Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 93028
G.R. No. 93028
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment
alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold
four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the
sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his
escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, 2 he
pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, 3 after which trial on the merits
ensued and was duly concluded.
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative,
informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a
certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding
Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of
Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante,
the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the
police authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential
informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he
had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags.
Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags
and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his
head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and
the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested
appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp
Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the
investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between
Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and
took the marked money from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was
stationed farthest from the rest of the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from
his companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he
saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who
conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to
remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which
appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his
possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt
was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and
Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He
agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the
purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day
after the latter's apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for his relatively high
blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant.
The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a
history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit
blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-
intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day
in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the members of his family in their
house when three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the
assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant
boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that
they were taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted
to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was
ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine
times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents
presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted
that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited
blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped
from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his
uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m.
There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana
Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at
Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise
confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest. 10 Also,
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
abrasion or contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and
to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in
favor of the Government. 12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court,
contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-
up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence,
and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the
appellant actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags
were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the latter not being in any way
connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves. 15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling
the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue
of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. 17 To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. 18 It must,
therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally
certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988,
did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as
to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between
the straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more entitled to
credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers
is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. 19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial
apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact
that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. 21 Such lack of dubious motive
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
appellant of having been framed, 22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all,
appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the
charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn
Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the
contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8
grams of marijuana. 24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. 25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really
confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had
nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really
matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is
unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even,
assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither
impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses'
honesty. 27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that
he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in
the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were
not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust
operations. 28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as
follows:
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory,
CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for
entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution
because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." 30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification
can be supplied by other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian
to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest.
Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities. 31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure,
to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the
taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they
were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in
connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 32 states, inter alia, that
"suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation
of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed
appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned,
was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him. 33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions
of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he
was assisted by counsel. 34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he
waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel, 35 hence
whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is
not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated
from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been
sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely
the consummation of the selling transaction 37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. 38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been
ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We
take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small
scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any
place. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, 41 for what
matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be instances where such
sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time and place,
as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that
those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting
officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under
custody. 43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier
discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of
maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution 45 and the other for the defense, 46testified on the
absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of
appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that appellant
has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. 48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever
for not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during
his detention there. 49Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal
services of counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's
story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless
and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all costs. 51 Premeditated
or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and it
was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs.
Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective
December 31, 1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and
entails additional questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are
to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in
substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been settled
that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall
be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. 54 The execution in said article would not
apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third
time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification. 55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been
involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the
present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant.
That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a
felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied
for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the
penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic
Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence
thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate
the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus. 56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been
committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial
reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended,
imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the
marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana
involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions
in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the
quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with
the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the
accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by
the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the
law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the
drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest
of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is
its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the
drug subject of the criminal transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code
and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component
penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the
quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of
that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid
disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the
drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and
double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately
among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved
is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499
grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty
of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue
has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it
consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76
of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here
to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised
Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own
specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special
laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main
function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws,
since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its
technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the
system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed
for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but
differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided
for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for
one year or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense
thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided
therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-payment of salaries
and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section
one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer
against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those
mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a)
of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein
provided. 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished
by the penalties as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are
exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to
death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto
mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may
involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and
are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory
effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of
special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is
true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty
for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances
stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same
formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under
the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such
provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are
special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised
Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies
under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any express or
implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible
judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation,
which could never have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64,
paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely
distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the
penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an
amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as
Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should,
likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal
Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more
recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that where the special
law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the
offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no
explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by
the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the "deep
legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws."
(Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties
defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much
more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant
modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of
penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if
they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the
role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating
circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of
the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of
the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties
in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also,
the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce
the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68
should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have
been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy
therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many
penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since
the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and
public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case
should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty
should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution
cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now
before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed
any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does
not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved
will exceed one year of imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate
sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under
the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a
special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised
Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense is
punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses
under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said
laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties
in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but
an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their
technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section
1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the
hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone
only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions.
Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered
is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law, 70and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of
the principles of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this
Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the interrelation of the
penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it
follows that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in
Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of
interpretation. 71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be
liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and
not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance
of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since
thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is
only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole
may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal
grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the
benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71
of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference,
which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest
in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court
a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION
that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.