was unlawful, is legally inconsequential in this
to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its case considering that his conviction was not based on his arrest
commission. on June 29, 1994 but on his having participated in the transport
and delivery of marijuana on June 27, 1994; that appellant
Accused Kimura testified that on the evening of June 27, 1994, he was Kizaki never questioned the validity of the warrantless arrest of
with his co-accused Kizaki at the Cash and Carry Supermarket but for his co-appellant Kimura on June 27, 1994, either before the trial
another purpose, i.e., to meet Rey Plantilla who was borrowing money court or before this Court; thus, any challenge against the search
from him. In fine accused Kimura merely denied the offense charged and seizure of the marijuana based on constitutional ground is
against him, which is weak defense. deemed waived insofar as appellant Kizaki is concerned.
Both accused, Kizaki and Kimura, were positively identified by We will first resolve the issue on the alleged warrantless
prosecution witnesses SPO4 Baldomino, SPO1 Cabatu, Maj. Anso and arrest of appellant Kizaki.
PO3 Cadoy as the persons whom they arrested for drug trafficking in a
buy-bust operation at the Cash and Carry Supermarket on June 27, Appellant Kizaki assails the legality of his warrantless
1994. arrest. Indeed, SPO1 Delfin, one of those who arrested appellant
Kizaki at the Nippon Ichi restaurant, admitted that they did not
Finally, although the evidence show that there is a doubt in the illegality have a warrant of arrest when his group arrested Kizaki on the
of the arrest of accused Kimura by Major Dayco, the jurisprudence is night of June 29, 1994. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
that the illegality of warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private
right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the
culpability.[39] following circumstances:
Hence, this appeal before us. Appellants assert the (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
following: committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
I
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE.
to be arrested has committed it; and
II
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAD BEEN PROVEN
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Appellants claim that although the defense of alibi and
denial are weak, it is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the
The alleged crime happened on June 27, 1994 and
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt to support a
appellant Kizaki was arrested on June 29, 1994 or two days after
judgment of conviction; that the trial court mainly relied on the
the subject incident. At the time appellant Kizaki was arrested, he
weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the
was at a restaurant having dinner with a group of friends, thus,
evidence for the prosecution. They argue that appellant Kizakis
he was not committing or attempting to commit a crime. Neither
claim that he was not at the Cash and Carry Supermarket on the
was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even
night of June 27, 1994 was corroborated by three independent
without a warrant. It bears stressing that none of the arresting
witnesses including appellant Kimura who testified that he was
officers of appellant Kizaki was present on the night of June 27
not with appellant Kizaki at Cash and Carry Supermarket on the
where appellant Kizaki allegedly sold and transported marijuana
said night.
and escaped, thus the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that appellant Kizaki
Appellants further question how the trial court could have committed the crime. None of the exceptions enumerated above
been certain that the marijuana presented in court are the same was present to justify appellant Kizakis warrantless arrest.
articles confiscated from the appellants when the arresting
officers did not place identifying marks on the confiscated items.
However, notwithstanding the unjustified warrantless arrest
of appellant Kizaki, the records show that he did not raise such
Appellant Kizaki further contends that he was arrested two question before he pleaded to the offense charged.[40]Neither did
days after the alleged buy-bust operation without a valid warrant he move to quash the information on that ground before the trial
of arrest. He points out that although the trial court expressed court.[41] He thus waived objection to the illegality of his arrest.
doubts as to the legality of his arrest, it nevertheless convicted [42]
Moreover, appellant Kizakis application for bail[43] which was
him of the crime charged, which is in violation of the denied by the trial court likewise constitutes a waiver of his right
Constitution. Kizaki argues that he could not have been caught to question whatever irregularities and defects which attended his
in flagrante delicto to justify the warrantless arrest when he was arrest.[44]
arrested two days after the alleged Cash and Carry incident while
he was only having dinner with his friends at a restaurant.
Nevertheless, we find the other claims of appellants
meritorious.
In the appellees brief, the Solicitor General prays that the
decision of the trial court finding appellants guilty as charged be
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
affirmed. He argues that appellants were positively identified by
the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for
four prosecution witnesses, all police officers, as among the three
conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the
persons engaged in the transportation and delivery of about
crime of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[45]
40,768 grams of marijuana on June 27, 1994 at the Cash and
Carry Supermarket; that the police operatives were able to seize
the marijuana from the Sentra car they were using to transport
the marijuana; that the marijuana introduced and offered at the
In People vs. Casimiro,[46] we acquitted appellant for failure section that was the time when the investigator
of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug mark them?
which constitutes the corpus delicti and held:
WITNESS:
In People vs. Mapa, the accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after
the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the It is already their duty to mark them, your honor.
NBI for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from
the accused. In People vs. Dismuke, this Court ruled that the failure to ...
prove that the specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist
was that seized from the accused was fatal to the prosecutions case. In
ATTY. BALICUD:
People vs. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to
mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged
apprehension of the accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he And did you see if any of those men in the
marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the investigation section did the corresponding
police headquarters. It was held: markings?
WITNESS: WITNESS:
What I know your honor, is that the investigation I was ordered to bring the marijuana to the Crime
section is the one who will mark the evidence. Laboratory.
Where did this marijuana come from, if you know? Now, you said that this marijuana was contained in
three sacks, three rice sacks, will you please
WITNESS: examine the sacks and tell us if these are the
same sacks which you brought to the PNP Crime
In our office confiscated from Japanese nationals. Laboratory?
Do you know the name of the Japanese nationals you Yes, sir, these are the same sacks I brought.
are referring to?
COURT:
WITNESS;
What made you so sure that these are the same sacks
I do not know, sir. that you brought from your office to the Crime
Laboratory?
PROS. MANABAT:
WITNESS:
But then this request was received already by the ATTY. BALICUD:
Crime Laboratory on June 29, 1994, where were
the three sacks deposited from June 28 up to the You brought the same to the Crime Laboratory?
time you picked it up on June 29 to be brought to
the Crime Laboratory?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BALICUD:
Were there markings in the 3 sacks when the
same were brought to the PNP Crime
Why did you not deposit or deliver it immediately to Laboratory?
the Crime Laboratory?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Yes, sir. A, B, C.
We were still preparing the necessary papers.
ATTY. BALICUD:
ATTY. BALICUD:
WITNESS: WITNESS:
ATTY. BALICUD: How about the contents of these three sacks, were
they also marked when you brought the same to
Now, when the request for laboratory the PNP Crime Laboratory?
examination was made, did you already see the
contents inside the sack? WITNESS:
Yes, sir, but it was marked at the Crime Laboratory indubitably show the identity of the marijuana which mere
already. allegedly seized from appellants.
ATTY. BALICUD: The alibi of appellant Kizaki that he was in his house on the
same night assumes weight and significance considering that the
So, it is clear that when the alleged marijuana was scenario depicted by the prosecution on the alleged escape of
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, there was appellant Kizaki at the Cash and Carry left much to speculations
no marking yet? and surmises. The prosecution tried to show that appellant Kizaki
who was on board the stainless jeep was able to escape even if
WITNESS: the police operatives were only about five meters away from the
jeep[56] which was heading to the entrance of the Cash and Carry
along South Superhighway. It is quite difficult for us to accept its
Yes, sir. [51]
veracity considering that despite the short distance of the
operatives from the jeep when it started to speed off, the
While SPO1 Baduas testimony showed that it was operatives who were all armed with service revolvers[57] chased
investigator SPO1 Delfin who made the markings A, B, C on the on foot the stainless jeep and did not even fire any warning shot
three sacks containing the marijuana which he brought to the to stop the driver and appellant Kizaki nor did they fire a shot at
laboratory, nowhere in his testimony did he say that such the tire of the jeep to immobilize it.The alibi of Kizaki found
markings were made on the night the appellants were arrested, corroboration from his friend Akiyoshi Takeyama and appellant
i.e., on June 27, 1994. Investigator Delfin did not initial said Kizakis former housemaid Rosaria Quintia that he was in his
markings nor did he testify affirming his markings. house and never left it on the night of the alleged delivery or
transport of marijuana in Cash and Carry Supermarket. In fact,
Moreover, although the three sacks of alleged marijuana co-appellant Kimura testified that appellant Kizaki was not one of
were marked as A, B, C, the contents of these three sacks his companions in going to Cash and carry Supermarket on June
however had no markings when they were kept inside the supply 27, 1994.[58] Moreover, in the request for laboratory examination
room on June 28 since as Badua intimated, the contents of these dated June 28, 1994, signed by P/CI Jose F. Dayco, Chief,
three sacks were only marked when he brought the same to the Investigation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, the suspects named
PNP Crime Laboratory on June 29, 1994. therein were only Koichi Kishi and Tomohisa Kimura. [59] Hence,
the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been
The records of the case do not show that the police overcome by the prosecution.
operatives complied with the procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs as embodied in the Dangerous In fine, for failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of
Drugs Board Regulation No. 3 Series of 1979 amending Board both appellants beyond reasonable doubt, they must perforce be
Regulation No. 7 Series of 1974,[52] i.e., any apprehending team exonerated from criminal liability.
having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or
paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or confiscation, WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the Case No. 94-5606 is hereby REVERSED and appellants
presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki, are hereby ACQUITTED on
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the ground of reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
inventory and be given a copy thereof. In this case, there was no released from prison, unless they are being detained for some
inventory made in the crime scene despite the fact that Maj. Anso other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to
testified that he saw eighteen packages neatly wrapped in a inform this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days
newspaper but the inventory was made already in the from receipt hereof.
headquarters. SPO1 Badua testified that the marijuana
confiscated from appellant Kimura was contained in three sacks.
Let the PNP Director be furnished a copy of herein decision
for the proper information and guidance of his police operatives.
Consequently, the failure of the NARCOM operatives to The marijuana is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
place markings on the alleged seized marijuana coupled with government for its proper disposition under the law.
their failure to observe the procedure in the seizure and taking
custody of said drug seriously bring to question the existence of
Costs de oficio.
the seized prohibited drug. It is not positively and convincingly
clear that what was submitted for laboratory examination and
presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants. SO ORDERED.
On November 6, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Second. Respondent judge does not deny that the accused in
Jr. submitted a Memorandum[4] finding respondent judge guilty of gross Criminal Case No. 9106 was at large when the motion for bail on
ignorance of the law for releasing the accused on recognizance before it recognizance was filed and subsequently granted. Bail is the security
could acquire jurisdiction over his person. The accused was still at large given for the release of a person in custody of the law. [5] Section 15,
when the motion for bail was filed. He likewise found the respondent Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
judge to have violated R.A. No. 6036. He ratiocinated:first, the law court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that
requires that the accused sign in the presence of two witnesses of good of a responsible person. It is a basic principle that bail is intended to
standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending obtain provisional liberty and cannot be granted before custody of an
final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court hearing the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or
case periodically every two weeks. No such sworn statement was voluntary surrender. It is self-evident that a court cannot grant
executed by the accused and; second, in order to be released on provisional liberty to one who is actually in the enjoyment of his liberty
recognizance, the accused must be unable to post bail bond.The accused for it would be incongruous to give freedom to one who is free. Thus,
is a CPA and can afford to post bond. The Court Administrator we have held that it is premature to file a motion for bail for someone
recommends that respondent judge be ordered to pay a fine whose liberty has yet to be curtailed.[6]
of P20,000.00, considering that it is his first offense, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more In the case at bar, respondent judge was fully cognizant that the
severely. court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
who was still at large and yet, he entertained and granted his motion for
We agree with the finding of the Office of the Court bail. In doing so, respondent judge violated a tenet in criminal
Administrator. The respondent judge is liable in granting the motion for procedure which is too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the
bail on recognizance in clear violation of R.A. No. 6036, for the law. When the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
following reasons: disciplinary action.[7]
First. Section 1 of R.A. No. 6036 provides that "any provision of Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful
law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a to the law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon
person charged with violation of a criminal offense the prescribed to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
fine of two thousand pesos, or both." Instead of bail, Section 2 states principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He
that the person charged "shall be required to sign in the presence of two should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to
witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[8]
himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of
Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in In the case of Comia vs. Antona,[9] we found respondent judge
its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further liable for gross ignorance of the law for entertaining an application for
that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a bail even though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the accused. He was fined P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition
responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to
accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court." WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Acmad T.
Barataman liable for gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him a
In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn statement fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
supporting the motion for bail filed before respondent judge was signed, similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
not by the accused but by his father. The failure of the accused to sign
the sworn statement is in clear contravention of the express mandate of SO ORDERED.
the ground that the prosecution failed to report the matter to the Office
of the Solicitor General for appropriate action.
On January 28, 1997, the date set for the hearing of the petition
for bail, complainant Marallag, the private prosecutor handling Criminal Considering that the prosecution witnesses never appeared when their
Case No. 7316, manifested that Duarte first had to be arraigned in order turn to testify came and for four (4) settings, they never cropped up, this
that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over said accused. Upon Court developed its impression that prosecution is left without anybody
arraignment, Duarte pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged. The to oppose this motion for bail with no proof that the guilt of the accused
prosecution informed the court that during the preliminary investigation is strong.
before the Municipal Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Duarte
admitted to the killing of Ferdinand Feri but claimed that he did it in So this Court has to follow the amended Rules on Criminal Procedure,
self-defense. Thereafter, the prosecution orally moved that the reverse especially Rule 114, Sec. 3, quoted thus:
order of trial be conducted (i.e., that the defense shall be the first to
present its evidence), in view of Duartes admission of the killing. Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody, shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right; except
Respondent Judge ordered Duarte to clarify in writing whether he those charged with a capital offense, or an offense which, under the law
admits to the killing of Ferdinand Feri or not. She likewise set for oral at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
argument the next day, January 29, 1997, the issue of whether the is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
reverse order of trial should be followed in the criminal case.
Finding no witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused or to show that
On January 29, 1997, after both parties were heard, respondent the evidence of guilt is strong;
Judge granted the motion to conduct the trial in reverse order. The
defense moved to reconsider the trial courts ruling. Subsequently, the AS PRAYED FOR, said Motion for Bail is hereby granted.[1]
trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the issue of whether the trial should be in the reverse order. On Complainants thereafter filed the instant administrative case
February 4, 1997, the prosecution submitted a Memorandum of against respondent Judge, claiming that her issuance of the August 14,
Authorities while the defense submitted its Position Paper. 1997 Order reflects gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and grave
abuse of discretion on her part, since said Order granting bail did not
In an Order dated February 26, 1997, respondent Judge ruled that contain a summary of evidence presented by the prosecution which
the prosecution shall first present evidence regarding the petition for summary is necessary to determine whether a judge has adequate basis
bail. The order stated in part: for granting bail.[2]
(2) that respondent Judge denied complainants due process Respondent Judges act of granting bail to the accused without
by considering the application for bail submitted for hearing the parties on the matter or asking searching and clarificatory
resolution without conducting a hearing thereon, when it questions runs counter to the rule requiring the conduct of a hearing on
was the prosecution which failed, despite several a petition for bail in cases where an accused is charged with a capital
opportunities granted thereto, to present its witnesses on the offense. Such error merits a reprimand, for the Court has previously
scheduled hearing dates; held that-
(3) that respondent Judge refused to postpone the hearing on xxx admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise
the application for bail on August 12, 1997 despite the thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
pendency in the Court of Appeals of the petition for principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (assailing the order present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
directing the prosecution to present evidence ahead of the bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
defense), even though in truth, complainant had already weighed in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. in
received a copy of the appellate courts resolution denying other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within
said petition even before August 12, 1997. [6] the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
Respondent Judge further accused complainant Marallag of violating thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice
Canons 11[7] and 11.03 [8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for and arbitrariness.[16]
exhibiting disrespect towards her during the hearing on August 12,
1997, specifically, by using menacing language against her and raising However, the Court notes that the prosecutions failure to present
his voice. [9] evidence in relation to the petition for bail was not entirely due to the
fault of respondent Judge. The prosecution is also partly to blame for
On November 29, 1999, Office the Court Administrator submitted such failure. On the dates set by the trial court for hearing of the petition
its memorandum recommending that respondent Judge be held liable for bail, the prosecution raised other issues-first, the alleged
for gross ignorance of the law and be fined in the amount of Five inconsistency between the accuseds plea of Not Guilty during the
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). arraignment and his admission during the preliminary investigation that
he killed Ferdinand Feri in self-defense; and second, the necessity of
The complaint is meritorious. conducting the trial in the reverse order-which sidetracked the hearing
on the petition for bail. Moreover, it was the prosecution which refused
to heed respondent Judges order that it proceed with the presentation of
The rule is that all persons in custody shall, before conviction, be
its evidence relative to the petition for bail during the hearing of August
entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, when the accused is
12, 1997. Hence, the Court finds that an imposition on respondent Judge
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
of a fine would not be justified under the circumstances of this case.
perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is strong, the grant of bail becomes a
matter of discretion. [10]
The Court also deems it proper to refer to the integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, recommendation and report the allegations
Where the admission to bail of an accused is discretionary, it is
of respondent Judge that complainant Marallag knowingly made
mandatory for the trial court to conduct a hearing to afford both the
untruthful statements of fact in his complaint filed with the Court, and
prosecution and the defense a reasonable opportunity to present
exhibited disrespect toward respondent Judge during several hearings of
evidence to establish, in the case of the prosecution, that evidence of the
Criminal Case No. 7316.
guilt of the accused is strong, and in the case of the defense, that such
evidence of guilt is not strong. [11]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan
of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3, is
The criminal case before respondent Judge involved an accused
hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
who was charged with murder, a capital offense. [12] Thus, the conduct of
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
a hearing on the accuseds application for bail was necessary before the
this decision be attached to the personal record of respondent Judge.
trial court could grant bail. The records of the case however reveal that
although the trial court set several dates for the hearing on the
application for bail, the parties were not able to adduce evidence which The charges made by respondent Judge against complainant Atty.
would enable the trial court to determine whether the evidence of the Fred Henry V. Marallag are hereby REFERRED to the Integrated Bar of
accuseds guilt was strong, for purposes of resolving the issue of whether the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
the latter is entitled to bail. It was the other issues raised by the
prosecution, such as the necessity of Duartes arraignment before the SO ORDERED.
application for bail may be resolved, and the propriety of conducting
trial in reverse order, which were taken up during the scheduled
hearings.[13] The prosecution was thus deprived of the opportunity to
prove that the evidence of Duartes guilt was strong, and the defense was
also denied the chance to prove otherwise. The records further indicate
that when the prosecution failed to present any evidence during the [G.R. Nos. 148712-15. January 21, 2004]
hearing on the application for bail on August 12, 1997, respondent
Judge proceeded at once to pronounce that the motion was deemed PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINADOR
submitted for resolution. CACHOLA y SALAZAR, ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA,
NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN
The prosecutions failure to submit evidence on the accuseds LAEGEN y CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ,
application for bail did not justify respondent Judges act of granting bail RODEMIR GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO
to the accused without a hearing, because the established rule is that y SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA,
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose appellants.
any objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from DECISION
which it may infer the strength of the States evidence of guilt of the
accused.[14] A judge is in fact required to include in his or her order PER CURIAM:
granting or refusing bail a summary of the evidence presented by the
In just an instant, 12-year-old Jessie E. Barnachea lost his line-up at the Bauang Police Station, Jessie again
mother, an elder brother, an uncle, and a cousin as a result of the identified Cachola and Amay as the assailants.[8] The next day,
carnage that took place at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December when the police conducted the third confirmatory investigation,
1999 right inside their house in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, which was to present Jessie with photographs of the suspects,
La Union. Their horrible death was attributed to herein Jessie identified the two for the third time.
appellants, who, however, pleaded not guilty to the four
separate informations for murder. The eight appellants were thereafter subjected to paraffin
test. But only the right hands of Cachola and Amay yielded
At the trial before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La positive results for gunpowder nitrates.[9]
Union, Branch 67, the prosecution presented as witnesses Jessie
and his brother and neighbors, as well as several police officers. The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and
Their testimonies disclose as follows: merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on
her head and three on her body;[10] Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds
Jessie was about to leave their house to watch cartoons in on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and
his uncles house next door when two armed men suddenly arms;[11] Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his
entered the front door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to body, and with his penis excised; [12] Rubenson, one gunshot
drop to the floor, and then hit him in the back with the butt of a wound on his head and a stab wound that lacerated his liver.[13]
long gun. Without much ado, the intruders shot to death Jessies
uncle, Victorino V. Lolarga, who was then in the living room. The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses were
Jessie forthwith crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw dispensed with upon the stipulation by the public prosecutor and
the feet of a third man who had also entered the house. The men the counsels for the appellants that the nature of their testimonies
entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the rampage would be that (1) PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., was inside the police car
was over and after the malefactors had already departed, Jessie with Jessie when the latter recognized
came out of his hiding place and proceeded to the kitchen. There appellants Cachola and Amay; (2) Mark Garcia would
he saw his mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his brother corroborate the testimony of Felix Andrada regarding the
Felix Barnachea, Jr.; and his cousin Rubenson Abance - all description of the jeep; (3) Felix Barnachea, Sr., suffered actual
slaughtered.[1] damages amounting to P177,000 as a result of the death of his
wife Carmelita and son Felix, Jr.; (4) a police officer of Aringay,
Meanwhile, Jessies eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, La Union, flagged down the jeep at the checkpoint and saw the
was in his uncles house watching television with his aunt and appellants on board; and (5) a police officer of Bauang, La Union,
young cousins when he sensed a commotion outside. When would identify the pictures taken at the crime scene.
Robert went out to see what was transpiring, he saw armed men
running towards their house. One of them turned and pointed a After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense
gun at him, prompting him to scamper away and hide at the back counsels orally asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to
of his uncles house. From where he was hiding, he noticed a evidence. The trial court denied the motion outright and set the
stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking fruits and vegetables schedule for the presentation of the evidence for the defense.
dealer, parked in front of the fence of their house. Standing [14]
Instead of presenting their evidence, however, the appellants,
behind the jeep were three armed men wearing bonnets, with through their respective counsels, filed a Demurrer to
only their nose and eyes exposed. In the next instant, he heard Evidence[15] even without leave of court.
gunshots and then saw men running from his house. The men
hurriedly boarded the jeep and left the place.[2] On 26 September 2000, the trial court rendered a
decision[16] (1) convicting (a) Cachola and Amay, as principals, of
The jeep did not go unnoticed by the four counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer four counts
neighbors. Russel Tamba was with some friends in front of the supreme penalty of death; and (b)
of Rodas Store, around 100 meters away from Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria, as
the Barnachea residence, when the jeep passed by very slowly accomplices, of four counts of murder and sentencing them to
going towards the Barnachea residence. According to him, the suffer four counts of the indeterminate penalty of eight years
jeep had a marking El Shaddai in front, aside from the marking of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day
fruits and vegetables dealer on the sides. of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) ordering all of them to
[3]
Francisco Andrada was also talking with some people in front pay the heirs of the victims a total of P300,000 as death
of the Calumbaya Barangay Hall, only five meters away indemnity; P200,000 as moral damages; and P177,000 as actual
from Rodas Store, when he noticed that jeep, with or compensatory damages.
the El Shaddai marking, pass by.[4] Not long after, both heard
gunshots and later saw the jeep pass by again, this time running Before us on automatic review, appellants Cachola, Sagun,
very fast.[5] Ignacio, and Marquez contend that the trial court erred (1) in
finding conspiracy among them and their co-appellants; (2) in
The incident was immediately reported to the police, and finding proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) in not dismissing
the description of the El Shaddai jeep used by the malefactors the informations outright despite a motion before arraignment,
was relayed through radio to the police stations in there having been a clear illegal arrest and denial of due process.
the provinceof La Union.[6] At around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was
intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police As for appellants Amay, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria,
force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. they assert that the trial court erred (1) in finding
No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellant Amay guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
appellants were thereafter brought to the Aringay police station the crime of murder; and (2) in not acquitting
and then turned over to the Bauang police.[7] appellants Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria for insufficiency of
evidence and on reasonable doubt.
When the Chief of Police of Bauang Benjamin
M. Lusad was informed of the apprehension of the eight In its Consolidated Reply Brief, the Office of the Solicitor
appellants, he went to the Barnachea residence, where he came General (OSG) recommends the affirmance of the conviction for
to know that Jessie was an eyewitness. He invited Jessie to ride murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the
with him to pick up the suspects. While Lusad was supervising other appellants for failure of the prosecution to establish their
the boarding of the suspects into the vehicle, Jessie was in identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt.
another police vehicle with PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., to see whether
he could recognize any one of the eight men. Jessie pointed
We agree with the recommendation of the OSG to acquit
to Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the two armed men
appellants Sagun, Ignacio, Marquez, Guerzo, Laegen,
who entered his house and killed his relatives. During the police
and Echabaria. Upon a thorough review of the records of the Robert also stated that one of the men did not have his head
case, we found nothing that would show their participation in the covered. As to the alleged improbability of the lookouts wearing
commission of the crimes. Not one of the prosecution witnesses bonnets while the principal shooters were unmasked, or of the
identified them as among the malefactors who were at malefactors sparing Jessie, suffice it to say that such
the Barnachea residence on that fateful day. Surprisingly, even circumstances are not so incredible as to cast reasonable doubt
as the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to establish on the truth of the narrated events.
the actual participation of the other appellants in the commission
of the crime, it found that they cooperated in the execution of the In sum, none of the alleged inconsistencies, minor as they
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[17] It appears, however, are, could leave us with doubt that Jessie was present in his
that the only reason why they were implicated was that they were house and saw armed men shoot his relatives. Barely two hours
with Cachola and Amay on board the jeep that was intercepted had passed since he witnessed the gruesome murders when
in Aringay, La Union, almost two hours after the killings. What Jessie identified appellants Cachola and Amay as the
constitute previous or simultaneous acts that would make them malefactors. Reasonably, the memory of their faces was still
liable as accomplices are not found in the decision or in any fresh on his mind. Moreover, Jessie identified the two appellants
evidence on record. two times more at the police station and once in open court, and
he never faltered in his identification.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements
must concur: (1) community of design, which means that the Significantly, the appellants have not imputed any ill motive
accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the to Jessie for testifying against Cachola and Amay. Where there is
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a
accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely
indispensable to the commission of the crime. [18] In the present implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy and
case, neither element was proved. The mere presence of the six should be accorded full faith and credit.[23]
appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay on
board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, In all, there does not appear on record to be some fact or
the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre.[19] That they were circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has
found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two overlooked or the significance of which it has misapprehended or
hours after the commission of the crime does not constitute misinterpreted. [24] We rely, therefore, on the competence of the
previous or simultaneous act. Absent a link between the crime trial court to decide the question of credibility of the witnesses,
and their presence in the jeep two hours later, we cannot having heard them and observed their deportment and manner of
consider their participation even as accessories to the crime. testifying during the trial.[25]
It is a basic evidentiary rule in criminal law that the The reliance by appellant Cachola on People
prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused v. Teehankee[26] is misplaced. In that case the negative result of
beyond reasonable doubt.[20] If the prosecution fails to discharge the paraffin test did not preclude a finding of guilt by the trial
that burden, the accused need not present any evidence.[21] Thus, court, the reason being that the accused was tested for the
for utter lack of evidence against the six appellants, their acquittal presence of nitrates only after more than 72 hours had lapsed
is in order. from the time of the shooting. In the present case, the paraffin
test was conducted on the same night the shooting incident
However, as regards appellants Cachola and Amay, we occurred; hence, the lapse of only a few hours increases its
concur with the trial court and the OSG that the prosecution had reliability. While the presence of nitrates on accuseds hand is not
presented sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond conclusive of guilt, it bolsters the testimony of an eyewitness that
reasonable doubt. The credible testimony of, and positive the accused fired a gun.
identification by, Jessie Barnachea, which are corroborated by
forensic evidence, i.e., the positive results of the paraffin test on As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the
the right hands of Cachola and Amay, constitute sufficient appellants to present evidence after filing their demurrer to
evidence to sustain their conviction. evidence without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of
the Rules of Court[27] is clear on the matter, thus:
As to the credibility of Jessie Barnachea, the trial court
made the following observations: SEC. 15. - Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its
case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
The Court observed the demeanor of Jessie Barnachea on the witness evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
stand and ... did not observe any indication of falsehood in his narration. opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior
He showed obvious readiness to answer questions propounded to him. leave of court.
His reactions and answers to the questions displayed evident respect for
truth. He remained consistent on cross-examination. He positively If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
identified accused Amay and Cachola as the one who shot and killed his evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to
family. The Court did not observe any hesitancy or indication of dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
uncertainty - and his recital of the events appeared spontaneous. [22] evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution. (Underscoring supplied).
There is nothing on record that gives this Court cause to
interfere with the trial courts determination of the credibility of The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the
Jessie. Indeed, his testimony was unwavering despite attempts absence of prior leave of court was a clear waiver of their right to
of the defense counsels to confuse or trap him. The alleged present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had
inconsistency between Jessies sworn statement and testimony been denied due process because the evidence they belatedly
on the number of malefactors, if at all, does not detract from his sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow
credibility. That Jessie saw two armed men enter his house is them to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by
clear. While the defense claims ambiguity as to the presence of a espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
third man, Jessies statement easily reveals that the third man convenience.[28] Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver
was not immediately mentioned because he (the third man) only was not clear. The trial court postponed the hearings on the
followed the two and Jessie did not see his face. motion for demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied,
and then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the
It is also pointed out that Jessies identification position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this
of Cachola and Amay runs counter to Roberts testimony that the automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to the
armed men were wearing bonnets. Again, from their testimonies, waiver of the presentation of evidence.
it is apparent that the brothers saw different men. Besides,
Neither can the question of the legality of be reclusion perpetua,which is the lower of the two indivisible
the warrantless arrest of the appellants be raised for the first time penalties prescribed by law.
before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise
by the trial court of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused, As regards the civil liability of
the question should have been raised prior to their arraignment. appellants Cachola and Amay, we hold them jointly and severally
That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the liable to pay the heirs of each of the victims death indemnity and
arraignment[29]is unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested moral damages each in the amount of P50,000, or a total of
an extension of time to file a motion to quash the information or P400,000. They are further ordered to pay the respective heirs of
to dismiss the case,[30] which the trial court allegedly denied, Carmelita and Felix Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of
cannot save the day for them. The fact remains that before P25,000, or a total of P50,000, in view of the presence of one
arraignment, no such motion was filed. Even assuming that their aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime against
arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their the said victims. As to the claim for damages by
arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their Felix Barnachea Sr. in the amount of P177,000, we sustain the
arrest.[31] same even if only a list of expenses, [37] not official receipts, was
submitted because such amount was admitted by the defense
We now discuss the circumstances that attended the during the trial.[38] Moreover, although there is no evidence as to
commission of the crimes. the amount spent as a result of the death
of Victorino and Rubenson, their respective heirs shall be
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000, since
treachery and evident premeditation. There is no doubt that the they clearly incurred funeral expenses.[39]
killings were done with treachery, considering that the assailants
suddenly barged in and immediately went on a shooting WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated 26 September
rampage. We have time and again ruled that when the attack is 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67,
sudden and unexpected, there is treachery.[32] The presence of is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as DOMINADOR CACHOLA y
even this single qualifying circumstance is sufficient to qualify the SALAZAR and ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA are found GUILTY
killing to murder.[33] of four counts of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323-26 and
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal
As to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325. The said decision is, however,
we find the same lacking, for there is no evidence of planning or MODIFIED in that they are (1) sentenced to suffer the penalty
preparation to kill, much less of the time when the plot was of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, in Criminal Cases Nos.
conceived.[34] 2323 and 2326; and (2) ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
following damages:
It may not be amiss to mention that the death certificate
of Victorino Lolarga reveals that his penis was excised. One may a. P50,000 as death indemnity in favor of the heirs of each
wonder whether such circumstance amounted to ignominy that victim, or a total of P200,000;
can aggravate the offense.
b. P50,000 as moral damages in favor of the heirs of each
For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the victim, or a total of P200,000;
offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect
more humiliating, thus adding to the victims moral suffering. c. P25,000 as exemplary damages in favor of the respective
Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part heirs of Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea Jr.,
thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the or a total of P50,000;
accused.[35] In this case, the information states
that Victorinos sexual organ was severed after he was shot and d. P177,000 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of
there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea Jr.; and
natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider
ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
e. P25,000 as temperate damages in favor of the respective
heirs of Rubenson Abance and Victorino Lolarga, or a
However, as regards Carmelita and Felix, Jr., we appreciate total of P50,000.
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, since it was alleged in
the information and proved during the trial that they were killed
The assailed decision is REVERSED insofar as appellants
inside their house. Appellants Cachola and Amay, therefore,
NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y
violated the sanctity of the said victims home.
CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO
y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y SALVADOR, and NELSON C.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the ECHABARIA are concerned, and another one is hereby rendered
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In conjunction, (1) acquitting them of the crimes charged for insufficiency of
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law evidence; (2) ordering their immediate release from confinement
prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be unless their further detention is warranted by virtue of any lawful
imposed when in the commission of the deed, there is present cause; and (3) directing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
one aggravating circumstance. In the cases of Carmelita and to submit a report on their release within five days from notice
Felix Jr., in Criminal Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325, there is one hereof.
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance to
offset it; hence, the higher penalty of death imposed by the trial
Costs de oficio.
court stands.
SO ORDERED.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to
the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray[36] that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of
death, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling
of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed. G.R. No. 150735 March 15, 2004
But in the cases of Victorino and Rubenson, in Criminal PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
Cases Nos. 2323 and 2326, there being no aggravating or vs.
mitigating circumstance, the penalty should STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, appellant.
DECISION In defense, appellant, who gave his occupation as a vegetable
vendor at La Trinidad, Benguet, claimed as follows:
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
A certain Binyang who hails from Angeles City goes to his stall at
1
On appeal is the November 5, 2001 Decision of the Regional least once a month to buy vegetables during which she would
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. 597 ask him if he knows of any marijuana for sale to which he would
finding Stephen Cadley y Ciano (appellant) guilty of violating always respond in the negative. Sometimes, Binyang would also
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as offer to sell him shabu.
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
On June 9, 2000, appellant informed Binyang that he was going
2
The accusatory portion of the Information charging appellant for down to Manila with his friends the following day, or on June 10,
violation of Republic Act No. 6425 reads: 2000, at 10:00 p.m., to buy spare parts for his vehicle, and they
would stop-over in Tarlac.
That on or about 11th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
Mabalacat, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the Appellant left for Manila as planned and while on a stop-over at
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, the Victory Bus Terminal in Tarlac, he saw Binyang and went to
STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, without having been lawfully and talk to her while his companions went to the comfort room. While
permitted and authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully he was talking to her, somebody approached him and poked a
and feloniously deliver and/or give away to a poseur buyer gun at him, saying, "NARCOM ito, huwag gagalaw." More
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY GRAMS and SEVEN THOUSAND persons, who later arrived, along with the persons who identified
FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY ONE TENTH THOUSANDTHS OF himself as a "NARCOM," forcibly dragged him inside a vehicle.
A GRAM (790.7421 g) of dried marijuana leaves, a prohibited Inside the vehicle, the persons mauled him, poked a gun at him,
drug. and demanded that he show them where the marijuana was and
give the names of the persons in Benguet engaged in selling the
Contrary to law. same. He, however, denied having brought any marijuana or
knowing any such persons.10
Hence, the indictment of appellant. WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused STEPHEN CADLEY y
CIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
hereby sentences him to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and In another vein, appellant argues that the trial court has no
to pay the costs. jurisdiction over the offense as the incident actually occurred in
Tarlac City, and not in Dau, Pampanga. And he questions his
SO ORDERED. warrantless arrest and his detention as violative of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, he not having waived its provision, and
Appellant assails the decision on the following grounds: of Department of Justice Circular No. 61, September 21, 1993 on
New Rules on Inquest.
I.
Appellants appeal does not lie.
II.
Neither is the fact that no money changed hands a critical factor
that affects the outcome of the case at bar. There is no rule of law
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN:
which requires that in buy-bust operations there must be a
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited
A. BEING PARTIAL, BY TOTALLY BELIEVING THE drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.21
INCREDIBLE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION; BY
NOT APPRECIATING THE MAJOR
Moreover, Article II, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 punishes not
INCONSISTENCIES OF THE PROSECUTION
only the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs
WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES AND THEIR LACK OF
after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF
by the seller of prohibited drugs.22
THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERARATION; BY
TOTALLY IGNORING THE EXCULPATORY FACTS IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED; AND BY NOT As the information reflects, appellant was charged with the
APPRECIATING THE CREDIBLE VERSION OF THE unlawful delivery and/or giving away to a poseur buyer of
DEFENSE. 790.7421 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Since the prosecution
has discharged its onus of proving the accusation as in fact it
presented the prohibited drug and identified appellant as the
B. RELYING ON SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.
offender,23 it is immaterial that no payment was made to
appellant.
C. NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION. GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF
As for the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2
ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD
Lopez and SPO4 Jamisolamin, the same are minor and do not
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE, IT
detract from the veracity and weight of the salient points thereof.
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED.
What is important is that the testimonies are supported by the
physical evidence consisting of the marijuana block presented
D. NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE ACCUSED'S
before the court in its original newspaper wrapper (bearing the
DETENTION, INQUEST CONDUCTED, AND
initials of the arresting officers), and Chemistry Report No. D-
INFORMATION FILED WERE LEGALLY
0592-200024 "the genuineness, due execution and the truth of the
FLAWED/INFIRMED FROM THE VERY START
contents" of which were admitted by appellant during the pre-trial
AMOUNTING TO BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE
on July 26, 2000 as shown by the Pre-Trial Order dated July 27,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF
2000.25
THE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD ENTITLE THE
LATTER FOR (sic) HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE.
As to why the police arrested appellant after receiving only one
brick of marijuana instead of waiting for the receipt of the rest of
Appellant draws attention to the fact that the judge who wrote the
the 70 kilos offered for sale, PO2 Ubias explained that his
decision did not hear the case, hence, did not have the
instructions were to effect the pre-arranged signal once he had
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. That a
determined that what appellant was offering was indeed
judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less
marijuana, and there was no instruction for him to try to recover
competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely
the rest of the marijuana. Moreover, he proffered that when
on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and
appellant was asked where the remainder of the marijuana was,
calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common
appellant responded that "the other 70k were in the possession
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such
of his companion."26
reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process
of law.18
Neither is it improbable for appellant to deal in drugs openly in a
public place to persons he hardly knew, for drug dealers are
Appellant goes on to call the buy-bust operation a fabrication in
known to sell their goods even to strangers. They ply their wares
light of the lack of surveillance conducted on him, the admission
wherever prospective customers may be found. They have
of the prosecution that no buy-bust money was involved or used
indeed become increasingly daring and openly defiant of the
in the operation, and his immediate arrest after his alleged
law.27
production of only one brick of marijuana even if PO2 Ubias and
the civilian informant were allegedly offered 70 kilos. He posits
that no seller of marijuana would openly carry a brick thereof As for the non-presentation by the prosecution of the confidential
under his arm and negotiate its sale in the open. And he informant, it is well-settled that except when the appellant
contends as denting the case for the prosecution its failure to vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material
present the confidential informant as a witness, and the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or
inconsistency of statements of its witnesses. there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had
motives to testify falsely against appellant, or that only the
informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it would merely be corroborative of the [G.R. No. 144317. August 5, 2003]
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.28
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL
In the case at bar, the presentation of the confidential informant, MONTE y ABDUL, appellant.
whose identity must be hidden to preserve his invaluable service
to the police,29 the sale having been adequately proven by DECISION
prosecution witnesses.30
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Like alibi, frame-up as a defense has invariably been viewed with
disfavor as it is a common and standard line of defense in most This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 99-171228,
Clear and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense finding appellant Michael Monte guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of "frame-up" which appellant has failed to proffer. of violation of Article III, Section 15 of Republic Act 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,[2] as
If the only reason appellant was brought to the police station was, amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
as he claims, to extort money, why did he fail to file charges perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
administrative or criminal against the policemen, especially in pay the costs.
light of the fact that his uncle who came to his rescue is a military
sergeant and, therefore, ought to have been aware and Appellant Michael Monte was charged with violation of
knowledgeable of appellants rights in the premises. Article III, Section 15, of RA 6425, as amended, in an information
which reads:
Neither is there any basis for appellants contention that the
incident occurred in Tarlac City, Tarlac, and not in Dau, That on or about March 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
Pampanga. The policemen were clear and straightforward in said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
furnishing details of their location, whereas the description made deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
by appellant and the witnesses for the defense as to the place of wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell or offer for sale five (5) heat-
the alleged arrest is bereft of details determinative of the exact sealed transparent plastic bags each containing white crystalline
location of the arrest. substance with a total weight [of] 262.272 grams known as shabu
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
Parenthetically, albeit appellant had manifested that he had an
independent witness who would testify to the occurrence of the Contrary to law.[3]
incident in Tarlac City, no such witness was presented.
The 262.272 grams of shabu is forfeited in favor of the government and Q: How long did you wait?
is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, for proper
disposition. A: Around 10 minutes then the accused arrived.
This administrative matter refers to the Order dated 8 July On 10 April 2002, this Court resolved to require the parties
1998 of then Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos* of the Regional
[1] to manifest within ten (10) days from notice whether they were
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, relative to Criminal Cases willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
Nos. 93-100 and 101 entitled People of the Philippines v. pleadings already filed.[5]
Jennifer Santos, which were pending in said court.
On 14 May 2002, Judge Marvin B. Mangino submitted his
On 10 July 1998, Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos furnished manifestation expressing his willingness to submit for resolution
the Office of the Court Administrator with a copy of his 8 July the above-entitled case based on the pleadings filed therein.
[6]
1998 Order for whatever action it may deem appropriate Since complainant Judge de los Santos did not submit any
concerning the actuation of Judge Mangino of the Municipal Trial manifestation, the Court, in its Resolution of 19 February 2003
Court of Tarlac in approving the bail bond of an accused arrested directed that the Resolution of 10 April 2002 be served on him at
in Angeles City and residing in Angeles City and the cases being his office at the Court of Appeals. On 27 March 2003, the Court
pending also in Angeles City. received his Manifestation[7] dated 24 March 2002, expressing his
willingness to submit this matter for resolution on the basis of the
In his 8 July 1998 Order, Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos pleadings already filed.
narrated:
In its Evaluation Report, the Office of the Court
The records show that these cases pending before this Court were filed Administrator stated:
since last February, 1993. Both the accused and the complainant are
residing in Angeles City. The accused was arrested in Angeles City and Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the accused was issued by the
Angeles City office of the Imperial Insurance Company. According to Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the Court where the case is
the accused, she paid P3,000 as premium to the Imperial Insurance pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
Company thru a certain Mr. Antonio Tolentino. However, instead of another branch of the same court within the province, city or
having the said bail bond be approved by this Court, the said bail bond municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also
was approved by Judge Marvin Mangino of Branch I of the Municipal with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge there is
Trial Court of Tarlac. The order of release was also issued by the said available, with any metropolitan judge, municipal trial judge or
Judge Mangino. According to the accused, she never went to Tarlac and municipal circuit trial judge therein.
appeared before said Judge Mangino. She also alleged that she never
went to Makati City and appeared before the Notary Public Melchor Thus, bail may be filed with the same court where the case is
Ancanan. pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, it may
[sic] filed with another branch of the same court within the province or
From the contents of the said bond No. 27367 issued by the Imperial city.If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
Insurance Company, it was made to appear that accused Jennifer Santos than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional
appeared before Notary Public Melchor Ancanan in Makati City on trial court of said place, or, if no judge there is available, with any
June 23, 1998. metropolitan judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
In the same Order, Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos required
Julieta M. Bautista, Clerk of Court I, Branch 1, Municipal Trial In the instant case, the accused Jennifer Santos was not arrested. That
Court, Tarlac, to appear before his court on 24 July 1998 at 8:30 being the case, she should have filed her bail bond with the court where
a.m. to explain and shed light on the circumstances behind the her case was pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. In
issuance and approval of bail bond No. 27367 by Judge Marvin the absence of the judge thereof, it could be done at another branch of
B. Mangino of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac, the same court within the province of Pampanga or City of
Tarlac. He also ordered Mr. Roberto Cabuay, Executive Vice- Angeles. Instead, accused Jennifer Santos filed her bond in the
President and General Manager of the Imperial Insurance Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac, respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino,
Company and notary public Melchor Ancanan to explain in writing presiding, who approved the same and ordered his [sic] release from
or in person why they should not be held liable for making it custody. Res ipsa loquitor. Respondent Judges act is clearly irregular
appear that accused Jennifer Santos appeared before notary and is in violation of the rules on the matter.
public Ancanan in Makati City on 23 June 1998.
and recommended, as follows:
In her written compliance[2] dated and filed on 23 July 1998,
Clerk of Court Julieta M. Bautista of the Municipal Trial Court of that respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino of the Municipal Trial Court
Tarlac explained: of Tarlac, Branch I, be DECLARED guilty of misconduct for non-
observance of Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
Regarding the bailbond posted by the accused JENNIFER SANTOS in less serious offense under Section 4, Rule 140, supra, for which he
Crim. Cases Nos. 93-100 and 101 of that Court, at the time the should be ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000.
bondsman Imperial Insurance Co. who [sic] has a branch office at
Tarlac, Tarlac, presented the same for approval, he [sic] was with a As regards Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
woman who appears [sic] to be the accused and believing the bond to be cited by the Court Administrator, this Court held in Cruz v.
legal with all its attached documents, the same was approved by Hon. Yaneza:[8]
Marvin B. Mangino of this Court.
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused
For its part, on 18 August 1998, the Office of the Court is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
Administrator referred to Judge Marvin B. Mangino for Comment pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof the 8 July 1998 Order of municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation,
Judge de los Santos.[3] the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch
On 2 September 1998, Judge Marvin B. Mangino submitted of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the
his Comment[4] wherein he stated that he initially adopts the accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where
explanation of Clerk of Court Julieta M. Bautista on the incident, his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial
and requested for a photocopy of the order and the bond subject court in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. When
no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any showed a flagrant disregard for the applicable procedural law he
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial had sworn to uphold and serve. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of
judge therein. Court is a sign of incompetence which goes against Canon 3,
specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[13] To
The case at bar falls under the first situation mentioned disregard the law when one has become familiar with it is worse
in Cruz v. Yaneza because the accused, Jennifer Santos, was because bad faith comes in.
arrested in Angeles City and Criminal Cases Nos. 93-100 and
101, which were filed against her and under which she was This palpable disregard of the procedural law on bail or
arrested, were pending with Branch 59 of the Regional Trial gross ignorance thereof, which also amounted to conduct grossly
Court of Angeles City. Thus, the bail bond for Jennifer Santos prejudicial to the best interest of the service, renders Judge
provisional liberty should have been filed in said court, or, in the Marvin B. Mangino administratively liable as recommended by
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another the Office of the Court Administrator. Under the doctrine of res
branch of the same court within the province or city. ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring
judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross
A mere cursory glance of the bail bond application would incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.[14]
readily inform Judge Marvin B. Mangino that the criminal cases in
question were pending with Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court A brief survey on the existing jurisprudence on the matter
of Angeles City. He also knew, or ought to know, that there are reveals that for similar conduct, less severe penalties were
many branches of the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City and in imposed. In Paz v. Tiong,[15] this Court imposed upon the
the province of Pampanga. Thus, even if the Presiding Judge of respondent judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao,
Branch 59 was absent or unavailable, any one of the judges of Pangasinan, a fine of P3,000 for signing the bail bond and the
the other branches of the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City order of release of an accused whose case was pending before
could have acted on the bail bond. Judge Marvin B. Mangino also the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, absent any
knew that his court is not of the same level as Branch 59 of the showing that the judge presiding over the same was
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Therefore, he knew, or unavailable. In Adapon v. Domagtoy,[16] this Court fined the
ought to know, that he had absolutely no authority or jurisdiction respondent judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa
to approve the bail bond of accused Jennifer Santos. Clearly, Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, in the amount of P10,000 for
Judge Marvin B. Mangino blatantly disregarded Section 17(a), ordering the release of an accused whose cases were pending
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, notwithstanding the fact, that the accused was neither
Worse, it would further appear that Judge Marvin B. arrested nor did he surrender to the authorities before the order
Mangino did not even try to verify the authenticity of the bail of release was issued and that the judge having jurisdiction over
bond. It appears that the bail bond was notarized in Makati City, the cases was not shown to be unavailable. In the more recent
although the bonding company has a branch office in Tarlac, case of Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,[17] this Court imposed the
Tarlac. He should have inquired why it was notarized in Makati penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000 on respondent Municipal
City. It is obvious that he solely relied on the clerk of court and Circuit Trial Court judge of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite who granted
approved the bail bond on the basis of the findings of the clerk of bail and ordered the release of the accused whose case was
court. He admitted this dereliction of duty to make an pending with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite by relying on the
independent assessment of the bail bond application when he representations made by the process server of the latter court
adopted as part of his Comment the compliance of his clerk of that the presiding judge therein was absent.
court.
Under the factual milieu in this case, respondent Judge
It is thus patent that Judge Marvin B. Mangino failed to Marvin B. Mangino deserves a penalty higher than a fine
exert such conscientiousness, studiousness, and thoroughness of P5,000 recommended by the Office of the Court
expected and demanded of a judge. He was, therefore, remiss in Administrator. A fine of P15,000 is in order in light of the ruling of
observing the conduct expected of a member of the judiciary.[9] this Court in Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero.
A judges conduct should be above reproach, and in the It is rather a sad commentary to make that this is not the
discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, first time that a complaint involving irregular approval of bail bond
studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial. and issuance of order of release was brought before this Court.
[18]
[10]
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the Some judges refuse to learn from the lessons of previous
law, he is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the rulings of this Court. Indeed, some are difficult to reform. This
application and interpretation of the law. When the law is Court takes this opportunity to once again remind the judges of
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; lower courts of their role as the embodiment of competence,
anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law. integrity and independence.[19] They should always keep in mind
that in order to achieve justice, they should diligently ascertain
Further, a judge should exhibit more than a cursory and conscientiously apply the law in relation to the facts of each
acquaintance with the basic legal norms and precepts as well as case they hear and then decide the same, unswayed by partisan
with statutes and procedural rules. It is his pressing responsibility interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. The pursuit of
to be diligently acquainted with the law and jurisprudence and the excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that
changes therein not only because the study thereof is a never- judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the
ending and ceaseless process but also for the reason that public reposed on them and the institution they represent.[20]
ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one, not even judges.[11] Having accepted his exalted position WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino of the
as a member of the judiciary, Judge Marvin B. Mangino owes it to Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, is hereby found
the public and to the court over which he presides to maintain GUILTY of grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
professional competence at all times and to have the basic rules conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is
at the palm of his hands.[12] hereby FINED in the amount of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000)
Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
Judge Marvin B. Mangino failed to live up to these commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
standards. Not only did he approve the bail bond of the accused severely.
without the requisite authority to do so, his manner of doing so
SO ORDERED.