Secret Weapons of The Luftwaffe
Secret Weapons of The Luftwaffe
Table of Contents 5
Mission Instructions: In-Flight 107 German and U .S.
Simulation Controls 109 Aircraft and Weapons 145
Pilot View Controls 109 German Secret Weapons Projects 146
Maneuvering Controls 111 German Aircraft:
Airplane Controls and Equipment 113 Messerschmitt Bf 109G-6
Engine Controls 113 and Bf 109G-l 0 Fighter 149
Weapons Controls 115 Focke-WulfFW 190A-5
Crew Position Controls and FW l 90A-8 Fighter 154
(Bomber Only) 115 Messerschmitt Me 163B-la
Gunner Position Controls Komet Fighter 158
(Bomber Only) 116 Messerschmitt Me 262A-la
Bombardier Controls (Bomber Only) 117 and Me 262A-2a Fighter 162
Using the Norden Bombsight 117 Gotha Go 229A-0 Fighter-Bomber 168
Cockpit Instruments 118 United States Aircraft:
View Indicators 118 Republic P-47C Thunderbolt
Flight Instruments 118 Fighter ("Razorback") 172
Airplane Control Indicators 119 Republic P-470 Thunderbolt
Engine Indicators 120 Fighter ("Razorback") 176
Weapons Indicators 121 North American P-51 B
Aircraft Operating Instructions 124 and P-51C Mustang Fighter 180
Flight Fundamentals 124 North American P-51 D
Aircraft Engines 124 Mustang Fighter 184
Stalling 127 Boeing B-l 7F and B-l 7G
Maneuvering 127 Flying Fortress Bomber 188
Takeoffs and Landings 129 German Airborne Weapons 194
Film Viewing Room 130 United States Airborne Weapons 197
Film Controls 130
Disk Menu 131 Combat Tactics 199
View Modes 131 General Fighter Tactics 200
Selecting Camera Positions Firing Weapons 202
and Tracked Objects 132 Fighter Formations 205
The View Window 134 Fighter versus Fighter Tactics 206
In-Flight Map 134 Fighters Attacking Bombers 209
Getting Information from Fighters Protecting Bombers 213
the In-Flight Map 134 Ground-Attack Tactics 214
Changing Orders 135 Bomber Formations 217
BombingTactics 218
Mission Instructions: Post-Flight 137
Flak 218
Ending Your Mission 138
Mission and Campaign Results 139 Appendix 221
Updating Combat Records 139 Suggested Reading 222
Medals and Promotions 140 Bibliography 223
U.S. Army Air Force Medals 140
Battle Maps 225
Luftwaffe Medals 141
Ranks and Promotions 143
Introduction 7
In addition to what could be the most realistic action
graphics of any computer simulation, Secret Weapons of the
Luftwaffe gives you a host of all-new simulation features. For
example, an advanced flight control mode lets you try your
hand at expert aerial maneuvers. With the new Tour of
Duty option, you can try to survive a set number of missions
just like World War II pilots did. Other features, such as the
replay gun camera and the In-Flight Map, have been en-
hanced and improved. And, of course, you'll be able to cre-
ate your own custom missions with the Mission Builder. In
Campaign Missions, you'll direct the war effort, setting the
strategy for the side you choose. This can include dictating
German war production, if you're directing the German
side, and selecting which German targets to bomb, if you're
directing the U.S. side. You'll see if your command deci-
sions can affect the outcome of the air war over Europe.
How to Use This Manual
Once again, we've produced an enormous manual for
our simulation. However, the volume's size doesn't mean
that the simulation instructions are lengthy and complex.
Actually, the opposite is true, as we've attempted to make
our instructions more concise, better organized, and easier
to understand. This manual contains a
"Armies and navies have clashed for more detailed Historical Overview chapter,
centuries, and their battles, strategies, plus interviews with World War II veterans
and tactics have been recorded, studied, and experts. The chapters on aircraft and
and analyzed by historians and war col- tactics have also been expanded.
leges of m any nations. Prior to World To get started, take a look at the Refer-
W ar II , air power had never had similar ence Card inside the simulation box , and
experience. Although Lord Trenchard of turn to the Loading Instructions, which tell
Britain, General Douhet of Italy, and you how to load the program and start it
General William Mitchell of the U.S. had up. For your convenience, the Reference
prophesized that strategic air power Card also lists all the keyboard commands
co uld exercise a decisive influence on
you'll use in the simulation. The Qy,ick Start
warfare, those theorie s had never been
tested ....
instructions on the Reference Card can get
"For the first time, the U.S. Eighth you in the air on a sample mission right
A ir Force, operating out of Britain, and away. Next, turn to the three Mission In-
Britain's own Royal Air Force were to be structions chapters. Pre-Flight tells you how
given the resources to test those theories to select a mission, choose the aircraft you
of the use of strategic air power. General want to fly, create a pilot or crew to fly yo ur
H. H. Arnold, head of the U.S. Army Air mission, and get a briefing before taking
Force, was a dedicated Mitchell disciple. off. In-Flight gives you information on the
His instructions to General Carl Spaatz various flight controls and weapons you'll
and to me were clear-cut, specific, use while flying your mission . Post-Flight de-
unmistakable. We were to take the scribes how to end your mission and get a
heavy bombers General Arnold would post-flight review, which could include a
send us and demonstrate what air power
medal or promotion if you distinguish
could do ."
yourself in battle.
U.S. Army Air Force
Brigadie r General Ira Eaker Whenever you're ready to learn more
about the aerial battles , strategies, and
Introduction 9
. .
fill~T ffHl[H~
[ WfHW lf~
ne of the longest and bloodiest cam-
paigns of World War II was fought in
broad daylight in the skies over western
Europe from 1943 to 1945. This air bat-
tle, the greatest the world has ever wit-
nessed, pitted two formidable adversaries
against each other. On the offensive was the United States
Army Air Force, which sought to destroy the industrial
might of Germany through precision bombing, and thus
prove that air power could win war single-handedly. On the
defensive was the German air force, the Luftwaffe, desper-
ately battling the American bombers with experienced pi-
lots and a variety of fighter aircraft, including the proven
Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the outstanding Focke-Wulf FW
190. As this air war slowly shifted in favor of the United
States, a succession of highly advanced German jet and
rocket aircraft were unleashed against the hordes of Ameri-
can aircraft. Two of these weapons, the Me 262 jet fighter
and the Me 163 rocket fighter, proved to be far deadlier in
combat than anything the Americans could counter with.
German technological advances at this time exceeded simi-
lar Allied research developments, but the resulting
weapons were plagued by development problems, and
Adolf Hitler and others in the Third Reich's leadership ulti-
mately squandered any advantage they might have given
the Germans. Still, some historians have called these ad-
vanced German warplanes "war-winning weapons"; had
they seen action earlier, perhaps they would have had a
chance to fully live up to their frightening potential - and
alter the outcome of the war.
THE " GRAND ALLIANCE "
Oune 1940-December 1941)
With nearly all of continental Europe under German
control by 1940, only Great Britain remained as an active
opponent. In the summer of 1940, the fighters and
bombers of the Luftwaffe pushed the fighter defense of the
British Royal Air Force to the brink of defeat. But the Ger-
mans, in a strategic blunder, ceased their attacks on RAF
airfields and began bombing London at the
moment when victory was within reach.
"War, no matter how it may be glo- This four-month aerial struggle, the Battle
rified, is unspeakably horrible in every
of Britain, marked the first German setback
form. The bomber simply adds to the
of the war. Germany canceled Operation
extent of the horror, especially if not
used with discretion; but whe n used with Sea Lion, the planned invasion of England,
the proper degree of understanding, it but continued to bomb England by night.
becomes, in effect, the most humane of Though supplying the British with aid
weapons." through the Lend-Lease program, the
U.S. Army Air Force General United States was reluctant to help Britain
Henry H. "Hap" Arnold further by entering a new war.
Meanwhile, in other battlefields of the
Algeria
(Algeria & Morocco controlled
MorOfCO by Vichy France 1940-1942) Tunisia
Historical Overview 13
and on December 4, the German drive on Moscow was halt-
ed.
But events taking place on the other side of the world
would greatly affect the course of the European war. On De-
cember 7, 1941,Japanese aircraft attacked and sank most of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The next day , in a
show of support for his Axis ally Japan, Hitler declared war
on the United States. At last, Britain had a powerful ally in
its struggle against Germany, and thus the "Grand Alliance"
was born.
THE RAF ' S FIRST
BOMBING MISSIONS
(August 1940-June 1942)
During the Battle of Britain and the Blitz of London, the
British people wanted desperately to show that they were
still in the fight, and were demanding vengeance for their
bombed-out cities. The RAF 's Bomber Command launched
a series of retaliatory "nuisance raids," first
against Berlin, then against German mili-
tary targets. Later, in an effort to break the
morale of the German people, this bombing
campaign was increasingly directed at
cities. Missions flown in daylight resulted in
heavy British losses, and the RAF decided
to switch to night bombing, hoping the
darkness might offer some protection. Un-
fortunately, precision bombing proved
nearly impossible at night, since few of the
bombers could even find their targets, let
alone hit them . With only one-third of the
bombs landing within five miles of their tar-
get, the RAF attacks were more hazardous
to sheep and cows than to Germans. More-
over, the RAF bombers were without fighter
escort, and losses to German night fighters
mounted.
Recognizing that their bomber force was
too weak to do the job, in November of
1941 British prime minister Winston
A bom bed-out cathedral at Churchill curtailed the bombing offensive against Germany
Furth.
and won cabinet approval to build up Bomber Command
to 4,000 aircraft. Then, in February of 1942, Air Chief Mar-
shal Arthur Harris took over as head of Bomber Command.
"Bomber" Harris, as the dynamic new leader was known,
opposed precision bombing, arguing that damage caused
by what he called "panacea" attacks on pinpoint targets
could be easily repaired. Instead, he favored large-scale
area-bombing attacks on population centers, which would
leave the inhabitants homeless and lower civilian morale,
particularly among industrial workers. Moreover, he was
Historical Overview 15
"The trouble with Yanks fighters. The difficulties of assembling such large numbers
of planes ruled out any further large-scale attacks until
is, they're overpaid, Bomber Command regained full strength. More disturbing
oversexed, and over was the news that Cologne and the other bombed cities had
here." gradually come to life again and that German wartime pro-
duction was relatively unaffected. Intelligence reports that
Common quip of English civilians
from 1942 to 1945 even the morale of German civilians was good provoked
surprise, since the British believed that on ly they could
keep up their spirits amid bombing attacks, as witnessed
during the Blitz of London.
Obviously, Harris needed assistance if his Bomber Com-
mand was to win the war according to his strategy. And he
had hopes that the U.S. Eighth Air Force, which was gradu-
ally forming in England, could supply exactly what he
needed.
THE AMERICANS BRING
CONTROVERSY
(February 1942-May 1942)
On February 20, 1942, U.S. Army Air Force Brigadier
General Ira C. Eaker arrived in London with the immedi-
ate task of procuring sites which could be used as U.S.
bomber bases. His superior, General Henry H . "Hap"
Arnold, the head of the U.S. Army Air Force, had also or-
dered Eaker to observe Bomber Command, and to lead the
U.S. bombing offensive once enough bombers had been
flown in from the States.
Both Eaker and Arnold were supporters of former U.S.
general "Billy" Mitchell and the theories of air power he
had developed after World War I. Mitchell believed that the
coming war would be decided in the skies, and that bomb-
ing important military production targets would destroy
the enemy's ability to wage war, while crushing its will to
fight. Italian general Giulio Douhet and the RA.F's first air
chief marshal, Hugh Trenchard, had also promoted air
power as a war-winning strategy in the 1920s. Trenchard, in
particular, contended that the breakdown in civilian morale
following such an aerial onslaught would lead to revolution.
Mitchell, Douhet, and Trenchard all believed that the
bomber would be the principal weapon in the future war; to
these three men, and those generals who would follow
them, this aircraft was invincible. "A slower, heavily armed
plane, able to clear its way with its own armament, can al-
ways get the best of a faster pursuit plane," wrote Douhet,
continuing, "A unit of combat composed of slower heavily
armed planes is in a position to stand up to the fire of enemy
pursuit planes and carry out its mission successfully." An-
other believer, former British prime minister Stanley Bald-
win, declared, "The bomber will always get through ." Luft-
waffe bombers had not, in fact, always gotten through in the
Battle of Britain; still, the American generals insisted that
Historical Overview 17
"At present the United bomber, the Lancaster. Eaker, faithful to the doctrine ofthe
heavy bomber, asserted that the B-l 7's firepower would al-
States are persevering low it to withstand daylight Luftwaffe fighter attacks, even
with the idea of the day- without protective fighter escort. (Later, General Arnold re-
light bombing of fused the British request that the United States build Lan-
Germany ... informa- casters, because he felt they were underarmed.) The British
were skeptical of the performance of the B-17, since its
tion without escort. bombload of around 4,000 pounds was much smaller than
They will probrzbly expe- that of the Lancaster, which when modified could carry
rience a heavy disaster 10,000 pounds ofbombs. (Later, the Lancaster would carry
the 22,000-pound "Big Boy" bomb against the German bat-
as soon as they do so." tleship Tirpitz.) Moreover, several Flying Fortresses that
Prime Minister Winston Bomber Command had actually used in a few raids in 1941
Churchill, in 1942 had been shot to pieces by German fighters. But Eaker
countered that the British had misused the B-17, which was
designed to be operated in large formations of a dozen or
more, where it was felt that its collective firepower would be
murderous. He conceded that for additional protection,
the Fortresses should have fighter escort as far as the
fighters' range permitted.
It was Eaker's belief that ifthe Americans began to bomb
by day while the British continued to bomb at night, it
would wear out the German defenses by keeping them on
alert at all times. It would also force the Luftwaffe to draw
some ofits aircraft from the Russian offensive, and thus take
some of the pressure off the Soviets, who were clamoring
for Britain and the United States to establish a second front.
Harris remained skeptical of the U.S. ability to bomb by
daylight, and debates between the two stubborn comman-
ders went on incessantly during the first few months ofEak-
er's stay in England.
BAPTISM BY FIRE
Oune 1942-0ctober 1942)
In the spring of 1942, Harris and the RAF turned over
some old RAF bases to Eaker and the Eighth Air Force, and
helped the Americans acquire land on which to build addi-
tional airfields. The majority of these bases were located
northeast of London in East Anglia, within easy reach of Eu-
rope and, eventually, Germany. By June, final preparations
were completed on the first of the 127 bases that the Eighth
Air Force would occupy. Before long, the first B-l 7s and
their crews began to arrive, after flying 2, 119 miles from the
United States via Newfoundland, Greenland, and Scotland.
The RAF lent a hand by providing some badly needed gun-
nery training to the American crews. At this time, the new
commander of the Eighth Air Force, Major General Carl
Spaatz, also arrived . Slowly, the Eighth was assembling as a
fighting force.
On August 17, the Eighth's 97th Bomb Group made the
first U.S. Army Air Force daylight bombing run over occu-
Historical Overview 19
antiaircraft fire and fighter attacks had not been severe.
Moreover, while the British were flying raids deep into Ger-
man airspace, these early U.S. missions had targeted sites in
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands that were relatively
close to their home bases.
Most importantly, they had yet to experience the full
power of the Luftwaffe.
THE STATE OF THE LUFTWAFFE
(February 1941-0ctober 1942)
In early 1941 , as it was becoming obv io u s that the
Luftwaffe was not going to defeat the RAF or destroy the
spirit of the British people , many fighter and bomber
Geschwader were transferred away from the English Chan-
nel area. Despite the denials of Reichsmarschall Hermann
Goring, the head of the Luftwaffe, Germany was abandon-
ing the conquest of Britain for a goal which became appar-
ent on June 22 - the conquest of Russia. T hough Hitler
had promised not to repeat the mistake of World War I and
force Germany to fight a two-front war, the reality was that
in 1942 Germany was in a multifront war. German troops
were fighting in Russia, in North Africa, and in the Mediter-
ranean, as well as engaging the British in France and Nor-
way. With most of its aircraft scattered from Scandinavia to
the Middle East, the Luftwaffe was stretched to the breaking
point, and had few aircraft left to battle the RAF in western
Europe.
As Luftwaffe opposition lessened, the RAF became more
aggressive and began making daytime fighter sweeps across
France along with night bombing raids on France and Ger-
many. To counter the bombing, Goring formed a special
night fighter branch, headed by Generalleutnant Joseph
Kammhuber . A radar defense system known as the
"Kammhuber Line" was built to locate incoming enemy
bombers and vector night fighters to intercept them . Large,
twin-engined aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf 110 and
the Junkers Ju 88 began to enjoy success as night fighters .
Goring had ridiculed the first American
The poor marksmanship of antiair- daylight bombing raids. But Adolf Galland,
craft gunners during the first U.S. bomb- the Battle of Britain ace who had recently
ing raids became the source of a German become the Luftwaffe's ge n era l of t h e
joke. A soldier who was sentenced to die fighter arm, could see the dangers that lay
was told to choose the means of his exe- ahead. The United States, rich in resources
cution. He chose death by antiaircraft and far out of the range of German
fire, and was tied to the top of a tower.
bombers, could conceivably produce thou-
Three German antiaircraft batteries
sands of bombers. If these aircraft were all
fired away at him for three weeks. When
the gunners went to retrieve the soldier, launched from England, Germany could be
they found that he had not been hit by destroyed while Lu ftwaffe fighters were
their fire but had starved to death battling on other fronts. Galland also dis-
instead. covered that Luftwaffe fighter production
had been virtually neglected since the Bat-
Target Cities
in Germany
Historical Overoiew 21
squadrons after engine problems in the earlier versions
were corrected.
And in the development stage were two even deadlier
fighters , the likes of which had never before been seen in air
combat.
THE BIRTH OF THE
"SECRET WEAPONS"
During the 1930s, many of Germany's leading scientists
and scholars had been victimized by the anti-intellectual-
ism, racism, and religious persecution that marked the Nazi
regime, and fled the country. Many of the Germans who
had taken their place were not so much theoretical scientists
as technicians, and the fields of research and development
came to be dominated by these engineers. Incited by Nazi
propaganda regarding the "intellectual superiority" of the
German people, the emphasis on militarism, and the Ger-
man tradition of workmanship and discipline, these Ger-
man engineers had spurred an incredible push in the devel-
opment of new warfare technologies . Research faci lities,
sponsored by profit-seeking businesses in collaboration
with the government, had sprung up all over Germany, and
the most secret of these were the Luftwaffe's. Inside their fa-
cilities, plans for advanced aircraft, as well as for solid- and
liquid-fueled rockets and jet engines, were already on the
drawing boards by the mid- l 930s.
In 1936, Ernst Heinkel's aircraft company began to take
an interest in the possibilities of jet propulsion. After much
experimentation, the first German jet engine, the HeS 3,
was developed. The prototype that used the engine, the He
178, made the world's first jet-powered flight on August 24,
1939,just before the outbreak of World War II. This plane
was later demonstrated to Feldmarschall Milch and General
Ernst Udet, the Luftwaffe's chief of the technical office, but
amazingly, neither of them was impressed.
When flying on a bombing mission, Because both men felt that the Luftwaffe's
gunners used the "clock face" system to resources should be committed to other ar-
note which direction an enemy fighter eas, and that such an aircraft would not be
attack was coming from. "Twelve needed, the jet fighter that emerged from
o'clock" signified straight ahead, while the He 178 prototype, the He 280, was left
"six o'clock" meant straight behind. If a to languish.
gunner called out "Bandits at two Other manufacturers started develop-
o'clock," it meant that fighters were ing their own jet engines, including
attacking from ahead and sixty degrees Junkers , who was commissioned by the
to the right.
German air ministry to begin work on the
1,300-horsepower Jumo 004 engine in
1938. The Messerschmitt company, in turn, was asked to
develop a suitable aircraft for the new engine, testing of
which began in 1940, at the time of the Battle of Britain.
The airframe was completed a year later, and the earliest
version of the new aircraft, dubbed the Me 262 Schwalbe, or
Historical Overoiew 23
In 1939, Projekt X was moved to the Messerschmitt com-
pany. ln 1940, they test-flew a new rocket-powered Lip-
pisch prototype, a tailless single-seater called the D FS 194.
Its performance exceeded expectations. With its Walther
liquid-fuel rocket engine, it boasted a top speed of342 miles
per hour, and could climb at a rate of 5,300 feet per minute.
It was decided to put this aircraft into production, and the
new model was designated the Me 163, and nicknamed the
Komet. The first Me l 63A
flew in August 1941 and set
a secret world speed record
of 623 miles per hour two
months later.
In an age when the bi-
p lane was sti ll seeing mili -
tary service, the Me 262 and
the Me 163 represented a
huge leap forward in avia-
The Walther rocket that pow- tion technology, a leap necessitated by the urgency of the
ered the Me 163 Komet.
Courtesy of the United States Air
war, which had pushed the imaginations of German design-
Force ers and engineers to their limits. But how would the Luft-
waffe and the German high command use this advantage
over the Allies and the Eighth Air Force?
THE CASABLANCA D I RECTIVE
(November 1942-January 1943)
The euphoria brought on by the Eighth Air Force's first
successful bombing raids on France was quickly snuffed in
the final months of 1942. Bad weather forced the cancella-
tion of numerous missions, and only twelve were flown dur-
ing the months of November and December. Another blow
came when the Eighth was ordered to transfer nearly one
hundred bombers and crews to support Operation Torch ,
the Allied invasion of North Africa. This action also made
General Eaker the new head of the Eighth, in place of Gen-
eral Spaatz, who was now in charge of the air offensive in
North Africa. Most of the bombing raids made by the
Eighth during th is period were against U-boat yards in
France, in response to the growing U-boat menace in the
Atlantic. But these raids did little damage to the U-boat
pens, whose thick concrete walls and roofs could withstand
d irect hits by one-ton bombs. The pens, moreover, were
heavily defended by antiaircraft guns and fighters, and U.S.
losses were heavy.
As 1943 dawned, Winston Churchill was increasingly
critical of the U.S . bombing operations. Not one U.S. mis-
sion had been flown over Germany, which was being
bombed nightly by the RAF. It was obvious to the British
prime minister that U.S. generals were reluctant to put
their daylight bombing theory to its toughest test. More-
over, the Un ited States lacked a long-range escort fighter
Historical Overview 25
ty for armed resistance is fatally weakened." It also autho-
rized the Eighth Air Force to "take every opportunity to at-
tack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuit-
able for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on
German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day
fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away
from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war."
Two days after Eaker returned to London, he authorized
the first Eighth Air Force bombing mission against Ger-
many.
"THE BIG LEAGUE "
Oanuary 1943-May 1943)
On January 27, 1943, a force of fifty-three B-l 7s and
B-24s headed toward the submarine factories at Vegesack,
Germany. When it was discovered that the target was ob-
Spitfire, I 75 ml.
May 1943
P-47 Thunderbolt,
230 ml. June I 943
P-47 Thunderbolt
(with belly tank).
375 ml. June 1943
P-38 Lightning.
520 mi. Nov 1943
P-5 I Mustang.
over 600 ml.
Dec '43 I Mar '44
Historical Overview 27
Arnold and Eaker were b u sy prodding
Washington to beef up the Eighth with
lllj>re bombers and fighters. On a single day
in May 1943, the number of Eighth Air
Force bombers jumped from 100 to 215.
That same month, the Allies approved their
Combined Bomber Offensive Plan, under
which the Eighth was to receive nearly
3,000 more heavy bombers by the end of
the year.
Though the generals were convinced
that unescorted bombers wou ld survive
without fighter escort, the lack of a long-
range, maneuverable escort fig h ter that
cou ld go deep into Germany and back
remained a pressing issue. In combat over
the Channel and France, the P-47 Thun-
derbolt was more durable and could dive
faster than the FW 190, but could not climb
as fast. It was felt that another U.S. fighter,
the P-38 Lightning, would be a good long-
P-51 B Mustangs being assembled range escort because of its twin-engined durability, plus a
at a North American Aviation
distinctive twin-boom design that was easily recognized by
factory. In the background to the
left are several partially assem- the trigger-happy U.S. bomber gunners. However, the P-38
bled B-25 Mitchell medium proved to be far less maneuverable than the Bf 109 and the
bombers. Courtesy of the FW 190, and its Allison engines developed problems at high
Sherman Fairchild Collection altitudes. Finally, before either the P-47 or the P-38 could be
tried out as a long-range escort, a satisfactory external drop
tank, which U.S. Army Air Force brass had assigned a low
priority to until 1938, would have to be developed. For the
time being, the bombers would go it alone once the fighter
escort had turned around over France and the Low Coun-
tries.
This decision would prove to be a tragic one for the
bomber crews, made even more so by the fact that the U.S.
Army Air Force had stalled the production of an excellent
long-range escort fighter, maintaining that there was no
need for one at the time. This fighter was the P-51 Mustang,
which had originally been developed for the British in
1941. Its Allison engine was underpowered at high alti-
tudes, but when the British installed the Rolls-Royce Merlin
engine, the Mustang's performance picked up incredibly.
Moreover, the Mustang had greater range than the Thun-
derbolt, since it had an additional internal fuel tank behind
the pilot, and its Merlin engine used up roughly less than
half the fuel used by the P-47. But the U.S. Army Air Force's
material division decided that, being liquid-cooled, the
Merlin engine was too vulnerable to gunfire. They reached
this conclusion despite the fact that the RAF's Spitfire and
the Luftwaffe's Bf 109, two of the most successful fighters in
the world during the early part of the war, were both pow-
Historical Overview 29
realized that a golden opportunity to regain air superiority
and counter the bombing offensive was being needlessly
thrown away.
OPERATION GOMORRAH
Ouly 1943)
While the Eighth Air Force had been making its first
raids on Germany, the RAF's Bomber Command had taken
the night offensive into Germany's industrial center, the
Ruhr valley. On one raid, on May 16, 1943, the RAF made
an out-of-character display of pinpoint bombing when a
squadron of Lancasters dropped bombs specially designed
to bounce on water on three of the Ruhr's reservoirs, knock-
ing out two dams. The "dam busters" raid failed to stop in-
dustrial production in the Ruhr, however, and Harris decid-
ed to continue with his area bombing strategy. Subsequent
RAF raids crippled the Ruhr, and Harris then began plan-
ning a large-scale attack on Germany's largest port, Ham-
Feldmarschall Erhard Milch, burg. For the first time, American daylight bombing and
a pilot in World War I, RAF night bombing were both to be concentrated on a sin-
became head of the gle target. The code name for this mission, which was to last
German airline Lufthansa
during the period between
for ten days, was Operation Gomorrah, for reasons that
wars. In this position, he would soon become obvious.
secredy laid the ground- Mea nwhile, the Eighth was finding that Luftwaffe
work for the future fighter attacks and antiaircraft fire were becoming more
Luftwaffe, and helped build
and more effective against their B-l 7s and B-24s. On May 7,
it into a formidable force. In
1933 he became deputy air just three days after a successful raid on Antwerp that saw all
minister of the Luftwaffe, the bombers return to base safely, 7 bombers out of a force
and was second in com- of 31 were shot down over Saint-Nazaire . Two mid-May
mand to Hermann Goring. raids on the U-boat yards at Kiel resulted in only 14 losses
A brilliant organizer and
capable administrator, the
for the Eighth, yet on a return raid on June 13, a stunning
ambitious Milch continually 26 out of 182 bombers were shot down. Nine days later, the
pushed for great numbers Eighth made its first attack on the Ruhr. Despite fierce
of existing models of air- fighter opposition, 182 B-l 7s and B-24s bombed the syn-
craft to be produced, a
thetic rubber plant at Huls, effectively knocking out pro-
move which hampered the
development of newer duction for months.
models. However, Milch During July, only a few Allied bombing raids were made,
backed the Me 262 jet fight- mainly on targets in coastal France. But this was the calm be-
er once Adolf Galland con- fore the storm , as on the evening of July 24, nearly eight
vinced him of its worthiness.
As the war progressed,
hundred RAF bombers took off for Hamburg, signaling the
Milch began losing influence beginning of Operation Gomorrah. Dropping strips of tin-
with Hitler and Goring, and foil to confuse the radar of the Kammhuber Line, the force
was removed from office successfully unloaded nearly 3,000 tons of bombs on Ham-
after he argued with Hitler
burg. The next day, U.S. bombers largely avoided the city it-
that the Me 262 should be
used as a fighter instead of a self and attacked the Hamburg shipyards and docks, losing
bomber. After the war, nineteen B-l 7s out of sixty-nine.
Milch was sentenced to life That evening, the returning RAF bombers dropped in-
imprisonment at the cendiary bombs on the burning city, whose water mains had
Nuremberg Trials, but was
released after serving ten
burst under the earlier attacks. As more fires sprang up all
years. over Hamburg, the air above the city became superheated,
and as the hot air rose, cool air rushed in to replace it. This
never been inflicted on a city or its people before. Not until A burned-out railway station
in Cologne. Scenes like this
1957 was it finally determined that some 50,000 inhabitants littered the German landscape
died in the raids. The last bombs fell on Hamburg on Au- in 1944-45.
gust 2, and word of die Katastrophe quickly spread across
Germany. Albert Speer, the German minister of arma-
ments, told Hitler that ifthe Allies continued to bomb in this
manner, the war would quickly be lost. The leaders of the
Luftwaffe vowed that the destruction that Hamburg had
suffered would never be inflicted on another German city.
From Goring on down, they decided that building up the
fighter arm at the expense of the bombers would now be a
top priority, and that the Luftwaffe would now become a de-
fensive force, to fight off the U.S. and British bombers and
regain air superiority for Germany.
Goring met with Hitler to get approval of these strategy
changes. But the enraged fiihrer would not listen to any
Historical Overview 31
"There were gaping talk ofa defensive war, especially from Goring. Instead, the
bombing of Hamburg was to be avenged by a renewed Luft-
holes in their precise for-
waffe bombing offensive against London! A badly shaken
mations ... . More than Goring left the meeting, and Adolf Galland later found him
half the bombers we sobbing uncontrollably. (The aerial bombing of London did
nursed over the North not begin until January 1944 and was so ineffective that it
was referred to as the "baby blitz" by the British.)
Sea were shot up. One If the destruction of Hamburg had little effect on Hitler,
or two ditched in the sea. it certainly had a unifying effect on the Luftwaffe's leaders.
Others, carrying dead For the first time they all agreed with Galland that the Allied
bombing offensive was a grave threat, and that radical mea-
and badly wounded sures needed to be taken. Milch announced a production
crew members, had to target of 4,000 fighters per month to bolster the fighter
make crash landings." arm. Since British countermeasures had neutralized the
radar of the Kammhuber Line, special night fighter units
Unidentified U.S. Anny Air
Force fighter pilot who escorted
called "Wild Boars" were visually guided by searchlights to-
B-17s back from the first ward RAF bombers, and began enjoying success. And Gal-
Schweinfurt raid on August 17, land continued to urge Luftwaffe day fighters to fly at least
1943 three missions a day against U.S. bombers, who were con-
tinuing to fly unescorted over Germany.
CARNAGE IN THE SKIES
(August 1943)
On August 1, the day that Speer was warning Hitler of
the dangers of Allied bombing, the U.S . Ninth Air Force,
with three bomber groups on loan from the Eighth,
launched a massive raid against the oil refineries at Ploesti,
Romania. Taking off from their base in Benghazi, Libya,
some 177 B-24s flew at low altitude toward the heavily de-
fended refineries, which supplied Germany with over one-
third of its oil. A series of mechanical breakdowns caused
eleven of the bombers to drop out of the force , and naviga-
tional errors put the remaining aircraft on a course over the
most heavily defended approach to Ploesti. Murderous,
point-blank antiaircraft fire ripped into the B-24s as they
made their bombing run, and one Liberator after another
was blasted out of the skies at treetop level. Dodging chim-
neys and explosions from refinery storage tanks, many of
the surviving bombers were scorched by flames from the
Ploesti inferno. Those that made it through the bombing
run were quickly attacked by swarms of Luftwaffe fighters.
Only half the attacking force made it back to Benghazi.
With 579 men killed, wounded, or captured, 53 B-24s
lost, and another 55 severely damaged, the raid on Ploesti
was a disaster for the Ninth Air Force. Although forty per-
cent of Ploesti's refinery capacity was destroyed, production
was stepped up in the idle refinery units so that the oil flow
to the German military continued uninterrupted . The mis-
sion was deemed a failure when no immediate follow-up
raid was ordered.
Between the bomber groups loaned to the Ninth for the
I st Schweinfurt Raid,
August 17, 1943
Historical Overview 33
ball bearings used by Germany. Destruction of these facto-
ries could seriously hamper the German war effort, since
without ball bearings, no airplanes, tanks, ships, artillery
guns, or other equipment which depended upon precision
machinery could be built. This "bottleneck target," consid-
ered to be too small for the night bombers of the RAF to find
in the darkness, was the ideal target for the Eighth's pro-
gram of precision daylight bombing. It would also be a test
of the generals' fixed belief that the heavily armed B-17s
could survive without fighter escort. The raid on Schwein-
furt would mark the furthest penetration into German
airspace by U.S. aircraft thus far.
Also to be bombed was the Messerschmitt aircraft factory
at Regensburg, which turned out nearly two hundred
fighters a month. It was believed that if Regensburg was at-
tacked first, it would draw the Luftwaffe fighters away from
Schweinfurt, the more important of the two targets. The
Eighth's Fourth Bombardment Wing, led by Colonel Curtis
LeMay, was to bdmb Regensburg, then land at U.S. bases in
Algeria. The Eighth 's First Bombardment Wing, led by
Brigadier General Robert Williams, was to attack Schwein-
furt, then return to its bases in England.
On the morning of August 17, thick fog surrounded the
Eighth's airfields. Since LeMay had drilled his men repeat-
edly in the art of blind instrument takeoffs, his 146 B-17 s
were delayed only a few minutes before taking off for Re-
gensburg. However, Williams's aircraft, scheduled to take
U.S. Army Air Force off ten minutes after Le May's, were grounded for over
General Curtis E. LeMay, a three hours. The tactical advantage of the two-pronged raid
tactical innovator, propo- was now lost, but it was decided not to cancel the mission,
nent of strategic bombing,
and ruthless taskmaster,
since the hazards oflanding with a full load of bombs meant
was affectionately dubbed that all of LeMay's returning bombers would have to salvo
"Iron Ass" by the men who their bombs in the English Channel, where they could pos-
served under him in the sibly hit Allied ships. When the fog finally lifted, the First
Eighth Air Force's Fourth Bombardment Wing took off, way behind schedule.
Bombardment Wing.
Leading many raids himself, LeMay's B-l 7s encountered antiaircraft fire and mini-
he developed the B-17 com- mal fighter opposition shortly after they crossed into Ger-
bat box formation, which man-occupied Holland. But most of the Luftwaffe fighters
gave the Fortresses better avoided tangling with the P-47 escort fighters, knowing the
mutual firepower and pro-
tection. He also drilled his
Thunderbolts would soon have to return to their bases in
crews relentlessly on instru- England. Although the P-47s now had paper drop tanks,
ment flying, a skill that these leaked badly, were unusable at high altitudes, and
enabled them to take off on could safely hold only 100 gallons of fuel. With these tanks,
the historic August 17, the range of the Thunderbolt was now extended to Aachen,
1943, raid on Regensburg,
even though the English air-
just inside the German border.
fields were socked in by fog. As LeMay's armada crossed into Germany, the fuel-
LeMay went on to direct B- depleted U.S. escort fighters were forced to head back to
29 bombing raids from the England. Almost immediately, Luftwaffe FW 190s and Bf
Marianas against Japan, and
l09s began tearing into the B-17s with machine gun and
after the war became head
of Strategic Air Command. cannon fire . Twin-engined Bf 110 fighters, flying outside
the range of the American machine guns, fired four-foot-
Historical Overview 35
bombers that landed safely in England and North Africa,
122 were damaged and 27 of those had to be scrapped.
Many Americans wondered if the damage done by these
raids was worth the horrendous losses. To Adolf Galland,
whose Luftwaffe fighter arm had lost 36 aircraft out of some
300, with another 12 written off, this was positive proof that
the American heavy bomber offensive could be made too
costly by a strong German fighter defense, though his forces
could ill afford the losses they too had suffered. Moreover,
these raids disputed the air power theorists' doctrine that
"the bomber will always get through." Sadly, the U.S. lead-
ers would be slow in grasping this lesson.
" BLACK THURSDA Y"-
RETURN TO SCHW EI N FURT
(October 1943)
Crews of the Eighth were disappointed to find out that
instead of making a follow-up night raid on Schweinfurt,
the RAF had bombed the German secret weapons facility at
Peenemiinde on the night of August 17. The Baltic island
was now the test site for two Vergeltungswaffen, or "venge-
ance weapons," the V-ljet-powered flying bomb and the V-
2 liquid-fueled rocket. The raid had killed many top Ger-
man scientists and would delay the V-1 and V-2 programs
for months. The RAF bombing of Peenemiinde following
the U.S. attack on Schweinfurt typified the lack of coopera-
tion between the two air forces in what was mistakenly
called the "Combined Bomber Offensive."
The next few weeks saw the battered Eighth bombing
targets in northern France, well within range of fighter es-
cort. Additional bomber reinforcements were flown in from
the States, including the new B-l 7G, which had a gun tur-
ret in its nose to ward off frontal attacks. General Arnold
continued to call for attacks on Germany, and several un-
escorted raids were made on targets in East Prussia and
2d Schweinfurt Raid,
October 14th, 1943
Historical Overview 37
"Wherever one looked thirty-four more had headed home with damage or me-
chanical problems. Those bombers which had reached
in the sky there were
Schweinfurt now had to face the murderous fire of new an-
Germans attacking tiaircraft batteries that had been installed after the first raid .
and B-17s smoking, Luftwaffe fighters, ignoring the fierce fire of their own flak,
burning, spinning continued to attack the formations relentlessly. Fortunately
for the surviving Americans, their formations had remained
down." tight, so that they were able to deliver 500 tons of bombs on
Unidentified survivor of the the factories with high accuracy within the space of twelve
second raid on Schweinfurt on minutes.
October 14, 1943
But the flight home was even worse than the flight in .
Just as in the first raid , the tired crews of the B- l 7s were met
by waves of refueled and rearmed Luftwaffe aircraft along
the route from Schweinfurt. Another thirty-two bombers
were shot down on the return trip. After over three hours of
the most savage aerial fig hting ever displayed, the surviving
bombers, many badly damaged and full of dead, dying, and
wounded, reached the English Channel.
Once again, 60 bombers and their crews had been lost
over Germany, in the bloodiest mission ever flown by the
United States. Of the planes that returned, 142 were dam-
aged. Although the Americans claimed to have shot down
Flak hit this B-17 over Cologne, 186 German fighters , the Luftwaffe had actually lost 31 ,
killing both the bombardier and with another 12 written off. As for the raid itself, Eaker was
the navigator. Amazingly, the initially optimistic, based on photographs of Schweinfurt
pilot, Lieutenant Lawrence which showed even greater damage than after the first raid.
Delany, managed to fly the
bomber safely back to England. On the German side, Albert Speer estimated that 67 per-
Courtesy of the United States Air cent of the factories ' production capability had been de-
Force stroyed: ifthe Allies could follow up the October 14 attacks
Histarical Overview 39
"!would rather have finally developed to extend the range of the P-4 7 to deep
within German airspace. The Eighth also received a steady
one Me 262 than five supply of trained crews and replacement bombers, and
[Me] 109s." some five hundred B-l 7s and B-24s were available by the
Luftwaffe General Adolf Galland, end of October.
in 1944 While the Eighth was regaining strength, the RAF's
Bomber Command continued to attack German targets by
night. On October 22, the industrial city of Kassel was hit by
1,800 tons of bombs, causing a fire storm like the one that
had swept through Hamburg. Next, Harris turned his at-
tention toward Berlin, maintaining that ifthe German capi-
tal were destroyed, the war would be ended. The U.S. gen-
erals did not share Harris's belief, but the stubborn Bomber
Command leader sent large numbers of RAF aircraft on
raid after raid on Berlin. Bad weather and heavy losses to
German night fighters hampered what was being called the
Battle of Berlin. Despite pressure to switch to industrial tar-
gets, Harris continued the raids through the spring of 1944,
when he commanded his forces to assist in preparations for
the invasion of France.
HITLER BLUNDERS AGAIN
(November 1943)
By late 1943, the embattled empire of the Third Reich
was withering away on all fronts in the face of the combined
Allied offensives. The German campaign in North Africa
had collapsed. U.S. and British troops had captured Sicily
and were working their way up the "boot" of Italy. Russian
troops were pushing back the German army on the eastern
front. And even Hitler himself conceded that the Allied in-
vasion of France was only a matter of time and would prob-
ably take place in the spring of 1944.
For years Hitler had embraced the concept of the "blitz
bomber," a plane that would fly faster than any pursuing
enemy fighters . He spoke with Goring of how the "blitz
A restored Me 262. bomber" would wreak havoc strafing and bombing the in-
Historical Overview 41
the jet prototypes. Despite Hitler's decision, only one Me
262 was fitted with bomb racks while the rest were built as
fighters. By March 1944, the first evaluation prototype was
ready for combat. However, its Junkers Jumo 004B turbojet
engines had numerous technological problems, and pro-
duction of this powerplant crept along at a slow rate. In
June 1944, before all the problems had been worked out, it
was finally decided to "freeze" the design of the engine for
mass production. The resulting engine would frequently
break down at the high temperatures it generated.
Meanwhile, work on another secret weapon, the Me 163,
was continuing without interference from Hitler, although
the rocket fighter was plagued by technical problems, and
its volatile fuels often caused it to explode. From 1941 on,
several flights had been made with various powered and
unpowered prototypes, and on June 24, 1943, the Me 163
made its first takeoff and landing from the airfield at Peen-
emtinde. By the fall of 1943, the Me 163 group had been
moved to Bad Zwischenahn, and thirty pilots were selected
to begin training on the Komet. This marked the birth of
Jagdgeschwader 400, a group of rocket fighter pilots whose
skill could only be equaled by their courage in flying this
volatile aircraft.
GATHERING STRENGTH
FOR "BIG WEEK"
(December 1943-March 1944)
With the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower
as supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force,
changes were in store for the Eighth Air Force. On Decem-
ber 18, General Eaker was notified that he was being trans-
ferred to head the Fifteenth Air Force in the Mediter-
ranean. His replacement was Lieutenant General James H .
Doolittle, who had led the famous B-25 carrier raid on
Tokyo in 1942. General Spaatz was brought
The volatile T-Stoff and C-Stoff fuels back from North Africa to supervise the air
that powered the Me 163 were extreme- offensive over Europe. Doolittle and Spaatz
ly dangerous even when they were not had served with Eisenhower before, and he
ignited. On one occasion, a pilot crash- valued the close working relationship they
landed his Komet while attempting to had established.
take off. Ground crews smothered the Extremely disappointed at the prospect
rocket plane with foam, then inspected of leaving the Eighth just as it was about to
the accident scene. They found that the gain the upper hand against the Luftwaffe,
fuel lines had ruptured and the two fuels Eaker departed London on January 1,
had doused the pilot, literally dissolving
1944. On his way to his new headquarters
him in his seat.
in Italy, he was told that a certain "Colonel
Holt" wanted to see him in Casablanca.
This turned out to be Winston Churchill, who received Eak-
er in the same villa where the two had discussed bombing
operations a year ago. Eaker was consoled by Churchill,
who told him , "Your representations regarding daylight
Historical Overvi.ew 43
and B-24s take off to attack three targets in Germany, in-
cl ud ing a Focke-Wu lf factory at Oschersleben . The raid
marked the successful debut of the P-51 as an escort fighter
for the Eighth: fifteen German fighters were shot down by
the Mustangs. Although most of the bombers had to turn
back because of bad weather, the remaining aircraft badly
damaged the Focke-Wulf factory and other targets in the
raid, which cost the Eighth thirty-four bombers.
Another raid on Frankfurt was made on J anuary 27, but,
again hampered by bad weather, fewer than sixty bombers
reached the target. Mission after mission was canceled be-
cause of the weather, and Spaatz, impatient for Operation
Argument to begin, ordered that it be completed by March
1. On February 20, meteorologists forecast fair skies for a
few days over Europe. Even though it was overcast and
snowing in England, Spaatz gave the orders to "let 'em go."
"Big Week" had begun.
Fo llow ing an RAF n ight bombing mission against
Leipzig, over 1,000 bombers, the largest number ever as-
sembled by the Americans, headed for targets in central
Germany and Poland, escorted by 700 fighters. The Luft-
waffe, ordered by Goring to avoid the fighters and attack
the bombers, had trouble penetrating the
In September of 1943, several Ameri- thick fighter formations, and managed to
can fighter planes were shot down just shoot down only 21 bombers. That night,
inside the German border at Aachen, the th e ball-bearing works at Stuttgart were
first sign that the U.S. escorting aircraft blasted by the RAF. The next day , bad
were extending their range deeper into weather moved in, and although 764 B-l 7s
the Reich. When Adolf Galland reported and B-24s were in the air, the results were
the news to Adolf Hitler, Hermann minimal. February 23 saw the Fifteenth Air
Goring confronted Galland, calling the Force wipe out the Messerschmitt factory at
reports "pure bluff." Galland replied, Regensb u rg while los ing 33 bombers .
"Those are the facts, Herr Reichs-
Sch we infurt, the most dreaded target in
m arschall! American fighters have been
shot down over Aachen. There is no
Germany, was hit by the Eighth on Febru-
doubt about it." Cried Goring, "That is ary 24, and the RAF dropped even more
simply not true .... What must have hap- bombs o n to the burning city later that
pened is that they were shot down much evening. The Gotha factory, where Bf l lOs
further to the west. I mean, if they were were bu ilt, was heavi ly damaged by 238
very high when they were shot down Liberators.
they could have glided quite a distance Bad weather terminated Big Week on
farther before they crashed." Keeping a February 25, but not before the Eighth and
straight face, Galland replied, "Glided to the Fiftee nth had hit the Bf 109 production
the east, sir? If my plane were shot centers at Augsburg and Regensburg, los-
up ...." Before he could continue, Goring ing 64 bombers. As the RAF dropped the
barked, "I herewith give you an official fi n al Bi g Week bombs on the flames at
order that they weren't there! Do you
Augsburg, it appeared to the Allies that the
understand? The American fighters were
German aircraft industry had been wiped
not there! Get that! I intend to report
that to the Fuhrer. You have my official o u t, at a cost of 229 bombers and 29
order!" Smirked Galland, "Orders are fig h ters. Dropping over 19,000 tons of
orders, Sir!" bombs, the Allies had destroyed 700Bf109s
th at were eith er combat-ready or in the
Historical Overview 45
tries, concentrating on
some eighty railroad mar-
shaling yards and adjacent
repair facilities and depots.
Knocking these vital rail
centers out and bombing
them repeatedly to keep
them from being repaired
would prevent the Ger-
mans from reinforcing the
invasion beaches on D-Day.
The RAF decided to test
out the precision attacks
called for under the Trans-
portation Plan. Though
Harris had stated that hi s
bomber crews were un-
skilled in anything but area
bombing, they had proved
him wrong before, in the
"dam busters" raid, and
A U.S. bombing raid on an oil they now proved him wrong again by successfully knocking
refinery in Bremen on March 30,
out several rail centers in France. Eisenhower, who felt that
1945. Te n Me 262s attacked the
B- l 7s of the 306th Bomb Group the Transportation Plan would support the invasion plans
afte r they had dropped their more directly than would Spaatz's tactic of attacking oil cen-
bombs; six of the German jets ters, faced stubborn opposition from Churchill and others
were shot down by escorting P- who felt that many French civilians would be killed in the at-
S I Mustangs and B-17 gunners.
tacks. But when Roosevelt refused to intervene in the mat-
ter, Churchill dropped his opposition. Spaatz won a conces-
sion from Eisenhower: the Eighth's bombers would be
allowed to attack oil centers and other industrial targets in
Germany when they were not needed to carry out the
Transportation Plan.
Meanwhile, the RAF attacks on Berlin raged on. The
German capital was heavily damaged, but the morale of its
inhabitants had not been crushed by Harris's bombers, and
many Lancasters had been shot from the skies by Luftwaffe
night fighters. On March 4, the United States joined in the
attacks as the Eighth's bombers, escorted by P-5 ls and P-
4 7s, dropped their bombloads on Berlin. Two days later, the
Eighth made another daylight attack on Berlin, losing sixty-
nine bombers and eleven fighters, while the Luftwaffe lost
eighty-two fighters. On March 24, the RAF lost seventy-two
bombers in a night raid over the target that, like London
years before, refused to be pounded into submission from
the air.
While it was becoming obvious that the Battle of Berlin
was resulting in a defeat for Harris and Bomber Command,
another blow to the RAF came on the night of March 30,
when nearly 1,000 bombers were sent to hit Nuremberg.
Owing to faulty British meteorological forecasts, the
Historical Overview 47
"Ifyou see fighting air- etly countermanded this order. When Hitler met with
Speer, Erhard Milch, and others on May 23, he was startled
craft over you, they will to hear production estimates calling for 1,000 Me 262
be ours." fighters per month. "I thought the Me 262 was coming out as
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a speed bomber," snapped the agitated fiihrer. "How many
to his troops on D-Day, June 6, of the Me 262s already produced can carry bombs?" "None,
1944 my Fuhrer," explained Milch. "The Me 262 is being manu-
factured exclusively as a fighter aircraft." Hitler exploded,
screaming that Milch had deceived him. Milch blurted that
"even the smallest child could see that it was a fighter air-
craft." With these ill-chosen words, his career as the Luft-
waffe's number two man was effectively terminated.
A furious Hitler ordered the immediate conversion of all
Me 262 fighters to bombers, and transferred all the Me 262s
being used for testing and training from Galland's fighter
arm to the bomber arm. No more prototypes were to be
supplied to Galland, and the general was forced to secretly
appropriate what few Me 262s he could. What made
Hitler's decision so disheartening for Galland was the fact
that the Me 262 had flown in combat a few times during
testing, with superb results against Allied aircraft. More-
over, the Me 262's engines.used diesel fuel, which was in less
demand than the high-octane fuel used by prop aircraft. All
in all, the potential of the Me 262, Galland's hope for end-
ing the Allied air raids, was being squandered for the sake of
dropping one or two bombs.
D - DAY
(May 1944-June 1944)
As the invasion date neared, the Transportation Plan was
achieving devastating results. The B-25 Mitchell and B-25
Marauder medium bombers, and other fighter-bombers of
the Ninth Air Force, newly relocated to England, dropped
33,000 tons of bombs on vital rail centers in France. Fifty-
one of these centers were destroyed, along with 1,500 loco-
/
American /
lstArmy
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Historical Overview 49
A few of the P-47 pilots of the
56th Fighter Group, the
''Wolfpack." On the left is
Colonel Francis Gabreski, the
leading U.S. ace in the European
theater with 31 "kills."
tion , who wanted revenge for RAF bombings. Over the next
few months, thousands of these flying bombs, each carrying
2,000 pounds of high explosives and traveling at speeds of
around 400 miles per hour, landed on target in greater
London, while thousands more either crashed into the sea
or were shot down by Allied fighters. Although 5,000 Lon-
Historical Overview 51
<loners were killed by V-1 attacks, these bombs did not dev-
astate the city to the extent that the Blitz had, and many of
the V-1 bases in France and Holland were soon overrun by
Allied troops. The V-2 liquid-fuel guided missile, with its
one-ton warhead, was even deadlier than the V-1, and since
it flew at supersonic speeds, it was impossible to defend
against. Moreover, it required no specialized launching
sites, and could be fired from any cleared space. From
September 1944 on, more than 3,000 V-2 guided missiles
were fired on London, as well as on those European cities
that had been recaptured by the Allies. But .at this stage of
the war, it was obvious that even these Vergeltungswaffen
had arrived too late to turn the tide in favor of Nazi Ger-
many. In fact, the V-1 and the V-2 actually helped the Allies
by consuming valuable raw materials that could have gone
into increased fighter production.
To Adolf Galland, Germany's only hope lay in a massive
fighter strike against the American bombers. Amazingly, de-
A V-2 rocket blasts off from its
spite the intense Allied bombing, fighter production was
launching pad in Peenemiinde in steadily increasing and by November would reach 4,000
1943. per month, the highest level of the war. If enough of these
fighters could be launched against the
American heavy bombers, which were now
numbering 1,000 per raid, they could per-
haps shoot down 400 to 500 bombers and
4,000 to 5,000 crewmen. A "Big Blow" like
this would damage the Eighth Air Force
'
~
materially and psychologically, and perhaps
lead to the curtailment of the paralyzing
daylight raids , though the respite would
probably be only temporary. For the second
time, Galland began assembling a reserve of
fighters; his " Big Blow" was planned for
sometime in November.
Meanwhile, one of the "secret weapons"
Galland was hoping to use was seeing its
first action against the enemy. This was the
Me 163 rocket fighter, which made its first
appearance against U.S. bombers during
an August raid on Leipzig. Still in the devel-
opmental stages, it was proving to be as
deadly to the pilots who flew it as it was to
American aircraft. Because the landing
gear was jettisoned upon takeoff, the
Komet touched down on a landing skid at
120 miles per hour. Any fuel vapors remain-
ing in its tank would often be ignited by a
rough landing. Moreover, its fuel supply
was exhausted in four to seven minutes,
leaving it precious little time to engage Al-
lied aircraft. When its fuel ran out, it was
Historical Overview 53
In October, much to Galland's surprise, he was ordered
by Goring to establish the world's first operational unit of
Me 262 jet fighters. Evidently, Heinrich Himmler, the
feared head of the S.S., had taken an interest in the jet
fighter, and in Goring's declining position within the Third
Reich. With visions of an eventual S.S. jet group, Himmler
had pressured the reichsmarschall to establish a test unit.
Galland appointed 24-year-old Major Walter Nowotny, who
had scored 250 aerial victories, as the leader of this new
group, and two bases were set up near the main U.S.
bomber routes into Germany. "Blitz Bomber" versions of
the Me 262 were converted back for use as fighters.
The thirty Me 262s of Kommando Nowotny were soon tan-
gling with Eighth Air Force bombers and fighters with
deadly effectiveness. Twenty-two American aircraft were
shot down in the first month of operations, and the crews of
the surviving bombers and fighters were awestruck by the
German jet's capabilities. It could attack with four 30-mm
cannons, and then fly away so fast that few machine guns
could be trained on it. The appearance of the jet forced the
free-ranging U.S . fighters to provide closer escort to the
heavy bombers. By early 1945, General Spaatz worried that
the Me 262 could actually give Germany the upper hand in
the air again.
Fortunately for Spaatz and the Allies, the Me 262 had
been delayed too many times to change the outcome of the
war. Now,just as the world's first operational jet fighter unit
was proving itself in combat, the overwhelming success of
the Allied forces was proving to be too much for even this
remarkable aircraft to overcome. By September, the Allied
advances had forced the German army out of France ,
where Allied fighter bases were now being set up. The two
Me 262 bases were under constant harassment from Allied
fighters hoping to catch the jet when it was most vulnerable,
Luftwaffe Major Walter during takeoff and landing. On November 8, this tactic
Nowotny, the first Gennan
pilot t o reach the 250- claimed Major Nowotny, whose crash while attempting to
victory m ark, was consid- land was witnessed by a shaken Galland. After Nowotny's
e red t o be the best young death, Galland relocated thejet unit deeper into Germany,
fighter ace of the Luftwaffe and used the surviving core of Kommando Nowotny to
at only 24 years of age.
formjagdgeschwader 7.
Holder of the Knight's Cross
with Oak Leaves, Swords, Ga!Jand continued to prepare for the "B ig Blow" attack.
and Diamonds, he was given Although 300 fighters had recently been lost in a four-day
command of the first opera- stretch while defending oil facilities, thousands more were
tional jet fighter unit, amassed for the one-day assault on the American heavy
Kommando Nowotny, in
t he fall of 1944, and worked bomber fleet. On November 12, Galland notified Goring
wit h Adolf Galland t o devel- that he was ready to proceed. All that was required was a
op jet fighter tactics. After day of good weather, and a large U.S bomber formation
downing a U.S. bomber on headed for Germany. But day after day, the skies above Ger-
November 8, 1944, he was
many remained overcast as Galland and his Luftwaffe
killed when his Me 262 was
jumped by U.S. fighte rs. fighter pilots waited. Then, in late November, came orders
from Hitler: 1,200 of Galland 's fighters were to be trans-
Historical Overview 55
and only one bomb shelter. This city, often called the Flo-
rence of Germany, was better known for its splendid archi-
tecture, with buildings that dated back to the thirteenth
century. Dresden normally had a population of 633,000,
but in early 1945 that figure had doubled, as its streets and
rail stations were choked with thousands of refugees fleeing
the pillaging Russian army.
For some time, Russia's premier, Josef Stalin , had been
pressing the Allied leaders for strategic bombing to support
his army's major offensive in eastern Ger-
"Five jet-propelled enemy aircraft, many. The leaders of Britain, the United
Me I 63s, flying in two separate forma- States, and the USSR were soon to meet at
tions, one element of two and one ele- Yalta, and Winston Churchill was eager to
ment of three, were seen in the target show Stalin a sign that the British and the
area around Merseburg. The element of Americans were indeed supporting the So-
two was seen to approach the bombers viets. Since the Ardennes counteroffensive
from the rear at about 32,000 feet. They
had stalled the advances of the British and
were leaving very dense white contrails.
Their formation was reported as very
American armies, Churchill decided that
good and they maintained formation bombing Dresden would visib ly demon-
position in their diving attack. They strate to Stalin that Britain and the United
made a slight diving turn attack at the States were doing their part to end the war.
rear of the bombers at very high speed, It would also demonstrate to the Russians
reported as between 500 and 600 miles the destructive punch of the combined An-
per hour. Eight of the 359th [Fighter] glo-American bombing offensive, a gesture
Group turned into them but they only whose ramifications went beyond the war
turned slightly away and continued. The with Germany.
Group did not get a shot. After attacking, General Spaatz was unhappy about the
the jet wingman pulled up into the sun at decision to bomb Dresden but did not ac-
a fifty-degree angle. In climb the jet gave tively resist the order. Spaatz was already
off smoke in bursts which was assumed
embroiled in controversy over Operation
to indicate the use offull power at inter-
Thunderclap, the plan to bomb Berlin
vals. It is believed that we can expect to
see more of these aircraft immediately, round-the-dock and force the Germans to
and that we can expect attacks on the sue for peace. He opposed this plan, since
bombers from the rear in formations or he was against wholesale bombing of cities
waves. To be able to counter and have and preferred to attack more strategic tar-
time to tum into them, our units are gets. Nevertheless, he gave in to the pres-
going to have to be in position relatively sure to end the war with one stroke, and on
close to the bombers to be between February 3, nearly one thousand B-l 7s
them and our heavies. It is believed that headed for Berlin. An estimated 25,000 res-
these tactics will keep them from making idents died in the bombings, and Spaatz lat-
effective, repeat effective, attacks on the er admitted that little effort had been made
bombers. Attention is called to the fact to hit targets of military importance.
that probably the first thing seen will be
Ten days later, on the night of February
dense contrails probably as high as
30,000 feet approaching from the rear of
13, a wave of244 RAF Lancasters dropped
the bombers." incendiary and high-explosive bombs on
Dresden. Flames swept the o ld wooden
U.S. Army Air Force Major General
William Kepner, commander of the
buildings, creating a firestorm like the one
fighter element of the Eighth Air Force, that had engu lfed Hamburg. It roared
after eight P-51 Mustangs encountered through eight square miles of the old city,
Me I 63s for the first time, on July 28, 1944 up rooting huge trees, ripping roofs off
buildings, and sucking hundreds of human
Historical Overview 57
''A !lied air power was "You're all mutineers," he screamed. As he left the room, he
threatened to have Luetzow shot. The next day, he ordered
the greatest single Galland to leave Berlin under house arrest.
reason for the German In deepest despair, Galland thought about suicide. But
defeat." word of Goring's vendetta against Galland reached Hitler,
who ordered the reichsmarschall to back off. Galland could
Feldmarsc~all Albert Kesselring
not be reinstated, but since he had long called for the use of
the Me 262 as a jet fighter, Hitler decided to let him form his
own jet fighter unit. Furthermore, this unit was to be com-
pletely outside the Luftwaffe chain of command, reporting
only to Galland, who would be able to choose his own pilots.
Goring suggested that Galland choose many of the "muti-
neers" for his new squadron, secretly believing the unit to
be a death sentence at this stage of the war. The ecstatic Gal-
land was only too willing to oblige, since these rebellious pi-
lots were among the finest in the Luftwaffe.
Word of the formation of this remarkable new unit,
Jagdverband 44, spread through the Luftwaffe. Many pilots
reported to Galland without permission or transfer orders,
and a few even rode bicycles in their eagerness to get to the
jet unit's base. Others left Luftwaffe hospital beds, where
they were recovering from battle stress. Among the pilots
who formed the core of this elite group were Major Gerd
Barkhorn, with 300 victories, Oberstleutnant Heinz Bar,
with 220 victories, and Oberst Johannes Steinhoff, with 170
victories. The "mutineer" Luetzow also found his way to
Jagdverband 44, which was now unquestionably the most
A Gruppe of Me 262s. Courtesy of talented group of fighter pilots ever assembled. "The
the Messerschmitt Archives Knight's Cross was, so to speak, the badge of our unit," Gal-
Historical Ove?View 59
overhead and U.S. tanks rumbled toward the airfield at
Salzburg, Austria, the parked Me 262s burst into flames,
one by one. Thus was ended the remarkable saga of
Jagdverband 44, which had shot down fifty Allied aircraft
while in operation.
CONCLUSION
The destruction of Jagdverband 44 signaled the end of
the long and costly war in the skies over Europe. Some
79,265 American pilots and crewmen were killed , while the
British lost 79,281 airmen. Although it is not known exactly
This U.S. flier, Second
Lie utenant Kenneth Meidigh, was
shot down on March 31 , 1945,
and escaped captivity ten days
late r.
Historical Overoiew 61
INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR
WILLIAMSON MURRAY
rofessor Williamson Murray is a Worl.d War II and
P
aviation history specialist who is the director of the
military history and strategic studies program at
Ohio State University. A 1963 graduate of Yale
University, Professor Murray spent five years in the
United States Air Force, then returned to Yale for his
Ph.D. before joining the faculty at Ohio State. He has served as a
research associate at the Air War College, and taught as a visiting
professor of military history at West Point and at the Naval War
College. Professor Murray is the author of numerous articles and
books, including Luftwaffe; The Change in the European
Balance of Power, 1938-1939; and The Path to Ruin .
Lucasfilm: First of all , if Germany had been able to come out
with advanced warplanes like the Me 262 sooner, what ef-
fect would that have had on the outcome of the war?
Murray: Well, Germany would probably have still lost the
war. And the reason is that the one secret weapon that clear-
ly was decisive in and of itself was the atomic bomb. And
only the United States was capable of spending the huge
amount of money for the atomic bomb in addition to fight-
ing a world war. We would have been in a position to drop
that bomb on Germany in increasing numbers in 1945. No
number of Me 262s, no number of special glide bombs, no
number ofV-2s could have changed that equation.
Lucasfilm: How close did Germany ever come to develop-
ing an atomic bomb?
Murray: Not close at all. The Germans thought they had the
technological lead, and so since they weren't close to devel-
oping the bomb, they assumed that nobody else was - be-
cause in their minds nobody else was as smart or as good in
terms of atomic physics as the Germans. Therefore there
was no pressure to develop such a weapon.
Lucasfilm: Why did Germany squander their huge techno-
logical advantage in the development of other weapons?
Murray: So many of their weapons never got past the proto-
type stage because of the problems involved in putting
them on a production line. It's extremely difficult to speed
that process up, even by throwing more money at it. In the
case of the Me 262, by early 1945 the Germans were in a po-
sition to turn out several hundred of these aircraft a month ,
but by that point they'd lost the war. Another problem for
the Germans was that it wasn't quite so easy to see which of
their weapons were war winne1s. Knowing what we now
know, it's very easy to say that they should have put their
money into the Me 262, the antiaircraft rocket, and other
weapons which would have changed the balance of the air
war or made it much more difficult for the U.S. to win. But
along with these weapons, the Germans spent huge
Historical Overui.ew 63
jects because of the desperate situation it was in until May-
J une, 1940. After that, the Germans had victory disease for
a year and a half and believed that the war was won and
nothing more had to be done. To get around that mindset
would have required a level of political wisdom so high that
had they possessed it, they would have realized that they
didn't need to fight a whole world war to dominate the con-
tinent. When it became apparent that the war was going to
last a long time, and they had this large number of fantastic
weapons systems in development, they still had trouble
picking the winners from the losers, as I mentioned earlier.
The second part of the problem is technological: taking
prototype design and going to mass production. In the case
of the Me 262, the problem wasn't the airframe production
- the Germans were capable of doing that, since they were
building other aircraft. The problem was the engine pro-
duction . And it's clear that they did not get a satisfactory
model of the 262 engine until June of 1944. I've heard, in-
directly, from those in the Luftwaffe that while the hand-
tooled , hand-constructed turbine had a life of seventy-five
or one hundred hours, when they went into mass produc-
tion they suddenly went down to five hours in the initial
runs . They put these engines on the 262 and took it out
and, suddenly, during the second flight, one of the engines
would eat the turbine blades and the engine would blow up
-and that was the end of the 262, and maybe the pilot, too.
My sense is that when the war was over the Germans
Eighth Air Force,
Sortie Loss Rate for
Bombers and Fighters
Historical Overview 65
something beautiful about airplanes - whether they're
flying or on the ground - they're simply fascinating. And
there was sort of a romance to aircraft flying.
Lucasfilm: How was air power to be employed?
Murray: The sense was that civilians were more vulnerable
to attack, since they were considered undisciplined and in-
capable of bearing pressure and sacrifice the way military
organizations do. So the idea was that you blast the enemy's
cities just a little bit, and the workers will be rioting and
mothers and children will be out in the street and the gov-
ernment will fall, and we'll win the war. Now, the U.S. Army
Air Corps didn't go in that direction for political reasons.
They understood that killing women and child ren was
something that Congress, in the late twenties and early thir-
ties, would have shut them down for . Something that nasty
would have been so appalling to your average congressman
from upstate New York or even Alabama or California that
it would have been rejected out of hand, so they had to look
elsewhere.
Lucasfilm: So they looked at economies?
Murray: Right. If you could break the enemy's economy,
this would have an enormous impact on the civilian society,
would collapse a civil government, and win the war quickly
and easily. And American military strategists did all sorts of
studies before the war, looking for nodules in the American
economy which would , by knocking them out, create such
economic difficulties that economic life would grind to a
halt. An obvious one was ball bearings. If you knocked out
three plants in the Northeast, suddenly half of the U.S. au-
tomotive industry would grind to a halt. Electric power was
a very attractive target, because if you hit one or two crucial
stations, the Northeast grid went down.
The problem is, there's no way of testing any of these
ideas. Military organizations have generally found it
difficult to predict what's going to work in a war and what's
not. It's not because they are made up of
very stupid, ignorant people. T he problem
Having been being hit by numerous
is that military organizations are asked to
antiaircraft shells during a raid on the
German city of Kassel, a B- 17 named prepare for the most horrible conditions
Tondelayo nevertheless managed to that human beings ever face in this world ;
make it back to its base in England. conditions that you simply cannot replicate
Amazingly, eleven unexploded shells in peacetime. When the airmen did get into
were found in the bomber's fuel tanks. conflict, they did not adapt very well, be-
Had even one of these shells gone off, the cause they tried to imprint their prewar
bomber would have been blown to bits. framework on the conditions they were fac-
Upon closer inspection, the shells were ing, rather than adapt to these conditions.
found to contain no explosive charges, The result was that air power ran into se-
and one actually had a rolled-up note vere problems almost right from the begin-
inside it. The note, in Czech, read, "This ning.
is all we can do for you now."
Lucasfilm: What were some of these prob-
lems?
ooo
- soo
..,...
g g
~
~ 0
..,...
~ ~
Historical Overview 67
with one thousand aircraft - the whole sky filled with air-
planes - if you shot down two or three of your own, it was
no big deal. If you lose five percent or under, you're win-
ning the air war; if you lose five percent or more, you're los-
ing the air war. Five percent actually is a huge loss. If you
lose five percent in a constant formation, in twenty missions
you will have lost half the formation . Again, when yo u're
dealing with eight hundred aircraft and you lose two of
them because they shot each other down,
that's more than acceptable - as long as it's
added to a small group that the Germans
have shot down .
Lucasfilm: At what point did the Luftwaffe
fighter pilots realize that they cou ld do
some real damage to the B-17 formations ?
Murray: When they discovered that their
cannons could damage at ranges beyond
the U.S. machine guns. They also discov-
ered that head-on attacks were possible ,
something that nobody thought was possi-
ble in any air force. The Luftwaffe guys who
were really good could come in and, in one-
and-a-half seconds, put a whole bunch of
30-mm. shells into an engine, and that was
the end of the B-17. The head-on attack
was terrifying to the B-17 crews, and was
probably pretty frightening to the Bf 109
and FW 190 drivers who were doing it. And
the really good German pilots were aiming
While another black cross is to come so close that they would break up the B-17 forma-
painted on a P-47, two outstand-
tion; make a B-17 pilot actually take evasive action, which
ing U.S. fighter pilots, Captain
Robert Johnson and Captain might lead to a couple of B-l 7s running into each other or
Walker Mahurin, congratulate falling out of the formation , where they're sitting ducks. But
each other. at closure rates of600 miles per hour, a good portion of the
Luftwaffe pilots couldn't hit anything.
Lucasfilm: And when the Me 262s and other faster aircraft
came along, the closure rates were even faster.
Murray: Again, of course, the faster the closure rate, the
more skilled a pilot you had to be to put shells on a target.
And some guys in the Luftwaffe in 1943 and 1944 - the
only thing they could try to do was to fly their airplane.
Lucasfilm: How did the availability and the quality of Ger-
man pilots change during the war?
Murray: The Luftwaffe in the summer of 1942 was spend-
ing as many hours to train a new pilot, in terms of flight
time, as the British and Americans. In fact, I think it was
slightly more for brand-new Bf 109 drivers in summer
1942, and twenty-five more hours in Bf 109 fighter transi-
tion school than a Spitfire or a P-38 pilot. The problem for
the Germans is that starting in 1942, attrition begins to pick
up speed. They're fighting on every front, outnumbered;
Historical Overview 69
rate pilot. And you can't put a guy into a 262 in the fall of
1943 with 175 hours' flying and expect him to do anything
with the aircraft.
From their own point of view, the Germans had another
problem. Pilot morale was not helped by Goring's attitude
that, somehow, the failure to shoot down or stop B-17 for-
mations was due to cowardice. There were incredible con-
ferences where Goring talked to a large group of fighter pi-
lots and called them all base cowards. This fat, dumpy,
corrupt guy with forty-seven rings on each hand, calling
them cowards! I asked Johannes Steinhoff, "How could you
guys take that?" And he said, "You have to understand that
the sensibilities of many people in the Third Reich weren 't
particularly high." I think his answer also would have been
to the effect that they were all twenty-one, twenty-two years
old, and had that German respect for authority.
Lucasfilm: Did it really take a better pilot to
A few U.S. bombers and fighte rs that fly an Me 262, on average? Was it a more
had crash-landed in German-occupied difficult plane than the Bf 109 or FW 190?
Europe were repaired and made airwor- Murray: My guess is if you 're a less experi-
thy again by Luftwaffe ground crews. enced pilot, speed kills. The faster you go,
This group of aircraft, known as the Wan- the more unforgiving the aircraft is. In ad-
derzirkus, or "traveling circus," toured dition, the great weakness of the 262 was
Luftwaffe bases, giving German fighter that its takeoff and landing patterns were
pilots invaluable knowledge of the air- too long and slow - it needed a 10,000-foot
craft they were fighting against. Some of concrete runway. Fires in the jet engines
these patched-up B-17s, still retaining
were also common. But the real issue here
their U.S. markings, would infiltrate
American bomber formations and even
is: If a guy can't hit anything with a 109,
open fire on the startled bomber crews. how can he hit anything with a 262? With-
out the pilot, it doesn't matter what aircraft
you have. It's not a question of whether a
guy can take it off and land; it's whether a guy can fly
through a B-17 formation, shoot two B-l 7s down , swing
over, shoot down two P-5 ls, and then go home. If all five
hundred of your guys flying 262s could do that, in a couple
of days you could put some real holes in the U.S. bombing
offensive. But if only twenty of the five hundred guys can do
that, then it doesn't do you much good .
Lucasfilm: How was it that the Luftwaffe had so many high-
scoring aces in World War II?
Murray: There are certain extraordinary pilots who can de-
velop, in the right arena, even more extraordinary capabili-
ties the more they fly. And some really good examples of
this are the top Luftwaffe fighter pilots, the guys who fly
from 1939 or 1940 through to 1945: some of them ended
their careers in 1943 as smashed-up wrecks, but the guys
who flew over one hundred missions showed from that
point on a quantitative leap in the number of airplanes shot
down per fifteen missions. And, clearly, guys like Adolf Gal-
land and Hannes Trautloft had sort of a computer template
in their mind that allowed them to look at a situation in-
Historical Overview 71
Murray: If you could figure out today who the top fighter
pilots would be, you could go to the United States Air Force
and they'd make you a millionaire tomorrow. Because you
really can't tell. Some of these guys were religious, decent
fami ly men. Others were comp lete wastre ls, women
chasers, drank huge amounts of liquor, that sort of thing.
One of the top Luftwaffe night fighter pilots was one of the
leading conspirators against Hitler. There's no pattern be-
cause there's just something undefinable about what it takes
to be an ace fighter pilot.
Lucasfilm: How did the Luftwaffe organize their day forces?
Murray: It's an interesting question. Their day interception
approach is a defense that looks relatively similar to what
the RAF did in the Battle of Britain, giving the course and
speed of enemy bomber formations when they crossed the
Channel. In the daylight, the other side wasn't going to try
to spoof your radar because they were in visible range once
they crossed the Channel. What the Luftwaffe aimed to do
U.S. Army Air Force Major from 1943 on was to make the U.S. escort fighters drop
General Carl Spaatz, the their tanks early, and then intercept attacking bomber for-
commanding general of the mations after the escort fighters dropped off. They put sus-
U.S. Eighth Air Force in
1942, was temporarily
tained pressure on B-17 formations from the beginning of
assigned to oversee air their run into Germany until they went home . And the
operations for the North longer they could attack them, the better! Now, it's clear
African theater, and then that the system became more and more complex as more
commanded the Allied air
fighters were brought back to defend Germany's airspace in
forces for the invasion of
Sicily and the Italian penin- the summer and fall of 1943. They also added Bf 11 Os and
sula. Brought back to Me 410s and a variety of other aircraft to go up there and
England in early 1944, fire rockets. The crucial thing they understood right from
Spaatz coordinated the the first was that the best way to attack the formations was to
overall bombing of
Germany by the Eighth Air
break them up. Because a small group, or preferably even a
Force and the Fifteenth Air single B-17 by itself, was a much easier target than a whole
Force in Italy. On March S, group of them. So they ended up firing rockets into the B-
1944, Spaatz issued the Oil 17 formations, or dropping fragmentation bombs from
Plan, which called for the above. Dropping bombs wasn't terribly effective, except
bombing of Germany's vital
oil installations before D- that seeing an enemy airplane above dropping bombs
Day as a way to draw the scared the hell out of B-17 crews. In one case of a B-17
Luftwaffe away from the group of twelve aircraft, one aircraft was hit by a bomb and
invasion beaches. His Oil a number of the others scattered, and then were shot down.
Plan was rejected in favor of
the Transportation Plan,
Lucasfilm: Were the air-to-air rockets really that effective at
but he nevertheless ordered breaking up formations?
strikes on oil targets after Murray: Not really. But that brings up an interesting point:
D-Day, and these proved If the Germans had really put a major effort into air de-
extremely successful in sti- fense, and regarded air superiority over the central conti-
fling the German war effort.
Later, Spaatz directed the nent as their first priority in terms of air fighting, they could
bombing of japan by B-29 have done a much better job. For example, they actually
bombers, including the two had a glider bomb that looked like a tiny V-2, except it was
that dropped atomic bombs much tubbier . This bomb had a little TV camera in the
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. front, and the resolution from it was primitive, but you
Courtesy of the United States
Air Force could at least make out the shape of the target you were at-
tacking. In the Mediterranean, they dropped a radio-
Historical Overview 73
"There is one thing that how did the Mustang program ever get off the ground?
Murray: The story of the Mustang development is a fasci-
will bring Hitler down,
nating piece of greed, capitalism, incompetence, and des-
and that is an absolutely perate need . The British showed up in the U.S . in 1940,
devastating attack by and they went to North Jtrnerican Aviation and said, "We'd
very heavy bombers like you guys to build the P-40 under contract from Curtis."
And the engineers at North American thought to them-
from this country upon selves, "Ifwe build the P-40, we'll have to give Curtis all this
the Nazi homeland." money. No, No, No!" And they told the British, "We've got
Prime Minister Winston
this great design we're working on, and we could have the
Churchill, in 1940 design to you in final form in one hundred days and we'll be
able to go into production shortly thereafter. " Desperate,
the British said , "Oh, OK, do it!" And the engineers came
up in one hundred days with a design for the P-51. They
put an Allison engine in it - which was a dog - but it took
off. And the RAF bought it and the guys at North American
were happy to have it, but they didn't think about develop-
ing it into something else. They didn't say, "Ah, what a great
design we've got!" But then in 1942, the RAF 's R & D guys
at Farmborough are looking at the flight characteristics and
profiles of all the various fighters that they're buying. And
they put the Mustang in the wind tunnel, and they discover
that it's a wonderfully aerodynamic airframe! They try a few
more tests with it, and it still comes out as an extraordinarily
good design . And then, one of them gets the bright idea,
"What's the matter with it? It's got a terrible engine. Let's
put a Merlin on it." They install the Merlin engine and cre-
ate the hottest piston engine fighter of World War II.
What's interesting is that the U.S. Army Air Force still
did not want to buy it because it was ordered under RAF
specifications and then further developed by the RAF estab-
lishment. They wouldn't buy it even though its airframe was
August 1944 September 1944 October 1944 November 1944 December 1944 J anuary 1945 February 1945
Historical Overview 75
A fonnation of B-17s from the
452d Bomb Group unloads its
deadly cargo. Courtesy of the
United States Air Force
Historical Overview 77
ball bearing factory by mistake, which he was severely repri-
manded for, because that was really undiplomatic behavior.)
We also miscalculated the fact that the Germans had some
options on the low end of the spectrum. For example, Tiger
tanks and Panther tanks were changed to roller bearings
rather than ball bearings, since roller bearings were much
easier to manufacture. The resulting tanks were harder for
the crew to turn, but the Tiger and Panther were still fairly
efficient weapon systems in 1944 and 1945.
lucasfilm: Why didn't the U.S. and the RAF cooperate
more fully by bombing more of the same targets day and
night, and how did this lack of cooperation hamper the
Combined Bomber Offensive?
Murray: I believe we cooperated with the British more than
they cooperated with us. And I think that reflects Harris,
who was an ideologue, a true believer, the man who saved
the British strategic bombing campaign. The problem is
that Harris was worn out by his success, and
the very qualities that made him an extraor-
During a fifty-plane raid on a German
dinary commander in 1942 and 1943 made
airfield near Brussels, the lead bom-
him a disaster at the end of 1943 and into
bardier decided to practice for the
bombing run by aiming for a large rect- 1944. One of the few quarrels I have with
angular park in a residential section of the British official history is that they claim
the Belgian capital. With their bombers' that the Americans hit Schweinfurt during
bay doors open, all the bombardiers a full moon period and, therefore, Bomber
adjusted their bombsights. Suddenly, the Command cou ldn't come over that night.
lead bombardier accidentally released his That's ridiculous, because that same night
own bombs over the park. Following his the RAF hit Peenemtinde, a much deeper
lead, the other bombardiers also target. They spoofed the night defenses so
dropped their bombloads, hitting many the Germans put up a huge number of
houses alongside the park. The pilots, fighters over Berlin, and the RAF got away
navigators, and bombardiers of the lead with minimal losses over Peenemtinde.
crews were later called to a meeting with
They could have done the same thing over
the commander of their bombardment
wing. Fearing that hundreds of innocent
Schweinfurt. If the raids had been com-
and sympathetic civilians had been killed, bined so that after the Eighth Air Force
the lead bombardier took full responsibil- started a large number of fires at Schwein-
ity for the accident. After noting how fu rt , the RAF Pathfinders could have
bombardiers had been warned repeated- dropped marker flares on these fires and
ly about such accidents, the commander 600 Lancasters and Halifaxes could have
informed the crews that through intelli- destroyed fifty-seven percent of the Ger-
gence sources it had been learned that man ball bearing industry. Unfortunately,
the houses around the park were occu- Harris obdurately refused to believe in
pied not by Belgians but by German what he called "panacea targets"; he was not
troops, some 1,200 of whom had been going to bomb precision targets. The irony
killed in the recent bombing. "Across the is that, by the summer of 1944, the RAF had
Channel," the commander stated, "this
better capabilities of hitting targets with
accident is being called a remarkable
exhibition of American precision bomb-
precision bombing than the U.S. did. In the
ing. Such are the fortunes of war, gentle- Transportation Plan attacks on France,
men. This meeting and the incident are Bomber Command did a better job than
now closed." the Eighth Air Force, because each RAF
bomber bombed its target individually, so
that once the markers had gone down accurately, then the
target was dead. But Harris was such an ideologue that it
reached the point where he was ordered by the chief of air
staff at the end of 1944 to hit more oil targets and he basical-
ly said, "Not only no, but if you don't like it, fire me!" And
the air staff didn't fire him.
Lucasfilm: lt seems like early on, the U.S. took the high
moral road as far as bombing. The RAF bombed cities to kill
workers, whereas the U.S. tried to knock out industries.
Why did the U.S. position deteriorate as the war went on?
Murray: Well, the British position deteriorated as the war
went on, too. During the RAF Wilhelmshaven raid in De-
cember 1939, they didn't drop their bombs, even though
they saw German cruisers and maybe even a pocket battle-
ship tied up on docks, because bombing policy at that time
was that you could not drop a bomb onto a warship tied up
on a dock because you might kill a dockworker. Under the
pressures of war, all that changed. In 1941 and 1942, the
British are forced to go to area bombing because of the ca-
pabilities of the weapons and air crews - the cities are the
only target they can hit. So they're driven to it. And I think
they are also pushed to that by their own prewar doctrine
and proclivities. The two go hand-in-glove. But I think the
reason the U.S. went in that direction is because we discov-
ered that, while we could do precision bombing, there were
large numbers of days when there was a cloud cover over
Germany and we weren't going to do any precision bomb-
ing. So what did they do, seven out of ten days, do nothing
with their air force? This was one reason why the Eighth Air
Force gave far more support to the Transportation Plan, be-
cause whe'n it couldn't hit oil targets or precision targets,
Historical Overview 79
then it could hit cities, because the railroad station is located
at the middle of every major German city. I think it was un-
realistic to believe that you could drop bombs on enemy
countries and not kill civilians. But in 1937 and I 938, the
U.S. Army Air Force could not advertise that to Congress
because the idea of killing civilians was anathema to the
American people.
Lucasfilm: Was part of this policy based on the fear that the
Germans would also let loose?
Murray: No, I think everybody understood in World War II
- they've forgotten since - that the Germans let loose
from the beginning. First in Rotterdam, then in London in
September of I 940, the Germans clearly tried to do what
the British were finally able to do to Hamburg; and, actual-
ly, the Germans created the first fire storm, at Belgrade,
which killed near I 7 ,000 people - that's up there with
Flak over Ludwigshafen punched
t his huge hole in the wing of
" Rum Runne r,'' a 8 - 17 which
neverthe less returned to its base
safe ly.
Historical Overview 81
LOADING INSTRUC T IONS
nside the box that this manual came in, you'll find
an envelope with several floppy d isks labeled Se-
cret Weapons of the Luftwaffe. You'll also find a Code
Wheel, along with a Reference Card. Turn to the
Loading Instructions section of the Reference Card,
which tells you how to start up the program from
the floppy disks, plus how to install it on a hard disk drive.
When you've finished loading the program, see the Game
Controllers section below.
Game Controllers (Mouse/joystick/Keyboard)
Your mouse, joystick, or keyboard cursor (arrow) keys
will be referred to as the controller in this manual. Controller
buttons will refer to the buttons on the mouse or joystick, as
well as several keys on the keyboard .
To find out which controllers you can use with your com-
puter, see your Reference Card.
If your computer doesn't support a mouse or a joystick,
you can use the keyboard to control all of the game func-
tions. However, flying an aircraft is easier and more enjoy-
able with a joystick or mouse. The joystick allows you to pi-
lot the U .S. and German planes much the way you would in
actual flight. The mouse gives you very precise control,
which is helpful for positioning a fighter to attack and for
aiming your guns.
Using the Controller to Select
from Menus and Directories
After you've loaded Secret Weapons of the Luftwaffe, you'll
need to make selections from several menus, often by
choosing icons from those screens. You 'll also need to make
selections from a number of directories consisting of long
lists of names, not all of which are displayed at once.
Whenever you're at a menu or screen that has a list of
choices or icons, look for a floating arrow. Use your con-
troller to move the arrow over the desired choice or icon,
and then click your controller button. This procedure will
be referred to as "clicking on" in the manual.
To select an item from a directory, click on its name.
Sometimes, the list of names will be longer than what is dis-
played. To look down all the names in the directory, move
the floating arrow over the down arrow icon at the bottom
of the vertical bar that is located on the lefthand side of the
list, and press and hold the controller button . To look back
up the list, pass the floating arrow over the up arrow icon,
Preceding page: With its massive and p ress and hold the controller button. There is also a
industrial strength, the United small slider box inside the vertical bar, and you can use it to
States tumed out tens of thou-
scan the directory: Position the floating arrow over the box,
sands of heavy bombers during
World War II. Courtesy of the press and hold your controller button, and move the con-
United States Air Force troller up or down. Release the controller button when
The P-47C Thunderbolts of the Rodeo A fighter sweep without bombers . The U.S.
56th Fighter Group, the fighters would simply fly over enemy territory looking for
"Wolfpack."
Luftwaffe fighters to engage. Often they were ignored by
the Luftwaffe, since they posed no threat to their fighters,
until the U.S. fighters began strafing airfields and other tar-
gets.
Ramrod A bombing mission in which U .S. bombers,
with heavy fighter escort, would try to knock out a specific
ground target. The Germans, not knowing the difference
between a Circus and a Ramrod , would usually attack the
bombers in either case.
Sweep Differed from a Rodeo in that the U.S. fighters
would be flying ahead of a bomber formation, where they
could "sweep" the sky of Luftwaffe fighters before a target
was bombed.
After you've selected a mission, you 'll go to the Flight
Briefing Map. Or, to leave the Historical Mission Selection
menu altogether, click on EXIT.
CONTINUE TOD
RETRY
EXIT
VIEW TOD
RETRY
EXIT
ma
1iii111
Toggles between advanced and
standard flight control modes
IS Exits the program; returns you to your
1iii11 computer's operating system
Left forward
I 0 to 11 o'clock
Forward
llo'clock
Right forward
I to 2 o'clock
9 o'clock 3 o'clock
ENGINE CONTROLS
All of the aircraft in Secret Weapons of the Crews of the two main U.S. Eighth
Luftwaffe are powered by either jet, rocket, Air Force heavy bombers, the B-17 Fly-
or propeller-driven engines. The following ing Fortress and the B-24 Liberator,
keys control the th rottle or power settings developed a less-than-serious rivalry. B-
of the engines of all aircraft, with the func- 24 crews touted their plane's superior
tion keys app lying only to multi-engined bombload capacity and speed. B-17
aircraft. On twin-engined aircraft, if you're crews, on the other hand, bragged that
facing forward in the cockpit, the left en- the Fortress could fly at higher altitudes
gine is numbered 1, and the right engine is and was better able to withstand battle
numbered 2. On fo ur- engined aircraft, damage. Noting the B-24's large, ungain-
when you're facing forward in the cockpit, ly fuselage, they cracked that the Libera-
tor was really the crate that the B-1 7 was
the engines from left to right are numbered
shipped in. Since the B-24s were forced
1, 2, 3, and 4. If you're fl ying a fo ur-en-
to fly several thousand feet below the
gined aircraft, pressing the E key will let you Fortresses, where they were easier tar-
view a set of engine instruments for two en- gets for German fighters, the B-17 crews
gines only, on either the left or the right also joked that the Liberator was the
wing. To turn off an engine, decrease its best fighter escort they could ask for.
throttle until its RPM indicator reads 0. (For
Right cheek
gun
Chin turret or
nose gunner
Left cheek
gun
"
Left waist
gun ner
Top turret
gunner
Right waist
gunner
Tail turret or
tail gunner
Disk Menu
Pressing the D key will bring up the Disk Menu, which
allows you to save a film clip, load or delete a film clip you've
already saved, and allocate disk space so that you can record
longer films. On the righthand side of the screen will be a
directory listing all the film clips you've previously saved,
and on the lefthand side of the screen will be a menu dis-
playing the following disk menu selections:
LOAD Lets you load a film clip. To do this, first click on a
film clip name from the film clip directory, then click on the
LOAD button. (The LOAD selection is not available during
flight.)
SAVE Brings up a text cursor. Type the name of the film
clip you're currently viewing, then press RETURN to save
it.
DELETE Brings up a text cursor. Type the name of the
film clip you want to erase, then press RETURN to delete it.
RETRY Lets you search a new floppy disk for film clips if
you aren't using a hard drive.
DISK CACHE Toggles between on and off settings.
When the disk cache is turned off, the film is saved to system
memory, and the length of the film clip is limited to the
amount of memory available. When the disk cache is turned
on, the film is periodically saved to disk and the length of
the film clip is determined by the film disk cache size.
SET FILM DISK CACHE SIZE Limits the amount of
disk space to be allocated for the film disk cache, allowing
you to record as long a film as you'd like. Click on this selec-
tion, then type in the maximum number of bytes you want
to set aside on your disk drive.
View Modes
Below the Film Controls buttons are three View Modes
buttons. The CHASE view mode, selected by pressing the C
key, is the one you'll always start out in. In the CHASE
a
,iii
TRACK mode; automatically pans camera to
follow an object in either CHASE or FREE mode
Controller Button Function
Left controller Moves camera forward
button
"The I09 was not bad at diving, but the Thunderbolt was
much better at diving. In climbing, if you compared it with the
Mustang and with the Spitfire, it depended on what height you
started to climb. In the altitude between 5,000 and I0,000
meters, I think the I09 was much better at climbing than all the
other types. The version of the I09 that I flew in 1944 and 1945
as a commander of a high-cover fighter group for our FW I90s
was a very good one at 8,000 to I0,000 meters, as it had a special
engine for high altitude, but it was very bad at low levels. Of
course, it had a special tank for injections in the fuselage and so at
a lower altitude your turning radius was not so good as that of a
normal I09 and not even as good as that of an FW 190. So we
normally didn't attack Mustangs or Thunderbolts at low altitudes
because it was bad for our type of aircraft."
Luftwaffe General Walter Krupinski
"I always thought that the I09 could go faster on the initial
dive than a P-47, I guess because we didn't throw everything to
the wall. But overall, the I09 was not as fast as the P-47."
U.S. Anny Air Force Captain James Rnnegan
The pilot of this FW 190 acciden- while using an engine that was in far less demand from the
tally landed his fighter in
German aircraft industry. Lightweight, extremely maneu-
England, giving the Allies a valu-
able prize. Courtesy of the United
verable, and formidably armed, the FW 190 quickly re-
States Air Force placed the Bf 109 as the Luftwaffe's deadliest fighter, al-
though it never supplanted the 109 in production totals. Its
wide-track landing gear proved to be far superior to the no-
toriously weak, narrow landing gear of the Bf 109. And
since the FW 190 was smaller than the Bf 109 and most oth-
er fighters of its day, it had the added advantage of being a
smaller target for Allied fighters and gunners. A superb
daylight fighter, the FW 190 also saw service as a night
fighter, fighter-bomber, dive bomber, ground attack, and
photo reconnaissance aircraft.
The FW l 90A-5 began to roll off the assembly lines in
April 1943. This model could accept a wider variety of
bombs, armament, and fuel tanks than earlier versions. The
FW l 90A-8, which began to appear in late 1943 and early
1944, was the last and most numerous A-model to be pro-
duced, and offered improved performance over earlier
models, along with a larger fuel tank. Like the Bf 109G-6,
the FW l 90A-8 could accept the MW 50 methanol-water in-
jection system, which gave it ten minutes of increased speed
and climbing power. Heavy armament, including a 20-mm
"I only flew the late model of the FW 190, what we called the
'long nose,' for about a month, in February 1945. It was a mar-
velous aircraft, I must say, but if you had over 1,000 missions in a
I 09, you didn't like the 190 too much. There were a lot of Ger-
man pilots who flew the 190 from the very beginning who very
much favored it over the I 09, but personally I didn't like it too
much . In 1944, the I 90s normally attacked the American
bombers, and were much better at it than the I 09s because they
had a radial engine that was very good protection against the rear
gunners of the bombers." Luftwaffe General Walter Krupinski
"A good friend, Wolfgang Spate, flew the Me 163. I heard that
the problem was that it would explode if the two types of fuel
came together. They had a lot of losses out of this one. It was
only used as what we called an 'object fighter.' You could only let
it take off when you saw the enemy bombers, and it went up very
fast over them. The main tactic I know about was attacking from
above, without any fuel in the tanks, if possible.
"I don't know anyone who liked flying it, since it was a very
dangerous thing to fly. I would say it was a crazy idea - that's my
opinion. If you have a fighter and you have to burn out your fuel Frontal view of an Me 163. As its
sleek design indicates, it had
first, attack, and then make a glider landing, it doesn't seem to excellent handling characteristics
make much sense." Luftwaffe General Walter Krupinski as a glider once it ran out of fuel.
Courtesy of the United States
Air Force
Optional Armament
Two 20-mm MG 151
cannons, with 100
rounds per gun,
mounted in the wing
roots
Ten vertically
launched SG 500
Jagdfaust 50-mm high-
explosive rocket-
propelled shells,
mounted in vertical
tubes in the wings
months, until the end of the war, the Me 262 proved to be An Me 262 Sturmvogel fighter-
outstanding in combat; it was simply too fast for Allied bomber. Although Hitler ham-
pered the development of the
fighters and bomber gunners. However, its superior speed Me 262 by ordering that it be
was sometimes a liability to its pilots, who found it difficult to equipped with bomb racks, tech-
hit targets at high speeds, and Me 262s were sometimes shot nical problems with the junkers
down after the pilot had slowed to attack. In fact, most of the jumo 004 jet engine also kept
this remarkable aircraft from
losses occurred when the pilot had to slow down to land . mass production until 1944.
The Me 262A-la was the main fighter version produced Courtesy of the U.S. Air Force
during the war, and was dubbed the Schwalbe, or "Swallow." Museum, Wright-Patterson Air
It was heavily armed, with four cannons in the nose, and lat- Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
er, as the Me 262A-1B, with twenty-four R4M air-to-air
rockets mounted under the wings. Other versions included
the infamous Me 262A-2a Sturmvogel fighter-bomber, with
bomb racks mounted under the fuselage for carrying one
or two bombs, and various two-seater night fighters and
trainers. Although some 1,430 Me 262s were produced,
only about 300 were ever used against the Allies.
@;it.fl 50 miles 1> "Goring made the worst mistake with the 262 that ever
could have been made - it was our greatest error of all
on every target, because the 262 would have given the American
bomber force so many losses; their fighters at that time were not
fast enough to fight against the 262. So the Americans would have
concentrated much more on special mi litary targets and not
destroyed all of Germany, or all the towns wherever they were
flying." Luftwaffe Genera/ Walter Krupinski
"We first got news of the 262 in October of '44. They said
that it was a jet and was the fastest one around. We weren't
afraid that if we hit it we were going to die. We knew we had
won the war by this time, and the pilots that we were running up
against were just kids, with the exception of this one squadron
led by Galland, who had all the aces on the western front. And
yet, the first time I saw the 262, I just couldn't believe it, I
couldn't figure out what the hell it was. I just saw the 262s as
specks, until we finally got closer to them; then I recognized them
as jets. We never got any instructions on how to go after the
262, other than, 'Watch out for these things.'
"Had the Germans done what Galland had continuously
harped on them to do, to use the 262s as defensive weapons
instead of offensive weapons, before the massive air raids t hat
started knocking out their manufacturing, their oil, their fuel, we
would have still won the war, but it would have been one hell of a
bitter time." U.S. Army Air Force Captain James Finnegan
Optional Armament
and Attachments
Four 30-mm MK 103
cannons, with 120
rounds per gun ,
mounted in the wing
roots
Two 2,205-pound
bombs
Two 33 1-gallon auxil-
iary fuel ta nks
Courtesy of Temple Press, Ltd. could withstand damage better than liquid-cooled engines.
The P-4 7 also had a huge propeller that measured twelve
feet in diameter. Despite its huge size and seven-ton weight,
the P-47 was fast and maneuverable ; since it weighed so
much, it could dive faster than any other fighter, reaching
speeds of600 miles per hour (several pilots actually report-
ed reaching supersonic speeds). And with eight machine
guns in the wings, it packed a deadly punch.
Tough and durable, the P-47 was the main
fighter of the Eighth Air Force until the arrival
of the P-51 Mustang. Its worthiness increased
with the development of external drop tanks, which ex-
panded its range and countered the limitations of its fuel-
guzzling engine. The P-4 7 was later used as a fighter-
bomber for ground-attack strafing and bombing missions,
where it excelled. The Thunderbolt had the distinction of
being built in larger num-
bers than any other U.S.
fighter.
The P-47C, as well as the
early D-models, were known as "razorbacks," be-
cause of the distinctive raised shape of the rear
canopy, which, unfortunately, obscured the pilot's vi-
"The P-4 7 shot down a lot more I90s and I09s than they
shot down P-47s. As a matter of fact, it was hard to shoot a P-47
down because it could come home with half the engine gone and
it would still run. It was a great plane, the safest one of all. For
combat, for ground support, air-to-air, anything, I'd take it any-
time over the P-51 . I flew P-80s and F-86s after the war, and I'd
still take the P-47 anytime."
U.S. Army Air Force Second Ueutenant Thomas Marsters
Optional Equipment
One 200-gallon
belly tank
Two 75-gallon
wing tanks
200-gallon "flat" belly tank.
Two-thousand-pound
bombload
Optional Equipment
One 200-gallon
belly tank
lwo 75-gallon
wing tanks
Two-thousand-pound
bomb load
"Flying the P-51 was very, very exciting; it was a really great
aircraft. I could do anything I wanted with it in flight. You could
make quick turns, things like that, although it wouldn't go any
faster than the P-47 once you got the old Jug going. The P-51 had
a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine in it that sounded just like a kitty
purring; it really ran smooth. There was only one problem with
the airplane itself in combat, which was if you got one bullet hole
in the coolant system, you had to abandon it right away because
the engine would freeze up because of the lost coolant. Also, like
all rear-wheeled aircraft, it was a little tough to taxi because you
couldn't see out the front, you had to do an S-curve when you
taxied. But it handled real nicely; we really didn't fly it, we wore
it." U.S. Army Air Force Second Ueutenant Thomas Marsters
Optional Equipment
Canopy of a P-51 B
Two 75-gallon
wing tanks
Two-thousand-pound
bomb load
Optional Equipment
Canopy of a P-51 D
Two 75-gallon
wing tanks
Two-thousand-pound
bombload
" You monitored all your engines all the time, and checked
your oil pressure, your RPMs, especially when you were getting
hit by flak."
'The B-17 was an easy plane to fly. I flew a B-24 for a few
hours and that was a lot of work. The B-17 was really stable and
easy to fly; in fact you'd think, 'This thing can fly by itself."'
U.S. Army Air Force Pilot Officer Robert Davila
" In the beginning when we were trying to find out what was
the best way to attack a B-17, we tried everything, even bombing
the bombers with bombs and so on. But we found out that the
best tactic was to attack them from the front, and we used the
190 for this from late 1943 on. The time when you could shoot
was very short because the closing speed was a very high one.
But if you hit the B-17 from the front, you normally hit the cock-
pit and the engines. After that time, there were only four groups
of I 90s who were still attacking from behind, called the Sturm-
gruppen; if the B-17 didn't burn or the crew didn't bail out, these
I 90s were ramming the bomber on the elevator and the rudder."
Luftwaffe General Walter Krupinski
A trio of Bf I 09Gs. B-l 7s were blasted out of the sky until the U.S. developed a
suitable escort fighter, the P-51 Mustang. The emphasis in
World War II fighter tactics also shifted, from maneuver-
ability, as typified by the dogfights of the Battle of Britain, to
speed and sophisticated weaponry, as embodied by the suc-
cessful Me 262.
But in World War II, as in every war, the key to success in
air combat was to know the strengths and weaknesses of
your own aircraft - and of you r opponent's aircraft. The
warplanes of World War II all had a wide range of capabili-
Preceding page: A P-47 flies ties, and newer aircraft with greater performance and
above a column of U.S. tanks. weaponry were constantly being introduced. A pilot also
Thunderbolts provided invalu- needed to quickly spot his opponent and determine the di-
able ground support for the rection he was flying. Most importantly, ifhe wanted to sur-
Allied annies as they penetrated
vive and succeed, he needed to be able to size up a given
into France and Germany in
1944-45. Courtesy of the United combat situation and to know when to fight - and when to
States Air Force flee .
Use your view control keys frequently to look around your air7
craft, so that you can spot the enemy before he spots you. Use your
wing-level view, high view, and scan view to completely cover the
sky. See Pilot View Controls in the Mission I nstructions: In-
Flight chapter for more information.
One way for a fighter pilot to gain an advantage in com-
bat was to surprise an opponent by attacking from a higher
altitude or from the enemy's blind spot. This allowed the at-
tacking fighter to build up speed while diving, so it could at-
tack and get away rapidly.
Gaining an altitude that is higher than your opponent's is one of
the fundamentals of air-to-air combat and gives you a tremendous
tactical advantage. In a dive, altitude trans/ates into speed, so the
higher up you can get, the faster you'll be able to pounce on your tar-
get, fire your weapons, and get away from other enemy aircraft. The
Go 229, with its superior ceiling, can gain an altitude advantage
over any other aircraft.
If you don't have an altitude advantage, try approaching your
opponent from his blind spot, which is behind and below his aircraft.
Those aircraft without bubble canopies, such as the Bf 109, the FW
190, the P-51B Mustang, and the "razorback" P-47, will not be
able to see you from this angle.
One of the best ways for a fighter pilot to surprise an op-
ponent was to attack from the direction of the sun.
"W e always tried t o come out of the sun, but that was only in
t he late afternoon. We were always flying into the sun in the
morn ing." U.S. Army Air Force Captain James Finnegan
To attack from out of the sun, first use the view controls to locate
it, then look for the enemy aircraft you want to attack. Change your
flight path so that your fighter will eventually be positioned directly
between the sun and the enemy. When you reach this position, turn
your fighter toward the enemy. Jn a perfect attack position, the sun
should be at your back and will be visible in your rearview mirror.
The enemy pilot, blinded by the sun, will be unaware of your ap-
proaching attack, and won't fire at you or execute any evasive ma-
neuvers until you attack.
To avoid surprise attacks, pilots were also advised never
"Very seldom did you ever get some guy just sitting right in
front of you. It just didn't happen, but if it did happen, it was
because he was trying to shoot some other guy down, and he
was more interested in him than in you."
U.S. Army Air Force Captain James Finnegan
air-to-air bomb was a fragmentation bomb that was time- FW 190. Courtesy of the Boeing
Aircro~ Company
fused to explode after five seconds, which meant that the pi-
lot had to be several hundred feet above the formation be-
fore releasing the bomb. The R4M and Wfr. Gr. 21 rockets
were pr-imitive and had no guidance system: to aim them
the pilot had to either point his fighter toward the enemy
airplane until it was in his gunsight, or use deflection shoot-
ing and fire them ahead of the target. Since they had a low
flight velocity, their trajectory was similar to that of cannon
shells , and the pilot had to lob these rockets in by firing
slightly above the target aircraft. These two rockets were
fired from distances of half a mile to a mile, well out of the
range of the gunners of U.S. bombers. The R4M rockets
were fired in a salvo of twelve per wing, while only one Wfr.
"Toward the end of the war, a few of our Me 262s had this
air-to-air rocket, the R4M. We attacked the bombers every time
from behind with the R4M, and the bombers pulled up immedi-
ately when they saw the detonation of the rocket, and their very
close formation spread out a little bit. I was flying with General
Galland on one attack, and one of his rockets hit a wing of a
bomber and the rest of the aircraft landed on the wing of another
bomber and so two bombers were destroyed by one rocket. It
was very effective, but you had to shoot it only in one shot, and
we had only a few of them." Luftwaffe General Walter Krupinski
D~
The Second
Leader's
,,,CA Wingman
The Leader
..JI<, c
Leader of the
Second Pair
....CB
The Leader's
Wingman o+
+c
used for ground attack. They were aimed
the same way as their German counterparts, -i-A
and their accuracy was also low . However,
Two versions of the Schwann.
stationary ground targets were generally easier to hit than
The small diagram shows the
fast-moving aerial targets. The bazooka rocket was not time- view from below the fonnation.
fused but exploded on impact.
FIGHTER FORMATIONS
During the Spanish Civil War, three years before the
outbreak of World War II, Luftwaffe fighter pilots had
flown in tight three-plane formations. Their heavy losses
had forced them to develop a looser, four-plane fighter for-
mation, called the Schwarm, made up of two pairs of Bf
109s, each pair known as a Rotte. The four aircraft flew
about six hundred feet apart, a distance based on the turn-
ing radius of their plane. The best pilot and best shot was
the leader of the formation, who navigated and flew ahead
of the other three fighters . The leader's wingman protected
the leader, and always flew between the leader and the sun,
though at a lower altitude so that the other pilots would not
be blinded by the sun while looking for him . The leader of
the second Rotte and his wingman flew at a higher altitude.
The second wingman always had the job of guarding the
formation against surprise enemy attacks from the sun side.
The heights of the four fighters in the Schwarm were stag-
gered, so that they could cover each other in all directions.
The formation reduced the risk of collision and, being so
spread out, was harder for the enemy to spot.
This fo ur-plane formation was later adopted by the U.S.
Army Air Force, which, like the Luftwaffe, stressed the im-
portance of the pair of fighters in combat. When enemy air-
craft were spotted, the pilot who was in the best position to
attack became the leader, while the second aircraft of the
the target's tail. This was the simplest attack because it re-
quired no deflection shooting, and was ideal for inexperi-
enced pilots or poor marksmen.
The stern attack is useful if the speed of your aircraft is greater
than the speed of the aircraft you're attacking. However, it is useless
against a faster aircraft, such as the Me 262 or the Go 229, which
can accelerate quickly, leaving you with no chance to catch it.
The most effective tactic against the Me 262 was to dive
down upon it from high above to pick up speed, and then to
open fire before the jet pilot could react. U.S. fighters would
try to knock out one of the Me 262's engines, reducing its
speed so that it could not get away. Occasionally, a U.S. pilot
would encounter a jet pilot whose reliance on maneuver-
ing, rather than on speed, would slow the jet down enough
so that the American could not be shaken. Most of the time,
If you're a U.S. pilot, diving down from above is the best way to
attack a faster aircraft, such as the Me 262, the Me 163, or the Go
229. This approach gives you a larger target area to fire at, espe-
cially if you're attacking the Go 229, which offers a very small
profile if you attack it from the front, side, or rear.
In most cases, a pilot would try to make a single pass, do
as much damage as he could , and then get away. Very rarely
would he engage in a turning battle with the opponent, in
which each jockeyed for position on the other's tail.
"I only got into one dogfight in which we got into those stupid
circles, where you're pursuing someone and you're both turning
tighter and tighter. The bad thing about fighting air-to-air is that if
you get into those circles, you're so interested in getting inside
him, and getting that nose around, that some other bastard
you're not even paying attention to comes down and takes a shot
at you." U.S. Army Air Force Captain James Finnegan
Ifyou're flying a fighter with your drop tanks still attached, and
you're engaged by enemy fighters, you should jettison the tanks im-
mediately. If you don 't, they will explode if hit by gunfire and will
also cut back on the maneuverability ofyour fighter.
GROUND-ATTACK TACTICS
As the war progressed, the role of the fighter expanded.
In 1944, U.S. fighter pilots who were previously ordered to
stay near bombers in their escort role were
As the air war began to turn in favor now told to destroy "targets of opportunity"
of the Allies, a special suicide unit of the on the ground on their return flight if they
Luftwaffe, called the Raubvogel, or "bird did not encounter fighters in their patrol
of prey," was formed. The pilots of this area. These targets included railroad mar-
group flew heavily armored FW I 90s and shaling yards, trains, bridges, and especially
opened fire on U.S. bombers only when airfields.
they were at point-blank range, pulling The biggest hazard of these ground at-
away at the last possible second. In April tacks was the heavy concentration of flak
1945, five members of this unit actually around key installations . To counter the
downed U.S. bombers by ramming into
threat, U.S. fighter pilots relied on two tac-
them.
tics: They would fly toward the target at an
extremely low altitude to surprise the gun-
ners. They would also assign several fighters to take out the
flak batteries before the rest of the formation shot up the
ground target.
BOMBER FORMATIONS
After the first few bombing raids on France in 1943,
Colonel Curtis LeMay devised several tactics to maximize
the firepower of the B-l 7s and improve their bombing ac-
curacy. One of these tactics was a flying formation known as
the combat box. In this formation, three squadrons of six or
seven bombers each were stacked in boxes on top of one an-
other. The middle box was in the lead, and the other two
boxes were stacked 1,000 feet above and below it and 250
B-17s from the 381st Bomb
Group line up for takeofrfrom
their base in England.
feet to its left and right. When viewed from the side, this for-
mation resembled a sideways V, with the first planes in the
middle box leading the way. The purpose of the combat box
was to provide a clear area for the bomber's gunners to fire
in, especially if German fighters were attacking from head-
on.
"We never used the auto-pilot because our main task was to
stay in formation all the time. In training we were told to keep
fifty feet apart, but over in Europe we practically buried our wings
into each other. It was very tiring to fly formation, especially if
you were flying in a low slot, because you had to watch the guy
right overhead more than anything else. You're sitting and looking
up and looking ahead and looking up all the time, so we'd take
turns flying, about fifteen, twenty minutes at a time, and then
switch off.
"I'd say the weather over Europe was bad sixty percent of the
time. We never had a day where we had clear weather all the
"On a bomb run, the group had to fly straight and everything
had to be perfect, so the bombardier could take control of the
plane from the initial point when you told him to take over. That
was when the flak would come in, because they knew you
weren't going to move. As soon as 'bombs away,' there'd be flak
coming in at our altitude, and that impressed me. The whole
group would just drop down 500 feet together to get underneath
the next barrage coming."
U.S. Army Air Force Pilot Officer Robert Davila
Ifyou 're flying as the lead bomber, the success of the bombing run
depends upon you and your bombardier. Use the sighting mecha-
nism on your Norden bombsight to lock in on a target, and to calcu-
late the proper time at which to release your bombs. If you're not
flying lead, keep your eye on the lead bomber and coordinate your
bombload drop with that of the leader.
For more information about the Norden bombsight, see the Bom-
bardier Controls section of the Mission Instructions: In-Flight
chapter.
FLAK
The word flak was enough to strike terror in the heart of
B-17 crewmen from 1943 to 1945. "Flak" was an abbrevia-
tion of a German word for antiaircraft shells fired at the
bomber formations from the ground. These shells were set
......
.......
to explode when they reached a certain altitude, riddling The lead B-17 in the fonnation is
rocked by a burst offlak during a
the B-17 formations with chunks ofjagged metal. A bomber
bombing raid on Leipzig.
that received a direct hit from one of these antiaircraft shells
usually went down in flames. The B-l 7s were required to
stay in formation at a prescribed altitude over their target,
which made it easier for flak gunners to zero in on them.
"We had maps that would tell you where the flak concentra-
tions were going to be, but that didn't mean anything, because the
Germans had a lot of guns on rail cars. On my first mission, we
lost an engine when a piece of flak cut an oil line. We lost our
first navigator - he got hit in the throat by flak, and I found out
that I got sick when I saw things like that. Our tail gunner got hit
with a piece of flak that had his initials on it - it was part of the
lettering on the shell. We caught a lot of flak in the Kiel Canal
because the German navy was just churning in the water down
there and those navy gunners were good."
U.S. Army Air Force Pilot Officer Robert Davila
,m
Simulation Controls
Keys Function
mm
'
~ ~ Turns only the engine sound off and on
m
'iiiill
Exits the ~rogram'. returns you to your
computer s operatmg system
Left forward Forward Right forward
IOo'clock 12 o'clock 2 o'clock
9 o'clock 3 o'clock
Forward
Function
m
,iii
Centers rudder in fighters
and bombers
, . . post-flight evaluation
A Bf I 09 damaged by gunfire
from aP-47.
-,iiiillm
,. .
Increases the throttle
for Engine # l
dropped (on a B-17, this key allows you to
toggle between dropping only one bomb at
-,iiiillm
,iii
Increases the throttle
for Engine #4
or SPACE BAR
Right controller button
guns or cannons
Fires secondary
a
Left cheek
gun
Chin turret or
nose gunner
Right cheek
gun
Left waist
gunner
Top turret
gunner
Right waist
gunner
Tail turret or
tail gunner
(uparrow) Increases
Swivels the bombsight magnification
"You drop a load of
sighting mechanism up ofbombsight
bombs and, if you're
cursed with any imagina-
tion at all, you have at
Repositions the sighting cross- Resets magnification least one quick horrid
hairs of the bombsight nearly ofbombsight to lx glimpse of a child lying in
bed with a whole ton of
directly below your bomber
masonry tumbling down
on top of him; or a
three-year-old girl wail-
(down arrow) Decreases ing for Mutter...
Swivels the bombsight magnification Mutter... because she
sighting mechanism down ofbombsight has been burned. Then
you have to tum away
Key Function
a Locks on the target, and begins to count down
, . . the number of seconds until your bombload
from the picture if you
intend to retain your
sanity. And also if you
should be dropped to hit the target intend to keep on doing
m Toggles between dropping only one bomb
, . . at a time and automatically dropping them
the work your nation
expects of you."
consecutively U.S. Army Air Force
Colonel Curtis LeMay
RETURN Drops bombload
war the barrels of ten If you're running the simulation from floppy disks, and
want to save pilot and crew records, Custom Missions, Cam-
thousand antiaircraft paign Missions, Tours of Duty, combat film replays, and oth-
guns were pointed to the er important mission data, you must format a blank floppy
sky. The same guns disk before you start up the simulation (consult your DOS
manual for information on formatting a floppy disk) . To
could have well been save this information, insert the floppy disk and click on
employed in Russia SAVE.
against tanks and other If you've loaded the simulation on a hard drive, all mis-
sion information will automatically be saved in the SWOTL
ground targets." subdirectory.
German m inister of armaments
Albert Speer CREATING CUSTOM MISSIONS
WITH THE MISSION BUILDER
With the Mission Builder, you can open up a world of en-
tirely new and unique air combat challenges. It lets you cre-
ate your own missions and then save them to disk for your-
self and others to fly. When you create a mission, you
organize the forces of both the Eighth Air Force and the
Luftwaffe into flight groups, and create a flight plan for
them to follow. (This process is nearly identical to setting up
a Campaign Mission.)
NOTE: Before you begin to build your mission, it's a
good idea to plan it out on paper. The large Battle Map at
the back of the manual is helpful for choosing targets to at-
tack or defend.
The Mission Builder Map
To create a mission, select CUSTOM MISSIONS from
the Main Menu. You'll then move to the Custom Mission
menu, which displays three selections:
that installation . As you create flight groups and flight Women factory workers assem-
plans, they will be represented by icons that will appear on bling a P-51 B Mustang. While
women made up a large percent
the map (see Creating Flight Groups and Flight Plans below). age of the U.S. labor force during
Below the map, you'll see four buttons: the war, German leaders
SAVE Lets you save the current mission that you're deemed women unfit to work in
building wartime factories, and relied
instead on slave laborers, which
LOAD Lets you load a mission that you've already built
resulted in a poor quality of
and saved workmanship.
NEW Cancels all the values for the mission you've been
editing, so you can start creating a new mission
EXIT Returns to the Custom Missions menu
Creating Flight Groups and Flight Plans
Just as when you set up a Campaign Mission, you'll need
to create one or more flight groups, which are a given num-
ber of aircraft that fly together as a unit. Each mission that
To choose the starting point for a flight group's mission, P-47 fighter-bombers of the
click on BEGIN . This word will be highlighted, and the 386th Fighter Group blasted this
pointer will change to a crosshair (to change the crosshair bridge on the Moselle.
Product Support
We recommend that you carefully read the instructions
below to insure proper installation of this Tour of Duty soft-
ware. However, if you experience technical difficulties and
require assistance, contact Lucasfilm Games Product Sup-
port at l-415-721-3333.
Installing the Do 335 Pfeil
Tour of Duty Disk on a Hard Drive
NOTE: The contents of this disk must be installed on
your computer's hard drive in order for it to be used with
Secret Weapons of the Luftwaffe.
To install the Tour of Duty disk on a hard drive, first boot
your machine. Then:
l. Insert the disk in drive A or B.
2. Type a: and press RETURN . Your computer will re-
spond with the prompt "A> ." (If you're using drive B, type Although the nick-
name of the Do 335 was
b: and press RETURN. Your Computer will respond with
the Pfeil, or "Arrow:' its
the prompt "B>".)
unique fuselage outline
3. Type install c: (or the letter of your hard drive) and inspired its pilots to call
press RETURN . The installation program will automatical- it the Ameisenbir, or
ly copy all of the files from the Tour of Duty disk to the ap- "Anteater!'
propriate subdirectories on your computer's hard drive.
Do 335
remained cool toward his ideas for a fighter. Instead, they Artist's rendering of a Dornier
Do 335.
awarded him a development contract for a 495-mile-per-
hour unarmed , single-seat bomber that could carry a
2,205-pound bombload. Dornier decided to implement the
tandem engine arrangement on this aircraft, the Do P.231.
By 1942, design work had nearly been completed, but as an
air war over Europe loomed more likely, priorities changed
and Dornier's bomber project was cancelled. The idea of a
twin-engined tandem fighter was then revived, and
Dornier decided to adapt the bomber design to the require-
A Do 335 A-1 sits derelict out- of bombs as the Me 262. Hitler still supported the bomber
side the Oberpfaffenhofen facto- version of the Messerschmittjet, but finally decided that the
ry, having endured five U.S. Army
8th Air Force attacks. An Arado Do 335 should be produced as a backup measure in case the
Ar 234 jet bomber can be seen 262 was a failure. In mid-1944, he ordered the production
parked in the distance. of the Do 335 to proceed as quickly as possible.
Meanwhile, more Do 335 prototypes were rolling out of
the factory at Oberpfaffenhofen. The Do 335 V4 was the
prototype for the Do 435, a night and all-weather intercep-
tor with cabin pressurization -and two side-
Since both engines of the Do 335
by-side seats for the pilot and copilot. (This
were ail"-cooled, a special scoop,
program was canceled in the fall of 1944.)
positioned beneath the fuselage and T h e VS prototype was a testbed for the
behind the wings, was devised to cool the Do 335's proposed armament of one 30-mm
hard-to-reach rear engine. But even with MK 103 cannon in the front propeller spin-
this scoop, the rear engines of several ner and two 15-mm MG 151 cannons on top
Do 335 prototypes were prone to over- of the front engine. The V6, V7, and VS
heating. One of these prototypes was prototypes were used for various equip-
flown by an unlucky RAF test pilot after ment trials, with the V7 and VS delivered to
the war. As he neared an airfield to land, Junkers and Daimler-Benz respectively to
the rear engine of the Do 335 caught fire. be used as engine testbeds. The Do 335 V9
Evidently, he was unaware of the flames,
served as the basis for the first pre-produc-
for he continued to make his circuit of
tion mode l, the Do 335 A-0, a fighter-
the airfield instead of making an emer-
gency landing. Before he could complete
bomber.
the circuit, the fire severed the elevator Between July and October 1944, ten
control cables, and the Do 335 dove Do 335 A-Os were built. In September, sever-
straight down into a schoolhouse. The al A-Os were sent to a special experimental
pilot was killed in the crash. Luftwaffe unit, Erprobungskommando 335,
which was established to evaluate the
fighter, had a second cockpit for the radar operator which The Do 335 VI I was the
prototype for the Do 335 A-10
was located behind and above the pilot's cockpit. The V-11 series.
and V-12, prototypes for the Do 335 A-10 and A-12 respec-
tively, were unarmed trainer aircraft, with the second cock-
pit carrying full instrumentation for an instructor. Several
heavy fighter prototypes for the Do 335 B-series Zerstdrer,
the Do 335 V-13 and V-14, were completed during the win-
ter of 1944-45. The Do 335 V-13, the prototype for the
Do 335 B-1, had more powerful 20-mm cannons mounted
on its forward engine, while the V-14, the prototype for the
Do 335 B-2, had two additional 30-mm MK 103 cannons
mounted in its wings. The V-13 and V-14 would be the only
two B-series prototypes to be completed before the end of
the war, although several other two-seat night fighters and
Optional Armament
One 1,102-pound
bomb, mounted in the
fuselage weapons bay
Four 551-pound
bombs
Do 335 number 240 I02 being BIBLIOGRAPHY Gunston, Bill. The Illustrated
loaded into the British aircraft
Bambach, Werner. The Life Encyclopedia of Combat
carrier H.M.S. Reaper. This air-
craft was transported from and Death ofthe Luftwaffe. Aircraft of World War II.
Cherbourg, France to the Coward-McCann, Inc., Bookthrift Publications,
Patuxent River Naval Air Test
1949. Inc. , 1978.
Center in Maryland. Number
240 I02 was eventually returned Brown, Eric. Wings of the Nowarra, Heinz. Dornier
to Dornier where it underwent
Luftwaffe. Pilot Press, Do 335 "Pfeil." Schiffer
complete restoration during the Publishing Ltd., 1989.
mid- I970's. Limited, 1987.
Ford, Brian. German Secret Smith, J., and Anthony Kay.
Weapons: Blueprint for Mars. German Aircraft of the Second
Ballantine Books, Inc., World War: Putnam, 1972.
1969.
Green, William. Warplanes
of the Third Reich. Galahad
Books, 1990.
625702
Product Support
We recommend that you carefully read the instructions
below to properly install this software. However, if you ex-
perience technical difficulties and require assistance, con-
tact Lucasfilm Games Product Support at 1-415-721-3333.
Installing the He 162 VolksjagerTourofDuty Disk
on a Hard Drive
NOTE: The contents of this disk must be installed on
your computer's hard drive in order for it to be used with
Secret Weapons of the Luftwaffe.
To install the Tour of Duty disk on a hard drive, first
boot your machine. Then:
1. Insert the disk in drive A or B.
2. Type a: and press RETURN . Your computer will re-
spond with the prompt "A>." (If you're using drive B, type
b: and press RETURN . Your computer will respond with
the prompt "B>.")
3. Type install c: (or the letter of your hard drive) and
press RETURN . The installation program will automatically
An He I 62A-1 with the Claiming that these specifications could not be met,
American evaluation serial
Messerschmitt dropped out of the competition, leaving the
T-2-489 on the fins. This aircraft
was evaluated at Edwards Air other five companies to vie for the project. The Luftwaffe's
Force Base in 1946. general of the fighter arm, Adolf Galland, also blasted the
Volksjager project, noting that the Luftwaffe already pos-
sessed a proven jet fighter, the Me 262. Despite these
protests, the date for submission of designs was, amazingly,
moved up to September 15. At that time, the design submit-
ted by Blohm und Voss was judged to be the best, followed
by the design submitted by Heinkel. By September 23,this
opinion had been revised: the very features that made the
Blohm und Voss design more technologically advanced -
its swept-back wings and fuselage which resembled the later
U.S. F-86 Sabre - were likely to delay its production .
Heinke! had by this time already built a mock-up ofits Volks-
jager design, and its simplicity was decisive in its favor. On
September 30, the Heinke! He 162, nicknamed the Sala-
mander, was ordered into full production.
As these first He 162s were being assembled and flown, This unpainted He I62A-2 was
strafed by Allied fighters, but the
plans were on the drawing boards for even more advanced canopy was probably shattered
models. The He 162 B series was to have a longer fuselage by an explosive charge to prevent
and wingspan, which would enable it to carry more fuel and the aircraft from falling intact
heavier 30-mm cannons. It was to be powered by the into the hands of the approaching
HeS 11 turbojet, which was finally nearing completion and Allied forces.
projected to produce 2,866 pounds of thrust. The
HeS 11-powered He 162 C was to have swept-back wings
and a V-shaped "butterfly" tail, while the He 162 D was to
have its wings swept forward, for greater low-speed stability.
Finally, the He 162 E was to be powered by a combination of
jet and rocket engines, using the rocket for climbing and the
turbojet for level flight. Its projected performance was out-
standing, with an estimated rate of climb of 16,400 feet in
the first minute, and a top speed of 628 miles per hour in
horizontal flight at sea level.
The Volksjager joins the Luftwaffe
By January 1945, enough prototype, pre-production,
and production models of the He 162 had been developed
to turn over to the Luftwaffe for further testing. It was nec-
essary for the Luftwaffe to "break in" the He 162 and deem
Optional Armament
Two 30-mm Rhein-
metall Borsig MK 108
cannons, with 50
rounds per gun,
mounted in the lower
nose section of the
fuselage
MISSION INSTRUCTIONS
Once you've installed the P-38 Lightning Tour of Duty
disk in your SWOTL directory, you'll be able to fly the P-38
in a variety of missions when you run Secret Weapons of the
Luftwaffe.
Flight School Missions
There are three Flight School Missions for the P-38
Lightning. After selecting any of these missions, you'll be
able to test-fly the P-38 and practice your aerial gunnery,
ground attack, and bomber escort skills.
To fly any of these missions, select FLIGHT SCHOOL
from the Main Menu on the U.S. side. Then click on the
P-38 icon.
added inside its wings boosted the total internal fuel capaci-
ty to 410 gallons , and 1,010 gallons with external drop
tanks, for a maximum range of 2,260 miles. With this ver-
sion, a problem known as compressibility, in which the air-
craft would lose lift and go out of control during a high-
s peed d ive, was finally solved by "dive recovery flaps"
installed underneath the outer wings. The P-38] was fol-
lowed by the most widely produced Lightning, the P-38L. It
differed little from its predecessor except that it could carry
4,000 pounds ofbombs or ten .5-inch rockets. However, the
P-38L did not see service in Europe because it had been re-
placed in operations by the P-51D.
As the Allied armies pushed the German and Italian
forces out of North Africa, the P-38 was used for bombing
and strafing ground targets in Sicily and
Italy, as well as for photo reconnaissance. Af- The P-38 was chosen to provide air-
ter Italy surrendered to the Allies in Septem- craft cover for the invasion fleet during
ber 1943, the Fifteenth Air Force was based D-Day chiefly because of its unique sil-
in Foggia, Italy. This gave the U.S. Army Air houette. Since there were so many inex-
Force an additional direction from which to perienced gunners on board the ships
attack Germany, and there the P-38 was used taking part in the Normandy landing, the
as a bomber escort. Later, as German aerial Lightning was singled out as the Allied
resistance diminished, the P-38 was used aircraft least likely to be confused with a
mainly for ground attack, destroying targets Luftwaffe fighter. Unfortunately, several
P-38s were nevertheless shot down by
in southern Germany. One fighter group de-
the Allied gunners on June 6, 1944.
stroyed 84 locomotives during a single mis-
sion.
It was in the Pacific theater of operations, as well as in the
Mediterranean, that the P-38 earned its reputation as one of
the truly outstanding fighters of the war. The air over the
Pacific was warmer than that over Europe, and far less
detrimental to engine performance. With so many long dis-
623302
LOADING INSTRUCTIONS
Installing the P-80 Shooting Star
Tour of Duty Disk on a Hard Drive
NOTE: T his Tour of Duty disk must be installed on your
computer's hard drive in order for it to be used with Secret
Weapons of the Luftwaffe.
To install the Tour of Duty disk on a hard drive, first boot
your machine. Then:
1. Insert the Tour of Duty disk in drive A or B.
2. Type a: and press RETURN. Your computer will re-
spond with the prompt "A> ." (If you're using drive B, type
b: and press RETURN. Your computer will respond with
the prompt "B>.")
eluding the Hudson bomber and the Lightning fighter for With the help of JATO Oet Assist
the British. The Army decided on a company whose work- Take Ofl) rockets, a Shooting
Star lifts off the runway at Van
load wasn't as heavy, Bell Aircraft, builders of the P-39 Aira- Nuys Metropolitan Airport.
cobra fighte r. General Electric was contracted to build
copies of the British Whittle jet engine for the new Bell
fighter, which was designated the XP-59AAiracomet.
On October 1, 1942, the XP-59A was flown for the first
time. The results were disappointing. Because of the low
1,250 pounds of thrust produced by each of its two jet en-
gines, plus a portly shape that resembled that of the P-39 ,
the XP-59A could only reach a top speed of 404 miles per
hour, which was slower than that of the piston-engined P-38
Lightning. Even with the addition of more powerful jet en-
gines, the XP-59A was outperformed in test flights by piston-
engined fighters like the P-47D Thunderbolt and the
P-38J Lightning. The German Me 262, which had made its
first flight as early as July 1942, was projected to have a top
speed of 600 miles per hour: the Airacomet would be no
match for the Luftwaffe jet in the skies over Europe.
Optional Armament
Two 1,000-pound
bombs, mounted under
the wings
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Angelucci, Enzo. EncyclD'jJe- Davis, Larry. P-80 Shooting
dia of Military Aircraft: Starin Action. Squadron/Sig-
1914-1980. Military Press, nal Publications, Inc. , 1980.
1983. Pilot's Manual for Lockheed
Arnold, Rhodes. Shooting F-80 Shooting Star. Aviation
Star, T-Bird & Starfire: A Publications.
Famous Lockheed Family. Wooldridge, E.T. The P-80
AZTEX Corporation, 1981 . Shooting Star: Evolution of a
j et Fighter. Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1979.
624602