Pasno v. Ravina
Pasno v. Ravina
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
MALCOLM, J.:
There are two appeals in this case. One appeal has been taken by the
oppositors to the legalization of the will of Gabina Labitoria, and concerns
the validity of that will. The other appeal has been taken by the Philippine
National Bank and concerns the survivability of the right of sale of the
mortgaged property under special power while the mortgaged property is
in custodia legis. We will deal with these appeals separately.
As the stenographic notes have not been written up and elevated to this
court, any discussion of the evidence is rendered impossible. The single
question to be decided is whether the admitted fact that the will was
executed on July 27, 1928, although stating that it was executed on
February 6, 1926, invalidates the will. As said by the trial judge, the reason
for the error was on account of the will being in great part a reproduction of
another will of February 6, 1926, and inadvertently retaining this date.
It results that the trial judge was right in admitting the will of Gabina
Labitoria to probate.
The facts are not in dispute. Gabina Labitoria during her lifetime mortgaged
three parcels of land to the Philippine National Bank to secure an
indebtedness of P1,600. It was stipulated in the mortgage, among other
things, that the mortgagee "may remove, sell or dispose of the mortgaged
property or any buildings, improvements or other property in, on or
attached to it and belonging to the mortgagor in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 3135 or take other legal action that it may deem
necessary." The mortgagor died, and a petition was presented in court for
the probate of her last will and testament. During the pendency of these
proceedings, a special administrator was appointed by the lower court who
took possession of the estate of the deceased, including the three parcels
of land mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. The estate having failed
to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, the Philippine National Bank,
pursuant to the stipulations contained in the same, asked the sheriff of
Tayabas to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. When the attorney
for the special administrator received notice of the proposed action, he filed
a motion in court in which an order was asked requiring the sheriff to
vacate the attachment over the mortgaged properties and to abstain from
selling the same. The lower court granted the petition in an order of
February 14, 1929, and later denied a motion for reconsideration presented
on behalf of the Philippine National Bank.
The mortgage makes special reference to Act No. 3135. That Act is one to
regulate the sale of property under special powers inserted in or annexed
to real-estate mortgages. It fails to make provision regarding the sale of
mortgaged property which is in custodia legis. Under these circumstances,
it would be logical to suppose that the general provisions of Philippine law
would govern this latter contingency. It is a familiar rule that statutes in pari
materia are to be read together. The legislative body which enacted Act No.
3135 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of
such a well known law as the Code of Civil Procedure and to have passed
Act No. 3135 with reference thereto.
The appellant practically concedes that the law applicable to the case is
section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The cited section reads: "A
creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by mortgage or
other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim
before the committee, and share in the general distribution of the assets of
the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security,
by ordinary action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant; and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other
proceeding to realize upon the security, he may prove his deficiency
judgment before the committee against the estate of the deceased; or he
may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the
same at any time, within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that
even he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in
the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein
contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the
property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as
security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be
for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made." In
this connection, it is to be noted that the law provides two remedies (Osorio
vs. San Agustin [1913], 25 Phil., 404). The creditor here is not taking
advantage of the first remedy for the mortgage security has not been
abandoned. Rather is the second remedy invoked but until now
unsuccessfully since the mortgagee has not begun an ordinary action in
court to foreclose the mortgage making the special administrator a party
defendant.
It results that the trial judge committed no error in sustaining the petition of
the administrator of the estate of the deceased Gabina Labitoria and in
denying the motion of the Philippine National Bank.