Dolfo, Petitioner vs. The Register of Deed For The Province of Cavite, Trece Martires, Et Al.
Dolfo, Petitioner vs. The Register of Deed For The Province of Cavite, Trece Martires, Et Al.
#13
Dolfo, petitioner vs. The Register of Deed For the Province of Cavite, Trece Martires, et al.,
G.R No. 133465, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 58
Facts : This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Amelita Dolfo v. Hon.
Novato T. Cajigal, et al." in which the court had denied petitioner's motion for leave to intervene and/or admit
complaint in intervention as well as her motion for reconsideration. On March 5, 1996, petitioner Dolfo and Yangtze
Properties, Inc. filed a motion for leave to file and/or admit complaint-in-intervention in LRC Cases pending before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the real
property subject of the said LRC Cases as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-320601 issued in her name
by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. The trial court denied the aforementioned motion on the grounds
that: 1) it is a procedural error to file a complaint for intervention in cases involving original application for land
registration, the proceedings therein being in rem; and 2) there had already been an order of general default entered
by the court against those who failed to oppose the applications. The trial court noted petitioner's failure to exercise
any act of dominion over the subject property consistent with her allegation of ownership. The trial court opined that
petitioner's title over the subject property was of doubtful nature and that allowing her to intervene in the LRC cases
would unduly delay the proceedings. And so the Regional Trial Court rendered a joint decision recognizing and
confirming the rights of private respondents over the litigated property and ordered the issuance of a Decree of
Registration in their favor. Later, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus
to annul and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court. However, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
denying the petition. The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. The petitioner now contends that the
respondent court of appeals gravely erred in holding that the proper remedy in the land registration cases is an
opposition to the application of the applicants, and not a motion to intervene in the proceedings before the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the proper remedy in the land registration cases is a motion to intervene in the proceedings
before the trial court.
Ruling: The Supreme Court states that, the provisions of Sec. 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are the only parties in cases of original applications for land
registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party
complainants, cross-claimants, and intervenors. (VIP!) It is now settled that a motion to intervene in a land
registration case cannot be allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general
default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. This is so because proceedings in land
registration are in rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for, not the determination
of any right connected with the registration. The Supreme Court further provides, with regards to the issue of the
petitioners certificate of title's authenticity.
"It is premature for petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases because her certificate of title, supposedly her best proof
of ownership over the property described therein, is questionable. Besides, inasmuch as the authenticity of her
certificate of title is also being questioned in the LRC cases, the evidence that she will present to the prove the
contrary would be the same evidence she will present in the case for annulment of title. At this point, where there is
already a decree of registration issued in favor of private respondents, it is moot and academic to allow petitioner to
participate in the LRC cases for the purpose of preventing possible double titling of property. As the trial court
correctly stated, petitioner is not left without remedy even if she was not allowed to intervene. If it is shown that her
certificate of title is genuine and that she is the true owner of the litigated property, the proceedings in the land
registration cases would then be null and void because the trial court has no jurisdiction on the matter. The Petition
is denied and the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
#27
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS et al.
G.R. No. L-31303-04 / 83 SCRA 453 May 31, 1978
FACTS
Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots, i.e,,
Nos. 817 and 2509 of the lots located in Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros Occidental. Ocampo filed for
registration of the subject property to which petitioner-appellant opposed. The latter then filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the lots.
On August 3,1965, a joint trial for recovery of possession and the land registration case was conducted, dismissing
the complaint and adjudging the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo. A
certificate of title was issued in his name. The petitioner-appellant received a copy of the decision on August 13,
1965 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a
Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding.
The petition alleged that the Republics failure to appeal was due to accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence,
specifically, stating that its docket clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he
inadvertently attached the copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was only on November 5, 1965, that
Salud found the copy of the same; and that petitioner has a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No. 264 (6154)
and a good and substantial defense in the Land Registration Case. The petition was dismissed by the CA.
ISSUES
1. Whether appeal has perfected on the part of the petitioner.
2. Whether the dismissal of Republics appeal by the CA should be reversed and set aside.
RULING
1. Yes, the appeal has perfected. The requested 20-day extension (which was granted by the lower court) expired
on November 3, 1967. As to the legal ground for the dismissal on the foregoing bases, this Court has repeatedly
construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court as mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with
which justifies the dismissal of the appeal.
2. Yes, although the dismissal of the appeal is justified, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts
attendant to this case and the procedural and substantive implications of the dismissal of the appeal to be reviewed
and reconsidered; and a due and proper regard to the merits of the case rather than a fascile reliance on procedural
rules compels the Court to do so for the following reasons:
In the interest of justice, to correct Identity of the lots that were donated to the then Bureau of Education (admitted
by respondent de Ocampo), as well as those parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the land registration
case; and
There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the parties, that respondent de Ocampo used
fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations in securing his title.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the case was remanded to the same court.
#37
MANOTOK vs. BARQUE (G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605; August 24, 2010; VILLARAMA, JR., J.)
FACTS:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar
Land.)
o The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the
administration of the Director of Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall
on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot
No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted
copies of the alleged owners duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D
covering the property.
o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177
actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302)
pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the Manotoks. --> Barques
MR was denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.
o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque title to be
reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and
the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases claiming ownership
of the subject property.
2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the Reconstituted Manotok
Title and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT No. 210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on August 2, 2004.
December 12, 2005, SC First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks filed MR Denied in April
2006 Resolution.
o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached. Denied in June
2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the
meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the
Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for
oral arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was
attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued
Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the
Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.
o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment recalled and the CAs
Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded
the case to the CA.
o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace their claim of
title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land.
PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.
CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the government in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the
deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by
Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits
relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and
irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied the land,
built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They had a
caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation
to protect their rights.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823?
RULING :Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines
RATIO:
From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB indicate the original
claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale
certificate in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records Management Division. In
addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated
1919, 1920 and 1923.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks
belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7,
1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only
by the Director of Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of
this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).
In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of Conveyance No.
29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the
words Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly
imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the Secretarys approval.
The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in
the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact
approved by the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the
buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity
in the performance of official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then
DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.
Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao Cases the absence of
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate
made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or
assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY requirement. Approval of the
Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its
mandate. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans, states that some Deeds of
Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature despite full payment for
the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid
the purchase price and complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance because it makes reference
only to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the
alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the National Archives.
Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases reservation of its title
once the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of
the Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new rule Pugeda v. Trias, the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed
upon is not paid for in full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership
to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to
Section 18.
CONCLUSIONS
Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to
them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of
buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title
allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks
did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents
leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT
No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered
owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.
RE: MANAHANS No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the records of either the DENR-
NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No.
511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show
that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax
purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 and Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly observed that the claim had become stale after the
lapse of 86 years from the date of its alleged issuance. Citing Liao v. CA the certificates of sale x x x became stale
after 10 years from its issuance and hence cannot be the source documents for issuance of title more than 70
years later.
Dispositive:
Manotok Appeal denied
Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice to Reversion proceedings