Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation: Doc 9756 AN/965
Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation: Doc 9756 AN/965
AN/965
Manual of
Aircraft Accident
and Incident Investigation
Part IV
Reporting
Manual of
Aircraft Accident
and Incident Investigation
Part IV
Reporting
The issue of amendments is announced regularly in the ICAO Journal and in the
monthly Supplement to the Catalogue of ICAO Publications and Audio-visual
Training Aids, which holders of this publication should consult. The space below
is provided to keep a record of such amendments.
AMENDMENTS CORRIGENDA
IV-(ii)
FOREWORD
The purpose of this manual is to encourage the uniform The following ICAO documents provide additional
application of the Standards and Recommended Practices information and guidance material on related subjects:
contained in Annex 13 and to provide information and
guidance to States on the procedures, practices and Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident
techniques that can be used in aircraft accident Investigation;
investigations. Since accident investigations vary in Accident/Incident Reporting (ADREP) Manual
complexity, a document of this kind cannot cover all (Doc 9156);
eventualities. The more common techniques and processes, Accident Prevention Manual (Doc 9422);
however, have been included. Although this manual will be Manual of Civil Aviation Medicine (Doc 8984);
of use to experienced and inexperienced investigators alike, Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683);
it is not a substitute for investigation training and Human Factors Digest No. 7 Investigation of
experience. Human Factors in Accidents and Incidents
(Circular 240).
This manual will be issued in four separate parts as
follows: This manual, which supersedes Doc 6920 in its entirety,
will be amended periodically as new investigation
Part I Organization and Planning; techniques are developed and new information becomes
available.
Part II Procedures and Checklists;
Readers are invited to submit material for possible
Part III Investigation; and inclusion in subsequent editions of this manual. This
material should be addressed to:
Part IV Reporting.
The Secretary General
Because this manual deals with both accident and International Civil Aviation Organization
incident investigations and, for reasons of brevity, the terms 999 University Street
accidents and accident investigation, as used herein, Montral, Quebec
apply equally to incidents and incident investigation. Canada H3C 5H7
IV-(iii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Page
IV-(v)
Chapter 1
safety recommendations.
Introduction
The findings and the causes of a Final Report should point
clearly to the safety issues that need to be addressed. This section gives brief identification details of the accident
and lists the names, titles and affiliations of the group
1.1.3 The Final Report is usually the report of the members. Matters of organization, such as the forming of
investigator-in-charge or the accident investigation sub-groups to handle specific tasks within the terms of
authority. The report should cover in detail all relevant reference of the group, should be explained. For example,
aspects of the investigation. When the investigation of an in the case of the Operations Group, sub-groups such as a
accident is organized by establishing specialized groups, Witness Group and a Performance Group are sometimes
each group chairperson should submit a written report to formed. The terms of reference for the group and sub-
the investigator-in-charge together with all supporting groups and brief details of the time and location of
documentation and data covering the facts and findings investigation activities should also be recorded in this
established. The Final Report will be drafted based, to a section.
large extent, on the reports of the various groups. The
investigator-in-charge is responsible for ensuring that the
Final Report is written in a consistent and uniform style. Investigation
1.1.4 The investigation of a general aviation accident The facts, conditions and circumstances established by the
seldom requires organization into groups. Such group should be presented under appropriate headings
investigations are usually carried out by one or two describing the areas investigated. For example, in the case
IV-1-1
IV-1-2 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
of the Operations Group, headings would include crew development and the drafting of the Final Report. The Final
histories, flight planning, dispatch, and aircraft mass and Report should be a comprehensive report of the whole
balance. All the relevant facts, whether or not considered investigation. The factual information collected during the
significant to the findings of the group, must be included. investigation should form the basis for the analysis section
Relevant documentation should be attached to the group of the report, which leads to and supports the establishment
report. of the findings, causes and safety recommendations. The
standardized format for the Final Report, which is
contained in the Appendix to Annex 13, provides a well-
Analysis structured record of the investigation. The Final Report
contains five parts: Introduction (Title and Synopsis),
The analysis discusses the significance of the facts stated in Factual Information, Analysis, Conclusions (Findings and
the previous section of the group report and presents the Causes) and Safety Recommendations.
groups analysis of those facts as they pertain to the terms
of reference of the group. This information should be 1.3.3 Detailed guidance on the format and content of
presented in a logical way that leads to and supports the the Final Report is at Appendix 1 to Chapter 1.
findings.
1.3.1 An investigation into an aircraft accident is not 1.4.1 In accordance with Annex 13, the State
complete until all the relevant facts revealed by the conducting the investigation shall send a copy of the draft
investigation, the analysis of the facts, the conclusions and Final Report to the State which instituted the investigation
the safety recommendations have been recorded in the and to all States that participated in the investigation,
Final Report. The Final Report should be structured inviting their significant and substantiated comments on the
logically and written in clear and concise language. The report. The State conducting the investigation should also
report should explain what happened, how it happened, and send copies of the draft Final Report to the operator and the
why the accident happened, and it should address the safety organizations responsible for type design and final
issues involved. A standardized format of the Final Report assembly of the aircraft, through the State of the Operator,
assists in the production of a complete and reliable record the State of Design and the State of Manufacture,
of the investigation of the accident. respectively, in order to enable the operator and such
organizations to submit comments on the draft Final
1.3.2 In a major investigation, the investigator-in- Report. When sending the draft Final Report to recipient
charge receives the group reports and is responsible for the States, the State conducting the investigation should
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-3
consider using the most appropriate means available, such e) the State of Manufacture;
as facsimile, e-mail, courier service or express mail. When
the draft Final Report is sent by e-mail, secure protection f) any State having suffered fatalities or serious
should be used when available. injuries to its citizens; and
1.4.2 If the State conducting the investigation receives g) any State which provided relevant information,
comments within sixty days of the date of the transmittal significant facilities or experts.
letter, it shall either amend the draft Final Report to include
the substance of the comments received or, if desired by the
State that provided the comments, append the comments to
the Final Report. Usually, comments to be appended to the 1.6 FINAL REPORTS TO BE INCLUDED
Final Report are restricted to non-editorial specific IN THE ICAO AIRCRAFT
technical aspects of the Final Report upon which no ACCIDENT DIGEST
agreement could be reached.
1.6.1 The purpose of the ICAO Aircraft Accident
Digest is to disseminate information to States on selected
1.4.3 States shall not circulate, release or give access major accidents. Publication of the Digest began in 1951.
to a draft report or any part thereof, any group reports or States have reiterated a need for the Digest, not only as a
any other investigation documentation obtained during an valuable source for information on major accidents, but
investigation of an accident, without the express consent of also as a tool for accident prevention, as a training aid for
the State which conducted the investigation, unless such investigators and as educational material for technical
reports or documents have already been published or schools.
released by that latter State.
1.6.2 When a Final Report has been released by a
State that has conducted an investigation into an accident or
an incident involving an aircraft of a maximum mass of
1.5 RELEASE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE over 5 700 kg, that State shall send to ICAO a copy of the
FINAL REPORT Final Report. Whenever practicable, the Final Report sent
to ICAO is to be prepared in one of the working languages
1.5.1 If the State conducting the investigation receives of ICAO, and in the format shown in the Appendix to
no comments within sixty days, it shall issue the Final Annex 13.
Report, unless an extension of that period has been agreed
by the States concerned. The State conducting the 1.6.3 The Final Reports included in the Digest are
investigation should release the Final Report in the shortest selected on the basis of their contribution to accident
possible time, and if possible, within twelve months of the prevention and are usually published as received. However,
date of the occurrence. If the report cannot be released lengthy reports may be abbreviated and the appendices are
within twelve months, the State conducting the inves- usually not reproduced.
tigation should release an interim report or should use some
other means detailing the progress of the investigation and
any safety issues identified. 1.7 EXCHANGE OF FINAL REPORTS
BETWEEN STATES
1.5.2 In addition to the release and distribution of the
Final Report within the State, the State conducting the 1.7.1 Aircraft accident prevention is dependent, in
investigation shall send the Final Report with a minimum part, on information made available from accident
of delay to: investigations. The causes of accidents, especially those in
which large aircraft are involved, are of interest to all States
a) the State which instituted the investigation; and in particular to those States operating similar aircraft
types. Therefore, prompt dissemination to all States of the
b) the State of Registry; findings of aircraft accident investigations can be a major
contribution to aviation safety. To facilitate the exchange of
c) the State of the Operator; accident information, all States are encouraged to
disseminate their Final Reports to other States. Use of the
d) the State of Design; Internet can expedite such dissemination.
IV-1-4 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Appendix 1 to Chapter 1
FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE FINAL REPORT
To enable the Final Report to be presented in a convenient in this report are addressed to the regulatory authorities of
and uniform manner, a standardized format is contained in the State having responsibility for the matters with which
the Appendix to Annex 13. Detailed guidance on the recommendation is concerned. It is for those authorities
completing each section of the Final Report is provided to decide what action is taken.
below.
The introduction should contain a reference to the time of
day used in the report, and the differential between local
INTRODUCTION (Title and Synopsis) time and Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC).
The title of the Final Report should contain the following A table of contents, a list of abbreviations used in the report
information: name of the operator; manufacturer, model, and a list of appendices will enhance the readability of the
nationality and registration marks of the aircraft; and place report.
and date of the accident.
be explained in the factual information part. Such the latitude and longitude, as well as a geographical
discussions should be presented in the analysis part. reference to a well-known location (such as 75 km
south of XYZ);
1.1.1 The history of the flight describes the significant time of the occurrence in local time (and UTC if the
events which preceded the accident, in chronological order flight crossed time zones); and
when this is practicable. The information is usually
obtained from sources such as flight records, flight data whether it was day, dawn, dusk or night.
recorders, cockpit voice recorders, air traffic services
records and recordings, and witness accounts. The
information should be correlated to local time, or UTC if
1.2 Injuries to persons
the flight involved more than one time zone. The
information presented in this section of the report should be
1.2.1 Table 1-1 should be completed in numbers.
based on established facts. Usually the flight number, the
type of operator and operation, the crew briefing and flight
1.2.2 Fatal injuries include all deaths determined to be
planning, the departure point and time of departure, and the
a direct result of injuries sustained in the accident. Serious
point of intended landing will be given, followed by a
injury is defined in Chapter 1 of Annex 13. For statistical
description of the events leading to the accident, including
purposes, ICAO classifies a fatal injury as an injury which
navigational details and relevant radio communications. It
results in death within thirty days of the accident. The
is important to give a description of the flight and the
heading Others in the table refers to persons outside the
pertinent events as they occurred, including a
aircraft who were injured in the accident. When the
reconstruction of the significant portion of the flight path,
accident involves a collision between two aircraft, a
if appropriate. Evidence which facilitated the reconstruction
separate table should be used for each aircraft.
of the sequence of events, such as witness accounts, cockpit
voice recorder and air traffic services transcripts, should be
1.2.3 Also, the nationalities of the passengers and the
mentioned.
crew should be listed by stating the number of fatalities and
serious injuries for each nationality.
1.1.2 In the history of the flight section, the objective
is to enable the reader to understand how the accident
happened but to avoid any analysis of why the accident
occurred. 1.3 Damage to aircraft
1.1.3 With regard to the location of the occurrence, 1.3.1 This section should contain a brief statement of
include: the damage sustained by the aircraft in the accident
Fatal
Serious
TOTAL
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-7
Aircraft load: The maximum certificated take-off A general view of the weather situation (synoptic
mass and landing mass, actual take-off mass, and weather);
mass at the time of the occurrence should be given.
Also, state the certificated limits for the centre of Weather radar recordings, satellite photos, low-level
gravity of the aircraft, and the centre of gravity at wind shear alert system (LLWSAS) data, and other
take-off and at the time of the occurrence. Include recorded meteorological information; and
a description of the operators loading control
system, the load distribution and its security, and Natural light conditions at the time of the accident,
how the details of the aircraft mass and centre of such as day (sunlight or overcast), twilight (dawn or
gravity were established. dusk; when relevant, the time of sunrise or sunset at
the applicable altitude should be included), night
1.6.2 Describe any aircraft part or system which had (dark or moonlight) and when relevant, the position
a bearing on the accident. Similarly, describe operational of the sun relative to the direction of the flight.
procedures, performance limitations and other aircraft
related circumstances which played a role in the accident. 1.7.2 The amount of meteorological information to be
The objective is to enable the reader to fully understand included in this section depends on the significance of the
how the accident happened. meteorological factors in the occurrence. A detailed
description of the forecast and weather observations is
appropriate for a weather-related occurrence whereas a
1.6.3 The availability, serviceability and use of
brief summary of the weather is appropriate when the
transponder, airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)
weather was not a factor.
and traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS),
ground proximity warning system (GPWS) and terrain
awareness warning system (TAWS), should be stated. The
1.8 Aids to navigation
relevant systems should be discussed in detail for near-
collisions, mid-air collisions, approach and landing
1.8.1 Include relevant information on navigation and
accidents and controlled flight into terrain accidents.
landing aids available, such as global navigation satellite
system (GNSS), non-directional radio beacon (NDB), very
high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR),
1.7 Meteorological information
distance measuring equipment (DME), instrument landing
system (ILS), and visual ground aids, as well as their
1.7.1 Provide a brief statement on the relevant
serviceability at the time of the accident.
meteorological conditions, including the forecast and actual
weather, together with an appreciation of the weather in
1.8.2 When relevant, include pertinent information on
retrospect. When relevant to the occurrence, the following
equipment on board the aircraft, such as autoflight system,
information should be included:
flight management system (FMS), global positioning
system (GPS), and inertial navigation system (INS),
Describe when, where and how the pilot obtained
including their serviceability. Relevant maps, charts,
weather information;
approach plates and radar recordings should also be
discussed and included in, or attached to, the report.
Weather forecast: Route and aerodrome forecasts
available to the pilot, and details of any weather
briefing obtained by the pilot prior to departure or 1.9 Communications
received en route;
1.9.1 Describe the communication facilities available
Weather observations at the time and place of the to the flight crew and their effectiveness. Describe the
occurrence including precipitation, ceiling, communications with the air traffic services and other
visibility, runway visual range, wind speed and communications relevant to the flight, including reference
direction, temperature and dewpoint; to communication logs and transcripts of recordings. When
essential to the analysis and understanding of the
Actual weather on the route of the flight, including occurrence, pertinent extracts from the transcripts of air
weather observations, SIGMETs, pilot reports and traffic services communications recordings should be
witness accounts; included in this section or attached to the report.
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-9
1.10 Aerodrome information could not be extracted, describe the reasons for the
malfunction or loss of data. Include techniques used to
1.10.1 When the occurrence took place during take- extract data and any problems encountered. If the recorders
off or landing, include information concerning the operated properly, a short statement to this effect should be
aerodrome and its facilities. When relevant, include the made and the pertinent data presented.
following information:
1.11.3 In this section, provide information recorded
Name of aerodrome, location indicator, reference by the flight recorders. Because of the length of a flight
point (latitude/longitude) and elevation; data recording read-out report, include here or in an
appendix to the Final Report only those parts of the read-
Runway identification, runway markings, runway out reports which are pertinent to the analysis and findings.
length and slope, length of overrun, and
obstructions; 1.11.4 Transcripts from the cockpit voice recordings
should be included in the Final Report or its appendices
Runway conditions, such as pavement texture and only when essential to the analysis and understanding of
grooving, rubber deposits, presence of water, slush, the occurrence. Parts of the recordings not essential to the
snow, ice, friction coefficient and braking action; analysis shall not be disclosed. Chapter 5 of Annex 13
contains provisions pertinent to transcribed voice
Lighting, such as runway, taxiway and stopway recordings and should be taken into account when it is
lighting; and visual aids, such as visual approach considered necessary to include such transcripts in the Final
slope indicator system (VASIS) and precision Report or its appendices.
approach path indicator (PAPI);
1.11.5 If the aircraft was not required to be equipped
Runway inspection programmes and inspections with flight recorders, a statement along the following lines
carried out; and may be used: The aircraft was not equipped with a flight
data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder. Neither recorder
Bird and wildlife programmes. was required by the relevant aviation regulations.
facts determined by the group which was responsible for should be taken that such information is disclosed in the
the detailed investigation. Under appropriate sub-headings Final Report only when pertinent to the analysis and
also include the relevant results of special technical conclusions of the accident.
investigations, examinations and laboratory tests, and the
significance of the results obtained (see also Section 1.16 1.13.5 If the medical examinations indicate that the
Tests and research). When relevant, the technical performance of flight crew members was not degraded, a
laboratory and test reports should be appended to the Final sentence along the following lines may be used: There
Report. was no evidence that physiological factors or incapacitation
affected the performance of flight crew members.
1.12.3 It is important to include all pertinent material
failures and component malfunctions, and to indicate
whether they occurred prior to or at impact. It is essential 1.14 Fire
that failed or malfunctioning components which are
deemed to be significant to the accident be described. A 1.14.1 If a fire or an explosion occurred, give a brief
detailed description of all wreckage components is not description of whether the fire started in flight or after
necessary; describe only components considered to be ground impact. For in-flight fires, describe the effectiveness
relevant or which required examination and analysis. The of the aircraft fire warning systems and the aircraft fire
inclusion of drawings of components and photographs of extinguishing systems. The determination of the origin of a
specific failures will enhance the Final Report. Such fire, source of ignition, fuel source, duration, severity and
drawings and photographs could be presented together with effects on the aircraft structure and the occupants usually
the appropriate text or as an appendix. requires an analysis of the facts and indications, and should
therefore be dealt with in the analysis part of the Final
Report. This section should describe the factual information
1.13 Medical and pathological information which was established in the investigation related to the fire
and which should then be discussed and analysed in the
1.13.1 Describe the results of the medical and analysis part.
pathological investigations of the flight crew. Medical
information related to flight crew licences should be 1.14.2 For fires on the ground, describe the
included under Section 1.5 Personnel information. propagation and the extent of the fire damage. The response
When relevant to the accident, the medical investigation time of the rescue fire service, access to the accident site by
may also concern the cabin crew members, passengers and the rescue fire service vehicles, the type of fire fighting
ground personnel. equipment used, the type of extinguishing agent and the
amount that was used and its effectiveness should also be
1.13.2 The results of the pathological and described.
toxicological examinations concerning injuries, detection of
disease and factors which impaired human performance, 1.14.3 The effect of the fire on the evacuation and
such as carbon monoxide, oxygen deficiency, alcohol and survivability of the occupants should be described in
other drugs, should be stated. If alcohol and drugs are Section 1.15 Survival aspects.
detected, their effects on human performance as determined
by medical experts should be presented in this section. 1.14.4 If there was no fire, a sentence along the
following lines may be used: There was no evidence of
1.13.3 Describe the pathological evidence of fire in flight or after the impact.
significance to the survival investigation such as the
relationship of injuries and pathological evidence to the
deceleration forces, aircraft attitude at impact, seat design 1.15 Survival aspects
and attachments, seat belts (see also Section 1.15
Survival aspects), break-up of the aircraft structure, smoke 1.15.1 Give a brief description of the search and
inhalation, decompression and any evidence of preparation rescue activities. When applicable, include information
for an emergency situation, such as forced landing, ditching regarding the serviceability and effectiveness of the
and unlawful interference. emergency locator transmitters.
1.13.4 Given the provisions of Annex 13, Chapter 5 1.15.2 The location of crew members and passengers
with regard to medical and private records, particular care in relation to injuries sustained should be stated. The failure
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-11
1.16.1 Describe the results of any tests and research 1.17.3 When relevant, provide pertinent information
undertaken in connection with the investigation. Flight concerning the operator, such as type and date of issuance
tests, simulator tests and computer modelling of aircraft of the air operator certificate, types of operations
performance are examples of the type of information that authorized, types and number of aircraft authorized for use,
should be included in this section. Relevant details of and authorized areas of operation and routes. Also, include
research that is used to support the analysis should also be information concerning any deficiencies found in the
included. operators company operations manual and other operator
documentation, when the deficiencies had a bearing on the
1.16.2 The results of examinations of aircraft and accident.
engine parts may alternatively be included in Sections 1.6
Aircraft information, 1.12 Wreckage and impact
information or 1.16. 1.18 Additional information
1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques groups in a major investigation) will contribute to the
analysis part of the report, the development of an outline
1.19.1 When useful or effective investigation and sub-headings for the analysis part will ensure that the
techniques have been used during the investigation, briefly investigators know their drafting assignments. Such an
describe the main features of these techniques and their outline will also indicate to the investigators how the sub-
pertinence to future investigations. However, the data and headings will come together in forming the analysis part of
the results obtained as they relate to the accident, should be the Final Report. An example of such an outline is provided
included under the appropriate Sections 1.1 to 1.18. The in Table 1-2.
full report on the use of these techniques may be included
as an appendix to the Final Report.
3. CONCLUSIONS
2. ANALYSIS
This part should list the findings and the causes established
2.1 In the analysis part of the Final Report, the in the investigation. The conclusions are drawn from the
significance of the relevant facts and circumstances which analysis. However, it is essential to maintain the same
were presented in the factual information part should be degree of certainty in a conclusion as was established in the
discussed and analysed in order to determine which events analysis. For example, if the discussion in the analysis
contributed to the accident. There might be a necessity to indicates that an event or circumstance was likely, then the
repeat the description of some of the evidence already finding should contain the same qualifier (likely).
presented in the factual information part, however, the
analysis should not be a restatement of the facts. Also, no
new facts should be introduced in the analysis part. The 3.1 Findings
purpose of the analysis is to provide a logical link between
the factual information and the conclusions that provide the 3.1.1 The findings are statements of all significant
answer to why the accident occurred. conditions, events or circumstances in the accident
sequence. The findings are significant steps in the accident
2.2 The analysis part should contain an evaluation of sequence, but they are not always causal or indicate
the evidence presented in the factual information part and deficiencies. Some findings point out the conditions that
should discuss the circumstances and events that existed or pre-existed the accident sequence, but they are usually
may have existed. The reasoning must be logical and may essential to the understanding of the occurrence. The
lead to the formulation of hypotheses which are then findings should be listed in a logical sequence, usually in a
discussed and tested against the evidence. Any hypothesis chronological order.
which is not supported by the evidence should be
eliminated; it is then important to clearly state the reasons 3.1.2 All findings must be supported by and directly
why a particular hypothesis was rejected. When a related to the factual information and the analysis. No new
hypothesis is not based on fact but is an expression of factual information should be introduced in the findings.
opinion, this should be clearly indicated. As well, the
justification for sustaining the validity of a hypothesis 3.1.3 It is customary to report on certain conditions in
should be stated and reference should be made to the every investigation, such as the validity of licences, the
supporting evidence. Contradictory evidence must be dealt training and experience of the flight crew members, the
with openly and effectively. Cause-related conditions and airworthiness and maintenance of the aircraft, the loading
events should be identified and discussed. The discussion of the aircraft, and whether there was a pre-impact failure.
in the analysis should support the findings and the The following findings are typical of what is usually
immediate and systemic causes of the accident. included:
2.3 Also, discuss and analyse any issue that came to The flight crew members were licensed and
light during the investigation which was identified as a qualified for the flight in accordance with existing
safety deficiency, although such issue may not have regulations;
contributed to the accident.
The maintenance records indicated that the aircraft
2.4 Because the Final Report is often drafted as the was equipped and maintained in accordance with
investigation progresses and several investigators (all the existing regulations and approved procedures;
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-13
An aircraft impacts the ground short of the runway during an instrument approach in marginal weather. Some of the
occupants are killed or injured. Based on these few facts, the investigator-in-charge can identify many of the areas to
be investigated and analysed. At an early stage of the investigation, the investigator-in-charge is able to allocate
drafting assignments to the investigators for tentative sub-headings in the analysis part, as follows:
2.1 General
2.3 Aircraft
2.5 Survivability
The tentative sub-headings in the analysis part may require adjustments as the investigation progresses, but the list
identifies the major areas that should be covered in the analysis. The list is a good starting point as it indicates to the
investigators where each drafting assignment for the sub-headings will fit into the analysis part as a whole.
IV-1-14 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
The mass and centre of gravity of the aircraft were 3.2.3 Some States list the causes, usually sequentially
within the prescribed limits; and as they occurred, without attempting to prioritize the
causes. Other States would prioritize the causes by using
There was no evidence of airframe failure or system terms such as primary causes and contributing causes.
malfunction prior to the accident.
3.2.4 When certain of a cause, a definite statement
should be used; if reasonably sure of a cause, a qualifying
3.1.4 Significant events and factors that were
word such as probable or likely should be used. The
investigated in detail, but eliminated in the analysis, should
causes statement is usually a reiteration of statements made
also be stated in the findings. For example, findings such as
at or near the end of the analysis and in the findings. For
flight crew fatigue was not a factor in the accident and
example, if the analysis and the findings state that a cause-
there was no malfunction of the elevator control system
related event or circumstance was probable, then the
should be considered when a comprehensive investigation
causes statement should contain the same qualifier
was made into these aspects. Areas of ambiguity should be
(probable).
identified and stated, for example, the investigation was
unable to establish whether the pilot-in-command or the co- 3.2.5 When there is insufficient evidence to establish
pilot was the pilot flying the aircraft at the time of the why an accident occurred, there should be no hesitation in
accident. stating that the causes remain undetermined. In many
instances, the most likely scenario could be stated provided
3.1.5 Some States present the causes of the accident that a qualifier, such as likely or probable is included.
separately from the findings under their own heading. However, a list of possible causes should not be given.
Other States indicate in the list of findings which of the
findings were causes of the accident, for example by adding 3.2.6 The causes should be formulated in a way
after such a finding (causal factor) or (contributory which, as much as practicable, minimizes the implication of
factor). blame or liability. Nevertheless, the accident investigation
authority should not refrain from reporting a cause merely
because blame or liability might be inferred from the
3.1.6 Examples of frequently used findings in
statement of that cause. An example of a formulation of the
accident reports are listed in Appendix 5 to Chapter 1.
causes is given in Table 1-3.
3.2 Causes
4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
3.2.1 Causes are those events which alone, or in
4.1 In accordance with Annex 13, the sole objective
combination with others, resulted in injuries or damage. A
of the investigation of an accident shall be the prevention
cause is an act, omission, condition or circumstance which
of accidents and incidents. Therefore, the determination of
if eliminated or avoided would have prevented the
appropriate safety recommendations is of utmost
occurrence or would have mitigated the resulting injuries or
importance. The safety recommendations are actions which
damage.
should prevent other accidents from similar causes or
reduce the consequences of such accidents. In order to
3.2.2 The determination of causes should be based on ensure that appropriate action is taken, each safety
a thorough, impartial and objective analysis of all the recommendation should include a specific addressee. This
available evidence. Any condition, act or circumstance that is usually the appropriate authority of the State which has
was a causal factor in the accident should be clearly responsibility for the matters with which the safety
identified. Seen together, the causes should present a recommendation is concerned.
picture of all the reasons why the accident occurred. The list
of causes should include both the immediate causes and the 4.2 Annex 13 requires that at any stage of the
deeper or systemic causes. No new information should be investigation of an accident, the accident investigation
introduced in the causes. The causes should be presented in authority of the State conducting the investigation shall
a logical order, usually chronological order, bearing in recommend to the appropriate authorities, including those
mind that it is essential that all the causes be presented. The in other States, any preventive action that is considered
causes should be formulated with preventive action in mind necessary to be taken promptly to enhance aviation safety.
and linked to appropriate safety recommendations. The interim safety recommendations made during the
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-15
The causes of this accident were: The causes of this accident were:
the failure of airport management to identify and the known and uncorrected lack of runway drainage;
correct poor runway drainage;
the failure of the air traffic controllers to inform lack of communication between the ATC and the
the flight crew that there was standing water on the flight crew regarding the degenerated runway
runway; condition;
the flight crews mismanagement of the aircrafts the aircraft crossing the threshold 16 knots above
airspeed; and Vref; and
the flight crews mismanagement of thrust the late application of reverse thrust.
reversers.
Note. The causal statement to the left implicates three groups of persons - the flight crew, the airport
management and the air traffic controllers. Since the formulation of causes should not be blame-setting in nature,
the statement on causation should focus on functions that in the example case were not performed at the level required
for safe operation. Such a functional statement logically leads to corrective or preventive measures that should be
recommended to prevent future accidents.
investigation may be presented in the safety for the authorities responsible for the matters in question to
recommendations part of the Final Report. Also, the determine how to accomplish the objective of the
preventive actions taken in response to the interim recommendation. This is particularly important if all the
recommendations should be presented, as well as any other salient facts are not available and additional examination,
preventive actions taken by the appropriate authorities and research and testing appears necessary. In addition, the
the industry, such as changed operating procedures by the accident investigation authority may lack the detailed
aircraft operator and the issuance of service bulletins by the information and experience required to evaluate the
manufacturer. Some States present the interim safety financial, operational and policy impacts on the addressee
recommendations and describe the preventive actions taken of specific and detailed recommendations.
in the factual information part, Section 1.18, in lieu of
including this information in the safety recommendations 4.4 During aircraft accident investigations, safety
part. Publishing the preventive actions taken in the Final issues are often identified which did not contribute to the
Report has significant accident prevention value for those accident but which, nevertheless, are safety deficiencies.
involved in similar operations. These safety deficiencies should be addressed in the Final
Report. Some States include safety recommendations not
4.3 A safety recommendation should describe the related to the causes of the accident in the safety
safety problem and provide justification for safety actions. recommendations part of the Final Report. Other States
An example of a recommendation is given in Table 1-4. have adopted means other than the Final Report to notify
Attention should be focussed on the problem rather than the the appropriate authorities of safety deficiencies that are not
suggested solution. Consideration should be given to related to the accident, although the actions taken are
whether a safety recommendation should prescribe a usually described in the Final Report.
specific solution to a problem or whether the
recommendation should be flexible enough to allow the 4.5 In summary, the safety recommendations should
addressee latitude in determining how the objective of the include a convincing presentation of the safety problem with
recommendation can be achieved. A safety recommen- the attendant safety risks deriving from it, as well as a
dation should identify what actions to take, but leave scope recommended course of action for the responsible authority
IV-1-16 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
to take in order to eliminate the unsafe condition. The safety appearance and should show only the information required
recommendations should identify what action is required, but for understanding the report. The appendices should be
should leave considerable scope for the implementing numbered and listed in the table of contents. The following
authority to determine how the problem will be resolved. is a list of appendices commonly found in a Final Report:
communications transcripts;
APPENDICES flight data recorder readouts;
flight plan and loadsheet;
The appendices should include, as appropriate, any technical investigation reports;
pertinent information considered necessary to understand pertinent pages from manuals and handbooks;
the report, such as a glossary, supporting technical reports, pertinent maintenance records;
accident site diagrams, photographs and flight recorder maps and diagrams; and
data. Graphics and diagrams should have a professional photographs.
ICAO should establish a working group to clarify the international Standards and Recommended Practices in
Annex 14 regarding the marking of runway centrelines in relation to co-located threshold markings and turn-
around areas.
In accordance with the guidance above, the addressee (in this example ICAO) should be given sufficient latitude
in determining how to achieve the objective of the recommendation. It should be left to ICAO to determine how
the work is to be undertaken, e.g. working group, consultant or panel. A general statement, such as international
requirements could also be used, thus leaving it to ICAO to determine whether Standards, Recommended
Practices and/or guidance material would be appropriate to meet the objective of the recommendation. Based on
the foregoing reasoning, the following formulation of the safety recommendation would be preferable:
The (accident investigation authority) recommends that ICAO re-examine the international requirements in
Annex 14 regarding the marking of runway centrelines in relation to co-located threshold markings and turn-
around areas.
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-17
Appendix 2 to Chapter 1
REPORT WRITING CONVENTIONS
1. GENERAL GUIDELINES the readability of the body of the Final Report, complex
subjects may be explained in an appendix to the Final
The purpose of writing any report is to convey the facts of Report.
the subject of the report to its readers in a succinct, clear,
unambiguous and well organized manner. When drafting 2.1.4 Subjects of equal importance should be given
the Final Report, the writer should not assume that equal coverage when describing the facts, conditions and
everyone who reads the report is familiar with the technical circumstances.
details. Therefore, information should not be omitted
because it is obvious to the writer. The writer should
remember that the readers will not have visited the accident 2.2 Clarity
site, nor did they participate in the investigation. The
writers responsibility is to present the reader with a word 2.2.1 The use of an outline, such as that provided in
picture of the accident and the investigation. The writer the Appendix to Annex 13, is a commonsense approach to
should assume that the reader is intelligent but uninformed the task of writing the Final Report.
and will analyse the facts presented in order to test the
conclusions of the Final Report. For example, if it is 2.2.2 Clarity in report writing can be enhanced by
obvious to the writer that the weather was not a factor in reporting sequentially. The History of the flight, for
the accident, this should be clearly stated, but nevertheless example, should describe the flight in a logical sequence
the reader should be provided with enough weather from start to finish. Placing events out of sequence tends to
information to substantiate the conclusion. confuse the reader.
are not precise enough for the factual part of the report. The 3.2 The passive voice is more appropriate in some
investigator must report evidence found and not that which cases, such as:
appeared, seemed, or was presumed to have been. when the agent, or doer of the act, is unknown;
when a reference to the actor is inappropriate; and
2.2.8 The findings and statements in the report must when the agent is less important than the action,
be unambiguous and subject to only one interpretation. e.g. The two survivors were rescued....
Post hoc fallacy: assuming that because one event 5.2 Contravention of regulations
follows another, the second event was caused by the and orders
first, e.g. Inexperienced pilots are more susceptible
to CFIT accidents; 5.2.1 Deviations from the accepted norms of
compliance with regulations and procedures should be
Either/or fallacy: assuming that a complicated clearly identified when relevant to the accident. The nature
question has only two possible answers, e.g. The of the regulation and the extent of the deviation should be
choice was to fly the mission in accordance with described in sufficient detail in order to explain the safety
the company directives or not to fly it at all; implications of the deviation. The analysis should explain
the reasons why the deviation created a hazard.
Non sequitur: drawing a conclusion that bears no
logical relation to the facts presented, e.g. Because
5.2.2 For a contravention to be included as a cause, it
of his position as Director of Flight Operations, he
should be clear that complying with the regulation or
was fully qualified to assess the qualifications of his
procedure could have prevented the accident or lessened
pilots; and
the consequences of the accident.
False analogy: suggesting that because two things
or situations share some similarities, they must be
alike in other ways, e.g. Flying an aircraft at night
is no different to flying it during the day in IMC. 5.3 Human suffering
Appendix 3 to Chapter 1
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
3. ABBREVIATIONS C
F K
G M
N R
T V SPEEDS
Appendix 4 to Chapter 1
AVIATION TERMINOLOGY
Arcing. Visible effects (burn spots, fused metal) of an Collapsed. Inwardly deformed original contour of a part.
electrical discharge between two electrical connections. Usually due to high pressure differentials.
Also: flash over.
Corroded. Gradually destroyed by chemical action. Often
Battered. Damaged by repeated blows or impacts. evidenced by oxide build-up on the surface of the
parent material. Also: rusted, oxidized.
Bent. Deviated from original line or plane usually caused
by lateral force. Also: creased, folded, kinked. Crack. Visible partial separation of material.
Binding. Restricting movement, such as tightened or sticking Crossed. Damaged parent material of parts due to improper
condition, may result from high or low temperature or a assembly (as in the case of crossed threads) or parts
foreign object jammed in mechanism. Also: sticking, rendered inoperative (as in the case of crossed wires).
tight.
Curl. A condition where the tip(s) of compressor or turbine
Bowed. Curved or gradually deviated from original line or blades have been curled over due to rubbing against
plane often caused by lateral force or heat. engine casings.
Brinelling. Circular surface indenting of bearing races, Dented. Damage by impact of a foreign object resulting in a
usually caused by repeated shock loading of the surface indentation with rounded bottom. Parent material
bearing. False brinelling is wear caused by bearing is displaced, but seldom separated. Also: peened.
rollers sliding back and forth across a stationary race,
while true brinelling is plastic displacement of material. Deposits. A build-up of material on a part either from
foreign material or from another part not in direct
Broken. Separated by force into two or more pieces. Also: contact. Also: metalizing.
fractured.
Disintegrated. Separated or decomposed into fragments.
Bulged. Swollen outward locally. Usually caused by Excessive degree of fracturing (breaking) as with
excessive local heating or differential pressure. Also: disintegrated bearings. Complete loss of original form.
ballooned, swelling. Also: shattered.
Burned. Oxidized destructively. Usually caused by higher Distortion. Extensive deformation of the original contour
temperature than the parent material can withstand. of a part usually due to impact of a foreign object,
structural stress, excessive localized heating or any
Burrs. A rough edge or a sharp projection on the edge or combination of these. Also: buckled, depressed,
surface of the parent material. twisted, warped.
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-25
Eccentricity. Part(s) wherein the intended common center Nick. A sharp surface indentation caused by impact of a
is displaced. Also: non-concentric. foreign object. Parent material is displaced, seldom
separated.
Electrical circuits grounded. Circuits in which the
current has a path to ground. Out-of-round. Part with inconsistent diameter.
Electrical circuits open. Incomplete electrical circuit Out-of-square. Part with deformation of right angle
due to separation at or between electrical connections. relationship between part surfaces.
Electrical circuits shorted. Circuits in which the current Peeling. A breaking away of surface finishes such as
has an undesired path between leads or circuits that are coatings and plating. Peeling would be flaking of large
normally at different electrical potentials. pieces. A blistered condition usually precedes or
accompanies peeling. Also: blistered, flaked.
Eroded. Component from which material has been carried
away by flow of fluids or gases; may be accelerated by
Pick-up. A transfer of metal from one surface to another.
heat or grit.
Usually the result of rubbing two surfaces together
without sufficient lubrication.
Fatigue. The progressive failure of a part under repeated
loading.
Pit. A small irregular shaped cavity in the surface of the
Flattened out. Permanent loss of curvature beyond parent material usually caused by corrosion, chipping
tolerance limits. Usually caused by compression. or electrical discharge.
Frayed. Worn into shreds by rubbing action. Plugged. Totally or partially blocked pipe, hoses, tubing,
channelling or internal passages. Also: clogged,
Fretting. Removal of material by rubbing. obstructed, restricted.
Fusing. Joining together of two materials. Usually caused Porous. State of material caused by internal voids. Usually
by heat, friction or electrical current flow. applied to cast material or welds.
Galling. Chafing or severe fretting caused by relative Rolling-over. Lipping or rounding of a metal edge. Also:
movement of two surfaces under high contact pressure. lipped, turned.
Glazing. Undesirable development of a hard, glossy surface Rubbed. Moved with pressure or friction against another
due to rubbing action, heat or varnish. part.
Gouging. Scooping out of material usually caused by a Rupturing. Excessive breaking apart of material usually
foreign object. Also: furrowed. caused by high stresses, differential pressure, locally
applied force or any combination of these. Also: blown,
Groove(s). Smooth, rounded furrow or furrows of wear,
burst, split.
usually wider than scoring, with rounded corners and a
smooth groove bottom.
Score(s). A deep scratch or scratches made by sharp edges
Hot-spot. Result of subjection to excessive temperature of foreign matter.
usually evidenced by change in colour and appearance
of part. Also: heat discoloured, overheated. Scratches. Light narrow, shallow mark or marks caused by
movement of a sharp object or particle across a surface.
Melted. Deformed from the original configuration due to Material is displaced, not removed.
heat, friction or pressure.
Seized. Parts bound together. May be due to expansion or
Mis-match. Improper association of two or more parts. contraction due to high or low temperature, foreign
object jammed in mechanism or lack of lubricant. Also:
Mis-positioned. Improperly installed part which may frozen, jammed, stuck.
damage the installed part or two associated parts. Also:
mis-aligned, reversed. Sheared. Body divided by cutting action. Also: cut.
IV-1-26 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Stretching. Enlargement of a part. May result from Confirmation bias. An expectation of an event may
exposure to operating conditions or excessive force. diminish an individuals ability to recognize evidence
Also: growth. that events are not developing as anticipated.
Stripping. A condition usually associated with fastener Distraction. The interruption and redirection of attention by
threads or electrical insulation. Involves removal of environmental cues or mental processes.
material by force.
Fascination. An attention anomaly in which a person
Torn. Separated by pulling apart. observes environmental cues, but fails to respond to
them.
Worn. Consumption of material of a part as a result of use.
Fatigue. The progressive decrease in performance due to
prolonged or extreme mental or physical activity, sleep
deprivation, disrupted diurnal cycles, or life event
2. HUMAN FACTORS TERMS
stress.
This section presents a selection of Human Factors terms
Habit pattern interference. Behaviour in which the subject
which are likely to be encountered when writing the Final
reverts to previously learned response patterns which
Report on an accident. Knowledge of these terms will
are inappropriate to the task at hand.
facilitate the identification and formulation of the Human
Factors aspects which were present in the accident.
Illusion. An erroneous perception of reality due to
limitations of sensory receptors and/or the manner in
which the information is presented or interpreted.
HUMAN FACTORS
Appendix 5 to Chapter 1
COMMONLY USED FINDINGS
The following findings might be used in aviation accident The destruction of the aircraft by impact and fire
reports and are presented here as examples only. The precluded determination of any material failure or
investigator-in-charge must ensure that each finding in an system malfunction.
accident report is pertinent, valid and in the proper context.
The position of the fuel selectors could not be
determined due to the extensive fire damage.
The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness The engine(s) stopped from fuel exhaustion (no
and had been maintained in compliance with the usable fuel on board).
regulations.
The engine(s) stopped from fuel starvation (usable
The maintenance records indicated that the aircraft
fuel on board).
was equipped and maintained in accordance with
existing regulations and approved procedures.
The intercom system, flight deck lighting and other
standby electrical services failed some four minutes
The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the
before impact as a result of a rapid decay in battery
flight.
power for which no explanation was found.
The mass and the centre of gravity of the aircraft
The obsolescent design of the aircrafts primary
were within the prescribed limits.
flight instruments and radio navigation systems
contributed to the loss of situational awareness of
There was no evidence of any defect or malfunction
the crew at a time of high crew workload.
in the aircraft that could have contributed to the
accident.
The worn condition of the left tire reduced braking
There was no evidence of airframe failure or system effectiveness in the wet runway conditions.
malfunction prior to the accident.
Propeller blade damage and twist was consistent
The aircraft was structurally intact prior to impact. with the engine producing power at impact.
All control surfaces were accounted for, and all The propeller(s) exhibited chord-wise scratching
damage to the aircraft was attributable to the severe and torsional damage indicative of the engine
impact forces. producing power at impact.
The flight crew/pilot/co-pilot was properly licensed, The wind conditions in which the pilot landed the
medically fit and adequately rested to operate the aircraft were outside the limits detailed in the Flight
flight. Manual and the Operations Manual.
The flight crew/pilot/co-pilot was in compliance Braking performance analysis indicated that, in the
with the flight and duty time regulations. conditions existing at the time of the accident, the
aircraft could not have stopped on the runway
Although the aircraft was equipped for instrument available.
flight, the pilot was not qualified for IFR flight.
The incorrect handling of the airframe de-icing
system resulted in a considerable accretion of ice or
The pilots degraded performance was consistent
snow during the descent.
with the effects of fatigue, but there was insufficient
evidence to determine if the pilots degraded
performance contributed to the accident. The continuation of the landing with the airspeed
above the calculated threshold speed resulted in
touchdown beyond the normal touchdown point.
Although the pre-flight rest period was adequate
and the flight duty time was within the company
flight time limitations, the two-hour turnaround in The pilot made an early decision to divert towards
the middle of the night may have reduced the a suitable aerodrome while attempting to determine
alertness levels of the two pilots. the extent of the emergency.
During flare for touchdown, the pilot lost control of 5. AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES AND
the aircraft in a strong gust of wind. AIRPORT FACILITIES
The aircraft was fitted with a radio altimeter, but the The approach/approach radar controllers were
operators procedures did not require reference to it properly licensed, medically fit and correctly rated
during non-precision approaches. to provide the service.
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 1. The Final Report IV-1-29
The number of air traffic controllers on duty in the There was no evidence that the pilot suffered any
tower was (not) in accordance with the regulations. sudden illness or incapacity which might have
affected his/her ability to control the aircraft.
The air traffic controllers workload was assessed
as low/moderate/high with normal complexity. Toxicological tests for common drugs/ carbon
monoxide/ hydrogen cyanide were negative/
The air traffic controller gave conflicting clearances
positive.
to the two aircraft.
Based on the autopsy, toxicology, and medical
The air traffic controller issued a clearance to ...
reports, there was no evidence to indicate that the
(flt #) which caused a loss of separation to another
pilots performance was degraded by physiological
aircraft (flt #).
factors.
The air traffic controller requested (flt #) to (turn,
climb, descend) immediately to avoid traffic. A post-mortem examination of the pilot showed
that the cause of death was a coronary
ATC provided prompt and effective assistance to atherosclerosis/hypertensive heart disease.
the flight crew. Toxicological results were negative for carbon
monoxide, cyanide, volatiles and tested drugs.
Use of incorrect RT terminology by the flight crew
when declaring the emergency negated an effective The flight crew was diagnosed as suffering from
response from ATC. carbon monoxide (CO) exposure.
All aerodrome approach aids and lighting facilities A toxicology report revealed 0.180 per cent alcohol
were operating normally at the time of the accident. in the pilots blood. The specimen was taken one
hour and 12 minutes after the accident.
The airport was not equipped with a facility to
record the Secondary Surveillance Radar. The lack
of data significantly impaired the reconstruction of
the aircrafts descent profiles, given the limited 8. SURVIVABILITY
information available from the FDR fitted to the
aircraft. The accident was not survivable due to the
magnitude of the deceleration forces and the
severity of the post-impact fire.
The 30-minute closed loop cockpit voice recorder The fatal injuries sustained by the occupants might
tape was of inadequate duration to be helpful in the have been prevented had they worn shoulder
investigation of this accident. harnesses.
There was no evidence that incapacitation or The civil aviation authoritys safety oversight
physiological factors affected the flight crew programme had not addressed the subject of the
performance. diverse nature of the operators fleet of aircraft, in
IV-1-30 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
terms of the primary flight instruments, navigation Management aspects of the companys operations.
equipment, flight deck layout and its suitability for However, the oversight programme was ineffective
public transport operations. in producing sufficient and timely improvement.
The safety oversight programme conducted by the The civil aviation authoritys monitoring system
civil aviation authority on this operator had had been ineffective in identifying and making the
identified deficiencies in the Crew Resource operator correct the procedural lapses.
Chapter 2
IV-2-1
IV-2-2 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
2.2.3 In 2003, the ADREP database contained 28 000 investigation should forward the Preliminary Report to the
reports, of which 18 000 were Accident/Incident Data same States as above, but excluding ICAO.
Reports. Fifty-one per cent (51%) of the reports concerned
airline operations and forty-nine per cent (49%) were 2.4.3 The Preliminary Report shall be sent by airmail
general aviation. Seventy-five per cent (75%) were within thirty days of the date of the accident unless the
accidents and twenty-five per cent (25%) were incidents. Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time.
When matters directly affecting safety are involved, it shall
be sent as soon as the information is available and by the
most suitable and quickest means available.
2.3 DATA VALIDITY
2.4.4 An example of a completed Preliminary Report
2.3.1 The validity of the safety information which (ADREP Form P) can be found in Doc 9156.
ICAO provides to States depends on the detail and care
with which accidents and incidents have been investigated
and reported to ICAO. Thus, it is in the interest of all States
to accurately report all investigated occurrences in 2.5 ACCIDENT DATA REPORT
accordance with Annex 13. Only then can ICAO provide (ADREP FORM D)
valid and complete information required for accident
prevention. 2.5.1 When the investigation has been completed and
the Final Report has been released, the Accident Data
Report is to be compiled. The purpose of the Accident Data
Report is to provide a standard method for reporting
2.4 PRELIMINARY REPORT accurate and complete information on an accident,
(ADREP FORM P) including factors (causes) and safety recommendations. In
accordance with Annex 13, the Accident Data Report is to
2.4.1 Basic factual and circumstantial information on be sent to ICAO by the State conducting the investigation
an accident is usually available within the first two to four of an accident involving an aircraft of a maximum mass of
weeks of the investigation. The Preliminary Report form is over 2 250 kg.
a simple and standard method for reporting such
preliminary information. In accordance with Annex 13, 2.5.2 If, at the end of the investigation, it is
when the aircraft involved in an accident is of a maximum established that some of the data in the Preliminary Report
mass of over 2 250 kg, the Preliminary Report shall be sent was not correct or was incomplete, this should be reflected
by the State conducting the investigation to: in the Accident Data Report. When ICAO receives the
Accident Data Report, the Preliminary Report information
a) the State of Registry or the State of Occurrence, as will be updated. Similarly, if a State re-opens an
appropriate; investigation, the information previously reported should
be amended by a new report.
b) the State of the Operator;
2.5.3 If an accident investigation has been completed
c) the State of Design; and the Accident Data Report can be compiled within thirty
days of the date of the accident, the State conducting the
investigation should send an Accident Data Report to
d) the State of Manufacture;
ICAO, instead of a Preliminary Report. In such cases, this
State should also send the Data Report to the States which
e) any State which provided relevant information, normally would have received the Preliminary Report.
significant facilities or experts; and
f) ICAO.
2.6 INCIDENT DATA REPORT
2.4.2 When the aircraft involved in an accident is of (ADREP FORM D)
a maximum mass of 2 250 kg or less, and when
airworthiness or matters considered to be of interest to 2.6.1 Accident investigations have frequently brought
other States are involved, the State conducting the to light previous incidents which were dismissed as
Part IV. Reporting
Chapter 2. The Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) System IV-2-3
insignificant at the time of their occurrence. The knowledge 2.6.5 Copies of the Preliminary Report and the
acquired in retrospect from the accident investigations has Accident/Incident Data Report shall be sent to ICAO,
demonstrated that these incidents, if properly investigated, addressed as indicated in Chapter 1, 1.8.
could have provided the basis for remedial action, which
might have prevented the accident. Therefore, it is highly
desirable that incidents be investigated and the reports be
given the same worldwide release as accident reports. 2.7 CONSTRAINTS ON INCIDENT
DATA REPORTS
2.6.2 In accordance with Annex 13, if a State
conducts an investigation into an incident to an aircraft of 2.7.1 Considering the sensitivity related to the
a maximum mass of over 5 700 kg, that State shall send, as dissemination of incident information, the following
soon as is practicable after the investigation, the Incident constraints are placed upon the use of incident data by
Data Report to ICAO. ICAO:
2.6.3 If a State has found an incident significant a) ICAO will use incident information for the purpose
enough to carry out an investigation, it is likely that safety of accident prevention only;
matters are involved and it is therefore important that
ICAO receive the relevant information. The types of b) when ICAO conducts analyses based on incident
incidents which are of main interest to ICAO for accident information, it will be identified as such; and
prevention studies are listed in an Attachment to
Annex 13. c) ICAO will de-identify incident reports before their
dissemination, by deletion of the State of Registry,
2.6.4 An example of a completed Accident/Incident the nationality and registration marks, and the name
Data Report (ADREP Form D) can be found in Doc 9156. of the owner and operator.
END
ICAO 2003
5/03, E/P1/2000