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Aristotle's Metaphysics Overview
Aristotle's Metaphysics Overview
Aristotle distinguished between things that are better known to us and things that are better
Aristotle's Metaphysics known in themselves,[1] and maintained that we should begin our study of a given topic with
things better known to us and arrive ultimately at an understanding of things better known in
First published Sun Oct 8, 2000; substantive revision Wed Jun 15, 2016 themselves. The principles studied by first philosophy may seem very general and abstract,
but they are, according to Aristotle, better known in themselves, however remote they may
The first major work in the history of philosophy to bear the title Metaphysics was the seem from the world of ordinary experience. Still, since they are to be studied only by one who
treatise by Aristotle that we have come to know by that name. But Aristotle himself did not use has already studied nature (which is the subject matter of the Physics), they are quite
that title or even describe his field of study as metaphysics; the name was evidently coined by appropriately described as coming after the Physics.
the first century C.E. editor who assembled the treatise we know as Aristotles Metaphysics out
of various smaller selections of Aristotles works. The title metaphysicsliterally, after the Aristotles description the study of being qua being is frequently and easily misunderstood,
Physicsvery likely indicated the place the topics discussed therein were intended to occupy for it seems to suggest that there is a single (albeit special) subject matterbeing qua being
in the philosophical curriculum. They were to be studied after the treatises dealing with nature that is under investigation. But Aristotles description does not involve two things(1) a study
(ta phusika). In this entry, we discuss the ideas that are developed in Aristotles treatise. and (2) a subject matter (being qua being)for he did not think that there is any such subject
matter as being qua being. Rather, his description involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a
1. The Subject Matter of Aristotles Metaphysics subject matter (being), and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied (qua being).
2. The Categories
3. The Role of Substance in the Study of Being Qua Being Aristotles Greek word that has been Latinized as qua means roughly in so far as or under
4. The Fundamental Principles: Axioms the aspect. A study of x qua y, then, is a study of x that concerns itself solely with the y aspect
5. What is Substance? of x. So Aristotles study does not concern some recondite subject matter known as being qua
6. Substance, Matter, and Subject being. Rather it is a study of being, or better, of beingsof things that can be said to bethat
7. Substance and Essence studies them in a particular way: as beings, in so far as they are beings.
8. Substances as Hylomorphic Compounds
9. Substance and Definition Of course, first philosophy is not the only field of inquiry to study beings. Natural science and
10. Substances and Universals mathematics also study beings, but in different ways, under different aspects. The natural
11. Substance as Cause of Being scientist studies them as things that are subject to the laws of nature, as things that move and
12. Actuality and Potentiality undergo change. That is, the natural scientist studies things qua movable (i.e., in so far as they
13. Unity Reconsidered are subject to change). The mathematician studies things qua countable and measurable. The
14. Glossary of Aristotelian Terminology metaphysician, on the other hand, studies them in a more general and abstract wayqua
Bibliography beings. So first philosophy studies the causes and principles of beings qua beings. In .2,
Academic Tools Aristotle adds that for this reason it studies the causes and principles of substances (ousiai). We
Other Internet Resources will explain this connection in Section 3 below.
Related Entries
In Book E, Aristotle adds another description to the study of the causes and principles of beings
qua beings. Whereas natural science studies objects that are material and subject to change, and
mathematics studies objects that although not subject to change are nevertheless not separate
from (i.e., independent of) matter, there is still room for a science that studies things (if indeed
1. The Subject Matter of Aristotles Metaphysics there are any) that are eternal, not subject to change, and independent of matter. Such a science,
he says, is theology, and this is the first and highest science. Aristotles identification of
Aristotle himself described his subject matter in a variety of ways: as first philosophy, or the
theology, so conceived, with the study of being qua being has proved challenging to his
study of being qua being, or wisdom, or theology. A comment on these descriptions will
interpreters.
help to clarify Aristotles topic.
Finally, we may note that in Book B, Aristotle delineates his subject matter in a different way,
In Metaphysics A.1, Aristotle says that all men suppose what is called wisdom (sophia) to deal
by listing the problems or perplexities (aporiai) he hopes to deal with. Characteristic of these
with the first causes (aitia) and the principles (archai) of things (981b28), and it is these
perplexities, he says, is that they tie our thinking up in knots. They include the following,
causes and principles that he proposes to study in this work. It is his customary practice to
among others: Are sensible substances the only ones that exist, or are there others besides
begin an inquiry by reviewing the opinions previously held by others, and that is what he does
them? Is it kinds or individuals that are the elements and principles of things? And if it is kinds,
here, as Book A continues with a history of the thought of his predecessors about causes and
which ones: the most generic or the most specific? Is there a cause apart from matter? Is there
principles.
anything apart from material compounds? Are the principles limited, either in number or in
kind? Are the principles of perishable things themselves perishable? Are the principles
These causes and principles are clearly the subject matter of what he calls first philosophy.
universal or particular, and do they exist potentially or actually? Are mathematical objects
But this does not mean the branch of philosophy that should be studied first. Rather, it concerns
(numbers, lines, figures, points) substances? If they are, are they separate from or do they
issues that are in some sense the most fundamental or at the highest level of generality.
always belong to sensible things? And (the hardest and most perplexing of all, Aristotle says)
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are unity and being the substance of things, or are they attributes of some other subject? In the particulars (ta kath hekasta). Although he does not use these labels in the Categories, it is not
remainder of Book B, Aristotle presents arguments on both sides of each of these issues, and in misleading to say that the doctrine of the Categories is that each category contains a hierarchy
subsequent books he takes up many of them again. But it is not always clear precisely how he of universals and particulars, with each universal being said of the lower-level universals and
resolves them, and it is possible that Aristotle did not think that the Metaphysics contains particulars that fall beneath it. Each category thus has the structure of an upside-down tree.[2] At
definitive solutions to all of these perplexities. the top (or trunk) of the tree are the most generic items in that category[3] (e.g., in the case of
the category of substance, the genus plant and the genus animal); branching below them are
universals at the next highest level, and branching below these are found lower levels of
2. The Categories universals, and so on, down to the lowest level universals (e.g., such infimae species as man
and horse); at the lowest levelthe leaves of the treeare found the individual substances,
To understand the problems and project of Aristotles Metaphysics, it is best to begin with one
e.g., this man, that horse, etc.
of his earlier works, the Categories. Although placed by long tradition among his logical works
(see the discussion in the entry on Aristotles logic), due to its analysis of the terms that make
The individuals in the category of substance play a special role in this scheme. Aristotle calls
up the propositions out of which deductive inferences are constructed, the Categories begins
them primary substances (prtai ousiai) for without them, as he says, nothing else would
with a strikingly general and exhaustive account of the things there are (ta onta)beings.
exist. Indeed, Aristotle offers an argument (2a352b7) to establish the primary substances as
According to this account, beings can be divided into ten distinct categories. (Although
the fundamental entities in this ontology. Everything that is not a primary substance, he points
Aristotle never says so, it is tempting to suppose that these categories are mutually exclusive
out, stands in one of the two relations (inhering in, or being said of) to primary substances.
and jointly exhaustive of the things there are.) They include substance, quality, quantity, and
A genus, such as animal, is said of the species below it and, since they are said of primary
relation, among others. Of these categories of beings, it is the first, substance (ousia), to which
substances, so is the genus (recall the transitivity of the said of relation). Thus, everything in
Aristotle gives a privileged position.
the category of substance that is not itself a primary substance is, ultimately, said of primary
substances. And if there were no primary substances, there would be no secondary
Substances are unique in being independent things; the items in the other categories all depend
substances (species and genera), either. For these secondary substances are just the ways in
somehow on substances. That is, qualities are the qualities of substances; quantities are the
which the primary substances are fundamentally classified within the category of substance. As
amounts and sizes that substances come in; relations are the way substances stand to one
for the members of non-substance categories, they too depend for their existence on primary
another. These various non-substances all owe their existence to substanceseach of them, as
substances. A universal in a non-substance category, e.g., color, in the category of quality, is
Aristotle puts it, exists only in a subject. That is, each non-substance is in something, not as
in body, Aristotle tells us, and therefore in individual bodies. For color could not be in body,
a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in (Cat. 1a25). Indeed, it becomes clear that
in general, unless it were in at least some particular bodies. Similarly, particulars in non-
substances are the subjects that these ontologically dependent non-substances are in.
substance categories (although there is not general agreement among scholars about what such
particulars might be) cannot exist on their own. E.g., a determinate shade of color, or a
Each member of a non-substance category thus stands in this inherence relation (as it is
particular and non-shareable bit of that shade, is not capable of existing on its ownif it were
frequently called) to some substance or othercolor is always found in bodies, knowledge in
not in at least some primary substance, it would not exist. So primary substances are the basic
the soul. Neither whiteness nor a piece of grammatical knowledge, for example, is capable of
entitiesthe basic things that there arein the world of the Categories.
existing on its own. Each requires for its existence that there be some substance in which it
inheres.
3. The Role of Substance in the Study of Being Qua Being
In addition to this fundamental inherence relation across categories, Aristotle also points out
another fundamental relation that obtains between items within a single category. He describes The Categories leads us to expect that the study of being in general (being qua being) will
this as the relation of being said of a subject, and his examples make clear that it is the crucially involve the study of substance, and when we turn to the Metaphysics we are not
relation of a more general to a less general thing within a single category. Thus, man is said of disappointed. First, in Metaphysics Aristotle argues in a new way for the ontological priority
a particular man, and animal is said of man, and therefore, as Aristotle points out, animal is of substance; and then, in Books , , and , he wrestles with the problem of what it is to be a
said of the particular man also. The said of relation, that is to say, is transitive (cf. 1b10). So substance. We will begin with s account of the central place of substance in the study of
the genus (e.g., animal) is said of the species (e.g., man) and both genus and species are said being qua being.
of the particular. The same holds in non-substance categories. In the category of quality, for
example, the genus (color) is said of the species (white) and both genus and species are said As we noted above, metaphysics (or, first philosophy) is the science which studies being qua
of the particular white. There has been considerable scholarly dispute about these particulars in being. In this respect it is unlike the specialized or departmental sciences, which study only part
nonsubstance categories. For more detail, see the supplementary document: of being (only some of the things that exist) or study beings only in a specialized way (e.g.,
only in so far as they are changeable, rather than in so far as they are beings).
Nonsubstantial Particulars
But being, as Aristotle tells us in .2, is said in many ways. That is, the verb to be (einai)
The language of this contrast (in a subject vs. said of a subject) is peculiar to the Categories, has different senses, as do its cognates being (on) and entities (onta). So the universal
but the idea seems to recur in other works as the distinction between accidental vs. essential science of being qua being appears to founder on an equivocation: how can there be a single
predication. Similarly, in works other than the Categories, Aristotle uses the label universals science of being when the very term being is ambiguous?
(ta katholou) for the things that are said of many; things that are not universal he calls
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Consider an analogy. There are dining tables, and there are tide tables. A dining table is a table matter what the subject matter. It is a first principle, and hence is not derived from anything
in the sense of a smooth flat slab fixed on legs; a tide table is a table in the sense of a systematic more basic.
arrangement of data in rows and columns. But there is not a single sense of table which
applies to both the piece of furniture at which I am writing these words and to the small booklet What, then, can the science of first philosophy say about the PNC? It cannot offer a proof of the
that lies upon it. Hence it would be foolish to expect that there is a single science of tables, in PNC, since the PNC is presupposed by any proof one might offerany purported proof of the
general, that would include among its objects both dining tables and tide tables. Tables, that is PNC would therefore be circular. Aristotle thus does not attempt to prove the PNC; in the
to say, do not constitute a single kind with a single definition, so no single science, or field of subsequent chapters of he argues, instead, that it is impossible to disbelieve the PNC. Those
knowledge, can encompass precisely those things that are correctly called tables. who would claim to deny the PNC cannot, if they have any beliefs at all, believe that it is false.
For one who has a belief must, if he is to express this belief to himself or to others, say
If the term being were ambiguous in the way that table is, Aristotles science of being qua somethinghe must make an assertion. He must, as Aristotle says, signify something. But the
being would be as impossible as a science of tables qua tables. But, Aristotle argues in .2, very act of signifying something is possible only if the PNC is accepted. Without accepting the
being is not ambiguous in this way. Being, he tells us, is said in many ways but it is not PNC, one would have no reason to think that his words have any signification at allthey
merely (what he calls) homonymous, i.e., sheerly ambiguous. Rather, the various senses of could not mean one thing rather than another. So anyone who makes any assertion has already
being have what he calls a pros hen ambiguitythey are all related to a single central sense. committed himself to the PNC. Aristotle thus does not argue that the PNC is a necessary truth
(The Greek phrase pros hen means in relation to one.) (that is, he does not try to prove the PNC); rather, he argues that the PNC is indubitable. (For
more on the PNC, see the discussion in the entry on Aristotles logic)
Aristotle explains his point by means of some examples that he takes to be analogous to
being. Consider the terms healthy and medical. Neither of these has a single definition that 5. What is Substance?
applies uniformly to all cases: not every healthy (or medical) thing is healthy (medical) in the
same sense of healthy (medical). There is a range of things that can be called healthy:
In the seventeen chapters that make up Book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle takes up the
people, diets, exercise, complexions, etc. Not all of these are healthy in the same sense.
promised study of substance. He begins by reiterating and refining some of what he said in :
Exercise is healthy in the sense of being productive of health; a clear complexion is healthy in
that being is said in many ways, and that the primary sense of being is the sense in which
the sense of being symptomatic of health; a person is healthy in the sense of having good
substances are beings. Here, however, he explicitly links the secondary senses of being to the
health.
non-substance categories. The primacy of substance leads Aristotle to say that the age-old
question What is being? is just the question What is substance? (1028b4).
But notice that these various senses have something in common: a reference to one central
thing, health, which is actually possessed by only some of the things that are spoken of as
One might have thought that this question had already been answered in the Categories. There
healthy, namely, healthy organisms, and these are said to be healthy in the primary sense of
we were given, as examples of primary substances, an individual man or horse, and we learned
the term. Other things are considered healthy only in so far as they are appropriately related to
that a primary substance is what is neither in a subject nor said of a subject (2a10). This
things that are healthy in this primary sense.
would seem to provide us with both examples of, and criteria for being, primary substances.
But in Metaphysics , Aristotle does not seem to take either the examples or the criteria for
The situation is the same, Aristotle claims, with the term being. It, too, has a primary sense as
granted.
well as related senses in which it applies to other things because they are appropriately related
to things that are called beings in the primary sense. The beings in the primary sense are
In .2 he recounts the various answers that have been given to the question of which things are
substances; the beings in other senses are the qualities, quantities, etc., that belong to
substancesbodies (including plants, animals, the parts of plants and animals, the elements,
substances. An animal, e.g., a horse, is a being, and so is a color, e.g, white, a being. But a
the heavenly bodies), things more basic than bodies (surfaces, lines, and points), imperceptible
horse is a being in the primary senseit is a substancewhereas the color white (a quality) is
things (such as Platonic Forms and mathematical objects)and seems to regard them all as
a being only because it qualifies some substance. An account of the being of anything that is,
viable candidates at this point. He does not seem to doubt that the clearest examples of
therefore, will ultimately have to make some reference to substance. Hence, the science of
substances are perceptible ones, but leaves open the question whether there are others as well.
being qua being will involve an account of the central case of beingssubstances.
Before answering this question about examples, however, he says that we must first answer the
4. The Fundamental Principles: Axioms question about criteria: what is it to be a substance (tn ousian prton ti estin)? The negative
criterion (neither in a subject nor said of a subject) of the Categories tells us only which
Before embarking on this study of substance, however, Aristotle goes on in Book to argue things are substances. But even if we know that something is a substance, we must still say
that first philosophy, the most general of the sciences, must also address the most fundamental what makes it a substancewhat the cause is of its being a substance. This is the question to
principlesthe common axiomsthat are used in all reasoning. Thus, first philosophy must which Aristotle next turns. To answer it is to identify, as Aristotle puts it, the substance of that
also concern itself with the principle of non-contradiction (PNC): the principle that the same thing.
attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same
respect (1005b19). This, Aristotle says, is the most certain of all principles, and it is not just a
hypothesis. It cannot, however, be proved, since it is employed, implicitly, in all proofs, no
6. Substance, Matter, and Subject
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Z.3 begins with a list of four possible candidates for being the substance of something: essence, But from the point of view of the Physics, substantial individuals are seen as predicative
universal, genus, and subject. Presumably, this means that if x is a substance, then the substance complexes (cf. Matthen 1987b); they are hylomorphic compoundscompounds of matter and
of x might be either (i) the essence of x, or (ii) some universal predicated of x, or (iii) a genus formand the subject criterion looks rather different from the hylomorphic perspective.
that x belongs to, or (iv) a subject of which x is predicated. The first three candidates are taken Metaphysics .3 examines the subject criterion from this perspective.
up in later chapters, and .3 is devoted to an examination of the fourth candidate: the idea that
the substance of something is a subject of which it is predicated. Matter, form, and the compound of matter and form may all be considered subjects, Aristotle
tells us, (1029a24), but which of them is substance? The subject criterion by itself leads to the
A subject, Aristotle tells us, is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not answer that the substance of x is an entirely indeterminate matter of which x is composed
predicated of anything else (1028b36). This characterization of a subject is reminiscent of the (1029a10). For form is predicated of matter as subject, and one can always analyze a
language of the Categories, which tells us that a primary substance is not predicated of hylomorphic compound into its predicates and the subject of which they are predicated. And
anything else, whereas other things are predicated of it. Candidate (iv) thus seems to reiterate when all predicates have been removed (in thought), the subject that remains is nothing at all in
the Categories criterion for being a substance. But there are two reasons to be wary of drawing its own rightan entity all of whose properties are accidental to it (1029a1227). The resulting
this conclusion. First, whereas the subject criterion of the Categories told us that substances subject is matter from which all form has been expunged. (Traditional scholarship calls this
were the ultimate subjects of predication, the subject criterion envisaged here is supposed to tell prime matter, but Aristotle does not here indicate whether he thinks there actually is such a
us what the substance of something is. So what it would tell us is that if x is a substance, then thing.) So the subject criterion leads to the answer that the substance of x is the formless matter
the substance of xthat which makes x a substanceis a subject that x is predicated of. of which it is ultimately composed.
Second, as his next comment makes clear, Aristotle has in mind something other than this
Categories idea. For the subject that he here envisages, he says, is either matter or form or the But Aristotle rejects this answer as impossible (1029a28), claiming that substance must be
compound of matter and form. These are concepts from Aristotles Physics, and none of them separate (christon) and some this (tode ti, sometimes translated this something), and
figured in the ontology of the Categories. To appreciate the issues Aristotle is raising here, we implying that matter fails to meet this requirement. Precisely what the requirement amounts to
must briefly compare his treatment of the notion of a subject in the Physics with that in the is a matter of considerable scholarly debate, however. A plausible interpretation runs as
Categories. follows. Being separate has to do with being able to exist independently (x is separate from y if
x is capable of existing independently of y), and being some this means being a determinate
In the Categories, Aristotle was concerned with subjects of predication: what are the things we individual. So a substance must be a determinate individual that is capable of existing on its
talk about, and ascribe properties to? In the Physics, his concern is with subjects of change: own. (One might even hold, although this is controversial, that on Aristotles account not every
what is it that bears (at different times) contrary predicates and persists through a process of this is also separate. A particular color or shape might be considered a determinate
change? But there is an obvious connection between these conceptions of a subject, since a individual that is not capable of existing on its ownit is always the color of shape of some
subject of change must have one predicate belonging to it at one time that does not belong to it substance or other.) But matter fails to be simultaneously both christon and tode ti. The matter
at another time. Subjects of change, that is, are also subjects of predication. (The converse is of which a substance is composed may exist independently of that substance (think of the wood
not true: numbers are subjects of predicationsix is even, seven is primebut not of change.) of which a desk is composed, which existed before the desk was made and may survive the
disassembly of the desk), but it is not as such any definite individualit is just a quantity of a
In the Categories, individual substances (a man, a horse) were treated as fundamental subjects certain kind of matter. Of course, the matter may be construed as constituting a definite
of predication. They were also understood, indirectly, as subjects of change. (A substance, one individual substance (the wood just is, one might say, the particular desk it composes), but it is
and the same in number, can receive contraries. An individual man, for example, being one and in that sense not separate from the form or shape that makes it that substance (the wood cannot
the same, becomes now pale and now dark, now hot and now cold, now bad and now good be that particular desk unless it is a desk). So although matter is in a sense separate and in a
4a1720.) These are changes in which substances move, or alter, or grow. What the Categories sense some this, it cannot be both separate and some this. It thus does not qualify as the
did not explore, however, are changes in which substances are generated or destroyed. But the substance of the thing whose matter it is.
theory of change Aristotle develops in the Physics requires some other subject for changes such
as thesea subject of which substance is predicatedand it identifies matter as the 7. Substance and Essence
fundamental subject of change (192a3132). Change is seen in the Physics as a process in
which matter either takes on or loses form.
Aristotle turns in .4 to a consideration of the next candidate for substance: essence. (Essence
is the standard English translation of Aristotles curious phrase to ti n einai, literally the what
The concepts of matter and form, as we noted, are absent from the Categories. Individual
it was to be for a thing. This phrase so boggled his Roman translators that they coined the
substancesthis man or that horseapart from their accidental characteristicsthe qualities,
word essentia to render the entire phrase, and it is from this Latin word that ours derives.
etc., that inhere in themare viewed in that work as essentially simple, unanalyzable atoms.
Aristotle also sometimes uses the shorter phrase to ti esti, literally the what it is, for
Although there is metaphysical structure to the fact that, e.g., this horse is white (a certain
approximately the same idea.) In his logical works, Aristotle links the notion of essence to that
quality inheres in a certain substance), the fact that this is a horse is a kind of brute fact, devoid
of definition (horismos)a definition is an account (logos) that signifies an essence (Topics
of metaphysical structure. This horse is a primary substance, and horse, the species to which it
102a3)and he links both of these notions to a certain kind of per se predication (kath hauto,
belongs, is a secondary substance. But there is no predicative complex corresponding to the fact
literally, in respect of itself)what belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to it in its
that this is a horse in the way that there is such a complex corresponding to the fact that this
essence (en ti ti esti) for we refer to it in the account that states the essence (Posterior
horse is white.
Analytics, 73a345). He reiterates these ideas in .4: there is an essence of just those things
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whose logos is a definition (1030a6), the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect provide a link between substance and form and thus fill what would otherwise be a gap in the
of itself (1029b14). It is important to remember that for Aristotle, one defines things, not argument.) Since individual substances are seen as hylomorphic compounds, the role of matter
words. The definition of tiger does not tell us the meaning of the word tiger; it tells us what it and form in their generation must be accounted for. Whether we are thinking of natural objects,
is to be a tiger, what a tiger is said to be in respect of itself. Thus, the definition of tiger states such as plants and animals, or artifacts, such as houses, the requirements for generation are the
the essencethe what it is to be of a tiger, what is predicated of the tiger per se. same. We do not produce the matter (to suppose that we do leads to an infinite regress) nor do
we produce the form (what could we make it out of?); rather, we put the form into the matter,
Aristotles preliminary answer (Z.4) to the question What is substance? is that substance is and produce the compound (Z.8, 1033a30b9). Both the matter and the form must pre-exist
essence, but there are important qualifications. For, as he points out, definition (horismos), (Z.9, 1034b12). But the source of motion in both caseswhat Aristotle calls the moving
like what it is (ti esti), is said in many ways (1030a19). That is, items in all the categories are cause of the coming to beis the form.
definable, so items in all the categories have essencesjust as there is an essence of man, there
is also an essence of white and an essence of musical. But, because of the pros hen equivocity In artistic production, the form is found in the soul of the artisan, for the art of building is the
of is, such essences are secondarydefinition and essence are primarily (prots) and form of the house (1034a24) and the form is in the soul (1032b23) of the artisan. For
without qualification (hapls) of substances (1030b46). Thus, .4 tells us, it is only these example, the builder has in mind the plan or design for a house and he knows how to build; he
primary essences that are substances. Aristotle does not here work out the details of this then enmatters that plan or design by putting it into the materials out of which he builds the
hierarchy of essences (Loux, 1991), but it is possible to reconstruct a theory of such a house. In natural production, the form is found in the parent, where the begetter is the same in
hierarchy on the basis of subsequent developments in Book . kind as the begotten, not one in number but one in formfor man begets man (1033b302).
But in either case, the form pre-exists and is not produced (1033b18).
In .6, Aristotle goes on to argue that if something is primary and spoken of in respect of
itself (kath hauto legomenon) it is one and the same as its essence. The precise meaning of As for what is produced in such hylomorphic productions, it is correctly described by the name
this claim, as well as the nature and validity of the arguments offered in support of it, are of its form, not by that of its matter. What is produced is a house or a man, not bricks or flesh.
matters of scholarly controversy. But it does seem safe to say that Aristotle thinks that an Of course, what is made of gold may still be described in terms of its material components, but
accidental unity such as a pale man is not a kath hauto legomenon (since pallor is an we should call it not gold but golden (1033a7). For if gold is the matter out of which a
accidental characteristic of a man) and so is not the same as its essence. Pale man, that is to statue is made, there was gold present at the start, and so it was not gold that came into being. It
say, does not specify the what it is of any primary being, and so cannot be an essence of the was a statue that came into being, and although the statue is goldeni.e., made of goldit
primary kind. As .4 has already told us, only species of a genus have an essence (1030a11 cannot be identified with the gold of which it was made.
12) in the primary sense. Man is a species, and so there is an essence of man; but pale man is
not a species and so, even if there is such a thing as the essence of pale man, it is not, at any The essence of such a hylomorphic compound is evidently its form, not its matter. As Aristotle
rate, a primary essence. says by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance (1032b1), and
when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence (1032b14). It is the form of a
At this point there appears to be a close connection between the essence of a substance and its substance that makes it the kind of thing that it is, and hence it is form that satisfies the
species (eidos), and this might tempt one to suppose that Aristotle is identifying the substance condition initially required for being the substance of something. The substance of a thing is its
of a thing (since the substance of a thing is its essence) with its species. (A consequence of this form.
idea would be that Aristotle is radically altering his conception of the importance of the species,
which in the Categories he called a secondary substance, that is, a substance only in a
secondary sense.) But such an identification would be a mistake, for two reasons. First,
9. Substance and Definition
Aristotles point at 1030a11 is not that a species is an essence, but that an essence of the
In .10 and 11, Aristotle returns to the consideration of essence and definition left off in .6,
primary kind corresponds to a species (e.g., man) and not to some more narrowly delineated
but now within the hylomorphic context developed in .79. The main question these chapters
kind (e.g., pale man). Second, the word eidos, which meant species in the logical works, has
consider is whether the definition of x ever includes a reference to the matter of x. If some
acquired a new meaning in a hylomorphic context, where it means form (contrasted with
definitions include a reference to matter, then the link between essence and form would seem to
matter) rather than species (contrasted with genus). In the conceptual framework of
be weakened.
Metaphysics , a universal such as man or horsewhich was called a species and a secondary
substance in the Categoriesis construed as not a substance, but a compound of a certain
Aristotle begins .10 by endorsing the following principle about definitions and their parts: a
formula and a certain matter, taken universally (Z.10, 1035b2930). The eidos that is primary
definition is an account, and every account has parts, and part of the account stands to part of
substance in Book is not the species that an individual substance belongs to but the form that
the thing in just the same way that the whole account stands to the whole thing (1034b2022).
is predicated of the matter of which it is composed.[4]
That is, if y is a part of a definable thing x, then the definition of x will include as a part
something z that corresponds to y. Indeed, z must stand to y in the same relation that the
8. Substances as Hylomorphic Compounds definition of x stands in to x; that is, z is the definition of y. So, according to this principle, the
definition of a thing will include the definitions of its parts.
The role of form in this hylomorphic context is the topic of .79. (Although these chapters
were almost certainly not originally included in Book there is no reference to them, for In a way, this consequence of the principle seems very plausible, given Aristotles idea that it is
example, in the summary of given in .1, which skips directly from .6 to .10they universals that are definable (Z.11, 1036a29). Consider as a definiendum a universal, such as
11 12
man, and its definiens, rational animal. The parts of this definiens are the universals rational bones, etc. Some things, he continues, surely are a particular form in a particular matter
and animal. If these parts are, in turn, definable, then each should be replaced, in the definition (1036b23), so that it is not possible to define them without reference to their material parts
of man, with its own definition, and so on. In this way the complete and adequate definition of (1036b28). Nevertheless, Aristotle ends .11 as if he has defended the claim that definition is
a universal such as man will contain no parts that are further definable. All proper, or of the form alone. Perhaps his point is that whenever it is essential to a substance that it be
completely analyzed, definitions are ultimately composed of simple terms that are not further made of a certain kind of matter (e.g., that man be made of flesh and bones, or that a saw
definable. cannot be made of wool or wood, .4, 1044a28) this is in some sense a formal or structural
requirement. A kind of matter, after all, can itself be analyzed hylomorphicallybronze, for
But the implication of this idea for the definitions of hylomorphic compounds is obvious: since example, is a mixture of copper and tin according to a certain ratio or formula (logos), which is
matter appears to be a part of such a compound, the definition of the compound will include, as in turn predicated of some more generic underlying subject. The reference to matter in a
a part, the definitions of its material components. And this consequence seems implausible to definition will thus always be to a certain kind of matter, and hence to a predicate, rather than a
Aristotle. A circle, for example, seems to be composed of two semicircles (for it obviously may subject. At any rate, if by matter one has in mind the ultimate subject alluded to in .3 (so-
be divided into two semicircles), but the definition of circle cannot be composed of the called prime matter), there will be no reference to it in any definition, for this is indefinite
definitions of its two semicircular parts. For, as Aristotle points out (1035b9), semicircle is (1037a27).
defined in terms of circle, and not the other way around. His point is well taken, for if circles
were defined in terms of semicircles, then presumably semicircles would be defined in terms of .12 introduces a new problem about definitionsthe so-called unity of definition. The
the quarter-circles of which they are composed, and so on, ad infinitum. The resulting infinite problem is this: definitions are complex (a definiens is always some combination of terms), so
regress would make it impossible to define circle at all, for one would never reach the ultimate what accounts for the definiendum being one thing, rather than many (1037b10)? Suppose that
simple parts of which such a definition would be composed. man is defined as two-footed animal; why is this one and not manytwo-footed and animal?
(1037b1314). Presumably, Aristotle has in mind his discussion in .4 of such accidental
Aristotle flirts with the idea of distinguishing between different senses in which one thing can unities as a pale man. The difference cannot be that our language contains a single word
be a part of another (1034b33), but instead proposes a different solution: to specify carefully (man) for a two-footed animal, but no single word for a pale man, for Aristotle has already
the whole of which the matter is allegedly a part. The bronze is part of the compound statue, conceded (1029b28) that we might very well have had a single term (he suggests himation,
but not of the statue spoken of as form (1035a6). Similarly, the line when divided passes literally cloak) for a pale man, but that would still not make the formula pale man a
away into its halves, and the man into bones and muscle and flesh, but it does not follow that definition nor pale man an essence (1030a2).
they are composed of these as parts of their essence (1035a1720). Rather, it is not the
substance but the compound that is divided into the body and its parts as into matter Aristotle proposes a solution that applies to definitions reached by the method of division.
(1035b212). According to this method (see Aristotles logic), one begins with the broadest genus containing
the species to be defined, and divides the genus into two sub-genera by means of some
In restating his point yet more clearly (1035b4), Aristotle notes parenthetically another differentia. One then locates the definiendum in one of the sub-genera, and proceeds to divide
important aspect of his theory of substance. He reiterates the priority of form, and its parts, to this by another differentia, and so on, until one arrives at the definiendum species. This is a
the matter into which a compound is divided, and notes that the soul of animals (for this is the classic definition by genus and differentia. Aristotles proposal is that the division should be
substance of living things) is their substance (1035b15). The idea recurs in .11, where he by the differentia of the differentia (1038a9). For example, if one uses the differentia footed to
announces that it is clear that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter divide the genus animal, one then uses a differentia such as cloven-footed for the next division.
(1037a5). It is further developed, in the Metaphysics, in .17, as we will see below, and If one divides in this way, Aristotle claims, clearly the last (or completing, teleutaia)
especially in De Anima. For more detail on this topic, see Section 3 of the entry on Aristotles differentia will be the substance of the thing and its definition (1038a19). For each differentia
psychology. of a differentia entails its predecessor (being cloven-footed entails being footed), and so the
long chain of differentiae can be replaced simply by the last differentia. As Aristotle points out,
Returning now to the problem raised by the apparent need to refer to matter in the definition of saying footed two-footed animal is saying the same thing more than once (1038a2224).
a substance, we may note that the solution Aristotle offered in .10 is only partially successful.
His point seems to be that whereas bronze may be a part of a particular statue, neither that This proposal shows how a long string of differentiae in a definition can be reduced to one, but
particular batch of bronze nor even bronze in general enters into the essence of statue, since it does not solve the problem of the unity of definition. For we are still faced with the apparent
being made of bronze is no part of what it is to be a statue. But that is only because statues, fact that genus + differentia constitutes a plurality even if the differentia is the last, or
although they must be made of some kind of matter, do not require any particular kind of completing, one. It is not surprising, then, that Aristotle returns to the problem of unity later
matter. But what about kinds of substances that do require particular kinds of matter? (H.6) and offers a different solution.
Aristotles distinction between form and compound cannot be used in such cases to isolate
essence from matter. Thus there may after all be reasons for thinking that reference to matter 10. Substances and Universals
will have to intrude into at least some definitions.
At this point, we seem to have a clear idea about the nature of substantial form as Aristotle
In .11, Aristotle addresses just such a case (although the passage is difficult and there is
conceives of it. A substantial form is the essence of a substance, and it corresponds to a species.
disagreement over its interpretation). The form of man is always found in flesh and bones and
Since it is an essence, a substantial form is what is denoted by the definiens of a definition.
parts of this kind, Aristotle writes (1036b4). The point is not just that each particular man must
Since only universals are definable, substantial forms are universals. That substantial forms are
be made of matter, but that each one must be made of matter of a particular kindflesh and
13 14
universals is confirmed by Aristotles comment, at the end of .8, that Socrates and Callias are (katholou). Universals are contrasted with particulars (kath hekasta), not individuals (although
different because of their matter but they are the same in form (1034a68). For them to be Aristotle does sometimes ignore the distinction between tode ti and kath hekaston). What
the same in form is for them to have the same form, i.e., for one and the same substantial form makes something a tode ti is its being a fully determinate thing, not further differentiable; what
to be predicated of two different clumps of matter. And being predicated of many is what makes something a kath hekaston is its being a particular thing, unrepeatable, and not
makes something a universal (De Interpretatione 17a37). predicated of anything else. There is thus the possibility of a universal tode tia fully
determinate universal not further divisible into lower-level universals, but predicated of
But .13 throws our entire understanding into disarray. Aristotle begins by returning to the numerous particulars. (2) The claim that there are no universals apart from particulars needs to
candidates for the title of ousia introduced in .3, and points out that having now discussed the be understood in context. When Aristotle asserts (1038b33) that there is no animal apart from
claims of the subject and the essence, it is time to consider the third candidate, the universal. the particulars (ta tina) he is just as likely to be referring to the particular kinds of animals as
But the remainder of the chapter consists of a barrage of arguments to the conclusion that he is to particular specimens. If so, his point may be that a generic kind, such as animal, is
universals are not substances. ontologically dependent on its species, and hence on the substantial forms that are the essences
of those species. (3) The arguments of .13 against the substantiality of universals are
Z.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotles metaphysics that has fragmented presented as part of a give-and-take investigation of the perplexities involved in the notion of
his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotles theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds substantial form. It is not clear, therefore, whether the blanket claim No universal is a
that it is committed to all three of the following propositions: substance is intended to be accepted without qualification. Indeed, a closer examination of the
arguments may show that qualifications are required if the arguments are to be cogent. For
(i) Substance is form. example, the argument at 1038b1115 is based on the premise that the substance of x is
(ii) Form is universal. peculiar (idion) to x. It then draws the conclusion that a universal cannot be the substance of all
of its instances (for it could not be idion to all of them), and concludes that it must be the
(iii) No universal is a substance. substance of none. But note that this conclusion does not say that no universal can be a
substance, but only that no universal can be the substance of any of its instances (cf. Code
Others have provided interpretations according to which Aristotle does not maintain all of (i) 1978). Aristotles point may be that since form is predicated of matter, a substantial form is
(iii), and there is a considerable variety of such interpretations, too many to be canvassed here. predicated of various clumps of matter. But it is not the substance of those clumps of matter,
But there are two main, and opposed, lines of interpretation. According to one, Aristotles for it is predicated accidentally of them. The thing with which it is uniquely correlated, and of
substantial forms are not universals after all, but each belongs exclusively to the particular which it is the substance, is not one of its instances, but is the substantial form itself. This
whose form it is, and there are therefore as many substantial forms of a given kind as there are conclusion should not be surprising in light of Aristotles claim in .6 that each substance is
particulars of that kind. According to the other, Aristotles arguments in .13 are not intended one and the same as its essence. A universal substantial form just is that essence.
to show that no universal is a substance, tout court, but some weaker thesis that is compatible
with there being only one substantial form for all of the particulars belonging to the same
species. Proponents of particular forms (or essences) include Sellars 1957, Harter 1975, 11. Substance as Cause of Being
Hartman 1977, Irwin 1988, Witt 1989b. Opponents include Woods 1967, Owen 1978, Code
1986, Loux 1991, Lewis 1991. In .17 Aristotle proposes a new point of departure in his effort to say what sort of a thing
substance is. The new idea is that a substance is a principle and a cause (arch kai aitia,
It would be foolish to attempt to resolve this issue within the confines of the present entry, as it 1041a9) of being. Before looking at the details of his account, we will need to make a brief
is perhaps the largest, and most disputed, single interpretative issue concerning Aristotles detour into Aristotles theory of causes. The relevant texts are Physics II.3, Posterior Analytics
Metaphysics. I will, instead, mention some of the main considerations brought up on each side II.11, and Metaphysics A.3 and .2. See also the entry on Aristotles natural philosophy and
of this dispute, and give my reasons for thinking that substantial forms are universals. Section 2 of the entry on Aristotles psychology.
The idea that substantial forms are particulars is supported by Aristotles claims that a The word aitia (cause or, perhaps better, explanation), Aristotle tells us, is said in many
substance is separate and some this (christon kai tode ti, .3), that there are no universals ways. In one sense, a cause is that out of which a thing comes to be, and which persists; e.g.,
apart from their particulars (Z.13), and that universals are not substances (Z.13). On the other bronze, silver, and the genus of these are causes of a statue or a bowl (Physics 194b24). A
side, the idea that substantial forms are universals is supported by Aristotles claims that cause in this sense has been traditionally called a material cause, although Aristotle himself did
substances are, par excellence, the definable entities (Z.4), that definition is of the universal not use this label. In a second sense, a cause is the form the account of the essence
(Z.11), and that it is impossible to define particulars (Z.15). (194b27), traditionally called the formal cause. A third sense, traditionally called the efficient
cause, is the primary source of change or rest (194b30). In this sense, Aristotle says, an
In my opinion, the indefinability of particulars makes it impossible for substantial forms to be adviser is the cause of an action, a father is the cause of his child, and in general the producer is
particulars. If there were a substantial form that is unique to some sensible particular, say the cause of the product. Fourth is what is traditionally called the final cause, which Aristotle
Callias, then the definition corresponding to that form, or essence, would apply uniquely to characterizes as the end (telos), that for which a thing is done (194b33). In this sense, he
Calliasit would define him, which is precisely what Aristotle says cannot be done. The says, health is the cause of walking, since we might explain a persons walking by saying that
question, then, is whether the evidence against substantial forms being universals can be he walks in order to be healthyhealth is what the walking is for. Note that, as in this case,
countered. This is less clear, but the following considerations are relevant. (1) Aristotles claim things may be causes of one anotherhard work of fitness, and fitness of hard work
that a substantial form is an individual (tode ti) does not exclude its being a universal although not in the same sense: fitness is what hard work is for, whereas hard work is principle
15 16
of motion (195a10). So hard work is the efficient cause of fitness, since one becomes fit by Aristotle distinguishes between two different senses of the term dunamis. In the strictest sense,
means of hard work, while fitness is the final cause of hard work, since one works hard in order a dunamis is the power that a thing has to produce a change. A thing has a dunamis in this
to become fit. sense when it has within it a source of change in something else (or in itself qua other) (.1,
1046a12; cf. .12). The exercise of such a power is a kinsisa movement or process. So, for
Although Aristotle is careful to distinguish four different kinds of cause (or four different example, the housebuilders craft is a power whose exercise is the process of housebuilding.
senses of cause), it is important to note that he claims that one and the same thing can be a But there is a second sense of dunamisand it is the one in which Aristotle is mainly
cause in more than one sense. As he puts it, form, mover, and telos often coincide (198a25). interestedthat might be better translated as potentiality. For, as Aristotle tells us, in this
And in De Anima he is perfectly explicit that the soul, which is the form or essence of a living sense dunamis is related not to movement (kinsis) but to actuality (energeia)(.6, 1048a25). A
thing, is a cause in three of the ways we have distinguished (415b10)efficient, formal, and dunamis in this sense is not a things power to produce a change but rather its capacity to be in
final. a different and more completed state. Aristotle thinks that potentiality so understood is
indefinable (1048a37), claiming that the general idea can be grasped from a consideration of
Let us return to Aristotles discussion in .17. The job of a cause or principle of being, he cases. Actuality is to potentiality, Aristotle tells us, as someone waking is to someone
notes, is to explain why one thing belongs to another (1041a11); that is, it is to explain some sleeping, as someone seeing is to a sighted person with his eyes closed, as that which has been
predicational fact. What needs to be explained, for example, is why this is a man, or that is a shaped out of some matter is to the matter from which it has been shaped (1048b13).
house. But what kind of a question is this? The only thing that can be a man is a man; the only
thing that can be a house is a house. So we would appear to be asking why a man is a man, or This last illustration is particularly illuminating. Consider, for example, a piece of wood, which
why a house is a house, and these seem to be foolish questions that all have the same answer: can be carved or shaped into a table or into a bowl. In Aristotles terminology, the wood has (at
because each thing is itself (1041a1720). The questions must therefore be rephrased by taking least) two different potentialities, since it is potentially a table and also potentially a bowl. The
advantage of the possibility of a hylomorphic analysis. We must ask, e.g., Why are these matter (in this case, wood) is linked with potentialty; the substance (in this case, the table or the
things, i.e., bricks and stones, a house? (1041a26). The answer Aristotle proposes is that the bowl) is linked with actuality. The as yet uncarved wood is only potentially a table, and so it
cause of being of a substance (e.g., of a house) is the form or essence that is predicated of the might seem that once it is carved the wood is actually a table. Perhaps this is what Aristotle
matter (e.g., of the bricks and stones) that constitute that substance. The essence is not always means, but it is possible that he does not wish to consider the wood to be a table. His idea might
just a formal cause; in some cases, Aristotle says, it is also a final cause (he gives the examples be that not only can a piece of raw wood in the carpenters workshop be considered a potential
of a house and a bed), and in some cases an efficient cause (1041a2930). But in any case table (since it can be transformed into one), but the wood composing the completed table is
what we seek is the cause, i.e., the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; also, in a sense, a potential table. The idea here is that it is not the wood qua wood that is
and this is the substance of the thing (1041b69) and the primary cause of its being actually a table, but the wood qua table. Considered as matter, it remains only potentially the
(1041b27). thing that it is the matter of. (A contemporary philosopher might make this point by refusing to
identify the wood with the table, saying instead that the wood only constitutes the table and is
Notice that the explanandum in these cases (why is this a man? or why is that a house?) not identical to the table it constitutes.)
involves a species predication (Callias is a man, Fallingwater is a house). But the answer
Aristotle proposes invokes a hylomorphic analysis of these questions, in which form is Since Aristotle gives form priority over matter, we would expect him similarly to give actuality
predicated of matter. So Callias is a man because the form or essence of man is present in the priority over potentiality. And that is exactly what we find (.8, 1049b45). Aristotle
flesh and bones that constitute the body of Callias; Fallingwater is a house because the form of distinguishes between priority in logos (account or definition), in time, and in substance. (1)
house is present in the materials of which Fallingwater is made. In general, a species Actuality is prior in logos since we must cite the actuality when we give an account of its
predication is explained in terms of an underlying form predication, whose subject is not the corresponding potentiality. Thus, visible means capable of being seen; buildable means
particular compound but its matter. Form predications are thus more basic than their capable of being built(1049b1416). (2) As regards temporal priority, by contrast, potentiality
corresponding species predications. A substantial form, as a primary definable, is its own may well seem to be prior to actuality, since the wood precedes the table that is built from it,
substance, for it is essentially predicated of itself alone. But the substantial form of a material and the acorn precedes the oak that it grows into. Nevertheless, Aristotle finds that even
compound, because it is predicated (accidentally) of the matter of the compound, is the cause of temporally there is a sense in which actuality is prior to potentiality: the actual which is
the compounds being the kind of thing that it is. The form is therefore, in a derivative way, the identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is prior to it
substance of the compound, as well. (1049b1819). A particular acorn is, of course, temporally prior to the particular oak tree that it
grows into, but it is preceded in time by the actual oak tree that produced it, with which it is
identical in species. The seed (potential substance) must have been preceded by an adult (actual
12. Actuality and Potentiality substance). So in this sense actuality is prior even in time.
In Metaphysics , Aristotle introduces the distinction between matter and form synchronically,
(3) Aristotle argues for the priority in substance of actuality over potentiality in two ways. (a)
applying it to an individual substance at a particular time. The matter of a substance is the stuff
The first argument makes use of his notion of final causality. Things that come to be move
it is composed of; the form is the way that stuff is put together so that the whole it constitutes
toward an end (telos)the boy becomes a man, the acorn becomes an oakand the actuality
can perform its characteristic functions. But soon he begins to apply the distinction
is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired ... animals do not see in
diachronically, across time. This connects the matter/form distinction to another key
order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see ... matter exists in a
Aristotelian distinction, that between potentiality (dunamis) and actuality (entelecheia or
potential state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its
energeia). This distinction is the main topic of Book .
form (1050a917). Form or actuality is the end toward which natural processes are directed.
17 18
Actuality is therefore a cause in more than one sense of a things realizing its potential. As we the current context. If this is so, we may conclude that the material component in the definition
noted in Section 11, one and the same thing may be the final, formal, and efficient cause of of a species is intelligible matter. Elsewhere, he explicitly describes genus as matter: the genus
another. Suppose an acorn realizes its potential to become an oak tree. The efficient cause here is the matter of that of which it is called the genus (I.8, 1058a23). So a species too, although it
is the actual oak tree that produced the acorn; the formal cause is the logos defining that is not itself a material object, can be considered a hylomorphic compound. Its matter is its
actuality; the final cause is the telos toward which the acorn developsan actual (mature) oak genus, which is only potentially the species defined; its differentia is the form that actualizes
tree. the matter. The genus does not actually exist independently of its species any more than bronze
exists apart from all form. The genus animal, for example, is just that which is potentially some
(b) Aristotle also offers (1050b61051a2) an even stricter argument for his claim that specific kind of animal or other. Aristotle concludes (1045b1721) that the proximate matter
actuality is prior in substance to potentiality. A potentiality is for either of a pair of opposites; and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually ... the
so anything that is capable of being is also capable of not being. What is capable of not being potential and the actual are somehow one.
might possibly not be, and what might possibly not be is perishable. Hence anything with the
mere potentiality to be is perishable. What is eternal is imperishable, and so nothing that is This solution, of course, applies only to hylomorphic compounds. But that is all it needs to do,
eternal can exist only potentiallywhat is eternal must be fully actual. But the eternal is prior according to Aristotle. For he ends the chapter by claiming that the problem of unity does not
in substance to the perishable. For the eternal can exist without the perishable, but not arise for other kinds of compounds. All things which have no matter are without qualification
conversely, and that is what priority in substance amounts to (cf. .11, 1019a2). So what is essentially unities (1045b23).
actual is prior in substance to what is potential.
14. Glossary of Aristotelian Terminology
13. Unity Reconsidered
accident: sumbebkos
In .6, Aristotle returns to the problem of the unity of definition (discussed above in Section 9) accidental: kata sumbebkos
and offers a new solution based on the concepts of potentiality and actuality. He begins by account: logos
pointing out (recalling the language of .17) that the things whose unity he is trying to explain actuality: energeia, entelecheia
are those which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but alteration: alloisis
the whole is something besides the parts (1045a810). His task is to explain the unity of such affirmative: kataphatikos
complexes. assertion: apophansis (sentence with a truth value, declarative sentence)
assumption: hupothesis
The problem is insoluble, he says, unless one realizes that one element is matter and another is attribute: pathos
form, and one is potentially and the other is actually. Once one realizes this, the question will axiom: axioma
no longer be thought a difficulty (1045a2025). He offers the following example (1045a26 be: einai
35). Suppose round bronze were the definition of cloak. If someone were to ask what makes being(s): on, onta
a cloak one thing, a unity? the answer would be obvious. For bronze is the matter, and belong: huparchein
roundness is the form. The bronze is potentially round, and round is what the bronze actually is category: katgoria
when it has received this form. The cause of the unity of the cloak (in this sense of cloak) is cause: aition, aitia
just the cause of bronze being made round. Since the cloak is something that was produced, or change: kinsis, metabol
brought into being, there is no cause of its unity other than the agent who put the form into the come to be: gignesthai
matter. Bronze (the matter) is a potential sphere, and the cloak is an actual sphere. But round coming to be: genesis
bronze is equally the essence of both the actual sphere and the potential one. The bronze and contradict: antiphanai
the roundness are not two separate things. The bronze is potentially a sphere, and when it is contradiction: antiphasis (in the sense contradictory pair of propositions and also in
made round it constitutes an actual onea single sphere of bronze. the sense denial of a proposition)
contrary: enantion
It is easy to see how this hylomorphic analysis explains the unity of a substantial material definition: horos, horismos
particular, since neither the matter nor the form of such a particular is by itself a single material demonstration: apodeixis
individual, and it is only when they are taken together that they constitute such an individual. denial (of a proposition): apophasis
But the problem Aristotle is trying to solve concerns the unity of the thing whose account we dialectic: dialektik
call a definition (Z.12, 1037b11). And since proper definables are universals, it remains to be differentia: diaphora; specific difference, eidopoios diaphora
seen how the proposed solution applies to them. After all, universals are not material objects, distinctive: idios, idion
and so it is not clear how they can be viewed as hylomorphic compounds. But Aristotle has at end: telos
his disposal a concept that can fill this bill perfectly, viz., the concept of intelligible matter essence: to ti n einai, to ti esti
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