MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit
for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where the
quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u
sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20.
Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean -
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible
for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific
pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope
that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the
end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of
procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against
him for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created
under the said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper.

RULING:

The filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the Commission on the
matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal)
(Sec 9). The Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not pollution did exist is
vested in the Commission, who is in better position to determine the same for such requires specialized
knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or
of those sitting in a court of justice (Sec 8).

Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the
Commission on the alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject law had
been violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos
River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory
and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable
standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of
untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar,
however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for
certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the
questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of
dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the
Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari
was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to
Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question
of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and
were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution
are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for
petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of
Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an
order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section
7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when
there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution
level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner
Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River
provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the
other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only
if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no
finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had
been denied due process by the Board.

HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of
petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like
here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows
that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact
appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the
decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness
of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.