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Reversion Jurisprudence Fulltext
Reversion Jurisprudence Fulltext
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan
and Solicitor Patricio M. Patajo for petitioner.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General
Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 1253, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City, Defendants", instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102
and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based thereon issued in the name of defendant
Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. No.
P-2508 and the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land
in question to the mass of public domain, and granting such further relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria,
who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant
Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee from
Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for
the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of
defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City (Civil Case No.
1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name
of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in
question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered
thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a
reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the
Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700
to be inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest, whereas the application for
free patent by Isagani Du Timbol was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter;
that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol
never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-301), holding
that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted
in misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not,
the respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the
patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section
38 of the Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order
of June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this
Court for review.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the
patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent
and title thereto are null and void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie
against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a
public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or
disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of
Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable
or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative
thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has
jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy
and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of
products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code).
That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by
the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the defendant Isagani
Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in
question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private
parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but
forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p.
508, 512, this Court said:
And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent
because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may
be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack
at any time by any party adversely affected. (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-17619,
Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vao vs. Insular Gov't.,
41 Phil. 161; Aderable vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960).
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight vs. Land
Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title
under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered
under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same
because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become
the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297, relied
upon by respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case no forest land was
involved but agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent issued to one party and later
registered under the Torrens System by the other party. The litigation was between private parties
where the party who registered it under Act No. 496 sought the nullity of the title of the patentee
under the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of
the land is the state itself which is specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to
initiate such proceedings as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private
individual.
The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of
the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must
have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years; that the applicant, after diligent
search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R. Alcones, in South Cotabato, could not
be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City; that there are no existing signs of
improvements found in the area in question as it is not under cultivation but covered with grasses,
bushes and small trees; that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes
Chilsot; that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no
actual survey thereof; that the property in question is inside the ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes
Chilsot under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1244 and, therefore, inside the forest zone; and that
said ranch has a fence around it to show that other persons could not enter and cultivate the same,
and that the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has
been forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining
title to the land, and if proven would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without
hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land
and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section
91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is
procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name
although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part
of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void
(Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-
80; emphasis supplied). The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be
reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become
indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the
law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38).
Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du
Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the state. A
title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance
thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail vs. Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278. 96 Phil. 946: Eugenio, et al., vs. Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-
7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap G.R. No. L-6088, Feb.
24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al.,
G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the
Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil
Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription (Republic of the
Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348. People vs.
Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31, 1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de
Piedad 35 Phil. 728; 751-753).
Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be reopened
under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an
action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act), for the
remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the complaint for the grant of such
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the
complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its reconsideration, both issued in
Civil Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent
court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render judgment thereon accordingly.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CRUZ, J :p
732-742)
[G.R. No. L-36507. June 14, 1974.]
DECISION
BARREDO, J : p
Footnotes
(Piero, Jr. v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-36507, [June 14,
|||
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J : p
For the same reason that no case related to the complaint filed
by private respondents has been filed by them in any other court,
we rule pro hac vice that the contested certificate of non-forum
shopping is substantial compliance with the rules. Indeed to hold
otherwise would only further delay the disposition of the original
dispute between petitioners and private respondents concerning
the ownership of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. We note that their
conflicting claims could have been resolved by now if not for the
erroneous application of the elementary rules of pleading which
resulted in the premature dismissal of the complaint filed by
private respondents. This Court need not repeat the fastidious
and unfounded adherence to technicality which already stalled
for an unfortunate seven (7) years more or less the proceedings
in the trial court.
In sum, the grounds relied upon in petitioners' desire to dismiss
the complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 95-312
cannot be impressed with merit. By this decision, however, we
are not foreclosing the presentation of evidence during trial on
the merits that Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 are not private property
and that private respondents are not truly the owners thereof.
This and other issues on the merits must follow where the
preponderant evidence lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February
2000 reversing the Order dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 95-312 entitled Heirs of Honorio Dacut, namely,
Visaminda Orevillo, Violeta Dacut, Josephine Dacut and
Elizabeth Dacut v. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala, namely, Ana,
Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and Camilo, all surnamed Kionisala,
and Isabel Kionisala is AFFIRMED with the understanding that
private respondents Heirs of Honorio Dacut as plaintiffs therein
may proceed on the basis of their causes of action of declaration
of nullity of free patents and certificates of titles and/or
reconveyance based on an implied trust, with claim for damages.
The proceedings in the trial court shall commence forthwith
within thirty (30) days from notice of the finality of this Decision
without unnecessary delay. SHIETa
SO ORDERED.
(Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, G.R. No. 147379, [February
|||
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p
In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent
is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the
petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action
because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being
the real party-in-interest. It is the respondent's contention that
only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates
of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the
ownership of the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of
action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground,
requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers, 26 this
Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an
action or affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to
dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on
whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the
cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint
in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the
determination of whether or not a complaint states a
cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and noother
matter may be considered, and the court may not inquire
into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is
improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts
not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said
motion.
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action
was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does
arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action,
not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be
dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. 32 Petitioners failed to establish in
their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or
legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their
right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is
based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of
his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a
rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property. 33
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject
Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of
the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment
executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an
integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property
on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim
of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since
time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title
granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time
immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private
property even before the Spanish conquest. 34 If the Subject
Property was already private property before the Spanish
conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the
Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the
Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having
acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could
acquire no better title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based
on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners
from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the
Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by
discontinuing the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands
recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title,
unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months
from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No.
1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under
the Torrens system. 35 Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the
Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing
ownership over real property. DHEcCT
PHIL 269-297)
[G.R. No. L-11651. December 27, 1958.]
SYLLABUS
DECISION
LABRADOR, J : p
PHIL 1011-1014)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
The RTC explained that the free patent and title had
already been issued after Hachero was found to have complied
with all the requirements; that it was the Republicitself thru
the DENR-CENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under
the operation of the Torrens System; that it could not
understand the complete turnabout made by the same office
and its officials who certified before that the subject land was
alienable and disposable and who approved Hachero's
application; that the Republic failed to show the document
which stated that the subject land was still timberland as
indicated under Project No. 2A L.C. Map No. 839, released on
December 9, 1929, despite the fact that said document was
already available at the CENRO office at the time of the
application for free patent; that the lands adjacent to the
subject land were already alienable and disposable; that the
free patent and the title itself were public documents entitled
to the presumption of regularity; and that the verification and
inspection report of one Sim Luto together with the other
CENRO officials presented by the Republic were insufficient to
defeat Hachero's patent and title. 10
The Ruling of the CA
On July 4, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, stating
that the verification presented by the Republic could not be
given probative value because L.C. Map No. 839, dated
December 9, 1929, which served as basis for the verification,
was not presented before the RTC. According to the CA, the
Inspection Report, standing alone, was not sufficient to
overcome the burden imposed upon the Republic and could not
serve as basis of the reversion of the subject land. The CA
doubted the subsequent findings of the land investigator that
the subject land was still timberland because he was the same
land investigator who previously evaluated the subject land
and certified that it was alienable and disposable. 11
Not in conformity, the Republic filed the subject petition
anchored on the following:
GROUNDS
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S ACTION
FOR CANCELLATION OF FREE PATENT NO. 045307-98-
9384 AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. E-
18011 AND REVERSION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE DISCHARGE OF THE OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS BY THE INVESTIGATING
PERSONNEL OF THE DENR IN THIS CASE HAS
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, WHICH
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT.
II
THE PREVIOUS FACTUAL MISAPPRECIATION
COMMITTED BY THE DENR EMPLOYEES
CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BIND THE
GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN, AS IN THIS
CASE, THE MISTAKE OR ERROR REFERS TO
IMMUTABLE MATTERS SUCH AS
ALIENABILITY OF A PORTION OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN. 12
In advocacy of its cause, the Republic basically argues
that per its investigation and verification conducted in July
2000, the free patent issued to Hachero was defective and
erroneous considering that the land it covered fell within the
timberland zone. It contends that the said factual findings
carry great weight and should be accorded respect by the
courts due to the special knowledge and expertise of DENR
personnel over matters within their jurisdiction. Considering
that the DENR personnel acted in the discharge of their official
functions, the Republic asserted that they have in their favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duties. Moreover,Hachero failed to rebut the DENR's
investigation report and, for said reason, the presumption in
favor of the investigating personnel and their report has
become conclusive.
The Republic further contends that the title issued
to Hachero, which had been issued based on an erroneous
DENR finding that the land was alienable, can still be
overturned by a later report stating otherwise. Thus, the
Inspection Report, 13 dated July 24, 2000, and Verification
Report, 14 dated July 17, 2000, superseded the previous finding
that the subject land was alienable and disposable.
The Republic avers that the State is not estopped by the
mistakes of its officers and employees and that the previous
factual misappreciation committed by DENR employees cannot
bind the government. 15 DETACa
Hachero's counter-position
Hachero counters that the petition should be dismissed
on the ground that it has raised substantially factual matters.
He points out that the findings of fact of the RTC and the CA
are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal if
there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion. He calls the
attention of the Court to the fact that the officials, who
previously certified to the alienability and disposability of the
subject land but made a complete turn around by declaring
otherwise, could not have made a mistake or error. He asserts
that the main document a vital piece of data denominated as
Cadastral Map No. 839, which became the basis for the
reinspection/reinvestigation and verification by CENRO, Coron,
was released on December 9, 1929 and admittedly already in
their records when the application was approved for titling,
and yet was not presented in court as evidence.
Finally, Hachero stresses that the government cannot be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens
and that titleholders maynot be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in
the absence of his complicity in a fraud or manifest damage to
third persons.16
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
General Rule and Exceptions when
factual findings of the trial court
are affirmed by the CA
It is generally settled in jurisprudence that the findings of
fact of the trial court specially when affirmed by the CA are
final, binding and conclusive and may not be re-examined by
this Court. There are, however, several exceptions to this rule,
to wit:
1] When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures;
2] When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
3] When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4] When the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts;
5] When the findings of facts are conflicting;
6] When in making its findings, the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7] When the findings of the CA are contrary to that of the
trial court;
8] When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
9] When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
main and reply briefs are not disputed;
10] When the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and
11] When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 17
After combing through the records, the Court is of the
considered view that there is a need to review the findings of
the courts below due to the presence of some of the
enumerated exceptions mentioned above, which are 1) when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and 2)
when the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence on
record.
The Republic showed clear and convincing
proof that the subject land was inalienable
and non-disposable
Records reveal that on October 15, 1998, upon the
approval of Hachero's application by CENRO of Palawan, Free
Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was issued and, on May 7, 1999, the
property was subsequently registered under OCT No. E-18011.
Thereafter, in an effort to find out fake or illegal titles, the
DENR created a task force to investigate and evaluate all
issued patents and titles. An investigation conducted by a
representative of the Regional Executive Director of the
Regional Office No. IV revealed that the subject land covered
by OCT No. E-18011 was still timberland and, therefore, could
not be segregated from the public domain as timberlands were
classified as inalienable and non-disposable public lands.
Accordingly, both Sim Luto, Land Management Officer III,
and Diosdado L. Ocampo, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, prepared and signed the Inspection Report,
dated July 24, 2000, and Verification, dated July 17, 2000,
attesting to the fact the subject land fell within the timberland
zone under Project No. 2A, L.C. MapNo. 839, released on
December 9, 1929. For said reason, both recommended the
cancellation of OCT No. E-18011.
Aside from the Inspection Report and the Verification,
the Republic also adduced maps 18 prepared by the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), which
showed that the subject land was located within the periphery
of the land area classified as unclassified public forest and
beyond the alienable and disposable area. In other words, as
the maps clearly reveal, every inch of the subject land is inside
the unclassified public forest area. Evidently, these maps
presented by theRepublic, together with the Inspection Report
and the Verification, all clearly demonstrate that the subject
land is not yet subject to disposition. aDSIHc
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J : p
The result would have been different had the State proved
that the property was already classified as part of forest
land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title
was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to
discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it
the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the
alienable character of the property in the cadastral
proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a
subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence,
would amount to taking of private property without just
compensation and due process of law. 53 This, however, is not
what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due process are
paramount considerations that must still be observed. 54
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' July 25, 2008
Decision and February 4, 2009 Resolution
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 186603, [April 5, 2017])