Benami Jayalalitha Case
Benami Jayalalitha Case
Benami transactions have been a common practice in India since a very long period of time.
The word benami is of Persian origin and literally means property without a name. It
signifies a transaction where a person buys property in the name of another or gratuitously
transfers property to another without an intention to benefit that other.[1]A benami transaction
was one where property was purchased or transferred in the name of one person but another
person paid the consideration for the transfer. The person in whose name the property was
transferred was only the nominal owner while the person from whom the consideration
flowed was the real owner of the property. The practice of Benami transactions was not
restricted to Hindus but was also common among Muslims as furzee transactions. Moreover,
benami transactions were not confined to purchases in the name of a person but also applied
to leases and mortgages i.e. a person may take a lease of property in the name of another or he
may buy property in his own name and subsequently convey or mortgage it to another for a
fictitious consideration.
Benami transactions were noticed as early as the year 1778 in Mr. Justice Hydes notes after
the establishment of British rule in India. In 1854 the committee on a review of cases in
Gopeekrist Gosain Vs. Gungapersuad, (1854) 6 MLA 53, held that benami transaction is a
custom of the country and must be recognized till otherwise ordered by law. In 1882 sections
81 and 82 of Indian Trusts Act gave legislative recognition to the practice of benami
Such benami transactions abused and defrauded public revenues and creditors. The Parliament
for the first time intervened in 1976 when it introduced section 281A in the Income-tax Act,
1961 barring the institution of suit in relation to benami properties. But this too did not stop
benami transactions and its consequences, this time the Parliament totally prohibited the
benami transactions and made it an offence also, prohibiting all suits, claims and actions
based upon benami transaction. The Parliament also in order to stop the abuse and fraud by
the benami transaction property without compensation repealed section 82 of Indian Trusts
Act and section 281A of the Income tax Act alongwith other consequential repeal. The Law
Commission was requested to examine the subject on benami transactions in all its
ramifications. The Law Commission submitted its 57th Report. To implement the
(Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988 on 19th May, 1988 by which
it barred all suits and defences based upon benami transactions. This Ordinance was converted
(1) To implement the recommendations of the Fifty-seventh Report of the Law Commission
the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988, on the 19th May, 1988.
(2) The Ordinance provided that no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any
property held benami shall lie and no defence based on any right in respect of any property
held benami shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action. It however, made two exceptions
regarding property held by a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family for the benefit of the
Coparceners and property held by a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity for
the benefit of another person. It also repealed section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882,
section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 281A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
(3) The provisions of the Ordinance received a mixed response from the press and the public.
There had been criticism also that the Ordinance was a half-hearted measure and had not
tackled the problem effectively and completely. It was, therefore, felt that the Bill to replace
the Ordinance may be brought out as a comprehensive law on benami transactions touching
all aspects and accordingly, the Law Commission was requested to examine the subject in all
its ramifications. The Law Commission has submitted its 130th Report titled "Benami
(4) The Law Commission has, inter alia, recommended the inclusion of the following
(ii) entering into a benami transaction after the commencement of the new law should be
declared as an offence. However, an exception should be made for transactions entered into
by the husband or father for the transfer of properties in the name of the wife or unmarried
daughter for their benefit. By this, the doctrine of advancement as obtaining in the English
(iii) Voluntary organisations should be authorised to file complaints about the entering into of
benami transaction and the District Judges should be designated as Tribunals. Even Gram
Nayalayas recommended by the Law Commission may also be utilised for this purpose;
(iv) as both the benamidar and the true owner are equal participants to a criminal transaction,
by prohibiting the true owners right to recover property held benami as provided in the
Ordinance will be provided for an undue enrichment to the benamidar. As such, the
Commission has suggested that the properties should be acquired form him by resorting to a
procedure analogous to Chapter XXA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.It has been suggested that
the same action has to be taken when a benamidar retransfers the property back to the true
(v) in addition to section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, as provided in the Ordinance,
(vi) appointment of an authority, like the Charity Commissioner, for supervising private trusts
(5) The recommendations of the Law commission have been examined. It is felt that all the
authority, like the Charity Commissioner, for supervising private trusts, may be specifically
provided in the Bill, and the other two recommendations would, it is felt, come into effect
automatically as a result of the prohibition of benami transactions and the provision for
acquisition of all properties held benami. The Bill accordingly provides for the following,
(a) entering into benami transactions after the commencement of the new law will be an
offence, with an exception for the transfer of properties by the husband or father for the
(b) all the properties held benami will be subject to acquisition by such authority, in such
manner and after following such procedure, as may be prescribed by rules under the proposed
legislation. As a result of the provisions of the Ordinance and the prohibition of entering into
benami transactions, the benamidar would be acquiring the rights to the property by the mere
lending of his name and without investing any money for the purchase of such property.
Accordingly, it is provided that no amount shall be payable for the acquisition of any property
held benami:
Preamble
Act 45 of 1988
The Bill was passed by both the Houses of Parliament and it received the assent of the
President of 5th September 1988 and became the Benami transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988
(45 of 1988).
An Act to prohibit benami transactions and the right to recover property held benami for
(1) This Act may be called the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) The provisions of sections 3m 5 and 8 shall come into force at once, and the remaining
provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th day of May, 1988.
2. Definitions
(c) Property means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, tangible or
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to the purchase of property by any person in the
name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried
daughter.
(3) Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2of 1974),
(1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against
the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on
person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any
suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such
property.
(a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided
family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or
(b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing
in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he
COMMENTS
(i) Sub-section (1) of section 4 has no application to the claim made in the suit as this is not a
suit filed by or on behalf of defendant No.1 against defendant No.2 or the legal
representatives of defendant No..2, instead it is a suit filed by a third party for specific
performance of the suit contract against the real owner as well as benamidar, Murlidhar
(ii) The defence raised by the contesting respondents that the transaction of the sale under the
sale deed dated 9th October, 1957 executed in favour of the appellants was a benami
transaction is prohibited in view of section 4(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act,
1988; Duvuru Mohand Reddy v. Alluru Nagi Reddy, AIR 1994 SC 1647.
(iii) The defence taken by the defendant that the plot in fact was purchased by him in the
name of his brother i.e. the plot was purchased benami, cannot be allowed by virtue of
section4(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988; Om Prakash Rawal v. Justice
(iv) Under section 88 of Indian Trusts Act, an agent or other person bound is in a fiduciary
character to protect the interest of the principal and the former would hold the property for the
benefit of the principal or the person in whose behalf he acted as an agent. Held that a real
purchaser is the respondent, the petitioner as an agent and power of attorney had purchased
the property but ostensibly had his name entered in the sale certificate fraudulently and
without consent of the principal and the question of benami does not arise though section 4
prohibits such a plea; P. V. Sankara Karup v. Leelavathy Nambiar, AIR 1994 SC 2694.
(v) A coparcenery is purely a creature of law and it cannot be created by act of parties
whereas a composite family is the result of an agreement express or implied. There are
incidents to the constitution of a composite family, but all incidents are consequences of the
agreement between the parties. Held that exception is section4(3) could not be attracted in the
(vi) On coming into force of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, defence raised for the
proof of the fact that the property held by a person is in the capacity of a benamidar is
expressly prohibited. Neither the court is permitted in law to consider such defence nor to
record its findings. Held that the Income-tax Deptt. would be prohibited from raising a
defence that the suit property held by the wife is benami and the real owner is her husband;
Smt. Khateeja Bai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 NOC 136 MP.
(vii) The plaintiff cannot lay any claim in view of section 4 to the house on the ground that
they stand in the name of step mother benami for her deceased father, Baghyavathi v.
(viii) The burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction lies on the person who
asserts that is such a transaction. The governing principal for determining the question
whether a transaction is benami or not is to be proved by showing that the purchase money
came from a person other than the person in whose favour the property is transferred . The
intention of the person who contributed towards the money has to be inferred from the
circumstances and the relationship of the parties and the motive governing their action in
bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct; Mahinder Singh v. Pardaman
(ix) In view of section 4, there is a total prohibition against any suit based on benami
transaction and the plaintiff-respondent is not entitled to get any decree in such suit or in
appeal, an appeal being a constitution of suit and in the present case the appeal was pending
before this court. In s suit for recovery of benami property if any appeal is pending on the date
of coming into force of section 4 the appellant court can take inot account the subsequent
(x) Section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition ) Act, must be taken to relate of section 2
of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988. It
is clear that in spite of the recommendation of the Law Commission of India to bar institution
of suits only, the Ordinance making authority has thought if it to bar other proceedings also
and has also provided in express words barring of all claims and actions to enforce the right of
a person alleging to be the real owner against the benamidar. The Legislature by using the
expression shall lie made departure from the usual expression shall be institute clearly
demonstrate its resolve to regulate all such suits, claims or actions also which would be lying
in the court on the date of its commencement; Urmila Bala Dasi v. Probodh Chandra Ghosh,
(xi) The expression any property held benami is not limited to any particular time, date or
duration i.e. the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is retrospective in operation.
Once the property is found to have been held benami no suit, claim or action to enforce any
right in respect thereof shall lie. Sub-section (2) of section 4 similarly nullifies the defences
based on any right in respect of any property held benami. Section 4 in its sweep envisages
past benami transaction also within its retroactivity. In this sense the Act is both a penal and a
disqualifying statute. Held that as the appeal was pending in Supreme Court on
commencement of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, the matter becomes sub-
judice and thereafter the Supreme Court had seisin of the whole case and the decree passed
by the lower courts annihilated and the suit dismissed; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari
(xii) The benamidar before the enactment of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
could not have any right, title and interest in the property, which the benamidar could convey.
By the principle of fictional relation back as propounded by the Supreme Court in Mithlesh
Kumari, the benamidar should be deemed to have title to the property on the date he executed
the deed or release. Held that Surendra Kumar was the benamidar and in point of act on the
date of execution of the deed of release he had no right or interest in the property; Ratanlal
(Prohibition) Act, 1988 as the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant No 1 i.e. one of the
partners was or is a benamidar or that the money was paid by the plaintiff or that the property
was purchased in the name of the defendant No.1 as benamidar apart from that the under
section 14 and 15 of the Partnership Act, a partnership can acquire asserts in the name of
partners and these sections have not been deleted by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)
Act, 1988; Md. Hasan Hashmi v. Smt. Kaberi Roy, AIR 1993 Cal 70.
(xiv) Section 4 takes into its ambit the right of a real owner vis--vis ostensible owner. The
prohibition under section 4(1) and (2) does not prohibit the right of a third party to get a
declaration. The third party has the right to raise the contention that someone was the real
transferee and the sale deed was only executed in the name of the transferee who was a
(xv) Section 2 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property)
Ordinance, 1988 relates to section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and
Property) Ordinance, 1988, action means a civil proceeding commenced by "writ" or in such
other manner, as may be prescribed by rules of court but does not include a criminal
proceeding, therefore the term "action" is wide enough to take in an appeal or a second
(xvi) In the context and setting of section 4 the word held has to be understood as
"possessed or occupied". If the possession or occupation is not benami, section 4 can have no
application and as a sham transaction or bipartite transaction is not a benami. Section 4 does
not apply to such a transaction; Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair, AIR 1989 Ker 317.
(xvii) Section 4 and 7 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 relate to sections 2
and 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance,
1988. Both section 7 of the Benami Act and section 4 of the Benami Ordinance repeal section
82 of the Trusts Act keeping section 81 of the Trusts Act intact. Keeping in view section 81 of
Trusts Act nominal transactions are not intended to be covered and are not hit by section 4;B.
(1) All properties held benami shall be subject to acquisition by such authority, in such
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no amount be payable for the
COMMENTS
Section 5 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 applies only to tripartite or
benami transactions and not to bipartite or sham transactions, for if it had been so, the
compensation or payment of any amount and the Legislature too has not declared it as
opposed to public policy and prohibit the same prospectively; Bhargavy P. Sumaathykutty v.
Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act,
The object of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is vest ownership rights in
benamidar as against the real owner. It is not the intention of the Benami Act to protect such
person from the creditors who allege diversion of funds by such persons in a fraudulent
manner in order to escape their liability to the creditor. Therefore when it is alleged that the
diversion of funds (movable property) by defendant No. 1 in favour of the other defendant
was fraudulent and illegal section 6 of the Act Protects such a claim from the applicability of
section 4; M/s PNB Finance Ltd. v. Shital Prasad Jain, AIR 1991 Del 13.
(1) Sections 81, 82 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2of 1882), section 66 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5of 1908), and section 281 A of the Income-tax Act, 1961(43 of 1961).
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect
the continued operation of section 281 A of the Income tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), in the
(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules
under section 5;
(c) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed
(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before
each House of Parliament, while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of
the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both
Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should
not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no
effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be
without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule.
(1) The Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance
shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
Whenever a property has been purchased by one person for which consideration has been paid
The proposition of law regarding the ownership of any property would be that the person in
whose name the property has been purchased is presumed to be the real owner of the property
and the burden of proving the transaction as benami is on the person who asserts that the
property was purchased through the funds provided by him. Property means property of any
kind, whether movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and includes any right or interest
in such property. The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is a piece of prohibitory
legislation and it prohibits benami transactions subject to stated exceptions. Sections 3,5,8 of
the Act came into force on 5-9-1988 and the remaining sections came into force on 19-05-
1988.
Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 = whether the facts disclosed would indicate that
even after coming into force of the Act the defence under Secion 4 can be available.
Admittedly, the transaction in question was registered on 24th August, 1970. The suit was
filed on 5th of July 1984 which was long before coming into force of the Act. It is an admitted
position that the written statement in the suit taking plea of benami was also filed by the
appellant long before the Act had come into force. Therefore, it was not a case where Section
4(2) of the Act will have a limited operation in the pending suit after Section 4(2) of the Act
had come into operation. It is true that the judgment of the trial court was delivered after the
Act had come into force but that could not fetter the right of the appellant to take the plea of
benami in his defence. Since the Act cannot have any retrospective operation in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, as held by this Court in the aforesaid decision, we are
therefore of the view that the appellant was entitled to raise the plea of benami in the written
statement and to show and prove that he was the real owner of the suit property and that the
respondent was only his benamidar. ;sub-section (2) of Section 3 clearly says that nothing in
sub-section (1) shall apply to purchase of property of any person in the name of his wife,
unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that suit property
had been purchased for the benefit of the unmarried daughter. = Section 3 deals with
Prohibition of benami transaction. Sub-section (1) clearly prohibits that no person shall enter
into benami transaction. However, sub-section (2) of Section 3 clearly says that nothing in
sub-section (1) shall apply to purchase of property of any person in the name of his wife,
unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that suit property
had been purchased for the benefit of the unmarried daughter. Section 3(2) makes it
abundantly clear that if a property is purchased in the name of an unmarried daughter for her
benefit, that would only be a presumption but the presumption can be rebutted by the person
who is alleging to be the real owner of the property by production of evidences or other
materials before the court. In this case, the trial court as well as the appellate court
concurrently found that although the suit property was purchased in the name of the
respondent but the same was purchased for the interest of the appellant. We are therefore of
the opinion that even if the presumption under section 3(2) of the Act arose because of
purchase of the suit property by the father ( in this case appellant ) in the name of his daughter
( in this case respondent ), that presumption got rebutted as the appellant had successfully
succeeded by production of cogent evidence to prove that the suit property was purchased in
the benami of the respondent for his own benefit. ;whether the concurrent findings of fact
could be set aside by the High Court in the second appeal. = From the judgment of the High
Court we further find that the concurrent findings of fact were set aside not on consideration
of the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below but only on the basis of the arguments of
the learned Advocate of the respondent. This was also not permissible to the High Court in
Second Appeal to come to a contrary findings of its own only on the basis of the arguments of
the learned counsel for the respondent without considering the findings of the trial court as
well as the appellate court. (See [2002(9) SCC 735, Gangajal Kunwar (Smt.) and Ors. Vs.
Sarju Pandey (Dead) by LRs & Ors.] ). It is equally settled that High Court in second appeal
is not entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below
until and unless it is found that the concurrent findings of fact were perverse and not based on
sound reasoning.
PROVISIONS
THE Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of
the Right to Recover Property) Act, 1988, did not prohibit a suit being filed against a trustee
The ruling was given by a Division Bench comprising Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal and Mr. Justice
R.P. Sethi while allowing an appeal in the case of C. Gangacharan Vs. C. Narayanan.
The appellant had sent money from abroad to the respondent to enable him to purchase
immovable properties in his name (appellant). The respondent purchased properties in his
On July 20, 1983, the appellant filed a suit for possession of the suit properties or its market
value. The case of the appellant was that the money, which was sent was wrongly utilised in
purchasing the properties in the name of the respondent and his b rothers instead of
On July 31, 1985, the suit for possession was decreed with costs and mesne profits were to be
The respondent filed an appeal in the High Court (name not given in the order), which
7, 1988. The appellant then filed an execution application before the trial court. Before the
said application was disposed of on May 19, 1988, the Benami Trans actions (Prohibition of
Basing on the Ordinance, objections were filed by the respondent to the effect that the decree
The executing court disallowed the objections and thereafter the respondent filed a revision
By its judgment, dated August 2, 1988, the High Court held that the Ordinance prohibited the
recovery of the possession of the suit properties which was being held by the respondent as a
The Supreme Court, in its order, noted the High Court had already given a categorical finding
to the effect that the respondent was only a trustee and the case was governed by Section 82
``Section 4 of the Act which contains the prohibition to recover the property held in benami
expressly provides in sub-section (3), clause (b) that the said section is not to apply, inter alia,
In view of the finding of the High Court in its judgment, the Supreme Court said, the
properties were being held in the name of the respondent as a trustee. The question of the
respondent invoking the provisions of the Ordinance or the Act did not arise. The provisions
of the Act did not prohibit a suit being filed against a trustee for the recovery of the trust
properties.
``That apart, this court in R. Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by Lawyers and others vs. Padmini
Chandrasekharan (dead) by Lawyers (1995) has held that the Act and the Ordinance were not
retrospective in operation and the Act did not apply to pending suits'', the court observed.
This being so, the High Court, the apex court said, fell in error in setting aside the decision of
the executing court and in holding that the right of the appellant to recover possession had
Inordinate and unexplained delay and further continuance of the criminal proceedings pending
Objection based on denial of right to speedy trial should first be addressed before the High
Court, this Court has no hesitation to invoke and exercise the extraordinary inherent power
(vi)This Court finds inapplicable the decisions in Jamuna Chaudhary and Surya Sankaram
Karri's cases since this Court does not find any reason to find that the investigating officer has
acted unfairly. The reliance in J.Satyanarayana and Mohanlal Soni's cases is misplaced as in
State of Tamil Nadu v. N.Suresh Rajan and others [2014 (3) SCC (Cri) 529], the Supreme
.While passing the order of discharge, the fact that the accused other than the two Ministers
have been assessed to income tax and paid income tax cannot be relied upon to discharge the
accused persons particularly in view of the allegation made by the prosecution that there was
no separate income to amass such huge properties. The property in the name of an income tax
assessee itself cannot be a ground to hold that it actually belongs to such an assessee. In case
this proposition is accepted, in our opinion, it will lead to disastrous consequences. It will give
opportunity to the corrupt public servants to amass property in the name of known persons,
pay income tax on their behalf and then be out from the mischief of law.
(vii)The reliance on the judgment in Selvi.J.Jayalalitha's case is to be stated only to be
It is to be kept in mind that on one hand, the right of the accused is to have a speedy trial and
on the other, the quashment of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for sending the matter
for re- trial has to be weighed, regard being had to the impact of the crime on the society and
the confidence of the people in the judicial system. There cannot be a mechanical approach.
From the principles laid down in many an authority of this Court, it is clear as crystal that no
time limit can be stipulated for disposal of the criminal trial. The delay caused has to be
weighed on the factual score, regard being had to the nature of the offence and the concept of
social justice and the cry of the collective. In the case at hand, the appellant has been charge-
sheeted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for disproportionate assets. The said Act
has a purpose to serve. The Parliament intended to eradicate corruption and provide deterrent
punishment when criminal culpability is proven. The intendment of the legislature has an
immense social relevance. In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the
potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is
small and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in
our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An
attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the
collective and an anathema to the basic tenet of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the
people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law. Be it noted, system
of good governance is founded on collective faith in the institutions. If corrosions are allowed
to continue by giving allowance to quash the proceedings in corruption cases solely because
of delay without scrutinizing other relevant factors, a time may come when the unscrupulous
people would foster and garner the tendency to pave the path of anarchism.
It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that corruption is not to be judged by
degree, for corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates
undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the
economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of
governance. It is worth noting that immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the
people believing in honesty, and history records with agony how they have suffered. The only
redeeming fact is that collective sensibility respects such suffering as it is in consonance with
the constitutional morality. Therefore, the relief for quashing of a trial under the 1988 Act has
(viii)All that a Court is required to do in considering a petition for discharge u/s.239 Cr.P.C.
only is to satisfy itself as to the existence or absence of a prima facie case. The reasons
Crl.O.P.Nos.26062 & 26063 of 2007 These petitions seek quash of proceedings in Special
C.C.No.2 of 2006 pending on the file of learned Special Judge I/X Additional Judge, Chennai.
Once a prima facie case is made out, no occasion arises to consider favourably the petitions
seeking quash of proceedings in Special C.C.No.2 of 2006 pending on the file of learned
In the result,
Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, passed in Crl.M.P.Nos.6601 and 6602 of 1997 in
Crl.O.P.No.7 of 1997 on 11.08.1998 raising the attachment of properties held by third parties
is affirmed.
(iii)The order of the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, passed in
names of A2 to A4 are set aside. The attachment of properties standing in the names of A2 to
A4 are made absolute. However, the same shall extend only to properties listed as Item
(v)Criminal Original Petition Nos.26062 and 26063 of 2007 shall stand dismissed. The trial
Court is directed to dispose of the case in Special C.C.No.2 of 2006 on the file of learned
Special Judge I/X Additional Judge, Chennai, on a day-to-day basis, in any event, not later
It is the duty of this Court to inform and record its great displeasure in the action/inaction of
the State agencies in earnestly not pursuing the proceedings before this Court. What is the
effect?
In a case in which wrong doings between 1991 and 1996 are alleged, the final report has been
filed in 2006. The order of the Court below was of the year 1998. Since then, over 17 long
years, the matter has been pending before this Court. A perusal of the docket suggests that the
matter has not been listed between September 2001 and November 2011. Leave alone the
question of why in a case alleging offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
more particularly, disproportionate possession of assets, the First Information Report of the
year 1996 resulted in the filing of a charge sheet only after 10 long years, the questions, of
who is responsible for pendency of proceedings before this Court over 17 long years, what, if
any, are the vested interests and are none accountable, cry for an answer.
2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance & Anti Corruption, C.S.V.I. Chennai.
3.The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Erode Detachment at Erode.
JUDGEMENTS
Section 107 of the IPC deals with abetment of a thing. Abetment is constituted by instigating a
person for committing an offence or intentionally hiding a person committing it. Instigation
necessarily connotes some suggestion or support or stimulation to the commission of the act
itself. Sometimes, illegal omission also comes under the purview of the abetment. Though the
prosecution has adduced evidence, nearly about 259 witnesses, prosecution mainly relies on
registration of 165 documents i.e., sale deeds and registration of the documents at the
residence of Accused No.1. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution is that, Accused
No.1 has amassed wealth and she has parted with this amount to Accused Nos. 2 to 4 to
acquire immovable properties, namely, agricultural lands, sites and 32 firms and companies.
There is a positive evidence to the effect that the Accused, firms and companies have
borrowsaed a a loan in a sum of Rs.24,17,31,274/-. Besides, they also borrowed loans from
private parties. This loan borrowed by private parties has not been considered by this Court.
However, the evidence reveals that this amount has been utilized for purchase of agricultural
lands, sites, firms and companies. Therefore, the question of Accused No.1 abetting for
Accused Nos. 2 to 4 for acquiring the immovable properties does not arise. Accused Nos. 1 to
4 individually secured loans from the banks and they have acquired the properties. Therefore,
the charge under Section 107 read with section 109 of the Act must fail.
Page 821-822 of Cunha judgement: One of the peculiar features of the rules of evidence
relating to conspiracy is that, anything said or done by any one of the conspirators having
reference to their common offence, is under certain circumstances evidence against the other.
The reason of the law is that, within the scope of conspiracy, the position of the conspirators is
analogous to that of partners, one being considered the agent of the other.
Page 887: In so far as the complicity of A-2 to A-4 in the alleged offence is concerned, there
the A-2 to A-4 in the commission of the above offence u/Sec. 13 (1)(e) of the Act. Though it is
argued by the learned counsel for the accused that, except the fact that A-1 to A-4 were
residing together under the common roof, there is no other evidence to show that they were
parties to the criminal conspiracy, yet, the circumstances proved in evidence conclusively
establish that all the accused acted in a concert with each other with the sole object to acquire
and hold properties and assets disproportionate to the known source of income of A-1.
2. Kumaraswamy order
Pg 894-895
Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with things said or done by the Conspirator in
reference to common desire. This section will come into play only when Court is satisfied that
there are reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together i.e. to
say there must be prima facie evidence. Where 895 evidence is only circumstantial, the
circumstance in their totality must be such as would not only be consistent with the guilt of
the Accused, but also inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of his innocence.
Kum Page 895: Just because Accused Nos. 2 to 4 stay along with Accused No.1, that itself is
not component which the Court can come to the conclusion that Accused Nos. 1 to 4 abetted
Cunha Page 891-892: Though the factum of A-1 to A-4 residing together by itself may not
lead to the inference that there was meeting of mind to pursue the object of conspiracy. The
very fact, A-2 to A-4 have engaged themselves in constituting firms and acquiring large tracts
of land out of the funds provided by A-1 indicate that, all the accused congregated in the
house of A-1 not for social living nor A-1 allowed them free accommodation out of
humanitarian concern, rather the facts and circumstances proved in evidence undoubtedly
point out that A-2 to A-4 were accommodated in the house of A-1 pursuant to the criminal
Kum Page 902: The prosecution mainly relies on evidence of the Sub-Registrar and brokers
and also the sale deeds. Except marking the sale deeds, there is no other evidence. The burden
lies on the prosecution to establish benami transaction. The prosecution has not adduced any
Kum Page 903: The allegation of prosecution is that Accused Nos.2 to 4 purchased the
property from the ill gotten money of Accused No.1. The value of immovable property
acquired amounts to Rs.6,24,09,120/- i.e., agricultural lands. Kodanadu Tea Estate was
acquired by Accused Nos. 2 to 4 and it is worth about Rs.3.50 Crores. The prosecution itself
has shown the property of Accused Nos. 1 to 4 firms and companies to the extent of
Rs.9,34,26,053.56/- whereas the loan borrowed by Accused Nos. 1 to 4 and also firms and
5. Unverified costing & estimates; Engineers valuing pandal etc did not see, therefore hearsay
Kum Page 905-906: I have adopted the square rate and cost of construction per square rate is
taken as Rs.28,000/-. The marbles or granites samples were not sent to the suppliers.Quotation
is not procured. They have simply guessed the rate and assessed the value of granite and
marbles. The construction cost was valued at Rs.27,79,88,945/- by the DV & AC. The
construction area measured by way of square feet is about 1,66,839.68 sq. feet. It amounts to
1668.39 squares. The learned Sessions Judge has simply on guess work has reduced the cost
of construction to the extent of 20% without verifying the evidence and the material placed on
record.
Kum Page 906: Engineers valued pandal based on plan. Their evidence is to the effect that
without inspecting the pandal, they have given statement of expenditure that might have
Cunha Page 366: 67.7) I have carefully gone through Ex.P.1019 and the evidence of PW.181.
I am in full agreement with the counsel for A-1 that PW.181 was neither an eye witness to the
marriage arrangements made at the venue nor had he any personal knowledge about the
expenses incurred thereto. But, in appreciating the evidence of this witness, it is pertinent to
note that the submissionSpl.C.C.208/2004 367 of the learned Spl. P.P. is that, PW.181 is
examined only as an expert witness to speak about the cost of the arrangements. In order to
prove that the various arrangements noted by PW.181 in his report Ex.P.1019 were in fact
carried out at the venue, the prosecution has examined large number of witnesses and
therefore, the evidence of PW.181 has to be analysed in the context of the evidence of the
other witnesses who have given elaborate evidence regarding each and every item of the
Kum Page 907: In our Hindu customs, it is bride's family members who take care of marriage
Accused No.1 was Chief Minister at that time, we cannot saddle all the marriage expenses on
her part.
Cunha Page 438-440: 72.37) The circumstances surrounding the opening of the account for
the alleged purpose of maintaining the marriage expenses by DW.1 who is not the immediate
member of the family of the bride is another factor leading to doubt the defence set up by the
accused. The opening of a bank account to meet the marriage expenses is a strange and
unnatural. Commonly, parents save for the marriage of their wards either in the form of
deposits or bank savings or raise loans. In the instant case, accused have come up with a novel
story that a fresh account was opened and thereafter money was remitted to that account from
the family companies and family of the bride. But neither DW.1 nor the accused have named
the persons who remitted the money to this account. The entries contained in Ex.D.15 show
that, the account was opened on 14.08.1995 by remitting cash of Rs.1,001/- and on
Rs.58,80,000/-, Rs.17,80,521/- is remitted to this account and on 23.08.95, Rs.28 lakhs has
been remitted. 72.38) Even with regard to the source of the money remitted to this account,
the version of DW.1 is that, it is remitted by the family members. There is no evidence as to
which of the family members remitted this money. Curiously, during the argument it is
submitted that, enquiry was conducted by the Income Tax Authorities and the department has
accepted the case of DW.1 that it is foreign remittance. This theory is not spoken to by DW.1
in his evidence making it evident that the theory of foreign remittance is an afterthought
which cannot be given any credence. 72.39) Another circumstance which leads to disbelieve
the contention of the accused is that, none of the witnesses or relatives of the bride have come
forward to say that DW.1 looked after the marriage expenses. There is absolutely no
corroboration whatsoever to the testimony of DW.1. On the other hand, it has come in
evidence that the father of the bride gave Rs.14 lakhs into the hands of PW.200 towards the
expenses. If bank account was opened to meet the marriage expenses and all the arrangements
were looked after by DW.1 as contended by the accused, there is no explanation as to why the
father of the bride had to pay Rs.14 lakhs to PW.200. 72.40) The evidence of DW.1 is silent as
to the arrangement made by him in connection with the marriage. There is not even a stray
sentence in his entire evidence that he made the payment through cheques from the above
account towards the marriage expenses. This is yet another circumstance to show that the
opening of Ex.D.15 and the story of issuance of cheque is only a make believe story which
has taken shape only after the closure of the evidence of the prosecution.
7. Not taken into account loans and income from Kodanad tea estate
Kum Page 909-910: The case of the prosecution that Accused No.1 amassed wealth and
acquired agricultural lands, sites, floated firms, became Directors of the companies cannot be
believed because the money that has been spent for acquiring the said properties can be
inferred from the loans borrowed from the Nationalized Banks. Besides, Accused was having
On perusal of evidence of PW.71, it is clear that Kodanadu Tea Estate generated income to the
extent of Rs.7 Crores. This is the income generated from the tea estate. The Investigating
Agency has valued the building constructed in the tea estate and also pipes laid down in the
tea estate. But, it is very strange that they have not assessed the income of the tea estate and
added to Annexure-III i.e., income during check period between 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996. The
Investigating Agency has omitted this income in Annexure-III. Even defence has not
examined any witness as to what is the income generated from the tea estate and they have
also not claimed the same. Therefore, this court has not considered this income while
Kum Page 916: Though the Trial Court in its judgment mentioned that the accused availed
loan by the Indian Bank, but it has not considered the same as income. Therefore, the Trial
Kum Page 917: It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that without
treating the witnesses as hostile, the witnesses were recalled and cross-examined. The
questions are put in such a manner that whether what they have stated in the examination-
and also by adopting this method, they cannot wipe-out the answers elicited in the cross-
examination. This is also one of the factors, which weigh in favour of the accused. If the
witness gives different statements at different stages, it is unsafe to place reliance on them.
Taking into consideration of overall circumstances and material placed on record, in my view,
the Judgment and finding recorded by the Trial Court suffers from infirmity and it is not
sustainable in law.
The High Court found a number of holes in the prosecution's arguments. Justice
Kumaraswamy ruled that there was not enough evidence to suggest that Jayalalithaa was
linked to the 32 companies, and the presence of her associates on the board was not enough.
The HC also found that the prosecution and trial court had erred in their judgement that bank
loans worth Rs 24.17 crore was used as an income by the companies linked to the accused. It
also ruled that the value of the properties owned by Jayalalithaa and her associates was only
Rs 6.24 crore not Rs 20.07 crore as the trial court had stated.
To the allegation of her spending Rs 22.53 crore on refurbishment and renovation the High
Court found this to be untrue and ruled the amount was only Rs 5.10 crore.
"Everything assessed is done more or less on guesswork rather than actual price prevailing
One piece of evidence that the special judge had taken into consideration to assess the
into the bank accounts of a newspaper, Namadhu MGR, operated by a firm with Jayalalithaa
as a partner. The High Court over-ruled this saying this was accumulated through collection of
Lastly, the High Court also found fault with the fact that she spent Rs 3 crore on her son's
wedding, where musicians A R Rahman and Mandolin Srinivas were performing. " Just
because Accused No 1 was Chief Minister at that time, we cannot saddle all marriage
expenses on her part. Relying on income tax returns towards expenditure of marriage, I
consider that she has spent about Rs 28,68,000", the High Court ruled.
In the end, Justice Kumaraswamy found that the accused had assets worth Rs 37.59 crore
against a total income of Rs 34.76 crore with disproportion worth Rs 2.82 crore. The court,
therefore, acquitted them as the percentage of disproportionate assets is 8.12 percent, which is
There are no studies or records to show whether the BTPA has succeeded in achieving its
purpose but from the preceding section, it is evident that the Act in its present form has too
many loopholes for it to ever achieve its purpose. An example of the failure of the Act is that
this researcher could not find any cases dealing with benami transactions, which were filed
before the Courts after the passing of the Act except those relating to retrospectivity of the
Act.
It is submitted that to change a century old practice, change in the law by itself shall not serve
the purpose. Change has to be through a gradual process. At the same time, the glaring
loopholes in the Act sufficiently ensure that the practice need not change, as the provisions of
the Act shall not be implemented. Is this merely a product of poor legislative drafting or due
to lack of political will to bring about change? One possible reason for the legislators lack of
commitment could be that more often than not our lawmakers are themselves responsible for
evasion of taxes and they find entering into benami transactions a convenient way to carry out
their ends.
Yet if we want that the prohibition of this practice to be strictly enforced, the law needs to be
drastically amended. In this regard, the following recommendations may be taken note of-:
The definition of benami transactions should be amended to include within its ambit sham
transactions.
The Central government should make rules regarding acquisition of property under this Act at
the earliest.
A provision should be enacted in the law not only barring the real owner but also the
benamidar from having any claim to the property. There is really no justification for the
benamidar having a right to the property since neither the consideration for the same was paid
The exceptions provided in the Act with regard to purchase of property in the name of wife or
unmarried daughter as also regarding purchase of property by a Hindu coparcener are liable to
misuse and hence must be repealed. However, the exception with regard to a trustee holding
The lack of litigation, after the Act has shown as already discussed that either the fact that the
benamidars are close relations of the real owner or the threat of criminal prosecution once
they fall out shall prevent the benamidars from coming to Court and asserting their rights.
Therefore, the Act should not depend upon acquiring property held benami based on the
property and all such land should be acquired.This land can be used for the benefit of poor
Such amendments coupled with proper enforcement of the law may help in checking the
violation of tax and revenue laws and at the same time provide land to the government for
However, for carrying out such drastic amendments and ensuring proper enforcement of the
amended law, political will and legislative commitment is required. It is doubtful whether in
light of increasing corruption amongst our politicians this will be forthcoming in the near
future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Raghu Raman C.S. Critical Appraisal of the Law Relating to Benami Transactions 2
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary 1 (4th ed., New Delhi:
Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage (Justice Alladi Kuppuswamy ed,, 14th ed., New
Mulla, 1 Principles of Hindu Law (Satyajeet A. Desai ed., 17th ed., New Delhi: Butterworths,
1998).
Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law (Faridabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 1998).
S.K. Mitra, Mitra on Hindu Law (Allahabad: Orient Publishing House, 2000).
Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed., P.J. Fitzgerald ed., Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd.,
1966).
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-government-to-soon-bring-bill-to-curb-benami-
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http://www.scoopwhoop.com/news/why-the-high-court-acquitted-jayalalithaa/
http://blog.scconline.com/post/2015/05/27/benami-transactions-prohibition-amendment-bill-
2015/