EN BANC

[G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES , petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO ,
respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES , petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ , respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA , J.:

I concur. The Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled the petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.
At the outset, this discussion is necessarily framed in the context of the nature of
the petitions brought before the COMELEC and the resultant scope of this Court's
review.
The Omnibus Election Code ("OEC") positively requires an aspiring candidate to
formally manifest his or her intention to run through the ling of a certi cate of
candidacy. 1 Section 74 of the OEC enumerates the information required to be stated
by a candidate in his or her certificate of candidacy, thus:
Sec. 74. Contents of certi cate of candidacy. The certi cate of
candidacy shall state that the person ling it is announcing his candidacy for
the of ce stated therein and that he is eligible for said of ce; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post of ce
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his
oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certi cate of candidacy are true to the best of
his knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 78, a certi cate of candidacy can be denied due course or
cancelled in case of false material representation therein. The jurisprudential
requirements for the cancellation of a certi cate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
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 OEC are clear: (1) that a representation is made with respect to a material fact, (2) that
the representation is false, and (3) that there is intent to deceive or mislead the
electorate. 2
The Assailed Resolutions were issued by the COMELEC disposing of Petitions
for Disquali cation and Cancellation of Certi cate of Candidacy led by the
respondents against the petitioner. Treating all petitions led as Section 78 Petitions,
the Assailed Resolutions held that (1) the representations made by the petitioner with
respect to her citizenship and residence were false, and (2) she intended to deceive or
mislead the electorate as to her quali cations to run for of ce. In determining the
existence of false material representation, the COMELEC declared that the petitioner
cannot claim that May 24, 2005 was the starting point of her period of residence, and
that she is not a natural-born citizen. Consequently, her certi cate of candidacy was
cancelled.
In these Consolidated Petitions for certiorari, the petitioner ascribes grave abuse
of discretion to the COMELEC for, among others, ruling on her quali cations in a
Section 78 petition. In other words, the extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a
Section 78 petition should have been to check the accuracy of the material
representations made in a certi cate of candidacy and to determine the existence of an
intent to mislead only for the purpose of deciding whether the certi cate of
candidacy should be denied due course or cancelled.
The limited scope of this Court's review on certiorari of a judgment, nal order or
resolution of the COMELEC under Rule 64 is well-de ned. Time and again, this Court
has held that the extent of its review is limited to the determination of whether the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 3
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has been described in a number of
cases as the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 4 This
Court has also previously held that wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an
issue is suf cient to taint COMELEC's action with grave abuse of discretion, and that in
exceptional cases, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, this Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.
5

The question in these Consolidated Petitions is whether or not the Assailed

Resolutions of the COMELEC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. If the COMELEC committed grave abuse, then it becomes
this Court's bounden duty to strike down the assailed judgment. Moreso in this case,
when the right of an individual to run and be voted for public of ce and the right of the
electorate to choose their leader are at stake.
Necessarily, therefore, this Court's jurisdiction and its exercise neither hinge on
nor require a nal determination of the petitioner's quali cations. Keeping in mind the
narrow con nes of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction as invoked, and the principle of
judicial restraint, I con ne my views only to those matters that are absolutely necessary
to resolve the Petitions, and accordingly leave the resolution of the questions of her
quali cations to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal if and when such a petition is led
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 before it.
With this framework, I proceed to examine whether the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled
petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it cancelled
the petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
I believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by (1)
misinterpreting the jurisprudential requirements of cancellation of a certi cate of
candidacy under Section 78, and (2) for placing the burden of proof upon the petitioner
to show that she complies with the residency and citizenship quali cations for the
position of President.
The COMELEC grossly misinterpreted the law in the manner it treated the
jurisprudential requirements of cancellation under Section 78. Speci cally, it gravely
abused its discretion by failing to determine the existence of petitioner's intent to
deceive separate from the determination of whether there were false material
representations in her certificate of candidacy.
I n Mitra v. COMELEC, 6 this Court elucidated on the nature of the element of
intent to deceive, thus:
[T]he misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a
mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception of the electorate results. The
deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who
falsifies a material fact cannot run; . . . .
Proceeding from this statement, this Court found in that case that Mitra did not
commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his certi cate of candidacy.
Moreover, this Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its
appreciation of the evidence which led it to conclude that Mitra was not a resident of
Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render
him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
In Jalover v. Osmea, 7 the requirement of intent to deceive was restated, thus:
Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation
under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words,
it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate's qualifications for public office. . . .
These cases show that there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
Therefore, the requirement of intent cannot be disposed of by a simple nding that
there was false representation of a material fact; to be sure, there must also be a
showing of the candidate's intent to deceive as animating the making of the false
material representation. 8
In the case of petitioner, apart from the nding that there were false material
representations in the petitioner's certi cate of candidacy, the COMELEC relied mainly
on the representation previously made by the petitioner in her 2012 certi cate of
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 candidacy for the position of Senator, and that she is a foundling, to support the
inference that the petitioner intended to mislead the electorate into believing that she
has the requisite residency and natural-born status. The existence of intent to mislead
is not a question of law and I nd that the petitioner has adduced substantial
evidence to show, contrary to any intent to mislead, that she honestly believed herself
to have the requisite quali cations to run for President. Her evidence should have been
directly met by the respondents. As it was, her evidence was not considered by the
COMELEC. On this ground, its judgment was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, contrary to the rules of evidence, the COMELEC shifted the burden of
proof to the petitioner, ascribing to her the onus of showing that she had the
quali cations to run for President, instead of requiring the respondents to prove the
three elements that furnish the grounds for denial of due course or cancellation of
certificate of candidacy.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
9 This Court has consistently held, and it is an established rule, that the burden of
evidence may shift depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of trial; 10
however, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is originally imposed
11 he who seeks the af rmative of an issue. In this case, as with other election cases,
the burden of proof is placed upon the parties seeking the denial of due course or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. 12
In this case, this shifting of burden of proof to the petitioner unfairly skewed the
analysis and resulting conclusions reached by the COMELEC in the petitions for
cancellation against the petitioner. It would appear that the COMELEC relied merely on
its judgment being based on substantial evidence, without considering the effect upon
the petitions for cancellation of the: (1) respondents' claims and evidence being met by
those of the petitioner, and (2) evidence of both parties at equipoise. This erroneous
consideration similarly taints the judgment with grave abuse of discretion.
Consequent to the nding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, this
case falls within the exception whereby this Court can examine the factual conclusions
of the COMELEC.
There was no intent to deceive.
A. With respect to residency
Mitra, while admittedly not on all fours with this case, shares enough similarities
to this case on a conceptual level that the analysis used therein can be applied by parity
of reasoning. Inasmuch as we held in Mitra that the establishment of a new domicile
may be an incremental process and that the totality of the evidence should be
considered in determining whether or not a new domicile was established, the same
disquisition applies to the instant case.
The totality of evidence presented by the petitioner points to a decision and
action to establish a new domicile of choice in the Philippines as early as 2005. Stated
differently, my considered appreciation of the totality of all these overt acts done by the
petitioner is that she had believed in good faith that when she lled up her certi cate of
candidacy she was correctly reckoning the period of her residency from the time that
she had taken concrete steps to transfer her domicile. Using the standard of Section 74
of the OEC, petitioner lled in the certi cate of candidacy to "the best of her
knowledge". To impute intent to mislead upon a person who represents what she
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 knows to the best of her knowledge and belief to be true, as supported by the evidence,
is to commit grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner did not falsely represent her length of residence.
All told, the evidence of petitioner preponderantly shows that she (1) has been
physically present in the country from 2005; (2) had intended to remain in the
Philippines, and (3) abandoned her domicile in the United States.
Actual physical presence
The petitioner suf ciently established that after she came to the Philippines in
2004 to support her father's campaign, she returned in 2005 with a more permanent
stay in mind and had been physically present in the country since; that she had brought
her children to the Philippines in mid-2005.
Animus manendi and animus non revertendi
Similar to evidence showing physical presence, the petitioner suf ciently showed
that since 2005, she and her entire family had taken steps to permanently relocate in
the Philippines. Petitioner showed that as early as March 2005, her husband had begun
the process of transporting and disposing of their household belongings in the United
States. By the middle of 2005, the petitioner and her children had arrived in the
Philippines; the children, enrolled in Philippine schools by June 2005. The next year, they
began the construction of a home and acquired a condominium unit to stay in until the
construction is completed.
Her travel documents also show that whenever she left the country, she returned
to the Philippines. By July 2006, she had taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. Her husband had
also formally noti ed the United States Postal Service of their change of address. The
entire process culminated in her acceptance of the Movie and Television Review and
Classi cation Board ( "MTRCB" ) Chairmanship and her renunciation of her American
citizenship in 2010.
To an unbiased mind, all these overt acts would show that the intent and
demonstrative acts to transfer to or establish a new domicile of choice began in 2005.
The evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the conclusion that the petitioner's
physical presence, animus manendi and animus non revertendi had concurred by clear
overt acts obtaining as early as 2005. While admittedly, the last acts that foreclose any
other conclusion were done in 2010, more than substantial evidence is present to
support her claim that she had established a new domicile of choice in the Philippines
from May 24, 2005. As in Mitra, 13 the transfer was an incremental process, nowhere
near completed in 2005, but already existing then. I submit that these facts lead to no
other conclusion than that the petitioner had already determined to permanently reside
in the Philippines.
On this point, I quote with approval the Separate Opinion 14 of Commissioner
Luie Tito F. Guia:
To prove her claims, Respondent presented, among others, the following: a) E-
mail exchanges from 18 March 2005 to 29 September 2006 with Victory Van
Corporation and National Veterinary Quarantine Service Bureau of Animal
Industry of the Philippines indicating respondent and her husband's plan of
relocating all their movable properties from the United States to the Philippines;
b) Of cial Transcripts, Permanent School Records and Registrar Certi cation
showing the enrolment of her school-aged children in Philippine schools before
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 June 2005; c) her Philippine Bureau of Internal Records [sic] or Tax
Identi cation Number 239-290-513-000; and d) Condominium Certi cate Titles,
Declarations of Real Property and a Transfer Certi cate of Title indicating
acquisitions of different real properties in the country.
It is clear from the foregoing that Respondent was physically and actually
present in the Philippines since May 2005. This is one of the requisites for an
effective change of domicile. It is also evident that, independent of her still
being a US citizen at that time, Respondent had already intended to change her
domicile from the US to the Philippines. All her acts and conduct points to her
intention to transfer her residence to the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

From the substantial evidence on record, I nd that there is no
misrepresentation in Respondent's CoC in so far as her period of residency in
the Philippines is concerned. It is an error for the Commission to cancel
Respondent's CoC on this ground.
xxx xxx xxx
To my mind, there can be no clearer manifestation of the earlier concurrence of
the petitioner's animus manendi and animus non revertendi with her physical presence
in the country than when she brought her children to the Philippines in the middle of
2005 and enrolled them in the same year in Philippine schools. To any parent, this is a
very big decision that is not lightly made. To uproot teens from the world they know,
and to displace them from the environment in which they grew up, is, to say the least, a
very signi cant decision for any parent to make. Indeed, as a parent, the petitioner is
presumed to be acting in the best interest of her children. And that petitioner did this
convinces me that petitioner's decision to permanently reside in the Philippines was
already made at the time, or just before, the children were brought to the Philippines to
stay with her and to study, in the middle of 2005.
Given the totality of evidence presented by petitioner, the inaccuracies with
respect to the period of her residency can be considered an honest mistake. The
petitioner had admitted to making a mistake in determining the precise date of the
start of her residency when she led her certi cate of candidacy for the position of
Senator in 2012. The ling of the 2015 certi cate of candidacy is the earliest
opportunity that the petitioner had to correct her previous representation the very
fact that she changed her period of residence, on its own, cannot be the basis of a
finding that there was deliberate intent to mislead as to her residency.
As for the 2015 certi cate of candidacy, even assuming that the representation
that her period of residence began on May 24, 2005 is false, the petitioner had
suf ciently shown that the effective transfer of domicile occurred in 2005. Even in an
effect-based analysis, therefore, there should not have been a nding that there was
intent to mislead. By fact and law, she complies with the residency requirement, and no
deception of the electorate as to her quali cation ensues by virtue of her
representation.
What is more, she has in her favor substantial evidence to show that she had
been physically present and had taken overt actions demonstrative of her animus
manendi and animus non revertendi from the time of her claimed period of residence
on May 24, 2005. 15 In ne, the evidence presented preponderated in favor of the
petitioner. And even if we were to assume arguendo that the evidence of the parties is
at equipoise, still, the COMELEC should have ruled against the party with the burden of
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 proof the respondents.
This application of burden of proof can be seen in one of the holdings in Tecson
v. COMELEC, thus:
[B]ut while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certi cate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful." 16
B. With respect to citizenship
On this point I deviate from the majority opinion when it proceeded to rule on the
question of the petitioner's citizenship. Keeping in mind the nature of this Court's
limited certiorari review, I believe that this Court need not have made a de nitive ruling
on petitioner's status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I concur, however, that the COMELEC grossly misappreciated the evidence when
it found that the petitioner deliberately intended to mislead the electorate when she
stated that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, knowing full well that she is a foundling.
The COMELEC would have us believe that the petitioner knew that she was not a
natural-born citizen at the time that she accomplished and led her certi cate of
candidacy, and knowing this, deliberately attempted to deceive the electorate by
claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The question of petitioner's citizenship as a foundling is subject to legal
interpretation. Any conclusion reached on this point is necessarily a legal conclusion. If
one needs proof to show how intricate and susceptible to several interpretations her
real status is as a foundling, one needs only to look at the different interpretations
advanced by the members of the COMELEC and of this Court.
The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or dif cult question of law may be the
basis of good faith. 17 In Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 18 this Court, citing Manresa, recognized
the possibility of an excusable ignorance of or error of law being a basis for good faith:
We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith
founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public
document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by
competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from nal
judgments and administrative remedies against the quali cation of registrars,
and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but,
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public
documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth
is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not
infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one
thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is
possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the
interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or
better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as
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 to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and
appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation
of doubtful doctrines.
If indeed a mistake was made by petitioner as to her real status, this could be
considered a mistake on a dif cult question of law that could be the basis for good
faith. In this regard, good faith is presumed. 19 In the same vein, it is presumed that a
person is innocent of a crime or wrong, and that the law was obeyed. 20 Without more,
the legal conclusion alleged by the respondents in the petitions for cancellation, and
thereafter reached by the COMELEC, that the petitioner was not a natural-born citizen
simply because she is a foundling is not suf cient to overcome the presumption that
the petitioner made the representation as to her citizenship in good faith.
Even assuming that these presumptions cannot be considered in the petitioner's
favor, the lack of intent to deceive is fully supported by evidence tending to show that
she fully discharged the burden of her oath in the certi cate of candidacy that her
status as a natural-born Filipino is true and correct to the best of her knowledge. The
evidence submitted by the petitioner tends to more than adequately establish that
before her naturalization as an American citizen, she consistently comported herself as,
and was deemed, a Filipino citizen, even by the government. Though this by no means
determines her real status, it cannot be gainsaid that any reasonable person can be led
to believe that he is how he was deemed or treated, i.e., a natural born citizen. Given
what the petitioner believed of her status, the claim that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen is far from groundless or deceptive. It is credible that she believed in good faith
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that this fact is true and correct to the
best of her knowledge as she so swore in her certificate of candidacy.
In the nal analysis, even assuming falsity in her representation as to her
citizenship similar to her residency, this fact alone should not have led to an automatic
nding of intent to mislead and deceive the electorate, and ultimately to the
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy under Rule 78.
A nal word. The function of this Court's review in this Petition does not
absolutely require an examination of the petitioner's quali cations, but only to
determine whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled the petitioner's Certi cate of Candidacy.
This is in keeping with the limited scope of review in this certiorari petition. By applying
the standards that have been previously set, this Court can dispense justice without
presuming to make that determination.
For these reasons, I vote to GRANT the consolidated Petitions.
Footnotes

1. OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, Sec. 73.

2. Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015; See also Villafuerte v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA 312, citing Salcedo II v.
COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377 (1999).
3. Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, 698 Phil. 548, 559 (2012); Laurena, Jr. v. COMELEC, 553 Phil. 210,
217 (2007), citing Manzala v. COMELEC, 551 Phil. 28, 35 (2007).
4. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September
10, 2013, 705 SCRA 340, 344, citing Beluso v. COMELEC, 635 Phil. 436, 443 (2010);
Velasco v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 1172, 1183 (2008), citing Gonzales v. Intermediate
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 Appellate Court, 252 Phil. 253, 262 (1989); Lalican v. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 495
(1997).
5. Sabili v. COMELEC, 686 Phil. 649 (2012), and Jalover v. Osmea, G.R. No. 209286,
September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 267, citing Mitra v. COMELEC, 648 Phil. 165 (2010).
6. 636 Phil. 753, 780 (2010).
7. Supra note 5, at 282.
8. In Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534, 551 (2013), a
case that dealt with the question of whether a disquali ed candidate whose
certi cate of candidacy was not cancelled could be substituted, the Court
ratiocinated:

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less
one's intent to defraud, is of bare signi cance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough
that the person's declaration of a material quali cation in the CoC be false. In this
relation, jurisprudence holds that an express nding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether
one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the
petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis
of one's ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.
However, cases on cancellation of certi cate of candidacy under Section 78 (which were
promulgated after Tagolino) retained the element of intent: Villafuerte v. COMELEC,
supra note 2 and Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA
223.
9. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1.

10. Bautista v. Sarmiento, 223 Phil. 181, 186 (1985); See also De Leon v. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 184565, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 443; Vitarich
Corporation v. Losin, 649 Phil. 164 (2010).
11. Bautista v. Sarmiento, id. at 185.
12. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522 the same discussion
repeated in the Resolution dated October 22, 2013; Tecson v. COMELEC, 468 Phil.
421 (2004).
13. Supra note 5.
14. In the Consolidated Petitions docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC), and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC).
15. The amount of evidence presented by the petitioner suf ciently distinguishes her case
from the cases of Coquilla v. COMELEC, 434 Phil. 861 (2002), Caballero v. COMELEC,
supra note 2 and Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 12, wherein this Court was
constrained to either closely link or reckon the period of residence to the reacquisition
of citizenship for sheer dearth of evidence.
16. Supra note 12, at 488; citations omitted.
17. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890 (1999); Kasilag v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 46623, 69
Phil. 217 (1939).
18. Id. at 230-231, citing Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, Volume IV, pp.
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 100, 101 and 102.
19. GSIS v. Sps. Labung-Deang, 417 Phil. 662 (2001); Bermudez v. Gonzales, 401 Phil. 38, 47
(2000).
20. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3, pars. (a) and (ff).

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