Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Adminpub Reviewer
Adminpub Reviewer
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Introduction
1. Definition and Scope
2. Historical Development
FACTS
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pe
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of membe
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as memb
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of vo
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commissio
Motion of Protest against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only pro
filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that s
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or
the election of said position be nullified.
ISSUE
W/N the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
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RULING
Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional org
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may no
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that i
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subjec
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropr
cases. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutio
grant to the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
DOCTRINE:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not thro
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it d
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitut
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provi
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the vari
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far mad
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the Presiden
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. T
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the ot
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrenc
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction
to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a cer
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in tu
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
Constitution.
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DOCTRINE:
Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC), as follows:
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.
All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that
Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue
forged on this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court finds it expedient
to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis--vis the independence
of the COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1, which reads Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit.
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Manila Electric Co., vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 (1988)
FACTS
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur
Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in
the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position
as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of
judiciary.
ISSUE
W/N he can be a member of such committee
RULING
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the
Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions
(Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
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cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus
alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions
of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and
refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
DOCTRINE:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of their judicial duties.
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Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the
CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution
states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the
Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly,
the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed
the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE
W/N the CSC has the power to abolish the CESB
RULING
The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1,
1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that
the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be
read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power
to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view
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the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was notmade to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to
attain policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation,
either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted
by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of
periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.
NOTES:
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be
headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the
Commissionmay effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the
following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.
DOCTRINE:
The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1994 which adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
As the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This
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follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices
is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers and Employees, viz: Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far
as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it
is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable,
necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government, it is necessary to
create and define duties the legislative department has the discretion to determine
whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached
to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of
filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit,
abolish the office." In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law
authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General
Appropriation Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the
operation of CESB.
Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. - The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies;
and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.
Section 21. Organization. - The Office of the President shall consist of the Office of the President
Proper and the agencies under it.
(1) The Office of the President Proper shall consist of the Private Office, the Executive Office, the
Common Staff Support System, and the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System;
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(2) The Executive Office refers to the Offices of the Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive
Secretaries and Assistant Executive Secretaries;
(3) The Common Staff Support System embraces the offices or units under the general categories
of development and management, general government administration and internal administration;
and
(4) The President Special Assistants/Advisers System includes such special assistants or advisers
as may be needed by the President.
Section 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President. - The agencies under the Office of the
President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office
of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.
Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012)
FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
ISSUE
W/N EO 13 constitutional
RULING
Yes. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the
executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292,
thus:
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But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's
continuing authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives
and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own
office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal
structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic
move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in
Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another.
In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the
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The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on
the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the
limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it
was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of
Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the
Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions
of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the
President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
DOCTRINE:
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and
distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body
were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office
of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration
of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third
division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA
could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that
Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78 (2010)
FACTS
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
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order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
a. E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
b. The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
ISSUE
W/N E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
RULING
Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in
the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable
to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was
not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,[46]
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
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of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre
[323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject
to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of
control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is
entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v.
Manglapus:[52]
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of
the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
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the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum
of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
1. By the President
Secs. 1, 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
Secs. 1-7, 21-23, Book III, EO 292
Secs. 1, 38, Book IV, EO 292
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
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ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. The Secretary shall decide the appeal within
thirty (30) days fromreceipt thereof.1wphi1 The decision becomes final after
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is filed with
the proper court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the
Office of the President should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of
the President to review acts of department secretaries will be rendered illusory by
mere rules of procedure.
The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down
in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been
defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify orset aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
DOCTRINE:
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the
executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative
control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be
effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the
more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.Appeals are
remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rulemaking
power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts.
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order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the
President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.
A study of the above-cited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with
the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to
issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of
cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid
down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited
only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over
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the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review
and supervision.
As thus defined, the power of supervision does not snow the supervisor to
annul the acts of the subordinate, for that comes under the power of control.
What it can do only is to see to it that the subordinate performs his duties in
accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to determine whether
it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is
necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the
subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the
subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his
attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over
him.
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On the basis of the above statements which petitioner claimed to be a direct attack on
her character and reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaint for four counts
of libel against respondent Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. It was dismissed. Petitioner Judge was clearly undaunted, as she filed a
petition for review with the DOJ of the dismissal. The petition was, again, dismissed,
even upon reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review Before the OP questioning the DOJ
Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the Petition for Review,
stating that under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated 29 May 2003, no appeal
from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Petitioner thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing
the OP order. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio
v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all
executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political
agency. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed petitioner's
petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or overturn the
DOJ Secretary's resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ
Secretary, being her alter ego.
The CA also held that the OP's outright dismissal of petitioner's Petition for Review
was valid and binding, and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It found
that the DOJ resolutions dismissing petitioner's petition for review became final and
executory after petitioner failed to elevate the said DOJ resolutions directly with the
CA in a petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period provided for
under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE
W/N CA was erroneous in applying the doctrine of qualified political agency
RULING
The President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
DOCTRINE:
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency - The official acts of a Department Secretary
are deemed to be the acts directly of the President herself unless disapproved or
reprobated by the latter; that it was the OPs prerogative to determine whether or not
it shall consent to exercise its general appellate jurisdiction in any given case
emanating from the Chief Executives power of control over all executive officers
from Cabinet secretaries to the lowliest ranks.
FACTS
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend
that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront
the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of
congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is
illuminating:
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an
enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated
to them. x x x x x x x x x
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may
be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
b. Congressional investigation
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight
power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and
informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power.
It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations
to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before
it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if
Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if
Congress affirmatively approves it.
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of
modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived
necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory
standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive
officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the
judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the
development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances
the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post
enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon
the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures
undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the
Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the
provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-
house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject
to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision,
two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing
legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article
I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised.35 (emphasis
supplied)
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation40 and
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate
the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter
case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or
the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations
implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain
facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
4. By the Ombudsman
Secs. 12-13, Article XI, 1987 Constitution
D. Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies
1. In General
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940)
FACTS
The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along
Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the
opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter
enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a
citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
ISSUE
W/N regualation is valid
RULING
The Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police power in the
interest of public welfare.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then,
lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
(U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred
upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. The grant of the
rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law"
DOCTRINE:
This case is known primarily for the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in defining social
justice:
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to ensure economic stability of
all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo lex.
FACTS
Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The
respondents, however, admit to operate colorum or kabit taxis, thus, they applied for
legalization of their unauthorized excess tacis citing PD 101. Respondent Board set
such applications for hearing and granted provisional authority to operate. Petitioners
argue that the Board cannot do this as the six month period in the Transitory
Provision has lapsed and has become functus officio.
ISSUE
W/N the board may issue such permits
RULING
YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was to grant special permits of limited
term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the
Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and
responsible operators. Such power remains even after the six months prescribed in
the law as such period merely provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its
right to punish said colorum operators. Notice and hearing are not required for the
grant of such temporary authority because of its provisional nature and that the
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
FACTS
Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as
station commanders of the three police precincts of Manila as their continued
employment as such was illegal, the eligibility required being that of an inspector
first class, allegedly not possessed by them Mayor: to disregard said directive, it
being in excess of the authority vested in [the Civil Service]Commission." As noted
in such communication: "
This Office is not aware of any provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station
Commanders should be at least a Police or Detective Major or an Inspector First
Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260
ISSUE
W/N CSC acted within its jurisdiction
RULING
It is well-settled that respondent Commissioner at the most may inquire only as to the
eligibility of the person thus chosen to fill up a vacant position. If he were, then
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service must so attest. That function being
discharged, his participation ceases. So we have held in the leading case of
Villanueva v. Balallo,11 the opinion being penned by the present Chief Justice. Thus:
"When the appointee is qualified, as petitioner herein admittedly is, then the
Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It has
been repeatedly held that an appointment becomes complete upon the performance of
the last act required by law of the appointing power. The attestation required of the
Commissioner of Civil Service is merely a check to assure compliance with the civil
service laws."
In this particular case, the eligibility of the other petitioners as police captains is
admitted. That was duly set forth in the decision now on appeal. More than that, their
being exceptionally well-qualified, was likewise duly noted therein, a finding of fact
binding on us as this appeal raises purely questions of law. The justification for the
directive of respondent Commissioner is thus premised on his alleged power to insist
on a specific eligibility for each of the other petitioners designated, that of "Inspector
First Class (Police or Detective Major)."
In his brief, however, he can point to no express provision that would confer on him
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
such a power. His failure is understandable because there is none. At the most, then,
he would rely on a reading of the Civil Service Act from which, mistakenly to our
mind, he would infer such authority. According to his brief: "Said authority to fix
appropriate eligibilities being corollary to respondent's 'exclusive jurisdiction over the
approval under the Civil Service Law and rules of all appointments including
promotions to positions in the competitive service" and/or being an implied power,
there is therefore no need for an express provision setting forth in black and white
what eligibilities are appropriate for what positions."12
There is thus an admission from respondent Commissioner himself that his power is
necessarily limited. He would, however, construe such a restricted authority
expansively. He would rely on an ambiguity.
DOCTRINE:
It would be a stultification of well-settled principles of public law if from the
vagueness of a statute, competence to act could be predicated. If such a purpose were
within the contemplation of Congress, an appropriate form of words could have been
utilized. The absence of such language negates its existence.
What is worse, the rules in question are not issued by the President, but by one of his
subordinates; their binding force then is not as great. Much less could they supersede
applicable statutes, not only in what they command but also in what they omit. It
does not admit of doubt that in the hierarchy of legal norms, such rules and standards
definitely occupy an inferior status. If the statute is silent as to the existence of
power, there the matter rests.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292 (1994)
FACTS
The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation
of the City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala
Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution of the
surrounding water.
LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining
the open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental
Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR.
They also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the
dumpsite.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and
other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law
that the review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of
Appeals and not the RTC.
RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the
pendency of the case.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage.
The residents seek a review of the decision.
ISSUE
W/N LLDA has the power to issue cease and desist order
RULING
LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a. Explicit in the law.
4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order in that language, the provision granting authority to
make () orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution, has the same effect.
FACTS
On 6 July 1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for
prohibition, certiorari and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary
and Atty. Venancio R. Nava, Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
andSports, Region IX to annul and set aside the closure order and to enjoin the
respondentsfrom closing or padlocking AMACC, Davao City.On 26 July 1990, the
trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.Thereafter, AMA filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in assailing the26 July order of the court
a quo, but, again,the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the petition and also
denied its motion for reconsideration.
On 7 August 1990, the court dismissed the petition. AMA, however, in order to
thwart the closure or padlocking of its school in Davao City,filed with the RTC of
Makati, Branch 134, presided over by respondent Judge, anotherpetition for
mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining orderagainst
Hon. Isidro Carino, Secretary and Director, Department of Education, Cultureand
Sports, Region IX to compel the respondents to approve petitioners' application
forpermit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school year 1990-1991, and
toenjoin the closure and/or padlocking of AMA-Davao school.Petitioners, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss AMA's petitionon the ground
that(1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners' authority to grant
ordeny the permit to operate is discretionary and not ministerial;(2) AMA failed to
comply with the provisions of the Education Act;(3) AMA is blatantly engaging in
forum shopping;(4) AMA failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before
resorting to court;and (5) lack of territorial jurisdiction over petitioner Regional
Director and AMA-Davao.
On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, let a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued, upon filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, duly
approved by this Court, enjoining and restraining therespondent Hon. Isidro Carino,
his agents, representatives and any person acting for and his behalf, from
implementing the closing and/orpadlocking AMA Computer College, Inc. - Davao
City Branch, until further orders from this Court and on the following day, on 16
November 1990, issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
W/N the action for mandamus is proper
RULING
As a rule,
mandamus
will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
discretionary function.
Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to
allow such operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do
so is violation of the Educational Act.
2. Determinative / Investigatory
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
FACTS
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latters attention.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not
try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if
there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.
DOCTRINE:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to
subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function,
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . .
to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. .
. . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
FACTS
Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are former employees of the
Department Of Health National Capital Region (DOH-NCR). Some concerned
DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman
Ringpis against Dir. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and
respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500
bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules
worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory. Thereafter, the Resident
Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents. Subsequently, the
Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co-
respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.
Afterwards, then Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O No. 298 creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAGC). Consequently, the PCAGC took over the investigation
from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution finding respondents
guilty as charged. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 390 dismissing the
respondents from service as recommended by the PCAGC in their resolution.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against
respondents and Cabrera dismissing them from service. Respondents and Cabrera
filed their separate appeal with the CSC which was both denied. Respondents
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While Cabrera s
motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000. Respondents, however,
received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on November 2001
which was promulgated on . Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to the CA the
CSCs resolutions ahead of respondents. The petition of Cabrera was granted by
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
the CA setting aside the resolutions of the CSC and exonerated Cabrera of the
administrative charged against him. Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC of their
appeal, respondents brought the matter to the CA which nonetheless used the same
legal bases for annulling the CSCs Resolution against respondents and held that
the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the
charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the
PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative
due process. Hence, the Petition.
ISSUE
W/N DOH Sec may delegate the power to investigate; PCAG has the power to
impose sanctions
RULING
Yes; No. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the
authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers
and employees under the formers jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the health secretary had
disciplinary authority over respondents.
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the
jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive directly dismissed
her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretarys disciplinary
authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for
the secretarys appropriate action.[18]
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created
under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing their findings and
recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining
authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the
present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident
from the health secretarys Order dismissing the respondents thus:
ORDER
This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAG[C]) on the above captioned case dated January 23, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving
thus:
Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what
action should be taken against officials and employees who have been
administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the
disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the
law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence
gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation,
and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.
In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing respondents
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to
the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a
restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered
by the PCAGC.[22] On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica
simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commissions Resolution.
She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to
Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
The Presidents endorsement of the records of the case for the appropriate action of
the health secretary[25] did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of
respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should
have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal
intelligently, if they so desired.
To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents.
[26] However, this case merely authorized the delegation of the power to investigate,
but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring the disciplining
authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding a case, American
Tobacco supports the present respondents cause. In that case, the petitioners objected
to the appointment of hearing officers and sought the personal hearing of their case
by the disciplining authority.[27] The Court, however, sustained the right to delegate
the power to investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding
authority.
By the same token, the Constitution[28] grants the Supreme Court disciplinary
authority over all lower court justices and judges, as well as judicial employees and
lawyers. While the investigation of administrative complaints is delegated usually to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP),[29] the Court nonetheless makes its own judgments of the cases when
sanctions are imposed. It does not merely adopt or solely rely on the
recommendations of the OCA or the IBP.
3. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE /RULE-MAKING
a. In General
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must
involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix
the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself,
so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power. (RP v Drugmakers Lab)
Ople vs. Torres, supra
Smart Communications vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 768 (2003)
Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970)
People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)
FACTS
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-
1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider
the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE
W/N the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid.
RULING
No. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been
easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative
purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a
valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to legislate Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because
the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law.
DOCTRINE:
All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
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sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to
make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power
should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative
agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon it.
FACTS
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and
6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is
a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has
powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the
conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by
law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
ISSUE
W/N RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty,
which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12%
VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence
of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit
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In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information
and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can
go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
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(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;
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Exception - Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
(1) Advise the President in issuing executive orders, regulations, proclamations and other
issuances, the promulgation of which is expressly vested by law in the President relative to
matters under the jurisdiction of the Department;
(2) Establish the policies and standards for the operation of the Department pursuant to the
approved programs of government;
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs and projects;
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(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the offices
under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances shall
not prescribe penalties for their violation, except when expressly authorized by law;
(5) Exercise disciplinary powers over officers and employees under the Secretary in accordance
with law, including their investigation and the designation of a committee or officer to conduct
such investigation;
(6) Appoint all officers and employees of the Department except those whose appointments are
vested in the President or in some other appointing authority; Provided, However, that where the
Department is regionalized on a department-wide basis, the Secretary shall appoint employees to
positions in the second level in the regional offices as defined in this Code;
(7) Exercise jurisdiction over all bureaus, offices, agencies and corporations under the
Department as are provided by law, and in accordance with the applicable relationships as
specified in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this Book;
(8) Delegate authority to officers and employees under the Secretarys direction in
accordance with this Code; and
FACTS
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits
and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE
W/N MC 2 is a valid
RULING
SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
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enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force
and effect of law.
DOCTRINE:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
FACTS
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda
allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within 15% above and
below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the
Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and
unreasonable.
ISSUE
W/N DOTC may delegate the power to prescribe rates
RULING
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to
an undue delegation of legislative authority.
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DOCTRINE
General Rule: An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a
statute by filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor
competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are
the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator or other public service.
Exception:
Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The
policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at
will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs.
This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may
increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases
them or whenever they deem it necessary to do so.
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
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charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries:
(i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii)
whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure.
But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of
the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments.
In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the
correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted
with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the
opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree
of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
DOCTRINE:
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of
respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
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notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3. Filing. -
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open
to public inspection.
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law
not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from
the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in
the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
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appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center
shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the
preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect,
together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to
the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general
subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is
punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin
and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be
made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may
select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or
distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of
each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
Section 9. Public Participation. -
(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Hypermix, supra
Phil. Communications Satellite vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989).
Include the Separate Opinion of Gutierrez, J.
GMA Network vs. COMELEC, G.R.No. 205357 (2014)
Board of Trustees vs. Velasco, 641 SCRA 372 (2011)
ASTEC vs. ERC. supra
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954)
Cawad vs. Abad, G.R. No. 207145 (2015). Include the Separate
Opinion of Leonen, J.
4. QUASI-JUDICIAL/ADJUDICATORY
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a. In General
Administrative agencies posses quasi-legislative or rule making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule making power is
the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and
separability of powers.
Interpretative rule, one of the three (3) types of quasi-legislative or rule making powers of
an administrative agency (the other two being supplementary or detailed legislation, and
contingent legislation), is promulgated by the administrative agency to interpret, clarify
or explain statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. The
purpose or objective of an interpretative rule is merely to construe the statute being
administered. It purports to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, the rule tries to
say what the statute means. Generally, it refers to no single person or party in particular
but concerns all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said
interpretative rule. It need not be published and neither is a hearing required since it is
issued by the administrative body as an incident of its power to enforce the law and is
intended merely to clarify statutory provisions for proper observance by the people. In
Taada v. Tuvera, 6 this Court expressly said that "[i]interpretative regulations . . . . need
not be published."
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. 7 The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. 8 In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of
the proceedings.
The importance of due process cannot be underestimated. Too basic is the rule that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Thus
when an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, notice and fair open
hearing are essential to the validity of the proceeding. The right to reasonable prior notice
and hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also the opportunity to
know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit arguments
implies that opportunity otherwise the right may as well be considered impotent. And
those who are brought into contest with government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed
at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairy advised of what the government
proposes and to be heard upon its proposal before it issues its final command. (CIR v
CA)
Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970)
Subido vs. CA, G.R. No. 216914 (2016)
Lupangco vs. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
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CIR vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236 (1986). Include the Separate
Opinions of Bellosillo and Hermosisima, JJ.
Saado vs. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 456 (2001)
b. Incidental Powers
Sec. 13, Book VII, EO 292
Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting
rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage
amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration.
Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. -
(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at
least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.
(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded
by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or
default.
(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.
Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily
available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If
the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit
rebuttal evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or
scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity
to contest the facts so noticed.
Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance
of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any
party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose
jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each
case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision
personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.
Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15)
days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an
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administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration
may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.
Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. -
(1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the
adjudication of contested cases.
(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary to prepare a
register or compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public.
FACTS
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. NLU avers that employer Toribio Teodoro (of the National
Workers Brotherhood [NWB] of Ang Tibay) made a false claim that there was a
shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay, making it necessary for him to lay off
workers. NLU alleges that such claim was unsupported by the Bureau of Customs
records and the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adopted
to discharge all the members of the NLU from work. Hence, they say that Teodoro
was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against NLU and unjustly
favoring NWB.
As regards the exhibits attached to this case, NLU says that these are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the CIR. In addition, the
attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
ISSUE
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DOCTRINE:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative
proceedings. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations
enumerated these rights: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must
have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or any of
its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and, (7) the tribunal should in all controversial questions render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding may know the various issues
involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.
ii. Judgment
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Hypermix, supra
e. Special Writs
Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318 (1989)
Lozada vs. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80 (2012)
Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)
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A. Introduction
Laurel, supra
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 (1964)
2. Disqualifications
a. General Disqualifications
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b. Specific Disqualifications
Sec. 13, Art. VI; Sec. 13, Art. VII; Sec. 12, Art. VIII; Secs. 1-2, Art. IX-
A; Secs. 1, Art. IX-B; Sec. 1, Art, IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D, all of
the 1987 Constitution
3. De Facto Officers
1. By Appointment
a. Classification
i. Permanent or Temporary
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i. Career Service
iii. Non-career
iv. Requisites
2. By Election
1. Rights
a. Right to Office
b. Pecuniary Rights
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2. Duties
Sec. 1,17-18, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
RA 6713
Alconera vs. Pallanan, A.M. No. 12-3069 (2014)
Marquez vs. Ovejera, A.M. No. P-11-2903 (2014)
Rabe vs. Flores, 272 SCRA 415 (1997)
PAGC vs. Pleyto, G.R. No. 176058 (2011)
3. Prohibitions
Sec. 2(4), 8 Art. IX-B; Sec. 16, Art. XI; Sec. 5 (3), Art. XVI, all of the
1987 Constitution
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E. Personnel Actions
1. Promotion
2. Transfer
3. Secondment
4. Detail
5. Reassignment
6. Reinstatement
7. Reemployment
3. Retirement
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6. Abandonment of Office
Sec. 11, OEC
Municipality of San Andres vs. CA, G.R. No. 118883 (1998)
Canonizado vs. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 359 (2001)
Quezon vs. Borromeo, 149 SCRA 205 (1987)
In Re: AWOL of Darlene Jacoba, A.M No. 98-8-246-RTC (1999)
Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Garrido, G.R. No. 135003 (2002)
Adiong vs. CA, G.R. No. 136480 (2001)
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
Gloria, supra
CSC vs. Magnaye, G.R. No. 183337 (2010)
Teves vs. Feliciano, A.M. No.P-12-3089 (2013)
Balasbas vs. Manayao, G.R. No. 190524 (2014)
Villanueva vs. CA, G.R. No. 167726 (2006)
Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307 (2014)
CSC vs. Clave, G.R. No. 194665 (2012)
Fernandez vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193983 (2012)
OCA vs. Ampong, A.M. No. P-13-3132 (2014)
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
A. General Principles
1. Suffrage
Art. V, Secs. 2-4, Art. XVII, Sec. 32, Art.VI, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 4, RA 9189
Sec. 2, RA 6735
Sec. 69, RA 7160
RA 8346
Sec. 2, RA 9369
3. Election Period
1. Composition
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
C. Political Parties
Secs. 3, 6, RA 7941
5. Absentee Voting
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
E. Candidacies
Sec. 79, OEC
1. The Candidate
2. Qualifications
Frivaldo, supra
Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970 (2012)
Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra
SJS vs. DDB, G.R. No. 157870 (2008)
3. Disqualifications to be candidates
5. Disqualifications of Candidates
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
Tagolino vs. HRET and Lucy Torres-Gomez, G.R. No. 202202 (2013)
Villafuerte vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698 (2014)
Hayudini vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900 (2014)
Gonzalez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856 (2011)
7. Substitution
Sec. 77, OEC
Sec. 12, RA 8436
Sec. 12, RA 9006
Sec. 2, RA 8436
Sec. 15, RA 9369
I. Casting and Counting of Votes
RA 9369
RA 6646
Sec. 5, OEC
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
K. Failure of Elections
Sec. 6, OEC
Carlos vs. COMELEC, 346 SCRA 571 (2000)
Batabor vs. COMELEC, 434 SCRA 63 (2004)
Sanchez vs. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (1987)
Sardea vs. COMELEC, 224 SCRA 344 (1993)
Mitmug vs. COMELEC, G.R.No. 106270 (1994)
Mutilan vs. COMELEC, 520 SCRA 152 (2007)
L. Special Election
Tolentino vs. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004)
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REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)
2. Quo Warranto
Sec. 253, OEC
Sampayan vs. Daza, 213 SCRA 807 (1992)
Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649 (2013)
Reyes vs. COMELEC, supra
3. Jurisdiction
Alvarez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527 (2001)
Veloria vs. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 502
Nollen vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635 (2010)
Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690
Lazatin vs. HRET, 168 SCRA 391
Arroyo vs. HRET, 246 SCRA 384 (1995)
Reyes vs. COMELEC, supra
P. Election Offenses
Sec. 2(6) Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution
Secs. 261-263, 267-269, OEC
Sec. 2, RA 7890
Secs. 31-32, RA 7166
Sec. 43, RA 9360
Sec. 27, RA 6646
Sec. 45, RA 8189
Sec. 5, RA 8295
Sec. 13, RA 9006
Sec. 28, 31-32, 35, 42, RA 9369
Pimentel vs. COMELEC, supra
Domalanta vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586 (2000)
Regalado vs. CA, G.R. No. 115962 (2000)
People vs. Reyes, supra
Margarejo vs. Escoses, G.R. No. 137250 (2001)
Guzman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182380 (2009)
BANAT vs. COMELEC, supra
Arroyo vs. DOJ, G. R, No. 199082 (2013)
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