07-Torbela vs. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 140553, Dec. 7, 2011
07-Torbela vs. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 140553, Dec. 7, 2011
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DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Presently before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, both assailing the Decision dated June 29, 1999 and Resolution dated October 22, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 140528 are siblings Maria Torbela, Pedro Torbela, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario, Leonila
Torbela Tamin, Fernando Torbela, Dolores Torbela Tablada, Leonora Torbela Agustin, and Severina Torbela
Ildefonso (Torbela siblings).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 140553 is Lena Duque-Rosario (Duque-Rosario), who was married to, but now legally
separated from, Dr. Andres T. Rosario (Dr. Rosario). Dr. Rosario is the son of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario and the
nephew of the other Torbela siblings.
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 2 of 25
The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374 square meters, located in Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (Lot No. 356-A). It was originally part of a larger parcel of land, known as Lot No. 356 of the
Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, measuring 749 square meters, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 16676, in the name of Valeriano Semilla (Valeriano), married to Potenciana Acosta. Under unexplained
circumstances, Valeriano gave Lot No. 356-A to his sister Marta Semilla, married to Eugenio Torbela (spouses
Torbela). Upon the deaths of the spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was adjudicated in equal shares among their
children, the Torbela siblings, by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated December 3, 1962.
On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over Lot No. 356-A in favor
of Dr. Rosario. According to the said Deed, the Torbela siblings "for and in consideration of the sum of NINE
PESOS (P9.00) x x x transfer[red] and convey[ed] x x x unto the said Andres T. Rosario, that undivided portion of
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR square meters of that parcel of land embraced in Original Certificate of
Title No. 16676 of the land records of Pangasinan x x x." Four days later, on December 16, 1964, OCT No. 16676
in Valerianos name was partially cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and TCT No. 52751 was issued in Dr. Rosarios
name covering the said property.
Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim was subsequently executed on December 28, 1964, this time by Dr. Rosario,
acknowledging that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same
to the latter for P1.00. The Deed stated:
That for and in consideration of the sum of one peso (P1.00), Philippine Currency and the fact that I only borrowed
the above described parcel of land from MARIA TORBELA, married to Eulogio Tosino, EUFROSINA
TORBELA, married to Pedro Rosario, PEDRO TORBELA, married to Petra Pagador, LEONILA TORBELA,
married to Fortunato Tamen, FERNANDO TORBELA, married to Victoriana Tablada, DOLORES TORBELA,
widow, LEONORA TORBELA, married to Matias Agustin and SEVERINA TORBELA, married to Jorge
Ildefonso, x x x by these presents do hereby cede, transfer and convey by way of this ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM
unto the said Maria, Eufrosina, Pedro, Leonila, Fernando, Dolores, Leonora and Severina, all surnamed Torbela the
parcel of land described above. (Emphasis ours.)
The aforequoted Deed was notarized, but was not immediately annotated on TCT No. 52751.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) on February 21, 1965 in the sum of P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage constituted on Lot No.
356-A. The mortgage was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on September 21, 1965 as Entry No. 243537. Dr. Rosario
used the proceeds of the loan for the construction of improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio) executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, on behalf of the Torbela
siblings. Cornelio deposed in said Affidavit:
3. That ANDRES T. ROSARIO later quitclaimed his rights in favor of the former owners by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim which he executed before Notary Public Banaga, and entered in his Notarial
Registry as Dec. No. 43; Page No. 9; Book No. I; Series of 1964;
4. That it is the desire of the parties, my aforestated kins, to register ownership over the above-described
property or to perfect their title over the same but their Deed could not be registered because the registered
owner now, ANDRES T. ROSARIO mortgaged the property with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, on September 21, 1965, and for which reason, the Title is still impounded and held by the
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 3 of 25
said bank;
5. That pending payment of the obligation with the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES or
redemption of the Title from said bank, I, CORNELIO T. TOSINO, in behalf of my mother MARIA
TORBELA-TOSINO, and my Aunts EUFROSINA TORBELA, LEONILA TORBELA-TAMEN,
DOLORES TORBELA, LEONORA TORBELA-AGUSTIN, SEVERINA TORBELA-ILDEFONSO, and
my Uncles PEDRO TORBELA and FERNANDO, also surnamed TORBELA, I request the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan to annotate their adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52751,
based on the annexed document, Deed of Absolute Quitclaim by ANDRES T. ROSARIO, dated December
28, 1964, marked as Annex "A" and made a part of this Affidavit, and it is also requested that the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES be informed accordingly.
The very next day, on May 17, 1967, the Torbela siblings had Cornelios Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated May 16,
1967 and Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 annotated on TCT No. 52751 as
Entry Nos. 274471 and 274472, respectively.
The construction of a four-storey building on Lot No. 356-A was eventually completed. The building was initially
used as a hospital, but was later converted to a commercial building. Part of the building was leased to PT&T; and
the rest to Mrs. Andrea Rosario-Haduca, Dr. Rosarios sister, who operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant.
Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP. Under Entry No. 520197 on TCT No. 52751 dated March 6,
1981, the mortgage appearing under Entry No. 243537 was cancelled per the Cancellation and Discharge of
Mortgage executed by DBP in favor of Dr. Rosario and ratified before a notary public on July 11, 1980.
In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime in 1979-
1981. Records do not reveal though the original amount of the loan from PNB, but the loan agreement was
amended on March 5, 1981 and the loan amount was increased to P450,000.00. The loan was secured by
mortgages constituted on the following properties: (1) Lot No. 356-A, covered by TCT No. 52751 in Dr. Rosarios
name; (2) Lot No. 4489, with an area of 1,862 square meters, located in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, covered by
TCT No. 24832; and (3) Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, with an area of 1,001 square meters, located in Nancayasan,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, covered by TCT No. 104189. The amended loan agreement and mortgage on Lot No. 356-A
was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on March 6, 1981 as Entry No. 520099.
Five days later, on March 11, 1981, another annotation, Entry No. 520469, was made on TCT No. 52751, canceling
the adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A under Entry Nos. 274471-274472, on the basis of the Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage executed by Dr. Rosario on March 5, 1981. Entry No. 520469 consisted of both stamped
and handwritten portions, and exactly reads:
Entry No. 520469. Cancellation of Adverse Claim executed by Andres Rosario in favor of same. The
incumbrance/mortgage appearing under Entry No. 274471-72 is now cancelled as per Cancellation and Discharge
of Mortgage Ratified before Notary Public Mauro G. Meris on March 5, 1981: Doc. No. 215; Page No. 44; Book
No. 1; Series Of 1981.
Lingayen, Pangasinan, 3-11, 19981
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario (spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan in the
amount of P1,200,000.00 from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To secure said loan,
the spouses Rosario again constituted mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
The mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry No. 533283 on December 18, 1981.
Since the construction of a two-storey commercial building on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was still incomplete, the
loan value thereof as collateral was deducted from the approved loan amount. Thus, the spouses Rosario could only
avail of the maximum loan amount of P830,064.00 from Banco Filipino.
Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr. Rosarios loan from PNB, the mortgage on Lot No. 356-A in favor
of PNB was cancelled per Entry No. 533478 on TCT No. 52751 dated December 23, 1981.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, a
Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, against the spouses Rosario,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4359. On the same day, Entry Nos. 593493 and 593494 were made on
TCT No. 52751 that read as follows:
Entry No. 593494 Complaint Civil Case No. U-4359 (For: Recovery of Ownership and Possession and
Damages. (Sup. Paper).
Entry No. 593493 Notice of Lis Pendens The parcel of land described in this title is subject to Lis Pendens
executed by Liliosa B. Rosario, CLAO, Trial Attorney dated February 13, 1986. Filed to TCT No. 52751
The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan from Banco Filipino. As of April 2, 1987, the spouses
Rosarios outstanding principal obligation and penalty charges amounted to P743,296.82 and P151,524.00,
respectively.
Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-
B-2-A. During the public auction on April 2, 1987, Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the three foreclosed
properties for the price of P1,372,387.04. The Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987, in favor of Banco Filipino,
was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on April 14, 1987 as Entry No. 610623.
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their Amended Complaint, impleading Banco
Filipino as additional defendant in Civil Case No. U-4359 and praying that the spouses Rosario be ordered to
redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino.
The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on March 4, 1988 a case for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure
and damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, against Banco
Filipino, the Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff and his Deputy, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-4667. Another notice of lis pendens was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on March 10,
1988 as Entry No. 627059, viz:
Entry No. 627059 Lis Pendens Dr. Andres T. Rosario and Lena Duque Rosario, Plaintiff versus Banco Filipino,
et. al. Civil Case No. U-4667 or Annulment of ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage The parcel of
land described in this title is subject to Notice of Lis Pendens subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Mauro
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 5 of 25
G. Meris, as Doc. No. 21; Page No. 5; Book 111; S-1988. March 7, 1988-1988 March 10, 1:00 p.m.
The Torbela siblings intervened in Civil Case No. U-4667. Eventually, on October 17, 1990, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. U-4667 due to the spouses Rosarios failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino, but their efforts were
unsuccessful. Upon the expiration of the one-year redemption period in April 1988, the Certificate of Final Sale
and Affidavit of Consolidation covering all three foreclosed properties were executed on May 24, 1988 and May
25, 1988, respectively.
On June 7, 1988, new certificates of title were issued in the name of Banco Filipino, particularly, TCT No. 165812
for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and TCT No. 165813 for Lot No. 356-A .
The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on August 29, 1988 a Complaint for annulment of the
Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988, judicial cancelation of TCT No. 165813, and damages, against Banco
Filipino, the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. U-4733.
On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC of Urdaneta City a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession. In said Petition, docketed as Pet. Case No. U-822, Banco Filipino prayed that a writ of possession be
issued in its favor over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A, plus the improvements thereon, and the
spouses Rosario and other persons presently in possession of said properties be directed to abide by said writ.
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822. The Decision on these three
cases was promulgated on January 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 executed by Spouses Andres
Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino, legal and valid;
2. Declaring the sheriffs sale dated April 2, 1987 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT 52751 and subsequent
final Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1988 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751 legal and valid;
3. Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751 (now TCT 165813);
4. Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot 356-A together with the improvements thereon
(Rose Inn Building). The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue a writ of possession in favor of
Banco Filipino;
5. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to render accounting to Banco Filipino the rental they received
from tenants of Rose Inn Building from May 14, 1988;
6. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to pay Banco Filipino the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
7. Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give [the Torbela siblings] the right of first refusal over Lot 356-A.
The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to annotate the right of [the Torbela siblings] at the back of TCT
No. 165813 after payment of the required fees;
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 6 of 25
8. Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby ordered to reimburse [the Torbela siblings] the market value of
Lot 356-A as of December, 1964 minus payments made by the former;
9. Dismissing the complaint of [the Torbela siblings] against Banco Filipino, Pedro Habon and Rufino
Moreno in Civil Case No. U-4733; and against Banco Filipino in Civil Case No. U-4359.
The RTC released an Amended Decision dated January 29, 1992, adding the following paragraph to the dispositive:
Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-[B]-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
122471, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 104189 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan[.]
The Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario appealed the foregoing RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals. Their
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
In its Decision dated June 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Items No. 6
and 7 of the appealed decision are DELETED. Item No. 8 is modified requiring [Dr. Rosario] to pay [the Torbela
siblings] actual damages, in the amount of P1,200,000.00 with 6% per annum interest from finality of this decision
until fully paid. [Dr. Rosario] is further ORDERED to pay [the Torbela siblings] the amount of P300,000.00 as
moral damages; P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against [Dr. Rosario].
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated October 22, 1999, denied the separate Motions for Reconsideration of
the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
The Torbela siblings come before this Court via the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 140528, with the following
assignment of errors:
First Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY [DR. ANDRES T.
ROSARIO] IN FAVOR OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] DATED DECEMBER 28, 1964 AND THE
REGISTRATION OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM EXECUTED BY THE [TORBELA
SIBLINGS], SERVE AS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO CONVEY OR AFFECT THE LAND AND
IMPROVEMENTS THEREOF IN SO FAR AS THIRD PERSONS ARE CONCERNED.
Second Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 52751 IS CLEAN AND FREE, DESPITE OF THE
ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCES OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM AND THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM APPEARING AT THE BACK THEREOF AS ENTRY NOS. 274471 AND
274472, RESPECTIVELY.
Third Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NOTICE OF
ADVERSE CLAIM OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] UNDER ENTRY NO. 274471 WAS VALIDLY
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 7 of 25
PRESCRIBED.
Duque-Rosario prays that the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that Lot No.
4489 and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A be freed from all obligations and encumbrances and returned to her.
Review of findings of fact by the RTC and the Court of Appeals warranted.
A disquisition of the issues raised and/or errors assigned in the Petitions at bar unavoidably requires a re-evaluation
of the facts and evidence presented by the parties in the court a quo.
In Republic v. Heirs of Julia Ramos, the Court summed up the rules governing the power of review of the Court:
Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially
where such findings coincide with those of the trial court. The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are, as a
general rule, conclusive and binding upon this Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.
The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
As the succeeding discussion will bear out, the first, fourth, and ninth exceptions are extant in these case.
Barangay conciliation was not a pre-requisite to the institution of Civil Case No. U-4359.
Dr. Rosario contends that Civil Case No. U-4359, the Complaint of the Torbela siblings for recovery of ownership
and possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, should have been dismissed by the RTC because of the failure of
the Torbela siblings to comply with the prior requirement of submitting the dispute to barangay conciliation.
The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 on February 13, 1986, when Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level, was still in effect. Pertinent provisions
of said issuance read:
Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 9 of 25
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Section 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays
within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involved real property
or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
1. involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangays adjoin each other; and
2. involving real property located in different municipalities.
xxxx
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court gave the following elucidation on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa in Tavora v. Hon. Veloso :
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay
"shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be
"actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the
disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays" within the same city or
municipality unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties
who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each
other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the
parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually
reside adjoin each other.
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a given dispute, Sec.
3 of PD 1508 adds:
"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such.
The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary the
operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 10 of 25
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except something from the enacting clause; to limit,
restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or in part; or to exclude from the scope of the statute that which otherwise
would be within its terms." (73 Am Jur 2d 467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the
principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although venue is generally determined by the residence
of the parties, disputes involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part
thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the same city/municipality. (Emphases
supplied.)
The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the Torbela siblings and the spouses Rosario) do not reside in the
same barangay, or in different barangays within the same city or municipality, or in different barangays of different
cities or municipalities but are adjoining each other. Some of them reside outside Pangasinan and even outside of
the country altogether. The Torbela siblings reside separately in Barangay Macalong, Urdaneta, Pangasinan;
Barangay Consolacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Pangil, Laguna; Chicago, United States of America; and Canada.
The spouses Rosario are residents of Calle Garcia, Poblacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Resultantly, the Lupon had no
jurisdiction over the dispute and barangay conciliation was not a pre-condition for the filing of Civil Case No. U-
4359.
The Court now looks into the merits of Civil Case No. U-4359.
There was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to Lot No. 356-A from their parents, the Torbela
spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same from the first registered owner of Lot No. 356-A, Valeriano.
Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which they
transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of P9.00. However, the Torbela
siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot No.
356-A registered in his name and use said property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which would be
used for building a hospital on Lot No. 356-A a claim supported by testimonial and documentary evidence, and
borne out by the sequence of events immediately following the execution by the Torbela siblings of said Deed. On
December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr. Rosarios name. On
December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario executed his own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which he expressly
acknowledged that he "only borrowed" Lot No. 356-A and was transferring and conveying the same back to the
Torbela siblings for the consideration of P1.00. On February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosarios loan in the amount of
P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a
hospital building started on Lot No. 356-A.
Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela siblings is the testimony of Atty. Lorenza Alcantara (Atty.
Alcantara), who had no apparent personal interest in the present case. Atty. Alcantara, when she was still a boarder
at the house of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr. Rosarios mother), was consulted by the Torbela siblings as regards
the extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 356-A. She also witnessed the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute
Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in his name, to prove his purported title to Lot No. 356-
A. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 11 of 25
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently
confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the
best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as
a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder
any better title than what he actually has. Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein his acquisition of title
to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name.
Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A after paying the Torbela siblings P25,000.00, pursuant to a
verbal agreement with the latter. The Court though observes that Dr. Rosarios testimony on the execution and
existence of the verbal agreement with the Torbela siblings lacks significant details (such as the names of the
parties present, dates, places, etc.) and is not corroborated by independent evidence.
In addition, Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12,
1964 and December 28, 1964, even affirming his own signature on the latter Deed. The Parol Evidence Rule
provides that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the
two written Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim since he did not put in issue in his pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake, or imperfection in the Deeds; (2) failure of the Deeds to express the true intent and the agreement of the
parties thereto; (3) the validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence of other terms agreed to by the Torbela siblings
and Dr. Rosario after the execution of the Deeds.
Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosarios testimony on his alleged verbal agreement with the Torbela siblings, the
Court finds the same unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario averred that the two Deeds were executed only because he was
"planning to secure loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank and the bank
needed absolute quitclaim[.]" While Dr. Rosarios explanation makes sense for the first Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964 executed by the Torbela siblings (which transferred Lot No. 356-A to Dr.
Rosario for P9.00.00), the same could not be said for the second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28,
1964 executed by Dr. Rosario. In fact, Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim (in which he admitted that he only
borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was transferring the same to the Torbela siblings for P1.00.00) would actually work
against the approval of Dr. Rosarios loan by the banks. Since Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 28, 1964 is a declaration against his self-interest, it must be taken as favoring the truthfulness of the
contents of said Deed.
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A based on
his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the said Deed that he merely
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 12 of 25
borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, "[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon." That admission cannot now be denied by Dr. Rosario as against
the Torbela siblings, the latter having relied upon his representation.
Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only holds Lot
No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a
fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust
relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor
or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o
particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended."
It is possible to create a trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact that these words
are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor
manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial
whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he
knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.
In Tamayo v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in the beginning,
but the registered owners subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale of the
property to another party, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust. The
same situation exists in this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his name under TCT No.
52751 on December 16, 1964, an implied trust was initially established between him and the Torbela siblings under
Article 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of
another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing his express
admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the
trust to an express one. The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr.
Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property, together with the
improvements thereon.
The right of the Torbela siblings to recover Lot No. 356-A has not yet prescribed.
The Court extensively discussed the prescriptive period for express trusts in the Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs
of Constancio Labanon, to wit:
On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to rule in Bueno v. Reyes that unrepudiated written express
trusts are imprescriptible:
"While there are some decisions which hold that an action upon a trust is imprescriptible, without distinguishing
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 13 of 25
between express and implied trusts, the better rule, as laid down by this Court in other decisions, is that
prescription does supervene where the trust is merely an implied one. The reason has been expressed by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88, as follows:
Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all actions for recovery of real property prescribed in 10
years, excepting only actions based on continuing or subsisting trusts that were considered by section 38 as
imprescriptible. As held in the case of Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958, however, the continuing or
subsisting trusts contemplated in section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred only to express unrepudiated
trusts, and did not include constructive trusts (that are imposed by law) where no fiduciary relation exists and the
trustee does not recognize the trust at all."
This principle was amplified in Escay v. Court of Appeals this way: "Express trusts prescribe 10 years from the
repudiation of the trust (Manuel Diaz, et al. vs. Carmen Gorricho et al., 54 O.G. p. 8429, Sec. 40, Code of Civil
Procedure)."
In the more recent case of Secuya v. De Selma, we again ruled that the prescriptive period for the enforcement of
an express trust of ten (10) years starts upon the repudiation of the trust by the trustee.
To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would bar a beneficiarys action to recover in an express trust, the
repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and made known to the beneficiary. The
express trust disables the trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his management or
custody, at least while he does not openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary
or cestui que trust. For this reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) declared that the rules on adverse
possession do not apply to "continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts. In an express trust, the delay of
the beneficiary is directly attributable to the trustee who undertakes to hold the property for the former, or who is
linked to the beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The trustee's possession is, therefore, not adverse to
the beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made aware that the trust has been repudiated.
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated the trust on December 16, 1964, when he registered Lot
No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751, so when on February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings instituted before
the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359, for the recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A from the spouses
Rosario, over 21 years had passed. Civil Case No. U-4359 was already barred by prescription, as well as laches.
The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor v. Ringor for the following reasons:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not vest ownership of the land upon
him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested.
It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in the
performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does not have
a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot
rely on the registration of the lands in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the
wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-
heirs. The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The
intended trust must be sustained. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the more recent case of Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose Labiste, the Court refused to apply
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 14 of 25
the prescriptive period for the enforcement of the express trust by the Torbela siblings began to run.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and mortgage agreement was registered on TCT No. 52751, to
February 13, 1986, when the Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359 against the spouses
Rosario, only about five years had passed. The Torbela siblings were able to institute Civil Case No. U-4359 well
before the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement of their express trust with Dr. Rosario.
Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches. Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. As the Court explained in the preceding
paragraphs, the Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 five years after Dr. Rosarios repudiation of the
express trust, still within the 10-year prescriptive period for enforcement of such trusts. This does not constitute an
unreasonable delay in asserting one's right. A delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not
considered to be a delay that would bar relief. Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.
Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
Having determined that the Torbela siblings are the true owners and Dr. Rosario merely the trustee of Lot No. 356-
A, the Court is next faced with the issue of whether or not the Torbela siblings may still recover Lot No. 356-A
considering that Dr. Rosario had already mortgaged Lot No. 356-A to Banco Filipino, and upon Dr. Rosarios
default on his loan obligations, Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage, acquired Lot No. 356-A as the highest
bidder at the foreclosure sale, and consolidated title in its name under TCT No. 165813. The resolution of this issue
depends on the answer to the question of whether or not Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith.
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is that the
mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered
null and void. However, an exception to this rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine,
even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale
arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This principle is based on the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent
purchasers for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the
certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might
arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the
rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is,
nonetheless, entitled to protection.
On one hand, the Torbela siblings aver that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith because as early as
May 17, 1967, they had already annotated Cornelios Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and Dr. Rosarios Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 274471-274472, respectively.
On the other hand, Banco Filipino asseverates that it is a mortgagee in good faith because per Section 70 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the notice of adverse claim,
registered on May 17, 1967 by the Torbela siblings under Entry Nos. 274471-274472 on TCT No. 52751, already
lapsed after 30 days or on June 16, 1967. Additionally, there was an express cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 16 of 25
274472 by Entry No. 520469 dated March 11, 1981. So when Banco Filipino approved Dr. Rosarios loan for
P1,200,000.00 and constituted a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A (together with two other properties) on December 8,
1981, the only other encumbrance on TCT No. 52751 was Entry No. 520099 dated March 6, 1981, i.e., the
amended loan and mortgage agreement between Dr. Rosario and PNB (which was eventually cancelled after it was
paid off with part of the proceeds from Dr. Rosarios loan from Banco Filipino). Hence, Banco Filipino was not
aware that the Torbela siblings adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A still subsisted.
The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good faith. Entry Nos. 274471-274472 were not validly
cancelled, and the improper cancellation should have been apparent to Banco Filipino and aroused suspicion in
said bank of some defect in Dr. Rosarios title.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is
a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during
the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is
subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Adverse claims were previously governed by Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, quoted in full below:
ADVERSE CLAIM
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the
land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and designate a place
at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim,
and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity
of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged
to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a
claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion.
Construing the aforequoted provision, the Court stressed in Ty Sin Tei v. Lee Dy Piao that "[t]he validity or
efficaciousness of the [adverse] claim x x x may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested
party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as
justice and equity may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration
thereof may be cancelled." The Court likewise pointed out in the same case that while a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled in a number of ways, "the same is not true in a registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only
in one instance, i.e., after the claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court x x x;" and "if any of the
registrations should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens and not the
annotation of the adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing and
proper disposition of the claim."
With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree on June 11, 1978, Section 70 thereof now applies to
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 17 of 25
adverse claims:
SEC. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registrations, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right, or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and a place at which
all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance
where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon
the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the
adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court,
after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in
an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of
thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to
that effect. (Emphases supplied.)
In Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, the Court squarely interpreted Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree,
particularly, the new 30-day period not previously found in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act, thus:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a construction that
could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning
quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the
law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days.
But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence
following, which reads:
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest."
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days,
then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no
adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not
have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 18 of 25
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute
must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its
purposes may be examined by the courts in their construction. x x x.
xxxx
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law
such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on
the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon
the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be cancelled," which obviously indicates, as inherent in its
decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding
such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court
cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the
limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim
which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a
proper hearing for the court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days
defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act
496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to
afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed
interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance
on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision immediately following:
"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant."
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from
registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant and
giving notice and warning to third parties." (Emphases supplied.)
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act or Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree, notice
of adverse claim can only be cancelled after a party in interest files a petition for cancellation before the RTC
wherein the property is located, and the RTC conducts a hearing and determines the said claim to be invalid or
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 19 of 25
unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has been conducted herein to determine the validity or
merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings. Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse claim of the Torbela
siblings, annotated as Entry Nos. 274471-774472, upon the presentation by Dr. Rosario of a mere Cancellation and
Discharge of Mortgage.
Regardless of whether or not the Register of Deeds should have inscribed Entry No. 520469 on TCT No. 52751,
Banco Filipino could not invoke said inscription in support of its claim of good faith. There were several things
amiss in Entry No. 520469 which should have already aroused suspicions in Banco Filipino, and compelled the
bank to look beyond TCT No. 52751 and inquire into Dr. Rosarios title. First, Entry No. 520469 does not mention
any court order as basis for the cancellation of the adverse claim. Second, the adverse claim was not a mortgage
which could be cancelled with Dr. Rosarios Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage. And third, the adverse claim
was against Dr. Rosario, yet it was cancelled based on a document also executed by Dr. Rosario.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title
of the vendor or mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to
the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's title, will not make him an innocent
purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he
had such notice of the defects as would have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which
may be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 might not be evident to a
private individual, the same should have been apparent to Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an ordinary
mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose business is impressed with public interest. In fact, in one case, the
Court explicitly declared that the rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of
title does not apply to banks. In another case, the Court adjudged that unlike private individuals, a bank is expected
to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the
status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its
operations.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less a purchaser in good faith at the foreclosure
sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the Torbela siblings over Lot No. 356-A is superior over that of Banco
Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No. 356-A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of said
property even from Banco Filipino.
Nonetheless, the failure of Banco Filipino to comply with the due diligence requirement was not the result of a
dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill will that partakes of
fraud that would justify damages.
Given the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings, there is no more need to address issues
concerning redemption, annulment of the foreclosure sale and certificate of sale (subject matter of Civil Case No.
U-4733), or issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino (subject matter of Pet. Case No. U-822)
insofar as Lot No. 356-A is concerned. Such would only be superfluous. Banco Filipino, however, is not left
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 20 of 25
without any recourse should the foreclosure and sale of the two other mortgaged properties be insufficient to cover
Dr. Rosarios loan, for the bank may still bring a proper suit against Dr. Rosario to collect the unpaid balance.
The rules on accession shall govern the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and the rents thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of accession is recognized under Article 440 of the Civil Code which
states that "[t]he ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or
which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially."
There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A. The Torbela siblings
themselves alleged that they allowed Dr. Rosario to register Lot No. 356-A in his name so he could obtain a loan
from DBP, using said parcel of land as security; and with the proceeds of the loan, Dr. Rosario had a building
constructed on Lot No. 356-A, initially used as a hospital, and then later for other commercial purposes. Dr.
Rosario supervised the construction of the building, which began in 1965; fully liquidated the loan from DBP; and
maintained and administered the building, as well as collected the rental income therefrom, until the Torbela
siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 before the RTC on February 13, 1986.
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, both the Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr. Rosario
(as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware of the construction of a building by Dr.
Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr. Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his knowledge that Lot
No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela siblings. This is the case contemplated under Article 453 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of
another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge
and without opposition on his part. (Emphasis supplied.)
When both the landowner and the builder are in good faith, the following rules govern:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he
may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 21 of 25
his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the land. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced
co-ownership," the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to
acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the
land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because
his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. But even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to
remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his
land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements,
that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the determination of matters necessary for the proper application
of Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of the Civil Code. Such matters include the option that the Torbela
siblings will choose; the amount of indemnity that they will pay if they decide to appropriate the improvements on
Lot No. 356-A; the value of Lot No. 356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr. Rosario; or the reasonable rent if they opt
to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario but the value of the land is considerably more than the improvements. The
determination made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1999 that the current value of Lot No.
356-A is P1,200,000.00 is not supported by any evidence on record.
Should the Torbela siblings choose to appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, the following ruling of the
Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals is relevant in the determination of the amount of indemnity under Article 546
of the Civil Code:
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined. The
respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the apartment
building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful
improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this
Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this Court pegged the value of the useful improvements
consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material based on the market value of
the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential
house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00),
the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value
of the house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the
house, a useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard,
this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said provision was
formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 22 of 25
complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does
not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who
would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly
amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of
the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be
paid by the landowner. (Emphases supplied.)
Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such as rents, belong to the owner of the building. Thus, Dr.
Rosario has a right to the rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and is under no obligation to render an
accounting of the same to anyone. In fact, it is the Torbela siblings who are required to account for the rents they
had collected from the lessees of the commercial building and turn over any balance to Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosarios
right to the rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen their
option under Article 448 of the Civil Code. And in case the Torbela siblings decide to appropriate the
improvements, Dr. Rosario shall have the right to retain said improvements, as well as the rents thereof, until the
indemnity for the same has been paid.
Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to the Torbela siblings.
The Court of Appeals ordered Dr. Rosario to pay the Torbela siblings P300,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00
as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Indeed, Dr. Rosarios deceit and bad faith is evident when, being fully aware that he only held Lot No. 356-A in
trust for the Torbela siblings, he mortgaged said property to PNB and Banco Filipino absent the consent of the
Torbela siblings, and caused the irregular cancellation of the Torbela siblings adverse claim on TCT No. 52751.
Irrefragably, Dr. Rosarios betrayal had caused the Torbela siblings (which included Dr. Rosarios own mother,
Eufrosina Torbela Rosario) mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. Resultantly, the award of moral
damages is justified, but the amount thereof is reduced to P200,000.00.
In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages may also be imposed given that Dr. Rosarios wrongful acts
were accompanied by bad faith. However, judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages
must always be exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. The circumstances of the case call for a
reduction of the award of exemplary damages to P100,000.00.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Because of Dr. Rosarios acts, the Torbela
siblings were constrained to institute several cases against Dr. Rosario and his spouse, Duque-Rosario, as well as
Banco Filipino, which had lasted for more than 25 years. Consequently, the Torbela siblings are entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and the amount of P100,000.00 may be considered rational, fair, and reasonable.
Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
The Court emphasizes that Pet. Case No. U-822, instituted by Banco Filipino for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the RTC of Urdaneta, included only Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A (Lot No. 4489,
the third property mortgaged to secure Dr. Rosarios loan from Banco Filipino, is located in Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, and the petition for issuance of a writ of possession for the same should be separately filed with the
RTC of Dagupan City). Since the Court has already granted herein the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A from Banco
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 23 of 25
Filipino to the Torbela siblings, the writ of possession now pertains only to Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino.
Dr. Rosario no longer appealed from said judgment of the appellate court. Already legally separated from Dr.
Rosario, Duque-Rosario alone challenges the writ of possession before this Court through her Petition in G.R. No.
140553.
Duque-Rosario alleges in her Petition that Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A had been registered in her name under TCT
No. 104189. Yet, without a copy of TCT No. 104189 on record, the Court cannot give much credence to Duque-
Rosarios claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Also, the question of whether Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-
B-2-A was the paraphernal property of Duque-Rosario or the conjugal property of the spouses Rosario would not
alter the outcome of Duque-Rosarios Petition.
The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and the two other properties after Dr. Rosario defaulted on the payment of his loan; Banco
Filipino was the highest bidder for all three properties at the foreclosure sale on April 2, 1987; the Certificate of
Sale dated April 2, 1987 was registered in April 1987; and based on the Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24,
1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation dated May 25, 1988, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 104189 and
issued TCT No. 165812 in the name of Banco Filipino for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A on June 7, 1988.
The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year redemption period should be counted not from the date of
foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the Registry of Deeds. No copy of TCT
No. 104189 can be found in the records of this case, but the fact of annotation of the Certificate of Sale thereon was
admitted by the parties, only differing on the date it was made: April 14, 1987 according to Banco Filipino and
April 15, 1987 as maintained by Duque-Rosario. Even if the Court concedes that the Certificate of Sale was
annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later date, April 15, 1987, the one-year redemption period already expired on
April 14, 1988. The Certificate of Final Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation were executed more than a month
thereafter, on May 24, 1988 and May 25, 1988, respectively, and were clearly not premature.
It is true that the rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property. The policy
of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of redemption. However, the liberal
interpretation of the rule on redemption is inapplicable herein as neither Duque-Rosario nor Dr. Rosario had made
any attempt to redeem Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Duque-Rosario could only rely on the efforts of the Torbela
siblings at redemption, which were unsuccessful. While the Torbela siblings made several offers to redeem Lot No.
356-A, as well as the two other properties mortgaged by Dr. Rosario, they did not make any valid tender of the
redemption price to effect a valid redemption. The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly
consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in
good faith. In case of disagreement over the redemption price, the redemptioner may preserve his right of
redemption through judicial action, which in every case, must be filed within the one-year period of redemption.
The filing of the court action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, would have the
effect of preserving his redemptive rights and "freezing" the expiration of the one-year period. But no such action
was instituted by the Torbela siblings or either of the spouses Rosario.
Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A in favor of
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 24 of 25
Banco Filipino by invoking the pendency of Civil Case No. U-4359, the Torbela siblings action for recovery of
ownership and possession and damages, which supposedly tolled the period for redemption of the foreclosed
properties. Without belaboring the issue of Civil Case No. U-4359 suspending the redemption period, the Court
simply points out to Duque-Rosario that Civil Case No. U-4359 involved Lot No. 356-A only, and the legal
consequences of the institution, pendency, and resolution of Civil Case No. U-4359 apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.
Equally unpersuasive is Duque-Rosarios argument that the writ of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
should not be issued given the defects in the conduct of the foreclosure sale (i.e., lack of personal notice to Duque-
Rosario) and consolidation of title (i.e., failure to provide Duque-Rosario with copies of the Certificate of Final
Sale).
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute upon the expiration of the
redemption period. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser's ownership of the property. After the
consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a
matter of right and its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.
The judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage
or the manner of its foreclosure. Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a
legal ground for the refusal to issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for
the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without
prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. The issuance of a writ of possession
in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is a ministerial act and does not entail the exercise of discretion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition of the Torbela siblings in G.R. No. 140528 is GRANTED,
while the Petition of Lena Duque-Rosario in G.R. No. 140553 is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
June 29, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770, which affirmed with modification the Amended
Decision dated January 29, 1992 of the RTC in Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, to now read as follows:
(1) Banco Filipino is ORDERED to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings;
(2) The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is ORDERED to cancel TCT No. 165813 in the name of Banco
Filipino and to issue a new certificate of title in the name of the Torbela siblings for Lot No. 356-A;
(3) The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the
proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, particularly: (a) the present fair market value
of Lot No. 356-A; (b) the present fair market value of the improvements thereon; (c) the option of the
Torbela siblings to appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A or require Dr. Rosario to purchase Lot
No. 356-A; and (d) in the event that the Torbela siblings choose to require Dr. Rosario to purchase Lot No.
356-A but the value thereof is considerably more than the improvements, then the reasonable rent of Lot
No. 356-A to be paid by Dr. Rosario to the Torbela siblings;
(4) The Torbela siblings are DIRECTED to submit an accounting of the rents of the improvements on Lot
No. 356-A which they had received and to turn over any balance thereof to Dr. Rosario;
(5) Dr. Rosario is ORDERED to pay the Torbela siblings P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
Torbela v. Sps. Rosario & Banco Filipino G.R. No. 140528 25 of 25
(6) Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession over Lot-5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, covered by TCT No.
165812. The RTC Branch Clerk of Court is ORDERED to issue a writ of possession for the said property
in favor of Banco Filipino.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.