Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Torts 8
Torts 8
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at The test by which to determine the existence of
San Fernando, La Union. The plaintiff was riding on negligence in a particular case may be stated as
his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
way across, the defendant approached from the negligent act use that person would have used in the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
He continued his course and after he had taken the situation before him. The law considers what would be
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
appeared to him that the man on horseback before ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart and liability by that.
his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did not
move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his
horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith
towards Picart without slowing down and when he saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart
was already so near the horse he swerved to the other and his horse did not move to the other lane so he
lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body should have steered his car to the other lane at that
across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its point instead of swerving at the last minute. He
limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the
required several days of medical attention while the unfortunate incident. When Smiths car has
horse eventually died. approached the horse at such proximity it left no
chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on
his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore
Issue: Whether or not Smith is negligent. recover damages from Smith but such should be
proportioned by reason of his contributory
negligence.
Held: Yes and so was Picart for being on the wrong
side of the road.
In the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., From the convergence of circumstances, we are
this Court there held that while contributory inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a
negligence on the part of the person injured did not product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious
constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in intent on Glenns part. First, as testified to by
evidence to reduce the damages which would prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon.
other party. And according to PAGASAs observed weather report
within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a
radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took
place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely
no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial
dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon
People v. Delos Santos and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts
that illuminated the highway. Second, the jogging
FACTS: trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-
shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat
On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the
shoes, which made them hard to make out on that
Maitum Highway in Cagayan de Oro City, a team of
dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither
PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course
reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving
were performing an Endurance Run. They were
hand signals. Third, GLENN was driving on the
jogging at the right side of the lane. A speeding Isuzu
proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other
Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The
hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong
accused surrendered to the Governor, and was
lane, the same lane as Glenns vehicle was traversing.
eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Worse, they were facing the same direction as Glenns
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder.
truck such that their backs were turned towards the
He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence,
oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no convincing
this automatic review.
evidence was presented to rebut Glenns testimony
ISSUE: that he had been momentarily blinded by the very
bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at
Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve.
kill the policemen, or a mere reckless imprudence He must have been still reeling from the blinding
HELD: effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle
when he plowed into the group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one
to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees of this prevision, is always necessary before
a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid negligence can be held to exist.
bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one
on the road is a person. It would therefore be GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
children who were dependent on him for support, to without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
have deliberately hit the group with his truck. which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it person performing or failing to perform such act,
was in light of the number of persons killed and taking into consideration (1) his employment or
seriously injured, was an accident and not an occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his
intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is physical condition; and (3) other circumstances
no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind regarding persons, time and place.
against the police trainees that would drive him into
deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenns GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an
offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve experienced driver, should have known to apply the
his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon
he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further
done so, many trainees would have been spared. hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
established that the road was slippery and slightly
The test for determining whether a person is going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or was foggy and dark. He should have observed due
damage results to the person or property of care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably
another is this: Could a prudent man, in the prudent man, such as by slackening his speed,
position of the person to whom negligence is applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being
a reasonable consequence of the course actually no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was
actor to refrain from that course or to take driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was
precautions to guard against its mischievous driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that
results, and the failure to do so constitutes he was exercising due care under the existing
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, circumstances and conditions at the time.
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
Considering that the incident was not a product of a from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway
reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the (NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines from Mabalacat, and via
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San Fernando
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and going to its milling factory. The TRB furnished the
less serious physical injuries. Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)
(the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll
I.SHORT TITLE: PNCC vs CA facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
II. FULL TITLE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to
CONSTRUCTION comment thereon.
CORPORATION, Petitioners, On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered
vs. into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), where the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, latter was allowed to enter and pass through the
RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA NLEX on the following terms and conditions:
LATAGAN, RICARDO
GENERALAO and PAMPANGA 1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;
SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;
COMPANY, INC.,
CORPORATION, Respondent. 3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at
G.R. No. 159270. August 22, the rear end of the convoy with a sign which should
2005. CALLEJO, SR., J. read as follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!;
III. TOPIC: Test to determine the existence of 4. Tollway safety measures should be properly
Negligence observed;
5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities
arising out of any activity related to this approval
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO;
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc.
6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their
(PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat
stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience
and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo
to the other motorists;
eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul
via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission
7. This request will be in force only while the national the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to his
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the
via Magalang remain impassable. necessary report.
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified
mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY
At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin,
Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota
the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Corolla along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per
Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling
hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his
Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of friend Ricardo Generalao; they were on their way to
sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and
Baguio to attend their grandmothers first death
southbound lanes of the road. They placed lit cans anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered
with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes,
sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to several times. The accident threw the car about
warn motorists of the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin
fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.
and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office,
believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the
since it was the only milling company in the area. matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the
They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the road, on both lanes, which appeared to be flattened.
area. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECOs
equipment supervisor and transportation On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and
superintendent, told them that no equipment operator Generalao filed a complaint for damages against
was available as it was still very early. Nonetheless, PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila. The
Mallari told them that he would send someone to case was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-64803. They
clear the affected area. Thereafter, Sendin and alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence,
company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe
At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks
and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass
They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled
The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put
few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As up emergency devices to sufficiently warn
the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and approaching motorists of the existence of such
transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there spillage; and that the combined gross negligence
was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and
already approaching, Sendin and company removed proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. They completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty
prayed, thus: of contributory negligence in driving his car at
such speed.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due
hearing, judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs, The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim
ordering the defendants jointly and severally: against the plaintiffs and cross-claim against its co-
defendant PASUDECO.
(a) To pay unto plaintiff Rodrigo Arnaiz the sum of
P100,000.00 representing the value of his car which On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its
was totally wrecked; decision in favor of Latagan, dismissing that of
Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of
(b) to pay unto plaintiff Regina Latagan the sum of
evidence. The case as against the PNCC was,
P100,000.00 by way of reimbursement for medical
likewise, dismissed. The decretal portion of the
expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral
decision reads:
damages, and the sum of P30,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages; WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(c) To pay unto plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo
Generalao the sum of P5,000.00 by way of I. ORDERING defendant PASUDECO:
reimbursement for medical expenses; and
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
(d) To pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by
way of attorneys fees; plus the costs of suit. a. P25,000 = for actual damages
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which the Honorable b. P15,000 = for moral damages
Court may find due them in the premises.16 c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees
In its Answer, PNCC admitted that it was under P50,000
contract to manage the North Luzon Expressway, to
keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the 2. To pay costs of suit.
mishap was due to the "unreasonable speed" at
II. The case is DISMISSED as to defendant PNCC. No
which Arnaizs car was running, causing it to pronouncement as to costs. Its counterclaim is,
turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of likewise, DISMISSED.
flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the
proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECOs III. The claims for damages of plaintiffs Rodrigo
gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao are hereby DISMISSED
its failure to clear and mop up the area for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED. The PNCC, now the petitioner, filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and Rules of Court.
defendant PASUDECO appealed the decision to the
CA. Since the plaintiffs failed to file their brief, the CA
dismissed their appeal.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Resolving PASUDECOs appeal, the CA rendered
judgment on April 29, 2003, affirming the RTC
decision with modification. The appellate court The petitioner asserts that the trial court was
ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his correct when it held that PASUDECO should be
car, but that such negligence was merely held liable for the mishap, since it had assumed
contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e., such responsibility based on the MOA between it
PASUDECOs failure to properly supervise its and the TRB. The petitioner relies on the trial
men in clearing the affected area. Its supervisor, courts finding that only PASUDECO was given a
Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while permit to pass through the route.
their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the
appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, The petitioner insists that the respondents failed
jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. The to prove that it was negligent in the operation
decretal portion of the decision reads: and maintenance of the NLEX. It maintains that it
had done its part in clearing the expressway of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles of
DECISION is hereby MODIFIED and judgment is sugarcane along the road when its men left Km. 72;
hereby rendered declaring PASUDECO and PNCC, only a few scattered sugarcanes flattened by the
jointly and solidarily, liable: passing motorists were left. Any liability arising from
any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanes should
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
be borne by PASUDECO, in accordance with the MOA
a. P25,000 = for actual damages which provides that "accidents or damages to the toll
facilities arising out of any activity related to this
b. P15,000 = for moral damages approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees The petitioner also argues that the respondents
2. To pay costs of suit. should bear the consequences of their own fault or
negligence, and that the proximate and immediate
SO ORDERED.
cause of the mishap in question was respondent Negligence is the omission to do something
Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross negligence. which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
VI. ISSUE: of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would do. It also refers to the conduct which
Whether or not the CA erred in holding PNCC and creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to
PASUDECO jointly and solidarily liable for damages observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that
VII. RULING: other person suffers injury. The Court declared the
The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it test by which to determine the existence of
the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate negligence in Picart v. Smith, viz:
and maintain toll facilities covering the expressways, The test by which to determine the existence of
collectively known as the NLEX. Concomitant thereto negligence in a particular case may be stated as
is its right to collect toll fees for the use of the said follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
expressways and its obligation to keep it safe for negligent act use that reasonable care and
motorists. caution which an ordinarily prudent person
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) would have used in the same situation? If not,
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
negligence of the defendant, or some other effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the connection of cause and effect between the the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
fault or negligence of the defendant and the case is not determined by reference to the personal
damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2176 of judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
the New Civil Code provides: law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage prudence and determines liability by that.
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, The test for determining whether a person is
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by damage results to the person or property of
the provisions of this Chapter. another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to the tollway.
refrain from that course or to take precautions to
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that
guard against its mischievous results, and the failure
Arnaizs car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled
to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight
from a hauler truck.
of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition
born of this provision, is always necessary before Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to
negligence can be held to exist.35 the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to
property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner
who are not privies to the MOA.
failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes
lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in
removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered removing the emergency warning devices, were two
on the ground. The highway was still wet from the successive negligent acts which were the direct and
juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The proximate cause of Latagans injuries. As such,
petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.
of the highway would endanger motorists passing by As the Court held in the vintage case of Sabido v.
at night or in the wee hours of the morning. Custodio:39
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee According to the great weight of authority, where the
PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of
maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in two or more persons, although acting independently
the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC of each other, are, in combination, the direct and
should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private proximate cause of a single injury to a third person
agreement, to other parties. and it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction
the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
since there were no piles of sugarcane, but
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage
evidence shows there were still pieces of
might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-
sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists.
feasor. ...
There must be an observance of that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence
situation demands. There should have been in order to render a person liable need not be
sufficient warning devices considering that there the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that
his negligence, concurring with one or more same in mitigating the award of damages in his
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the favor as provided under Article 2179 of the New
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where Civil Code. Contributory negligence is conduct
several causes combine to produce injuries, a person on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
is not relieved from liability because he is responsible legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
for only one of them, it being sufficient that the falls below the standard to which he is required
negligence of the person charged with injury is an to conform for his own protection. Even the
efficient cause without which the injury would not petitioner itself described Arnaizs negligence as
have resulted to as great an extent, and that such contributory.
cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is
no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors
that the injury would not have resulted from his VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
negligence alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
injury are concurrent and each is an efficient Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
cause without which the injury would not have No. 47699, dated April 29, 2003, is AFFIRMED.
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or Costs against the petitioner.
any of the causes and recovery may be had ANECO v. Balen
against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable,
Facts:
and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. Each wrongdoer is Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO)
responsible for the entire result and is liable as is a duly organized and registered consumers
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in
the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City.
Thus, with PASUDECOs and the petitioners
successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors Petitioner ANECO installed an electric post in Purok
who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage 4, Ata-atahon, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, with its
under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code. main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing
Angelita Balens residence. Balens father, Miguel,
Anent respondent Arnaizs negligence in driving
protested the installation with the District Engineers
his car, both the trial court and the CA agreed
Office and with ANECO, but his protest just fell on
that it was only contributory, and considered the
deaf ears. his act or omission is the legal cause thereof.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of the law of
This case arose when Balen, Hercules Lariosa and negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have
Celestino Exclamado were electrocuted while acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
removing the television antenna from Balens reasonable man would have realized that certain
residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs main interests of certain persons were unreasonably
distribution line which resulted in their electrocution. subjected to a general but definite class of risk which
Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa made the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the
suffered extensive third degree burns. consequence for the actor must be held legally
responsible. Otherwise, the legal duty is entirely
Balen and Lariosa (respondents) then lodged a defeated. Accordingly, the generalization may be
complaint for damages against ANECO with the RTC formulated that all particular consequences, that is,
of Butuan City. Petitioner tried to free itself from consequences which occur in a manner which was
liability arguing that it is the respondents negligence reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of
that caused their injury. his misconduct are legally caused by his breach of
duty."
Issue:
Whether or not ANECO was negligent, hence liable Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have
for damages. reasonably foreseen that, even if it complied with the
clearance requirements under the Philippine
Ruling: Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension
Yes. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe wires above MIGUEL BALENs house, still a potential
for the protection of the interests of another person risk existed that people would get electrocuted,
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which considering that the wires were not insulated.
the circumstances justly demand, by reason of which
such other person suffers injury. Moreover, quoting Benguet Electric Cooperative vs.
CA, the Court declared that "as an electric
As found by the courts, petitioner's negligence is cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in
the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet
respondents. Instructive is the test in adapted in province, its primordial concern is not only to
determining proximate cause- Foreseeability Test, viz: distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to
ensure the safety of the public by the proper
"Where the particular harm was reasonably maintenance and upkeep of its facilities."
foreseeable at the time of the defendants misconduct,
Thus, by leaving an open live wire unattended for alleged that the accident was caused by a live tension
years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for wire from the electric post which struck and
the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's electrocuted them. They alleged that the accident was
death was an accident that was bound to happen in caused by the Coops negligence as it failed to fix and
view of the gross negligence of BENECO. Likewise, change live tension wires.
this pronouncement is against ANECO for letting its
main distribution wires not insulated despite that fact
that it traverses in a populated area. In its defense, CAGELCO alleged that typhoons
struck its areas of responsibility which caused some of
Contrary to petitioners claim despite the facts that the poles to fall, high tension wires to snap or cut-off.
the incident happened only after 11 years, is not a It claimed that they cannot be faulted for negligence if
valid ground to mitigate is liability. there were electric wires dangling along the national
road since they were caused by typhoons which are
fortuitous events.
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.
ALLAN RAPANAN
During the trial, Dr. Hasim, the physician who
G.R. NO. 199886, December 3, 2014, Villarama,
attended them upon arriving in the hospital that the
JR., J.
abrasions of Rapanan were caused by pressure when
the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but
she is uncertain as towhether a live electric wire
FACTS: could have caused them. She further said that she did
not find any electrical burns on Rapanan. As with
Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma on his
A motorcycle with 3 passengers figured in a body and that the cause of death was due to "cardio
mishap along the National highway of Maddalero, respiratory arrest secondary to strangulation." She
Cagayan. It was driven by its owner, Camilo Tangonan also opined that the strangulation could have been
who eventually died from the accident, his caused by an electric wire entangled around Camilos
companions Rapanan and Erwin Coloma suffered neck.
injuries.
CA set aside RTCs decision and awarded The motorcycle was probably running too
damages. fast that it lost control and started tilting
and sliding eventually which made its foot
rest cause the skid mark on the road.
Therefore, the mishap already occurred
ISSUES:
even while they were on the road and away
from petitioner's electric wires and was not
caused by the latter as alleged by
1 Whether or not CAGELCOs negligence in its respondents. It just so happened that after
maintenance is the proximate cause of the the motorcycle tilted and slid, the
death and injuries? passengers were thrown off to the shoulder
2 Whether or not award of damages is proper? where the electric wires were.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court
provides that: of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED, making the City of
Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs P221.90 actual
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any
medical expenses, P900.00 for the amount paid for
person by reason of defective conditions of roads,
the operation and management of the school bus,
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
P20,000.00 as moral damages due to pain, sufferings
works under their control or supervision.
and sleepless nights and P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
Upon his return to the Philippines, the WPD It was established that McLoughlins money, kept in
conducted an investigation which resulted in the Tropicanas safety deposit box, was taken by Tan
preparation of an affidavit forwarded to the Manila without McLoughlins consent, through the use of the
City Fiscals Office. Said affidavit became the basis of master key which was in the possession of the
preliminary investigation but McLoughlin left again management. Payam and Lainez allowed Tan to use
for Australia without receiving the notice of the the master key without authority from McLoughlin.
hearing. Thus, the case at the Fiscals Office was The trial court added that if McLoughlin had not lost
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mcloughlin his dollars, he would not have gone through the
requested the reinstatement of the criminal charge trouble and personal inconvenience of seeking aid and
for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his assistance from the Office of the President, DOJ,
lawyers wrote letters of demand to those having police authorities and the City Fiscals Office in his
responsibility to pay the damage. desire to recover his losses from the hotel
management and Tan.
At about 4pm, Mantala still has yet to give birth. The ISSUE:
midwife and the younger assistants again pressed Whether or not Bondocs conduct during the delivery
down on her abdomen causing excruciating pain on of respondents baby constitute grave misconduct.
her ribs and made her very weak. They repeatedly did HELD:
this pressing until the baby and placenta came out. YES. Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some
When she regained consciousness, she was already at established and definite rule of action, more
the recovery room. She learned that an operation was particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
performed on her by petitioner to remove her a public officer,13 a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
ruptured uterus but what depressed her most was her willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
stillborn baby and the loss of her reproductive not mere error in judgment.14 It generally means
capacity. Mantala noticed that her vulvawas swollen wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by
and that there was an open wound which widened a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The
later on and was re-stitched by Dr. Bondoc. Dr. term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption
Bondoc was heard uttering words unbecoming of his or criminal intent. To constitute an administrative
profession pertaining to the respondents state while offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
in labor. Respondent filed then a complaint for grave with the performance of the official functions and
misconduct against the petitioner before the duties of a public officer. On the other hand, when the
ombudsman. The petitioner resigned as medical elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
officer of OMPH, alleging that the complaint against or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest,
him is now moot and academic. the public officer shall be liable for grave
misconduct.15
On August 12, 2010, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon rendered a Decision finding In deliberately leaving the respondent to a midwife
the petitioner administratively liable (penalty of and two inexperienced assistants despite knowing
DISMISSAL). It held that by fully entrusting to his that she was under prolonged painful labor and about
subordinates the task of handling respondent's to give birth to a macrosomic baby by vaginal delivery,
petitioner clearly committed a dereliction of duty and condition as borne out by his very own findings.
a breach of his professional obligations. The gravity of Worse, petitioner haughtily and callously spoke of
respondent's condition is highlighted by the expected respondent's case to the other doctors and medical
complications she suffered - her stillborn baby, a staff while performing a CS after he had briefly
ruptured uterus that necessitated immediate surgery attended to her at the delivery room "...paanakin na
and blood transfusion, and vulvar hematomas. long 'yon, abnormal din naman ang bata kahit
mabuhay, kawawa lang siya." Such insensitive and
Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of derisive language was again heard from the petitioner
the Medical Profession in the Philippines states: when he referred for the second time to respondent's
traumatic delivery, saying that: "Pinilit no 'ng tatlong
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and ungas, ayon lumusot pero patay ang bata, tapos ito,
conscientiously. He should secure for them all mukhang pumutok" As a government physician,
possible benefits that may depend upon his petitioner's demeanor is unbecoming and bespeaks of
professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to his indifference to the well-being of his patients.
adjudge the physician's failure to fulfill his obligation
to his patients is, in most cases, his own conscience, Petitioner thus not only committed a dereliction of
violation of this rule on his part is discreditable and duty, but also transgressed the ethical norms of his
inexcusable. profession when he failed to render competent
medical care with compassion and respect for his
A doctor's duty to his patient is not required to be patient's dignity.
extraordinary. The standard contemplated for doctors
is simply the reasonable average merit among A physician should be dedicated to provide competent
ordinarily good physicians, i.e. reasonable skill and medical care with full professional skill in accordance
competence. Even by this standard, petitioner fell with the current standards of care, compassion,
short when he routinely delegated an important task independence and respect for human dignity.
that requires his professional skill and competence to
his subordinates who have no requisite training and A grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that
capability to make crucial decisions in difficult the accused is a first time offender or by the length of
childbirths. service of the accused. The Court stressed that
dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been
Not only did petitioner routinely delegate his and should remain anathema in the civil service. They
responsibility to his subordinates, he casually inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to
instructed them to press down repeatedly on continue in office. When an officer or employee is
respondent's abdomen, unmindful of her critical disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer or employee but the improvement of the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the
public service and the preservation of the public's level of the street.
faith and confidence in the government.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of maintaining its tracks as described, but it is
merit. contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that
he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. accident that he was unable to take care of himself
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant- properly and that such intoxication was the primary
appellant. cause of the accident.
G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914 The trial court held that both parties were negligent,
but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as
defendant's and under the authority of the case
of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359)
FACTS: The defendant is a corporation engaged in apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a
operating an electric street railway in the city of judgment of P1,000.
Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of
Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts Both parties appealed from the decision, the
on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so defendant on the ground that it was not liable and the
that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is plaintiff on the ground that the damages were
obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night insufficient according to the evidence, and while the
mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in plaintiff made a motion for a new trial upon the
crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse statutory grounds and took proper exception to the
stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the denial thereof
vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop,
threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the
injuries complained of.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent,
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff and, if so, to what extent.
crossed the tracks on the night in question not only
the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon
which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the HELD: NO.
In support of the defendant's contention counsel says: After showing clearly and forcibly the negligence of
"Defendant's negligence was its failure properly to the defendant in leaving its tracks in the condition in
maintain the track; plaintiff's negligence was his which they were on the night of the injury, the court
intoxication; the 'principal occurrence' was plaintiff's has the following to say, and it is all that can be found
fall from his calesa. It seems clear that plaintiff's in its opinion, with reference to the negligence of the
intoxication contributed to the fall; if he had been plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which Mr.
sober, it can hardly be doubted that he would have Wright was on returning to his house on the night in
crossed the track safely, as he had done a hundred question, the testimony of Doctor Kneedler, who was
times before." the physician who attended him an hour after the
accident, demonstrates that he was intoxicated. . . . .
There seems to have been two hearings, one on the
31st of August and the other on the 28th of If the defendant or its employees were
September. Not all the evidence taken on the hearings negligent by reason of having left the rails and
being before the court so the SC refused, under the a part of the ties uncovered in a street where
rules, to consider even that evidence which is in the there is a large amount of travel, the plaintiff
Court; and, in the decision of this case, the Court is, was no less negligent, he not having abstained
therefore, relegated to the facts stated in the opinion from his custom of taking more wine than he
of the court and the pleadings filed. could carry without disturbing his judgment
and his self-control, he knowing that he had to
In the trial courts decision, there is nothing in the drive a horse and wagon and to cross railroad
opinion which sustains the conclusion of the court tracks which were to a certain extent
that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the dangerous by reason of the rails being elevated
accident which is the basis of this action. Mere above the level of the street.
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but
a circumstance to be considered with the other If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in
evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the question and had not attempted to drive his
general rule that it is immaterial whether a man conveyance while in a drunken condition, he
is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or would certainly have avoided the damages
prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater which he received, although the company, on its
degree of care is required than by a sober one. If part, was negligent in maintaining its tracks in
one's conduct is characterized by a proper a bad condition for travel.
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial
whether he is drunk or sober. Both parties, therefore, were negligent and
both contributed to the damages resulting to
the plaintiff, although the plaintiff, in the ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL. v. THE MANILA
judgment of the court, contributed in greater RAILROAD COMPANY
proportion to the damages that did the
defendant. G.R. No. L-39587, 24 March 1934, EN BANC,
(VILLA-REAL, J.)
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are
stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the
plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had
been sober he would not have been injured is not FACTS:
warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say
that a sober man would not have fallen from the Aleko E. Lilius, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and
vehicle under the conditions described. A horse his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius, left
crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but Manila in their Studebaker car driven by Aleko E.
a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, Lilius for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on
stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, a sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he made
the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force said trip although he had already been to many
as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a places, driving his own car, in and outside the
person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; Philippines. He was entirely unacquainted with the
and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a conditions of the road at said points and had no
sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at
did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question,
speculation and guesswork. there was nothing to indicate its existence and
inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and
It having been found that the plaintiff was not trees along the road, it was impossible to see an
negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question approaching train. At about seven or eight meters
presented by the appellant company with reference to from the crossing, coming from Calauan, the plaintiff
the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road.
Co., above; and the Court do not find facts in the Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the
opinion of the court below which justify a larger said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He
verdict than the one found. slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded
his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his
attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing
but he heard two short whistles. Immediately
afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon
him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at Dayap,
defendant company's train coming eastward from Bay to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in
to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's order that they might take the necessary precautions
car right in the center. After dragging the said car a before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its
distance of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it employees the flagman and switchman, for not
upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great having remained at his post at the crossing in
that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown question to warn passers-by of the approaching train;
from the car and were picked up from the ground the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman
unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts and switchman to his post on time; and the engineer,
of engineer Andres Basilio, he was unable to stop the for not having taken the necessary precautions to
locomotive until after it had gone about seventy avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said
meters from the crossing. Prior to the accident, there flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and
had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle
crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of before arriving at the crossing. Although it is probable
approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived that the defendant-appellant entity employed the
after the collision, coming from the station with a red diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its
flag in one hand and a green one in the other, both of aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such
which were wound on their respective sticks. The said diligence in supervising their work and the discharge
flagman and switchman had many times absented of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a
himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous
of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and occasions as well as on the night in question, the
therefore traveled at great speed. flagman and switchman would have always been at
his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The
ISSUE: diligence of a good father of a family, which the law
requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to
Is Manila Railroad Company negligent? the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or
employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
Issue: WON Arada is liable for the loss of the cargo of In the case at bar, Southern Negros failed to observe
San Miguel Corporation. extraordinary diligence over the cargo in question
was negligent previous to the sinking of the carrying
vessel. The master crew knew that there was a
Held: Yes. South Negros Enterprises was exercising typhoon coming before his departure but did not
its function as a common carrier when it entered into check where it was. He should have verified first
a contract with San Miguel Corp to carry and where the typhoon was before departing. The master
transport the latters cargoes. A common carrier both crew did not ascertain where the typhoon was headed
from the nature of its business and for insistent by the use of his vessels barometer and radio.
reasons of public policy is burdened by law with the Neither did the captain of the vessel monitor and
duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not only in record the weather conditions as required under Art.
ensuring the safety of passengers, but in caring for 612 of the Code of Commerce.
the goods transported by it. The loss, or deterioration
or destruction of goods turned over to the common
carrier for the conveyance to a designated destination A common carrier is obliged to observed
raises instantly a presumption of fault or negligence extraordinary diligence and the failure of the master
on the part of the carrier, save only in cases where crew to ascertain the direction of the storm and the
such loss, destruction or deterioration arises from weather condition of the path they would be
traversing, constitute lack of foresight and minimum
vigilance over its cargoes taking into account the and/or after a surgical operation causing by such
surrounding circumstances of the case. negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and
incompetence, and causing by such failure, including
I.SHORT TITLE: Cruz vs CA the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert
a tragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on
II. FULL TITLE: DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, the day following said surgical operation."
petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness,
respondents. G.R. No. 122445. Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother
November 18, 1997, Francisco, to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital
J; situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna.
They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the
III. TOPIC: Standard of Care for Physicians in afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991,
medical malpractice cases; the Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a
necessity of an expert witness "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
thereto hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena
and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of
March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS: the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was
The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty
the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe
of the deceased were charged with "reckless the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy
imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
homicide" in an information which reads: mother not to proceed with the operation. The
following day, before her mother was wheeled into the
operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San operation could be postponed. The petitioner called
Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told
abovenamed, being then the attending her that she must be operated on as scheduled.
anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did then
and there, in a negligence (sic), careless, imprudent,
and incompetent manner, and failing to supply or Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband,
store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating
meet any and all exigencies apt to arise before, during room while Lydia underwent operation. While they
were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating
room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District
which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room
hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her
time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought because there was blood oozing from the abdominal
type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr.
same was brought by the attendant into the operating Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District
informed them that the operation was finished. The Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia
operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed
was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he
and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other could do to help save the patient. While petitioner was
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus, on
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia
petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate
available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was antecedent cause.
attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and
Rowena's husband together with the driver of the On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision, the
to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as
oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00 follows:
o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition "WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra.
further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the
District Hospital was without the prior consent of death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and
Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
out about the intended transfer only when an Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of
District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then arresto mayor with costs."
boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
there that we could determine the condition of the
The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in
Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished to
of the MTCC prompting the petitioner to file a petition postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed
for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The
Hence this petition for review on certiorari assailing court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the
the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra.
October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood during the
with modification that she is further directed to pay operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness
the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for and for lack of skill, the reason why the patient was
her death. brought for operation at the San Pablo City District
Hospital. As such, the surgeon should answer for such
negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that
she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found actually did the operation."
the following circumstances as sufficient basis to
conclude that she was indeed negligent in the
performance of the operation:
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of
provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any "incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and
contingency that might happen during the operation. skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the
The manner and the fact that the patient was brought subject patient before and after the operation." And
to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the
indicates that there was something wrong in the Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:
manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation.
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and
There was no showing that before the operation,
filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate
accused Dr. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary
negligence, it nevertheless shows the absence of due
clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It
care and supervision over her subordinate employees.
was (sic) said in medical parlance that the "abdomen
Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating
of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do
room? Were the surgical instruments properly
not know the whole thing the moment it was open
sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have
(sic) and surgeon must be prepared for any
contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the
eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a
petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to
public document was not presented because it is only
testify. This could only give rise to the presumption
that she has nothing good to testify on her defense. wanted the postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously,
Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get
prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and the family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she
unrebutted. did not prepare a medical chart with instructions for
the patient's care. If she did all these, proof thereof
should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed,
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version
these are overwhelming evidence of recklessness and
indicating the following facts: that the accused asked
imprudence."
the patient's relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while
the operation was already in progress; that after an
hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for VI. ISSUE:
the patient; that after the surgery, they were again
asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was Whether or not petitioner's conviction of
not anymore available from the source; that the the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
oxygen given to the patient was empty; and that the homicide, arising from an alleged medical
son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the malpractice, is supported by the evidence on
petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District
record.
Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. All these
conclusively show that the petitioner had not
prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before VII. RULING:
going into the first surgery, which was not emergency
in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had This court, however, holds differently and finds
no ready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a
typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
supply. crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep
or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-
without malice; (4) that material damage results from
pulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by an
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
internist, which are standard requirements before a
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner
offender, taking into consideration his employment or
determine as part of the pre-operative evaluation, the
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
time and clotting time? There is no showing that these
place.
were done. The petitioner just appears to have been
in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the family
Whether or not a physician has committed an standard of care that petitioner should have
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment exercised.
of his patient is to be determined according to All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the
the standard of care observed by other members facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of
of the profession in good standing under similar provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a
state of the profession at the time of treatment cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the
or the present state of medical science. In the omission of any form of blood typing before
recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of
Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and be true that the circumstances pointed out by
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ the courts below seemed beyond cavil to
such training, care and skill in the treatment of his constitute reckless imprudence on the part of
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived
same level of care that any other reasonably at not through the educated surmises nor
competent doctor would use to treat a condition conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by
under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of the unquestionable knowledge of expert
medical malpractice that expert testimony is witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon
essential to establish not only the standard of has exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care of the profession but also that the care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.
falls below such standard. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove
that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of
this case is the absence of any expert testimony on care employed by other physicians in good standing
the matter of the standard of care employed by when performing the same operation. It must be
other physicians of good standing in the conduct remembered that when the qualifications of a
of similar operations. The prosecution's expert physician are admitted, as in the instant case,
witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala there is an inevitable presumption that in proper
and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National cases he takes the necessary precaution and
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
the possible cause of death but did not venture attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
to illuminate the court on the matter of the sufficiently established. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood
in the case at bench. loss.
Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir. (Underscoring
facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of supplied.)
provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests
on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia
The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto
to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
Salvador:
performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even
without expert testimony, that petitioner was "Q. And were you able to determine the cause of
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a death by virtue of the examination of the specimen
surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these submitted by Dr. Arizala?
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it
absence of the fourth element of reckless would be difficult for me to determine the cause of
imprudence: that the injury to the person or death, sir.
property was a consequence of the reckless Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr.
imprudence. Arizala?
In litigations involving medical negligence, the A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in
plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's connection with your pathology report.
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of Q. What could have caused the death of the
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on victim?
the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection
of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. A. This pathologic examination are (sic)
compatible with the person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of
Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of hemorrhagic compatible?
the deceased summarized his findings as follows:
A. It means that a person died of blood loss.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood
indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the and so the victim before she died there was shock of
cause of death? diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings probably before the actual complete blood loss, sir.
are compatible with hemorrhagic shock. Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this was due on (sic) operation?
hemorrhagic shock? A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.
Q. What could have caused this loss of blood? A. May be (sic)." (Underscoring supplied).
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the
surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be cut following expert opinion:
while on operation and this cause (sic) bleeding, or "Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic)
may be set in the course of the operation, or may be would suffer hemorrage what would be the possible
(sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are causes of such hemorrage (sic)?
other cause (sic).
A. Among those would be what we call
Atty. Cachero: Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood the bleeding, sir, which cannot be prevented by
replacement? anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and to any
A. Yes, sir." (Underscoring supplied.) persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the
or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death. However, cutting or the operations done in the body?
as likewise testified to by the expert witnesses in open A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not
court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during related to any cutting or operation that I (sic) have
surgery may be caused by several different factors. done.
Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration on the matter: Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes
"Atty. Pascual: (sic) that could be the cause for the hemorrhage or
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that bleeding in a patient by an operations (sic)?
you mentioned you said that it could be at the moment A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic)
of operation when one losses (sic) control of the and it is possible that the ligature in the suture was
presence, is that correct? During the operation there (sic) become (sic) loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if
is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel? proven.
A. Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does
considerable size? not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or any
A. Yes, sir. suture that become (sic) loose the cause of the
bleeding could not be attributed to the fault of the
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may
subject?
have slipped later on?
A. Definitely, sir." (Underscoring supplied.)
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible
also to some clotting defect, is that correct?
According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC
hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the failure of which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding
the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; (2) tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a
allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major
the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied hemorrhage occurs.i[42] And as testified to by defense
to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC
known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture "cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone,
that the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body anytime." He testified further:
of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut "Q.Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility
blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose
A. Yes, sir.
thereby causing the hemorrhage. Hence the following
pertinent portion of Dr. Arizala's testimony: Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be
prevented?
"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you
know whether these were sutured ligature or plain A. Yes, sir.
ligature Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?
A: Ligature, sir. A. Possible, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that
the cut structures were tied by first suturing it and will tell you whether this patient suffered among such
then tying a knot or the tie was merely placed around things as DIC?
the cut structure and tied? A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of
A: I cannot recall, sir. the patient.
Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the
you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is that record of the deceased Lydia Umali looking for the
correct? chart, the operated (sic) records, the post mortem
A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were findings on the histophanic (sic) examination based on
sutured, sir. your examination of record, doctor, can you more or
less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know
have been the caused (sic) of death of this Lydia
whether any of the cut structures were not sutured or
Umali?
tied neither were you able to determine whether any
loose suture was found in the peritoneal cavity? A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the
caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic) Intra
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."
Vascular Coagulation or the DIC which resulted to
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.
not preclude the probability that DIC caused the
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is Nevertheless, this Court finds the
knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the doctor petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia
her (sic) has been (sic) fault? Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires
ATTY. MALVEDA: proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on preponderance of evidence is required to
finding they just read the chart as well as the other establish civil liability.
record.
ATTY. PASCUAL: The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient
Precisely based on this examination. puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence
this Court was not able to render a sentence of
ATTY. MALVEDA: conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and
Not finding, there was no finding made. imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out
COURT: her duties. A precious life has been lost and the
He is only reading the record. circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief
of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased
ATTY. PASCUAL:
continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the
Yes, sir. present timeii[46] and this Court is aware that no
A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the amount of compassion and commiseration nor words
surgeon, sir." of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt
for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of
This court has no recourse but to rely on
Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
the expert testimonies rendered by both
prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's
allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR.
cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the
negligence. The probability that Lydia's death crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia
and has engendered in the mind of this Court a Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED
Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages,
imprudence resulting in homicide. and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the for P500K with the parcels of land as security and
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for with the help of the same impostors. The loan was
appropriate action. left unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially
SO ORDERED. foreclosure on the lots.
January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter
informing ASB that the mortgage was without
Canlas vs CA their authority. He also requested the
sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the auction.
Both parties refused.
The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment
G.R. No. 112160 February 28, 2000 of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing
Damages) a Certificate of Sheriffs Sale and annulled the
Laws Applicable: Article 1173 mortgage
CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for
coming to the bank with Maosca and letting
FACTS: himself be introduced as Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the
August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a doctrine of last clear chance
Special Power of Attorney authorizing Vicente
Maosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land situated
in BF Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED
Angelina Canlas.
Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the
the lands to Maosca for P850K, P500K payable obligor consist in the omission of that diligence
within 1 week, and the balance serves as his which is required by the nature of the obligation
investment in the business. Maosca issued 2 and corresponds with the circumstances of the
checks P40K and P460K. The P460K lacked persons, of the time and of the place. When
sufficient funds. negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
September 3, 1982: Maosca mortgage to Atty. articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply
Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with The degree of diligence required of banks is
the help of impostors who misrepresented more than that of a good father of a family
themselves as the Spouses Canlas. not even a single identification card was
September 29, 1982: Maosca was granted a exhibited by the said impostors to show their true
loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) identity
acted simply on the basis of the there to make sure that Maosca pays his debt so
residence certificates bearing signatures which he cannot be estopped from assailing the validity
tended to match the signatures affixed on a of the mortgage
previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno But being negligent in believing the
previous deed of mortgage did not misrepresentation by Maosca that he had other
bear the tax account number of the spouses as lots and that the lot were not to be used as a
well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina security, Canlas was negligent and undeserving of
Canlas Attorney's fees.
doctrine of last clear chance the contract of mortgage sued upon was
where both parties are negligent but the entered into and signed by impostors who
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of misrepresented themselves as the spouses
time than that of the other, or where it is Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence nullity
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the consequences arising therefrom Jonas Aonuevo, petitioner,
the antecedent negligence of a person vs.
does not preclude recovery of damages caused by Hon. Court of Appeals and Jerome
the supervening negligence of the latter, who had Villagracia, respondents.
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence TINGA, J.:
Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was
negligent in giving Vicente Maosca the Facts:
opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his
him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of bicycle, while Aonuevo,traversing the opposite
title of subject parcels of land lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter
Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos
simple expedient of faithfully complying with the brother. Aonuevo was in the course of making
requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of a leftturn towards Libertad Street when the
the persons transacting with them - ASB bears the collision occurred.
loss
Canlas went to ASB with Maosca and he was Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to
introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted
correct Maosca. However, he did not know that an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc.
the lots were being used as a security for he was
and Aonuevo before the RTC. He had also fi led Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
a criminal complaint against Aonuevobefore contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
but the latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the of the mishap he was violating any traffic
criminal charge. regulation.
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traff ic
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply
regulations when he failed to register his
by analogy to all types of vehicles [23]. He points out
bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that
that modern-day travel is more complex now than
Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by
analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to when the Code was enacted, the number and types of
the contrary, it is presumed that a vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of
persondriving a motor vehicle has been then. He even suggests that at the time of the
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen
violating any traff ic regulation. that only motor vehicles were of such public concern
that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today,
Issues: the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
A Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil inescapably become matter of public concern so as to
Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles, expand the application of the law to be more
making Villagracia presumptively negligent. responsive to the times.[24]
B Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for
failure to comply with traff ic regulations. At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed
C Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from
contributory negligence human-powered contraptions on wheels such as
bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such
Held: No to all.
as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport
were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s
A Application of Article 2185
and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with
install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo
2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The seriously contends that the application of Article 2185
provision reads: be expanded due to the greater interaction today of
all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts
historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles
as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such
significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be negligent act was the proximate cause of the
certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such accident.
has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons
over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see
intra-road dynamic between motorized and non- Villagracia because the bicycle was not
motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to equipped with headlights, such lapse on the
the present. cyclists part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded
to make the left turn.
There is pertinent basis for segregating
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles.
C Contributory Negligience
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries,
greater speeds and acceleration than non-
motorized vehicles. At the sam etime, motorized it must be shown that he performed an act that
vehicles are more capable in infl icting greater brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
injury or damage in the event of an accident signs of an impending danger to health and body. [60] To
or collision. This is due to a combination of prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as establish a causal link, although not proximate,
the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of between the negligence of the party and the
mass, and greater combustibility due to the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
use of fuel. contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its
B Negligience on the part of Villagracia occurrence.[61]
The existence of negligence in a given case is As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower court
not determined by the personal judgment s adjudged Aonuevo assolely responsible for the
of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is accident. The petition does not demonstrate
the law which determines what would be reckless why this fi nding should be reversed. It is hard
or negligent. Aonuevo asserts that Villagracia to imagine that the same result would not have
was negligent as the latter had transgressed occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had been
traff ic regulations. However, Aonuevo was equipped with safety equipment.
speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own
admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance
of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in
should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, good anesthesiologist and for arriving 3 hours late
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the
SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the
HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
respondents (2002) anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly
and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The
FACTS: CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to
remove stone from her gall bladder ISSUES: Whether the private respondents were
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, negligent and thereby caused the comatose condition
to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical of Ramos.
Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would
find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not HELD:
go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are
operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist solidarily liable for the damages.
botched the administration of the anesthesia
causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary rule
damage. The botched operation was witnessed by which means the thing or the transaction speaks for
Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center. occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs
the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that defendant to meet with an explanation, where
Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
in not exercising reasonable care in intubating complaining party must present expert testimony to
Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist prove that the attending physician was negligent.
saying Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day
of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda her person to the private respondents who had
was robust and fit to undergo surgery. complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from
the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist failed to and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose
exercise due care in intubating the patient, the
and brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!the thing very least, supervision over the procedure then being
speaks for itself! performed on Erlinda.
ii