Juris Motion To Quash Search Warrant
Juris Motion To Quash Search Warrant
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks the reversal of the decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587, the
dispositive portion of which read:
SO ORDERED. 3
After examination of the applicant and his witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and
David Lee Sealey, Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued Search Warrant No. 99-17
dated April 27, 1999 worded as follows:
G r e e t i n g s:
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime of the day
or night of the above-premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the
aforedescribed items found at the residence/warehouse of Christopher Choi at
No. 25-13 Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd., Angeles City.
THEREFORE, seize and bring the said articles to the undersigned to be dealt
with in accordance with law.
You are hereby further directed to submit a return within ten (10) days from
today.
Given under my hand this 27th day of April, 1999 at Angeles City, Philippines. 7
On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a "motion to quash search warrant" 9 and a
"supplemental motion to quash"10 on June 22, 1999. Both were denied by Judge
Gatbalite in an order dated November 29, 1999. 11Reconsideration was likewise
denied. 12
According to the CA, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe
that the cigarettes purchased by Nieto were fake and in violation of RA
8293, 15 Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching and probing questions of witness
David Lee Sealey. 16 The examination of Sealey went this way:
Court:
Q There was testimony here given by Mr. Mario Nieto and Max Cavalera, that
fake Marlboro cigarettes bought by them from Michael Chua, Christopher Choi
and Johnny Chang were turned over to you for examination, is that correct?
Q After the same had been turned over to you, what did you do with the said
merchandise, if you did anything?
A I examined the sample of cigarettes and their packaging bearing the Marlboro
Trade Marks which were suspected to be produc[ed] and manufactured by La
Suerte or [with] the permission of Philip Morris.
A Based on the packaging of the packs, the color of the box and the printing on
the front side of the packs and the cigarettes themselves, I concluded that they
are counterfeit or unauthorized product[s].
Q Whose signature is this appearing on the printed name David Lee Sealey?
Court:
Thats all. 17
The People of the Philippines aver that the CA erred in finding that Judge
Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant
allegedly because she failed to determine probable cause pursuant to Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 19 The People assail the finding of the
CA that, in issuing the search warrant, Judge Gatbalite purportedly did not
comply strictly with the requirement to determine the existence of probable cause
by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses through searching
questions and answers. The People also assert that the CA erred in applying the
doctrine in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation 20 since it had already been
superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 21
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon
a finding of probable cause. Probable cause means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 22 The
determination of the existence of probable cause requires the following:
(1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally;
(3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions
and answers. 23
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend
largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule
governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. 24 The judge must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 25 The questions should not merely be repetitious
of the averments stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the
witnesses. 26 If the judge fails to determine probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
before issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of discretion is committed. 27
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. 28 No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. 29 Probable cause is determined
in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. 30 The entirety of the
questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must be considered
by the judge. 31
In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey, petitioner judge also heard the
testimony of applicant Nieto:
Q: In connection with Search Warrant 99-17, are you the same Mario Nieto who
is the applicant in this application for search warrant filed today April 27, 1999?
Q: As what?
A: When I was conducting a test-buy operation against Mr. Michael Chua, Mr.
Michael Chua told me that the bulk of supply if we need more supply we can get
from the source, a certain Christopher Choi, who lives in the same village and
who is actually the supplier for the entire region.
Q: Where?
A: Upon arriving at the place, your Honor, I introduced myself as the one who
was referred by a certain Michael Chua who is interested in buying the Marlboro
cigarettes from him and he accommodated me and showed me the sample that
he has and I was able to procure the samples from him, the samples that like
what we did to the others were inspected by certain Mr. David Lee Sealey, the
representative and authority from the Philip Morris.
A: Yes, your Honor, I got the samples form Mr. Christopher Choi and I submitted
them to Mr. David Lee Sealey.
Q: Do you know from what particular place the house of Christopher Choi did he
got (sic) those samples?
A: The volume stocks were found inside the house, they are almost everywhere
in the house of Christopher Choi.
Q: There is a sketch here attached to your application, can you point it out here?
A: Yes, your Honor, at the warehouse, in the storage room as shown in the lay
out of the house, it is adjacent to the residential house as shown in the sketch.
A As Ive said earlier, he was one of those identified by the informant storing and
selling counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes, so on April 22, 1999 we conducted a
surveillance and we were able to confirm that the said cigarettes are being stored
at the subject place.
Q At what place?
A At 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville Subd., Angeles City. On April 23, 1999 at
about 8:30 p.m., Mario Nieto and I again went to the subject place to conduct a
test-buy operation. [A]fter Mr. Choi had been convinced of our intention to buy
cigarettes from him, he brought us to his warehouse where he showed to us
several cardboard cases of Marlboro cigarettes. 34
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the
judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question
the applicant and his witnesses, 35 the findings of the judge deserve great weight.
The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. 36 We
thus find no reason to disturb Judge Gatbalites findings.
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement
in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in copyright infringement
cases needs revisiting and clarification.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for
the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of
search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement
cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the
pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case
could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended
to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright
infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual
matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could
unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the
fallacy of undue generalization.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140657 October 25, 2004
DECISION
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51759 granting the petition for certiorari of
Cesar O. delos Reyes and nullifying Search Warrant No. 98-905 issued on June
18, 1998 by Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 43.
The Antecedents
On June 18, 1998, SPO3 Benjamin Nuguid of the Western Police District applied
for a search warrant with the RTC of Manila, Branch 43, against Cesar Reyes
alias "Cesar Itlog." In support of his application, Nuguid submitted his affidavit
and that of Alexis Tan, a housewife. Nuguid and Tan also testified in support of
the application. After the court conducted examination of the said witnesses, it
issued on even date Search Warrant No. 98-905 authorizing the search of the
house allegedly under the possession and custody of one Cesar Reyes alias
"Cesar Itlog," at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, worded as follows:
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
b) drug paraphernalia
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL this 18th day of June 1998 at the
City of Manila.
MANUELA F. LORENZO
J u d g e2
The policemen conducted a search not only of the house at No. 2600 Oroquieta
Street, Sta Cruz, Manila, which turned out to be the house of respondent Cesar
delos Reyes, but also of the car and motorcycle owned by the latter, bearing
Plate Nos. UBS 463 and TA 8077, respectively. The car and the motorcycle
happened to be parked near the house.
As per the receipt of the property signed by Nuguid, the search of the house, the
car and the motorcycle yielded the following:
That in the course of orderly search at the premises of Cesar Reyes alias
"Cesar Itlog," inside his room at the ground floor was a steel vault and
when forced open it yields 13 transparent plastic bags containing [an]
undetermined amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, three (3) weighing scales
"Tamita" broad, drugs paraphernalia and 38 pcs. of Valium-10, also found
atop his drawer; a .9mm "Smith & Wesson" pistol, Model 39mm with SN-
A643638 with magazines loaded with ammo, one (1) loaded magazine of
9mm and 36 rounds of .25 cal. ammunition inside his drawer, one (1)
plastic transparent bag containing white crystalline substance suspected to
be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu and three (3) 12-gauge
shotgun ammo. His personal car, a black VITARA bearing plate No. UBS
463 parked beside his house was also search[ed] in the presence of [a]
Bgy. Kagawad and found inside tucked beneath the drivers seat are three
(3) sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
wrapped in a mail envelope suspected to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu and in his sport Honda Motorcycle 900cc with
plate No. TA 8077 also yields one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu at the motorbike back compartment.3
That on or about June 18, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control eighteen (18) transparent
plastic bags (small and big) with [a] total net weight of eight hundred
eighty-six point eight (886.8) grams of white crystalline substance known
as "shabu" containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulate drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.5
That on or about June 18, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
under his custody and control of one (1) .9mm Smith & Wesson pistol, Model 39
with Serial Number-A643638 with two magazines loaded with ammunitions, 36
rounds of .25 caliber ammunition, three (3) 12-gauge shotgun ammunitions,
without first having secured from the proper authorities the necessary license
therefor.
Contrary to law.6
On August 11, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying the respondents
motion. The court also denied his motion for reconsideration of said order.
The respondent forthwith filed a petition for certiorari against Nuguid and the
Public Prosecutor therein in the CA, alleging, inter alia, that the questions
propounded by RTC Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo on Nuguid and Tan were leading
and not searching. He also alleged that Judge Lorenzo delegated the
examination of Tan to Nuguid, and allowed the latter to question her. He,
likewise, reiterated that Tan and Nuguid did not know him personally because
they identified him as "Cesar Reyes" when his full name was Cesar delos Reyes.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of Tan and Nuguid that his house was a two-
storey edifice located at Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, said house was only
a one-storey structure located at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The respondent also assailed the search of his house, car and motorcycle on the
ground that he was not there when the search was conducted and that no
barangay officials were present as required by Section 7, Rule 126 of the 1997
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On October 15, 1999, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition and
nullifying the search warrant. The decretal portion reads:
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The appellate court ruled that (a) the RTC delegated its duty to determine
probable cause to the applicant; (b) the application for a search warrant was
based on hearsay evidence; and (c) the application for the search warrant issued
was filed more than four (4) weeks from the alleged time the offense took place;
hence, was considered "stale."
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the People
of the Philippines filed the instant petition for review of the decision, alleging that
The petitioner avers that Judge Lorenzo did not delegate the determination of
probable cause to Nuguid before issuing the subject warrant. While she allowed
Nuguid to propound questions on Alexis Tan, the same consisted of only three
preliminary questions, and, as such, was inconsequential. The petitioner also
asserts that the leading questions propounded by Judge Lorenzo on Tan does
not detract from the fact that searching questions were also propounded on the
witnesses, and that based on the entirety of such propounded questions and the
latters answers, there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
The petitioner maintains that Tan had personal knowledge of the respondents
delictual acts which were in violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
Moreover, as gleaned from the affidavits of Tan and Nuguid and their collective
testimonies before the RTC, the respondents house was sufficiently described
and identified, which description Nuguid was able to confirm through his
surveillance of the house, the place where the crime was committed.
The petitioner further contends that although there was an interregnum of six (6)
months from the time the commission of the crime came to the knowledge of Tan
up to the filing of the application of the search warrant by Nuguid, the same did
not obscure the finding of probable cause made by Judge Lorenzo.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.9
After a comprehensive and well-studied review of the Rollo and the records of
the Court of Appeals, we resolve to deny the petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted in the petition at bar that it
received a copy of the assailed decision of the CA on October 21, 1999. Under
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the OSG had until November 5, 1999
within which to file its petition for review on certiorari. However, it did so only on
November 25, 1999, long after the period therefor had lapsed. We reject as
totally unacceptable the pretext of Solicitor Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-
Estoesta that, because of heavy pressure of work,10 the actual filing of the motion
to file the petition at bar prepared on November 3, 1999, was "accidentally
slighted." The Solicitor is mandated to insure that her motion for extension was
filed within the period therefor.11 Volume of work is a lame excuse.12She cannot
escape the adverse effects of her forgetfulness.
Even if we gloss over the gross negligence of the OSG and resolve the petition
on its merits, we find the same to be barren of merit.
A search warrant must (a) be based on probable cause; (b) contain a particular
description of the place to be searched; and (c) must describe the items or
property to be seized.13 Probable cause comprehends such facts and
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon and act in pursuance
thereof.14
In issuing a search warrant, the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions.16
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.17 Before issuing a search
warrant, the Judge must personally examine, in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and his witnesses he
may produce, on facts personally known to them.18
The mandate of the Judge is for him to conduct a full and searching examination
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the absence of a rule
to the contrary, the determination of probable cause cannot be delegated by the
Judge, in part, or in whole, regardless of the qualifications of the person on whom
reliance is placed. It is not permissible for the Judge to share the required
determination with another.19
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must
depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge. Although there is no
hard-and-fast rule as to how a Judge may conduct his examination, it is
axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not
merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory.20 He must make his own
inquiry on the intent and factual and legal justifications for a search warrant. The
questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments not stated in the
affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the witnesses.21 If the Judge fails to
determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, it
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.22
It bears stressing that the determination of the existence of probable cause must
be made by a detached and neutral Judge.27 If he resorts to propounding leading
questions to the applicant and his witnesses to determine probable cause, the
Judge may be perceived as being partial, or even in cahoots with the officers
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.28
The transcript of the stenographic notes taken when Nuguid and Tan testified is
quoted, in toto, infra:
COURT
SPO3 NUGUID:
COURT:
Please stand.
COURT:
Q Who?
A I asked my witness to buy from Cesar Reyes alias "Cesar Itlog" and she
was able to buy the subject shabu.
Q How did you know that your witness was able to buy from Cesar Reyes
and not from other source?
A She told me and according to her she got it from Cesar Reyes.
Q Where is she?
A She is the one, Your Honor. (Witness pointing to a lady who answered
when asked of her name as Alexis Tan).
COURT:
Q Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth?
A Yes, I do.
A ALEXIS TAN, 34 years old, married, jobless and with address c/o WBD
Drug Enforcement Section, U.N. Ave., Manila.
COURT:
(to SPO3 Nuguid)
SPO3 NUGUID:
COURT:
SPO3 NUGUID:
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q When you were separated from your husband, what has it something to
do with introducing you to Cesar Reyes?
A They know each other, Your Honor. My friend knows that Cesar Reyes
is selling shabu, Your Honor.
Q Did you really find out if Cesar Reyes alias "Cesar Itlog" is selling
shabu?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How?
Q You mean, this Cesar Reyes is really in the business if (sic) selling
shabu?
Q Knowing his prohibited ((sic) activity, does he also sell to any other
people?
Q Have you also seen him in [the] company of that friend of yours who
introduced you to him?
Q And you have been going to this place of Cesar Reyes several times
also.
Q Everytime you go and buy shabu from him, is it always ready for sale to
you?
A There was one time when I called him if he could sell one for me he told
me through the phone to call back after an hour because he will be getting
it from other source.
A 3 grams, Your Honor, he does not sell lower than 3 grams, Your Honor,
it must be 3 grams and above.
Q You have not yet bought from him only one gram?
Q During the time you bought shabu from Cesar Reyes, were you the only
customer?
A Because he also talked [to] callers on the phone. During the time I
bought shabu from him, he also talked to somebody on the phone.
Q That is only. . .
Q The shabu you had been buying from him, do you use it or sell it to
some other person?
Q When you go to his house, you usually go and see him in that (sic) living
room and not elsewhere before he comes out from that house?
A Normally, Your Honor, when I go to his house, he would open the door
for me and would say "come in" then ask me "how much." If, for example, I
would say 3 grams, he would just go to his room and comes out with the
item.
Q In other words, everytime you go to his place to buy shabu she (sic) is
there ready to entertain you?
Q Is it not that he is still busy conversing with other people when he comes
out from his room?
Q That is always the case, he is ready to open the door for you?
A There was also a time that his maid opened the door for me.
Q Aside from the maid, did you see other people inside that house?
A His family- his wife and a baby then he would usually let them stay away
from the living room or just get inside the room.
Q Not an apartment?
A There are some members of the family but usually he let (sic) them stay
away from the living room.
Q Was there an occasion when somebody arrives when you see him?
Q How do you know that these things are stored in his house?
A Everytime I bought shabu from him, he would get the money from me
and then get inside his room to get a sachet of shabu and give it to me.
Q Are you sure that these things (shabu) are stocked in his house
permanently or maybe they are just brought there from somewhere
because he knows you are coming to buy and get it?
A There was once when I called him by phone and he asked me "how
much" and I told him I will buy for (sic) P4,000.00 worth of shabu and he
said "you just proceed to my place by 2 oclock in the afternoon," I will have
to get it from other source."
A There is one room on the ground floor, Maam, but sometimes he also
goes upstairs and comes down with the shabu item. Most of the time of the
transaction just on the ground floor.
Q Did you not notice if there are other people in that room in the ground
floor?
A I did not notice but there was one time when I saw a child but he let that
child stay away from the visitor.
Q You mean this room where you saw him come out serve as storeroom of
shabu?
A Yes, Maam.
A Yes, Maam.
A Because when he entertained me, he left me for the moment and I said
"where do you go" and he said "I will get inside that room to get the
shabu."
Q So, since you were requested by the police officer to purchase shabu
from Cesar Reyes, how many times?
Q Did you notice people going there to the house of Cesar Reyes?
A We are not sure if those people are visitors of Cesar Reyes because we
have no contact inside his house.
Q This Cesar Reyes at the time did not have any idea that you were there
being sent by the police officers?
Q Did you really go to his place and successfully bought the shabu from
Cesar Reyes?
The questions propounded on Nuguid by Judge Lorenzo were not searching and
probing, but merely superficial and perfunctory. The records show that in his
application for a search warrant, Nuguid described the place to be searched as
the house located at "No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila," under the
name of Cesar Reyes alias "Cesar Itlog." However, the Judge ignored this
inconsistency and did not bother to inquire from Nuguid why he applied for a
search warrant of the premises at No. 2600 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
when the house where Tan had apparently purchased shabu from the
respondent was located at No. 2006 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Nuguid declared that he and the police officers conducted a test-buy on June 13,
1998, using Tan as the buyer for said purpose. The ordinary procedure for a test-
buy is for the police officers to monitor and observe, at a distance, the sale of
illicit drugs by the suspect to the buyer. In this case,
when the Judge asked Nuguid how Tan was able to buy shabu from the
respondent, Nuguid reported that Tan told him that he got shabu from Cesar
Reyes, implying that he did not witness the test-buy; however, Nuguid also
declared that he was at a distance when the test-buy was conducted.
The Judge also failed to ask Nuguid the circumstances upon which he and the
other police officers came to know how Tan was able to purchase shabu from the
respondent. Inexplicably, Nuguid conducted a search of the house of the
respondent only after the test-buy and not before then. However, the Judge failed
to inquire why the application for a search warrant was made only on June 18,
1998, or after the lapse of five days from the time the test-buy was conducted on
June 13, 1998. The Judge also failed to ask Nuguid why no surveillance was
made before the test-buy and whether any report on the surveillance operations
conducted on the respondents house after the test-buy was submitted.
Even a cursory reading of the transcript will show that most of the questions
propounded on Tan by the Judge were leading questions, and that those which
were not leading were merely based on or related to the answers earlier given to
the leading questions. By asking such leading questions, the Judge thereby
supplied the answers to her questions. Although Tan testified that she used to
buy at least three (3) grams for P3,000.00 from the respondent during the period
of December 1997 to January 1998, the Judge did not even bother to inquire
from Tan, a plain housewife who was separated from her husband, how she
could afford to purchase shabu for P3,000.00 on several occasions during the
period of December 1997 to January 1998.
Indeed, there was an interregnum of more than four (4) months from the time
Tan purchased shabu from the respondent up to the time when the test-buy was
supposedly made. However, the Judge was not even curious as to why Tan
failed to purchase shabu from the respondent for such a long period of time,
considering that from her testimony, Tan made it plain that she was a regular
user of shabu. The Judge should have asked Tan why she did not buy shabu
from the respondent for more than four months.
The Judge even failed to inquire from Tan when and under what circumstances
Nuguid was able to meet with her to discuss how she would be utilized for the
test-buy. The curiosity of the Judge was not even aroused when, in answer to her
question on the location of the house of "Cesar Reyes," Tan replied that it was
located at Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, without specifying the house
number. At the very least, it behooved the Judge to require Tan to specify the
house number if only to test her credibility. And yet, immediately after
propounding the questions on Tan and Nuguid, the Judge announced that she
was issuing the search warrant.
Q This Cesar Reyes at the time did not have any idea that you were there
being sent by the police officers?
Q Did you really go to his place and successfully bought the shabu from
Cesar Reyes?
COURT
Q During the time that Alexis Tan was being sent there to buy shabu from
Cesar Reyes, where were you then?
COURT:
SPO3 NUGUID:
COURT:
That will be all for now and the Court will issue the Search Warrant.30
The Judge allowed and even egged on Nuguid to examine Tan and elicit facts
and circumstances from her relating to the alleged purchase of shabu from the
respondent. What is so worrisome is that Nuguid, besides being the applicant,
was the same police officer who asked Tan to buy shabu from the respondent
and the one who, along with other officers, arrested the respondent. That Nuguid
propounded comparatively fewer questions on Tan is beside the point. By
allowing Nuguid himself to examine Tan, the Judge thereby compromised her
impartiality.
We echo, once again, the oft-cited caveat of the Court:
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power
to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. No presumption of regularity is to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it.31
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates
the Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the
fundamental law, we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be
left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating
back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of
power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of
all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his
sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes.
Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of
authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right
after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the
more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal
search and seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from
him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we
have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10,
1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the
officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are
4
now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed
by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His
purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding
provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our
model it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of
Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following
a brief debate, approved by the Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then
Rule 126:
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in
accordance with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact,
depositions were taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the
affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of
his affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the
same," and only because "the application was not yet subscribed and swom to."
The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the
affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case,
he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of
the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them
to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality
by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant
Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant
on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose
depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant
on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as
required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the
issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
14
apphcant's claims.
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of
the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the
sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in
the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that
they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the
respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that
they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the
opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the
respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible
misrepresentations from them.
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the
witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was
from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his
presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in
the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law.
These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted.
Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search
warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have
bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have
been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the
said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum
prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this
case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent
such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short,
the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there
and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they
are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise,
then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for
the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a
search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they
themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the
weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made
without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For
example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when
the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected
23 24
at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and
aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
25 26
jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also been held that
27
prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted
exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the
pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and
were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's
pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the
exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the
1973 Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the
criminal might be allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered,"
Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against
abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case
the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms.
Pending resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain
in custodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed
a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in
accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May
10, 1984, is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our
restraining order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129651 October 20, 2000
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the
premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items
seized by virtue thereof.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH
PACKING CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER)
[,] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority
stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time,
PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being
perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.
- versus -
x-------------------------x
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
G R E E T I N G S:
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or
night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take
possession of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such
violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
- versus -
x-------------------------/
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
G R E E T I N G S:
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or
night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take
possession of the articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such
violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,4 which was docketed as "SEARCH
WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263"
(hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the docket number and the
designation of the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section 238 in relation to
Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered
delivery receipts and/or sales invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the
Department of Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this
case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants
with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies
and a copy thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or order complained of and
true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and papers. (As
amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the
Motions to Quash, (2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of
Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the
resolution denying the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming
that the Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for
reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in
case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case shall
have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner
has other remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners
(referring to the petition for certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been granted.
Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are
as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post
bail for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a
reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's
resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180
as amended by P.D. 911);
3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash thei
nformation in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of Court).
4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgmentof the court after the case
shall have been tried on the merits.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the
Search Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The
argument therefore that the Court committed an error in not describing the
persons or things to be searched; that the Search Warrants did not describe with
particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and
for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties
were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible
by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.5
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the
pleadings and documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their
Motion for Reconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals
that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their
Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground
although, to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears
that the case could have been decided without these pleadings and documents.
Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the case, it
could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case,6 we held
that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration
constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,
requiring the submission of a certified true copy of "material portions of the record
as are referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto" along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially
considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed
right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated.7
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,9 where we held that the issuing
judges disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant
constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is
indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
said search warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously when he
ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized; and that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the
said rule renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been
held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari
and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy
of appeal.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,10 which also involved a
special civil action for certiorari:11
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the
constitutional requirement that he must determine the existence of probable
cause by examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes
grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-
29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in
not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants
constitutes grave abuse of discretion".
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing
judge violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court
in issuing the disputed search warrants, which, if true, would have constituted
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the
warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation thus
resulting in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an
adequate remedy that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not
by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.12
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of
the search warrants.13 The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely
legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of
which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites
such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The
warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length
of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.14
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that
command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of
the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the
names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued.
That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the
same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another
irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of probable cause that would
justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the things to be
seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to
petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.15
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address
of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while the body
of the same warrant states the address as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of
petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a
particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons of things to be
seized."16 The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended17 and distinguish it from other places in the community.18 Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement.19 Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,20 where the search
warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as
Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court
"admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could
be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant
A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be
searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against "Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy." Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against
"UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation."
In Miller v. Sigler,21 it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is
historically derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who
occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person,
the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and
search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner
of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search
warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be
searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the
search as to the place to be searched.22
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons
owning or occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied
by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the
constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of
inconsistencies in stating their names.23
Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial
court for the same crime (violation of "SEC. 253" of the National Internal
Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued
merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as
well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the
warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing
judge to be more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant
was issued and in the description of the place to be searched. Indeed, it would
be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants authorizing
the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent
in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter
should be deemed revoked by the former.
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue
the subject search warrants.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.24
In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court
require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be
probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his
own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.25 Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance
of a valid search warrant.26
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal
knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.27 Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact,
nor on mere suspicion or belief.28
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two
witnesses, namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to
be an old employee of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria
and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only as to the
testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:
A. No.
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing
Corporation?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery
receipts instead of the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.
The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged
illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but
was merely supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is
based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search
warrants.30
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias
deposition but is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners
alleged illegal practices was apparently obtained during his employment with
Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and
Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the
documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:
A Yes.
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his
business dealings that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax
evasion. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q How is it done?
A No. It is unregistered.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company
for the last three years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q Until now?
Q When?
A August, 1993.
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will
deliver to his customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn,
he pays to the company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger
or whatever?
not for the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between
the company and him. It is not made to be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to
certain supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts,
delivery receipts, sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have
stated, in your affidavit, which are only for the consumption of the company?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's
eyeview (sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is
the one recording all the confidential transactions of the company. In this table
you can find all the ledgers and notebooks.
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan
collects all the records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first
girl delivers the receipts. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl
keeps the inventory of all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from
these people are stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept
by Gina because according to you the whole records are already placed in the
bodega?
A Yes.
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If
you go straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit
right after opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current
records kept by Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given
me, especially this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that
these are for the months of January, February, March, April and May. Are these
transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being
shown to the BIR?
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of
January, what does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are
his customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the
report to the BIR?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish
for payment of sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin
Ho for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it
done?
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw
material but instead they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This
delivery receipt was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90
grams soya oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they
are seeling (sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you
mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to
packaging materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price
difference. Now, taking that advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain
company here, again to Virginia Farms.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search
warrant since according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the
books of account kept by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still
there?
COURT: Alright.31
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the
company records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus,
we reject the contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the
facts to which he testified. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate
otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries
made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness
affidavit. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the
subject warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,32 Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs.
Ruiz,33 and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.34
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the
requirements set forth by the Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining
to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights -
that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to
defeat its major object: the elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description
as those in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the
warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had
occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not
be committed. That is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision
borne out by the American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under
the search warrant issued in this case.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to
be seized, i.e., "Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including
subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts
including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc." was held to
be "an omnibus description" and, therefore, invalid:
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following
manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books,
Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official
Receipts;
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of
particularity, especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies
of the documents sought to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a
more specific description of these documents from said photocopies instead of
merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a
general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the
specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant. 35 The use by
the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,
journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records,
provisional & official receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock
cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank
statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable considering the
circumstances of this case.
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d
47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the
seizure of two particularly described books and myriad other generally described
items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only the books were
particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged
that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the
court chose to sever the defective portions of the warrant and suppress only
those items that were not particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even
though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the
warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the
warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x x.
The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered
illegal by the defects concerning other articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the
majority of state courts that have considered this question and hold that in the
usual case the district judge should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant
as passes constitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445,
459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity
in the warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the
search is hardly consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression
of only the items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting
from its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained
evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not particularly
described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who would
be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. As the leading
commentator has observed, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant
which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain
items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate
erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be
returned to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants,
were also taken by the enforcing officers:
6. Surety Agreement.39
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier
Industrial and Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with
petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like
those not particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order
to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search
warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly
described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder.40 In Tambasen
vs. People,41 it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the
police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant
should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and
intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not
be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.],
Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).
The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of
security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the
home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been
illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were
doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal
seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official
duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an
individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169,
176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and
seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it
in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself
abhors."
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the
directive in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of
other properties relative to such violation," which in no way can be characterized
as a particular description of the things to be seized.
SO ORDERED.
ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER TRADING
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY,
BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.
Ledesma, Guinez, Causing, Espino & Serfino Law Office for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY THE EXAMINING JUDGE,
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE CASE AT BAR. It has
been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-
27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a
certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record. In this case, We find that
the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant
himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records
disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe
the application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions,
none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and
that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom
the search warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R.
No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant himself was not
subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain, among others, if he
knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the examination must be
probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable
cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application."
cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST BE DESCRIBED WITH
PARTICULARITY. Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The
law requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity.
The items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor
drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories"
are so general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener
Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners petition before
respondent Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged
in the business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and
accessories and empty bottles. Far more important is that the items described in the
application do not fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application
nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject
of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an
offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision (pp. 38-42, Rollo) of
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders dated August 24, 1987 (p. 43,
Record) and October 14, 1987, (pp. 53-54, Record) of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental in Criminal Case No. 5657.
"x x x.
"That he was informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who may be found at
KENER TRADING located at Rizal Street corner Lacson Street, Bacolod City has/have in
her/his/their possession and control the following property/ies, to wit: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and
other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.
"The undersigned has verified the report and found it to be the fact and has therefore
reasons to believe that a SEARCH WARRANT should be issued to enable the
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring the following
described property/ies, to wit: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and
other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.
Feb. 4, 1987 .
ILT, PC
"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after having been duly sworn to,
testify as follows:jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circumstances?
"2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal
Street, near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?
"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and
other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories?
"4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept
in said premises/house?
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands and affixed our signature this 4th
day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City, Philippines.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.
Judge
BACOLOD CITY"
On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes issued
Search Warrant No. 181, commanding the search of the property described in the
warrant.
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) was filed against Kenneth
Siao with the office of the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation. Thereafter,
Siao filed a counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all his rights
and ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle Pendon. In
a resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated May 18, 1987, the office of the City Fiscal
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint
for the same violation against petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24, Record)
for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against petitioner and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 5657 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was
raffled to Branch 47 of the same court presided over by respondent Judge Enrique T.
Jocson.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an application for the return of
the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record) on the
ground that the said search warrant was illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an
opposition to the application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application was subsequently
amended to an application for quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the
return of the articles seized by virtue thereof (pp. 33-38, Records).
On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the
application for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the
validity of the issuance thereof. The order states: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"Counsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in open court that at least one of
the seized items bears the identifying mark of the complainant National Power
Corporation, and there being no statement that the seized items were acquired in usual
course of business for value, this court is constrained to have the case tried without
resolving whether or not the questioned search warrant was issued validly." (p. 43,
Records)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on October 14,
1987 (p. 11, Rollo).
On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the legality of
search warrant No. 181 and praying for the permanent prohibition against the use in
evidence of the articles and properties seized and the return thereof to petitioner. On
April 4, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The appellate court
found the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
The respondent court held: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"x x x
"For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the validity
of the issuance of the Search Warrant No. 181 and to sustain further the ruling of the
respondent trial court in denying the petition for the return of the articles and personal
properties seized thereunder.
"WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The
previous order to maintain the status quo is hereby withdrawn and set aside.
The motion for reconsideration of the above decision filed by petitioner on May 2, 1988
was denied in a resolution (p. 49, Rollo) dated July 21, 1988.
The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance of Search Warrant
No. 181. It is the contention of petitioner that the application for the search warrant
and the joint deposition of the witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements
prescribed by the Constitution and the rules.
The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the joint deposition of
Abaja and Reyes failed to comply with the requisites of searching questions and
answers. The joint deposition of the witnesses showed that the questions therein were
pretyped, mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-in. No
examination of the applicant and of the joint deponents was personally conducted by
Judge Magallanes as required by law and the rules.
Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of Rojas and the joint
deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal
knowledge that any specific offense was committed by petitioner or that the articles
sought to be seized were stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth
Siao.chanroble s virtualawl ibra ry cha nrob les.co m:chan roble s.com.p h
Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of polemics, that the
articles belong to the latter, his Constitutional right prevails over that of NAPOCOR.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III
(Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which provides: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge alter examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a
finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R.
No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable
cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses
personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco,
104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647).
These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states: "Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R.
No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must,
to a certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record.
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the
judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with.
The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The
records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to
subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed
questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or
a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person
against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v.
Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant himself
was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain, among
others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was
not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held that: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
will be found later that his declarations are false.
"x x x
"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application." (Emphasis
supplied; p. 695)
Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by the applicant
can hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public respondent prosecutor admitted in
his memorandum that the questions propounded were pre-typed. chanrobles. com.ph : vi rtua l l aw libra ry
The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing
law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The four (4) questions
propounded could hardly support a finding of probable cause. The first question was on
the personal circumstances of the deponents. The second and third were leading
questions answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was on how the deponents
knew about their answers in the second and third questions. The judge could have
exploited this last question to convince himself of the existence of a probable cause but
he did not. There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought
to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that
applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles
sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. It was not even shown what connection
Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading or with the premises sought to be searched. By
and large, neither the application nor the joint deposition provided facts or
circumstance which could lead a prudent man to believe that an offense had been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any, are in the
possession of the person named in the application.
". . . [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and
his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as
long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a
specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in
public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that
the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and
elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.
(Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388) (Emphasis supplied)
And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467, 483: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"As held in Nolasco v. Pao No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 163), the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicants witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary
Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the
articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the
warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly,
aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so general
that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the
premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners petition before respondent
Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the
business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories
and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the
list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that
the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or
embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended
to be used as a means of committing an offense. chanrobles vi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s.com:c hanro bles. com.ph
It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the existence of
probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant. In denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash and application for articles seized
by virtue of search warrant No. 181, he stated: jgc:chanroble s.com. ph
"The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for search warrant in the
lower court is cured by the admission for the accused of counsel that at least one of the
items seized bore the identifying mark of complainant National Power Corporation and
the failure to aver in the quashal motion and in the open hearing that the seized items
themselves were acquired in the usual course of business for value in good faith.
However, this order is without prejudice to the right of the accused to pursue against
the administrative liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes Magallanes." (p. 54, Rollo)
In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue of
search warrant No. 181 was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the
receipt in behalf of Kener Trading, which possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D.
1612, which states: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph
"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object
or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing."cralaw virtua1aw lib rary
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure
cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R.
No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388: jgc:chanrobles .com.ph
". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of
the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ib rary
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and
scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
"Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given
in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are
to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril
as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21, Record).
There is no showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return
thereof to petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant
to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through
their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG,
applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of
AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the
premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-
ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV
Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84
for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch
88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing
was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A.
Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A
Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal
knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents
and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including
support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following
may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested
by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and
3
additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents)
against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P.
Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY
FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled
that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying
the case against respondent."
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set
aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his
Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized
Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners'
Motion to Suppress.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it
is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General,
contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this
present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed
Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable
them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to
the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature
of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too
general. Thus:
A Yes, sir,
Q What else?
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality
of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this original,
independent action to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners did
raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated
October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the
evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest
investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS
CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore,
while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the
legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts
is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable
that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and
a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the
service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case
is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding
Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without
a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule
that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was
made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules,
there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the
place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of
the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals." 13
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-
ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No.1
to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1
issued by respondent Judge as well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00 seized
from petitioner Antonieta Silva.
On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. 1 This
application was accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13,
1986. 2
On the same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to
search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended. Pertinent portions of
Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic) MSGT.
Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr. and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon
T. Quindo that there is probable cause to believe that possession and control of
Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be
committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that marijuana
dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's Room (Rgt.
side lst Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day
(night) of the room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to
open (sic) aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and
take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and
bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. 3
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in
the amount of P1,231.40.
On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds
that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves,
cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search
warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 4
Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court "holds
in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate
charges in connection with the search warrant." 5
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it
was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition
of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to
personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation
of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6
On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had
replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the
requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. 7
A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied by
Judge Cruz in an order dated October 19, 1987.
Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality and that
respondent Judge should be viewed to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the Order dated August
11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No, 1.
Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal liberty
and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted. 8
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of
a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a
search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and
witnesses through searching questions and answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this
Court defined "probable cause" as follows:
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown
to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the
"Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to
comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together
with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. In fact there were only
four (4) questions asked, to wit:
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have the
property in his/their possession and control?
A Yes, sir.
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The
questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The
deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers
on the blanks provided.
In the case of Nolasco vs. Pao, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 152, 163, this Court
held:
Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the search warrant issued as invalid
due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and
answers. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was
too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching
questions and answers". On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they
called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, "the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness' are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant. 10
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply
with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De
Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge
in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes abuse of
discretion".
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the
money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even
named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of
marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of
personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of
committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits
of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected
the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void.
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to order
the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount of P1,231.40 which had earlier been seized
from her by virtue of the illegal search warrant. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search
Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons
to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally
possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense which the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and
concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines, to wit:
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our
surveillance and observation during the past few days.
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or
persons who has or have control of the above-described
premises?
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant
No. 87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching
team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a
bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old
newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade
(live); (b) one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423
Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and
Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to
the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has
decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 12 The
probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 15 This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it
was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay
evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has
verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting
deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources"
that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess
them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing
the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major
Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that
petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to
show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information
acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a
fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and
answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only
support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on
hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had
conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises
and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that
the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess
them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining
whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition, are based on
personal knowledge or not
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be
held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for
search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in
his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so
much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing
the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search
warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are
being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law."
The Court held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to
the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent books,
correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search
warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as
required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was
too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of
searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were
leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs.
NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also
notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns,
pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search
warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand
grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched
premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the
searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the
purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against
unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there
were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place
intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself
described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of
Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at
PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched
sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it
was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in
connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent
judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular
provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866
punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific
offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of
the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned:
"For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the
said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was,
qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by
respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In
other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal
possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant
to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of
such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be
overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of
items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same
species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms,
etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge: 24
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the
applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search
warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned
warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August
1987, which reads:
it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for
a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an
otherwise valid search warrant.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y.
Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of
petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134279 March 8, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Ricky Roger Austria was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila with Murder in an information reading:
That on or about June 21, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one AGUSTIN ABAD y ARAGUEZ, by then and
there stabbing him on the chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious stab
wounds which are necessarily fatal and mortal and which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.1
On June 21, 1995, at around 10:00 in the evening, in Bagong Barangay, Zamora,
Pandacan, Manila, Rowena went to a store in the plaza to buy ice. Failing to buy
any, Rowena started walking back home. On the way, she saw three (3) men
accost another man, who they took to a narra tree. Rowena heard one of the
three men instruct the man brought to the narra tree to bring out something.
Suddenly, accused-appellant hit the man with a piece of wood and
simultaneously stabbed him. A lamppost lighting the area enabled Rowena to
see accused-appellant's face when the latter looked to see if anyone else was
around.2
SPO2 Rodolfo Rival of the Homicide Division of the Western Police District
Command (WPDC), Manila, conducted an investigation of the incident. SPO2
Rival testified that at around 10:45 in the evening of June 21, 1995, SPO2 Danilo
Caballero of the Pandacan Police Station reported the presence of a dead male
person at Bagong Barangay, Zamora, Pandacan, Manila. SPO2 Rival examined
the crime scene where he found the victim's remains lying on its back at the
grassy portion of the sidewalk beside the estero. The body had a lone stab
wound on the mid-chest and a deep-cut wound on the face. There were also
splotches of blood on the ground at the first gate of Bagong Barangay.
SPO2 Rival interviewed several persons regarding the incident but none of them
gave any "good information." On June 22, 1995, however, Rowena Junio went to
the station and gave her statement identifying accused-appellant as the one who
stabbed the victim.3
He alleged that he learned of the stabbing incident that same night at around
10:00 p.m. Somebody near accused-appellant's house shouted that Agustin had
been stabbed. Accused-appellant went to the scene where he saw the victim
wounded but still alive. He did not recognize the victim as Agustin since the
latter's face was too bloodied. He stayed at the scene for about five (5) minutes.
A certain Roberto, a neighbor and an agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation, was also there and took the victim's wallet. Accused-appellant
learned from his sister that Agustin was the victim only when he was in the police
station.7
On April 28, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-
appellant of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, thus:
Accused-appellant now appeals his conviction, and the Court grants him acquittal
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
First, Rowena stated that she saw accused-appellant for the first time only during
the stabbing incident.
COURT: By the way, the accused was not the first time you met [sic],
when you saw him during the stabbing incident?
The Court also notes that the witness repeated this declaration when asked how
long she has known accused-appellant. She replied that she had only met him on
that tragic occasion:
Q: Now, Madam Witness, you said that you know him only when you
saw his face, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: In sort, [sic] you have not known him for a long time, is that correct
Madam Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.10
However, when confronted with the Affidavit11 she executed the day after the
incident, Rowena contradicted herself and claimed she had known accused-
appellant for a long time.
COURT: Wait, wait, what did you mean by that, when you said "Matagal
mo na siyang kilala sa mukha"?
COURT: When you saw the face of the accused in the evening of June
21, 1995, during the stabbing indident [sic], that was not the first time you
saw him?
Rowena was also inconsistent concerning her residence. When asked to state
her personal circumstances, she said that she was residing at 1953 Zamora,
Pandacan, Manila.13 She also testified that she was born there and had been
staying there since childhood.
Q: How long have you been living with [sic] this address, Mr. [sic]
Witness, 1953 [Zamora Street, Pandacan, Manila].
A: Yes, sir.14
However, in other parts of her testimony, she said that she was not from the area
but was merely visiting, and that she did not know anyone there.
Q: How long have you been residing in the said area, in that place in
Pandacan, Manila?
x x x
ATTY. ASKALI: Madam Witness, you said that you are not living
permanently in that place at Pandacan, you only visited the place, is that
correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So you are very knew [sic] in that place you do not know anyone
there, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.16
The Office of the Solicitor General submits, however, that Rowena Junio's
acquaintance with appellant is irrelevant considering that she personally
identified him to be the same person whose face appeared under the illumination
of the lamp right after the stabbing of the victim. If at all, any inconsistency in the
narration by the witness only bolsters her credibility since it would show that her
statements were unrehearsed and spontaneous.17
In the face of doubts regarding the familiarity of the witness with the alleged
assailant, the distance of the witness from the scene and the visibility conditions
thereat assume greater significance. Rowena was purportedly some eight (8)
meters from the scene of the killing,18 which was illuminated by a flickering lamp.
She testified:
The prosecution did not show, however, whether the intensity of the defective
lamp was sufficient to enable the witness to see accused-appellant's face,
considering her distance from the scene.
The prosecution has also failed to establish any motive on the part of the
accused-appellant to kill the deceased. While generally, the motive of the
accused is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of the same
becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the
assailant is in question.21
SO ORDERED.