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KASHMIR Sa IVISM
KASHMIR SAIVISM
L. N. SHARMA
Department o f Philosophy
Banaras Hindu University
VARAN ASI
BHARATIYA VIDYA PRAKASHAN

VARANASI-I (India)
Publisher :
Bharatiya Vldya Prakashan
Post Box 108f Kachauri Gali
Varanasi-1 ( India )
@ Autho
First Edition 1972
Price : Rs. 45*00
Printed at :
A R U N PRESS
B, 17/2, Tilbhande9war
V A R A N A S I-1
TO
MY REVERED TEACHERS
MM. PdK GOPINATH K AVI RAJ

AND
PROFESSOR T. R. V. MURTI
FO REW O RD
Little work has been done on Kashmir aivism, and
our knowledge o f the system has remained scanty and based
on secondary sources. This is all the more surprising since
the much-advertised philosophy o f Sri Aurobindo is largely
derived from this and could be described as a reformulation
o f the Tantra system in modern idiom. This system is also
known as Trika, Tantra and the PratyabhijnS. school o f
philosophy. It could be characterised as an Absolutistic
Theism based on the religious life and views depicted in the
aiva gamas.
One should be grateful to Dr, L, N. Sharma for expound

ing this interesting system o f Philosophy and Religion in
such an authentic and brilliant manner. He has relied
throughout on the original works o f the thinkers o f this
school, namely SomSnanda, Utpalacharva, Abhinavagupta,
Rmakatha, BhSskara and others. His insight into the
tenets of the system and power o f philosophical analysis
combined with a flair for precise and lucid expression have
enabled Dr. Sharma to bring out in fullness and clarity the
basic conceptions o f this philosophy and their implications.
The most valuable feature o f this book is its comparative

and critical study o f Kashmir aivism with the Advaita
Vedanta. The distinctive standpoints o f these two great
systems o f thought with regarct to the Absolute (Brahman
and iva), My and akti, the status o f the Individual Self
and the world process and the problems o f Bondage, Evil,
Spiritual Discipline and Release are drawn with admirable
acumen and understanding. All the other differences stem
from the basic conception o f Brahman and Siva. While
the Advaita Vedanta understands Brahman to be Pure Being
or Consciousness, Self-luminous (svayamprakSsa), it does not
invest it with Self-Consciousness o f the form: l know that I
am Brahman. Self-conscious awareness o f oneself, as imply
ing an other against which the self-assertion is made, thus
belongs to the stage of svara or Sagupa Brahman as asso
ciated with My. In the Pratyabhijha school however,
the Absolute Siva is not only Consciousness (praksa or
bodha) bin is at once Self-Consciousness (Vimarsa, Svata-
ntia) It is Siva and SaktTrolled into one, in a state o f equi
poise (s&marasya, see pp. 279ff ). The absolute iva inte
grally contains within himself Creativity, Negation and
Immanent Manifestation; iva is not only Being but also
Agent (karta) actively and freely unfolding himself and yet is
transcendent (visvamayam viivottiroam ca tattvam). The
Vedntist is more interested in maintaining the purity
and transcendence o f Brahman than in accounting for crea
tion. Brahman is free from , a Free Being, whereas iva
is free to do . Freedom (svatantrya) means that conscious
ness identifies itself with others and negates itself, merges
both into one state (as in Sadasiva) and denies both, which
have been merged into one. (p. 194; vimariohi sarva-
sahah> param api atmlkaroti, tmSnam ca patikaroti,
ubhyam eklkaroti, ekikrtam dvayam api nyagbhSvayati
ityevamsvabhvali). The Vedntist believes that Free
Being is the pre-supposition o f the Freedom to act, Brahman
freely phenomenalises himself as Isvara (Sagupa-brahman)
to create the world.
The aiva absolutist thinks that he has successfully resolved

the problem o f the world-process without having recourse to
the illusion theory by lodging the principle o f differentiation
within iva. It should be interesting to know the answer
o f the aivite on the question o f why and how the Lord him
self becomes the creature (patireva grhta pasubbvah). As
iva, he is perfectly free from all impurities. But when he
( i )
is associated with MyS. and is, therefore, manifest as limited,

he is called Pasu, the bound. There is no essential difference
between the absolute and the individual.* (p. 260). How
can Siva consciously forget himself, consciously lose his lordly
status and become bound, that is to be unfree freely, a contra
diction in terms ? Freedom from bondage comes through
the realisation, recognition that I am the Lord. Does not this
cancel or destroy without residue creaturely consciousness
and finitude ? If it does, the Saivite has to accept a case o f
absolute negation, the VedSntist s avidya or mSy2t which
he professes to have discarded. If it does not cancel even
partially the finitude, there is no freedom (moksa), at least
not from the recognition. If the aivite accepts negation,
his portion would be reduced to that o f Vednta. The
o f Vedanta correctly interpreted, means the Transce
ndent Freedom o f Brahman to appear or not to appear or
ap'pear in other forms.
This and most other philosophical issues are discussed in

this admirable book o f Dr. Sharma with a wealth o f detail
and acute analytical skill. He does not take sides, but
brings out the distinctions most clearly. All philosophical
dispute and discussion results in making the standpoints o f
the disputants clear and distinct. As Dr. Sharma states In
the preceding pages, attempt has been made to discuss some
o f the important points concerning the problem o f the absolute
and its manifestations. The central problem which persists
throghout this discussion is whether the manifestation o f the
finite process from the infinite is logically possible. And
if the process is logically possible, then how and why does it
take place ? Finally, how far is it proper to uphold the
reality o f the process and still maintain the perfection o f
self-identity o f the absolute. At present, it is not our pur
pose to determine the validity or invalidity o f a particular
standpoint, nor would it be proper to do so. At the most,
we may compare and contrast the two standpoints and
thereby try to find out the consistency or inconsistency in
them. (pp. 256-7). This attitude is comendable and proper.
( iv )
Dr. Sharmas work is an excellent and sustained piece o f

philosophical investigation. I consider it a significant
contribution to oar understanding o f the relative positions
o f the two great systems o f Indian thought, aiva Absolutism
and Advaita Vednta. This book will remain, I hope, the
standard work on Kashmir Saivism for quite a while.
November 20, 1972. T . R . V. M urti

P R E F A C E
Kashmir aivism, which represents the absolutistic

development o f aiva tradition, may be described as
theistic absolutism, lharadvayavZda. It includes schools
like Krama, Kaula, Pratyabhijft etc. and provides us an
integral vision o f reality which is more consistent than
many modern forms o f integralism and dynamism. It puts
forth a wholly dynamic view of life according to which
nothing is static or abiding. This system rejects all dualities,
bipolarities and conflicts and pronounces a vigorous affir
mation. It thus shows the futility o f the oft-repeated
charge that the Indian M ind is world-negating. For, the
whole vast soul o f India, as Romain Rolland puts it,
proclaims the domination o f a sovereign synthesis. There
is no negation. All the forces o f life are grouped like a
forest, whose thousand waving arms are led by Natarja,
the master o f dance. The ideal o f life is harmonious play
o f all faculties.
This system has stood the test o f times and is fast catch
ing our imagination after a lapse o f many centuries. It
provides the ultimate remedy for what Jung calls the
general neurosis o f our times.* The new generation o f
today would find that the mystical iva consciousness
attained through this path is absolutely free from the evils
o f drug induced psychedelic nirvaoa.* The new path
recommended in it is known as anupZya (effortless), Znando*
pZya (path o f bliss), tmopya (path o f se lf), paramopdya
(highest path), sahajopdya (smooth path), PratyabhijHopdya
(path o f recognition) etc.
It is rather surprising that so far due attention is not
given to this philosophy. Students and laymen both
remain in the dark about its fundementals. The present
work, besides being a philosophical treatment, aims at a
viii
comparative study. It is the first attempt to expound

aiva Absolutism in relation to Vednta advaitism. The
absolutistic aspects o f the system have been discussed
throughout in a critical and comparative manner.
The work is divided into four parts. Approaches o f

aiva and Vednta absolutisms have been analysed in the
first part. Theories o f recognition and error are discussed
in the second part. The third part contains a detailed
critical exposition o f the nature o f absolute reality. Con
ceptions o f self, bondage and liberation have been analysed
in the fourth part.
The value o f the present study is not in the direction o f

originality, but in the achievement o f greater clarity. Its
main purpose is to draw the attention o f the scholars and
to stimulate them for further study. Keeping this aim in
view, problems have been presented in simpler form and
English equivalents o f Samskfta terms have frequently been
used. It is also the reason why I have often quoted Sri
Aurobindo who is the best modern representative o f
integralism.
Being an interpretation, such a study may appear to be

misleading. However, the risk is worth-while in so far as
it may promote genuine understanding and tolerance o f
different outlooks. The treatment o f the problems is
neither historical, nor textual. For, I do not have the
inclination or the equipment to approach the subject either
historically or psychologically. Chronological factors,
however, should not count much in a metaphysical
discussion.
It is my great privilege to record my gratitude to the

various writers, both ancient and modern, from whose
writings I have benefited. I am specially indebted to Sri
J. C. Chatterjee, Dr. K . C. Pandey, Mm. Pdt. Gopinath
Kaviraj and Acharya Ramesvara Shastri for their enlighten
ing exposition o f the subject.
ix
M y deepest and most sustained obligations are due to

my revered teachers Dr. T. R. V . Murti and Mm. Pdt.
Gopinath Kaviraj. Dr. T. R. V . Murti, former Head of
the Department o f Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University,
kindly suggested the present subject for research and also
agreed to guide me. But for his valuable guidance and
kind encouragement this work could not have been com
plete. I am also deeply indebted to Mm. Pdt. Gopinath
Kaviraj at whose feet I learned the secrets o f Pratyabhiji.
The present work is dedicated to both these teachers as an
humble taken o f my gratitude. I am further obliged to
Prof. Murti who has kindly agreed to write the foreword o f
the book.
I am also obliged to Pdt. Mahadeva Shastri (Mahesvara-
nanda), former Principal, College o f Oriental Learning,
and Acharya Ramesvara Shastri who kindly explained
to me many difficult texts. I must also express my gratitude
to Dr. R. K. Tripathi, Dr. K . Sivaraman, Prof. J. A.
Alston, Prof. Arbinda Basu, Dr. Karan Singh, for the
help they have given to me. I am also thankful to my
friend Dr. H. Lenaerts who prepared the cover o f the book.
The present work is a revised version o f the Ph. D.
thesis approved by the Banaras Hindu University in 1960.
I am obliged to the University authorities for awarding me
the Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Fellowship during my research
period. Lastly, I am thankful to M /S Bharatiya Vidya
Prakashan and the workers o f Arun Press for taking interest
in the publication o f the work.
Varanasi-5 L. N. Sharm a
November 1972
A B B R E V IA T IO N S
AS Advaita Siddhi
( Bombay edition )
CPB The Central Philosophy o f Buddhism
by T. R . V. Murti
George Allen & Unwin, 1960
IPK svara Pratyabhijfta Krika
IPV livara Pratyabhijfia Vim ariin
Bhaskar vol. I to III,
edited by K . A. Subramania Iyer and
Dr. K. C. Pandey, Allahabad 1950
LD The Life Divine o f Sri Aurobindo
New York, 1951
MK Mandkya Karikas with artikara s
Commentary, Gita Press, Gorakhpur
NS Naiskarmya Siddhi
Bombay 1925
PD Paftcadasf
N. S. Press, Bombay
PH Pratyabhijfthrdayam
Trans, by Jaidev Singh,
Motilal Banarasi Das, 1963
PTV Para-triiTisika-Vivaraoa
( K. S. T. S. )
PS Paramrthasara
( K. S. T. S. )
SB ririka Bh&ya
(amkaras commentary on the Brahma Stras)
SD iva Dr
( K. S. T . S. )
SK Spanda Karika
SN Spanda N iraya
( K . S. r . S. )
ssv iva Stra Vimarsinl
( K . S. T . S. )
TA Tantraloka
( K . S. T . S. )
TS Tantrasara
( K . S. T. S. )
C O N T E N T S
Foreword
Preface
P A R T ONE
THE TW O APPROACHES
CHAPTERS PAGES
I. The T w o A p p ro a ch e s 1*23
1. Metaphysics as the doctrineo f salvation 1
The ego-conflict, the search, transvaluation
o f values, introversion, freedom through
knowledge, transcendental consciousness,
N irva, Kaivalya and Pratva approaches,
advaita as the final aim.
^ 2. The two approaches 14
Pratva and kaivalya approaches in the
aiva and Vedntic traditions, The two paths
and their differences, Vedas and gamas.
II. A d v a itism in the V edan ta 24-43
1. Advaitism in Indian Philosophy 24
2. Advaitism in the Upanisads 25
Upanisads as Vednta, emphasis on knowledge,
identity between tman and Brahman^ cosmic
and acosmic views, M&y.
3. S&mkhya dualism ... 31
Systmatisation, from Monism to dualism,
inconsistencies in dualism, Samkhya impact.
4. Antmavda advaitism 34
Rejection o f substance-view, doctrine o f momen
tariness, Buddhist advaitism, Mdhyamika and
Yog&cra.
5. Advaita in Buddhism and Vednta 36
Buddhist and Vednta advaitism, their similari
ties, Impact o f Buddhist advaitism.
( )
6. The Advaita Vednta 39

Vedntism and Samkhya, Gau<Jp&da, amkara as
a Vedantin.
III. E m erg en ce o f Saiva A b so lu tism 44-70

y l. tmavda and anHtmavllda controversy and the emer
gence of aiva Absolutism 44
The impact o f Vedanta advaitism, growth of lva-
radvayavada in Kashmir, two-fold absolutistic
awareness, integral logic.
2. Kashmir Saivism and other Systems ... 48
Recognition o f Priia advaitism, Kashmir aivism
Samkhya and amkara.
3. Kashmir aivism 52
Monistic aiva gamas, schools o f Kashmir ai
vism The Krama, as the path o f knowledge,
aktopya, Kaulism, synthesis o f bhoga and moksa
kulcra, the path o f will, ambhavopaya,
Pratyabhijha, path o f recognition or anupaya.
PART TW O
TRANSCENDENTAL RECOGNITION
^ IV. T ran scen d en ta l R e co g n itio n 71-89
1. Transcendental Recognition 73
Nature o f recognition, cognition as recognition,
knowledge as self-knowledge, recognition o f self.
2. Error 79
Theories o f error asatkhyati, tmakhyti,
anyathkhyti, akhyati, satkhyti, anirvacanya
khyti, aproa khyati
V. N ature o f K n ow led g e 90-131
1. Nature o f knowledge 90
Transcendental unity o f consciousness, luminosity
as T or the Lord, knowledge as the power of
the subject.
2. Determinate and indeterminate knowledge. 93
( i )
3. Pramna 95
Pramaa, the great light, Sarhvid or citi alone as
P r a n z a , Perception, inference, agama.
4. Triad o f Powers 105
JfiSna akti, smrti akti, apohaoa akti, M emory,
refutation o f Buddhist theory, memory in ai-
vism: memory, error and imagination.
5. AbhRsauda 112
Knowledge as I-consciousness, object as abhasa,
vastu, tattva, prameya identical.
6. Some objections against abhasavada 120
7. Relations 125
Relation as real, its nature, unity and multipli*
city, relations etc. in Vedanta.
P A R T THREE
THE ABSOLUTE REALITY

VI. T h e C on ception o f A b solu te 133-203
1* Absolutism : a problem 135

Comparative studies in absolutism, the absolute-
in-itself and the absolu te-for-us, positive and
negative approaches, absolute-in-itself in the
two approaches.
2. Absolute and Reason 151
Reason and the knowledge o f absolute, intuition,
logic o f the absolute, faith and reason, role o f
scriptures.
3. The two negations 161
Samkhya dualism and its impact, criticism o f
the negations o f the anatmavadin and atmavadins.
4. The Conception o f Absolute 176
Absolute as Free being, Prakasa Vimaria, Sacci*
dananda (tajastha and svarpa laksaa). Pra
aham, absolute subject, absoluteness o f self-con-
( iv )
sciousness, VedSntic absolute as Pure witness con-

sciousness.
5, The Absolute and godhead 199
iva as both personal and impersonal, Brahman
as indeterminate.
VII T h e A bsolu te and M an ifestation 204-275

1. The Absolute and causality 205
iva as the^true cause, matter or pure-conscious-
ness cannot be the cause, creation as externaliza-
tion o f consciousness, manifestation o f ideas,
Vivartavada in Vednta.
2. The how and why o f creation 218
manifestation due to freedom, free will, higher
and lower creation, creation through limitation,
thirty-six tattvas, creation as sport, spontaneous
overflow o f nanda.
y 3. The problem o f evil 240
The existence o f evil, evil as a result o f karmas,
everything identical with iva.
4. The eternal perfection o f theabsolute andfinite process 246
Reality o f the finite, change as ideal, inexhaus
tible nature o f infinity, Realism and illusionism,
Vednta illusionism.
5. The absolute and individual 258
Individual as a manifestation o f the absolute,
both identical, difference due to ignorance
6. The indeterminate and determinate 263
7. Unity and Multiplicity 266
8. Absolute and negation 270
Self-negation, positive nature o f negation,
negation as the principle o f manifestation, a
power o f self-limitation.
Vin Sakti 276-293
Universality o f aktis, akti-neither absolute nor
illusory, relationship between iva and akti,
smarasya, tdtmya, evolution o f akti, akti
as my.
( V )
PART FOUR
The Spiritual discipline
IX T he N ature o f s e lf 295-324
1. Knowledge o f Self 297
2. Discrimination betweenself and not-self 300
aiva integral method, different views as the
roles o f Self, discriminative method in Vedanta.
3. The true nature o f Self 306
Prpa aham and atman, free consciousness,
criticism o f atmavada and antmavda, Self as
Praka Vimara.
4. Atman and J iva 300
Jlvatva as a manifestation o f free will, seven
experiences, analysis o f the four states.
X. B ondage and L ibera tion 324-367

y \ % 'bondage 324
Difficulties in Svatantryavda, three gupas, deli
berate fall, theory o f Mala, Myvda.
v^2. Liberation 332
Are Bondage and release automatic ? Moksa as
Prpatva or Prpa ahmt, Vednta emphasis
on purity.
3. Divine grace and individual efforts 341
4. Means o f attaining release 348
Dks, two kinds o f ignorance and their removal,
synthesis o f knowledge and action, the four
Upyas.
5. The Liberated soul 356
Gradual liberation, Jivanmukti, Prpatva, inte
gration and harmony, synthesis of knowledge and
devotion, Moksa as Kaivalya.
B ib lio g ra p h y 369
Index 371
PA R T ONE
THE TWO APPROACHES

CH APTER ONE
THE TW O APPROACHES
1* M e ta p h y sics as the D o ctrin e o f S alv ation

The ego-conflict* generates metaphysical spirit. In its
worldly endeavours the finite ego is doomed to meet failures.
Defeat and dejection seem to be the very texture o f its
being. Restlessly striving after something, which by its
very nature it cannot h ave/ the finite self is involved in a
tragic paradox. Yet, as long as the finite energy is not
exhausted, the search* continues. However, when due to
either exhaustion or strong shock the finite capacity is
destroyed, the search is no longer possible. The inevitable
wreck appears to be inherent in the very nature o f the
search the search for the self in the not-self Sooner or
later the individual is bound to realise the utter futility o f
his efforts.
Recognition o f this painful situation constitutes the

primary condition o f spiritual awakening. Quest for the
realisation o f truth and the consequent desire to transcend
the appearances cannot arise so long as one is entangled in
the phenomenal. It is the consciousness o f universal misery
(sarvarh duhkham) and the realisation o f the total conflict
inherent in the very nature o f the 'search* which weaken
the lure o f the flesh, the hold o f the senses and the flights
of fancy. As Schopenhauer tells us, it is the knowledge o f
death and therewith the consideration o f the suffering and
misery o f life that give the strongest impulse to philosophical
reflection. When reflective attitude descends various
questions about the nature o f life and death arise : What
is it that persists when the body is dead ?x The tree if
hewn down springs anew from the old root What must be
1. Katha U p. I. I.
2 KASHMIR AIVISM
the root o f a man s life in order that it may spring again

even though hewn down by death P1 Let nobody call him
self wise unless he knows what becomes o f man alter death.2
Reflection over such problems leads to a transvaluation
of all values. One is fascinated, blinded or deluded by the
world drama only when there is attachment to the appear
ances. One is no longer spell bound by the plot o f the play
when out o f the melancholy weariness o f the cwill to live*
arises the desire for the inner life.* The inner enlighten
ment appears significant only when the true aspects o f the
given death, disease and misery are fully realized. T o
the sensitive vision o f a discriminating soul the worldly
existence appears to be full o f pain and suffering. Unaware
o f the real nature o f the world, the ignorant cling to it ; the
wise, on the other hand, being aware o f its real nature,
discard it. Even an infinitesimal particle o f a substance
becomes unbearable when placed in the sensitive regijn o f
the eye.3
Valuation o f the given is the first and foremost pre

requisite o f all metaphysical awakening. There could
be no occasion for philosophizing if the given* is just taken
for granted, i.e. if it is blindly and uncritically accepted.
In order that the desire for the beyond* may arise, the
desire for the given should be exhausted or overcome.
It is followed by an introversion o f the ego. When dis

illusionment is complete and the return to the external is
no longer feasible, the ego returns to itself. The self-with
drawal o f the ego, its return to itself, is the primary step
in the pilgrims progress. Know thyself is the first and
the last injunction o f all spiritual disciplines* It has been
emphasised both in the East and the West. The leading
question in philosophy, according to Gabriel Marcel, is :
W ho am I ? Like a man standing on burning fire and
longing for release, the strife-torn individual restlessly tries
1. Bfh. U p. III. 9.28

2. ChhSnd. U p. V . III. 1-4
3. Y oga Sutra II. 15
THE TWO APPROACHES 3
to get rid o f finitude and attain the true self ; the episodes
o f Nachiket and Maitreyx bear ample evidence o f this. Here
some vital questions arise : W ho am I ? Where from do
I come ? Where do I go ? Whatis my real origin and
destiny ? Am I born to be a master or a slave ?
Knowledge o f the true nature o f the self alone leads to

freedom. It is the conviction o f the majority of Indian
Philosophers that through knowledge alone one can attain
release* In India, as against the West, Philosophy is not
regarded primarily as a mental gymnastic, but rather, and
with deep religious conviction, as our salvation from
ignorance whichfor ever hides from our eyes the vision of
reality.1 Here, in its concern to solve the problem o f i
existence, Metaphysics turns into a doctrine o f liberation.
It was through philosophy, primarily, that the sages sought
to work out their salvation. In India Philosophy influen
ced religion even more than the latter did the former. 2
Samkara tells us that ail the systems, except the Crvka,
believe that Mok$a or release is attainable only through
p erfect knowledge.3 Scriptures declare that through know
ledge alone can nescience with all its effects be destroyed.
The same is reiterated by the Smrtis and confirmed by
reason.4 It is well and good if one attains the knowledge of
the Real in ones own life, otherwise death and disaster is
one's lot.5 It is the knowledge o f the One in which every
thing else becomes known. Without the knowledge o f the one
nobody can get rid o f sorrow. Mere scholarship does not
entitle a man to be called wise.6 Even the Vedas and the
1. Coomarswamy, A ., The Dance o f Siva f p. 23

2. Devaraj, N. K ., Introduction to Samkara*s Theory o f Knowledgef
p . 74
3. srfq ^ RWPT I
Samkaras commentary on the Brahma Sutra I. 11
4. Slfasn ^ fTrj ^TctsiT sjfa

Sankara's commentary on Gita X I I I . 3
5. K en. Up. II. 5
6. Chhnd. Up. 7. 1.
4 KASHMIR SAIVISM
Vedngas constitute lower knowledge (apar vidy) through

which the imperishable being is not known.1 It is the
metaphysical knowledge, the knowledge o f the o n e / which
is knowledge par excellance. Those who attain this 'absolute
knowledge exclaim no longer now can any one bring
before us anything which we have not already heard, under
stood or known.* The unknown is only as it were unknown,
only as it were a duality.3
Knowledge is freedom, ignorance is bondage. There is no

way to salvation except through knowledge.4 The vision o f
the senses is liable to be destroyed by disease etc., but the
vision o f the tman, the self, alone is eternal. Knowledge
is the essential nature o f the self : the self is knowledge
itself. Liberation is nothing but the knowledge c f the self.
Samsara results from an incorrect knowledge o f the s e lf5 It
is, therefore, the main task o f philosophy to analyse the true
nature o f the self. Knowledge o f the true nature o f the self
alone constitutes liberation ; lack o f it constitutes bondage.6
Obviously this 'absolute knowledge* cannot be gained by

all. The gates o f knowledge are not open to all. Although
there are no rigid external qualifications for attainment o f
knowledge, such as birth, age, sex, social status, yet an
intense desire for knowledge ( jijns ) is a primary necessity.
Plato holds that without the spirit o f dedication, steadfast
ness, loyality and sincerity, philosophy would become mere
cleverness. Only when one is able to withdraw attention
from the external objects can one listen to the voice from
inside.* Introversion or self-withdrawal is, thus, an essential
1. M und, U p. 1. 2. 7-11
2. Chhand. U p. 4. 6. 4.
3. Brh. U p. 2. 4. 14
4. Svet. U p. I I I . 8
5. 0 T 7 ?99T3TT-TTq trai f a a : , 0 0 * 9 7 3 S O R : . . . I
Pratyabhijnh{dayam, Trans, by Sri Jaideva Singh, M otilal
Banarasidas, p. 51
6. g%>:, o ... i ibid P. 46

qualification for seeking knowledge. The individual, due

to the very fact that he has an embodied nature, is bound to
be extrovert and look outside. It is only when a man o f
exceptional wisdom, one in millions, turns his gaze from the
external and peeps into the depths o f his inner being that
knowledge is attained. The creature looks outside because
the Creator has pierced the openings o f the senses outward.
Some wise man, alone, wishing to taste immortality beholds
the immanent self with reverted eyes (i.e. introspectively).1
Metaphysical awareness presupposes a descent o f trans

cendental consciousness. Reason, which is characterized by
the chasm between subject and object, operates always in
relative isolation and conflict. The gulf remains unbridged
in finite knowledge. The awareness o f the 'con flict/ the
desire to transcend it, and the introversion o f the ego, are
possible because o f the revelatory consciousness. It provides
ecstatic, mystic or intuitive experience o f the ground o f all
existence. In accordance with the nature o f their tradition
and revelation different metaphysical and religious approaches
conceive differently the nature and aim o f the 'urge for
transcendence At this point the task and scope o f Meta
physics and Religion become identical. Both aim at final
release or absolute freedom. Though there are differences
between them, philosophy and religion meet as far as value
is concerned The philosopher o f necessity has to operate
from an ultimate concern and the theologian must assume
the structure o f rationality.2
In the spiritual approaches there is greater emphasis upon
distinguishing the self from the not-self. The original sin
consists in mistaking the not-self for the self. It is the basic
illusion, the primary source o f bondage and suffering ; all
sins and suffering are the after effects o f this.3 Subtle
changes arise in the human personality from the habit o f
1. Katha U p . II. 1., Quoted in PH. p, 85

2. Paul T illich , Courage to be, The Master Pieces o f W orld s
Philosophy.
3. Pa*amrthasrat K urikl 40
* KASHMIR Sa i V IS M '^
taking the self to be the not-self. These engender new

habits in man. This round o f habits breeding habits is a
part o f Samslra, the wheel o f rebirth, which is governed
by Karma, the habits themselves.1 However, when the self
and the not-self are truly and clearly discriminated, the
wheel o f Karma, the round o f worldly habits or the mecha
nism o f empirical existence, not only stops moving forward
but starts moving back towardsthe realization of the true
self. Final release is possible only when the true self is
attained. Advances in science and technology cannot bring
us freedom.
The illusion which is the cause o f bondage is two-fold.

Firstly, it consists in assuming the not-self as the real self
(ianfttmani atmiibhimllna)y such as I am lean/ I am fa t/ T
am h a p p y/ I am non-entity and so on. Seeing the not-
self in the self is another form o f the illusion.2
However, the view that illusion consists in mistaking the

not-self to be the self and the self to be the not-self may be
interpreted differently in different approaches. In the
antmaDda approach, for example, illusion is regarded as
mistaking the not-self (anbtman) to be the self Jltman). In
reality there is no self ; belief in the self is illusory. What is
not-self appears as self in the case o f illusion. According to the
approach o f the atmaoltdins, on the other hand, illusion lies
in the fact that there is an unwarranted identification o f the
self with the not-self. In illusion the real self is confused
with the not-self.
Reality view is implicit in our world view. Our attitudes

towards the world, the conflict, and the given determine
largely the mode o f our viewing the Real. The vision and
the conception o f the goal depend upon the nature and
1. Karl Potter, Presuppositions o f Indian Philosophy9 p. 11
2. qRJTTfVTHHt I
PS, p p . 66-7, Also pp. 86-7
intensity o f the conflict.* Our attitude towards the Tran

scendent* or 'beyond* is determined by our attitude towards
the given.* This can be shown with the help o f an illus
tration from the Upanisads. There is a well known passage
in the Upanisad (Brh) in which spiritual progress has been
described as a process from the unreal to the real, from
darkness to light, from death to immortality, from bondage
to freedom or from finitude to perfection.1 The spiritual
process, so described, may be interpreted differently in
different approaches, depending upon the attitude adopted
towards the given.* Ultimately all differences in our out
looks originate from the differences in our fundamental
standpoints. The differences among several systems concer
ning the proper path to follow stemmed from their divergent
views about the nature o f reality.2
I f there is a predominant consciousness o f the conflict*

and the immediate concern is the resolution o f the conflict,
one is likely to adopt the path o f dissolution, or rejection,
o f the ego. Here the main urge would be to get rid of
suffering,* to be released from tension, and to realize the
state o f non egoity. There is such an acute awareness o f the
'con flict/ the awareness o f misery and suffering is so over
whelming, that ultimately silence* alone is regarded as the
great truth. Accordingly, the state c f release, or the highest
goal, is to be conceived mainly in negative terms. It can
be described as the path o f dissolution, the Nirvana Mnrga.
It has been typically represented in the Buddhist tradition.3
According to this approach, the ultimate state o f release
cannot be characterised in terms o f immortality, luminosity,
absoluteness etc. There is no appreciation in this tradition
for the optimistic speculative tendencies o f the Upanisads.
1. Brh. U p. I. III. 28
2. Potter, O p. cit. p. 44
3. T he N yya is clearly a different form ulation o f this approach
and is nearer to the Kaivalya approach than the Nirvana. T h ough
according to the Nyya also release is a state o f cessation o f
suffering etc., it is not really a state o f nirvana. It is a state o f
pure se lf-h o o d .
s KASHMIR SAIVISM
There is another approach, however, in which the path is

literally taken to be a process from the impure to the pure.
The ultimate goal is regarded not merely as the cessation o f
conflict or suffering but also as absolute or pure Being, Con
sciousness and Bliss. Release is not only a dissolution o f
the ego but the realization o f the true self as well. It is the
path o f Pure Being, the Kaivalya MUrga. Like the Nirvana
approach here too there is a complete rejection of the ego
(or ego-involvement). But, in contrast with the Nirvana
standpoint, here there is a vigorous affirmation o f the Self.
According to it release is the attainment o f the highest and
the true self. Though, like the nirvana approach, here also
there is a clear recognition o f the illusory or nescientic
character o f the given, yet the spiritual goal is not con
ceived as mere nothing. This approach is logically deve
loped in the. absolutistic metaphysics o f the Vednta
tradition, the Advaita Vedanta. The Vednta approach is
not so negative as the Buddhistic approach. It is true
that desires can never be satisfied ; every time a desire
is fulfilled, it increases more and more and leaves a still
stronger impression. Yet, we cannot attain the M man,
which is inanda or ecstatic jo y , merely by recognising
defects in the objects o f desire-tb ou g b we might achieve
freedom from attachment by doing so.
From another point o f view hotK

approaches might appear to be based uno ^ menti ne<3
separation o f the ego and th a art*ficia
The conflict it only avoided " m T ' !W^ eCt an<* old ect
approach.,. Th. ^ J * <v.d. I t h e
only in case there is harmonic confl,ct * possible
True freedom is neither a state o T n ! ^ ^ f the two
state o f pure or abstract Being r> ^ n0th,n8nes*> nor a
Pornatva and freedom or J L d f absolutenes, o,
as good as nothing.* W ithout ^ als WOU,d b<
ând^PreedonMhe attainment o f reiease w o n ^ h ^ a*>so*utftneS!
THE TWO APPROACHES
The highest state o f release should not be described, strictly

speaking, as an annihilation o f the ego ; for it is
essentially the state o f attainment o f absolute egoity,
prna ahamt ; it is not merely a dissolution o f finitude or
limitation but the realization o f infinitude and perfection as
well. In fact, the finite itself is an expression o f the infinite.
Release consists in the recognition by the finite that in its
essential nature it is infinite. The conflict, tension and
sufferings are due to a limitation of vision, wherein the
absolute subject appears divided into finite subject and object.
fThe process from bondage to release is a process from limi
tation to freedom, from finitude to perfection and from indivi
duality to universality not from the unreal to real, as it is held
by the Advaita Vedntins. Separation or disintegration is the
source and mark o f finitude and suffering, unity and har
mony that o f perfection and bliss. The given* is not rejected
in the end ; only its separateness from the beyond* is dis
carded. The given itself is realized to be the beyond ; the
object is recognised to be the subject. It is the path o f Per
fection or Prnatva mrga. The integral Saiva Absolutism o f
Kashmir represents a bold and consistent development of
this approach. Our effort in the subsequent pages o f the
present work would be to point out the relationship between
the Kaivalya and the Prnatva approaches as developed in
the Advaita Vednta and Kashmir aivism, respectively.
Though there might be many more approaches to the

conflict,* broadly speaking they might be regarded as
alterations or combinations o f these three basic approaches.
It would be incorrect to regard the differences between
various approaches as being merely terminological. Except
ing a few points o f similarity, the attitudes in these
approaches towards the given and the beyond are funda
mentally different. Both in the Nirvna and the Kaivalya
approaches the given* is regarded, generally, as unreal or
insignificant ( tuccha ). In the nirvna approach the given*
is taken to be absolutely devoid o f value ; it is of the nature
o f ignorance or suffering. Accordingly its attitude towards
lo k A S H M lR S A IV IS M
the beyond* is determined by this pessimistic outlook. On

the other hand, in the Kaivalya approach the given* is held
as merely distorting or hiding the real nature o f the beyond.*
It is neither real nor unreal and has value only in so far as
it leads towards the beyond.* In contrast with these two,
in the Prnatva approach the given* is accepted to be neither
as valueless nor as illusory or unreal. It is regarded as
merely imperfect or incomplete in itself. It is a manifes
tation o f the unlimited as limited That very duality which
prior to the rise o f knowledge, in the state o f ignorance,
gives rise to deluding or blinding attachment and limitation,
leads to absoluteness or perfection at the rise o f knowledge.
In fact, during the state o f illumination duality appears to
be more interesting and pleasing than pure or rigorous non
duality, advaita. When the state o f equanimity or smarasya
is attained duality becomes the eternal source of divine bliss.
But, inspite o f the fact that there are some fundamental

differences between them, these approaches need not be
regarded as essentially opposed to, or conflicting with, each
other. Not only that. We might even suggest that they
represent different aspects o f the same spiritual process.
These three approaches constitute three successive stages in
the path o f spiritual progress. The first approach, the
nirvana mrgay stands for the dissolution o f the ego ; it is the
first and foremost condition o f all spiritual awakening. Its
importance has been equally emphasised in the other
approaches. While the first approach stops at this stage,
there is a further progress towards the Transcendent (beyond)
in the other two approaches. Transcending the stage o f
dissolution o f the ego, the Kaivalya approach is a venture
into the nature o f the goal, an attempt to point out the
that* o f the beyond.* It confines itself to the task o f
emphasizing the transcendental purity o f the that*. Now
the third approach, though fully realizing the value o f the
first two stages, represents a still further attempt to dive into
the depths o f the that. It is third stage o f spiritual pro
gress wherein the that aspect o f the beyond is recognized
THE TWO APPROACHES 11.
in terms f the what, It is the stage o f realization o f the f

transcendent in positive trms. Thus, the first approach
may be characterized as a wholly negative stage o f spiritual
process, the second as partly negative and partly positive,
and the third as positive or integral.
Although these approaches represent different stages or

aspects o f the spiritual process, yet each may be absolute in
itself. While they can be conceived as being implicit in
each other, each is unique in itself ; none is secondary or
derivative.
The realization o f the Absolute or advaita may be

regarded as the ultimate aim o f these approaches. Different
lines or modes o f inquiry always end in the Absolute.1
For the conflict is resolved only when the state o f advaita is
attained. Tension, fear, frustration, sorrow and other evils
grow and flourish only within the realm o f duality. Diver
sity gives rise to fear, unity to fearlessness ; one who realizes
this unity, for him there is no grief, no delusion. For he
recognises everything as one with himself. It is only when
a feeling o f otherness gains lodgement in us that we come
to entertain the emotion o f fear. The primeaval tman
feared as he was alone, but on finding out that there was no
other person he should fear, he became fearless ; for it is
only from the idea or existence of a second that fear proceeds.
The whole Absolutist epistemology and moral philosophy
can be summed up in two propositions : Firstly the urge to
consistency and expansion, and secondly, that both are
connected, for consistency is only attainable by such an
expansion. Mental health and freedom from inner conflict
are attained through expansion to wholeness.8
1. W . E. H ocking compares a num ber o f lines o f inquiry which end

in an absolute. See his 'The M eaning o f God in Human
Experience,* p. 195
2. Brh, I. 42
3. Cleobury, F. H., God, Man and Absolute, Hutchinson & C o.,
p. 85-6
12 k a s h m ir Sa i v i s m
The Absolute represents the highest value. Ultimate

value and existence coincide in the Absolute. Religious
consciousness requires that the Supreme existence should also
be supreme value. The Absolute is the ground o f all beings,
all facts and values. M ankinds need for the Absolute is so
important that it can be traced in all cultures and ages.
From the beginning o f religious thought there has been
present to the mind o f man a Being who is present alike in
good and evil. In quite ancient times we may find a wholly
explicit definition o f such a being as the desire o f all man
kind. We could not live without the Absolute, nor without
our idea o f the Absolute. For, the Absolute alone is ultimately
satisfying truth.1 No optimism would be possible without
somekind o f absolutism. For one can be an optimist only if
one has caught or achieved the glimpse o f the whole.
Further, optimism requires the identification o f the Real
with the good.2
According to Schelling philosophy is the science o f the
Absolute. Advaitism is the goal o f all spiritual disciplines.
Absolute freedom is incompatible with duality or plurality o f
selves. Systems which do not conceive the highest state o f
release in absolutistic terms have o f necessity to relegate plu
rality to insignificant existence. Ultimately they have to attri
bute a non-functioning and non-manifest reality to it. Prof
Radhakrishnan says : T t is my opinion that systems which
play the game o f philosophy squarely and fairly, with
freedom from presuppositions and religious neutrality
naturally end in Absolute Idealism ; and if they lead to
other conclusion, we may always suspect that the game has
not been played according to the rules.8
The absolute resolution o f the conflict takes place at
the dissolution o f the ego. But the dissolution has been
interpreted differently in different approaches. The spirit o f
renunciation is supposed to be one o f the important means
1. Hocking, O p. cit. pp. 205-6
2. Ibid, pp. 167-8
3. S. Radhakrishnan, Preface to *Reign o f Religion in Contemporary
Society \
o f attaining the state o f dissolution o f the ego. The indi

vidual attains immortality only when the desires o f the heart
are destroyed.1 In the nirvana approach there is an
exclusive emphasis upon the transcendence o f desires. On
the other hand, there is a greater emphasis upon the reali
zation o f the true self in the other two approaches.
In the final analysis, the differences between these
approaches appear to be based upon temperamental
differences. The votaries o f one path need not be satisfied
with the methods and results o f the other paths. What
appears to be really pleasant or desirable {Preya or Sreya)
to one individual need not appear so to the others.2 The
attitude towards the given* and the beyond* in a particular
approach is determined mostly by the fact as to which o f the
three aspects o f experience, cognition, conation and
affection, play a dominant role in the formulation o f that
approach. The first two approaches may be described as
cognitive. The cognitive element plays a very significant
role in the development o f both the NirvUna and Kaivalya
approaches. The valuation o f the given, the urge to
transcend the given,* and the vision o f the beyond* in these
approaches are determined mainly through knowledge.
Accordingly, the path followed in these approaches might
be called the path o f knowledge. On the other hand, will
or conative aspect o f experience has been taken to be more
fundamental in the Prnatva approach. The will* to
transcend finite limitations and to achieve perfection
occupies a vital place in the formulation o f this approach.
But, inspite o f the fact that it is conation oriented, the affec
tive or emotional elements are not made insignificant in this
approach.3 In fact, as each approach is complete in itself,
1. K ath. U p. II. 3. 14
2. T h e shoe that fits one person pinches an other ; there is no recipe
for living that suits all cases. Each o f uscarries his own life
form -an indeterminable form that cannot be superceded by
another. Jung, C .G ., *Modern M en in Search o f a Soul,* p. 69
3. However, it is mainly in the devotional cults, especially in the
Vaisnava tradition as illustrated in Caitanya and MeerS, that the
affective element plays the dom inant role.
14 KASHMIR ATVISM
no approach excludes the other elements o f experience. It

is mainly due to an emphasis upon some particular element
in experience that the differences in the approaches arise.
Otherwise, satisfactory explanation o f entire experience
can be provided through every approach. W ill and feeling
can well be accommodated in the cognitive approach.
Similarly, knowledge also can find place in the non-cognitive
approaches. In reality none o f the elements is prior to
the other. In itself experience is dynamic and integral ;
all the three elements are simultaneously and equally
present in it. It is only from a particular approach or
standpoint that emphasis can be laid upon one o f the
elements. Thus*, the main reason why philosophers differ
about the respective merits and weaknesses o f a given path'
is their recognition that each one o f the classical paths
differs from the rest in the manner o f emphasis.1
2. T h e tw o a p p r o a c h e s
The present work is an attempt at elaborating some o f
the important aspects o f the Prnatva approach, as it is
developed in Kashmir aivism. Simultaneously, it would
be our aim to draw a clear distinction between this and the
Kaivalya approach, as represented in the Advaita Vednta.
These two approaches claim to be the direct successors o f
the cAgamic* and Vedic9 traditions respectively. Both o f
them represent the absolutistic development o f theirl
traditions. They have the same points o f agreement and
disagreement between them as those which can be found'
between the two cultural traditions. Every system of-
culture has its own line o f approach to reality.2
It is not possible to draw any final conclusion regarding:
the teachings o f the gamas as only a few o f them are
available so far. We can, however, form some general idea
on the basis o f the study o f systems which claim to have
been based upon the agamas. We shall confine ourselves
1. Potter, O p. cit. p . 43
2. Kaviraj, G opinath, History o f Philosophy ; East and West. V ol. I,
p. 401
to a summary statement o f some o f the most fundamental

differences between the two approaches, without entering
into the problem o f their historical origin.
T h e two approaches might be described as the two paths:

the left path and the right path ( vma and dakfina) , the path
o f happiness and the path o f knowledge ( nanda and jnna)
Left path is the path to utilize all the human potencies,
faculties etc. and maintain the state o f bliss and thus to
release oneself, The right path, on the other hand, is to
use these potencies and live discriminatively in order to
attain release. The Vednta approach regards knowledge
as more fundamental ; knowledge is sui generis for it. W ill
and feeling presuppose knowledge. These elements depend
upon knowledge for their very existence. But knowledge
need not depend upon them. Against this, will is
accepted as more fundamental than knowledge in the
Sgamic tradition. Knowledge is generated by will, as is
observed in our daily life.
The concept o f freedom or perfection is fundamental to

the Sgamic approach. Although freedom and perfection
have been attributed to Brahman in the Vednta tradition
also, yet the Vednta approach is more or less negative.
Perfection or Prnatva essentially means the purity o f Being
in the Vednt.1 Perfection o f Brahman denotes its freedom
from all becom ing. T o the followers o f the gamas the
exclusive separation between Spirit and W orld by the
Vedntin does not appear to be consistent with the notion
o f Perfection, which consists essentially in Omniscience,
Omnipotence, Omnipresence, etc. That is why the Vednta
absolutism could not becom e all-inclusive. As there is
hesitation in regarding myd, as real, the Vednta advaitism
is exclusive and is based upon renunciation or elimination
it could not be all embracing.2 Generally speaking,
there are two ways in which the term "freedom* might be
1. Unless specified otherwise, the term Vedanta in the present work

stands for the Advaita Vednta.
2. Kaviraj, G opinath, M r . to Praiyabijna Philosophy, Alak, p . 12.
16 KASHMIR SAIVISM
used ; it might be referred to as freedom from if used in

a negative sense, and as freedom to* when used in a positive
sense. Freedom to* is a positive description of the capacity
o f something to bring about the occurrence or non-occur
rence o f certain events. On the other hand, freedom
from* denotes the purity or transcendence o f a thing from
the others. Absolute freedom can be explained as the stage
where one is free to* and free from with respect to every
occurrence or non-occurrence.1
There are certain fundamental differences between the
two approaches. Firstly> the Vedanta tradition seems to
be based upon an exclusive or absolute separation o f the
Real and the Unreal. The distinction between the Real
and the illusory is the very presupposition o f spiritual awa
kening. Illusion is the datum for philosophy according
to the Ved2Lnta.a The experience o f illusion provides the
criterion o f the Real as non-cancellable (abzdhya) and the
illusory as cancellable ( bdkya). It is significant to note
in this context that Samkara not only begins his commentary
o f the Brahma Sutra* with an analysis o f illusion but also
insists upon certain essential requirements for spiritual
realization. The first and foremost essential qualification
of seeker after Truth (jijnftsu) is to have the sense o f discri
mination between the real and the unreal, the eternal and
the false ( nitya anilya viutka ) . 3 The emphasis upon this
qualification brings out clearly the difference o f the Vednta
with the non-eternalists (i.e. the Buddhists), on the one
hand, and the Tntric integralists (aivites), on the other.
While nothing is eternal or permanent for the Buddhists,
everything is real for the Tntric integralists, even the un
real is real for them. The Saivite who has attained liberation
in life sees the entire W orld as his own Self. He develops an
1. Potter, O p. Cit., p. 48.
2. M urti, T . R. V ,, Two definitions o f Brahman in the Advaita/ p. 142.
3. From the first qualification follow the other three qualifications in
succeeding order the sense o f discrimination produces detachment
(V airgya) which is followed by the possession o f equanimity and
the desire for freedom.
X-ray vision in which the phenomenal events appear to be

mere sport o f his own conscious energy {Cit. akti). Doubts
do not trouble him any more ; for he realizes the identity
between the internal and the external. Both internal and
external are aspects o f one and the same process. The
realization o f this identity is itself regarded as the attain
ment o f the highest bliss, the unity or samarasya o f iva and
Sakti. Thus, Abhinavagupta repeatedly asserts that nothing
is unreal in the aiva approach. In the world whatever
enters into consciousness is a manifestation o f the Self.
And the reality o f whatever enters into consciousness cannot
be denied. The objects shine, they do not cease to be by
a mere emphatic denial.1 As opposed to this, one does not
deserve to be taught about Brahman, in the Vedanta
approach, unless one possesses the powers o f discrimination
etc. T o understand the real import o f the Vedanta, one
must have the consciousness o f the illusoriness o f the w orld.
If this consciousness o f the illusorincss o f the world be not
in him, the meaning o f teachings about Brahman would not
be clear to the student o f Vednta.
Secondly, the VedSnta tradition presupposes opposition
between knowledge and ignorance.2 According to it know
ledge and ignorance are opposed to each other like light
and darkness. The concept o f avidy or ignorance is o f
fundamental importance for the spiritual discipline prescri
bed in the Vedanta. If something like avidy, which is
negated at the down o f right knowledge, be not admitted,
there would be no possibility o f freedom. Final release is
possible only if the bondage o f the soul is due to nescience.
For, if the soul is really and truly bound, its real bondage
cannot be done away with and, consequently, the Scriptural
1. Isvara Pratyabhijna Vimarstn, I. I. Intr.

2. T h e distinction between knowledge and ignorance begins with
the hymns o f R g v cd a but it is not absolute. Rut when we
com e to the Advaita Vedanta, wc find a total separation between
the principle o f knowledge and ignorance.* Misra, R. S .,
Integral Advaitism o f Sri Aurobindo, pp. 200-1.
18 KASHMIR SAIVISM
doctrine o f final release would become absurd.1 Infact,

truth and falsity are qualitatively different and absolutely
opposed to each other. The transition from error to truth
is like transition from darkness to light.2 Knowledge and
ignorance cannot exist simultaneously ; with the dawn o f
knowledge ignorance disappears altogether.
In the aiva tradition, on the other hand, knowledge and

ignorance are not accepted as absolutely separate. According
to the aivite knowledge is ignorance self-revealed and
ignorance is knowledges self-concealed. Since the supreme
self is o f the nature o f pure consciousness, what differentiates
it from matter is its self-awareness which consists in freedom
through which ignorance is manifest, and through ignorance
is manifest the world. Ignorance is, thus, a manifestation
o f divine freedom itself.3 In the words o f Sri Aurobindo,
The principle o f ignorance lies midway between the supre
me consciousness and the total inconscience. But ignorance
and inconscience are the exclusive and separative movements
o f the same Conscious Force which assumes these apparently
opposite and contradictory forms in order to proceed with
the work o f creation. 4 Ignorance is a manifestation o f the
power o f freedom o f Self. It is the light which gives rise
to darkness through self-friction.5 Ignorance is nothing
but a self-limitation or self-concentration o f consciousness
or knowledge.
Thirdly, in the sphere o f sdhan or spiritual discipline
also there is a great difference in the outlook o f the two
approaches. The distinction between the pure and the im
pure and emphasis upon the pure (means) constitute a
conspicuous feature o f the Vednta tradition. Througout
the Vedas and the Vednta there is present a highly
1. S. B. II. II. 29.

2. Malakani, G . R. Vcdanlic Epistemology, p. 15 ( 115 ? )
3. Kaviraj, Gopinath, History o f Philosophy : East and IVest, vol. I,
p. 424.
4. L ife Divine.
5. Kaviraj, Gopinath. *Bharatiya S'imskriti aur Sadhan* p. 4,
contemptuous attitude towards the impure. On the other

hand, there is not only a lack o f enthusiasm to draw any
distinction between the pure and impure in the ftgamic tradi
tion, but there are positive suggestions and directions not
to distinguish the two. The devotee is repeatedly asked to
develop the attitude to regard everything as pure.1 Self-
realization is possible only if the 'sndhaka* is able to accept
everything, including the impure, as a real manifestation
o f the divinity. The follower o f the Tantra goes directly
through the sphere o f greatest danger. By breaking within
himself the tension o f the forbidden , the Tantric resolves
every thing in light.3 The uniqueness o f the Tantric tradi
tion lies in the fact that while the followers o f other tradi
tions, especially the followers o f the Vednta, try to attain
release by avoiding what they regard as evil or impure, the
Tantric gains release through enjoyment or realization o f
the so-called evil* or impurity.3
This gives rise to another point o f difference between the

two traditions. Bho*a and Toga, sensous jo y and union with
the Divine, are taken to be identical in the Tantric ap
proach. On this point the Tantric discipline differs radi
cally from other spiritual disciplines, yoga and bhoga are
the same according to Tantricism. Through proper discipline
bhoga itself can be transformed into a way o f yoga. Tantri
cism, thus, represents a stupendous Dionysian affirmation
in Indian culture. It is an erotic life philosophy, precisely
77. Tantrism , as a matter o f course, insists on the holiness and purity

o f all things. Zim m er, IL , *Philosophies o f India,* p. 572.
2. Ib id , p. 573.
3. qiqqiTfq IpTr qq Rt'TTRri' flfgqq smrfHTjsrrr
3H: stcafaTHtfa, q: qrq <jiq qq $q srfq: qtrnf
qrq: q qq qtwqrarqfqfa i " q%q qîfa qq: qiirarcfei fq
qqRnj*
The objective world which is at first the cause o f sin and merit
etc., the root cause o f transmigration. By this Sstra the same
is made to be recognised as the sure means to spiritual path,
IP V . I. I. 1, Bhaskari, V ol. 1, pp. 40-1.
20 KASHMIR SAIVISM
the opposite and exactly complement o f sterilyzing, stern,

sublime, ascetic thinking o f the kaivalya tradition.1
In conformity with these differences there is further

difference in the two approaches as regards the admissibility
o f an individual for initiation. While the Vedanta tradition
is open only to the upper castes, the dvijas or twice-born,
the Tantric insists upon eligibility o f all persons, castes, and
sexes for spiritual realization.2 Unlike the Vedic systems,
there are no restrictions o f birth etc. in the Saiva schools.
Precise knowledge o f the origin and mutual relation

ship between the two traditions lies burried in the
depths o f antiquity. It is now generally recognized that
the origin o f these traditions is much older than was formerly
supposed. Siva and Sakti worship has been traced to the
M ohanjodaro and Harappan age.3 Efforts have also been
made to trace Saiva worship in the Vedas {f&iinadevahj
1. Philosophies o f India, p. 600.

2. n w HP*
IP V . IV . 1. 18.
T he Tantra doctrine and its expression in ritual arc for all, what
ever be their race, caste or sex. This marks a great advance on
the parochial restriction o f Vedas. The Tantras inculcate the
veneration o f woman and favour both sexes equally, It is regarded
as a crime to ill treat women, who are Saktis. A . Avalon, Principles
o f Tantra, p. 11.
According to the Tantra, alone o f the great Sstras, a woman
may be a spiritual teacher and initiation by her achieves increased
benefit.* Ib id. p p. 112-13.
The low kula who refuses to initiate a Candela or a Yavana into
the Kula dharma considering them to be inferior, or a woman, out
o f disrespect for her, goes the downward way. All two feeted
beings in the world, from the Vipra to inferior castes, are co m
petent for Kulacra.* Kulrnara Tantra, X IO , 184, 7.
3. A ccording to H. Zim m er, the antiquity o f the concept o f Siva
Pasupati and Siva Nataraj can be traced atleast till Indus Valley
Civilization. The former is indicated by a plaque on which is
engraved a horned deity, seated like a Yogin, having three
faces. The latter is suggested by .the significant torso depicted
in Harappa. Myths and Symbols, p. 168.
Vgmbarisiy etc). It has been suggested that among the

ancient gods the Vedic Rudra might be regarded as the
original form o f iva.1 Lord-worship can be traced back
to the neo-lithic period. Already at M ohanjodaro, the
lingam occurs. The lineam denotes the creative energy o f
iva combined with the (it) serves as a representation
o f the creative union that procreates and sustains the life o f
the universe. They symbolise the antagonistic yet coopera
tive forces o f the sexes. 2 It is, however, with a sense o f
forever lost that we must study the aiva tradition.
The term *tantra9 has been derived from the root tan.
Accordingly, it means the sstra through which expansion
o f knowledge takes place.3 It might also mean that which
protects the devotees. In its general usage, it denotes
any system, doctrine, theory or school o f thought, i.e. sllstra.
In its specific usage, TLgoma, which is another name for the
Tantra, is that system which explains the means o f enjoy
ment as well as o f release. Tantra is also used for such
works which deal with the nature, attribute and function
o f the gods, and the Mantras concerning them. By the use
o f these Mantras in the sacrifices (yajnas) concentration on
the Gods is attained.
There are two kinds o f attitudes towards the Vedas in
the gamas attitude o f antagonism and attitude o f alle
giance. Appayadiksita and some other scholars divide the
gamas into two classes those which are in agreement with
the Vedas and those opposed to the Vedas. Antagonism is
clearly noticeable in those Agamic passages in which the
VcdSnta has been frequently criticised.4 On the other hand,
there are many passages in the gamas which give the
impression that the gamas might have been derived from
the Vedas.5
It has been said that gama is meant specially for the
present age, i.e. kaiiyuga. There is a specific form o f worship
1. Yadubunshi, *Saivaiataf* p. 1.
2. Zimm er, H ., 'Myths and Symbols* p. 126.
3- ffst1faan arisr fn
4. Sasiri, S. S. Suryanarayan, 'The Sivadvaita o f Srikantha,' pp. 3-11.
5. Ibid. p. 4,
11 KASHMIR AIVISM
in each part or age ( yuga ) o f the great circle o f time. The

Vedic mode o f worship has been prescribed in the first age,
viz. Satayuga, sm jti in the second age, viz. T r e t y n g a ,
Parana in the third age> viz. D v p a ra , and Tantra in the
K aiiyu ga.1 In the present age there is no hope for mankind
without following the path shown by the gam as.2 The
Tantras were taught by iva to Prvati in order to redeem
those persons who are unable to distinguish between good
and evil. There is a greater emphasis upon knowledge in
the Vedas than in the gamas , which lay more emphasis
upon action. Accordingly, the knowledge path o f the
Vedas vis open. On the other hand, there are esoteric
tendencies in the Agamic path.
It is held that though the Agamas were originally based
upon the Vedas, they have developed independently o f the
latter. They have branched out from the same stem o f the
Vedic tree which produced the earlier Upanisads.8
The Agamas are supposed to constitute truest exigesis o f the
Vedas and their origin are certainly as ancient as some o f
the classical Upanisads.4 Further, it is said that both the
Vedas and the gamas belong to the same Hindu culture
and both have the same root. Their differences are confined
only to certain points While the Vedas have been issued
forth from four, out o f five, mouths o f iva, the Tantras
o f the higher tradition issued forth from his central or fifth
mouth.6 Again, the stras have been classified into ruti,
Smrti, Puroa, and Tantra. The last three assume the first
as their base and arc infact merely special presentment o f it
for their respective ages. The relation o f the Vedas and
gamas is sometimes com pared with that o f jivtm an and
1. Sec Kularnava fa n tr a .
2. t o r fr i
MahTi Nirvana Tantra.
3. Dr. V. V . Raman Sastri in his introduction to J. M . Naliaswami
Pillai,9 *Studies in Saiva Siddhnt*, A . Avalon, Principles o f the
Tantra, p, 50.
4. Avalon, A ., Principles o f Tantra, p. 51.
5. Ibid,
Paramtman ; the Tantra is said to represent the inner core

o f the former.1 The main purport o f the Agamas is to
represent the Vednta correctly. They deal with subjects
which are not dealt in the Vedas. While the Vedas repre
sent the quest , the Agamas stand for the attainment. The
Agamas also deal with the fifth state, viz. turlytlta9 in
addition to the four states o f experience, viz. waking, dream
ing, deep sleep and the fourth
Saint Tirumular holds that the Vedas and Agamas both

are true, as both are divine revelations. The only difference
between them is that while the Vedas are general the Agamas
are special. According to rikantha though both o f them
are o f equal authority, the Vedas are to be studied only by
the members o f the upper castes. The Agamas, on the other
hand, arc open for study by all castes.2
The other view may be that both Vedas and Agamas have
entirely different roots and traditions and have nothing in
common between them. The Agamas represent the essence
o f the Dravidian or non-Aryan culture and the Vedas, on
the other hand, originate from and represent the Hryan
culture. However, this view is based upon the much-disputed
theory o f different races. I he theory involves many un
sound assumptions.
In the absence o f any definite historical data it would be
safer to regard both Vedas and Agamas as belonging to the
same Indian roots. Both currents o f thought appear to have
been running parallel to each other since ancient days. Al
though sometimes they appear to be antagonistic to each
other, on the whole there prevails the spirit o f harmony and
regard between them.
1. Ib id .
2 . sm <j h 'rwnr: tsfr ftrarw fa 3 ^ r >
fri;:, sta: fsre m i fefjra: 3 3 % * i
Srikantha's Commentary o the Brahma Sutras II. II. 38.
CH APTER T W O
ADVAITISM IN THE VEDANTA
1. A d v a itism in In dian P h ilo s o p h y

Advaitism flourished in Indian Philosophy long before
amkara attempted a systematic interpretation o f the
Vednta tradition on advaitic lines. Since ancient times
advaitism appears to be a very favourite concept o f the
Indians. Elements o f advaitism can certainly be traced in
the Samhits. It was popular both in the Upanisads as well
as in the epics. Diffrent forms o f absolutism were prevail
ing during quite early days.1 G. H. Howison argues that
absolutism is an Oriental theory. According to him O c ci
dental man has an instinctive preference for personal
initiative, responsibility and credit which no monistic
philosophy can ever satisfy. It has to be admitted that
Indian thinkers, old and new alike, have been particularly
attracted by absolute idealism. Even now it is the Indians
who are keeping Bradleys name alive at a time when he
has few disciples in the Western w orld.2 In the words o f
Romain Rolland, The heart and essence o f the Indian
experience is to be found in a constant intuition o f the unity
o f all life, and the instinctive and the ineredicable convic
tion that the recognition o f this unity is the highest good
and the uttermost freedom. All that India can offer to the
world proceeds from her philosophy. 3
Though all the advaitic schools o f thought universally
admit that reality is ultimately non-dual in character, there
1. Sec Kaviraj, Gopinath, Introduction to Brahma Sutra with Samkar's

Commentary, Achyuta, Banaras ; Also Upadhyaya, Baldeva, Sri
Samkaracarya, p p. 328-9.
2. Hundred Years o f Philosophy, p. 74.
3. Rom ain Rolland, Foreword with introductory preface in Dance

o f Siva/ by Coomarswamy.
ADVAITISM IN THE VEDANTA 25
are some fundamental differences between them as regards

the conception o f the non-dual reality. Every system in
Indian philosophy belongs to a particular tradition o f
thought and culture. Each system has its unique line o f
approach towards ultimate reality. It would be quite erro
neous to overlook these basic differences in the different
forms o f absolutism. It has to be admitted that in each
tradition absolutism came to be established by its inner
dynamism It was the necessity to be self-consistent which
impelled them to move in this direction.1
2. A d v a itism in the U pa n isa d s

The Upanisads have been called the Vednta as most
o f them constitute the concluding part o f the Vedas, and
also because their teachings represent the aim or goal o f the
Vedas. They are connected to the samhits through the
Brhmanas and the ranyakas. Owing to their different
traditions the followers o f various Samhits developed their
own separate lines o f approach towards Reality. Later on
every school o f Vednta claimed to follow the true spirit
o f the Upanisads. Owing to the richness and fertility o f
their thought the majority o f systems o f Indian Philosophy
try to be inconfonnity with the Upanisads. This is precisely
the main difficulty in the study o f the Upanisads. Though
they contain the germs o f many systems, in themselves the
Upanisads lack consistency or system. Because their teach
ings are not confined to any particular system, differences
arise within the Vednta tradition itself. Ramanuja, and
Samkara, the champions o f qualified monism (visistidvaita)
and absolutism (advaitism) respectively, have attempted
interpretation o f the Upanisads in their own ways, amkara
holds that the real teachings o f the Upanisads is advaitic.
The Advaita Vedntins hold that though all the Brah-

manical systems are derived from the Upaniads, there is
justification to hold that only the Advaita Vednta repre
1. M urti, T . R . V ., Central Philosophy o f Buddhism, Allen and

Unwin p. 13.
26 KASHMIR SAIVISM
sents the real heart o f the Upanisads.*1 On the other hand,

according to Ramanuja the essence o f the teachings o f the
Upanisads is qualified monism.
However, with due respect to the two great acTlryas or tea

chers and the learned scholars who attempt to interprete the
Upanisads in their own way, we may say that the thought o f
the Upanisads cannot be confined to any particular system.
Though advaitism might be regarded to be the central thought
o f the Upanisads, this advaitism can not be given any parti
cular level. Advaitism o f the Upanisads is the fertile ground
containing seeds o f different types o f absolutism. The main
contribution o f Upanisads to advaitism lies in the fact that
they carried the original Vedic tendencies towards advai
tism to an advanced stage o f speculation. They provided
the ground, seeds, climate and necessary equipment for the
development o f absolutism in Indian Philosophy.
There is a great emphasis upon knowledge in the

Upanisads. Knowledge about perishable objects is regarded
as lower ; only the knowledge which relates to the Highest,
the Imperishable, is regarded as higher.1 The higher is
that knowledge whereby the unheard becomes the heard of,
the unthought becomes the thought of, the unknown becomes
the known.2 The higher knowledge alone is entitled to be
called knowledge (vidy) ; the lower knowledge is merely
ignorance. Throughout the Upanisads we find a vigorous
search for knowledge.3 It is the search* for the knowledge
o f the One , by knowing which everything else becomes
known. Knowledge is imperishable, ignorance is perishable.4
Establishment o f the identity between atman and brahman,

the highest self o f the individual and the ultimate reality o f
the universe, in the Upanisads is one o f the greatest achieve
ments in the realm o f thought. Right from the Mantras
1. Central Philosophy o f Buddhism, p. 55.
1. M und. U p. I. 1 .4 -5 .
2. Chhnd. Up. V I . I. 3.
3. Katha U p . II. 4.
4. Svet. U p. V . 1
ADVAITISM IN THE VEDNTA 27
and Brahmanas there was a tendency to seek for a corres-

pondenco between the individual and the world. In the
Puruja Sukto, for example, the parts o f the universe have
been described in terms o f the parts o f a mans body etc.
Further, in the funeral hymns (Rg. X . 16) also we find the
same tendency o f conceiving the universe as an individuality.
The most definite expression for the first principle o f the
universe or Brahman was found in the conception o f the
Atman. The Atman is the Indian expression for the first
principle and defines in a clear and striking manner the one
eternal problem o f all philosophical research.1 The abso
luteness o f Self has been emphasised in a dialogue between
Prajapati and Tndra.2 The senses, the body, the mental
states and the stream o f consciousness are mere instruments
or objects o f the Self. The Self is essentially the subject,
the knower or illuminator o f all experience, and transcends
all objectivity. The Self cannot be known as an object ;
for the knower cannot be the known.3 Not being able to
grasp it, thought and speech turn back.4 It i* other than
the known but above the unknown.5 Whatever shines shines
through its light alone. Knowledge o f the Atman is highest
wisdom (para vidy or Mma vidy) .n The identification of the
Subject and the O bject is o f great significance. An object
in itself is a mere hypothetical entity unless it is given in
self-experience. When the same iu identified with the Self,
it becomes the necessary presupposition o f all experience.
The unity o f the Self has been demonstrated through an
analysis o f the different states o f experience such as waking,
dreaming etc. The analysis o f deep sleep is very important
in this context. The state o f deep sleep/ in which there is
no distinction o f subject and object, supplies existential
evidence o f the non-dual Atman. It has been said that in
1. Paul Deussen, Philosophy of the Upanuads, pp. 25-86.

2. ChhTnd. V I I I . 3-12.
3. Brh. II. IV . 12-14.
4. T ait. II. 4.
5. K en. I. 3.
6. Ibid. II. 7.
28 KASHMIR SAIVISM
deep sleep the individual is carried every day to Brahman.

When a man is asleep then he becomes united with True,
he is gone to his own (self1. Therefore they say svapitiy he
sleeps because he has gone (apita) to his own (sv a V 1 But,
even though the Self is One with Brahman in deep sleep, it
does not know that it is one*. cAs people, who do not
know a field, walk again and again over a golden treasure
that is hidden somewhere on earth, and yet are not able to
discover it, thus do all these creatures day after day become
merged in Brahman, and yet do not discover it because they
are carried away by untruth. 2
Brahman or Atman has been described in two different

ways in the Upanisads. Often it has been recognized to be
an all inclusive first principle which is the ground and
source o f the universe. On the other hand, there are
passages in which Brahman is regarded to be the sole reality
and the universe as a mere appearance, a mere name and
form without substantiality. Because o f this dual mode o f
approach there arise different schools in the Vedanta
tradition. This two-fold description o f Brahman is very
frequent in the Upanisads. While teaching his son Bhrgu
about the nature o f Brahman, Varuoa begins with the tatastha
lakiana or accidental characteristics o f Brahman: That verily
from which all these beings are born ; by which when born,
they live and into which they pass at death that is
Brahman. Bhrgu is then successively told about the various
inadequate conceptions o f ultimate reality, like matter,
proa, etc Finally, the svarupa laksana or essential nature
o f Brahman is described. It refers to the very essence o f
reality, viz. ananda. From bliss all these beings are born,
in bliss they sustain, to bliss they return.3 The followers o f
Ramanuja hold both the characteristics o f Brahman to be
real. The Advaita Vedntins, on the other hand, regard
1. Chhand. V I. 8. 1.
2. Ib id. V III . 3. 2.
3. Taitt. III. Bhtguvalli.
the defining characteristics in both the cases to be Kalpita

or fancied. 1
There are various passages in the Upanisads which

support the cosmic view, and declare that the world is a real
manifestation o f Brahman. It has been repeatedly asserted that
the Self is indeed the whole world.2 As all spokes are contained
in the axle and the wheel, so all beings, all Gods, all worlds,
all organs are contained in the universal self or Brahman.8
The creation o f the world out o f Brahman has been compared
to the ejection o f the thread from a spider, to the scattering
o f sparks from fire, to the sprouting o f herbs from earth,
to the growth o f hair on the head and the body o f a living
person.4
On the other hand, there are passages in which cosmic

tendencies are clearly present. Later on these very tenden
cies were systematised into Vedanta advaitis?n at the hands
o f Gautfpada and amkara. Denying the reality o f plura
lity, the Upanisads proclaim that those who are engrossed
in plurality go on revolving in the cycle o f birth and death.
Brahman alone is Real ; it is the real o f the Real. Splitting
the term salyam into three syllables, sa, ti, yam, the
Brhadranyaka says that the first and the third syllable mean
truth and the third signifies untruth. Accordingly it means
that the entire world, the middle state, is untruth enclosed
on both sides by truth. Truth is the source o f origin and
ultimate end o f the middle state, which is untruth.6 Atman
is the only reality, everything else is a mere word, a mode or
name.6
Whether the doctrine o f mSy is taught in the Upanisads

is not very clear. But undoubtedly there are passages which
1. Hiriyana, Indian Philosophical Studies, V ot. I.

2. Chhnd. V II. X I I . 2.
3. Bfh. II. III. 15.
4. Brh. II. I. 20 ; M und. I. I. 7 ; sa 7 Taitt. II. 6.
5. Brh.
6. Chhnd. T I. 1. 4.
30 KASHMIR SAIVISM
contain the seeds o f the concept o f my. It is said in the

sa Upanisads that the veil that covers the truth is golden ;
it is so gaudy and dazzling that it takes away the mind o f
the observer from the inner contents.1 Ignorance has been
described as Knot which has to be untied before the realiza
tion o f the Self takes place.2 It is strange how people live
in ignorance and thinking themselves wise move about
wandering like blind following the b lin d .8 It is held that
Indra assumes many forms by his my.4 According to the
Svetsvetara, God, the M ayin, creates the world through
m3ya.5
But there are some passages which create the impression

that the Advaita Vednta doctrine o f my is foreign to the
Upanisads. That is why even the followers o f aiiikara
were themselves sceptical as to the presence o f MySvda
in the Upanisads and believed it to be an innovation o f
their school designed mainly to furnish a rational basis
to the Vednta metaphysics. 0 ruti itself is indifferent as
regards the question whether bondage is real or unreal.
It is we who, in order to make the texts tally with reason,
conceive bondage to be o f the nature o f nescience.7 There
are only a few places in the Upanisads where the term My
occurs. And in all such places it can be interpreted either
as a mysterious power or as a moral defect. Thus, It is
certain that the Vednta theory o f cdhybsa is utter stranger
to the Upanisadic thinkers No higher tribute can be paid
to the interpretative ingenuity o f amkara that his system
1. Isa. 15.
2. M und. II. 1. 10.
3. Kath I. 2, 4-5.
4. ^ w Ir i
Brh. II. V . 19
5. Svet. IV . 9.
6. Devaraj, N. K ., Introduction to Snmkara's Theory o f Knowledge,
p. 87.
7. ^ q q ? i
Ibid, VPS. p. 8.
ADVATISM IN THE VEDANTA 31
should produce the impression o f being not only the most

reasonable but also the most natural presentation o f the
Upanisadic philosophy. 1
However, the very fact that mutually opposed systems

owe their allegiance to the Upanisads indicates that the
seeds o f some o f the fundamental doctrines o f these systems
were present in the teachings o f the Upanisads. Any
objective or impartial study would lead to this conclusion.
It is evident that all systems o f Indian Philosophy, except
Charvka, derived inspiration from the Upanisads.
3* T h e Sam kh ya D u a lism
It is supposed that the Samkhya was the first system to
arise in Indian Philosophy. It grew and developed as a
synthesis purely on rationalistic basic o f the teachings o f the
Upanisads.2 Like the Vednta systems the Samkhya is also
based primarily upon the Upanisads. It aims at producing
a homogeneous system out o f the hetrogenious thoughts o f
the Upanisads.
In this endeavour, the Smkhya became conscious o f the

contradiction involved in the conception o f an immutable
pure Self transforming itself in the changing world. To
attribute change as well as changelessness to one and the
same entity is not logically possible. In order to maintain
the purity and identity o f the Self, it has to be regarded as
absolutely devoid o f change. The spiritual character o f the
Atman can be preserved only if the material, the changing,
does not form a part o f its nature. For the spiritual and
the material are absolutely exclusive to each other.
Accordingly, the Smkhya, separating all becoming or
materiality from the tmany accepted two distinct and eternal
entities having neither beginning nor end ; the Atman was
called the Purufa, the Being eternal (Ktasthanitya) , which
has no connection with the phenomenal world The other
1. Ibid, p. 89.
2. CPB, pp. 55-64.
32 KASHMIR SAIVISM
Reality is Prakrti or nature which is the source and ground

o f all change and is accordingly characterised as the Becom
ing Eternal (Parinomi nitya). Thus, the simple monism of
the Upanisads gives way to the Purusa-Prakfli dualism in the
Samkhya. The bliss-oriented lofty idealism o f the Upanisads
is henceforth lost in the wilderness 01 Being or Becoming.
Here creeps in the pessimistic attitude towards life, which
later on became the chief characteristic o f Indian thought and
dominated the Indian Mind for centuries.
While admitting the reality o f (hange, the SSmkhya

assert that change does not affect the unity and identity of
the whole.* The realm o f change is a unity which is
capable o f sustaining all differences. In spite o f its trans
formation into the effect, the identity o f the cause remains
unmodified. However, the emergeuce o f the effect from
the cause is not absolutely a new production. The existence
and nature o f the cause can only be inferred from the
nature o f the effect. For the cause is unmanifest, only the
effect is manifest. Now, judging from the effects, the cause
cannot be regarded as a simple entity. The cause must
have a complex nature, holding within itself the principle o f
both being and becoming Accordingly, Prakftiy the world
cause, has as its constituents the three gunas, sat, rajas and
tamas, which are responsible for rest, movement and inertia,
respectively. It is both the cause as well as the effect ; as
cause, it is the source and ground o f all effects ; as effect, it
stands for the entirety o f effects emerging from the causes.
The relationship that holds between the Prakfti as cause
and Prakfti as effect is that which holds between cause and
caused, independent and dependent, whole and part. The
underlying logic might be called the logic o f identity tinged
with differences.1
The later systems o f Indian Philosophy were quick to

reveal the contradictions inherent in the SSmkhya position.
It has to face difficulties similar to all dualistic approaches.
1. CPB, p. 62.
ADVATISM IN THE VEDNTA 33
The inconsistencies implied in a dualistic standpoint were

easily pointed out by the opponents. They also attempted to
show contradictions in the Smkhya conceptions o f bondage
and release. Though the primary aim o f this system is the
attainment o f release through knowledge yet, ineffect, it is
through knowledge that the existence o f two mutually opposed
eternal substances is established. I f Prakfti is ultimate reality,
final release from it is not possible. Nor is there any logical
ground for holding the view that in the state o f release
Prakfti hides itself from the view o f the wise like a bashful
maiden. Moreover, there is no satisfactory explaination o f
the phenomenon o f bondage in the Smkhya. Spirit and
Nature, Purusa and Prakfti, being wholly opposed in
nature, it is difficult to understand how can there arise any
sense o f identity between them. There is no other inter
mediary object or principle between them which can account
for the rise o f sense o f confusion. Finally, to say that
Prakfti exists and functions for the sake o f Purua is to make
Prakrti wholly dependent upon the Purusa. This leads the
Smkhya to the postulation o f plurality o f Purusas in order
to make the process continuous.
The Smkhya itself seems to be conscious o f some o f

these inconsistencies. In order to account for the possi
bility o f change, it is forced to attribute final causality to
Purusa. This means abandoning, or atleast, compromising
the original dualistic standpoint. On the other hand, the
Purusa also loses its independence and becomes dependent
upon Prakfti for attaining final release.
Thus, a critical assessment o f the Srtikhya metaphysics

convinced the later schools o f Philosophy that fundamental
dualism was ultimately untenable. It is mainly this reali
zation which is responsible for the growth and development
o f subsequent Indian thought into two opposite or extreme
lines, tmavnda and anUtmavTlda. tmavda tradition
originates from an acceptance o f the sole reality of the
Being Eternal, the Witness Consciousness or Purusa. The
Becoming Eternal or Prakfti loses its independence and is
34 KASHMIR SAIVISM
regarded as mere tuccha or nothing in itself* in the end.

This line o f approach was adopted by the Vedntins who
upheld the Upanisadic concept o f the Atman ; it attained
its culmination in the Advaita Vednta. The other line of
approach was developed in the Antmavda tradition o f
Buddhism which accepts the Becoming Eternal to be the
sole pattern o f reality and denies the reality of permanent
spirit, the Being Eternal or Atman. In either case, the
Samkhya dualism finally gave way to non-dualism. In the
former tradition dualism was replaced by the non-dualism
o f Being or Atman, in the later it was substituted by the
non-dualism o f Becoming or Antman.
4. Anatmavada Advaitism
There is no justification for postulating a separate
reality transcendent to Prakrti if our experience is wholly
confined to Prakrti or its evolutes. Accordingly, the
Buddhists, accepting the sole reality o f Prakfti, rejected the
concept o f a transcendental Being (viz. the Purusa).
Because o f their concern for consistency, they refused to
accept anything as permanent.
But logic is a double-edged weapon. The logic which

was employed by the Smkhya in order to divide the integral
monism o f the Upanisads into the Purua-Prakfti dualism
could also be used, with equal force, against the doctrine
o f a permanent and unitary principle o f change (viz.
Prakrti). Difficulties similar to the doctrine o f Atman in
the Upaniads arise with regards to the concept o f Prakrti.
For, how can Prakrti simultaneously be changing and un
changing, transcient and eternal ? How can Prakfti main
tain its identity and unity if it is always changing ? That
is why the Buddhists, accepting the Smkhya disintegration
of the simple monism o f the Atman, adopted the path o f
absoluteness o f Becoming. Although the Smkhya
abandoned the notion o f advaita/ he was careful to retain
the concept o f Spirit as well as o f Nature. But the Buddhist
was not interested in the eternal or permanent substance.
ADVAITISM IN THE VEDNTA 35
He, therefore, discarded the Conception o f Spiritual subs

tance and retained only the fleeting series o f mental states,
from which the development o f the void theory is a natural
step.1 Eflfeciency is the test o f reality according to the
Buddhists. Hence, the permanent, which is non-efficient,
cannot be regarded as real Reality is pure change or flux,
having neither a past nor a future, a point instant (klaika).
Advaitism, previously lost in the dualism o f the SSrhkhya

and later on in the Flux* o f early Buddhism, now reappears
with greater vigour in the later Buddhism as nya and
Vijna absolutism. In both the cases, firstly in the case o f
bifurcation o f simple monism and secondly in the emergence
o f Advaitism in later Buddhism, it was the inner urge for
consistency which led to these developments.
The Madhyamika Absolute is the consciousness that all

views about reality are unreal The Absolute is Silence. 2
It was the awareness o f the total conflict in Reason which
made the development o f unya Advaitism possible.3 The
dialectical consciousness brought about the realization
that the ultimate nature o f reality is utterly indeterminable.
The untenability o f the Samkhya position proved to be the
basis for the growth o f dialectical consciousness. The
Smkhya bipolarity o f Being and Becoming led to the doct
rine o f absoluteness o f change. Spirit and Nature both were
denied substantial existence, and were reduced to the exis
tence o f the moment, a point instant, in Buddhism. This
antmaoda tradition gave rise to first absolutistic system in
Indian Philosophy. The Mndhyamika Buddhists drew
attention to the inconsistencies involved in their own tradi
tion. They boldly asserted that the Buddhist view, that
pure change is real, is fallacious. Like Being, Becoming
also canot be ultimate. Permanent and transitory, continuous
1. Keith, A. B. The Snm^hva Svs/ew, p p. 23-4.

2. TTTOff f S T R r f T *1 |
M K V , p. 57.
3. CPB, pp. 55-103.
36 KASHMIR SAIVISM
and discrete are relative to each other ; one cannot be

conceived without the other. Affirmation or negation o f
the one cannot be possible without the simultaneous affirma
tion or negation o f the other. Accordingly the M&dhyamika
declared that both the substance and the modal views are
ultimately untenable. The adherents o f the substance view
fail to explain the phenomena o f change or becoming. Like
wise, the adherents o f the modal view cannot account for
the experience o f permanence, continuity and universality.
Both o f them, because o f the logical inconsistencies inherent
in their positions, are ultimately compelled to adopt a state
o f absolute silence.* They have to resort to the doctrine o f
avidy or ignorance.
The Mdhyamika made a significant contribution to

wards the development o f absolutism in Indian thought.
It has influenced almost all absolutistic systems in Indian
Philosophy. After it the Absolute has been generally recog
nized as transcending all determinations. But, at the same
time, it has been accepted as being immanent in the pheno
mena as their innermost essence.1
The ijiina absolutism in the Yogllcllra Buddhism repre

sents a constructive approach towards the conception o f the
Absolute. While the Mdhyamika did the pioneering work
in emphasizing the indeterminate nature o f the Absolute,
the Yogcra made a further contribution to absolu
tism by identifying the Indeterminate with pure consciousness
(vijina). The later absolutistic systems generally follow
the Vijftnavdins on this point.
5. Advaita in Buddhism and Vedanta

There is no unanimity among scholars about the exact
nature o f relationship between Buddhist and Vedanta absolu
tisms. Some hold that both o f these absolutisms belong to a
common tradition, viz. Vednta. While Buddhism is a
development upon the Upanisads, the Vednta is essentially
a reinterpretation o f the same tradition in the light o f the
1. Ibid.
VAITISM i n THE v e d n t a il
achievements and failures o f the new development. There

is the other view according to which they might be regarded
as belonging to two different traditions. However, inspite
o f this fundamental difference between them, mutual influ
ence cannot be completely ruled out. Buddhism, which
itself was inspired by the idealism o f the Upanisads, has
influenced the growth o f Vednta tradition.
It appears that these absolutisms developed independently

o f each other, in accordance with their own traditions. It
is not necessarily impossible for each tradition to develop
into Advaita. Nor it is true to say that Vednta Advaitism
would not have been possible without the Buddhist Advai
tism. For, if the radical pluralism o f earlier Buddhism could
lead to the absolutism o f the Mdhyamika, a similar deve
lopment could happen here too, perhaps with greater ease. 1
Infact, elements o f advaitism were already present in the
Vednta tradition. The Upanisads contained teachings
which emphasised knowledge o f the One*, knowing which
everything else becomes known. The fact that aihkara
refers to Gaulpda as the knower o f the tradition suggests
that the advaitic thought was already present in the
Vednta tradition.
As regards the question whether entire Indian thought

stems from one original root or from different sources, some
thinkers accept an unilinear tradition and regard almost all
systems to be representations o f a single line o f thought.
Other scholars hold that these various traditions are radically
different from each other. But both these views suffer from
the fallacy o f over simplification* and fail to grasp the
truth. A careful analysis would reveal that Brahmanism
and Buddhism belong to the same genius, but differ as
species. In a sense they are complementary to each other.2
Obviously there are many similarities between the two

traditions. Probably it is due to these similarities that
1. CPB. p. 113.
2. Murti, T R Y , Buddhism and Vedanta.
KASHMIR AIVISM
arhkara has been described as a crypto Buddhist by some

o f his critics For, both the Buddhists and the Vedntins
emphasise the transcendence o f the Absolute ; both accept
the theory o f avidy and o f the levels o f truth But it
would be unfair to hold that amkara borrowed his abso
lutistic ideas from others,1 or that he was indebted to the
Buddhists for his central concepts. Advaitism was already
present in the teachings o f the Upaniads. Even the dis
tinction o f empirical and absolute ( Vyvaklrika and Pramr-
thika) knowledge may be regarded as a development o f the
Parpar division o f knowledge in the Upanisads. The
doctrine o f illusory causation (Viuartavftda) also appears to be
a logical presentation o f the Upanisadic view that the effects
differ from the cause only in respects o f name and form,
which are unreal.2
Moreover, if amkara was really indebted to the

Buddhists, the Buddhists themselves would not have failed
to make use o f this fact. Infact, they should have been the
first to point out this. But nowhere in the Buddhist
tradition do we find any suggestion to this effect. In reality
there could have been no borrowing o f doctrines or concepts
from others. Unlike the Buddhists, the Vedntin adopts the
tman approach and accepts the authority o f the Vedas. It
is a God centred approach, as apposed to the man centred*
approach o f Buddhism. Revelation, as contained in the
Vedas, is the main source o f inspiration in the Vednta;
in Buddhism it is chiefly reason and practical in sight which
illumine the path.
However, inspite o f the fact that the two advaitisms ori

ginate from two different and independent traditions,
Buddhism played a significant role in the emergence and
development o f Vednta advaitism. There is a tremendous
influence o f Buddhistic advaitism upon entire Indian thou
ght. But generally this was confined mainly to the sphere
1. Kaviraj, G ., Introduction to Brahma Sutra, p. 75.

2. Devaraja, N . K Introduction to tamkara's Theory o f Knowledge,
p. 21.
o f technique or method. It seems that the Vedntin has

made use o f the dialectics and the analysis o f illusion o f
Buddhism in his own way. He makes the distinction between
VyavahHra and Paramrtha in order to establish the sole
reality o f Brahman. It cannot be said with justification
that these absolutistic notions, and the technique itself,
were present in the Upanisads. But this influence was not
one sided; it was mutual. Just as Buddhism impressed the
Vednta, similarly Buddhism was also influenced by the
Vednta tradition. For this kind o f mutual influence was
just natural as they grew together, though in opposition,
but not in isolation.1
6. The Advaita Vedanta

Like all other, absolutistic systems the Vednta absolu
tism grows on the foundation o f the Smkhya metaphysics.
That the Vedanta has close affinity with the Smkhya can
be observed from the fact that the author o f the Brahma
Sutras finds it necessary to refute the Smkhya centention
that it represented the true teachings o f the Upanisads.
Against the Sihkhya, the early Vedntins emphasised the
integral unity or oneness o f reality. But in this attempt
they gave up the lofty ideal o f purity o f consciousness the
ideal which was so carefully kept in view by the Samkhya.
Perhaps, they lost sight o f the ideal because their main aim
was to build a consistent and systematic monism on the
basis o f Upanisads. The Vedntin coneeives reality to be
the unity which evolves itself as multiplicity. Accepting
fully the Smkhya doctrine o f causation Sat-kUrya-vda> b5*
ascribes ultimate causality to Brahman. The Smkhya
itself contains suggestions to this effect when it makes
Purusa the real source o f the activity o f Prakrti. However,
the early Vedntin ignores the problem regarding the chow*
and why* o f creation. The Samkhya made serious
attempt to solve this problem but failed.
The monistic standpoint o f the early Vedntins did not
appear fully satisfactory to Vedntins like Gaulapda and
1. CPB, op. cit!
40 k a sh m ir Ea i v i s m
arhkara. They realized that the view according to which

creation, change, relations etc. were real is logically unten
able. Consistency demands that all such categories should
be rigidly excluded from any monistic scheme o f things.
Ultimately monism has to give way to advaitism. This
means that there can be no real modification o f Brahman.
The later Vedntins, following the lead o f amkara, devoted
themselves to the establishment o f advaitism.
Gautfapada is recognized to be the first important ex
pounder o f Vedanta Advaitism. He tries to establish that
there can be no real creation out o f Brahman. The doctrine
o f non-origination is the sole truth according to him.1 The
practical world, which people regard as real, is infact no
more real than a dream world. The two worlds differ only
from the point o f view o f externality. While the practical
world is external to the knowing subject, the dream world is
internal to him2 It is obvious that that which is non-existent
in the beginning as well as in the end cannot have existence
in the middle also,3 The immortal can never become mortal,
the mortal can never be immortal. For, the ultimate nature
o f a thing cannot change.4 According to Gautjapda those
passages in the Scripture which seem to account for the
world in terms o f creation should be interpreted as devices
to teach the identity o f Brahman and the world.5
On the analogy o f the experience o f dream and illusion,
Gau<Japda attempts to show how a thing could appear as
different from what it is and also how appearance could be
mistaken to be real. He is anxious to establish the absolute
ness of the Self, as opposed to the An&tmavada absolutism
o f the Buddhists, and asserts that the appearance o f multipli
city depends upon the non-dual Atman in the same way in
which the appearance o f snake depends upon the rope.
1. M ndkya Kfirika 11. 27. 8.
2. Ibid II. 4.
3. Ibid 4. 13,
4. Ibid III. 19-21 ; IV 6-7.
5. Ibid III. 15.
6. Ibid II. 32-3.
VATTISM IN Tll VEDA n T a *41
There is complete identity between Brahman and Jiva ; the

difference between them is merely apparent and is due
to aoidy.1 The unborn is born in manifold ways through
my.2 The Real can be born only through myl and not
in reality ; the unreal, however, can be born neither really
nor phenomenally.8
arhkara, a great grand pupil o f Gaucjapida, occupies a

somewhat similar position in the Vednta tradition to the
one occupied by Nagftrjuna in the Buddhist tradition.
The revolution which he brought about in the Vednta
destroyed the weak pillars o f the tradition and built it on
stable and solid rock o f advaitism. He further developed
Vedntism on the lines o f advaitism, the lead for which was
already given by Gaulapda. He may truly be said to owe
to Gaucjapada the doctrine o f illusory manifestation4
amkaras real greatness lies in his successful attempt at the
systematization o f the scattered thoughts o f the Vednta
tradition. He alone appears to be able to give significance
to the conflicting texts o f the Scripture. In contrast with the
other Vednta teachers, amkara has the rare capacity for
explaining the Scriptures in their entirety. He finds no
difficulty in explaining consistently the apparently theistic
and dualistic teachings o f his predecessors.
The grounds on which the early Vedntins rejected the

Smkhya postulation o f two eternal realities could equally
be pressed against the Vednta monism. Accordingly,
amkara points out that, for similar reasons, Brahman too
cannot be conceived as possessing mutually opposed charac
teristics. It is not justified to hold that Brahman transforms
itself in the world and yet transcends all change. Nothing
can simultaneously be subject to change and remain beyond
change. The doctrine o f real transformation (Parinma vUda)
cannot stand the scrutiny o f reasoning. At the hands o f am-
1. Ibid II. 37.

2. Ibid II. 24.
3. Ibid II. 27-8.
4. Devaraja, O p. cit., p. 230.
42 KASHMIR SAVISM
kara and his followers, Parinmavda gives way lo the doctrine

o f illusory manifestation (Vivartauda), simple monism to
rigorous non*dualism, and the concept o f Prakrti or akti-
to the concept o f My&.
O f all the Vedntins, arhkara has been often criticised

as being a hidden Buddhist (Pracckanna Bauddha), Some o f
his near contemporaries, such as Bhskara and others, have
accused him o f abandoning the tradition. According to them
amkara has given a false interpretation of the Brahma
Sutras in terms o f m&yvda, which has its roots in the
Mahyna Buddhism.1 It seems that aihkara himself was
aware o f the similarity between his system and Buddhism.
That is why he asserts that whatever resemblance is there
between the two systems is merely accidental or superficial.2
That the resemblance is not substantial is also evident from
the fact that in many o f his works amkara has openly
criticised the Buddhists. Moreover, the Buddhists themselves
do not find such resemblance. On the other hand, they take
pains to distinguish their standpoint from that o f the
Vedntins.8
arhkara appeared like a luminous sun on the horizon of

Vednta. During his presence little attention was paid to
the other scholars in the tradition. The post Samkara
Vednta does not represent, strictly speaking, any significant
or original contribution towards Advaitism. In this period
there arose differences among the Advaitins about the nature
a n d status o f illusion. The post Samkara Vedntins devote
greater attention to the epistemological, rather than meta-
physical, analysis o f illusion Some o f them introduce
vivarta or illusory relationship to explain the relationship
between Brahman and World. According to Mandana the
relation between Brahman and Nothing* is no relation at all.
It is an entity which is absolutely indescribable, anirvacanlya.
1. rte n m svw
Bhnskara s commentary on the Brahma Sutra I. I V . 25.
2. Sarfikara s Commentary on Mndkya Karik, IV , 99.
3. Upadhyaya Baldeva, Samkarucarya.
D V A lfis M IN THE VEDNTA 43
arhkara did not committ himself to a rigid position on

any issue. He did not offer a definite view regarding the
quection whether there are many souls or only one. Similarly
he avoids the question o f the locus and object o f avidyS.
In his analysis o f the nature o f creation Samkara even seems
to adopt the doctrine o f Parinma and at places uses the
analogy o f milk and curd.1
It if such vagueness in amkara which gave rise to differ
ences o f opinion among his followers. Some o f them,
belonging to the Vivarana school, hold that avidy resides in
Brahman. But those who belong to the Bhmati school
ascribe to the view that avidy resides in the Jlva.
1. Potter, K ., Op. cit., pp. 165-6.

CH APTER TH REE
EMERGENCE OF SAIVA ABSOLUTISM
1* Atmavada and Anatmavada Controversy and the

emergence of Saiva Absolutism
The transformation o f Vedntism into a systematic Ad-
vaitism made a tremendous impact upon entire Indian
thought. The wind o f Advaitism gathered sudden speed
and began spreading over all traditions. It took many
orthodox systems by surprise and violently shook their very
foundations. Vednta advilism appeared to be a danger
ously destructive force to various devotional cults, as it
emerged within the orthodox V edic tradition itself. In
this advaitism devotion was sacrificed at the alter o f know
ledge. The original defensive positions o f the theists and
others crumbled down before the powerful attacks o f the
Advaitins logic. It is during this hour o f crisis that the
Theists awoke from their dogmatic slumber.
' When the Buddhist and the Vedntins were engaged in
the well known imavda and antmaiida controversy, theism
silently underwent the process o f self-purification. W hile the
absolutists were concentrating their energies in the con
troversy, theistic systems were indulging in genuine self-
criticism. Consequently when the echoes o f the intellectual
battle between the tmavdins and the antmavdins were
110 longer audible, theistic schools began reasserting them
selves. Henceforth theism continues to assume the posture
o f self-assurance and confidence. During the period
immediately following Sarhkara two fully developed theistic
systems emerged which achieved important place in Indian
thought. Within the Vednta tradition itself, Rmnuja
expounded the qualified monism *visistdvaita) in which
devotion occupies an exalted place. The other significant
EMERGENCE OF SAIVA ABSOLUTISM 45
development was the appearance o f theistic absolutism

within the Agam ic tradition. This Ivaradvayauda evolved
in Northern aivism (i.e. Kashmir) and is based upon the
monistic teachings o f the aiva Agamas.
T h e Stman-anStman controversy* greatly influenced

the logical formulation o f aiva Absolutism. It is well
known that prior to the origin and developmeut o f
livaradvayavada the place o f its birth (viz. the valley o f
Kashmir) has been an important centre o f the controversy.
A ccordingly, the aiva Absolutists found it useful to adopt
an integral approach towards the controversy between
the Buddhists and the Vedntins. The two extremes, of.
ntman and antman, are perfectly harmonised in the integral
vision o f the aivite. When the two mutually opposing
lines o f thought, atmavlada and anZtmavtida, attained complete
maturity, aiva Absolutism or Integral aivism was born.
The Recognition o f Perfection or Prnctva could become
possible only when the concept o f Snya and Maya were
formed. The aivite could then realize that the nya
itself appears as My. The absolutely indeterminate or
pure iva (unya) has an inscrutable and mysterious power
called my or akti.
It seems that the recognition o f Parnatoa can take place

only when thought attains a certain level o f perfection. It
presupposes some amount o f metaphysical reflection.
Historically it grows after the fullest development o f the
controversy between the two absolutisms. Accordingly, a
two-fold absolutistic awareness is an essential pre-requisite for
the rise and growth o f theistic absolutism, the I^varadvaya-
vSda. First o f all, there should be the recognition that
the Real in itself is absolutely indeterminate. The
Mdhyamikas were the first to indicate and to emphasise
this indeterminate nature o f reality. The Absolute trans
cends the categories o f thought ; it cannot be described in
terms o f human thought, Thus the concept o f &nyat
provided a metaphysical basis for the growth o f aiva
Absolutism. Another implication o f unyat was that
46 KASHMIR AIVISM
SamsSra and Nirvana are the same ; there is no difference

between the two.1 The difference arises between them due
to the psychological attitude o f the person. Obviously
this resembles the aiva conception o f Puroatva.2 Secondly,
it has also to be realized that the indeterminate Absolute
(ifinya) is the infinite consciousness (Vijftna, Brahman)
itself. It is the substratum or self o f everything. The
Yogcra and the Vedntin drew attention to this. The
Advaita Vedntins attempted, with great dialectical skill,
to show that pure consciousness is the essentialnature o f
ultimate Reality, which is Brahman or Bhm,the inner
most essence o f everything.
This two-fold realization was finally followed by the

recognition that freedom (svtantrya) is the essential nature
of the absolute indeterminate consciousness. I f the absolute
consciousness be regarded as being devoid o f freedom, there
would be no significant difference between it and insentient
matter (Jatfa). Being devoid o f freedom, the Absolute
would become inert ; and the inert is nothing in itself.
Thus, the absoluteness o f Brahman can be established only
when svHtanlrya is attributed to it. The true, recognition
o f the Absolute consists in the realization that the pure
indeterminate consciousness is infinite freedom itself. The
Absolute is the Prna> the supremely perfect and infinitely
free Being.
The two lines o f thought, the tmav3da and AnStma-
vSda, start with mutually opposite premises. But, curiously
1. h sa R iffsfa rcfa fafrrpT I

fasfauw ^ *rr fhfe :, nr ^ i
h euftacR I
MSdhyamika Krik, X X X , 1920.
2. In the thought iranscending experience o f the wisdom o f the
Farther Bank (Prajn Pramit) the ultimate polarity-that o f
Nirvana and Saiftsra, freedom and bondage is totally annihilated.
NirvSnic serenity and the wild play o f the world o f forms are one
and the same. Clearly, this is a Buddhistic parallel to the aivite
Realization. Zimm er. H., Myths and Symbols, p. 201.
enough, both ultimately arrive at a similar conclusion. The

AnStmavdin begins with the basic assumption that only
the discrete and momentary alone are real, the identical
and permanent are unreal. But in the end he has to take
recourse to the doctrine o f acidy in order to account for the
experience o f continuity and permanence. The tmavdin,
on the other hand, begins with the assertion o f the reality
o f Permanent Witness Consciousness and the denial o f
multiplicity and change. But he has to face insurmountable
difficulties when he tries to explain the phenomenal appear
ances. Ultimately he too is compelled to resort to the princi
ple o f ignorance. Both the lines o f thought, when pressed
for logical consistency, really end in absolute void* (unya),
which is expressed only through complete silence. They
could explain neither the practical life (vyauahra), nor the
ultimate ( Paramrtha), without taking recourse to the theory
o f avidy. Infact, both o f them are confined only to the
realm o f duality, o f self and not-self. The final conclusions
o f both are as untenable as is the dualistic hypothesis. Being
sectarian and one-sided, they are unable to attain the true
vision o f the Absolute. The aiva Absolutist, therefore,
is careful to avoid the pitfalls o f dualism and attempts at
harmonising the duality into integral unity (Smarasya).
This leads to the formulation o f an integral Advaitism in the
aiva tradition.
Buddhist and Vedanta dialectics provide the basis for thej
development o f the integral logic o f the aivite. Skillfully
employing the arguments o f the one against the other, the
aivite tries to bring home to both the Buddhists and the
Vedantins the untenablity o f their standpoints. Against
the former, he emphasises the need for accepting the perma
nent and the continuous. Employing the logic o f identity ,
he tries to convince the Buddhist that without recognising
unity or identity even the discrete and unique instants
or absolute points could not be satisfactorily accounted for.
Against the tmavdins, he points out that there would be
no possibility o f knowledge or experience if we do not
accept the discrete and the varying. If multiplicity and
48 KASHMIR gAIVISM
change were unreal, even the existence o f the eternal Self

cannot be established. The Antmavdin is right in so far
as he recognises the reality o f the phenomena o f change or
becoming. But he is wrong when he denies the identical
or permanent. Likewise, the Atmavadin is also right in
so far as he advocates the importance o f Being. However,
he is not justified in his attempts at establishing the illusori
ness o f all becoming.
The aiva Absolutist holds that both Being and Becom

ing, eternal and discrete, are given in experience. They
cannot be regarded as unreal, for they are the manifestations
o f the Real by itself or in separation from the other, neither
being nor becoming can be absolute. Reality is the integral
unity o f being and becoming, the supreme equilibrium or
perfect identity ( Purrja smarasia) o f Purusa and Prakfti.
Brahman and M y S are not separate realities ; they are the
two inseparable aspects o f one integral reality. Reality is
Praksa Vimarsa, or eternal self-becoming. It is Param
iva or the Absolute Subject. In its essential nature, it is
the Supreme F, prna aham, It is the perfect identity o f
eternal and momentary, for in it the eternal is momentary
and the momentary is the eternal.
The elements which gave rise to the growth o f integral

aiva Absolutism were present in the ancient aiva theo
logy.1 T he aiva Absolutism is not entirely foreign to the
aiva tradition. It is based upon the monistic teaching of
the gamas. The philosophical genius o f the aivites o f
Kashmir consists in the fact that they transformed the
earlier monistic tendencies within their tradition into a
systematic and well-developed Absolutism. They provided
logical and epistemological basis for the growth o f absolu-
tistic aivism.
2. Kashmir Saivism and other Systems

We have seen above that the recognition o f the Prna
Advaiia could have been possible only after the full develop-
1. Zimmer, O p. cit. part III, Chapt. V
EMERGENCE OF AIVA ABSOLUTISM 49
ment o f the controversy between the Buddhists and the

Vedntins. The courageous esoterism o f the Tantras and
Tantric Mahyna have been supposed to be the last
synthesising attempt o f Indian philosophical tradition.1
Not only that, we can even go a step further and contend
that the logical formulation or systematic presentation o f
absolutistic aivism could be possible only when the
traditional Indian thought attained maturity. It has been
claimed that through this system, which is based upon
personal experience, the subject matter o f Mimms, Nyya,
Vykarapa and aivgama becomes helpful in the realiza
tion o f the Self. For no other than the sun is capable o f
uniting the juices [rasa) o f earth and water for the develop
ment o f grains 2 There is a tradition in the system
according to which a proper understanding o f it requires
a prior knowledge o f the six Vedic schools o f thought and
o f the Vedas with its six branches as an antecedent
condition. Besides, it also requires knowledge o f all
Agamas, an acquaintance with the reasoning o f other
systems and command over grammar.
Kashmir aivism is a well developed system. It rightly

deserves a place amongst the great philosophies o f the
world. However, it is unfortunate that at present we do
not have a sufficient knowledge o f its history and its back
ground. This is primarily due to a lack o f interest in the
subject and, secondly, due to the absence o f contact with the
tradition, which is almost dead now. It is only during the
last decade that the system has been brought to light.
1. Brahmanic Philosophy pronounced its last synthesising statement

in the courageous esoterism o f the Tantra and in the Tantric
Mahyuna. Zim m er, II., Philosophies o f India, p. 601.
2. SmUU rRc
q'rafafi nqs.-q: il
Bhskar, V ol. II, p. 317. (IP V . IV . 1. 18.)
so KASHMIR SAIVISM
The development o f the aiva thought in Kashmir,

especially Kaulism, has been influenced by the teachings
o f the Upanisads. There is also a close affinity between
Kashmir Saivism and G ita.1 There are frequent quotations
from the Upanisads in many texts o f the system.
As a system the S5mkhya precedes all schools o f Indian

Philosophy. Like many other systems, the Tantric systems
also can be regarded as being a development o f the Samkhya
tradition o f distinguishing between Purusa and Prakrti. Sm-
khya dualism played a significant role in the development
o f absolutistic aivism. The concepts o f Purusa and Prakrti
greatly influenced the formation o f the concepts o f iva
and akti. That is why in some o f its aspects Kashmir
aivism inclines heavily towards the Samkhya. However,
the affinity between them could not be more pervasive and
enduring mostly because o f the Samkhya tendency towards
atheism. But the Samkhya impact upon the aiva thought
is obvious. rlh e Goddess has been described in the Tantras
as the active force in the manifestation o f the universe,
while Siva has been conceived to be a mere witness.2
The aiva Absolutist holds that the Lord, the holy Sesa,
taught the knowledge o f attaining Brahman according to
the method o f instruction advocated in the Smkhya, by
drawing a distinction between Purusa and Prakrti and
finally rising to the conception o f supreme unity in Siva.3
The Buddhist thought was predominant in Kashmir before

the emergence o f absolutistic aivism. Though Saivism
has its own ancient tradition, as we have already seen, and
seems to be the native faith o f Kashmir, yet there has been
a tremendous influence o f Buddhism upon its development,
______ . i ..
1. T h is becomes clear from the fact that Abhinavagupta and
Rajanakd Ramakantha have attempted a commentary on the Gita
from the Saiva point o f view.
2. Yadubanshi, Saiva Mata, pp. 116-7.
3. flfe iW T f tr flr w r q r 'TOT^JRTl'ci: I

Paramarlhasra, p. 7.
EMERGENCE OF AIVA ABSOLUTISM 51
Prior to the advent o f Buddhism in Kashmir, aivism was

confined to a simple form o f worship.1 It is the Buddhist
concept o f nyata which provided the metaphysical
foundation for the growth o f integral Advaitism within
the aiva tradition. The influence o f Snyavda upon
TSntricism has been widely recognised. With its pheno-
menalising aspect Kahuna, which in many respects resembles
the aiva concept o f Sakti , the nya manifests itself as
the concrete world. But the forms neither exhaust, nor
modify the absolute in any sense. Further, it is through
these forms that the individual ascends to the level o f the
absolute.2
It has been supposed that amkara had close affinity with

Tntricism. Attempts have been made to establish athkara s
close intimacy with Tantra on the basis o f the alleged
TSntric character o f some works, such as Subhagodaya,
Saundarya LaharT etc., attributed to amkara. But unless
the authenticity o f these works is proved, this point would not
lead us anywhere. For, it is also probable that some o f
these works might have been forged by the Tntrikas under
amkaras name. Similarly the claim that infact Samkara
believed in the Pratyabhijnd principle and has declared so in
many places 3 has not yet been finally established. H ow
ever, there are some indications o f amkaras affinity to
Pratyabhijnd thought, amkara himself was a great devotee o f
r-VidyS, which has many similarities with the P ratyabhijnd.
The authorship o f Prapancasdra also has been attributed to
amkara. There prevailed the popular view that amkara
wrote the commentary on the Brahma Sutras after repea
tedly reflecting upon Sta Sam hit ,4 which contains teachings
similar to aiva Absolutism. I f D akshindm rti Stotra
1. Pandey, K . C., Abhinavagupia ; Also, Kaviraj, G., Philosophy :

Eastern and Western, V ol. I, p. 292.
2. CPB, p. 109.
3. Kaviraj, G ., BhUratiya Samshrti aur Sadhana, pp. 11-16
52 KASHMIR AIVISM
could be regarded as a work o f an kara, then his relation

ship with Tntricism can easily be established.1 The fact
that many adherents o f Saivism and Saktism, like Bh&skara
Ray and others, began referring to amkara as an authority
after his death also points out the relationship.2 The cons
truction o f KamakshI temple at Kncl at the initiation o f
amkara, establishment o f the worship o f Pasupatinth in
Nepal by him, his interest in bringing the lingam from
Kailasa, might also be regarded as some o f the significant
pointers in his context. Moreover, amkaras influence on
Kashmir aivism can very well be judged from the fact that
this system could develop only after Samkara has visited
Kashmir. The visit o f Samkara proved to be o f great help
to the local aivites in their struggle against Buddhism,
which has been a serious challenge to them. It appears as
if the great Master o f Vedanta cleared the way for the rise
and advancement o f aiva Absolutism.
3. Kashmir Saivism
The absolutistic development o f the aiva tradition in
Kashmir is not opposed to the spirit o f aivism. In fact,
advaitijm seems to be the very essence o f the gamas. The
brilliant jewel o f aiva Advaitism (o f Kashmir) could be
discovered only through a thorough churning o f the Agamas,
like Svacchanda, Mlin Vijava etc., and o f the Nigamas like
the Taittrlya Saihhit.8
Abhinavagupta has given an account o f the Agamic

tradition in his Tantrloka. 4 The Agamas originally consisted
o f nine crore (ninty million) verses. They disappeared in
1. On this point Prof. S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri holds that it is

possible that more than one Pratyabhijna work has derived from
advaita sources,wwhcre, in a work like the Dak?n!nrtstotra, there
are many points common to advaita and Pratyabhijn, it will rest
without further evidence to conclude the derivation o f either o f the
tw o,. Collected Works, University o f Madras, 1961, pp. 773-24.
2. K aviraj.G ., p. cit. p. 292.
3. Kaviraj, G ., Introduction to Pratyabbj> Altfi, p. 4.
4. 35th Ahnika.
Kali)iiga (the last o f the four periods o f the world cycle, the
period in which we are living now ). However, at .the
instruction o f rkantha sage DurbSs. imparted Agamic
thought to his inind-born sons, Trambyaka, Amardaka and
/ (
Srin&tha, after dividing it into three classes, monism, dua
lism and dualistic monism, respectively. The aiva Absolu
tism o f Kashmir is based upon the sixtyfour monistic aiva
Agamas. It is difficult to determine the exact nature o f the
development o f monistic Saivism at present, as many o f
these Agamas are not available, nor is it the task o f the
present work.
Kashmir aivism has been referred to as Pratyabhijna
Dariana by Madhva in Sarva Darsana Saiiigraha. Some
modern writers also prefer to call it by this name. But the
entire aiva thought o f Kashmir cannot be identified with
the Pratyabhijfi. For, according to Dr. K . G. Pandey and
others, the aiva monism o f Kashmir includes many im
portant branches or systems, the Pratyabhijn being one o f
them. There are three clearly distinct branches o f thought
within Kashmir aivism, viz. Krama> Kaula and Pratya-
bhijn.1 In the Krama system, the worship o f akti
occupies an important place. The means adopted here
are called Sktopya. As there is a greater emphasis upon
the Svili* in the Kula system, accordingly the means
adopted in Kaulism may be described as Smbhauopdya.
However, there is no restriction whatsoever with regards
to the object o f worship afc well as the means to be adopted
for worship in PratyabhijnS. Because there is no restriction
about the means, in this system, it prescribes the path
called anupdya or Pratyabhijnopdya.a
The term 'trika* is often used for the entire aiva
thought o f Kashmir. The term refers to both the authority
on which it is based and the subject matter which forms the
1. The analysis o f these schools is mainly based upon Dr. K. C.

Pandey s account. See Pandey, K . C., op. cit., pp. 295-97.
2. The present work is based mostly upon the texts belonging to the
Pratyabhijna branch o f Kashmir Saivism.
54 KASHMIR SAIVISM
distinctive feature o f the system. The system is called

Trika also because the chief authority on which it is based
is the triad o f gamas, viz. Siddha, Nmaka and MlinJ1
Moreover, the system admits three triads, called the Par
or the higher, the Apar or lower, and the Parapart or
combination o f both the higher and lower. Par consists o f
iva, akti and their union ; Apar includes iva, akti and
Nara.2 It is also called Trika as it deals with identity,
identity-cum-difference and difference. This term seems to
have been used mostly for the PratyabhijflS branch o f
Kashmir aivism.
The Krama
Emphasis upon Krama or the different stages o f mani
festation o f consciousness constitutes the chief characteristic
o f the Krama system. Unlike the other systems o f
Kashmir aivism, the Krama pays great attention to
different psychological stages in the process o f realization
and the corresponding mystic categories. It is primarily
confined to a detailed consideration o f the various states o f
consciousness. While Kaulism might be described as the
path o f W ill and Pratyabhijn as the path o f Recognition,
' the Krama is essentially a path o f knowledge or reflection.
According to KshemarSja, rituals occupy an important
place in the Krama path. The followers o f the Kaula
path, on the other hand, are prohibited to perform rituals.
The Pratyabhijn neither prescribes nor prohibits the per
formance o f rituals. These systems further differ as regards
the conception o f Par akti. Par has been conceived as
the highest state o f realisation and is called Mahbhairaoa
Candograghora Kl\ in the Krama system. This final state
is attained only when the determinate consciousness is
purified after passing through eleven successive stages,
which arc the manifestations o f Par Samvid or absolute
consciousness. It has been conceived as Kauliki Sakti in
Kaulism. It is always in unity with akula or anuttara, the
1. Tantrloka I. 49, I. 35.

2. T . A. I. 7-21
EMERGENCE OF SAIVA ABSOLUTISM 5$
transcendent Absolute. In the PratyabhijflS, Par5 is

regarded as identical with sutantrya akti.1
The Krama is essentially the path o f knowledge, Skto-

pdya. According to it, knowledge o f the true nature o f the
Cakras leads the individual to a realization o f the Absolute.
The knowledge o f the Pancavha also brings about release ;
the ignorance o f its true nature, on the other hand, causes
bondage. Correct reasoning (sattarka), also referred to as
bhavanti or sadvidyay removes the ignorance regarding the
true nature o f self. Though various disciplines might be
useful, ultimately it is the sattarka alone which leads to
realization.2 Depending upon the differences in the capacity
and temperaments o f the individuals, we have to admit
various other means for self-realization.3
As it regards Kali to be the highest reality, the Krama is

also called Kllnaj a, Devi naja, Mahnaya or MahUrtha Dari ana.4
Krama was first taught bv iva (Bhairava)to akti (Bhairavi)
Ktamasadbhva, Krama siddhi, Brahma ymata TantrarOja
Bhattrakay Kramodaya, Pahcaiatlka, Krama stotray Mahnaya
Praksa, Mahriha Manjarly Tantriokay Dehastha Deoat
Cakra stotra and Kiamakeli are the important works dealing
with the Krama concepts.
According to this system the universe is nothing but a

manifestation o f consciousness and exists in it in an ideal
form. The Absolute might be described both as iva and
as akti. However, most o f the followers o f the Krama hold
Kli or Par Sarpvid to be the Absolute. But SomSnanda,
the founder o f the PratyabbijfiS, school, asserts that K ali
or akti cannot be the highest reality. According to him
it is the convention among Grammarians that the feminine
always depends upon the masculine.6 But ultimately all agree
1. Pandey, K . C., op . cit., pp. 506-8

2. T . A. III. 3, 102
3. Ibid III. 62.
4. Ibid III. 193-196.-
5. SD, p. 94
56 KASHMI R SAIVISM
that the Absolute in-itself is neither masculine nor femi

nine. At the most it might be described "as equally male
and female, or half male and half female (ardha nrisvara).
K l manifests the objects which are essentially one with

it. It also represents the power which evolves and devours
the entire objectivity. The Kali is also called Mtfsad-
bhdvay as the whole o f experience is its manifestation. It
is also referred to as Vyomavdmesvarly which is nothing but
cit iaktiy as it continuously vomits or evolves the universe.
It is like a lake from which four currents, viz Khecarly
Dikcary Gocar and Bhcarly flow out. In so far as it trans
cends time, the K ali is also called Knla samkarfini.
The conception o f twelve forms o f Kali occupies a signi

ficant place in the Krama. The four aspects o f consciousness,
viz. sfstiy slhitiy samhdra and ankhya, have been represented
in the form o f circles (cakras) having ten, twenty-two, eleven
and twelve forms respectively. In the fourth state, the
andkhya aspect, Kail appears in twelve successive forms in
the experience o f the Yogin, when these states are related
to the knower, the known and the means o f knowledge.
Sffti Ktll, rakta K l, sthitinfa Kdll and Tama Kd.ll
represent the four states in relation to the object o f know
ledge. Samhra kdll, mftyu kTllly rudrakdll or bhadrakll, and
mdrtandakdli stand for the states in relation to the means o f
knowledge. Paramrka Klly Klnala rtidra Ktlli, mahdkdla
Kali and mahabhairata candogra ghora Kali represent the
states in relation to the knower. As each o f the twelve
Kalis is present in the other, they are also supposed to be
one hundred and forty four in number. However, the real
nature o f these Kalis is not openly taught in the system.
They are secret mystic symbols which have been so des
cribed in order to confuse the ordinary people about their
true nature.1
When the absolute consciousness shines in these forms,
its essential nature is not affected. Like an actor assuming
1. T . A . I II. 61
various roles during the play, the Azrft Samvid expresses

itself through these forms and yet remains unaffected in its
essential nature.
The cakras seem to have been conceived on the analogy

o f the dynamic circle o f light expressed through the circular
movement o f some burning or shining object. They are
symbolic representations o f the operation o f powers o f
consciousness. These powers operate in such a quick
succession that their continuous succession is not noticeable.
The dynamic circles indicate the recurrence o f the functions
o f these powers. Continuously succeeding one another,
each o f these powers passes into the other without being
noticed. Every moment is subject to the powers o f creation
etc., which succeed one another like the flames of a lamp.
The Pancavha represents the five basic forms o f mani

festation o f Absolute. The pentad consisting o f cit> nanday
icchtXy jnana and Jcriy represents the five aspects or powers
o f Lord. ParHy Sksm, Pasyanti, Madhyamd. and Vaikharl
constitute the pentad representing the five forms o f speech.
The various pentads are nothing but forms o f reality des
cribed from different points o f view.
Kaulism
Kaulism has been practised throughout India. The
original Kaula wisdom appeared as Mahat Kaula in the
second period o f the world cycle (Irelyuga), as Siddha
Kaula in the third period ( dvilpara)9 and as Matsyodara
Kaula in the fourth, i.e. present, period (Kaliyuga).1
Lord Siva is supposed to be the real originator o f all forms
o f Kaulism. It was propounded by Khagendra in the first
period, by Krma in the second period, by Mea in the
third, by Matsyendra or Macchanda in the fourth period.2
Siddhayoginlsvara mata, Malinvijayottara, Rudrymala Tantra,
JCulrnaca Tantra, Nity sodasikrnava, Svacchanda Tantra,
1. Kaul jnana Nirnaya, lth Patal, 46-9.

2. D w ivcdi, Hazari Prasad, W tha Sampradya* p p. 57-60.
58 KASHMIR SAIVISM
Netta Tantra, Tantra R7t}ay Pardtrimsik'l Vivarana and

Tantrloka are some o f the important texts on Kaulism.
As the terms kula and akula mean akti and iva,

Kaulism might be described as the path in which attempts
are made to unite kula and akula1. iva is called akula, as
it is pure partless non-dual Being, and akti is called
kula9 the entirety o f universal existence. A ccordingly,
Kaulas are those who worship the Kula. Further, as the
root lKvla1 means to grossify or to put together members
o f the same family, Kaulism is the belief that the universe
is an unity o f knower, known and knowing. Being
essentially identical with consciousness, all the members o f
this unity are referred to as Kula or members o f the same
family. Kaulism is the belief in absolute unity.2 The
term Kula is also used for the Kundalinl. Hence Kaulism is
the path in which the awakened Kundalinl rises and finally
attains unity with Parama iva in the thousand-petal
lotus (sahastrrj.3 It also refers to the final cause, viz.
Pinda. All the objects have their being in the Pinda in an
undifferentiated form just as the various colours o f the
peacock have their being in the egg. The term is also
used sometimes for the self.4
Kaulism has close affinity with the krama and Pratya-

bhijn. Like krama, it also recommends the worship o f
the cakras. Anupftya or Pratyabhijnopya is the highest state
of Smbhavopya, the path adopted in Kaulism. A ccordingly
Kaulism, in its final siate is identical with the Pratya-
bhijfiS..5 It is the highest thought as it has been originated
from the uppermost mouth o f iva (urdhumnya). It is
the higher path* because it transcends all moral or
1. 5^*5 qfc&ftr fa**

o
I a ta W W T ,
' p. S3
2. Kauta niarga Rahasyat pp. 4-6.
3. SaubhUgya Bhashara, p. 53 ; Gorabsa Siddhanta Samgraha, p. 13.
4. Pandcy, K . C., op. cit. pp. 596, 863.
5. T . A . I. 182.
EMERGENCE OF SATVA ABSOLUTISM 5$
physical laws whereas there is a dichotomy between enjoy

ment and release (bhoga and moksa) in ordinary life,
Kaulism aims at a complete synthesis between them by
showing the path o f perfection through enjoyment. Both
bhnga and nuksa become easily available to those who
follow the cKuIa Path. 1 In other spiritual disciplines
renunciation is regarded as the most essential pre-requisite
for self-realization. Enjoyment o f worldly pleasures is
supposed to be the greatest obstacle in these disciplines.
Enjoyment no longer remains an obstacle for a Kaula but
becomes a means o f release. It is the central belief o f
Kaulism that whereas the ignorant, the Paiu> is bound by
worldly pleasures the learned hero (vira) utilises them for
the quickest attainment o f spiritual ends.
The conduct o f a Kaula (Kulcara) is supposed to be

the highest amongst the seven kinds o f conduct or cra.
The first four cray viz. Vedcra, Vaiinavtcra, baivUcra
and Daksincaray are meant for individuals who are bound
by prohibitions and injunctions. As they are bound by
moral and other laws, these individuals might be called
Pai us or animals.2 The remaining three cra are meant
only for the heroes or Vira.. The Ved&cra is the lowest
form o f cnra and consists o f prescribed act, sacrifices and
rituals enjoined in the Vedas. The Vaisnavlcra lays greater
emphasis upon vegetarianism, fasts, festivals and ceremonies.
The aivcra mostly consists o f devotion io iva and Sakti
and other aspects o f spiritual discipline. The use of intoxi-
1. airr Rffsr fsr \

Kulrnava III. 23.
differ i ^ 5 pr stai, irerftct *r * 3 era wi:
Rudraymal Tan tra

2. The STidhakas might be classified into three classes, viz, animats
or Pasus, heroes or Virar, and divine or Uivyas. T h e Pasu is at
the low est level o f self-realization. The Vira is one who has
transcended all distinctions in lil'c. The sdhaka is called Divya
who is at the highest state o f realization.
60 KASHMIR SAIVISM
cants and recital o f mantras have also been recommended

in the DnksinTicKra. The self has been conceived in terms
o f akti or Power ( Vm ) in the Vmcra. The followers
o f the Siddhntclra realize absolute non-difference and be
come firmly established in advaitism. Those who follow the
Kulcra know that all laws are mere productions o f childish
imagination.1
Infact, Kaulism is supposed to represent the essence o f
entire Indian thought. It is the uliniate goal o f all disci
plines. I ike life in the body, fragrance in the flowers, oil
in the oil seeds, Kaulism pervades the whole o f Indian
culture.2
The Absolute, according to the Kaulas, is an integral

unity o f Praka and Vtmaria> Anuttara and Anuttar, akula
and Kula. The conception o f anuttara is very significant
in Kaulism. There are sixteen explanations of the term
Anuttara from different viewpoints.3 From the mystic
point o f view, Anuttara stands for the experience in which
the initiate becomes identical with the Absolute or Bhairava.
In its epistemological significance Anuttara is the presuppo
sition o f all knowledge. It is the highest reality with regard
to which no question or answer is possible, as it transcends
1. Akula Vira Tantra, 17-20, 26-8, 78-87.
2. srrcrafa
<ror ! n n : i
Kularnuva II, 10
qiT rrq a i^ m t sfafar 11

Tantrfiloka X X X I I , 373-4
qftmrsq i t âicTât af i
Ibid I. 48
3. u fas'rar i
# t qiî^rr siTqT 11
P T I I , 31
EMERGENCE OF SATVA ABSOLUTISM 61
the .thirty-sx tattvas 1 Anuttara represents the self-lumi

nous absolute consciousness which is devoid o f all limita
tions. Tt is the highest state realized bv a Kaula. It stands
for the state o f identity o f the Universe with the Supreme
I-consciousness. In fact, Anuttara alone is the pure I*.and
is nothing but free consciousness.2
Jagadtinanda is supposed to be the highest state o f bliss in

Kaulism. Prtinay aperta, udtinay samtiia and vytina are the
five particular ways in which the Vital air functions.
Corresponding to these there are six successive levels o f
experience which finally lead to the experience o f Anuttara.
These levels o f experience o f bliss are called nijnanda,
nirtinanda, paramtinanda, brahmnanda, mahnanda and cidtinanda.
The experience o f the highest bliss, the Jagadinanda, beco
mes possible when all forms o f vital air enter into the
central nerve (iufumnti). It is the experience of the perfect
unity o f iiv a and akti, the realization o f Anuttara.3
The unity o f anuttara and anuttara and the evolution o f the
letters have been explained on the analogy o f sex-union in
the Kula system.4
Release has been described as Khecarlstimya,Khecarlsa-
matti, or Kaulikl siddhi. In the state o f release the Kaula
attains union with Bhairava. The entire objectivity appears
as pure bliss to the Sadhaka who has realized Kaulikl siddhi.
In the state o f Khecarlstimya, he looks upon the difterent
states o f mind and the causes which induce them as. identi
cal with the Self or anuttara.
The Kaula path o f will , Stimbhavopaya, is also called
icchoptiya, anaytipya, abhedopdyay skstidupya, anuttaropya,
titmopdya. As it is mostly concerned with the triad o f iva,
akti and their union ( ytimala ), Kaulism emphasises the
^ r tffar 'fl fcT

q- Hdfd 1 Ibid, 21.
2. Pandey, K . C , op. cit. pp. 635-45.
3. T . A. V . 356
4. Pandey, op . cit. pp. 652-67.
62 KASHMIR SAIVISM
practical aspect o f realization o f this unity. It is mainly

the way o f practice, having no gulf between theory and
practice. Ignorance cannot be removed through a mere
verbal knowledge o f the Scripture. The attempt to do so
would be like trying to dispel darkness by a mere talk o f
the lamp1.
The practical aspect o f Kaula realization consists in the
performance o f the Kaula ritual, generally as a test to find
out whether the Sdhaka has really attained identity with
anuttara and continues to remain in the state o f identity
even in the most difficult situations3. Though the ritual
is a sort o f test to determine whether the individual has
control over mind and senses, often it is also performed as
a means to realize identity with the Absolute or the attain
ment o f pure bliss. It is the principle rite, the diyga3.
Ones ability to perform the Kaul ritual does not depend
upon age, caste or sex, etc. It is not at all essential that
one should be born in a high caste ( varna ) or strictly adhere
to the duties o f ones age ( srama ) in order to be eligible to
perform the ritual. There are no such distinctions within
the circle o f the initiated*4. He who makes caste distinctions
out o f his caste pride when in Cakra, he goes to a fearful
hell, be he the most excellent among the knowers o f the
Vednta5. For, a Kaula is simply one who is devoted to
the K ula6.
1. sm:
q f a q f o f fa T I Kularnava I. 99.
2. srq srrfaqirf ?qq%
forfHftwj q qfa srcq%nrr q
I T . A. 29.73-4
3. Ib id. 29.42-3.
4. Svacchanda Tantra, II. 329.
Kularnava II. 50.
5. q*rffwTqrsqq> g gifr q:.......t
Mahunirvi'na Tantra, 8th Ullsa.
6. Kularnava II. 68
Worship is performed in the Kaula ritual through the

use o f five ingredients, the PancamakTira, viz. madya or liquor,
mmsa or meat, matya or fish, mudr,* and maithuna or sexual
union. The first half o f the ritual ( Purvrdha) is mostly
preparatory for the second half ( uttarHrdha ) and is con
cerned with the external worship ( bhyapj ). The second
half constitutes the central part o f the ritual and is known
as mystic worship ( rahaya pj ). Idea ( Bhivan ) plays
an important role in the ritual. While performing the ritual
the Sadhaka mentally recites the mantras as in order to realize
his identity with Bkairava. The use o f the Panca makftras,
which is prohibited in the Scriptures, is prescribed prima
rily as a means o f realizing the identity. This is brought
about by merging the finite individuality in the absolute
consciousness through the continuous repitition o f the
Mantras.2 During this process the sadhaka aims at arousing
the KundalinI, the serpent Power, or sending the vital air
to the uppermost part o f the central nerve ( susumna ). The
sacrifice is done as an oblation to the Goddess, for KundalinI,
the coiled up energy o f the Kula, is the m icroscopic aspect
o f the universal akti3. Accordingly, when the Kaula drinks
wine or uses the other ingredients, he thinks that it is not
he, an ephemeral individual, who is using them, but that
they are being offered to the Goddess KundalinI. Besides
being always conscious that he is offering the ingredients
to the Goddess, the sdhaka continues repeating his specific
Mantra.
The use o f the makras is supposed to have great signifi

cance in the ritual. With liquors, meat, fish, mudr and
maithuna, the great Sdfiu should worship the mother o f the
1. T h e mudr in H indu Tantra means parched grain or kidney

beams any cereal aphrodisiac; in Buddhist Tantra it means the
female partner or adept; in Hindu and Buddhist non-Tntric lite
rature it most frequently means a ritualistic gesture. AgehSnanda
Bhrati, The Tntric Tradition, P. 242.
2. T . A. 29.19,
3. Bhrati, Agehnanda, O p. Cit. p p . 260-1.
64 k a sh m ir Sa i v i s m
universe*1. For, he who worships the Goddess without these

loses longevity, knowledge, wealth, etc.2 W ine is the
&iva rasfl, without which one can neither attain worldly
pleasures nor liberation from the world3. The mere sight
o f wine frees an individual from all sins; its smell brings
the fruit o f performing a hundred sacrifices. Touching the
wine is equal to visiting a hundred holy places. The use o f
wine brings about the release o f four types and supreme
bliss is realized. But wine is to be always used with m e a t4.
akti or Dfiy which in the female counterpart o f the

Ssdhaka, is also required in the ritual. She should be a
woman who can personify akti, should have excellent
body and mind, and should be able to realize identity with
Bhairava5. As it is difficult to find such a woman, generally
the ability to attain such an identity alone has been empha
sised. Preferably she should be a woman who has direct
blood relationship with the Vdhaka, such as mother, sister,
daughter etc6.
Sometimes the Dt! is brought to the scene only when

the preparatory part o f the ritual is over and the main part
begins. But in other cases the Dfit participates in the
entire ritual7. The part o f the ritual connected with the
Doti, in which the fifth makr, maithuna> is used, is kept
secret. It is the exercise o f sexual contact under laboratory*
conditions8. In it, both the sdhakas, the male and the
female, perform mutual worship and identify themselves
with Siva and akti. Though they should behave as male
and female in sex union and satisfy all the senses, yet they
should remain free from all attachment and not lose self
1. Kmkhy Tantra, 5th Pntal,

2. Kaula vali nirnaya III.
3. T . A. 29. 8-9.
4. Kularnava 7 (47).
5. T . A. 29. 68-71,
6. The various types o f Dula has been discussed by Abhinavagupta
in his Tantraloka, Ahn. X X I .
7. Bhrati, Ageminando, op. cit., p. 264.
8. Ibid. p. 228.
EMERGENCE OF !$AIVA ABSOLUTISM 65
control.1 When after the satisfaction o f the senses anania

becomes manifest both attempt at resting in it. This leads
them to the realization o f Anuttara, the unity o f iva and
akti.
Some objections against Kaul Practices

But the the Kaula ritual and certain practices o f the
left-handed Tantrics ( VdmUcdrins ) have always been
looked down by the orthodox Hindus. The Vmcra is a
term o f obvert abuse for all orthodox Hindus.2 However,
much o f the criticism against Tantricism loses its force if we
realize that an act is neither good nor bad, neither moral
nor immoral, in itself. Morality is a relative concept and
differs widely amongst different persons.3 It is the funda
mental principle o f Tantricism that the rightness or wrong
ness o f an act depends upon the attitude (bhvan) o f the
agent. The followers o f the Tantras believe that every
thing is pure when accepted as identical with samvid, and
even the pure becomes impure if it is regarded as separate
from consciousness. No such distinction o f pure and
impure exists for the Sdhaka who recognises everything to
* be essentially identical with consciousness.4 Just as when
one identifies himself with Garucja, one remains unaffected
by poison, similarly one who identifies himself with
Bhairava remains uneffected by moral and other consi
derations. Just as one who looks upon a woman with
desire, be it even his wife, has already committed adultery,
so also one who embraces a woman without desire has not
committed any immoral or wrong act.5 Those who per
form the Kaul ritual only for the sake o f satisfying the
senses are mere animals or Pasus. He who introduces
Paius into the cakra out o f love, fear or passion, falls from
1. Pandey, K . C ., op. cit. p. 623.

2. Bharati, Agehananda, op. cit. pp. 240-1.
3. T . A. III. 272.
TTTtqPPqt \ T . A. III. 266.

5. Coomarswamy, The Dance o] iva, p. 146.
66 KASHMIR AIVISM
the Kuladharma and goes to hell, even though he be a vira. *

Thus, the Kaulas take great care to prevent the undeserving
from entering into the fold o f the initiated. Only those
who know the true nature o f reality are eligible to perform
the ritual.
It is not easy to follow the Kula path. It is as dangerous

as walking on the swords edge, or holding a lion by ear or
putting the serpent on ones hand2. It is meant only for
those smaller number o f Sdhakas who have transcended the
sphere o f morality and attained a very high level o f spiritua
lity3. The ritual is performed not for the satisfaction o f the
senses, but for realizing the Absolute. The Kaula tries to
rest in the divine bliss just at the time when he experiences
the height o f sensual pleasure. The underlying belief is that
one may attain the vision o f akti (jpanda) if at the rise o f
an emotion one becomes introvert4. nanda, which is the
essential nature o f the self, becomes manifest at the begi
nning and end o f sex-union. Hence, the rest on nanda
enables the Sdhaka in realizing his true self5.
Sex-union has been described as the first sacrifice ( di

yga ) in Kaulism. In it the Sdhaka does not remain at
the level o f sensuality but rises to the sphere of spiritual
O
sttaisfa rj w
Mnha Nirvana Tantra 8th ullas.
2. f'TNg'TRPR*!?
' Kulrnava II. 123
3. ir n fa ilfa fa T . A . I II. 296-70. Ibid. 39-40
4. m qgqm rn n i f q q :,
I Spanda Nirnaya. p. 39-40,

s. tewafereitg ?rq ^ q^ n j^ i
U fR 5 ^ I 3 W q ^ q i ^ q T f q g II t . A, II. 164-5.
Pandey, op. cit. p. 622,
unity. He alone is true Kaula who does not lose control

over his body and mind, but is able to identify himself with
the Absolute through the use o f wine e t c 1 The Kaula
believes that sex can be transformed into a means for spiri
tual attainments. Specially in India, where social conven
tions are too rigid, illicit love becomes the very type o f
salvation. For, such a love involves a surrender o f all that
the world values, and sometimes life itself. When Krishna
receives the milk maids, and tells them he owes them a
debt that can never be paid, it is because they have come to
him like a VairHgl who has renounced his home. 2
The charge that the Tantrics pretend to be religious

only in order to indulge in wine and woman is unfounded.
For these things can be easily obtained even in India.
Then, where is the necessity o f inviting so much abuse ?
None has to undergo the excessive hardships, the degree
o f self-control, the tedium o f initiation, o f ritualistic per
fection, and o f minute detail in order to have these things.3
The Pratyabhijna
The doctrine o f PratyabhijnS is an important contri
bution o f Kashmir aivism to Indian Philosophy. Though
Krama and Kaula were prevailing in some form or other
in different places in India, Pratyabhijfia is altogether a
new concept in Philosophy and Religion. That is why
the entire Kashmir aivism has often been called Pratya-
bhijn Dariana.
The Pratyabhijfia has also been referred to as the

Trika system or as the *fadrdhakrama-vijnna.4 Trika is
the highest o f all spiritual disciplines. Anupdya, which is
the characteristic feature o f the Trika, is the fourth and
the highest means o f release. As imbhavopya in its
highest phase becomes identical with anupayay Kaulism
1. Kularnava, V . 70-74.
2. Coomar8wami, op. cit. p. 141.
3. Bharati, op . cit.
4. T , A. I. 28-9
68 KASHMIR AIVISM
merges in the PratyabhijftS. The differences between them

are mostly confined to attitudes and practices. In contrast
with Kaulism which involves certain prohibitions, there
is perfect freedom to the sSdhaka in the Pratyabhijn.1
Whereas, according to Kitmarja, the followers o f the
Tantra regard Parama iva to be transcendent, and the
Kaulas regard it as immanent, those who follow the Trika
regard it to be both transcendent and immanent. According
to Kemaraja, while the Tantrics regard Parama iva to
be transcendent, and the Kaulas regard it to be immanent,
the followers o f the Trika regards it to be both transcen
dent and immanent.2
The absolutistic aivism is based upon Divine revelation
contained in the sixty-four monistic aiva agamas. The
revelation is supposed to have continued from ages through
an unbroken tradition o f teachers. In the present age it
has been given to humanity by Durvt through his mind
born son Tryambaka when the revealed truth was being
misinterpreted or misused. Lord iva revealed the Siva
Stras to Vasugupta. The Siva Stras provide the main
basis for the growth o f absolutistic aivism.
The literature o f the Trika system has been divided in
to three stages the Ugama stlstra, spanda iftstra, pratyabhijn
Stira.* The agama destra or the revealed truths, constitute
the intuitive stage o f the system. Mlinivijaya, svacckanda,
vijnclna bhairavai mfgendra, Rudra ymal and Siva Stra4 are
the important texts belonging to the agamic stage.
Many important ideas o f the system were developed in
the Spanda Sstra period. The SpandaHriks further elaborate
1. Ibid III. 286. 288-9

2. : I
fa w f c K & if iw : i p h . v i n .
3. Chatterjee. J. C., Kashmir Shaivism, pp. 7-40. Also Jaideva,
Singh's Introduction to Pratyahhijna hrdayamt p. 102-3
4. There are the vrtti and vTirtika o f Bhskara and Varadaraj and the
VimarsinI o f Ksemaraja on the Siva Sutras.
MERGENCE OF SAIVA ABSOLUTISM 69
the basic principles o f the Siva Sutras. The Ktlriktls, also

called Stras by Kallata, are known as samgraha grantha as
they are supposed to gather the meaning o f the Siva Sutras.
KsemarSja holds Vasugupta to be the author o f the Spanda
Kriks.1 The Vivrti o f Rma Kantha, Pradlpikn by
Utpala Vaispava, spanda sandoha and spanda nirnaya by
KsemarSja, are some important commentaries on the
Spanda Kriks.
The Pratyabhijfia astra represents the stage o f philoso
phical systmatisation. The texts belonging to this period
deal with the concept o f recognition and the problems
connected with it. This stage might be regarded as the
central philosophy o f the monistic aivism of Kashmir.2
Advaitism, which was more or less implicit in the Stra
period, was explicitly established by the authors o f the
Pratyabhijn period. While Vasugupta propogatcd the
monistic doctrine merely as revelation or as faith, it was
SomSnanda who laid the philosophical foundation o f aiva
advaitism.3 In his Siva df$(i Somnanda provides the
ontological and epistemological basis for aiva Absolutism
The aiva view o f metaphysics is well conveyed by the term
dj$ti. According to the aivite different metaphysical
theories represent different visions or djstis o f reality.
Accordingly each system has its own unique vision o f reality.
Ultimately, however, the absolutistic aiva view alone,
being integral and perfect, is real. Utpaladevas commen
tary on iva dffti and his Is vara Pratyabhijn Krks are
also significant works. The PratyabhijnS texts represent
the full maturation o f the system which derives the name
from these texts. Utpaladeva claims to have summarised
the thought o f his teacher Som3.nanda in the Pratyabhijfta
Karikas. The KarikSs and the works relating to them are
primarily aimed at establishing the absoluteness o f God
( IivaradvayauVda). While facing the opponent on two
1. A ccording to J. C. Chatterjee they were com posed most likely by

Vasugupta s pupil K'dlata. Kashmir Shaivism, p. 15
2. 'Philosophy proper p i the Trika', Ibid. p. 17.
3. Ibid. pp. 22-3:
16 KASHMIR Sa IVISM
fronts, the tmavada and anatmavda, the Pratyabhijna

writers jealously guard the theistic spirit o f aivism.
Abhinavagupta occupies as important place in the aiva

tradition as is occupied by amkara and Ngrjuna in the
VedSnta and Buddhist traditions respectively.1 He has the
reputation o f writing many important works on philosophy,
religion, art and literature. In his Vimarsinl on the Karika
he tries to bring out the fuller implication o f the Karikas.
His Is vera Pratyabhijna Viviti Vimarsinl (Bphati Vrtti) is
aimed at clearing up those points which could not be clear
in the small commentary, Laghvi Vimarsinl. In the Paramr-
thasra he briefly states the essentials o f the system 2 Some
o f his other important works are Partrimiik Vivararxa,
Mali 1 Vijaya Vrtika, Bodha Pancadasik, Bhagwadgltrtha
Samgraha, Tantrloka, and Tantrasra.
1. For a detailed discussion o f Abhinavaguptas life, works and

teachings see Abhinavagupta by D r. K . C. Pandcy, Chovskhamba
Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1963.
2 According to Prof. S. S. Sastri this work o f Abhinavagupta is
derivative and Abhinavagupta has made an honest acknowledge
ment o f its source. See his Collected Papers, p. 323.
P A R T II
CH APTER FOUR
Having somehow realised my identity with the Supreme

and wishing to render service to humanity, I am establish
ing Self-Recognition which is a means o f attaining all that
is o f value, 1
1. Transcendental Recognition
Epistemological problems play vital role in the growth
and formulation o f a philosophical system. Considerations
o f these problems in Indian philosophy are primarily
extensions o f metaphysical issues. All philosophising in
India originates from the problem o f final release. The
appropriateness o f the methods and kind o f reasoning in
philosophy depend upon the solution o f the generating
problem .2 Prof. Hiriyana holds that Psychology in India
never succeeded in getting separated from philosophy.
Accordingly each system has its own view o f jhna or
knowledge which is coloured by its metaphysics.8
According to Absolutistic Saivism the attainment o f

the highest self is possible only through an investigation
o f the ultimate source o f the knowledge o f objects, such as
blue and pleasure etc. All objective consciousness ulti
mately ends in the universal Self.4 The aim o f this system
is to help the individual in attaining self-realization. Final
release is possible only when the veil o f ignorance is
1.
SRcr'TcSRciTfalg
cR S R gftm reqqrcqrfa
o IPV I I. I.
2. Potter, K ., Presuppositions in Indian Philosophy, p. 25, 89.
3. Hiriyana, M.,^ Indian Philosophical Studies, vol. I, p. 19.
4. Bhaskarx, vol., I, pp. 34-9.
u KASHMIR SATVTSM
removed. Knowledge is significant even in practical life.

The practical life o f those who have not recognised the
essential nature o f self is impure ; it is pure in case o f those
persons who have realized the true self.1 Entire aiva
philosophy, including even cosmology, is ultimately intended
to lead to the knawledge o f the Self.2
In order to establish that their theories are universally

applicable, followers o f different systems generally resort to
illustrations from empirical experience. It is intended,
through these illustrations, to rule out the objections
regarding the incompatibility o f the theory with practical
life, o f paramrtha with vjavahra. Besides, such illustrations
also provide concrete expression to the essential concepts
o f a system. That is why only a particular type o f illus
tration gains favour in a particular system. For the central
metaphysical standpoint o f a system can be expressed or
instantiated most clearly and comprehensively through a
particular illustration alone. Absolutistic systems, like the
Madhyamika, the Yogcra and the Vednta, which are
interested in showing the ultimate illusoriness o f the world,
select and repeatedly appeal to the instances o f experience
o f illusion in practical life. An analysis o f illusion helps
them in rejecting the practical as illusory and establishing
the ultimacy o f the Absolute. On the other hand, the
aiva Absolutists prefer the illustrations from re-cognitive*
experience and find it useful in their attempts to establish
the integrality o f reality. The absoluteness o f the knowing
subject (para pramt) is established by them on the analogy
o f knowledge situation in the case o f Recognition.
Recognition is a case o f knowing in which the present
awareness is somehow brought in relation with the past
experience. It is an act o f cognition which consists in the
unification o f past and present experiences. It differs from
memory in the sense that while the object o f previous
experience is absent in the case o f memory, it is present
1. IPV I V II. 14.

2. Bhaskari, vol. 1, p. 341.
tnANSCF.NDKNfT, FCOCKlfTON 1
in the case o f recognition. Recognition is the knowledge

that the object given in the present perception is identical
with the object experienced previously. When we identify
a person by recollecting his former image, as he is the same
C aitra/ it is a case o f simple recognition.1 Another case
o f recognition is that in which a lady recognizes her lover.
In this case, let us suppose, the lady falls in love with a man
merely on hearing about his excellances, without personally
knowing or seeing him. Her beloved happens to pass
before her eyes many times and yet she is unable to identify
this present image o f him with that she has formed after
hearing about him. This is a complicated case af recogni
tion. For, while in the former case recognition mostly
depends upon memory, in this case recognition cannot be
possible unless there is an identification o f the two images.
The identification is possible only if the veil of ignorance is
removed. Recognition would take place when somehow
the lady is able to identify the image o f the beloved in her
mind with the image o f the man present before her.
Similarly in the case of recognition o f the highest Self

there are two images in the mind o f the individual. The
first is the image o f the finite self derived from self-experie
nce; it is the knowledge which every body has of himself.
The other image o f the self is formed after a serious study
and rellection upon the Scripture2. Ultimate recognition o f
the highest Self, which consists in the identification of
the two images, depends upon spiritual instruction (dks).
However, an identification o f the two images is net always
dependent upon the word o f authority or instruction.
PratyabhijnS is that faculty which enables the individual
to attain self-realization without the help o f dks,3
In the ordinary case o f recognition the experience takes
place in two stages. In the first stage there is an obscura-
n>V- T- x-
2. Bhaskar, vol, I pp. 36-40
3. Pandey, kc. op . cit. p. 305
KASHMIR SAIVISM
tion o f the true nature o f the object by the veil o f ignorance.

In the second stage there is the removal o f the veil and an
identification o f the present image o f the object with a
previous image. The interesting thing about recognition
is that before it takes place the object, though present
before the perceiver, is not really known or perceived. But
it cannot be said that the perceiver does not know the
object; he knows the object and yet does not know it fully.
Prior to recognition the object is known only partially.
In recognition it is known fully. Ignorance is partial know
ledge; it is a failure te realize the whole truth. In perfect
knowledge the object is known in its completeness. When
knowledge takes place, either by way o f impartation or
through self-efforts, the object is revealed completely. In
the final analysis, knowledge becomes possible only due to
the synthetic activity o f the knowing subject. In the absence
o f synthetic unity provided by the self, the present image
cannot be identified with the previous image. Prior to its
recognition the object, say X , was known as something
else, say as Y. True knowledge o f the object consists in the
recognition that Y is really X . It is not knowledge but
ignorance to regard it as Y. However, Y is not an illusory
appearance superimposed upon the true nature o f X ; X itself
appears as Y, which represents the nature o f X incompletely.
All recognitive acts presuppose the synthetic unity o f
consciousness. Epistemologically it means that all recogni
tion is in fact self-recognition; all knowledge is self-know
ledge. The analogy o f recognition is extended to all
cases o f cognition in the Pratyabhijft system. Accordingly,
all cognition is recognition, which is self cognition. K n ow
ledge is in reality nothing but I-consciousness, limited by
the affections cast by a variety o f manifestations brought
about by the subject himself. And the freedom in relation
to these manifestations is the freedom o f the power of
knowledge.1
to 'srfafa* i
cranrrj qcj m fav t ? fflTO froftw * 3 1 ^ 4 tfqfa sfa u
Bhskar V ol. I P. 399
TRANSCENDENTAL RECOGNITION 77
W hile remembrance is a form o f knowledge which is

produced by mental impressions alone, recognition takes
place when the object is directly perceived. Cognitive acti
vity becomes successful owing to the recollecting power
o f the subject. In the absence o f the power o f recollection
no cognition would be possible. But recollection is recall
ing o f some previous experience. It implies twofold experi
ence some kind o f cognising and also its absence in the
past. Recollecting and forgetting or cognising and non-cogni
sing might be described as the self-revealing and self-con
cealing aspects o f consciousness. Both o f these aspects are
manifestations o f the power o f freedom o f the Self.
This means that knowledge is a product o f the freedom

o f consciousness. Knowledge involves some element o f
ignorance or forgetfulness. All worldly transactions pre
suppose these two elements. No action or knowledge would
take place if everything is known everytime. In pure and
absolute knowledge no vyavah&ra or w orldly life would be
possible. Some ignorance or forgetting is involved in all
knowing or acting. This point is very well illustrated in
such phenomena as sport, dance, drama, poetry etc. They
are the spontaneous expressions o f the freedom o f soul. A
veil o f forgetfulness is thrown over the subject during these
creative moments. Creativity, or any other activity, always
involves a lapse o f the subject into ignorance.
While the Buddhists interpret knowledge in terms o f

memory, the VedSntins explain it in terms o f perception.
Former regards perception to be illusory, the latter holds
memory to be illusory. But in reality none is possible
without the other. The opposition between these two stand
points is successfully resolved in the philosophy o f Pratya-
bhijfiS. In the case o f recognition past and present cognitions
are involved in the same experience. In it memory and
perception both are fused together. It is wrong to accept only
one side o f the integral experience and make it the absolute.
The recognition in the case o f Self is nothing but noti
cing the powers o f the Self. Though every body has some
78 KASHMIR gAIVISM
knowledge o f the self, it is not fully realized, as its real

nature is obscured by the veil o f ignorance1. Recognition
is the realization o f the true nature o f Self. It is also described
as a way to arouse the consciousness o f perfection o f self2.
It is transcendental recognition as it is not a product o f
finite reasoning. In its essential nature it is revelatory. It
consists in the removal o f the veil o f ignorance and the
identification o f the individual self as the universal Self.
The knowledge o f the Lord as possessed o f Supreme power,
having been got through the well known Puras, SiddhSnta,
gama and Inference etc., and the immediate apprehension
o f one s own self being always there, recognition arises
through the unification o f the two experiences in the form :
certainly I am that very L ord .8 As knowledge and igno
rance are modes o f experience, or manifestations o f consci
ousness, transcendental recognition consists in the realiza
tion o f the absoluteness o f consciousness.
Because o f ignorance the individual has never looked

upon himself as the Lord, though in reality he is the Lord
himself. Through bringing the powers o f the self to light
the PratyabhijftS system prompts people to look upon them
selves as Ihe L ord.4 The idea that the individual is identi
cal with the Lord was not in practice, prior to the rise o f
the PratyabhijfiS. system, due to ignorance. This lastra
aims at enabling the people to live this idea in practice by
bringing to light His powers o f knowledge, will and action
by means o f treatise on PratyabhijM, which is a collection o f
inferential proofs to justify the idea in practice*.6 According
1. I. P. V . I. I.
2. Ibid
f W S ^ - f c I I BhSskarT, V ol. I PP. 37-8.
ii ip v . ii. h i. 17
5. Ibid
to the PratyabhijftS doctrine all knowledge or action,

whether in Sadsiva or in a worm, really belongs to the
absolute subject. Unless willed by the Absolute, no action
or knowledge is possible, PramUna also ultimately is nothing
but the light o f the Self, The very functioning o f PramSpas
depends upon the luminosity o f Consciousness (Samvid),
Accordingly Cit akti or Samvid alone is the real PrarnSpa.
In order to manifest multiplicity, Cit akti manifests itself-
in the form o f thirty-six categories and becomes the cause
o f the experience o f diversity. The various means o f know
ledge and the intellect etc. are but different manifesttations
o f Cit akti.1
2. Error
Analysis o f error proves to be a difficult task for absolute
idealism. It is often hard for the absolutist to answer the
question how can error find a place in the absolute ?
W hile the absolutists like Vedntins, Madhyamika and
Yogcra begin with the fact o f negation or consciousness
M o f illusion2, the aiva absolutists question the very existence
o f error. There is, according to them, nothing like error
or illusion. There is no erroneous or illusory fact ; nor is
there any erroneous knowledge o f fact. All so called
illusory or erroneous knowledge is, in fact, incomplete
knowledge.3
The problem o f erroneous knowledge has been discussed

in great detail in Indian Philosophy. Each system attempts
to explain it in its own way. No system can afford to ignore
this problem. According to the M sdhyam ika error is the
cognition o f the non-existent,* asat khyti. Owing to
ignorance there is the awareness o f the non-existent in
1. Bhshar. vol. I. pp. 312-13,

2. CPB., pp. 214-7, 322-26.
3. An error is an incom plete thought that to a higher thought is
known as having failed in the purpose. W c can becom e cons
cious o f our error only in so far as we are able to identify our
selves with the * standpoint o f this higher thought, o f which we
are ourselves a fragment. Hundred Years o f Philosophy, p. 91-2.
80 KASHMIR AIVTSM
erroneous knowledge. Both terms o f an erroneous judge-

ment, the subject as well as the predicate, e.g. the this*
(rope) and the snake* in the judgement this is snake,* are
false. The MSdhyamika regards the analogical extension
o f the empirical case o f illusion to the whole world by the
speculative systems as dogmatic. He starts with the world
illusion itself in its directness and universality and is mainly
interested in showing the world-illusion in its entirety.1
As such, he is not interested in empirical illusion at all.
)
He has no theory o f illusion, rather for him all theories
are illusions.8
The YogScra Buddhists propound the theory that error

consists in regarding that which is internal to consciousness
as external to it. It is called tmakhyti. There is no object
outside o f consciousness. The objects o f cognition are
identical with consciousness ; they have no existence in
themselves. As the object and its consciousness are indistin
guishable, the two are identical. Objectivity or independence
and externality o f the object o f knowledge is unreal. The
1 thisness o f the snake, in the illustration o f the rope-snake,
jis false ; the subjectivity o f snake alone is real. The given
ness or objectivity is false, since there is nothing given to
consciousness.
The NaiySyikas, on the other hand, hold that error has

an objective basis and is not merely negative The snake,
in the case o f rope-snake illusion, is objectively real and
exists somewhere else. Error is, thus, neither a cognition
o f nothing, nor a case o f non-cognition, but a case o f cog
nition o f something else, anyathkhynti. The Nyya theory
o f error is consistent with its conception o f abhoa or nega
tion. Abhiva is not just nothing ; it is the negation o f
something ( Pratiyogin) in something else ( anuyogin). Even
in the case o f illusory perception there is a direct contact
with the real snake. It is, however, an extraordinary
contact, jnna-lakiana-pratysatti.
1. CPU, p. 216.
2. Chatterjee, A. K ., Yogcara Idealism, p. 257.
Being an extreme realist, the N aiyiyika does not agree

with the view that a negative judgement is merely privative.
Nor does he agree with the view that a negative judgement
is merely a wrong way o f expressing a positive one. On the
otherhand, he holds that like the positive judgements thg,
negative judgements too refer to facts which are negative.
Correction o f illusion merely cancels the identity or the.
super-imposed relation between th ? snake and the this.*
It does not negate the reality o f the snake. An erroneous
judgement is more a case o f commission than o f omision. j
Jn it we introduce a relation between the subject and the
predicate ( between this* and snake* ) which is not really
there.
The PrabhSkara Mimamsakas hold that an erroneous

judgement is negative. It is a case o f non-discrimination
o f different cognitions and o f their respective contents ; it
is a case o f akhyilti. Two distinct cognitions are involved
in an illusory experience. The cognition o f this is a case
o f perception, the c*> initio a o f snake* is recollection.
Neither the perceptual experience this , nor the recollection
o f snake h cancelled at the time o f correction. It is only
the non-distinction between the two distinct cognitions
which is rejected. A judgment is erroneous because it does
not lead to the desired practical consequences. In reality
there is, however, no wrong knowledge. For the real could
never be cognised as something other than what it is.
Unlike the YogflcSra. the Prabhkaras are realists and
refuse to allow human mind the power to create something
which does not refer to actual world.
Against the Prabhkaras, Kumrila and his followers

emphasize the creativity o f mind. According to them, in
order to explain satisfactorily the phenomenon o f error, it
has to be accepted that mind possesses the power o f creati
vity. Absence o f discrimination need not give rise to error.
A person might be discriminative and yet remain within
ignorance Further, knowledge being self-revelatory every
judgement should be confined to itself. But in the case o f
erroneous judgement there is supposed to be a confusion

between two simple judgements.
RmSnuja holds that the objects o f cognition are real
and exist independently o f the knowing consciousness.
Cognition always refers to some existing object. There is
cognition o f the existent even in the case o f illusory
experience, sat khyti. The shell often appears as silver,
for the former really contains the latter within it. Similarly,
the mirage also contains water in addition to earth and
fire. It is owing to some organic defects that we sec only a
few constituents o f the object. In reality there is no error.
All distinction between truth and error is made only from
the point o f view o f utility in practical life. Even in the
case o f erroneous knowledge, there is no subsequent
cancellation o f the object o f experience. All experience is
true and all objects o f experience are real. According to
the principle o f qu3ntaplication ( Pancikarana) everything
involves every thing (sarvam sarvtmakam) .
The Advaita Vedntins hold that error can be explained
only on the view that it is a superimposition or adhysa.
According to the exponents o f different theories o f error the
Jessence o f erroneous cognition consists in appearance o f one
thing as having the characteristics o f another. However the
Exponents o f these theories differ with regards to the nature
I o f the locus o f illusion. But ultimately all o f them fail to ex
plain the nature o f illusion. Finally we have to take recourse
to the doctrine o f aninacar.iyattl, the ultimate inexplica
bility o f error. Howsoever we try, it is not possible to
determine the true nature o f the illusory. It is wholly inexplP
cable, anirvacanlya. It is, rather,"of th nature o f ignorance
(ajnftna svampa) and is unintelligibility itself. There can be no
answer to the questions regarding the how, why, and whence
o f avidyH. These questions arise only within the realm o f
ignorance. The connection o f the illusory with its ground
itself is illusory. The relation between the illusory and its
ground is a one-sided relation; the former depends upon the
latter, but the latter is independent o f the former. Nowhere
is an illusion found without a ground. But the ground
need not be necessarily related to the illusory, which is

superimposed upon it. Though the ground is wholly
transcendent it is also vitiated in so far as it appears to be
related to the illusory. The question regarding the possibi
lity o f illusion cannot be answered. Illusion is a given fact*
As there is no conscious process from knowledge to igno
rance, there is no conscious fall into illusion. However, the
reverse is possible, one can go from ignorance to knowledge.
As there can be no beginning o f illusion, the Vedantin is
not concerned with showing the possibility o f illusion. He
is mostly interested in determining the conditions o f illusion.
The analysis o f illusory experience shows that realization
o f illusion becomes possible only when it is transcended.
One cannot become conscious o f illusion as long as one
is within it. Illusion is known as illusion only when it
is sublated by a subsequent awareness. The illusory is
composed o f a complex nature. It is not a pure or
simple entity; otherwise there would be no scope for
its being transcended. It is something which is apparently
real in the beginning but unreal in the end. It seems
to participate in the nature o f reality as well as
unreality. But in itself it is neither real nor unreal;
for the real cannot be negated, nor can the unreal be
experienced as real.1 It cannot exist in the substratum;
neither is it a mere memory image, nor purely subjective;
neither is it absolutely non-existent, nor is it real som e
where else. The illusory experience is neither o f the
nature o f perception, nor o f memory, nor anything else.
It is experience sui generis. The view that error is a
subjective percept (tmakhy&ti), or that it is a perception
o f something which exists elsewhere (anyathakhyti), fails
1. tr1lfiRr 5151 \ Saifikaras com . on

T ait. U p. II 6.
A ccordin g to Bradley it is a realm o f not-bcing* which is not
fully real and yet which is not nothing. The chief difficulty
is that, on the one hand, we cannot accept anything between
non-existence and reality, while, on the other hand, error
obstinately refuses to be either- Appearance and Reality, p. 164.
84 KASHMIR SAIVISM
to explain the element j i f irr.mrdiacy in it. T o regard the

illusory as real is to deny the possibility o f error; merely
because it appears like a snake, the illusory snake cannot
become real. It is something indescribable, anirvacanlya.
The snake or the silver that appears on the presentation o f
the rope or the shell is a product o f mSyS,1 The alleged
incompatibility o f the theory o f anirvacaniyatSl with the
law o f Excluded Middle should not make us blind to the
\ facts. Experience is not based upon logic; it is logic which
/ is based upon experience.2 The VedSnta analysis o f
illusion is from the standpoint o f realism. According to it
the object o f knowledge is independent o f the knowing
^consciousness and is self-evident thing-in-itself. 3 Illusion
(consists in mistaking the given* for the apparent, the this
ifor the snake. While the superimposed snake is unreal,
,the thisness* o f it is real.
The analysis o f illusion enables the Vedntin to treat

the entire world as illusory and Brahman alone as real.
From the illustration o f empirical illusion the Vedantin
interprets, analogically, the nature o f world-illusion. For
instance, in the judgement this is snake,* the this corrres-
ponds to Brahman as pure Being, the snake corresponds
to the phenomena as superimposed on the Real. Thus, we
arrive at the notion o f Brahman through an analysis o f the
knowledge function o f the subject. The pure object is
unrelated to the act o f knowing; it is independent o f its
being known. The cognition o f this as rope or anything
else does not affect the being o f this. Hence it has to be
denied that the this* appears as snake. The very appearance
o f this as snake is itself illusory; the snake is unreal, it
never existed. This gives rise to the view that there are
degrees o f the illusory, prtibhsika and Vyvahrika. While
the VySvahSrika has empirical stability, the prtibhsika
does not have even empirical validity. However, ultimately
Pancapdika, p. 205 (Calcutta cd .)

2. Dcvaraja, N. K ., op . cir. p. 133
3. CPB. p. 215
TRANSCENDENTAL RCOGNITION 85
both o f them are equally unreal, iliey are distinguished

merely because the illusory experience or the prtibhsika
provides a pattern for explaining the empirical or vyvah-
rika. The Ultimate reality (Pramrthika) remains wholly
unaffected by these appearances.1
But, here the difficulty arises that corresponding to the

illustration o f an empirical illusion we do not possess the
experience o f cancellation o f the empirical world. There
is 110 justification for an universal application o f a parti
cular experience o f illusion. From an ordinary case o f 1
illusion we cannot jum p to th conclusion o f universal,
illusion, unless it is actually experienced by us. Accordingly,*
the Vedantin claims to have got this insight from revelation.
It is revelation which declares Brahman alone to be real
and the world as unreal.2 The cosmic-illusion is revealed
in all its entirety in the transcendental consciousness. The
whole o f practical life, including the phenomena o f know
ledge, action, relation, etc., is ultimately illusory. Adhysa,
or the superimposition o f the unreal on the real, is the basis
o f all empirical life. The consciousness o f iliusion gives
*rise to philosophical reflection. Removal o f adhysa or
cosmic illusion is the main aim o f Vednta Philosophy.
No knowledge o f Brahman is possible without getting rid
o f this illusion. The analysis o f an ordinary case o f iliusion
also provides the pattern for interpreting the world-illurion.
Thus, the Vedntin adopts the procedure; the world is false
because it is seen, like shell-silver (idam jagat miihy, dfi)at-
vat; sukti-rajatavat) . 3
The problem o f error assumes a great significance in

absolutistic aivism. Abhinavagupta anticipates the
objection that there would be no possibility o f error m all
the three world if the aiva theory o f reality and knowledge
1. Chatterjee, A. K ., c p . cit.
2. CPB. pp. 254-5, 323
3. The Two Definitions o f Btahman in the Advaita, p. 143.
is accepted.1 On the Saiva theory even the shell would
be in reality silver, as there is determinate knowledge o f
it in the form this is silver. If the objects have no
essential nature o f their own, if everything is fixed by the
will o f the Lord, how can there be any erroneous
knowledge o f them ? M oreover, as there can be no error,
there would be no possibility o f correction or sublation.
But this would be directly opposed to the Saiva view that
determinate knowledge is that which is not proved to be
false at a later stage. 2
In answer to these objections Abhinava Gupta states
that the cognition o f silver is erroneous as there is no silver
in reality even when the cognition o f silver takes place.
There is no agreement between the earlier and the later
judgements, this is silver and this is not silver,* in respect
o f their spatial limitation. Error consists in having incom
plete knowledge.3 Error is not absence o f knowledge but
an imperfect knowledge, aprnakhyti. The essential
nature o f error consists in not shining o f the object in as
perfect form as it should be.4 It is possible to talk about
error in differeut ways, such as asatkhyliti, viparxtakhyti,
anirvacanxya Khyli> etc., only when this basic position is
accepted. It is owing to ignorance that different systems
accept different theoiies o f error. But according to the
learned error is always o f the form o f imperfect knowledge.5
This view, that error is actually a part o f truth, in the
sense that its correction is not a matter o f cancellation but
! *3 q fc Tqfifqqfqr 3 f| SS ia, fa jP lfa

fa<jar vnffaaqrcr:, afa>*PTt*rfa acm siafa ireafa
sta aas^ a m i3 q < m :
f a l s a i 'fa fa q ^ q q ifa a i:' sfa i ip v , n. 3. 13.
2. 1PK. 11. in . 2
3. * 1 ^ srraw 3 5 q r n w q q r ,... I Bhskar, p. 123.
4. aal qfaar arac* a a q ifa
S cq^ ijj^ q ifasqi req rfa ta ^ r ffa a c a n 1 i p v . ib id.
5- 3 atteal vrifa: qifaq^'uq yiq. ?rqf% 1
$ f a t a * f a 5 rin q r f a v u reurfa: 1
Bhskar, vol. 1. p. 123-4.
o f supplementation, is essential to the absolutists position.1

N o consistent absolutism can regard error as ultimately
indefinable. Nor can it be accepted that error is some
thing which obstinately refuses to be included in the
absolute experience. For the Absolute being, by definition,
the A ll, no part o f experience can be outside o f
it. Hence the piece o f experience which we call erroneous
must therefore be accepted completely by the Absolute
without subtraction o f one jo t or one title. The transfor
mation o f the erroneous in the Absolute does not mean its
subtraction or sublation but its fulfilment or a transfor
mation by addition.2
There is no error in itself. Partial or limited knowledge
is regarded as error only with reference to complete know
ledge.3 In the case of erroneous knowledge, This is silver ,
there is no error as far as the various bhsas or appearances,
such as this , silver* and their relationship, are concerned.
Error arises when there is determinate knowledge this is
not the thing called silver, which is hard and is capable
o f being peiceived as such by other perceivers and o f ser
ving its purpose*. In this case the earlier cognition is sub-
lated by the later cognition this is not silver*. However,
there is no error, nor cancellation, so far as the separate
consciousness o f this etc. is concerned. The latter cogni
tion ( bndhaka ) merely destroys the continuity o f the deter
minate knowledge regarding the unification o f various
bhsas. Thus, error consists only in the unification o f
bhsas.
Here, an objection might be raised that on the Saiva
theory o f error even the cognition o f real silver, being imper
fect knowledge, would be erroneous. Thus all knowledge
would equally be erroneous in nature and there would be no
1. Cleobury, op. cit., pp. 107-117.
2. Ib id .
3. Cleobury holds that the distinction between partial and com plete
truth is at the heart o f the Theory o f truth and error. The
only cpisu m ologically significant distinction underlying the
logical distinction is that o f lesser or greater, vaguer or more
accurate, knowledge. O p. cit.
KASHMIR SAIVISM
distinction between knowledge and error.1 But that would be

the most welcome conclusion according to the aiva Abso
lutists. I f the opponent accepts this view, he may very well
understand the nature o f reality. For it is certainly true
that whatever appears in the sphere o f my is a mere
abhsa or appearance. Ultimately, from the point o f view
of Absolute, it is erroneous. But that which appears as erro
neous even in the sphere o f mSya is an error upon error, or
illusion within illusion; it is like a dream within a dream
or a boil on the cheek. In this case there is a break in the
continuity o f that determinate cognition whose continuity
should not have been broken in the empirical sphere.
Although the shell silver appears as real silver, yet there is
no real existence o f silver in the shell, as it is proved in the
later cognition this is not silver . This is so because the
bhsas o f this and silver do not appear to be so rela
ted as they did in the previous experience. The place
or the locus which gave rise to the Sbhsa o f silver in the
erroneous cognition does not do so in the subsequent expe
rience.2
It might be held that, unlike the erroneous perception
of shell silver, there is no mixing up o f abhsas in the case
of erroneous perception o f two moons , as expressed in the
judgement there are two moons. How, then may error or
contradiction be possible in this case ? According to the
P rhalkhyitivlldins themselves there can be no error in the
case o f each separate bhsa. In reply to this, the Saiva
Absolutists point out that there is no ground to believe that
the bhsa o f two moons is a simple bhsa, not mixed up
with any other abhSsa. Otherwise, if it were without any
specific characteristic, how could it appear with disinctive
characteristic o f being limited by certain time and place ?3
13h?skarT, op. cit. ^

2. Bh'skarT, vol. II, p. 125-6.
5lf^ I75l( fj^S iT R 5 3
r?R t m *r*rafr ^ % ^rre:.
I ? H I <r<
WRuaiiR faqgiqRrasr ? ibid. P. 127.
TRANSCENDENTAL RECOGNITION 8$
Hence we have to admit that in the case of cognition o f

two moons also there is bhsa o f mixing up with time
and place.1 It appears as associated with the bhsa o f
time as there is a sense o f distinction between the previous
and the later experience. Without association with time
there could be no correction o f the previous determinate
knowledge In fact, Vimarsa or thought does not operate
on a single bhsa, which is unmixed with the bhsa of
time and place. Further, in the cognition o f two moons
there is unification o f the bhsa o f place, viz. sky, as is
clear from the later cognition the sky, which was seen as
occupied by two moons, is not so. That is how, through
this opposite cognition, the former erroneous cognition is
removed.
The Saiva and fmya Absolutisms represent two extreme
standpoints regarding the erroneous. While the Vedntins
and the Yogcra assert or deny only one o f the two terms
o f an illusory judgement, the aivites affirm, and the
unyavdins negate, both the terms. In the aiva view
both this and silver are real as bhsas.
l. sus a far Tua q* i ' t o sfa

fato: raw* sfa sfq*r?: a a arr,
-ita siw h ffar-sfa i ibd.
C H APTER FIVE
NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
We bow to that iva, who always illumines by his power

o f knowledge, the lamp, the multiplicity o f objects, which
lie merged within Himself, the great cave. 1
We bow to that iva, on whom the means o f right
knowledge depend, through dependence on the power o f
self, in producing the knowledge o f the object. 2
1* Nature of Knowledge
While dealing with the problem o f knowledge, the
essential nature o f the self has also been discussed by the
aiva Absolutists mainly to prove that the phenomena o f
knowledge are nothing but the powers o f Self. But, as
powers cannot exist independently, therefore, the aivite
further tries to show that the substratum o f these powers
is really one. This substratum cannot be inert like fire,
which is the substratum o f the powers o f burning and cook
ing. In the final analysis, it is the Highest Lord who
alone is the ultimate substratum o f all these powers.3
Owing to its nature as Prakftia Vimarsa, the self is capable
o f having knowledge. In its PrakSsa aspect it is pure
substratum o f psychical images which *re merely its modes
or forms. In its Vimarsa aspect, the self is capable o f
1. i
n: S5T * 3 * : II IP V . I. V. Intr.
2. swnorfa i
q q W T O v iW tfa Sfa 3 ftisr II IPV . II. III. Intr.
* Sfa I TfTT 3 sm t
tT r o w :, s ^
Bhskar, vol. I. p. 346.

NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 91
knowing itself in different states and forms, such as unity,

unity-in-multiplicity and multiplicity.
The aiva Absolutist attempts to establish, against the
Buddhist and the Vedfcntin, the necessity o f admitting the
transcendental unity o f consciousness. The Buddhist and
the Vedantin both fail to account for this unity o f conscious
ness. The Buddhist, because o f his rejection o f the per
manent subject, finds himself unable to explain the
phenomena o f knowledge. In the absence o f a permanent
principle, or self-luminous consciousness, which serves as
the background o f varying determinate cognitions, there
would be no possibility o f knowledge. There would be no
vimarsa without praksa. Similarly, the Vedantin also
finds it difficult to explain the fact o f knowledge. His failure
is mostly because o f his refusal to admit consciousness
as self-illuminating or self-differentiating. I f it were devoid
o f vimarsa, praksa in itself cannot reflect or illumine any
thing. Not only that, without vimarsa prakasa cannot be
regarded as self-luminous; it would be like inert matter.
M oreover, because o f their dogmatic refusal to accept
either Praksa or Vimarsa, these systems also fail to explain
the phenomenon o f memory on which depends the entire
practical life. For instance, even the most primordial per
ceptual experience would not be possible unless there is an
unification o f the previous and later states of experience.1
Thus, no human transactions would be possible in the
absence o f memory. Nor can the practical life be discarded
even if the opponents wish so. Accordingly, as these
human transactions are really possible, efforts should be
made to explain their possibility. But no body, not even
the almighty creator, can do it successfully unless the self
is admitted to be o f the nature o f Praksa Vimarsa.2
1. i s m fa scqsisTra srfafa
SprfawnjtfOTra strafa fasrrw-
\ IPV, I. III. 6.
2. * ^ 'TOrara' ira: er
w'rcRt-r*' flwftra asrrasinj-tftF i ew
w i f c s j ftrai N rtfq Bhskar, vol. . P . 38- 9.
92 KASHMIR SAIVISM _
The light o f consciousness which is affected, like a

mirror, by the reflection o f spatio-temporal order, charac
terised by simultaneity or succession o f objects, is self-
luminous and manifest to all. This very light o f conscious
ness is the great Lord, whose essential nature is pure and
absolute consciousness. He is called the subject in as much
as He is pure light o f self-consciousness. He is full o f the
power o f freedom, which expresses itself in various ways,
such as unifying, differentiating and relating to the subject
the mass o f knowledge, consisting o f de/erminate knowledge
in innumerable forms. Thus, the correct description of
the light o f consciousness is that it is the I.* the resting
place o f the indeterminate and determinate cognitions.1
In other words, knowledge is nothing but self-conscious

ness being affected by the variety o f manifestations brought
about by the subject himself. And freedom in relation to
these manifestations is freedom o f power o f knowledge.
Power o f knowledge is essentially the light o f consciousness,
and action is nothing but Vimarsa which is essentially free
dom and has its being in Pratosa. Freedom is the essence o f
light o f consciousness. The powers o f knowledge and
action, therefore, at the transcendental level, are nothing
more than free will. At the intermediate level, parpar
auasth, these powers are identicel with I consciousness,
which is identical with this consciousness. At the
lowest level, or the level.of mSya i.e. aparft aoastto, they are
dominated by thisness. Hence, in every way the power
o f knowledge is essentially free will or Vimarsa; for with
out Vimarsa knowledge would not be knowledge but
insentiency.2
1. I P V I. V II.
2- a f f rwrr<*n Ifr jterforrr a s n w flm j

arr fot, sm aniai ara arr foa: four, fo r t
sr^ra:...... i rar fora r arr ?fo forr asar-
\ PhiiskafT, V o l. I. P. 423
All knowledge, including even the erroneous knowledge,

is in reality nothing but the power o f freedom o f the subject
( Pramtd. ). And ultimately all knowership belongs to
the absolute non-dual subject, pira pramatTL. He is the real
knower in all acts o f knowing, the ultimate subject o f every
judgement. It is obvious that no knowing is possible unless
the subject participates in it. But the subject also cannot
participate if it is subject to change at every moment,
1. e. if it is essentially transitory in nature. Hence it has
to be admitted that consciousness is ever self-identical.
When it makes some objects manifest, this power o f mani
festation is called the power o f knowledge1. Knowledge is
the union o f subjective and objective waves o f conscious
ness. It is also called anubhava. which implies the subject
becoming what the object is2.
2. Determinate and Indeterminate Knowledge.

That knowledge which is not characterised by genus or
which does not have any specification or attribution o f time,
place, form, etc., in common with anything else is called
indeterminate knowledge. It consists in the consciousness
o f an object, at the instance o f its fir*t illumination, with
out involving the use o f words. Tt is only when this imme
diate illumination takes place that the process o f determi
nation begins with the selection by the mind o f some points
out o f the mass reflected on Buddhi. This can be compared
to the activity o f carving an image out o f a piece o f stone,2
The determinate knowledge is not directly related with

the object and is purely internal to the subject. It is also
different from the sensation which precedes it. It wholly
depends upon the use o f words and is produced by the
pramSpas. It refers to each bhsa, which is a universal,
separasely.4 Even in the case o f determinate cognition
this there is implied universal thisness , which is
1. IPV I. I l l 7
2. Pandey, K C . op , cit., P. 412
3. Ibid P. 409 .
4. IP V . II. III. 1-2
94 KASHMIR AIVISM
present in all objects.2 In contrast with erroneous know-

ledge, there is continuity in the case o f determinate know
ledge. It is not destroyed till it serves its desired purpose*
I f it is destroyed in the middle, without serving its well
known purpose, it would not be determinate knowledge.
That is why the erroneous knowledge o f two moons cannot
be called determinate knowledge.
All determinate knowledge is found invariably to be

dependent upon the self Whether the form o f determinate
cognition be I see this o r t h i s i s ja r , it implies that the
indeterminate cognition rests on the subject as one with
it.3 At the time when it arises, the indeterminate cognition
is self-luminous and essentially one with self (aham). Simi
larly, the determinate cognition also, being self-luminous,
is dependent upon the Self. Determinate cognition which
follows the indeterminate takes place in two ways. When
the activity o f indeterminate knowledge, relating to some
perceptual experience o f the moment, appears to be the
objeet o f determinate knowledge, it takes the form I see
this . But it may al*o assume the form, viz., this is ja r ,
without involving the use o f the personal pronoun I .
Determinate consciousness is present even in the case o f
indeterminate experience. Otherwise, in the absence o f all
determination, there would be no possibility o f activity such
as running etc. I f there is no association with inner speech,
which is the essential characteristic o f the self and which is
similar to indication by figure etc., how can it be possible
for a child to attain knowledge regarding an activity which
he sees for the first time ? On hearing the words, spoken
by another person, the child becomes aware that a parti
cular word has a particular meaning. For instance, when
hearing the words bring the ja r , how is it that the child
comes to know that the words bring* and ja r each have a
fixed meaning. For, the consciousness that this particular
1- w i m w q fasrngi astamfq
5mn^q qatcrr snqw refagfo i ibid.
2. IP V . I. IV . 7
meaning presupposes determinate cognitive activity. Thus

it is clear that all indeterminate experience involves some
element o f determination.
Ultimately indeterminate consciousness ends in the
determinate awareness, such as *1 see. Even if it be
supposed to be momentary, all indeterminate consciousness
involves determination. Otherwise, a person who goes
hurriedly with sorne aim, or utters letters, or reads a book
o f hymns, loudly, should not really be able to do so. A
person cannot reach his desired place unless there is deter
minate consciousness, which involves the activity o f unifi
cation, such as the knowledge o f the place, the desire to
step, stepping, the consciousness o f the foot having been
placed on the right place, the desire to leave the place,
consciousness o f another place, the desire to step on it, and
so on. Similar is the case with rapid speaking and reading
etc. In the case o f reading or speaking there is the contact
o f tongue with various places o f articulation. Here hurry
consists in the absence o f clear determinate knowledge
which follows the indeterminate. But in reality there must
* be the subtle determinate consciousness, consisting o f subtle
idea o f indicatory sign or word. For gross or explicit
determinacy is nothing but the expansion into clear and
definite shape o f the subtle idea in the form o f words.
3. Pramana
In order to justify his view that the empirical knowledge
is not erroneous the aiva Absolutist discusses the real
nature o f the well known means o f right knowledge
(Pramna) and their effect ( Pram ti). It is essential to bring
out the distinctive nature o f means o f right knowledge as
it is a commonly accepted principle among the philosophers
that the existence o f a thing can be established only by
means o f right knowledge. Ultimately everything depends
upon the relation between the knower and known.1
The means o f right knowledge is that because o f whose
powers the object shines deterrninately as this and o f such
1. IP V , II. I I L Intr.
96 KASHMIR SAIVISM
and such nature. It is due to the power o f Pramnas that

the objects o f knowledge, such as blue, 'pleasure, etc.,
shine within the bounds o f their limitation. Thus, that
because o f which the objects are positively ascertained as
'this in respect o f their form and as o f this nature in
respect o f their association with other qualities, such as
eternality and transitoriness, is called the means o f right
knowledge in the w orld.1
Pramga is self-luminous and rises afresh at every
moment. According to the aiva Absolutism an object
does not shine, with its essential characteristics, by itself,
as separate from others. It isso because, being insentient,
the object cannot illumine itself. Moreover, if it could
illumine itself, such consciousness as it is manifest to me*
would be impossible Hence it has to be admitted that its
luminosity depends upon something else. But this some
thing else, upon which the luminosity o f the object depends,
cannot be regarded as insentient ; for that would be a
case o f blind leading the blind. Therefore, that which
illumines the object has necessarily to be o f the nature o f
consciousness (Samvid). But it cannot be o f the nature o f
pure consciousness as, in that case, it would not be the cause
o f determinate shining o f blue alone; for it is the same with
regard to yellow etc. Therefore it has to be assumed that
in its essential nature consciousness faces the blue,* is
affected by it and shines as so afTected, at the time o f deter
minate knowledge.
If the blue is not separate from consciousness, then the
yellow also, being one with consciousness, should be
illumined at the same time. Hence it has to be admitted
that the blue shines as separate from consciousness. But
its shining as a separate object ( nbhasa) is possible only if the
subjective light which illumines it be separate from the
great Light (Mah Praksa). For, if it were not separate
from the great Light, it cannot shine as separate from blue
etc. as their illuminator. However, the fact is that nothing
in the objective realm can bear separation from the great
1. Ibid, II. II I .
Light. Therefore it has to be assumed that the Light

manifests jtself as limited. Thus, in reality the shining o f
the subject, the means o f knowledge and the object is
ultimately due to creative power o f the great Light. In
the final analysis Samvid or citi alone is the PmmTlna. All
PramSuas, being dependent upon the Self, really depend
upon Siva in producing the knowledge o f the object.1
At every successive moment PrarnSpa, the extrovert
subjective HbhTlia, has to be manifested afresh as different
from that o f the preceding moment in order to be able to
receive the affection o f new objects (abbinavo daya) . For the
light which is supposed to be the means o f right knowledge
emanates from the limited subject who is always naturally
inclined towards the object. The objects are also being
affected, at every successive moment, bv the new limiting
conditions o f time, place and form and thus appear new at
every moment. Tf Pramapa be not related to the limiting
subject, the consciousness I who had consciousness o f
blue (nlla)} am now having the consciousness o f yellow
(pita) would not be possible. But such consciousness is
an undeniable fact o f experience. Thus, PramSiia is the
Tibhsa or extrovert light which shines as related to the
limited subject and appears every moment in a new form
and operates to bring about cognition.
What is the relationship between the PramSpa and the
object o f valid knowledge engendered by it (pramiti) ? If
it is said that the same Sbhsa which is essentially the light
o f consciousness is *miti* or the fruit o f Pramapa, then it
would amount to making the two synonymous. But, in
fact, they are supposed to be related with each other as
cause and effect. T o this objection, the aiva Absolutist
holds that the same abh&sa is Pramapa in as much as it is
extrovert light. But the same light becomes the effect
when, being characterised by introvertness, it is limited
by the affections o f the objective world. For example,
in the case o f knowledge That I who am brave, am
1. Ibid.
98 KASHMIR gAIVISM
victoriou s/ though bravery and victoriousness are

supposed to belong to one and the same person, yet
they are discriminated as cause and effect in the critical
judgement (because I am brave, therefore I am victoriou s/
Similarly, there is the relation o f cause and effect between
Prampa and its resulting knowledge. Though Prampa and
Pramiti are essentially the same, yet it might be held that
because there is light or manifestation o f the b lu e /
therefore there is determinate knowledge there is b lu e /
Moreover the effect o f Prampa is no other than the
activity o f the subject ; and as action has no separate
existence apart from the agent and the means, therefore
there is no difference between the Prampa and its effect.
The chief characteristic o f Prampa is its power to pro
duce the determinate knowledge, which essentially con
sists in the use o f words. But a particular word is used
only for a particular manifestation (bhsa), which is free
from association with other bhsas, such as time, place
etc. Hence the Prampa operates only on an isolated bhsa,
which is an universal in itself. Even the word this* refers
merely to the manifestation that is in front o f the subject
and is not associated with any other bhsa.
Prampa might be described as that means o f right know
ledge which is not proved to be false later on by an expe
rience o f opposite nature. It is the cause o f the production
o f determinate knowledge which continues till the accom pli
shment o f its fixed purpose. It is related to the object and
springs from the essential nature o f the subject. It is essenti
ally the light o f consciousness. Ultimately Saihvid or Citi is the
only Prampa. All Prampas being dependent upon the
self depend, in the final analysis, upon iva, the Absolute
consciousness, ift producing the knowledge o f the object. The
efficacy o f Prampas, consists merely in removing the veil
o f ignorance. But in reality both ignorance and the removal
o f it are manifestations o f absolute consciousness. Hence, the
aivite holds Citi to be the only Prampa. In order to mani
fest diversity, Light manifests itself as Kal, V id y ,etc.^
and thereby beco Ties the cause o f the experience o f diver

sity. The various means o f right knowledge and the inte
llect. etc. are nothing but different manifestations o f the
activity o f Cit kti.1
The Buddhist definition o f PramSna as that which is not
subsequently contradicted only amounts to saying that it is
a prompter towards the object, or a helper in reaching the
object, or it shows the object which can be reached and can
be acted upon. But is does not state any positive characteri
stic o f Pramiia, which rests on the light o f consciousness,
which alone is admitted to be the PramSpa. Such positive
characteristic is established, if at all it can be, only in the
case o f aiva definition o f PramSqa. Any other definition
would be a m ockery.2 The detailed discussion o f the nature
o f Pramija is ignored in the aiva system. For, according to
it, when the general definition is understood, the essential
nature also is, thereby, grasped. Hence, the special defini
tion, etc. are quite useless.
Perception
The aiva Absolutist criticises the tikhya theory o f
Perception. The Samkhya holds the view that Purusa can
not be the illuminator o f the object. He puts forth the
Buddhi Vftti theory o f knowledge, according to which know
ledge is nothing but a form assumed by Buddhi or intelli
gence. Buddhi is the meeting place o f the internal luminosity
o f consciousness and o f the reflection o f the external
object.8 But, on the analogy o f mirror and its reflection,
it is necessary that both the reflecting medium and the
object reflected should have an identical nature. On the
1. IP V r. V I. 4-5 .
2. ffirasTWcsf a** ePrTfa srrw #
^ fasq POTT aej "I

BhSskar vol. II, p. 90-91.
3. Pandey, K . C- op. cit, p. 391, 93.
too KASHMIR SHAIVISM
other hand, Buddhi and Self are fundamentally opposed

in nature. Moreover, because o f its having the power o f
reflection, either Buddhi is self-illuminating or it is illu
mined by another. On the first alternative, i.e. if Buddhi
itself is self-illuminating, there is no need o f postulating the
existence o f Purusa in addition to Buddhi. On the second
alternative, if Buddhi is not self-illuminating, it follows that
it is really the Purusa who illumines the object.
The Sautrantika is wrong in holding that the objects are

not given in perception but are only inferred. For, if the
object is never known in perception, then in no way can the
existence o f the external object be established through
inference. The external object is so called only because it
has been directly perceived. Similarly the Vijianavdin
also, who admits the chain or stream o f momentary self-
consciousness, which is different in case o f different indi
viduals, fails to explain the true nature o f perceptual
knowledge. According to him the viisani or the capacity
to give rise to various presentments is also momentary like
the stream o f consciousness. The capacity to give rise to
certain presentment is supposed to be due to the matura
tion o f a link o f the chain o f v&sans. But here the
question arises as to how can there be some appearance
without something to appear ? And if vsan itself is
regarded as a thing then it amounts to abandoning the
theory that uijrWna alone is real.
The fact is that the phenomena o f perceptual experience

cannot be explained satisfactorily on any theory which
creates a gulf between the subject and the object. For,
knowledge is nothing but a function o f the will power o f
universal consciousness (SarhvU). This (Samvid) at the time
o f each cognition manifests the subject, the object and the
means o f knowledge This manifestation can be compared
to the creation o f a Yogin. The object is not self-luminous ;
it is the subject which illumines the object. An image o f
the object is formed on the mirror o f Buddhi by the light
which is reflected back from the object. Buddhi is like a
NATL' RE OF KNOWLEDGE 101
mirror which receives the reflection o f the external object

and is nothing but a state o f limited self. Thus perceptual
knowledge takes place when the light, which proceeds from
the self towards the object, is reflected back in the intellect
in the form o f an image. This activity o f external pro
jection and internal reflection arises anew at every moment.
Perception involves many acts and all o f them are taken to
be one as they lead to one result, viz. the judgement.
The various perceptions which take place within a parti
cular perceptual experience, which prompts the perceiver
to some kind of activity, are not generally known or con
ceived separately.
The VedSnta theory o f perception, however, is object-
oriented. In perception the mind, while approaching the
object, merely expands itself and seizes the whole object
all at once. The mind does not form the percept o f an
object by constructing the piecemeal sensation into a whole.
The modification o f the mind destroys the veil o f ignorance
w hich covers the object. This, however, becomes possible
because the transparent mental modification is already
fused with consciousness. Thus, destroying the veil o f
ignorance, the mind reveals the object.
A ccording to the Saivite, inference, like perception, is
also dependent upon the light o f the Self Inference is the
knowledge o f an abhasa, which is o f the nature o f an
effect, with the help o f an other bhsa, which is o f the
nature o f a cause, or o f which the bhsa inferred forms
the essential nature. However, inference is confined to the
spatio-temporal limits within which the invariable con
comitance ( VyUpti) is established. Ultimately all relations,
whether o f cause and effect or o f identity, are dependent
upon the power o f arrangement (.Viyati Sakti) o f the
L ord .1
s t im e r srfaTfrT, ^ rr f-nfarcqjvrrafaqq:
Sr**T t Bhuskari, vol. II, p. 85.

m KASHMIR SAIVISM
Agama
gama or Scripture is the natural internal activity, or
the transcendental speech or inner voice o f the Lord. It
might be described as the spontaneous thought o f one who
rises to the transcendental level o f pure absoluteness,
expressed at the empirical level. It arises from the pure
and highest self and is the very life o f the other means o f
knowledge. For example, the mantra cthis posion cannot
kill me, I am myself Garuda frees a person from the
effect o f snake-bite only if the person who uses it rises
above the empirical level and contemplates exclusively on
its meaning, Bor, a person really becomes what he seriously
contemplates.1 Hence Sgama is the strongest determinate
thought o f the absolute self, at the transcendental level.
The collection o f such thought in language is secondarily
called so, as it is a means o f arousing such thought.2 And
any collection o f such thought in language, which is helpful
in arousing such thought in the believer, is also a valid
Pram a, e.g. the Vedas, the Siddhnta and the Buddhist
and the Jain Agamas. For the assertions made in these
different Sgamas, such as, I who have performed Jyoiis-
toma shall go to heaven, 1 am initiated, I shall not be
rebcrn, I am coropassionale, 1 shall attain the State o f
B uddha/ I endure great pain, I shall reach the State o f
arlaty are really never proved to be invalid ; because only
those who believe in them are entitled to follow them.
They are invalid only to those who do not believe in them.
They fail to arouse strongest determinate thought in those
persons who do not have unshakable faith in them.
But it follows, from the above analysis, that one and

the same scripture is valid (Prama) to some persons and
invalid to others. And if so, does it not contradict the
general principle that the Pramas know no partiality ?
T o this, the aiva Absolutists hold that his view does not
2. IP V . II, III, 2.
NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 103'
really destroy the universality o f the pramSoas. T he state

ment, The pramSijas know no partiality, does not mean
that what is known by one man is equally known to all
men. It does not mean, for example, that the perception
o f blue on the part o f one man makes the blue perceived
by all men, nor does the perception o f smoke similarly
make all persons infer fire from it, nor does the agama
in the form o f the prediction by a Siddha, viz. In the
morning you will get treasure in this way,* become a
pram aa to all persons alike. Thus it is clear that, in all
such cases, a pramoa is valid only to a particular man at
a particular time and place. Hence there is no harm in the
position that the strongest determinate thought is the gama.1
The same gama, e.g. the Veda, which asserts the non
validity o f some portions, such as those regarding jyotis-
toma etc, in the case o f the unqualified person (such as
dra), asserts the validity o f the same portions in the case
o f a qualified Brhmin. For, in the former case, these
portions do not arouse the strongest determinate thought in
the unqualified dra, because they are not the articles o f
unshakable faith to them, and hence are not o f the nature
o f true Sgamas for them. But they are o f the nature o f
true agamas in the case o f a Brahmin as they are the articles
o f unshakable faith and arouse the strongest determinate
thought in him. Thus these agamas cannot be criticised
for being partial to some and impartial to others. All
Sgamas, whether they are o f the nature o f injunction or
o f prohibition, are productive o f strong determinate
thought only within limitation, i e. only in those persons
who are qualified to follow them. Tradition, time, place
etc. are significant factors in agama. Great teachers like
Bhartfhari and others have rightly emphasised that direct
perception and agama invalidate the inference.2
The Vedntins hold that all pramas, including per
ception, inference and scripture, deal only with the *>co
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
14 KASHMIR TVISM
duct o f avidy, and not with reality. Yet, though belong

ing to the realm o f avidy, the prampas may also produce
knowledge o f reality, just as the conventional symbols
consisting o f lines, letters etc. produce the knowledge of
real sounds and words.
In the Vednta epistemology, knowledge is always o f

the given and is dependent upon the thing itself (vastu
tantram hi jfinam). The being o f the object does not
depend upon its being known ; on the other hand, it is the
being o f the object which makes knowledge possible.
Anything which does not exist in itself but which exists
only through being known is a mere appearance, like the
rope-snake. Hence, ultimately all empirical knowing is a
form o f error ; all perception is misperception. Reality
is wholly and completely opposed in nature to what is
perceived.1 The relative character o f empirical knowledge
is sufficient to establish its illusoriness. Empirical know
ledge itself points out its own falsity. It is well known
that perception is denied by perception, perception by
inference and inference by authority. Moreover, as the
real is beyond all distinctions, the empirical knowledge,
which implies a distinction o f knower, known and knowing,
is a product o f avidy.2 Knowledge is not possible with
out the amalgamation o f the subject with object, both o f
which are as opposed in nature as light and darkness.
This confusion o f the two is the most striking example o f
ad/ysa or superimposition, whereby we attribute activity,
agency, enjoyment etc. to the witness consciousness. The
transfer o f the qualities o f the object to the subject, and
similarly o f the subject to the object, is logically false.
Yet in mankind this tendency has become natural.8 The
real self cannot be an object o f knowledge ; nor can it be
subject and object both. Ultimately, the problem as to how
the object is related to the subject remains inexplicable.4
1. M alkani, G ., Vedanta Epistem ologyt p. 14.

2. Saikara s commentary on M K . IV . 67.
3. SB I. I II. 2.
4. Advaita Siddhi, pp, 453-4.
A ccording to the VedSntins the attempt to define

knowledge in terms o f quality or power is open to serious
objection. Knowledge is better known than the hypotheti
cal entity quality. Nor is it necessary to posit a conscious
seer as different lrom consciousness. For consciousness
constitutes the very being o f the seer. Nor can knowledge
be regarded as an activity ; for this would also lead to
skepticism, as no knowledge o f the object would be possible
on this view. In fact, knowledge is nothing but illumi
nation or the principle o f revelation which informs, and is
implicit in, all experience. In itself knowledge is
indefinable.1
Knowledge which arises and disappears, or that which

is subject to change, is not pure knowledge. Knowledge
which changes is the mode o f the internal organ informed
by the pure knowledge, and constitutes the changing element
in our experience. There are two sights, the eternal and
unseen, viz. the sight o f the seer (sks jftna), and the
non-eternal and the seen (vfiti jnna). It is the seer who
sees the evanase'ent sight.2
Knowledge is the test o f reality in the VedSnta. The

distinction between real and unreal depends upon knowledge.
That alone is real whose knowledge is not proved false ; on
the other hand, the unreal is the object o f knowledge which
is proved to be false.3
4. Triad of Powers
We have seen that the phenomenon o f knowledge is

nothing but the power o f self-manifestation o f consciousness.
This power o f knowledge (jnfttftva Sakti) has three aspects
the power o f knowing ( jfina Sakti), the power o f remem
brance (smrti Sakti) and the power of differentiation
(apohana Sakti). The whole o f practical life depends upon
1. Devaraja, N . K ., Samhara's thecrv o f Knowledge, pp. 94 -6.

2. B jh. U p. I. .4- 10?
3. Samkaras Com m entary on the Gita, II. 16.
106 k a s h m ir Sa i v i s m ,
this triad o f powers. It is due to this triad that the mani

festation o f the finite subjects and objects becomes possible.
These powers are manifest in various ways ; the capacity
for such manifestation is the power o f freedom.1
JftSna akti is that aspect o f the power o f knowledge

which gives rise to the separate manifestation o f only some
bhsas or entities which lie merged in the great ocean o f
consciousness.2 But mere manifestation does not constitute
knowledge. In order that the momentary bh&sa may
serve the purpose in practical life, we have to admit some
power which provides the continuity o f experience this is
the power o f remembrance. It is owing to its power o f
remembrance that Saihvid manifests the knowing subject
who retains the affections o f the momentary bhsas and
is able to revive them in future.
However, mere reflection and its retention would not

constitute knowledge, unless the subjective and the
objective manifestations, both o f which are identical with
consciousness, be also manifest as separate from each other.
I he power which manifests the subjective and objective
bhsas as apparently cut o ff from one another as well as
from consciousness is called apohana &akti. It is owing to
this power that Samvid becomes manifest, as if it were,
difieient from itself and is known as the ever renewing
cognition 1 hough, even when it becomes extrovert, the
subjectivity o f consciousness is never affected.
5. Memory
In order to show the necessity o f admitting the self-
luminous active subject, the aiva Absolutists discuss the
t. aret ^ OTnfwrotat t o w sw it fa eronr

WTcl*W TOTrt W t \ i p v , I. III. 7.
2. W qTOfTO fa im fa fawTWT TOfa fa i*
atf w u w fc r fa m qfroq \ s r o s fo : i ibid.
phenomenon o f memory at great length. He asserts that

without memory knowledge would not be possible. But
memory itself could not be possible without a permanent
experiencing subject.
The Buddhists hold that belief in a parmanent Self to
account for memory is not at all necessary. For, if the
self changes as a result o f production o f arhskra then it
ceases to be eternal ; but if it does not change, in that
case the assumption o f the amskSra is useless. According
to him the chain o f consciousness is affected in a particular
way at the time o f experience. When it disappears each
momentary consciousness produces an identical conscious
ness. Accordingly, the subsequent consciousness carries a
residual trace or airisk&ra o f the former consciousness.
Later on, when this residual trace is revived at the time
o f an experience, it places the previous subjective cons
ciousness in relation to the object o f former experience.
In this way the phenomenon o f m em ory takes place.
Refuting the Buddhist view o f memory, the aivite
points out that though remembrance arises out o f the
residual trace o f the previous experience, yet being itself
self-confined it cannot illumine the former experience.1
And unless the former experience is illumined there can be
no remembrance in which the former experience is referred
to as that. Knowledge being self-luminous, one cognition
cannot be object o f another cognition. Knowledge would
cease to be self-luminous, if one cognition was to be
illumined by another cognition. Each cognition illumines
its own object alone. It is like dumb, deaf, or both, in
relation to the objects o f other cognitions and cannot
make them manifest.2 Now memory also, being a form o f
knowledge, cannot illumine the former knowledge or
l. CTsrerairr frw tita *13* ^ sn<rei 1

1PV, I. I ll 1.
^ ^ fpqtaCT sreraOTtftg 1 ibid, 1 . in . 6.

108 KASHMIR SAIVISM
experience. Nor can it be held that because o f its having

been originated from the residual trace memory has the
former experience also as an object ; for experience, being
self-luminous, cannot become the object o f another
experience. For example, the experience o f colour cannot
become an object o f the experience o f taste. Nor can it be
said that though the former experience does not become
an object o f memory, yet it appears to be so like the
object o f an erroneous perception. For, unlike the object
o f erroneous perception, the object o f memory is true.
Memory is not a form o f error, but a form o f knowledge.
The fact that memory arises out o f residual trace merely

makes it similar to direct experience (in respect o f having
the same object). But it does not make the consciousness
o f similarity in memory possible. Thus the consciousness
o f similarity in memory cannot be a product o f direct
experience, nor o f mere memory.1 Experience, whether
direct or remembered, cannot illumine another experience.
Though residual trace can make objective reference in
memory possible, it cannot make direct experience an
object o f memory, nor can it give rise to the consciousness
that the object o f memory is the object o f former
experience.
But the similarity in memory is possible, according to the

Saivite, because it is the same Light which shines in direct
experience as well as in memory. However, the light also
cannot make the object shine, if it be self-confined. Nor
can the light, which illumines the object, be supposed to be
momentary. Hence it has to be admitted that the Light is
universal and includes all objects within itself. The subject
l. * f ?rrfa t is i* m kzn
in a , i. in . 2.
o f the former experience, being also present at the time o f

mem ory, and determinately experiencing the object o f
former experience as that, is said to remember because
he is free.1 It is because o f his freedom that he has
the consciousness that . The essential nature o f
the experience that* is that it is not the experience
o f the pure subject, the I,* which is entirely
free from the limitations o f time etc., nor is it the
experience o f something which is altogether different from
the subject, but that o f the object which was formerly
differentiated from the universal self. Because o f its
association with the finite subject, limited by time and
place o f former perception, it was not merged in the I,
but was separately placed in the condition o f sarhskra, or
wrapped up in darkness, as if it were. And when the cover
o f darkness is removed from the object, it shines as before,
as differentiated from the subject.3
M em ory differs from error and imagination. It is not

^consistent to hold memory as a form o f erroneous know
ledge. I f so, how could memory serve practical purpose
in life ? How can error be the basis o f worldly transactions,
which are concerned with the real objects ? Further, if
memory is regarded as error, why should it be supposed to
depend upon the residual trace left by former experience ?
As all transactions depend upon memory, there would be
no practical life if memory were erroneous. In fact, the
very first and the most important kind o f cognition, viz.
direct perception, would not be possible without the
conscious unification o f the former and the latter states o f
1. IP V . I, I I I . 7.
tgmftcr: :, gg a*
g yfaej rcf rqmrfa t ibid. 1 . iv. 7.
experience, which is possible on the basis o f memory alone.

Thus, rejecting, accepting, actuating promising and similar
other transactions, which are possible due to unification o f
cognition with one another, would come to nought if the
view o f the opponentthat memory is erroneous know
ledge be accepted.1 In the case o f error, the object is
referred to as 'this.* It is erroneous because the collocation
o f abhasas to which it is supposed to refer is not really
there. But in memory the object is referred to as that.*
In this case, the image o f the object o f former experience is
present as samskra in the self. When memory takes place
the psychic image o f the object is revived and hence it is
referred to as 'that.* Unlike memory, the object o f ima
gination is wholly a new creation o f the finite subject.
The aivite believes that the subject and the object

have two aspects the momentary and the permanent.
While the momentary aspect o f the two dissolve in cons
ciousness soon after cognition takes place, the permanent
aspect o f the object remains merged in the permanent
aspect o f the subject.3 The subject has complete power to
unite or disunite the various Sbhsas o f which it is a per
manent support. When the samskSra is revived the object
becomes illumined in association with the former time and
the feeling o f pleasure etc. The phenomenon o f memory
which arises when the Sbhsas o f former experience shine
in relation to the subject is like small innumerable lights
shining in the same place.3 Here there is the consciousness
o f the past in association with the present.
The notion o f self-luminosity o f experience is not given

up on the view that past experience is reflected in memory.
The self-luminosity o f experience remains unaffected like
the light o f lamp which illumines the object in conjunction
1. Ib id . I. I l l , 6.
2. Pandey, K . C., op. cit., p. 424.
Ibid. p. 425.
with other lights. Ultimately, it 9 Maheioara, the great

Lord, who in the form o f the limited subject retains within
himself all the experiences and their objects which reappear
at the time o f memory. It is He alone who remembers
and His remembrance is nothing but assuming the form o f
the limited su bject.1
It is not correct to hold that, there being no manifes

tation o f object in memory, the awareness I remember
this* is iilusory. For admittedly there is a clear conscious
ness o f the object in memory. I f it were not so, memory
would not differ from deep sleep or unconsciousness. There
would be no mental reaction if the object did not shine
in memory. But the objeet does not shine either as
altogether dissociated or associated with the time o f its
former experience For, on any o f these two alternatives
consciousness would assume the form this* and not that.
The object also cannot shine apart from memory, as some
thing external to it. Because in that case it would not
shine as being remembered ; instead it would shine as an
pbject o f perception,
The difficulty that the object and its cognition would be

as good as nothing, as both belong to two different times,
one would be destroyed before the other comes into
existence, does not hold good on this theory. For, it is the
subject who determines the various cognitions by unifying
them into one whole. The former experience shines
objectively as associated with the present time. The
subject is free in uniting or separating the various cog
nitions according to his free will.
The former experience itself does not become an object
o f memory. For the former experience does not shine
separately as this* in memory. It merely shines as I
tfa \ ip v . i. iv . 1.
experienced before. This shining o f the former experience

is possible only because o f its resting on the subject.1
The experience does not shine apart from memory as this.
The particular form o f experience, such as *1 had that
experience,* in which experience seems to shine apart from
memory, is nothing but merely an analysis o f memory
I saw.2
5. A bh asavada
The aiva theorv o f knowledge is also, at the same

time the theory o f creation or minifestation and is called
nbhsavda. bhsavda is both an epistemological and
an ontological theory. O f the tv/o kinds o f relations,
existing between knower and known, and between
cause and effect, it is the relation between knower
and known which is the most important. Everything
depends upon this relation ; it is the basis o f discussion on
the objects and means o f right knowledge etc.3
K nowledge is nothing but I-consciousness being affected

by the variety o f manifestations (abhSsa) brought about by
the subject himself.4 The subject manifests himself as the
object o f knowledge ; the object has no existence indepen
dently o f the subject.5 The objects o f determinate cog
nition, such as the blue etc., constitute the middle points
in the thought process. In reality they are identical with
self-consciousness ; for all o f them ultimately rest upon
or merge in the original thought, the I.* Accordingly,
even the awareness *1 know this blue is in reality nothing
1. Ibid. I. IV . 4,
2. w f r tor: t
e n ip v . i. iv . 6.
3. fjffa r * T orer: w ta n ra T
IP V , II. I l l . I n t r ,
4. IP V . I, V I I I .
5. Ibid. I. V. 15.
more than I shine.*1 The various objects o f knowledge

shine in identity with the subject, like a city shining in a
mirror.2 Both the positive and the negative images o f
the object, e.g. the jar and the not-jar, are included
within the subject. During the state o f indeterminate
knowledge the ja r is one with pure consciousness ; at that .
time, it is infinite and perfect like consciousness. The
subject splits this perfect being o f the object, as it cannot
be o f any use in this form , and differentiates the jar from
the not-jar at the time o f knowledge. Exclusive separation
o f the subject and the object has been denied in Saiva
Absolutism. Such exclusive separation constitutes the chief
characteristic o f the Vednta epistemology according to
which the two are opposed in nature like light and dark
ness. According to the Vednta, what constitutes empiri
cal knowledge is the unwarranted mutuality o f the two.
In Saivism, on the other hand, the two are regarded as
identical in the integral unity o f consciousness. This
integral unity manifests itself as finite subject and ob ject,
at the time o f determinate knowledge. What makes the
phenomenon o f knowledge possible is the apparent,
separation o f the two on the background o f the integral
unity. Knowledge could not be possible if the object was
really different from the subject. If the subject and the
object were really cut o ff from one another, the meeting
of the two would be asimpossible as that o f the two logs
which are carried away by two opposite currents in the
sea. M oreover, if the subject and the object are exclusive
to each other even when knowledge takes place, and if
luminosity belongs to the object itself, then the question
arises Why is the object, which is self-luminous, manifest
only to a particular subject and not to all subjects alike ?
Again, the mutual relationship o f the objects can be
explained only if they are supposed to have their being in
t. ftr * f? '* i I ib id . i, v . 17.

2. ciCT ^ sn w gva: F w ra rcretaisfa -aci*rrar-
fw w r e fa r fa ip v i. v i . 3.
114 KASHMIR SAIVISM
the subject. It has to be assumed that the objects, such as

b lu e / pleasure etc., ultimately merge in the great ocean of
consciousness, which is essentially the subject, and are
carried to it through various determinate experiences, which
can be compared to the currents o f various rivers. The
insentient objects cannot become united by themselves; it is
the sarhvid which makes them united.1
The fact is that both the subject and object are manifes
tations o f absolute consciousness. Accordingly, the pheno
menon o f knowledge can be compared to the rise o f two
waves, subjective and objective, on the surface o f the sea
water, while the rise o f the subjective wave constitutes the
shining o f the finite subject, which has the capacity
to receive reflection, the rise o f the objective wave is the
manifestation o f the object. Knowledge takes place when
the rising subjective wave becomes affected by the objective
wave.
The objective wave is in fact, a collection o f SbhSsas
from which only a few constituent bh&sas are reflected on a
particular subjective wave. Each Sbhasa, as it is known,
is itself a collection o f various SbhSsas, each o f which
requires a separate subjective wave in order to be reflected.
Similarly, the causal efficiency o f each Sbhasa also depends
upon its being determinately cognised. And the deter
minate cognition itself depends upon the interest, need and
the analytical capacity o f the knowing subject.2 For
example, in the case o f a valuable jewel, which itself is a
collocation o f a number o f SbhSsas, the causal efficiency
depends upon the knowledge o f its constituent SbhSsas.
T o put it in other words, causal efficiency o f a jewel
depends upon the knowing capacity o f the subject. The
causal efficiency o f a jew el would be different in case o f
an ordinary farmer then in the case o f an expert jeweller.
In a way, we are all confined to our own individual
worlds. These individual worlds are neither illusory
1. IP V . I. V I I . 2.
2. Pandey, K . C ., o p . cit. pp. 388-9.
appearances, nor are they mere creations o f our imagination.

They are real objective worlds being constituted o f real objects
or abhsas, existing independently o f us. Each abhasa is in
itself a separate entity and, as such, is uniform and eternal
in itself. All change or becoming is confined to the realm o f
union or separation o f these abhsas.1
The manifestation and the union o f these abhasas is
controlled by the power o f niyati or order o f universal consc
iousness.2 An event or object is nothing but an abhasa or
appearance on the mirror-like surface o f universal
consciousness. Thus Vastu or object, tattva or substance, and
prameya are synonymous terms. Accordingly earth is the
abhasa o f hardness, fire and red colour are the abhasa o f
red, rajas is the abhasa o f union, arrangement or sannivea
is niyati or order, the very essence o f which is negation
(abhava). For instance, the shape o f jar, like that o f a big
belly with a base, is nothing but the strange shining o f the
negation o f the abhasa o f earth. The abhasa o f difference
is may. The abhsa o f the self-luminous consciousness,
which is beyond maya, is the iva tattva. It is the Lord
alone who has the power to unite or separate the various
abhasas.3 The different relative positions o f different
cognitions to one another in the case o f the relationship
between cause and effect have been determined by the
subject because o f his freedom. It is not possible for the
objects o f knowledge to fix themselves.4
1. Ibid. p. 390.
2. ^ fa a m ssrrftjr i ip v . ii. iii. 13.
3. sfa qfaT: 1 ott ^ sfa
sfa w fcronmri sfaftrar frsfasT:,
fa fa ff f w r : , s m w w n j:, ^
fa te ra i *r*r, <rcp&
K tw tra n n O T fo r e r e i 1 a rw * sift ptto s
fcft ^ ^ w ra rw r" 1 ip v . 11 . iii. 13.
fa fa 3 3 3 W *31*33^ 31^ 31^ I i p v . I. V II. 6.

In order to realize the Absolute, the ultimate unity,

one should try to see non-diference among the different
abhffsas ; one should attempt at realizing that all abhasas
are essentially one with Sainvid.1 Every judgement pre
supposes the unifying activity o f the subject. Cancellation
or affirmation is possible only due to the integrality o f
consciousness. When the previous cognition o f silver (in
the case o f shell-silver) is sublated, the later cognition o f
shell does not play any part in cancelling it. One cognition
cannot annul another cognition. Sublation o f cognition
is possible only when both the sublated and the sublating
cognitions, the cognition o f silver as well as that o f shell,
rest on one self-consciousness.2 The later cognition this is
not silver rests in the subject as replacing the previous
cognition this is silver.
Objects and events are essentially o f the nature o f

5bh8.sa ; their very shining depends upon the self. No
object can shine by itself, independently o f others. Firstly,
the object, being inert, cannot have self-luminosity. And
if luminosity essentially belongs to the object, then why is
the object manifest to some persons and not to others
also ? If the luminosity o f the object is self-confined, it
would not even be known. For knowledge depends upon
the object being given in association with others. There
being no such association in the case o f the object which
is self-confined, the object would not be determinately
cognised. Therefore it has to be assumed that the object
shines as dependent upon others. But the other, upon
which the determinate shining o f the object depends also
cannot be insentient, otherwise it would be like blind
leading the blind. Thus, the other, on which the
________
fta:, 5 s ^ t O s F t sto
Ib id . II. III. 13.
2. I3T 5 jfrfilpf ^ ?15T
object o f knowledge depends, is essentially o f the nature o f

consciousness, but not o f pure consciousness ; for the pure
cannot give rise to the determinate shining o f anything.
Consciousness in its essential nature faces the object, is
tinged by it and shines as so affected, when it makes the
object shine determinately. The capacity o f consciousness
to shine as affected is itself the capacity to manifest the
object determinately. Accordingly, the bhsa, or the mani
festation or illumination of an object, is nothing but self-
determination o f consciousness.
Here, it might be objected that on the doctrine o f
bhsavda all other objects should equally be illumined
when the illumination o f a particular object takes place,
for all objects are essentially one with luminosity. Thus,
everything should always be illumined. Nor would the
finite subject, who is ever identical with consciousness,
shine as distinct or separate from the object o f knowledge.
In reply to this, the aivites hold that it is precisely for
this reason that everything, including the finite knower
and the object o f knowledge, has to be regarded as a mere
manifestation o f the Light. As nothing can bear sepa
ration from light, it has to be assumed that the Light itself
shines as limited. When the light is manifest as limited
subject it is known as nya Pramt, which is o f the nature
o f not-being, as it were. The extrovert subjective bhsa
is manifest fresh at every moment in order to receive
the affections o f newly manifest objects.
As we have already seen, an bhsa is not a simple
entity it is a collocation o f various bhsas The cons
tituent bhsas are different in each case. Even in the
case o f the object, which has been constructed as one
particular object by determinative activity, the bhsas
differ according to the taste, purpose or established
tradition that a cogniser follow s.1 Though the bhsa differs
i. sfaai a ^
s f a s t e cfaqr, T R IS T O ,
sjcqfa xt pfaFq fasici r* surrs:

1FV II.*111. 3 ,
according to the individual taste, yet it is one bhsa as it

rests on the bhsa o f time and place. The bhsa o f time
and place impart particularity and exercise the function of,
as it were, destroying eternality and omnipresence which
give rise to the idea o f universality.
For example, in the case o f the well known bhsa
m a n / who is known to be conscious, sometimes only
length* is perceived. However, length is common to the
trees also. At another time only its circularity is per
ceived, which is common to many other things, such as
rocks etc. also. Sometimes only the quality o f being a
man, i.e. having freedom is perceived, which is common to
all men. This selectivity in perception, perceiving only a
particular bhsa at a particular tirne, is possible because
the perceiver is free. It is due to his free will, which is
independent o f purpose or interest (ruci), that he selects
only a particular bhsa out o f the configuration o f
bhsas.1 All other bhsas are also to be explained in a
similar way. From the illustration o f the bhsa man*
many other well known bhsas can be differentiated from
one another in the bhsa o f smoke* also, e.g. the smoke
o f sandal, o f gas, etc.
Likewise, we can ascertain a variety o f bhsas in the
case o f an bhsa which is not ordinarily known to have
them. Let us take the bhsa o f jar. When a broken
hearted man, who is having a feeling or consciousness o f
nothingness,* sees a jar, he merely perceives the bhsa
existence,* or being as it is ; for at that moment he has no
awareness o f any other bhsa even in name. Similarly,
when a person who desires to fetch water perceives the
bhsa jar, his perception is o f a different nature. As he
is interested simply in something which can be taken to
some place and then brought back, he perceives the bhsa
thing* only. But if a person is desirous o f price, he per
ceives the bhsa gold only ; the person who is desirous
o f pleasure perceives the bhsa brightness* one who
IPV II. III. 4-5.

Da t u re f kn ow ledg e 119
wants to have extremely hard substance perceives the

bhsa hardness/ The fact is that besides inclination
and taste, perception o f an object also depends upon the
intellectual capacity o f the perceiver.1
A ccording to the aiva Absolutism, the being o f the

object does not consist in its participation in universal
Being (satt) ; because this view is too narrow and involves
the fallacies o f infinite regress and uselessness. Nor is the
being o f an object constituted by causal efficiency as the
two are totally different. Nor are the objects always found
to discharge causal efficiency. M oreover, the discharge o f
causal function by an object is not always perceptible.
Therefore, in the case o f impcrceptibility o f causal function
the object would have to remain imperceptible, even though
it might have existence. Similar would be the difficulty, if
it is held that it is not the discharge o f causal efficiency
but the capacity to discharge causal efficiency which
constitutes the being o f the object. The main objection
against these Buddhist views is that causal efficiency etc.
do not shine, and therefore, they are as good as horns o f a
man. A ccordingly, the aivite holds that the being o f the
object is nothing but its shining (Prak&Samnat).2
Thus, in every way, the object o f knowledge is nothing

but bhsa, and cognition (vimarsa) also is separate for
each bhsa. Likewise, the capacity for serving a fixed
purpose also rests separately on each bhsa ; this is
known through positive and negative concomitance. For
instance, by the bhsa o f mere existence only the
breaking o f heart is avoided. Each bhsa has, thus, its
own separate functional capacity. From whatever point o f
view we reflect upon the object, we find that it is essentially
nothing more than an bhsa ; it shines objectively only as
1. Ibid.
HreU HHJT- I i p v II. II. 7.

120 KASHMIR SAIVISM
an abhsa ; as abhasa alone it is determinately cognised

and serves the required purpose.1
6. Some objections against Abhasavada

The question arises, if every abhasa is a thing by
itself, then how can ja r which is a collocation o f various
abhsas be regarded as a thing. T o this the Abhsavdins
hold that the causal efficiency o f those bhsas which
shine objectively as resting upon a common abhasa, such
as the jar, is collective. On the other hand, the causal
efficiency o f those abhasas which shine separately is indi
vidually fixed.2 Some abhsa has to be admitted to be the
chief abhasa in a configuration o f various abhsas. For
all practical purposes, this chief bhsa might be regarded
as the substratum or common abode o f all configurating
bhsas. Accordingly it has to be accepted that the
different bhsas rest upon one chief bhsa. Being
together these bhsas constitute one particular config
uration and discharge a collective function, though even
then they retain their individual differences. When it is
determinately known, each bhsa has its separate fixed
function. No bhsa loses its individuality even when it
appears to rest upon a substratum.3
rl he bhsavdin tries to establish, against the Buddhist

and the Vedntin, that the object o f knowledge is
characterised both by unity and diversity. This character
istic o f the object is indubitable because it ultimately rests
upon one subject.4 The object shines as separate on
account o f its particularity ; it also shines as associated or
mixed with others owing to its universality. Both o f these
aspects o f the object should be regarded as real, as there is
, tr<j ^ nfa-
s f a fa 1! i ib id . n . i i i . 4- 5.
2. Ib id . II. III. 6.
3i ifrsfq *iqrenft?wi g r P :"' 1 ibid
4 . Ibid II. 111. 14.
no reason to prove the falsity o f either. Finding this con

trariety between unity and diversity difficult to maintain,
the VedSntin regards it ultimately inexplicable or
illusory. The Buddhist, on the other hand, holds that
because it shines in determinate knowledge alone, therefore,
it has no real or objective existence. But the fact is that
both, the Ved&ntin and the Buddhists, have deceived
themselves as well as the com m on people.1 The bhsav-
din claims that the shining o f both o f them is possible as
resting on the universal consciousness which is free. Even
the birds and animals know through their own experience
that because o f resting within Saiiivid, and therefore
becoming one with it, even the blazing nre and water are
not contradictory.2
Just as the various rays o f the lamp, when scattered, do

not discharge the function o f bringing about the perception
o f a minute object, similarly an bhsa by itself is not
capable o f discharging the function which is performed by
a configuration o f bhsas. Like the focussed rays o f the
lamp, which illumine the minute objects, or like the
various currents which collectively discharge the function
o f giving rise to innumerable waves, the various bhsas
such as ja r / o f gold,* red* and it is fit to be used for
bringing water to pour on the head o f Siva*, when combined
together, discharge the function o f causing great pleasure.
It is important to notice, in this connexion, that only
those bhsas which are not o f opposite nature get mixed
up together, while those bhsas which are o f opposite
nature are not mixed up together For instance, the
bhsa o f form does not mix up with the bhsa o f ;air,*
because the two are opposed in nature. \Lhe nature of
these bhsas, by virtue of which they unite or separate
1. Ibid. Blmskar, V ol. III. p. 159.
I io,d.
ili KASHMIR AtVISM
with each other, is fixed up by the power o f Niyati or order.

Thus, the soalaksam, which is a configuration o f the various
bhsas, such as ja r , gold and red* etc., which are not
opposed in nature, gives rise to the idea o f oneness.1
But here the difficulty would arise that if each bhsa
is known by itself then the validity o f the manifestation of
each bhsa would depend upon the bhsa itself ; for
example the validity o f manifestation fire* depends upon
the cognition fire, o f smoke* depends upon the cognition
smoke.* This being the case, there would be no necessary
connection between objects and events, nor would there be
any possibility o f relations, such as cause and effect etc.
On this view fire could be perceived without the perception
o f smoke, and vice versa.
The Saivite holds that these difficulties are not genuine.

For, though the bhsa fire in itself is unique and is not
associated with other bhsas, such as time*, place etc.,
yet it is known with certainty only when it is united with
as many bhsas as are made invariably concomitant with
it by the power o f Niyati. The bhsa fire is, by its very
nature, invariably concomitant with the manifestation, or
bhsa, o f its being the effect o f fuel and cause o f smoke,
and also o f its being hot in nature. And it is perceived as
such at all times and places, because these bhsas are
mixed up together into one. Even those characteristics
which do not naturally belong to it and are merely conven
tional, such as being signified by the term fire or the
capacity to bring about the ocular perception o f jar etc.,
are ascertained by means o f a single perception itself. T o
the perceiver the bhsa fire is always known as invariably
concomitant with other bhsas, which are naturally or
! f a g ifaTfa: a a qrarm fmtaaffa, afj sm urai msar-

m fa fasf g fgafagmgcarfaa: i
aqsrsrar: f a gaffa a fa ami: sftaat g a fa a*g fa maf
aai faaat: am g ffa jr: narrar azgiffamâaiaa: fat
graffa a fa aawm a^raf fa fa frfa f a a ; - i ibid. n . n i, i.
conventionally mixed up with it. However, ultimately in

all cases the invariable concomitance o f one abhsa with
other bhsas, whether natural or otherwise, is due to the
working o f the Divine power o f Niyati, which operates
differently in relation to different objects. For example, it
manifests fuel as the cause o f fire as associated with the
past ; it also manifests smoke as the effect o f fire as asso
ciated with future time ; similarly it also manifests heat
as associated with fire at all times and its expressibility by
such words as fire etc. for a short duration only. Hence
the invariable concom itance o f the bhsa smoke* with the
bhsa fire* depends upon the working o f the power o f
Niyati. All the characteristics o f fire,* viz. its being both
an effect and a cause, its being hot and its being signified
by the various words which stand for it, its being without
any odour, its going upward and being o f the opposite
nature from water, and so on, are known through only one
means o f right knowledge.1 Thus the essential naiure of
an object is made manifest by a single means of right
knowledge which operates on each bhsa separately. The
proper invariable concom itance o f one bhsa with another
is ascertained by the introvert Light or samvid on which
depend all preceding experiences which had various bhsas
as their objects. However, this introvert light o f conscious
ness is the valid means only in regard to manifestation
oneness* and not in the case o f manifestations which are
unified.2
1. iu'm nirtr 3MT|riT ^ irqifar <mas?rf>rtraT,
q ir a smnjirj jtc:-
fa fc f fa q p ^ I ib id . II. III. 8.
2. rq nrqqqrqsqqmqH a fq w u fa w r R swuK foq^,
aq qsifjTatqrafqqq^q
qfcgfas^q, ^ q q w q m s r u d t "'* ibid.
But how can that which is a mere bhsa give rise to

purposive activity on the part o f the perceiver ? The &aiva
answer to this question consists in showing that the activity
o f the person, with purposive attitude, is possible with
reference to a particular object at the time o f its percep
tion, when it is determined by other cognitions, such as
those o f time etc.*1 The causal efficiency o f an object is
due to its determination, in which the association o f an
bhsa with the bhsa o f time and place is very important.
The determination o f bhsa would serve no purpose unless
it is definitely known as such. But it would not give rise to
any activity if it rests on the subject who is pure conscious
ness and is, therefore, free from the limitations o f time,
place etc., even if it is grasped determinately. Mental or
physical activity which takes place at the time o f percep
tion o f an object, which is nothing but a combination o f
various bhsas, is possible only if the object be determined
by other perception, such as that o f place and time and
any other characteristic that we unify. A purposive
activity is possible not from one but many PramQas. This
collective applicability o f Pramas cannot be explained
on any theory except bhsavda. It is possible on the
doctrine o f bhsavda, as resting upon the subject whose
essential nature is consciousness. On the analogy o f uni
fication o f perception in the case o f sweet-smelling objects
etc., this very unification o f Pramas has been called
yojika or 'yukti.2 This is so not only in the case o f percep
tion but also in the case o f inference. The various percep
tions o f the bhsas o f smoke, fire, their invariable con
comitance and o f mountain separately, as well as the
inference there is fire, which asserts the presence o f that
which is not known through perception, form one unified
1, STg \
c n w fa ift i ip k . ii, iii, 9.
2. ^ m snmuH s i w , i
' IP V . II, III. 9.
experience upon which the purposive activity o f the inferer

is based.1
The AbhSsavSdin holds that the sameness or identity

o f the objects, which appear to be different because o f
their nearness or remoteness, their direct relation to senses
or its absence, their externality or internality, or defect in
the accessories o f knowledge, remains intact, because they
primarily shine as such; a fact which is made manifest by
subsequent intellectual reaction, which recognises them to
be the same. 2 As there is determinate consciousness o f
the identity o f the object, therefore from the point o f view
o f chief or principal manifestation (i.e. the objective mani-
festion o f the sameness) the sameness o f the object, whether
it be far or near, is unaffected. Similarly the identity o f
the objects given in perception and inference is possible
because it is made to shine predominantly in a subsequent
cognition in which they are recognised as identical, such as
in the judgement the same as was inferred has been
perceived.1 The identity o f the object o f reflection and
sensation is also established in the same way, as in the
judgement, the same that I saw then am now imagining
within.* The objects which appear differently due to the
defective light o f the lamp are also similarly recognised as
the same the same red lotus that appeared to be blue in
the lamp light is now seen to be red in the sunlight.* Like
wise, all those objects which have different appearances
either because o f difference in the perceptive organs or
because o f some other reasons are the same as their essential
nature (i.e. their identity) shines in recognition.
7. Relations
Action, relation, change etc. cannot be satisfactorily
explained in those systems which admit the independent
existence o f the objective w orld.8 However, they can
1. Ibid.
2. IP V . II. III. 10-11.
3. Ibid. II. II.
126 KASHMIR AIVISM
easily be explained on the theory that everything is essen

tially an SbhSsa. The ideas o f action, relation, universal,
substance, place and time etc. are not unreal. For these
ideas continue to shine and all that shines in determinate
cognition cannot be regarded unreal, because the essential
nature o f reality is nothing but luminosity.1 M oreover,
these categories possess functional capacity ; they serve our
purpose in practical life and are based upon unity-in-
multiplicity.2 The attainment o f purpose by means o f an
object that has both unity and multiplicity is possible for a
subject only~according to the view that action, relation etc.
are real.9
Descending to the empirical level the universal conscious

ness manifests the categories o f action etc. Among these
categories relation is the principal category.4 Whatever
shines on the back o f what figures in consciousness as the
meaning o f a bare word is relation. Accordingly all
Ktirakas are nothing but relations. O nly in certain cases
relation admits o f being called by a different name. For
example, the word relation is substituted by 'universal etc.
to indicate the particular type o f relation o f those who
have similar features, which can be represented by one
word, as 'cow s. But the word relation is retained, in case
another word cannot be used. Hence all measures o f land,
grain and gold etc., and all that is included in them, such
as small and big etc., and number separateness etc., are
forms o f relation only. Even time, which is the essence o f
every thing through action, itself depends upon relation.
i. srftranRr %fa 's t r a fa

I Ibid. It. II. 3 .
o
n ibid. Ksrika i.
fi wifargtft n ibid. Ksrika. 7

4 . Ibid, 11.11. 3.
Thus practical life, in all its various aspects, entirely

depends upon relation.1
When the objects, which are self-confined, are unified,

in so far as they become mutually connected in the subject,
they constitute the basis o f the idea o f relation.2 For
instance, the Sbhasas king and man both are indepen
dent o f each other and self-confined. However, when they
are unified in the subject, not absolutely because then
the difference will completely disappearbut only in so far
as they are mutually connected in respect o f their forms,
or when they ride the swing o f oneness which has two poles,
unity and diversity, then they constitute the idea o f
relation. In this state o f unity, the two are not merged in
the subject, nor do they merge in each other, nor stand
absolutely apart from each other. They represent unity
in difference, both o f which appear and disappear simul
taneously, not successively. The essential nature o f relation
is that its multiplicity is outside the subject but its unity is
within the subject.3 Thus, relation is nothing but unity in
multiplicity.
* Here, some opponents may say that unity and multipli

city, being contrary to each other, cannot exist in one and
the samething.4 M oreover, unity and multiplicity being
experienced in two different moments, how can different
experiences refer to one and the same thing ? The so-called
unity-in-m ultiplicity cannot be experienced. It is given
neither in indeterminate nor in determinate knowledge.
1. q?fa n asfa fo m p isfa , mfa snqrsqqq smqfa,

gtsfa faqrertqr qq^qqfa sfa
s q fq q t a i^ q m I Ib id. Bhiiakari. V ol. II. p. 49.
2. fqnqfaw fafati.m w i q^qqrafa i
t f a q F q q f a q p ; II i l)id . K SrikS 4.
3. qq qf^qâr, pq qqqTsq^qqiqqq, sfa *fa*qfq qq i
Ibid.
4# q?qq>?q q qrm qf^T qsqfa qfaiq- I
Bhskat, V ol. II. p. 35.
128 KASHMIR AIVISM
Even supposing such an entity exists, it is psychologically

not possible to know that it exists.
In reply to the above objections the AbhSsavSdin
reminds us that according to him the being o f a thing is
nothing but its shining or its being reflected in conscious
ness (provided that the determinate cognition which refers
to it is not subsequently contradicted). The categories
like relation etc., which are o f the nature o f unity-in-
multiplicity, surely have such a being. Not only that ; in
the entire realm o f practical life these categories definitely
possess causal efficiency. For, purpose is served by that
object alone which, being essentially o f the nature o f
relation etc., has both unity and multiplicity. The object
which is self-confined never serves any purpose.1 For
instance, when we remember some past pleasure we desire
the object which gave pleasure, when we again get that
object, we experience satisfaction simply because we get the
desired. Now, if that which has been attained is nothing
but what has been attained previously, then there could
really be no scope for desire ; for the desired is already
attained. But, if that which is attained now be different
from that which was attained in the past, how could there
be any desire for it ? There can be no desire for the
unknown. It follows, therefore, that desire is possible only
if that only is not-that also and, likewise, not-that only*
is that-also, Similar would be the case with the means
o f pleasure also.2
1. * S'sfar rfa gr *r
g^fa ciir* pnfr, sfa wfcwr qistf:
S f a t t i, * w ifasF r
Ibid. p. 4.
2. " mrfft fVraw:, s w if t jfiR gff reu:
h a f fle r 5 g qq ^
qfq g fa g fa sii' ^ 3ff> f t
Vn OTfPr W
iTrl^ tTq 3%^ % *13^ ^ dfa ^ HOTfa H
I I Tbid. p. 61.
Further, if the object o f experience is to be destroyed

just at the moment o f its being experienced, how could
there be any desire for it ? Hence, it has to be admitted
that in the object, which is only a manifestation or bhsa,
other manifestations, such as universal or relation etc., are
present, though they are not directly perceived.1 Otherwise,
no practical life, whatsoever, could be possible. Therefore,
we should not commit the mistake o f looking upon the
relations as erroneous.2
Relation is merely a dependent category o f knowledge

and is based upon the general category unity-in-multipli-
city. Analysis o f any experience reveals the universal
operation o f the general category. While unity is due to
the unifying activity o f the subject, multiplicity is outside
the knowing subject as it is found in the object.3 Among
these unity is more diminant ; for multiplicity is mainly in
the unconscious state and arises only in consequence o f the
separate cognition o f two or more things. Though the
relation between them is similar to that which holds between
ân object and its attributes, yet both o f them are involved
in relation and none o f them is sufficient in itself. The
experience o f unity-in-multiplicity is not immediate but a
synthesis o f past experiences. It is a mental construction
out o f the revived residual traces o f the past experience.
Unity and multiplicity in the same thing are not really
1. There may be a relation within relation in reference to another

object, just as some maintain that in the number etc. inherence
is involved. In this case the iniinitc regress, though it may be
there, is not a fault, just us in the ca9c of creations in the
preceding and the succeeding Kalpas.*For, even if wedo not
grasp the creation connected with future, the grasp o f the
creation connected with the past is not adversely affected. Ibid.
V ol. III. p. 136.
2. s*asr a a*rfsvaî*: ffa sw a sttsa w ia a tT a la sfa w j
a aw : aff a aiws a<sw a fa*r:-fa a sa wrfra:
ffa - s r a a * ^ I ibid. ii. n . i
3. Ibid. II. II. 1-3.
130 KASHMIR tfAIVISM
inexplicable. For the universe itself is nothing but unity-

in-multiplicity.
The idea o f number, measure, separateness, conjunction,

etc. are all applications o f the special category o f relation.
Though only one thing is apprehended at a time, yet
worldly transactions depend upon the knowledge o f relation
between different objects. In the absence o f consciousness
o f relation objects would cease to be objects. Relation
always holds between two objects. Even when numerous
objects are involved in a relation, they can be put into two
groups, for all practical purposes, each o f which is looked
upon as one object, because o f its being the object o f a
single act o f apprehension, such as the kings man (rjftah
puruah). In fact, unity and plurality both depend not on
things but on the cognitive activity o f the subject. Thus
relation involves two external realities. As both the
object and the knowing subject are the manifestations o f
the absolute consciousness, therefore, relation does not end
with the finite subject but ultimately rests upon the absolute
subject.1
Against this, the Vedntin holds that the relation

between Brahman and the world, Real and false, is the
examples o f all relations. All relations are false ultimately.
A relation cannot relate itself to the two terms o f which it
is a relation ; for no juggler, however well-trained he
might be, can dance over his own shoulders. Relation is
neither internal, nor external to the terms o f relation ;
nor is it independent o f them. Whatever is relational in
our experience is, thus, untrue. Accordingly the entire
world o f relation is condemned as false in the Vednta.
For, if relation is false then space, time, causality, change
and all other categories, which are based upon relation,
must equally be false. The doctrine o f real transformation
or parinma, thus, gives way to the doctrine o f illusory
manifestation or vivarta in the Vednta.
1. Ib id .
NATCJRE OF KN VVLED 3E 131
The main dispute between Vednta and aivism, in

the field o f knowledge, concerns the nature o f the subject.
All other differences follow from the difference between
the two conceptions o f the Self. On the assumption that
the Self is pure Witness Consciousness, the Vedntin
rigorously rejects all attempts to attribute any quality
or power to the Self. This assumption ultimately leads
him to a denial o f all relational judgements. On the
other hand, just because he accepts the Self to be the
ultimate subject ( Para PramMd) in all knowing and acting,
the aivite attempts to establish the ultimate dependence o f
everything upon the Self.
P A R T III
THE ABSOLUTE REALITY

CHAPTER SIX
THE CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE
I bow to that Absolute which is unity o f Parama iva

and akti ; the unity, which from its ultimate state, first o f all
manifests the pure Ego, 4F, and then through its will divides
its powers into two the ultimate state, which, being without
any manifestation, is self-contained and is responsible for
creation and dissolution through the play and suspension
respectively o f its Powers 1.
1. Absolutism A problem
A critical study o f absolutism in Indian Philosophy is a
difficult task indeed. There are many crucial problems in
this field which still remain unsolved.2 Being confronted
with the various theories o f Absolute, which have many
common points o f agreement and disagreement, the student
o f philosophy finds himself unable to determine the exact
relationship between them. As a result of this, the most
crucial problem, concerning the nature o f identity or differ
ence between various absolutisms, has often been overlooked.
Sometimes easy and superficial observations have been made
in this context. Thus, it is said that there are no essential
differences concerning the nature o f Absolute in different
systems ; that these systems really belong to the same tradition
and express one and the same basic truth in different ways;
inspiie o f differences in their terminology and approach, they
aim at the same reality ; the essential nature o f the Absolute
is identical in all absolutisms.
1. 5x1 wOTfa ^
qV faR S K ftfffi* ll bhuskariV ol. i. p . 1

2. C .p .w p . 311
136 KASHMIR SAIVISM
But such attempts do not really go the whole way ; they

arc merely half-hearted efforts to solve the problem. Though
it is true that absolutists agree on various points, it does not
mean that they have an identical conception o f Absolute.
Undoubtedly the areas o f agreement deserve wide study, but
we should not forget the basic differences. We should not
ignore the fact that principles or ideas which meau almost
everything to one absolutist, mean nothing or little to the
other.1 It would amount to intellectual dishonesty if we
deliberately ignore the differences. Nor can these differences
be supposed to be merely formal or verbal. For, how is it
that each absolutism indulges in, what seems to be, a serious
and sincere refutation o f the other ? The tendency to brush
aside these attempts at refutation by regarding them as merely
superficial or tactical further adds to confusion. As such,
these tendencies should be fought and discouraged, in the
final analysis, we have to admit that every absolutism, inspite
of its similarities with others, has its peculiar characteristics
owing to its unique tradition and approach, which provide
it an individuality. T o overlook this would be to make the
confusion worse confounded
While rejecting the view that these absolutisms are essen
tially identical, at the same time we should also oppose the
other extreme view that they are wholly different and dis
connected. For, obviously these systems have striking simil
arities in many respects. We can well admit that there has
been mutual influence between them. There is sufficient
evidence o f living intercourse between them To be influen
ced is not to borrow or accept ideas from others. If a system
stimulates the other to revise or even to reassert its position,
it is also a kind o f influence. It is probably in this sense that
the different absolutisms have influenced each other. Other
wise, it is the inherent dynamism within each system which
impelled it to develop in its own way, irrespective of outside
influence.2
However, it is necessary to find out some way to deter-
1. M u iti, T .R .V *, Buddhism and Vedanta . 2. Ib id.

THE CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE
mine the relationship between these absolutisms. Such an

attempt is o f great significance in a comparative study.
In its metaphysical usage the term absolute* is quite
vague and elusive. According to a recent Encyclopedia, the
Absolute is a term used by philosophers to signify the ultimate
reality regarded as one and yet as the source o f variety; as
complete and perfect, and as not divorced from the finite,
imperfect world1. Every absolutism is infact an advaitism or
aduayavZda, a non-dualism. The absolute is the sole and
supreme reality in the Mdhyamika, the Yogac&ra, the Veda
nta, and the Kashmir Saivism.
Let us try to analyse our problem with the help o f an
illustration from the Scripture. It says that the one Real is
described differently by the learned.2 This statement suggests
that philosophies are nothing but dfftis or views about reality.
But reality, being infinite, cannot be limited to any finite view.
It can open itself to innumerable views, without being exhaus
ted in them, Ihe differences between the various dfffis arise
horn the differences in the origin and development o f their
individual traditions or lines o f approach. Different concep
tions o f absolute are formed in different systems in accordance
with their traditional approaches.
The Real, which in itself is beyond all symbols, becomes
visualized and expressed through symbols in various approa
ches. Thus the differences among the various approaches are
confined to the realm o f symbols lh e pure advaita, the
absolute-in-itself, transcends all visions. Though all visions
or approaches refer to the same absolute-in-itself, differences
arise when conceptualization lakes place. Comparing the
Real to the centre o f a circle, it might be held that it can
equally be reached from the periphery by any of the possible
radii. On this analogy, we can also understand why different
individuals following different radii feel that theirs alone is
the right path and those who adopt diirerent radii follow the
wrong path. For, from the very nature o f the case, the centre
1. The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, Vol. I, The M acmillan C o. and
ihe Free Press, N y, 1967.
2. UV I. 164.46.
138 KASHMIR SAIVISM
appears to him to be nearer than it is to the others. Each

votary might see the centre looming ahead o f him, but he
cannot see that others also may be reaching the centre through
their particular mode o f approach.1
The Absolute-in-itself and the Absolute-for-us

In order to proceed further in our effort to solve the
problem, it would be convenient to draw a tentative
distinction in the nature o f the Absolute. Accordingly we
might employ the term absolute-in-itself for the absolute
which is beyond all appearances and dfftis, the centre without
the radii. The M&dhyamika were the first to emphasise this
wholly indeterminate nature o f the Absolute. All the absolu
tists follow the Msdhyamika on this point and hold that the
absolute-in-itself is not open to any viewpoint. Silence alone
is the appropriate expression for it; inyat alone is the
proper view o f it. In itself it is non-conceptual pure Being,
transcending all relations and determinations.
However, differences arise when attempts are made to form
a conception o f the absolute. When the absolute, which is the
whole o f reality in-itself, is made the object of a vision, it no
longer remains the absolute-in-itself but, instead, becomes the
absolute o f a particular view, or the absolute o f an approach.
Henceforth it is no longer the absolute-in-itself but is the absol-
ute-for-us, the centre with a definite radii Obviously, the con
ception of the absolute (which is always o f the absolute-for-us)
depends upon the particular mode o f approach adopted in a
system. Thus, it is here, at the level o f conception of the
absolute, that the differences between absolutisms become
manifest.
While undertaking a critical study o f absolutism we may
hold fast to one principle, viz. that every absolutism is justified
in upholding its own conception of absolute, the absolute-of-
its-approach, provided that the approach is throughout consis
tent* "I hough it now seems to be an universally arrived conclu
sion that no philosophy has ever been successful in avoiding
1. CPU., P. 321.
THE CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE 13$
paradox, however the only set o f paradox which is objec

tionable is self-contradiction,1
It is also possible to account for similarities or differences
between various absolutism in another way. All philosophies
originate and develop from experience. The absolute, in
principle, represents perfectly all that is o f value in experi
ence; value and existence coincide in the absolute. In so
far as it represents the entire experience, the absolute has been
conceived in somewhat identical terms. But, as all aspects
o f experience are not preferred equally in various absolutisms,
there arise the differences o f emphasis and preference. Dep
ending upon the degree of emphasis upon any o f the three
elements o f experience, viz. Will, Knowledge and Feeling, we
might broadly classify absolutism into three types. The
Mdhyamika and the Vedanta, though differing in their
individual modes o f approach, both might be regarded as the
votaries o f cognitive absolute. Both emphasise the cognitive
element in experience at the cost o f will and feeling and ide
ntify the absolute with knowledge. On the other hand, the
* aiva and the akta,and in a way the YogRcSra also,emphasise
the will aspect o f experience and identify the absolute with
will. The devotional cult o f Vaispavism, especially as we
find it in Meer and Caitanya, if it is developed on the absol
utistic line, would represent the third type o f absolutism. Here
the feeling or the affective element assumes a central place,
while cognitive and conative elements become secondary.
Although in each o f the three types the absolute-in-itself
represents the totality o f experience, yet the absolute has been
approached in these three types mainly in terms o f knowledge,
will and feeling, respectively. This is also the reason why
each type o f absolutism, because o f its prior commitment to
one o f the elements, occupies itself mostly with a detailed
analysis o f that very element.
A particular viewpoint cannot suit all individuals alike.
An approach is adopted by those persons alone who have a
1. Passmore, John., A Hundred Years o f Philosophy, p. 81, London,

1957.
140 KASHMIR AIVISM
particular taste and temperament. For example, the will

absolute* might appeal more to an aristocratic, a chivalrous
and an artistic type o f man than to others. Similarly, it is also
natural that a person o f intellectual temperament .would
remain somewhat cool to it and refuse it with the whole
personality. However, the attitude o f the aristocratic, the
willing heroes o f the Goddess, towards the thoughtful sons*
o f the mother is different; according to them the intellectua-
list can never share the secret riches, boons and the wonderous
paradoxical insights which she holds in store only for the
devotee.1
The above analysis would be helpful in the field o f
comparative study. Firstly, it shows that every system is
ultimately based upon a certain viewpoint or standpoint,
which might also be called a postulate or an assumption.
Accordingly, the main task o f a comparative study would be
to determine the nature o f the vision or assumption upon
which a particular system is based* Secondly, the recognition
that metaphysical systems are ultimately based upon certain
assumptions also points out the nature and the scope of a
comparative study. For, it shows that a critical and compara
tive study should strictly be confined to determining merely the
consistency or inconsistencies o f a system. It is not only beyond
its competance but also irrelevant for such a study to find out
the truth or falsity o f a metaphysical system. Every attempt
to criticise and question the basic assumption o f a system
should be opposed and discouraged, simply because it should
not, and cannot, be the taskofa comparative study. A criticism
o f the fundamental assumption or vision o f a system would be
possible only when we adopt a different standpoint. For, to
criticise is to employ a standard, and to employ a standard is
to adopt or accept a different standard Finally, the present
analysis shows that the same absolute reality, the absolute-in-
itself, which is identical in all absolutistic experiences, appears
to be the absolute-for-us* in the realm o f thought. In other
words, the absolute becomes an absolute (or the absolute of
1, Zim m er, II., Philosophies o f India, p. 599.

THE CONCEPTION CF ABSOLUTE 141
an approach) when it is conceived. In accordance with the

different approaches towards reality, different conceptions o f
absolute are formed. No two absolutism, provided they are
consistent in themselves, would have an identical conception
o f the absolute. Even with regards to the nature o f a so-
called given fact different absolutism would have different
views.
We should be cautious before accepting the apparent
similarities between absolutisms as real. Whenever they
appear to be similar, they really refer to the absolute-in-
itself , the absolute beyond all approaches, and not to the
absolute-for-us*, or the absolute o f the approaches. Thus,
there is near unanimity between various absolutisms on many
issues. It is commonly held that the absolute is indeterminate,
that the finite process does not affect the absolute, that the
manifestation o f plurality does not go against unity that the
absolute is somehow* realized in the finite experience.
The two approaches

We have already noted that the differences in absolutisms,
arise in the realm o f conceptualization, when the absolute is
conceived through a particular approach, or when the absol
ute-in-itself becomes the absolute-for-us. However, the
differences in the approaches are closely related to the differ
ences in the valuation o f the world. In other words, the
nature and formulation o f an approach is mostly dependent
upon the way in which its votaries treat, or react towards, the
given. Thus, the conception o f the absolute is determined in
accordance with the significance or value of the world. For
example, if the attitude towards the world is that o f positive
affirmation, ihen the world would be supposed to be a
significant manifestation o f the nature o f the absolute. But,
in the cases where negative attitude is adopted, the appearan
ces would be regarded as insignificant (tuccha) or false
expression o f the real nature of the absolute, as constituting
limitation o f absoluteness The fiist o f the?e two attitudes are
exhibited in the approaches adopted in theistic-voluntaristic
absolutisms ; it has been consistently developed in Absolutis-
142 KASHMIR SAIVISM
tic aivism. The second altitude is found mostly in the

cognitive approaches towards the absolute ; finyavda and
Myvda are the chief illustrations o f the negative approach
These two approaches, the positive and negative, may
be also called symbolic and non-symbolic. In contrast with
the sign, which bears no necessary relation to that to which
it points, the symbol participates in the reality o f that for
which it stands. In the symbolic approach, the absolute is
regarded as the all-comprehensive and all-inclusive reality ;
here the emphasis is not on what is excluded but on what is
included. The world appearances are taken to be the symbols
o f the absolute. Although in itself the absolute transcends
all symbols, yet every symbol might be described as a mani
festation o f the absolute. For th aiva Absolutists the world-
appearances are nothing but the various ways in which
absolute manifests itself. Against this, in the non-symbolic
approach all symbols are dissolved ultimately. It is the aim
o f reason, which plays a vital role in the non-symbolic
approach, to arrive at the state o f absolute desymbolization.
Determination being negation, the absolute is completely free
from all determination. While asserting unity, the votaries
o f this approach reject multiplicity as unreal.
In the aiva Absolutism, the absolute is regarded not
merely as being consciousness but also as the being which is at
the same time self-conscious. The Vednta Absolute, on
the other hand, is pure witness consciousness. However,
unlike the Mdhyamika Absolute which does not even have
a nature (svardpa) o f its own, the Vednta Absolute is Being
itself. But, according to the aiva Absolutists the Vednta
Absolute lacks consciousness. Possession o f both being and
consciousness constitutes the essential nature o f the aiva
Absolute.
Parama iva, the aiva Absolute, has been described
as the supreme subject (para pramHtn) in Absolutistic aivism.
The absolute is that knowing which everything else becomes
known*. As such, nothing is really rejected or negated in
the absolute. Everything in the world, every appearance,
is a real manifestation o f the absolute. The widening or
THE CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE 143
expansion o f finite vision is the chief characteristic o f the

process towards the realization o f the absolute ; wider and
expanded the vision, nearer the absolute we arrive ;
narrower the vision, more removed from the absolute we are.
This aiva approach might be des ribed as an integral
approach, and the absolute also might be described as the
integral Reality. Contradictions and conflicts are neither
avoided nor rejected, but are resolved in the integral absolute.
There is greater emphasis upon the negation o f separate
ness than upon the negation o f duality or difference.
Unity or integrality alone is supposed to be the test o f
reality. Separateness or discord, likewise, is the test o f
unreality. In so far as they appear separate from each
other, appearances are false ; they are, however, real in so
far as they manifest unity. In reality, the one is All and
the A ll is One.
The Vedntic approach is from the unreal to the real*.

Illusion is the datum for Vedanta Philosophy.1 By their
very nature, the appearances are unreal and cannot
constitute reality. This awareness o f illusion and the spirit
o f rejection is fundamental to the Vedanta. The absolute
ness o f Brahman is established through the negation o f the
world. The three essential characteristics o f Brahman,
Being (sat), Consciousness (c/f) and Bliss (nanda), are also
established by showing the unreality (mithytua) > materiality
(jadatva) and finitude (paricchinatva) o f the world. Appear
ances, which belong to the sphere o f change, can in no
way be related to Brahman, which is pure Being. That
which appears is ultimately false ; the real is that which
never appears. The more stronger and comprehensive the
rejection o f appearances, the more closer to the absolute
we become. As they are disowned in their own locus, the
reality o f the appearances can be asserted only as the
being o f the locus itself. The absolute being known every
thing becomes known, because the absolute is the true
1. M urti, T R V ., The two definitions of Brahman in the Advaita,

pp. 136-7,
144 KASHMIR AVISM
reality o f everything. The central feature o f the Vedanta

approach consists in its emphasis upon the purity o f Being,
Accordingly, the Vedanta absolute can be characterised as
uddha.or pure absolute. That alone can be real which
never deviates from its essential nature. Except Brahman,
nothing else can have this nature. In reality, there is
nothing independent o f the Self.1
There is another way in which the two approaches

differ from each other. Whereas the aiva approach
develops mostly as a demand o f religious consciousness,
the Vedanta approach is largely governed by philosophical
awareness. While philosophy is born o f a rational inquiry,
religion is born out o f the concrete situation, the situation
o f involvement.* Reason is the supreme master in
philosophy; faith is the guide in the sphere o f religion.
Philosophy satisfies our mind, religion our heart; while
philosopher reasons and argues, the man o f faith believes
and acts, lives and loves.2 In religion the contradictions
o f reason, which disturb the philosopher greatly, are
simply resolved in the harmony o f feeling. Whereas the
believer insists that there are no contradictions in reality,
the thinker breaks his head* with contradictions. By
a sheer act o f faith the believer passes beyond all conflicts
and solves all problems o f life.
The religious symbol, in which we pass from the visible

to the invisible, involves a leap. And because it is symbolic
and involves a leap, religion gives rise to the demand that
it should be explained non-symbolically. This is done by
philosophy whose task is mostly negative, o f removing the
symbolic coverings from the truth gained by religion. But
philosophy does not, and cannot, make the discovery o f
1. v & qj zzi * r -f SRJpT acsr-

f 3*3 f as i sb. 2.1 .6.
2. Radhnkrishna. S., Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy,
p. 6-22.
the invisible. Without the discovery o f the Noumena,

made by religion, philosophy would remain empty, a
vacuous play o f the dialectic1.
The essential difference between Philosophical and
Religious approaches lies in the fact that while there is a
greater emphasis upon logical consistency in the former,
there is an immediate or spontaneous awareness o f facts,
without much regards to the demand o f logic or language,
in the latter approach. The main aim o f the religious approa
ch is 'somehow to establish the absoluteness o f God ( Ihara-
dvayavUda) . This approach develops as theistic absolutism in
which the absolute is realized as the home o f all values. The
absolute reoresents in its supreme perfection everything that is
o f worth in human life. In the philosophical approach, on the
other hand, there is a completely disinterested search
for truth, regardless o f the fact whether it satisfies our emoti
on or not. Here, reason is the supreme master and guide who
mercilessly rejects all that is inconsistent and illogical*
However, it does not mean that an approach is wholly and
purely religious or philosophical. Nor does it mean that the
* religious approach is necessarily against reason and the philoso
phical approach is opposed to faith. The fact is that there can
be no separation between philosophy and Religion. Philoso
phy has never completely divorced itself from religion in India*
Similarly religion also has always resorted to philosophical
method.2 Reason without faith would be mere logical jugglery.
Philosophy has impact upon life, it is to be lived in life. It
affects our behaviour and outlook fundamentally. Religion also
cannot be devoid o f reason. Just as true philosophy always
results in true religion, religion in its deepest aspect is philoso
phical. For there can be no ultimate conflict between reason
1. M urti, T . R. V ., Some Thoughts on the Indian Philosophy o f

Language Presidential address, 37th Session of Indian Philo
sophical Congress.
2. If Philosophy w ould be empty without the discovery o f the
Noum ena, religion also will be blind without philosophical
appraisal and critical alertness .
M urti, T. R . V ., Ib id .
146 KASHMIR SAIVISM
and faith. Unlike the Madhyamika, which represents a purely

philosophical approach, the Vednta is also a religious appro
ach. It is a synthesis o f religion and philosophy. It gives an
inferior place to devotion or feeling than knowledge. As Jhna
is superior to bhakti in it, the Vednta might be described as
the path o f knowledge, jM n a mUrga. According to the Vedanta
the unqualified Brahman assumes qualified form, or appears
as qualified, for the sake o f devotion and worship1. But ulti
mately all appearances are false The wise always reasons
about reality, saying not-this*, 'not-this* On the other
hand, the devotee or the bhakta accepts all states o f conscious
ness as real. For him everything is a real manifestation o f the
divinity.
The absolute-in-itself in the two approaches

It is difficult to determine the nature o f the absolute-in
itself* in the two approaches. Any discussion regarding the
nature o f absolute-in-itself* would appear to be self-contradic
tory. For, the absolute-in-itself* transcends all determination.
The moment it becomes an object o f thought it no longer
remains the absolute-in-itself* but becomes the absolute-
for-us*. As far as the absolute-in-itself* is concerned, silence
alone is the proper language. However, it would be clear
on second thought that a distinction between the relational
and the non-relational aspects o f the absolute is presupposed
in every absolutism2. The distinction is found in all
approaches and has to be accepted as long as we discuss the
problem. The reference to the non-relational and non-
empirical nature o f the absolute is actually a reference to
1. SB, L 9 .2 4 T
2. In speaking o f the absolute and its knowledge it is rather
difficult to avoid slight inconsistencies ; for thought is always rela
tional. The only solution is to make clear distinctions as far as
possible, and stick fast to them , though all such distinctions are
ultimately purely tentative, they have no claim in the end to be
real. These distinctions may give rise to apparent inconsistencies,
but the other alternative, devotion o f them , may create intolerable
confusion. Kaufman, W ., ^Critique o f Philosophy and Religion
p. 103, L on don, 1958.
the absolute-in-itself*. Almost identical views are held with

regards to this nature o f the absolute in different absolutisms.
As soon as attempts are made to conceive or communicate
the absolute differences in views arise.
The absolute that is approached is the absolute in rela
tion to us ; it is that aspect o f the absolute which faces
creation. The other aspect o f the absolute, which transcends
creation, can be known only by becoming the absolute. The
absolute, in the aiva approach, eternally performs the five
fold function o f creation, sustenance, etc. Accordingly, from
the point o f view o f the creature, the absolute is essentially
the supreme Lord ( Mahsioara). We have to postulate the
relation o f identify between the invisible and visible
aspects o f the absolute. The nyatva and Muheivaratva both
are integral and inseparable faspects, the transcendent and
immanent faces o f the same absolute. They are distinguished
only in the realm o f thought. In reality the absolute is both
transcendent and immanent, at the same time. Because
o f his concern for establishing the absolutism of God, the
âivite makes repeated use o f such terms and concepts which
best serve this purpose. Terms like spanda, spkurana, svHlantrya
mnhesvarya, Caitanya etc. easily bring out the creative or free
characteristic o f consciousness, or the dynamism and abso
luteness o f being.
On the other hand, the Vedntin is more concerned with
the absolute-in-itself, which transcends all relations and
empirical determinations. Though the absolute might also
be described as the ultimate cause, the creator and sustainer
o f the world, as long as we are approaching it through the
appearances, ultimately all relations are false. The absolute
appears as the great Lord ( Maheiuara) only in relation to us.
Ultimately the lordship or the creatorship o f the absolute is
as false as the world.
Both; the aivite and the Vedantin hold that as the
absolute is beyond the grasp o f thought, it can be realized
only intuitively. The aivite describes the absolute-in-itself
as anuttara. In itself the absolute is anuttara as there can be no
148 KASHMIR SAIVISM
question or answer with regard to it. It cannot be described

as this or 'that as mind is unable to reach it. Being the
highest reality, it is free from all limitation. And even when
it is realized intuitively words cannot be successfully used in
conveying or expressing its nature1. In the Vedanta approach,
Brahman also has been described almost in similar terms.
The Vedntin brings out, with equal force, the utter trans
cendence o f Brahman.
However, inspite o f some apparent similarities between
the two approaches, their conceptions o f absolute are quite
different. Anuttara%the non-relational absolute, is in fact the
absolute unity, the perfect equilibrium (sHmarasya) o f iva
and akti, or being and becoming. The manifestables or
relations are not absolutely negated or annuled but are
merged in its supreme unity. Hence, it is neither describable
by our negations, neti, neti> for we cannot limit it by saying it
is not this, it is not that, nor by our affirmations, for we
cannot fix it by saying, it is this, it is that, iti, iti2. There
may be innumerable visions o f the absolute, and each might
be regarded as true expression o f the absolute, which is All,
the perfect integrality o f everything actual or possible.
In contrast to this, according to the Vedanta Brahman
transcends thought and appearances alike. But transcendence
o f Brahman does not mean integrality or fullness o f being.
Transcendence really means that it is pure being, or being
itself. Appearances do not find any place, in any form, in it.
But the aiva absolutist finds it difficult to reconcile trans
cendence with immanence. He regards the absolute as trans
cendent and yet ^somehow immanent within the world. If
it were merely transcendent, it would be as good as nothing
for us ; we need not, and cannot, speak about it. But if it is
immanent, it becomes relational and its absoluteness becomes
compromised. Here, the Vednta Absolutist faces a special
problem, viz. if the world were not integral to Brahman,
t. Pandey, K . C ., O p. cit. pp. 484-92.

2. Sri A urobindo, Li/e Divine p. 292, Sri A urobindo Library, N ew
York, 1951.
how could Brahman be defined ? The Vedntin tries to

solve the problem by holding that it is not necessary that
the definition must be a real property o f the definitum to
serve as a mark o f distinction. Even an assumed mark can
well serve the purpose. For instance, the branch o f a tree
might indicate the location o f the moon, without really
belonging to it* Similarly, the crow perching on the house
top does serve, sometimes, as a mark to single out a particular
house from other houses, without constituting a permanent
feature of it. Likewise the world also might be taken to be
the indicative o f Brahman without being constitutive o f it.
The Saiva Absolutists do not subscribe to 'the view that
transcendence o f absolute necessarily implies a complete
rejection o f appearances. Parama Siva is both transcendent
and immanent, at the same time. Transcendence, in the
Saiva view, need not imply cancellation o f finitude. The
absolute would no longer be absolute if anything were
excluded from it. Its absoluteness does not consist in the
rejection o f the finite and relative ; on the contrary, its
absoluteness indicates supreme or perfect inclusion or integra
ls tion o f all finitude and relativity. In its embrace, everything
is truly preserved. The fact is that transcendence as such is
not a separate state o f the absolute. Any distinction between
transcendence and immanence can be possible only from the
phenomenal standpoint, otherwise the absolute cannot be
described in any way, not even as nyatlX.
The Saivite holds that, from his point o f view, the
absolute (Samvid) always appears as knower, known and
knowing, in the four states o f manifestation, creation, susten
ance, etc1. Accordingly it has to be assumed that even in
the state o f pure transcendence the appearances are not
reduced to total non-existence* They continue to have exis
tence, in the form o f oneness with the absolute consciousness,
during this state also. As the great Banyan tree lies only
in the farm o f potency in the seed, even so the entire
i- . . qrcmpfai tffa^ fffgftqfa sqrmfacs

smraft sito sin? ^ w fa . . . i T - A- IV- 125
150 KASHMIR SAIVISM
universe with all the mobile and immobile beings lies as a

potency in the heart o f the supreme 1. Just as a peacock with
all its variegated plumage lies as a mere potency in the
plasma o f its egg, even so the entire universe lies in the womb
o f consciousness. Though the absolute transcends thought,
it is also expressed through thought ; it is both transcendent
and immanent. That which is beyond , the same is here ;
that which is here , the same is there . Like the sun which
transcends its rays and also becomes manifest through them,
the absolute transcends the world and also manifests itself
through the world.
On the contrary, the Vedantin insists that if the appear
ances lose all their determinate characteristics in the state o f
absolute unity, there is no ground to assert their existence in
the Transcendent. Even if the appearances are supposed to be
there, we atleast do not have any means o f determining their
existence or presence in the absolute-in-itself. Those who
hold the view that the appearances have some kind of
potential existence would have to face the hard task of ex
plaining the relationship between potentiality and actuality,
substance and attribute, unity and multiplicity, and so on.
Nor does the supposition that the appearances continue to
exist as identical with Divine Power o f manifestation lead us
anywhere. For, in no case is it possible to reconcile absolute
unity with difference. The Vedantin, therefore, holds that
the reality of the appearances is opposed to the reality o f the
absolute. Brahman and world are not two equal realities,
but Brahman is the reality o f the world. From our point o f
view, there can be no passage from the Real to the unreal;
progression is always from appearances to reality.
Transcendence o f Brahman does not mean its otherness.
Brahman alone is the self o f everything. Nor can it be held
that Brahman lias two aspects, an immanent and a trans
cendent aspect. It is immanent in the sense that it is the
am g m r ito n j Quoled by Kshemaraja in

his Para Ptaiodhtka.
TH CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE 151
w orld; apart from Brahman the world has no existence.

Being the subject o f every judgement, Brahman is denoted by
every term. It has been described as the indescribable, spoken
o f as the unspeakable. Brahman alone is the reality in all
appearances. Even the this , in the judgement 'this is snake ,
is false in so far as it appears as the snake. Brahman as the
ndhnra has more phenomenality than Brahman as adhisthn,
which is wholly transcendent to the phenomena.
The above mentioned differences in the conception o f
absolute arise mainly from the basically different approaches
in the two systems. Although there are many points o f
agreement between them as regards the pure non-dual
character o f the absolute, there are fundamental differences
between them regarding the nature of transcendence. In
the aiva Absolutism, transcendence does not mean total
rejection o f appearances. It does not accept the view o f
absolutely new creation, nor the view o f absolute destruc
tion. In the Vedanta Absolutism, on the contrary, this very
standpoint leads to an opposite conclusion. Precisely because
there can be no new creation, there is no real creation ; all
creation is false. There can be no appearance o f absolute ;
all appearances arc illusory or false (i.e. viuarta). The Real
has nothing to do with the appearances.
2. Absolute and Reason

Here, the question arises that in our attempt to determine
the nature o f absolute, how far is it possible to rely on our
intellect ? T o what extent is it significant in determining the
nature o f the absolute ? In other words, it amounts to a
demand to know the place or role o f reason in the constitu
tion o f the absolute. Does the absolute wholly exclude
reason ? Or, is it merely rational ? Further, is there any
thing else than reason, such as will or feeling, etc., which
can also successfully convey the nature o f absolute ?
Reasoning or tarka itself is not included among the
Pramnnas in Indian philosophy. It is supposed to function
merely as an auxiliary o f the PrainHnaSy and as an auxiliary
152 KASHMIR SAIVISM
alone does it contribute to the production o f knowledge.

Independent o f the PramUna, reasoning cannot establish the
existence or non-existence o f anything. Moreover, there is
no universal agreement as regards the conclusion derived from
reasoning What one logician establishes as valid knowledge, the
same is contradicted by another o f superior merit; the conclu
sions o f the second logician are refuted by the third, and so on.
Nor is it possible to gather at the same time and place all the
logicians, past, present and future, to arrive at universal
agreement1. In fact, reasoning does not lead us far. It
proves to be inconclusive in the end.
The tragedy o f reason, as Bradley pointed out, is that it
artificially divides experience and, holding apart these artifi
cially divided aspects the content* from the 'for n*, the 'what*
from the that , attempts somehow to understand the whole
o f experience. Being essentially relational, it cannot give us
the knowledge o f the absolute, which transcends relations.
The absolute includes whole o f experience, but reason stands
for one aspect o f experience alone. Intellectual or cognitive
experience is not the whole experience. And, simply because
the absolute is not completely open to intellectual knowledge
it cannot be held that the absolute is as good as nothing. It
only shows that reason is not fully competent to reveal the
nature o f reality. Being the whole o f reality, the absolute
cannot become an object o f thinking or knowing, Thought
cannot fully express the experience o f feeling or willing2.
In order to know Brahman one has to become Brahman. As
Brahman is not reason alone, therefore, complete experience
of Brahman would imply a realization o f all elements o f
experience, reason constituting only one element in it. Thus,
reason, in order to be competent to give us knowledge o f
reality, has to be corrected and supplemented by other aspects
o f experience.
l. S. B. II. I. u .
2* 'I fio not know what I feci ; the more deeply and intensely I
feel, the less I know What 1 feel. If I have words for it, adequate
w ords, the feeling is not deep and intense; if I have no words
f>r it, I myself do not know what I fe e l. Kaufman, op. c it; p. 120
Similarly, no pramria, whether individually or collec

tively, can wholly reveal the existence and nature o f the absol
ute, the ultimate subject, which manifests all Pram$as. It is
only the particular, which is a modification, that can be
defined ; Brahman, which is not a modification, cannot be
defined1. Brahman is beyond the reach o f mind and speech
and is different from the known and unknown. The known
is the manifest differentia*ed into names and forms ; the
unknown is the manifest nescience, the root o f the manifest2.
It has been distinctly stated in the Vednta Sutras that
reason should be taken as subordinate auxiliary to intuitional
knowledge contained in the scriptures3. Whereas reasoning
proceeds from characteristic mark*, it is difficult to say that
Brahman is characterised by this or that attribute, or else we
would be limiting the absolute1. Hence there can be no
inferential knowledge o f Brahman. However, the main diffi
culty as regards the possibility o f an inferential knowledge o f
Brahman is that inference is purely a formal process. One
can start from anything and argue to anything else one likes
without any necessity for the conclusion being true5.
All attempts of reason to know the knower are bound to
fail. There can be no knowledge o f ithe knower other than
that revealed by the absolute itself. Those who try to establish
the existence o f BraBman do not really bring it into being.
And if proving means revealing, then also it is o f 110 use in the
case o f absolute light. There can be proving or disproving of
the Supreme Lord, who is essentially Omnipotent, Omniscient
and Eternal. As the entire universe is merely a manifestation
o f the absolute, therefore, what kind o f subject, with what
means o f knowledge, regarding what kind of Lord, can
advance proof or disproof leading to the knowledge of His
being or not-being ? Infact, ultimately the knowing subject,
1. Saiiikaras com m entary on Tait. up. II . 6-7
2. S. li. 1. 4
3. SB II. I. 6,11.
4. Gaudpda Krik, III. 26.
5. Saslri, S. S ., Critical Idealism and the Advaita Vedanta* A
com parison o f M ethods, M ysore University Journal.
154 KASHMIR AIVISM
the object and the means o f knoweldge arc not different from
the absolute1. Thus, any attempt to prove the supreme would
be like the attempt to put ones foot over ones own shadow
or like dancing over ones own shoulders2.
Brahman can only be known through the traditionally
handed down teachings o f the acHryas and not through reason-
ing, eloquence, deep learning, ascetic practices or sacrifice.
In fact, there can be no proper hearing , sravai}ay o f the holy
texts without the association with a Guru. Scripture is the
only proper recourse to us, when all other resources fail, as
regards the knowledge o f the absolute. Nor is it proper to
say that, besides Sruti, other pramijas may also apply to
Brahman because it is existent. For, being devoid o f colour,
form, etc., Brahman cannot become an object o f perception.
It is also not amenable to inference etc. because o f its not
having any characteristic mark. Like duty it is to be known
solely through the scripture3, or revelation, which is the
knowledge revealed to the seer and the prophet during the
moments o f highest exaltation*
As opposed to finite reason, divine revelation might be
described as the logic o f the infinite. An exalted place is
given to the logic o f the infinite in both the Vednta and
Saiva Absolutisms. It is the light which enables us to
transcend the barriers o f finite logic which otherwise leads
to skepticism and agnosticism. The Vedntins, like
Vcaspati, go to the extent o f holding that only the Scrip
tural revelation is to be relied on ; it is undoubtedly surer
and stronger than perception.4 Revelation gives us the
original truth; reason only works upon the truths provided
by revelation. Intuition or insight first leads us to hold
beliefs, which are confirmed or refuted by subsequent
reasoning. The fact is that reasoning is merely a harmonis
ing and controlling force, and not a creative one.5
1. Bhaskari, v ol. I, p. 47-56.

2. P. H . pp. 36-7.
3. SB. II. 1 .6 .
4. SiddhTmtalesa Saihgraka, p. 280-1, Chowkhamba ed.
5. Russell, B., Mysticism and Logic, p. 13.
But Scriptures do not come in conflict with other sources

o f knowledge. They provide us knowledge o f the non*
empirical. Though the absolute is not known by any other
Prama except revelation, the revelatory knowledge is
supplemented by all other means o f knowledge. The
inquiry into Brahman, unlike the inquiry into Dharma,
admits o f other Pramijas besides Scripture, and all other
Prampas are to be used according to the o cca sio n /1 ruti
is neither opposed to reason, nor does it render reason
useless. On the contrary, reason occupies a very important
place even within the sphere o f ruti Though reasoning
becomes superfluous with regards to the truth which has
been categorically and finally taught in the scriptures, it
would not be so in the cases where doubts arise in the
inquiring minds Revealed truths appear quite strange and
unbelievable and are not easily accepted by the mind.
Hence the use o f reasoning is necessary in order to remove
doubts regarding knowledge given by the Scriptures.
Further, reasoning also connects the teachings o f the scrip
tures with the experience o f our daily life and thus enables
us to gain an insightful knowledge o f the revealed truth.2
Advaitism, which is originally accepted on the authority o f
revelation, can also be demonstrated by reason.3 The
Vedantin, therefore, shows how the advaita can be demon
strated by reason. The Lord whom we know from the
tradition, possesses the powers o f knowledge and action ;
even if he be not known as such from tradition, he has to
be admitted as such from reason.4 - Reasoning is also useful
in clearing the apparent contradiction between one
revelation and another. The value and importance o f
reasoning in ascertaining the correct sense o f revelation
has been widely accepted,5 However, we should not over-
j * rofaiarararfa* sransg ^ swm atgfsiararat,

I SB. I. I. 2.
2. Samkaras Commentary on Brh. Up. IV . I I I . 21.
3. Saiikara s Commentary on Gaufjapda Krik III.
4. IP V . I, 1 .3 .
5. Satkara s Co/nmentary on Brh. Up. H I . 9. 7.
156 KASHMIR SAIVISM
look the fact that reasoning becomes effective only in so far

as it subserves true revelation 1
It is often held that belief in revelation is essentially

dogmatic. For, though we might assign an important
place to reason, the final court o f appeal is revelation and
not reason. How do we know that a given revelation is
true or false ? Various criteria by which we can differen
tiate between a true revelation and a false one have been
mentioned. But none o f these can be regarded as a
necessary or sufficient criterion.2 Nor can the validity o f
revelation be established on the basis o f miracles. For, if
miracle be supposed to be something utterly im probable, it
is quite likely that our senses might have deceived us.
Further, there is no universal agreement about miracles ;
what appears to be a miracle to one individual need not be
so to the other. In short, appeal to miracle is circular. A
miracle requires faith; to those who lack faith it is not a
miracle.3
It is the age old problem of Faith versus Reason. Hema-

cu<} expressed similar doubts to his wife Hemalekh* : one
should no doubt have faith in words o f the wise, but then,
one can have faith only when one had some grounds for
it. * How can one have faith without being convinced o f the
results ?
! ^ c r fq * 1 * 3 ^ 3 1 ^ I SB. I. I. 2.
2. As Kaufman asks, what is the criteria by which to differentiate
between a true revelation and a false one ? Five criteria have been
m entioned; subjective certainty, it would sanction every fanati
cism ; the result, but it presupposes a value standard by which to
judge the result ; it must not conflict with any accepted tradition,
but great religious figures have generally always opposed the
tradition ; St. Thom as, Paul T illich etc. held that it should
not be opposed to reason, but it leaves room for a multitude
o f sins ; it must not be explainable in wholly naturalistic terms,
but even ordinary vision, hearing or dream, is not wholly
explainable naturalistically. Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 89-92.
3. Kaufman, op. cit.
4. Tripura Rahasya, Jnana knda, chapter V I.
In order to remove the doubts o f her husband, HemalekhS

said that faith is essential in life. A person is able to com m u
nicate with the other only because he believes the other.
I f we give up faith completely, we would either think
absurdly or we would cease to think about the truth. T o
bring it home to her husband, she narrates the story o f
a disciple o f the sage Kauika, named Sunga. Sunga was
a master o f argumentation and held that since truth is that
which is probable on some logical grounds this very propo
sition is not probable by any logic, because any reason which
proves this, if they are defective, is untrue. Hence one
should first o f all try to prove whether the grounds them-
selve are free from defects or not and in order to prove
the ground o f this ground, one must have some other ground
to prove the truth o f this. Thus it will lead to an infinite
regress. It is not even possible to determine the nature o f the
knower, known and the instrument o f knowing. So all
this that is seen is phantasmal appearance or nothingness,
and even this nothingness is nothing, because it is not
possible to prove it by any logical reason. Hence every
thing is nothingness.
The final criterion o f truth is neither reason, nor revela
tion, but ones own intuitive experience.1 Truth cannot be
grasped wholly through intellect; it has to be realized in
ones own experience. Mere intellectual knowledge would
not lead to a realization o f truth, unless it is accompanied
by direct personal experience. Revelation or ruti, in it
self, is not sufficient. Ultimately both reason and revelation
turn out to be merely subsidiary aid to the realization o f
truth. In the end both must be transcended in order to
have direct experience.2 Just as reason requires the guida
nce o f revelation, revelation also depends upon reason for
clarification o f its true meaning. Finally, however, both
reason and revelation become meaningful only when expe
rience takes place. It is misleading to renounce all revela
tion. But it is even more misleading to reject all reason and
1. Hiriyana, M ., Studies in Indian Philosophy, vol. I, P. 49.
2. SB I. II. 2
158 K A SH M IR AIVISM
experience and accept revelation alone. And as there can

be no real opposition between reason and revelation, both
can be accepted as subsidiary to experience. When the import
o f Scriptures is not clear, it can be understood in accordance
with every day experience.1 For, not even a hundred texts
which declare fire to be cold and devoid o f light can be acce
ptable; not even a hundred texts can force things to abandon
their nature.2 Opposition to seen is, in fact, what no thinker
has ever vouched.3 Nor is it the aim o f Scriptures to distort
the true nature o f things. No amount o f reasoning or illu
stration can prove a thing to be o f a different nature than
its own, e. g. that the sun gives no heat or that the fire is
cold, for other pramnas represent these objects to be diffe
rent in nature. Nor is one pramUna contradicted by another
pramr.a. The Scriptures also cannot make the unknown
known without using words in the sense in which they are
used in the w orld.4
Here, it might be asked that if we refuse to accept the

authority o f the Scripture in some matters, how can we
accept its authority in the case o f Brahman ? In reply to
this, amkara holds that there is the possibility o f the
Scriptural statement being contradicted in the case o f
knowledge within experience. But there can be no possibi
lity o f contradiction arising in the case o f Brahman, where
there is no avidy. The knowledge o f the finite is always
conditional. But the knowledge o f Brahman, which,
ex-hypothesi, excludes the possibility o f correction, is not
conditional.5
The aiva and the Vednta absolutists interprete the

role or significance o f revelation in their own ways. While
both o f them attempt to resolve the contradictions o f reason
1. Ib id. IV . 1.5
Sax&kara's Commentary on G ita, X V I I I . 66
3. 5T ^ s f a t t a | Sarikara on Bth. U p. I 4.10

4. Ibid II. I. 10.
5. Sac6kara*s Commentary on Gt, X V I I I . 66.
through an appeal to revelation, their motives for this are

fundamentally different. The aivite, through an appeal
to ruti, aims at overcoming the conflicts o f thought.
According to him the conflicts exist only in the realm o f
finite thought. There are no conflicts or contradictions in
the Mogie o f the Infinite.* ruti helps us in understanding
the true nature o f the world which is a manifestation
(abhasa) o f the Lord himself. On the other hand, the
chief aim o f the VedSntin is to establish, through an appeal
to ruti, the ultimate illusoriness o f the world. For him the
real function o f knowledge is negative; when knowledge
dawns, appearances vanish. The absolute is not to be
known as qualified or disqualified by the manifold o f
effects. The teaching o f the Scripture, on the contrary,
is that having dissolved through knowledge the world effects
produced by Nescience, we should seek to know Brahman,
the immutable receptacle o f all 1 Thus the Vedntin tries
to bring out the central purport o f Upanisads, and also
other texts, upholding a fullfledged acosmic thesis. His
acceptance o f Scripture really amounts to a denial o f it.
Ultimately the bruti also has to be discarded; for what the
bruti and other pramSoas deal with are merely products o f
nescience.2 The aim o f the bstra is the removal o f all
distinctions created by avidyH; its purport is not to represent
Brahman as this* or that object.3 The sole fruit o f know
ledge is removal o f the obstacle lying in the way o f freedom.4
The fruition o f the PramSgas consists in producing know
ledge which also involves their negation or annulment.
In the aiva Absolutism, the btlstras are regarded as real
manifestation o f the Para Vk, the transcendental speech.
They are the valid means o f knowledge revealed by the
highest Lord Himself.6 They represent the knowledge which
1. * i sb i . i i i . i .
2. I SB. Intr.
3. I ibid
4. \ ib id .
5. ^ snTKJFJ \ T .S . P. 4
160 KASHMIR AIVISM
descends from the level o f the absolute consciousness to the

level o f the finite. From another point o f view, they stand
for the universe as originating from the transcendental speech
In its original state the universe consisted o f the Parti- Vdk9
which is Pfirpa Ahamta or absolute self-cosciousness. When
creation takes plac these Sstras are gradually manifest in
the form o f Paiyanti, Madhyim and Vaikhatl. Paiyantl, the
first form, is the vision o f the entire universe in an undiffer
entiated form. Later it assumes the form o f the Madkyam1L9
which is a state between the undifferentiated and the differen
tiated vision o f the universe. The Vaikharl state stands for
the grossified form o f the universe. The various &tstras, as
they are now with us, are nothing but the divine Madhya-
mS assuming these forms and flowing out as the Vaikharl
in the five streams representing the five faces o f iva, called
Ibna, Tatpurusa, SadyojSta, Aghora and Varna. These faces
represent five aspects o f absolute Power, viz. cit, nanda,
icchy jtixa and kriy.1 Thus it is the Parama Siva himself
who appears in the form o f stras. They bring to our
notice His powers o f knowledge, will and action and remove
the wrong idea about His true nature.2
It is mostly because o f this difference in their inter
pretations o f the role o f the Castras that there arises a
significant difference in the m ethodology o f the two
systems. The integral method o f approach finds great
favour in the Saiva Absolutism. This method proves to be
universally comprehensive and all embracing. Here sense-
perception, inference, reason, testimony and all other
resources o f knowledge are fully utilised in establishing the
absoluteness o f G od. Contradictions or conflicts do not
cause much inconvenience to the integralists. The absolute
being the ultimate subject o f all predication, every negation
or limitation and every contradiction or conflict really
belongs to the absolute. And in belonging to the absolute
these negations etc. are not cancelled or rejected, but are
harmonised or synthesised in sllmarasya or absolute integrality.
1. Chattcrjee, J. C ., Kashmir iatvism , pp. 3-6.
2. IP V . I. 1 .3 .
As such they are to be regarded as manifestation o f integral

unity. The Vedntin, on the other hand, adopts the well
known method o f double negation.*
3. The two Negations
A brief mention o f the criticism by aiva Absolutists o f
some opponents views about ultimate reality might help us
in understanding the &aiva conception o f the absolute. It
would enable us to see how through the refutation o f the
opposite views the aiva Absolutist develops his own
theory o f reality. For every system is determined not only
by the positive content which it attempts to express, but
also by the views it wishes toôppose.1 Abhinava Gupta
tells us that the absolute reality, as conceived in his system,
is made quite clear if the opposite views are first postulated
and then refuted.*
Since the SThkhya bifurcation o f the real, the Supreme
Person, into two separate realities through its postulation
o f Purusa and Prakrti the eternal being and eternal
becoming ( Ktastha Nitya and Parinm Nitya ) entire
Iiidian thinking has been overshadowed by dualistic)
tendencies. Unfortunately, many systems have assumed,
directly or indirectly, the reality o f this division. Moreover,*
as these systems were unable to bridge the gulf between
Purusa and Prakrti, they took the desperate step o f
solving the problem by a shortcut method, viz., the method
o f negation. It appeared to them that they could bridge
the gulf only if they reject one o f the dualities. It is this
very attitude o f rejection or negation which has sundered
human experience into two parts, Jiva and Ajva or
cetana and jada. This very attitude is responsible for the
discrimination between Samsdra and Nirvana, Brahman
and M y.3
Accordingly, some systems accepted the reality o f the
pure Witness Consciousness (Purusa) and denied the reality
1. Radhakrishnan. S., Indian Philosophy, V ol. I, p. 473.
2. Bhskar, V ol. I,%p. 82.
3. .Zimmer, op. cit., p. 595-6.
162 K ASH M IR A IV ISM
o f Prakrti. Other systems, on the other hand, adopted the

path o f expounding the sole reality o f pure becoming, the
eternal nature, and rejected the eternal spirit as illusory.
For, as Sri Aurobindo says, if we assert only pure spirit
and a mechanical unintelligent substance or energy, the
inevitable result would be that we shall either deny the
spirit or turn away from nature. Thought comes to deny
the former as an illusion o f the imagination or the latter as
the illusion o f the senses.1 Thus, stemming separately from
either Purusa or Prakrti vision two extreme lines o f
thought have developed in Indian Philosophy. Each line
develops by refuting or rejecting the other. Vet, in the
end none could succeed in bridging the gulf which has
been artificially created in the Sriikhya. Out o f the
vision o f the eternal {Nitya) develops the tmavJLda o f the
VedSnta according to which Atman, the* being eternal,
alone is real and the world o f becoming is only apparently
real. In this way, the tman or Purusa vision culminated
in the theory called M&yv&da. On the other hand, the
Prakrti vision develops in the Buddhist doctrine o f no-soul
(AnMmaoda), according to which atman or spirit is an
illusion o f the imagination. This view inevitably leads to
the doctrine o f void, &nyavda3 in Madhyamika Buddhism.
However, side by side with these negative approaches,

there was developing a positive approach in Indian thought
which affirms the reality o f both nature and spirit and
denies the duality strongly.2 In the aiva vision o f reality
such negative attitudes arise from narrow and sectarian
views o f reality. In a proper course o f development
thought, after having drawn a preliminary distinction
between Purusa and Prakrti, should rise to the conception
o f supreme unity in the end. Although to begin with, our
understanding may form a conception o f duality, yet it
1. L ife Divine, p. 9.
2. ' Yet, there flourished in India, side by side with this attitude
o f negation, a vigorous affirmation o f theworld o f flux and time,
which is as fearless and absolute, in its own way, as the
unflinching self-transcendence o f the Y o g is /* Zimmer, op. cit.
should aim at attaining the absolute non-duality.1 The

fact that Abhinava Gupta bases the ParamtlrthasHra9 one
o f his important works, on the foundations laid down by
S5mkhya and admits that the work originally belongs to
Kapila, the founder o f the Samkhya system, clearly shows
the importance o f SSihkhya dualism in the development o f
integral absolutism.
The negation of the Anatmavadins

The term antmavda* in the present work has been used
for those theories in which the reality o f the phenomenal
world alone is accepted and the reality o f self or spirit is
denied. We may regard Materialism and Buddhism as
important types o f antmavda. The term atmauda> has been
employed to express the doctrine in which the phenomenal
world is regarded as unreal and the spirit alone is accepted
as ultimately real. W e have used this term exclusively for
the Advaita Vedanta.2
The aiva absolutist disagrees with the materialist, who
regards matter alone to be ultimately real. Monism o f
matter is self-contradictory. In order to prove or disprove
a particular view the first and foremost condition is that
the reality o f a free and conscious subject be accepted.
But, there being no conscious subject according to the
materialist, how can the absolutism o f matter be established ?
Nor can we regard consciousness to be a fortuitous emer
gence o f material elements. Because in reality it is matter
which is dependent on consciousness, and not vice versa.
Matter cannot be an independent reality in itself. Only
that can be regarded as independent which does not depend
upon anything for its manifestation. But matter is nothing
1. P. S. Karika, 2-3.
2. There is, however, the risk that in some sense these terms might
convey wrong ideas about what a system stands for. For example,
it might be held that the Buddhists, like Mdhyamika and the
Yogacora, cannot properly be called Anatmavadins. For, what
these systems really deny is not transcendent self but the
empirical self. The &nya and the Vijnana themselves might
be represented to be something like 'Self.*
164 KA SH M IR AIVISM
in itself without the light o f consciousness. Hence the view

that matter reveals itself is unsound. Further, that which
is different from Light cannot be regarded as having
existence at all. In the absence o f light anything can be
asserted o f anything. In that case, one could even hold
that the blue* in itself is y ellow / or that it is nothing
in itself. Its being is essentially a manifestation o f the
light o f consciousness.1 Only that which is sentient, on
whose background alone the so-called existing things, viz.,
jar, blue, pleasure, etc., as well as their non-being, shine, is
real. And this background is also nothing but the light o f
consciousness.2
Though the Buddhist does not bind himself completely
to the materialist view, yet, like the materialist, he also
regards the permanent self as unreal. A ccording to him,
all our experience is confined essentially to the realm o f
change or becoming. The transitory and the momentary
alone is available to us. He holds, like Hume, that we
never catch the permanent or the eternal in us. Adopting
mainly the viewpoint o f the senses, the Buddhist ultimately
snatches permanency from matter and spirit alike and
postulates the reality o f the momentary alone.
According to the aivite, the Buddhist doctrine o f

momentariness is not self-consistent. I f the luminosity o f
an object be identical with, or wholly confined to, the
object itself, i.e. if it does not transcend the object, then
the object should always be manifest to all persons, or to
none. Again, as between two independent things logically
none can be regarded as being dependent upon the other,
in reality the object should be confined to itself, e.g. it
would be blue* only in itself. Thus it would imply that it
is nothing in itself. As no judgment can be possible in the
absence o f the luminosity o f consiousness, the blue* in
itself may be regarded either as b lu e / or also as n ot-b lu e/
or even both blue and not-blue. The same may also be
1. I. P. V ., I. V. 2-3.
2. Ibid. I. 1. 3. Also SN I. 2.
THE CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE 165'
said with regard to the light o f consciousness which is non-

different from the object. The light which is limited to
itself would either be nothing or everything in itself.
Hence if the theory o f momentariness be accepted, one
would not be able to assert anything at all.
In order to avoid this difficulty, it has to be admitted

that the light o f consciousness which manifests itself as the
object is essentially the absolute light or universal conscious
ness (Samvid) itself. Otherwise, if the light be supposed
to be different in the case o f different objects, every objec*
would be confined to itself and there will be no possibility
o f knowing anything.1 The objects can be manifest only
if they are one with luminosity and they can be one only
if the luminosity is universal. The same light which appears
in the form o f cloth* appears in the form o f jar* also.
And though this light appears in the form o f different
objects, it is not multiple in character. Its multiplicity is
essentially due to the limiting adjuncts constituted by
body etc., which are material.
Its commitment to the belief in momentariness ultimately

lands Buddism in nihilism*. The reality o f both the aspects
o f our experience, the changing and the parmanent, is redu
ced to a mere nothingness on the theory o f momentariness. Ii
makes all judgment, communication and expression, impossi
ble. The nothing* or the nihil* becomes the great truth,
nyavda is, thus, the inevitable result o f any belief in
absolute momentariness.
Because o f the complete transcendence o f the absolute-

in-itself, thought forms the impression that the absolute is
essentially o f the nature o f inyat or vacuity. But the
indeterminateness o f the absolute need not be interpreted as
nothingness*. Due to the inability o f the finite intellect
to comprehend the infinite, the inscrutable richness o f the
absolute often appears as mere barrenness. Our incapa
city to define the nature o f the absolute need not persuade
1. I. P. V ., I , V . 2-3.
166 K ASH M IR AIVISM
u sto the belief that it is nothing.1 However, if it is held

that the absolute is regarded as nya only because o f its
transcendence to thought, or that snyat stands for the
transcendence o f the phenomenal, then the Saivite would
have nothing to complain. He will only add that besides
inyat freedom, which is the essential characteristic o f
consciousness, also belongs to the absolute.
Moreover, inyat must at least be characterised as
being*. An absolute non-existence cannot even be con
ceived. If ianya be non-existent, then the question would
arise whether this non-existence itself is existent or not.
If the the former be the case, then obviously it has existence.
In the latter case, i e. if it did not have existence, it does not
even exist. In either case, the absolutism o f snyat cannot
be maintained. Just as darkness presupposes light for its
very existence and manifestation, similarly inyat or non
existence presupposes existence. Absolute negation is impo
ssible. Denial or rejection o f something as unreal is possible
only with reference to something which is real. Negation
becomes possible only if there is some positive reality. I f
everything is denied and nothing is left, then even denial
itself is denied. Or otherwise, denial itself becomes a
reality.
In fact, the aivite holds that snyat is not ultimate. It

is only a lower state o f reality. It presupposes the light o f
consciousness as its substratum and revealer. Accordingly,
it is a mere manifestation o f the light as self-limited. It
appears as ultimate only to the finite subject. When, in its
search for the absolute, the individual arrives at this state
everything appears as negated and nothingness appears to
be the highest truth. But in reality it is not the highest
state. There are still higher visions in which the state o f
snyat or nothingness is transcended. In fact, not-being
is only a word, a mere symbol, through which the finite
tries to comprehend the infinite. Actually, when we perceive
closely the nihil o f certain philosophies, we begin to
1. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit. p. 665.

realise that it is a zero which is the AH, or an indefinable

Infinite which appears to the mind as a blank, because the
mind grasps only finite constructions, but it is in fact the
only true existence.1 The Yogins who have attained higher
spiritual status have crossed the limitations o f the finite
mind. They have successfully transcended the state o f
nyat. The &Qnyavdins, therefore, can well serve them
selves and humanity if they sincerely approach the Yogins
who have realised the mystery o f the nya.2
I f the ultimate reality be conceived as nya then
salvation would become meaningless. How can nothingness
or Nirvana be regarded as the highest aim o f life ? The
great Nirvana, o f which the Buddhists speak so highly, is
enjoyed daily by all individuals in the state o f dreamless
sleep. When Nirvana is so easily available, where is the
necessity o f trying to acquire the state o f sQnyata through
meditation, etc. ?8 T o regard such a state o f nothingness*
as the highest reward o f a virtuous life would mean a
complete destruction o f human values.
According to the YogSLcSra the oijndna alone is real.
For him external objects are unreal. But the question
arises how can the unreal come out o f the real ? M ore
over, knowledge, being essentially an activity, presupposes
an active subject. It is the subject who is presupposed in
all acts o f knowing. But if knowledge itself is taken to be
the subject, then the distinction between the two is obli
terated. Knowledge cannot be characterised both as the
agent and the act. For two contradictory characteristics
cannot belong to one and the same thing simultaneously.
And if the same vijnna be admitted to be an agent at one
moment and the act at another, then it would no longer
remain momentary. But if the subject and the object both
are regarded as essentially identical, then there is no
fundamental diffrence between the YogcSra and the
aivite. The Yogcra should admit that the objects which
are reflected in consciousness are essentially identical with
1. L. D . p. 29.
2. S. N. Chapter I.
3. Ibid.
KASH M IR SATVM
it. For, the very possibility o f knowledge and action pre

supposes such identity.
The object cannot be regarded as unreal. Our sense
organs function with regard to the object only when there
is a will ~to that effect. For instance, one sees the pot
only when there is a desire to see it. But the desire can be
possible only if the object be supposed to be real. Hence
the existence o f the object has to be postulated in order
tht the functional activity o f the sense organs may begin.
And the object exists already as one with the subject, the
object o f perception (d f$ y a ) is already included in the
consciousness o f the perceiver (d fs t ).
The negation of Atmavadins
Both the negations, the negation o the antmavdin and
o f the tmavadin, ultimately lead to snyata. nyat is the
logical conclusion at which both the approaches arrive.
But the highest reality represents the truth o f both aspects
o f experience. Somehow, both change and permanence
are real manifestations o f the absolute which is an equili
brium o f both being and becom ing, or iva akti Smarasya.
If we accept only one o f the dualities as real and
reject the other as illusory, in the end the other also, which
we accept as real, would be reduced to nothing. Without the
one the other has no meaning. The real monism or true
advaita is that which admits all things as the one Brahman
and does not seek to bisect its existence into two incom pa
tible entities, an eternal truth and an eternal falsehood,
Brahman and not-Brahman, self and not-self. I f it is true
that the self alone exists, it must be also true that all is the
self.1 The self and the not-self are the two inseparable
aspects o f the absolute conceived in two ways only through
abstraction. Pure being itself is a becoming as well;
similarly becoming also is a self-becoming o f the absolute
being. Parmenides and Heraclitus were both right. The
real must somehow be an eternal activity which returns
upon itself, and this whole activity is somehow broken up
into the lesser activities which are our own.2
1. L . D . p . 3 1 .
2. Cleobury, F. H ., God, Man and Absolute, p. 105.

T h e c o n c e p t io n o f a b s o l u t e 16*
If we accept being and becoming as separate and

approach the absolute either in terms o f the one or the
other, we would finally be facing the fate o f Snyavda.
We have seen that antmavda, in which the reality o f the
spirit is denied, proves untenable. It arrives at nihilism in
the end. Likewise, according to the aivite, the sole
acceptance* o f being and the denial o f becoming also
ultimately leads to nihilism.
In its attempt to understand the absolute the finite mind
divides it into separate parts. By its very nature, it can
affirm something only at the cost o f denying the other.
Thus, the negation o f being or becom ing originates from
the essential limited nature of the finite mind. Because of
this essential limitation it cannot comprehend the fullness
and integrality o f reality, Hence it has to employ the
method o f negation in order to grasp the infinite. As Sri
Aurobindo says, there is something behind the phenomena
which is not only infinite but is also indefinable in terms o f
ordinary thought the very conception o f movement or flow
carries with it the potentiality o f repose and betrays itself as
an activity o f some existence, the very idea o f energy in
action carries with it the idea o f energy abstaining from
action, and an absolute energy not in action is simply and
purely absolute existence.
Many philosophers, like the Vedntins, the Buddhists, and
others, have fallen into the great ocean o f ignorance and have
accepted snyat as the ultimate reality. For, it is difficult for
the ignorant to transcend the state o f nothingness. Indeed,
snyat proved a great obstacle even in case o f those persons
who were about to realise the highest state, viz., Prnatva,
in the Saiva tradition. It is only through constant and
rigorous efforts that one can transcend the barriers o f the
finite logic. The moment our efforts slacken, the ultimate
appears to us as mere nothingness. 1 That is how the
Brahmavdins, who are o f the opinion o f non-being and
fa* ^ s js f r c i : i sn, p. 29.

k a s h m ir Sa i v i s m
who assert that this Universe was non-being, also arrive at

the sphere o f inya and rest content with it.1
Pure being cannot be regarded as the absolute. Although

the Ved&ntins represent a definite advance upon the
nihilists, in as much as they lay emphasis upon the being
aspect o f reality, they also go to the other extreme and
deny all becoming. Pure being, which excludes all
becoming and, thus, stands in opposition to it, cannot be
ultimate reality. As a first principle, the changeless is, o f
course, insufficient. Our ultimate reality must have
qualities o f both changelessness and change.2
In fact, the being approach o f the Vedanta suffers from

the same defects as the becoming approach o f the Buddhist.8
Like the inactive Purusa in the Samkhya or the unya
in the Madhyamika, the Brahman in the Vedanta is also
devoid o f freedom. Though Brahman has been described
as being-consciousness-bliss, yet being devoid of freedom
it also becomes material like the nya. What constitutes
the chief characteristic o f the sentient (caitanya), as
opposed to the insentient, is its power o f freedom with
regard to manifestation. In the absence o f this power o f
freedom, it would rather be impossible to distinguish
consciousness from matter, caitanya from jada. The fact
is that absolute materiality is mere nyat or nothingness.
Praksa (light) would in no way differ from the inert
crystal, if it did not possess the capacity to reflect the
objects according to its w ill.4 I f it were devoid o f freedom,
consciousness would be as good as nothing. Moreover,
pure consciousness is never known in experience. Experience
always points towards consciousness as being qualified.
1. P. H. p. 42.
2. H ocking, E., The M eaning o f God, p. 189.
t ^ am ? a?, * 5
^ 5 ^ 5 ^ 4 ,......... P T V ., p. 221. Also SN. p. 23.
4. I. P. V ., I. V. 11.
T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a b s o lu T li
Thus, the theory o f pure consciousness is a mere figment o f

imagination. The exponents o f pure consciousness fail to
provide any adequate evidence in support o f their view.
Ultimately the theory o f pure advaitism fails to account
for the phenomenal world. Such advaitism is strictly
narrow and one-sided.
I f we postulate an absolutely unqualified and inactive
principle as the uitimate reality, we* would, in effect,
condemn it to the fate o f ultimate dualism. Such an ultimate
would be wholly incompetent and powerless in relation to
the world, as the latter would be completely independent
o f the former. We will always find that the breakdown
and failure o f a system in the end is due to its unreconciled
dualism. For, if we begin with a monistic principle and
in the end fail to deduce everything from it, we virtually
surrender monism and accept dualism.
Nor is it reasonable to regard, as the Vedntin does, the
world as unreal. For, if the world which is given in experi
ence is supposed to the unreal, then the experience o f
Brahman would also be unreal. Both being and becoming
are equally given in experience; how can one be regarded
as real and the other as unreal ? If it is said that the
world o f duality is false, then it can also be asserted that
similarly pure unity is also proved to be false because o f
the experience o f duality,1 The aivite holds fast to the
principle that nothing which is manifest in experience can
be regarded as unreal.3
The Vedntins also fail to explain the concept of My.
It is difficult to maintain advaitism on the doctrine of
My. The more the Vedntin tries to do so, the more
difficult it becomes for him. Advaitism can really be establi
shed only on the view that Brahman and My are essenti
ally one, or that the latter constitutes the essential nature
o f the former. My is like the cloud which covers the
Sun, but which is itself revealed by the Sun.3 T o hold that
1. I. P. V .. II. IV . 20.
2. Ibid. Also, S*N . I. 3.
3. K aviraj, G., Bharatiya Samskrti aur Sadhana, p . 5.
m* 1KASH M IR SAIVISM
Brahman and My are different would amount to an

acceptance o f dualism. We have to explain the nature of
My arid answer the question T o whom does it belong ?
It cannot belong to Brahman who is pure being, nor can
it belong to the individual ( jtva) which is a product o f
M y. If it is held to be inexplicable, then th question
arises as to w hom is it inexplicable ? It would be wrong to
say that it is inexplicable to itself. And if it is held that
it is inexplicable' because it transcends reason, then why
should one unnecessarily search after a reason which dis
regards experience ? What is the fun in searching after
something which would invalidate experience P1 The
Saivite claims that this state o f inexplicability could be
transcended in the higher states o f realization. While all
other systems o f thought fail to make a distinction between
My and Suddha M y, the Saivite has been very
keen, to emphasize this distinction. These systems
could not fully account for the experience o f the mystics
and seers who have transcended the state o f nyat and
My. They have the vision o f reality in which all
conflicts and contradictions are harmonised.
In the end the Vedntin is forced to accept a sort of
dualism which is not much different from the Purusa-
Prakrti dualism o f the Smkhya. Both the Sriikhya and
the Vedntin start with the postulation o f Prakrti and
My as different from pure consciousness. But neither
Prakfti nor My can be regarded as the real cause o f the
world. Both systems fail to explain the relationship between
transcendent Brahman and Purusa on the one hand, and
the world o f becoming on the other. Hence dualism and
allied problems spring up in these systems. The fact is
that, like the antmavdins, the tmavdins also failed to
have a true vision o f the tman. The worshipper o f the
iman also do not reach the ultimate state.2
In a perfect vision o f reality there cannot be a dualism
of tman and antman. Realisation o f absolute unity or
T. 1. P. V. 1 .1 .
2. P. H. V III.
the perfect identity o f the Stman and anSLtman, constitutes

the highest wisdom according to the aivite. The anStman
is ultimately nothing but the atman. Everything is ulti
mately real, for everything is o f the nature o f iva. Only
when we accept this, the great teaching all this is verily
Brahman would be significant. This integral nature o f
reality is well illustrated in the famous work o f art, called
Trim urti. The middle head o f the Trimurti is a
representation o f the absolute. Majestic and sublime, it is
the divine essence out o f which proceed the other two.
Over the right shoulder, perpetually growing out o f the
central form, is the male profile o f iv .. in the left is the
female... the middle head is enclosed in a sublime, dreamy
aloofness. By its impassivity it silences the two gestures to
right and to left, ignoring completely the display o f their*
antagonistic features. 1
The aiva criticism o f the Buddhists and the VedSntins
cannot be fully justified. These systems appear inconsistent
only when they are looked at from outside. They appear
so only to the aiva absolutist who has adopted a different
line o f approach.
The M&dhyamika does not really mean nihilism by
ifinyatS, The charge that inyavSda is nihilism cannot be
true as the Mdhyamika himself explicitly warns us that
ftnya should not be taken to be nihilism.3
It cannot be said that TathSgata is nya or asnya, or
both or neither. The name given to him is conventional.
The absolute is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both
existent and non-existent, nor different from both. The
M&dhyamika also accepts the substance (tattva). The only
thing is that it cannot be described as sat or asat , etc.
nyat is an unqualified denial o f the predicates o f the
absolute. There can be no positive identification o f the
absolute with anything empirical. The MSdhyamika starts
with the philosophical views or formulations as propounded
1. Zimmer. H .f Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization,
p 149-50.
2. M . K. X X l V .i 7.
by speculative philosophy, and not with an existential

situation. He is primarily concerned with the criticism o f all
speculative theories. Accordingly, there is hardly any
justification for characterising the MSdhyamika as a
Nihilist.1 I f he were to be described as a nihilist, then
every absolutism would have to be regarded as nihilism.
For no absolutism can be established without rejecting all
determinations o f the absolute.
As regards the aiva refutation o f the Vijfina Absolu

tism, it is enough to point out that the Vijfi&na is not
momentary consciousness. It is the self-luminous reality
which like a lamp gives rise to the various states o f cons
ciousness out o f its own inner potentiality. It is, like
Sarhvid in aiva absolutism, self-luminous and self-revealing
ultimate reality.'
The Vedantin would also vehemently reject the charge
labelled against him that his system is nihilistic. In anti
cipation o f such criticism, Samkara states that the Vedanta
absolute might appear to be merely non-being or nothing to
certain individuals o f lesser understanding, as it is devoid
o f all empirical determinations, such as attribute, motion,
fruition and differentiation 2 Though Brahman is devoid
o f attribution, yet in its essential characteristics it might
be understood as being-consciousness-bliss. Besides, it also
has other characteristics, such as lordship etc., which are
accidental. Although it seems to be the best way o f des
cribing Brahman, it is not a com plete and true description.
Knowledge gives us the highest positive account o f Brahman
as Saccidnanda, while ignorance ascribes such attributes
to it which imply relation etc. As regards the attribute o f
freedom, it is not correct to say that Brahman is devoid o f
freedom. However, the Vedntin would hesitate to apply
either the attribute power or freedom to Brahman in a
positive sense, because freedom is essentially a negative
process. Freedom in relation to Brahman can be ascribed
1. C. P. B.. p p . 159-60, 234-6, 329-34.

2. Sarftkara a Commentary on Chnd, Up. V III. 1, I .
only negatively, as being freedom fro m / Freedom essen

tially consists in being free from the impurities or limita
tions characterising the empirical life.
Nor can the charge that the VedSnta is but a modified

version o f SSrhkhya dualism be justifiably maintained.
While Prakrti in the Samkhya is a reality in itself,
independently o f the Purusa, MSyS is not a reality in its
own right : M aya or AvidyS, neither exists nor functions,
independently o f Brahman. Prakrti, on the other hand, is
not only independent in itself, but also functions o f its own.
It is the real cause o f all events and things. The Vedntin
repeatedly insists, against the SSrfikhya, that agency cannot
be ascribed to the jatja Prakrti.1
According to the VedSntin, the falsity o f the world

means that it is ultimately unreal. Knowledge is like fire
in the presence o f which the false objects vanish like the
palace o f wax. It performs the function by pointing out
the falsity o f the object o f wrong knowledge. The false
object does not have any ontological status. The Vedntin
points out that in the instances o f dreams and illusions, in
which the objects are later known to be false, the dreaming
or the illusory consciousness is also recognised to be false.
In these cases, the consciousness o f the objects and the
objects both have a mutuality o f existence. Similarly,
AvidyS and the objects presented by it are both ultimately
false. In reply to the question, how can knowledge destroy
a thing, or how can that which is merely ideal perform the
ontological function, the VedSntin draws our attention to
the cases o f illusion, like the illusion o f rope-snake, shell-
silver, etc. The illustration o f rope-snake shows that besides
the sublation o f the object, viz., snake,* the sublating
consciousness itself is sublated when knowledge dawns.
The analogy o f illusion (Prtibhfika) is further extended
to the empirical (Vyvahrika) by the Vedantin. The
VedSntic Myavda cannot be equated with snyavda.
According to the MSdhyamika the entities lack self-essence
1. V.S. II. ii.

176 KASHMIR gAIVISM
or self-hood because they are infected with relativity. On

the other hand, according to the Vedntin, they are unreal
because they do not have a permanent nature or an
enduring essence o f their own. However, the Vedntin
never doubts the existence o f the phenomenal world which
derives reality from Brahman. The main aim o f the
Advaita doctrine o f the unreality o f the world and the
repeated stress on its falsity is to instil the feeling o f disgust
in wordly things. The attachment to the world does not so
easily die by the determination o f its transitoriness as by the
knowledge o f its falsity.1 Similar motive might be attributed
to Buddha and other religious teachers who preach the
falsity o f the world. They all deny the reality o f the worldly
life with the sole aim o f diverting mans attention from
it. 1
4. The Conception of Absolute

When we consider the different views about the absolute,
we find that generally there are two ways in which freedom
has been ascribed to the absolute. In the positive approach,
the main emphasis is upon the perfection and supremacy o f
the absolute. Accordingly, here freedom has bri conceived
mostly in a positive sense, as freedom to perform even the
impossible. It is an interpretation o f freedom as the freedom 1
of*. In the negative approach on the contrary, emphasis
is laid upon the transcendence, o f the absolute and hence
freedom has been conceived as freedom from* all limitation
and determination. The basic difference in their attitudes
gave rise to different conceptions o f the absolute ini the two
approaches. -
Absolute as Free Being

The aiva absolute might be described as essentially free
being. The term swatantra* indicates that the essence o f
consciousness consists in great lordship ( Makes varya). It
represents the chief characteristic o f the absolute according
to the aivite. In this respect, Parama iv a . differs from
1. Nyayamrtadvaita Siddhi (Calcutta Sanskrit Scries) p. 77.
Brahman.1 Parama iva might be described as the pure

absolute, there being no separation between cognition and
freedom (bodha and svtantrya) in it. It is the supreme
equilibrium o f bodha and svtantrya.
I f the gulf between the phenomena and the noumena,

Purusa and Prakrti, is to be bridged, then the two have to
be regarded as constituting the two inseparable aspects o f the
absolute. All other absolutisms failed mostly because o f
their narrow visions in which the absolute was identified
with one o f the dualities. The Vedntin also failed, like
others, to realise that in a conscious existence which is
absolute we must suppose an inherent freedom to manifest
or not to manifest the potentiality o f movement. A Brahman
compelled by Prakrti is no Brahman but an inert Infinite
with an active content in it more powerful than the
continent.2
Freedom is the very nature o f the light o f consciousness.

For, in the absence o f freedom consciousness would not be
different from material objects like crystal, mirror, etc.3
The essential nature o f luminosity, as opposed to materia
lity, consists in having freedom in respect o f manifestations.
This freedom is natural to the self-luminous consciousness
(Prakfc) and is known as absolute independence.4 There
appears to be lack o f freedom only in the intermediate
state o f consciousness which is characterised by thisness*
( Idariit). This manifestation o f lack o f freedom is itself
due to the freedom o f the absolute consciousness.
The term citi or consciousness has been used in singular

number in order to show that it transcends all limitations
o f place, etc. It also indicates that those who believe in the
doctrine o f non-identity o f consciousness are in the wrong.
1. sniffi*!!: fa si m i s e r a i t ^ i
P. H. I. C om .
2. L. D ., p. 80.
3. I. P. V ., I, V , 11.
4. Ibid.
178 KA SH M IR AIVISM
By using the adjective Absolute, the aivite tries to

emphasize that the essence o f citi is great splendour. This
brings out the difference between the aiva concept o f
absolute and the Vedanta concept o f Brahman. Citi
possesses unlimited power or infinite potency. In it alone
may be found the way to happiness and great reward.1
A greater prominence is given to the power o f freedom,

in spite o f the fact that Pararna iva has got innumerable
powers, because the power o f action, the essence o f which
is omnipotence, includes all other powers. And this is the
nature o f free consciousness.2 Freedom represents the
supreme power o f the highest Lord and includes all those
powers which can possibly be attributed to Him.*3 Freedom
has also been referred to as spanda and sphuratt in the
Spanda literature, because it stands for that essential nature
o f consciousness which is responsible for the manifestation
o f plurality on the background o f pure unity.4 SvStantrya
akti, being essentially the power o f consciousness, is also
known as Cit akti. Sometimes it also stands for self-
consciousness. The term fSvUtantrya1 has so frequently been
used in the aiva literature that the aiva Absolutism ha
often been described as Svtantryavda.
Although the terms like svtantrya, sakti9 ahamt,

sphuratt, vimarsa, etc., represent the dynamic aspect
o f the absolute, all o f them do not equally emphasize
the same form o f dynamism. While ahamt emphasizes
the dynamism o f integration, SphurattS. indicates the
manifestation o f the unmanifest. Similarly, vinaria
expresses the determination o f the indeterminate and
SvHtamrya stands for the capacity to perform the impossible.
The concept o f svZtantrya supplies us the key to the

riddles o f the universe. It helps us in our attempts at solving
some o f the most crucial and knotty problems which could not
1. P. H. I.
\\ 2. I. P. V ., I. V . 15-16.
3. Bhsk&r, v ol. I p. 204, 214; T . A . I, 107-8.
be solved in earlier philosophies. With this concept it is

possible to bridge the gulf between phenomena and noumena,
being and becoming, consciousness and matter. Due to its
power o f freedom, consciousness appears as phenomenal and
noumenal, as being and becom ing, as sentient and insen
tient, as subject and object. That is why the aiva absolutist
claims that his system alone represents true advaitism. In
contrast with other advaitisms, only aiva absolutism might
be described as consistent advaitism. In comparison with it,
various advaitisms appear to be weak, timid and insignificant;
for they give the impression as if they are frightened o f
duality. And in order to avoid dualism, these systems gener
ally end in dualism. In the aiva tradition advaitism really
means an eternal equilibrium o f the dualities. According to
it, advaitic or integral vimaria* is the very nature of the self.
Consciousness is essentially a self-aware force of existence.1
In every manifestation, it is one and the same consciousness
which is organising or expressing itself differently. The finite
Existence is a diversified organisation o f tlie universal consci
ous force (Citsakti) o f Existence. Thus the power that builds
the universe is the power o f freedom o f consciousness. Tt is
this principle that is responsible for maintaining the identity
or unity o f the absolute during the state o f manifestation o f
the world o f plurality.2
The essential characteristic o f the aiva absolute is the
free act o f consciousness*. The aivite interpretation o f the
supreme Self is unique in itself and is not found anywhere
else. The act of consciousness, or the characteristic feature
o f the agent in the act o f consciousness, is spoken o f as the
S elf3. The absolute, which has created consciousness as its
essential characteristic, cannot be described merely as pure
being. Nor can it be described as nya which is wholly
negative in character. For, the absolute is the source o f all fini-
1. L . D ., pp. 83-5.
2. nas * fa s i TOgsmTTnPffifa
fia a w a a r i p. h . p . 37. (
3. Bhskari, vol. I. p. 249.
180 KASHMIR SAIVISM
tude. VijhUna too, which is devoid o| the power o f objectifica

tion, cannot be regarded as a proper description of the absol
ute Freedom alone is the distinguishing feature o f the absolute.
It is the cause o f real, not illusory, manifestation o f the world.
Parama iva is the supreme slimarasya o f bodha and svJtta-
ntrya, consciousness and freedom, being and becoming, iva
and akti, In its pure transcendental aspect, the absolute is
referred to as iva or pure being. In its dynamic aspect the
same absolute might be described as akti or the principle o f
eternal becoming. Thus, the absolute has been described as
SivaSakti-Snmarasya*. As both these aspects are fully and
equally prominent in the absolute, the absolute might also be
called perfect or prna smarasya.1
iva is the principle o f pure witness consciousness which
serves as a background or substratum for the play o f akti.
akti is the dynamic principle, the absolute power, which
manifests itself in multifarious forms, iva and akti are
not two separate realities. They are the two aspects in which
the integral absolute is manifest to us. In other words,
they are the two forms in which the non-dual Reality is
manifest to us. I f the two were to be regarded as separate
realities, then both would become inert and ultimately both
would be reduced to nothingness, as it is the case in the
S&riikhya and Vedanta. In order to avoid nihilism, we have
to conceive the absolute in tei ms o f smarasya. Further, we
have also to assume that even when unity is replaced by
division, the supreme smarasya does not become modified.
Considered from the epistemic point o f view, the two
aspects o f the absolute have been described as Praka and
Vimarsa. Thus the absolute may also be described as fPrak-
a-Vimara\ Praksa stands for the pure, changeless, witness
aspect o f the universal consciousness. Vimara, on the other
hand, stands for the power which gives rise to self-conscious
ness, will, knowledge and action, successively, i'raka can
be compared to a pure mirror which serves as a background
for the reflection o f objects ; Vimarsa represents the power o f
1, P tH . op . cit.
THE CN CEPTION OF ABSOLUTE 181
the mirror to give rise to reflections. Vimarsa also signifies the

capacity o f the Subject to know himself in the state o f perfect
freedom from all kinds o f affections. It is the power o f self-
consciousness or absolute egoity (Purna ahamt) o f the Lord
and is called aham oimaria\ amarsa or ipratyHmaria\ In its
essential nature Vimara might be compared to the limited
power ot manifestation o f the individual subject at the time
o f dreaming, remembering, imagining and similar activities.
It might also be compared to the Yogins power o f creation.
Prakasa and Vimarsa are always united together. Just as Prak-
aa is always with VimarSa, Vimarsa is also never found with
out Prakaa. Together they both represent the self-luminous
and self-conscious nature o f reality. Vimarsa is the throb,
the original bimb , o f the absolute T holding within itself,
and experiencing as one with itself, the entire universe. It
is the power o f the highest Lord which always shines as un
limited self-consciousness and never as limited objectivity;
otherwise, if it were objective, it would not be independent
and would, therefore, require some other principle to illumine
itself. And this other principle would also require another
principle to illumine it, and this another would require still
another, and so on ad infinitum. Consequently, the object,
being without anything to rest upon, will not shine at all.
Therefore, it has to be admitted that no Vimara is separate
from Prakaia. Similarly, if Prakaa is devoid o f Vimarsa,
it would cease to be self-luminous, and would become jada,
which is ultimately nothing in itself. Moreover, even material
objects like mirror, crystal, etc., in that case, would have Pra-
kaa. Without Vimarsa; Praka would not be Prakasa. Ulti
mate reality is not only Sciousness, but a Sciousness that also
scirs itself. Unlike the prakaa in the mirror, it surveys itself
It is a non-relational immediate awareness o f itself. Cit scirs
itself as Cidrpini Sakti. This sciring itself is Vimara. There
fore, Vimara has also been named as Paru Sakti, Paru Vac,
Sotantrya, Aisvarya, Kartftva, Sphuratty Sra, Hfdayat Spanda1.
According to the Vedanta Real is that which does not
1. Jaideva Singh , Pratyahiji hrdayam P. 5.
182 k a s h m ir s a iv is m
have opposed characteristics. For, if it had opposite charac

teristics, it would cease to be one. Therefore, the Vedntin
describes the absolute as pure Being. It might be charact
erised as self-evident, universal, and pure Being; the first indi
cates the epistemological independence o f the absolute, the
second emphasizes its non-duality, the third shows its relation
to the world o f difference, viz., its non-relatedness. All these
characteristics may be derived from the Vednta definition o f
reality as triklllablldhita sat1.
If it is asked whether we know being at all, the Vedntin
holds that we cannot help knowing being; we know it in
variably. At least, in one case, with regard to the self*, we
know it undeniably. For. its denial itself is its affirmation.
Even in the ordinary cases o f cognition o f objects one is
aware o f being . Being or Brahman is the object of every
cognition and experience (sarva pratyaya vedya). But at the
s me time, Brahman is also transcendent to thought. We have
to abstract or withdraw fiom the surface in order to know the
underlying features o f things. Similarly, to be aware of
being , we have to see through, or put away, the surface
things. That is why dialectic or negation is employed in
the Vednta to do away with the surface things and to
uncover the ground o f being.
Brahman has also been characterised as free Being in the
Vednta. But the concept o f freedom in the Vedanta,
as we have already seen, is mostly negative; Brahman is
absolutely Tree from* the impurities and limitations which
characterise the finite things. According to the Vedntin,
freedom is neither the accumulation o f merit, nor the acces
sion o f power, but is mostly a negative process o f removal of
obstacles.
Absolute as Saccidananda
We find a twofold definition o f Brahman in the Vednta
Absolutism. Brahman has been described in terms o f its
1. T ripathi, R- K , Spinoza in the Light o f Advaita Vedanta,

pp. 102-9.
accidental characteristics as well as in terms o f its essential cha

racteristics (tatastha lakiar.a and svarpa lakiana). These two
definitions direct and deepen the spiritual process which is
already incipient in the desire to realise the Truth. In the
discovery o f Brahman, the tatastha lakiana constitutes
the first stage. The svarpa laksana represents the final stage
in which the knowledge o f the essential nature o f Brahman
takes place. Whereas, the tatastha lakiana does not provide
us with an insight into the nature o f Brahman, but only shows
Bralunan to be the unconditioned ground of the phenomena,
this insight is provided by svarpa lakiana In other words,
the tatastha laksana is the knowledge o f Brahman from with
out. svarpa lakiana is knowledge which is non-relational.
The former gives us the knowledge about absolute-for-us*,
the latter gives us insight into the nature o f the absolute-in-
itself*. The difference between these two ways o f describing
Brahman can be made clear with the help o f an illustration,
given by Hiriyana. Suppose we describe a house with reference
to its characteristic o f being built o f bricks, whereas all others
are huts or mud houses, it would be an instance o f svarpa lak-
*iana, In this case, being built o f bricks* forms an essential
feature o f the house. Let us further suppose that this house has
a mango tree by its side and no other house is having such a
tree. This mark, having a mango tree, may also enable us
to describe the nature o f the house. But this description would
not form an essential characteristic o f the house. Hence, it
would be an instance o f definition by reference to accidental
or external feature, tatastha lakiana,l
We shall consider the tatastha laksana in the next
chapter. Presently, it will be our endeavour to compare
and contrast the two views about the essential nature of the
absolute. In its essential nature, the absolute has been
conceived as Being, Consciousness and Bliss {sat, cit9 nanda).
in both aiva and Vednta Absolutisms However, unlike the
Vednta Absolutism, there is no clear-cut distinction bet
ween the accidental characteristics o f the absolute in the Saiva
1. Hiriyana, Indian philosophical studies, I, p. 98.
184 KASHMIR SAIVISM
Absolutism. Accoidingly, we shall be confined mainly to consi

dering the distinction between the concepts o f SaccidUnanda in
the two systems.
It has rightly been said that although each o f these three
terms denotes one and the same entity, each does so differently.
These terms are not concepts or predicates; each is sui
generis the self. Being, Consciousness and Bliss are employed
only to differentiate them from their opposites, signifying that
self is not non-being, etc. But this does not amount to Buddhist
apohavUda9 which means exclusion from all others, e. g. the
concept blue means merely that it is not yellow, not red etc.1
Although the absolute in itself is beyond all determina
tions, yet, it can safely be regarded as negation o f non-being.
It must have existence or being as its essential nature. Things
are real as long as they participate in being*. That which
is supposed to be absolute must have absolute existence. O f
the Real there is no non-existence, and o f the unreal, there
is no existence. Both the Saivite and the Vedntin reject the
view that existence is momentary. They commonly hold that
eternal existence is the ground and support o f all variable
and finite existence. But, whereas the Vedntin regards the
finite and momentary existence as a limitation of the absolute
pure Existence, the aivite holds it to be a real manifestation
o f the infinite Existence. The Vedntin holds that the Real
is such that its nature remains constant; the unreal, on the
contrary, is that whose nature is subject to variations. That
which is constant in whatever is variable is different from the
variable, as is the string different from the flowers which
have been strung upon it.2 The Vedntin arrives at the
conclusion, after analysing the nature o f the subject and the
object, that finite existence is unreal; the absolute alone is
true existence. Because o f ignorance we attribute to the finite
such characteristics as existence, etc., which in reality belong
to Brahman alone. We couple the true and ^he untrue and
indulge in such empirical usage born o f ignorance as that the
t. Chaudhury, A . K . R ., Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedanta, p. 111.

2. G ta, II, 16.
pot is real , the cloth is real . In reality the existence, that

is persistent in such cognitions as the pot exists *! is the
substrate, while only the particulars, e.g. pots, etc., are illusory.
In the aiva approach, on the other hand, the absolute

is taken to be the fullest and richest Existence. It is the All, the
transcendent and integral reality o f all finite existence. It is
One, or the sama9 which is the perfect harmony o f opposites.
There is no negation o f finitude, but merely a rejection o f
discord, in it. It is Being, such as does not exclude not being;
it is consciousness which manifests even the absence of
consciousness.1
Existence is freedom itself. It pervades even the imagin

ary objects like sky-flower . 2 Existence is not, what the
Vedntin affirms, a negation o f finitude, nor is it open
to change or movement. When the Saivite asserts that
Existence is without attributes or forms, he only means that it
is not limited by them. In it finitude is transformed in such a
way that it becomes one with the Infinite. During the state
of their oneness with infinite Existence, the finites cannot be
identified or determined in this or that form. That is why
it is said that Existence is the highest reality which is
unknowable and undeterminable by finite thought. Yet, all
things in the realm o f becoming contain, are contained in,
and are the Absolute.8 The view that Existence rigorously
excludes or rejects the finite existence amounts to a denial of
existence itself. For, in reality, Existence, though in itself
devoid o f all forms, is the source o f everything, The integral
Existence is not a mere idea 01 a concept, it is the sole and
supreme reality. And its movement, manifestation and change
are also real.
The Vedantin puts sal before the beginning of everything

and regards it to be the ultimate principle. According to
hiiDi Existence would cease to be eternal if it also varied with
1. Paryanta PancasikS, 2-3

2. Bhskari, v ol. 1, pp. 258-9,
3. L. D ., p. 70.
16 KASHMIR AIVISM
the variable. Therefore, it cannot be denoted by words which,

like being , in the usual sense signify a category o f things.
If it is objected that Brahman, being devoid o f colour and
other perceptible qualities, cannot be an object o f perception,
theVedantin holds that though devoid o f colour, etc., Brahman
can appear in cognition exactly as we have the notion o f time,
which is devoid o f colour, etc. What really exists is the non-
dual*, and it alone is the substratum o f all existence. 'Existence
which is the essential constitution o f Reality has neither
external relations nor internal differentiation. It is not
related to anything, for there is nothing with which it can be
related1.1 Existence being non-dual consciousness, we cannot
attribute any parts to it. Nor can it be regarded as one-in-
many, or as identity-in-difference. We cannot even hold that
names and forms are its constituents. In itself, it is devoid o f
parts and modifications. While all the objects have triple
distinctions, spatial, temporal and contentious being alone has
no such distinctions. Hence Being is infinite and indeterm
inate. Everything else has being* only as superimposed on
it, We may think away anything, but we cannot think away
Being or Existence. We can dismiss the qualities or attributes
o f Being, but not Being itself. The very thought o f denial
pre-supposes it.2 Nor can there be anything else exclusive to
Being, whether real or imaginary.3
Being or existence has to be regarded as coeval with

consciousness, Without consciousness, existence would be
nothing in itself. That is why, the aivite and the Vedantin
both agree that existence and consciousness cannot be related
to each other as substance and attribute. Existence and consci
ousness both are essentially and wholly identical with each
other. Existence is consciousness and consciousness is exis
tence. Consciousness is essentially self-luminous. If It were
illumined by something other than itself, then consciousness
1. M ahadcvan, T M . P ., Philosophy oj Advaita VcdntOy p. 111.

2. Sircar, M . N ., The System of Veainia Thought and Culture, p. 3.
3. Sankara s com m , on T ait. U p. 11, 1.
T he c o n c e p t io n o f a b s o l u t e 187
would not be consciousness. Hence we have to admit that

consciousness illumines itself
In aiva Absolutism, cit or consciousness, like existence,
is illimitable and infinite. In the absolute existence-consci-
ousness, there is an inherent freedom or power which is in
finite in itself. Consciousness in its very essence is eonscious
power (cit sakti). Unlike the Vedntin, who conceives con
sciousness as pure consciousness, the aivite regards it
essentially as free consciousness. I f consciousness were devoid
o f freedom, it could not be a source o f the manifestation o f the
Universe, What constitutes the essence of all activity is the
freedom o f consciousness. This freedom is the essence o f all
existence and consciousness. It is manifest to all persons
through self-experience, as being identical with their own
nature. Its presence can also be felt during the states to
which one is reduced at the time o f excessive anger, joy, fear,
deep grief, hunger, etc.1
Freedom constitutes the only point o f differentiation
between the intelligent and the iutert beings. In the absence
o f this distinction it will not be possible to distinguish the jada
from the cetana. We attribute consciousness in the case o f the
individual, but deny the same in the case of material objects
like pot , etc., simply because the former possesses freedom
and the latter does not. Evidently, the presence and the
absence o f freedom constitutes the essential nature o f the
sentient and the insentient. While the sentient has freedom
to illumine either itself or others, the insentient fully depends
for its manifestation upon the sentient.2 While conceiving the
Absolute in terms o f Consciousness, we are necessarily admit
ting that it L free. For consciousness and freedom go to
gether; in the absence o f the one the other would be redu
ced to mere nothingness. Thus, being separated from each
other bodha and svatautrya would lose their very identity.
Consciousness is essentially fiee, and is o f the nature of
Vimarsa or self-consciousness.
1, S. K ., 22.
2. I. P. V. I. v ., 11. fa r 1
SWQISqT^sfa snftqir: |t
KASHMIR SAIVISM
As against this, the Vedntin holds that a logical analysis

o f the nature and concept o f our knowledge inevitably leads
to the theory o f differenceless or non-dual Reality which at
best might be described as pure consciousness. There can be no
differences o f parts or aspects in Consciousness. Conscious
ness is free only in the sense o f transcending impurities and
limitations. It is the one without second and precludes the
possibility o f difference or distinction, o f like or unlike nature*
whether within or outside itself. T o attribute pow er or
freedom to the universal Consciousness w ould am ount to in
troducing relations and differences within it. Freedom can
be ascribed to Consciousness only negatively. It lias freedom ,
but freedom which keeps it free from limitation, or defile
ment.
As there is no conception o f Cit Sakti in the V edn ta,
there can be no place lor the doctrine o f absolute self-consci
ousness in it. Self-luminosity o f consciousness does not mean
that it is simultaneously the subject which illumines and the
object which is illum ined. O ne and the same entity cannot
be the agent and the object o f the same a ct.1 N or can self-
luminosity mean that which is not revealed by similar lum i
nous thing, as in that case even the lamp would also be self-
luminous. N or does it mean that which is not an ob ject o f
cognition but which is the subject o f usage that ensures its
direct awareness. Self-luminosity really means that which is
not an object o f cognition and yet is describable as a datum
o f im m ediate experience.2
Besides describing the absolute as Existence and C on sci
ousness, the Vedntin and the aivite also refer to it as Bliss
or Unanda. Limitation or finitude is suffering, freedom or
perfection constitutes happiness. The infinite E xistence-C on
sciousness, which is absolutely free and perfect, is supreme
Bliss itself. Bliss constitutes the essential nature o f both
Brahman and Parama &iva. The term iva denotes happiness;
sim ilarly, the word Brahman, whose root is B fh a, Brhi, to
1. Choudhury A. K . R ., Self and Falvsity in Advaita Vedanta

2. Citsukhi (N . . E d .), p. 10.
THF CONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE 189
increase, signifies absoluteness, ow ing to w h ich it is Bliss. It is

the source o f all happiness that is enjoyed in the world. If
the absolute were not o f the nature o f Bliss, why should there
be any desire for its realisation ? N obody hankers after pain
or suffering. All living beings are always in search o f Tltianda.
which is the source o f all existence. The Absolute is nanda
because it is the infinite or the BhflmTt,
In aiva Absolutism, the absolute is nanda, because,

besides being the Bhma, it is also freedom or Vimarsa, or self-
consciousness. This brings out the main difference o f the
aiva conception o f nanda from that o f the V ednta. Parama
iva is itself described as Unanda and there is also the ex
perience o f nanda in it. I f there were no consciousness o f
nanda, there could be no sense in describing the absolute in
terms e f Bliss. W e have to accept that in the absolute there
is an experience o f nanda.
In the V ednta, on the other hand, the absolute does not

have any consciousness o f nanda ; it is nanda itself. Ananda
cannot be regarded as an object o f experience, as there is no
subject-object relationship within Brahman. An admission o f
such distinction w ould am ount to a division o f the indivisible
non-dual Reality.
O bviously, the description o f the absolute as Saccidnnanda

has different implications in the two systems. T h e aiva
absolute is sat. cit, and nanda in itself, and is also conscious o f
itself as such. It is always conscious o f itself as Being-Consci-
ousness-Bliss. Existence itself has no m eaning without an exist
ent ; consciousness also has no standing place, if there is none
who is conscious ; similarly, delight is useless and invalid with
out an en joyer.1 T h e self o f things is an infinite, indivisible
existence ; o f that existence the essential nature or power is
an infinite and imperishable force o f self-conscious being, o f
that consciousness the essential nature or knowledge o f itself
is again an infinite inalienable delight o f being.2
1. L. D. p. 319,
2, Ibid, p. 94,
190 KASHMIR ÂIVISM
But, a ccord in g to the V ed n tin , there can be no self-

consciousness in Brahman, there being no su bject-object
relationship in it. These terms ultim ately denote Brahman
only negatively. Brahman is Being as opposed to n on -being
or falsity ( mithyatva) ; it is consciousness as opposed to
materiality (jaiatva); it is absolute Bliss as it is opposed to
lim itation or finitadc {paricchinnatoa). Being, Consciousness
and Bliss cannot be regarded as attributes o f Brahman as
there is no substanee-attribute relationship in it. Being,
Consciousness and Bliss are equally and fully Brahman.
Each o f them does not represent a separate absolute, as
they all denote one R eality in different ways.1 A lthough
they denote one and the same entity, the difference between
them is not m erely verbal, each denotes Brahman differently.
W hile sat excludes asat> cit and nanda exclude matter and
pain. Prof. M urti makes the pregnant suggestion that sat,
cit and nanda stand for three functions o f know ledge,
w illing and feeling. Spirit is Truth or know ledge. Spirit
is will and Spirit is Bliss. Each is sui generis and is not
to be confounded with the others.2
A ccord in g to the aiva absolutist, Parama iva is ever
a Personal-Im personal G od . W ill, K n ow ledge and A ction
constitute the essential nature o f Saccidnanda and the
world is a real manifestation o f it. W h ile the sat, cit and
nanda aspects o f the absolute are always fully manifest,
both in the phenomenal and noumenal states, volitional,
cognitive and functional forms o f the absolute becom e
manifest only during the state o f creation. T h e two
highest pow ers, viz., Cit Sakti and nanda Sakti, are fully
manifest both at the transcendent and em pirical levels.
Th e other three aktis, Icch, Jnna, and Kriya, becom e
manifest only during creation.
W hile aim ing at having a conception o f the absolute,

only tw o alternatives are open to us. Either we should
regard the absolute as w h olly indeterm inate, and absolutely
1. The two definitions o f Brahnan in Advaita VedSnta, op*, cit.

2. Ibid.
THE CONCEPTION O F ABSOLUTE 191
d evoid o f all categories, as it is done by the M dhyam ika.

O r, if we want to have a positive conception o f the
absolute, we should not stop, like the V edn tin , at the
tatastha laksana. ' v For. *Brahman ' is not only Existence-
Consciousness-Bliss, but also the Highest Lord ( Parameiv'ira)
who is essentially self-conscious, om nipotent and om niscient.
Absolute as Purna'Aham
T h e aiva absolutist also describes the Parama 6iva as
the A bsolute Subject ( Para Pram^tli). The absolute is
the Suprem e *1,* the all-inclusive R eality. T h e con ception
o f the absolute as the Supreme Ego enables the a ivite to
avoid the two extrem es the danger o f drifting towards
abstract or pure monism o f the V ednta type and drow ning
into the great void o f the M sdhyam ika. It is not necessary
to reject either the subject or the object, the knower or the
know n, in order to arrive at the notion o f the absolute.
For, it is the very nature o f the Self to manifest itself
sim ultaneously as the knower and the know n, as it ever
performs the transcendental functions of Nigrahaand
Anugraha> self-concealm ent and self-revelation 1
T h e absolute Ego is the most appropriate expression o f

the continuum absolute.* In this con ception , finitude and
infinitude, mom ent and eternity, m icrocosm and m acrocosm ,
and all extremes give up their b i-p ola r and opposed ch a ra c
teristics and becom e one in the integral absolute. All the
states, such as creation, maintenance and destruction,
waking, dream ing and sleeping, are present as phenom ena
in the consciousness o f the Goddess (Bhagaw at), in the
fourth state, where it is absolute bliss, the state o f perfect
E goity, from where these states d eriv e 'e x iste n ce .2 He is
at once the universal subject and o b je ct o f all p ercep tion ,
1. I. P. V ., I. V . 15.
2. f w r w n it *rw Tsntigirai^ % sntrcrcqtaw TfaSt'*!:,
5t a*q<tr tr o tta Htfa
vft r '*rfar sfamar: s fa: sfmJPrnfowi
192 KASHMIR AIVISM
the supreme unity. His essential nature is the rapture o f

supreme E goity, as opposed to the fictitious egoism o f the
physical p e rso n a lity /1 Thus, the S elf which is the great
L ord, is the supreme universal intuition o f self-hood.
W hile active as subject o f finite perception in all in telligen ce,
it still remains throughout all modes o f experience self
identical, the one universal consciousness.2
T h e absoluteness o f self-consciousness has been established
on the basis o f reasoning in the aiva system alone* As
consciousness always implies self-consciousness, the absolute
is ever conscious o f itself. I f caitanya did not know itself,
it would not differ from the insentient. T h e main ch a ra c
teristic o f the sentient, as opposed to the insentient, is its
capacity for self-revelation or self-awareness. It is the
revealer who reveals himself, besides revealin g the ob ject.
This self-knowledge is not som ething accidental to the
self, rather it constitutes the very nature o f the Self.4 T h e
power o f self-awareness has been described as Vim arsa or
SvStantrya and consists in the feeling o f nanda. It is the
basis o f unification o f finite experience. T h e awareness o f
the objects and the consciousness o f their con n ection with
each other w ould not be possible if they were supposed to
be resting either on fluctuating consciousness or on pure
witness consciousness. T h e mutual relationship between
various cognitions can be explained only if they, e.g. blue,*
pleasure,* etc., are supposed to be resting, and facing one
another, in the ocean o f consciousness, the great I . T o
this I , they are carried through various determ inate c o g
nitions which might be com pared to the various currents
o f rivers.5
T h e absolute is not o f the nature o f pure consciousness,
as is held by the Vedntins. A S elf as pure as crystal,
devoid o f freedom , cannot make any determinate activity,
1. Ibid, Comm. 5th Krik.
2. Ib id , KSriku, 7.
3. I, P. V ., I, V II Intr.
4. T . S., p. 12; I P. V I, V . 12.
5. I. P. V ., I, V I I ; 2, I, V. 11-12.
n or can it manifest anything. The fact is that the S elf is

always o f the nature o f self-consciousness His being the
great Lord consists in His eternal self-conciousness, un
restrained freed om , e tc .1
T h e Supreme S elf cannot be regarded as finite. There

is nothing from w hich the Self can be distinguished. It is
the perfect reality and there is nothing independent or o u t
side o f it.2 It is not the fictitious egoism o f the physical
personality, but a rapture o f supreme egoity, the transcen
dental self-awareness. The differentiation between the
subject and the object is itself dependent u p on the universal
consciousness, the self or the spirit, wherein there is no
opposition between the ego and the n on -e g o .3 N or does it
mean that the S elf is a mere com plex o f ego and n on -ego.
F or, there is no subject-object relationship in the supreme
ego itself. Its self-luminosity indicates the absence o f
bifurcation o f subject and object in it. Such dichotom y is
an essential characteristic o f finite existence. Oppositions
and polarities, including that between the subject and the
object, do not exist in the supreme E go, which is the state
o f absolute unity. It is the state o f identity o f Par akti,
w hich is Par V&c, with Param eivara. This supreme
egoity is possible due to the functioning o f the pow er o f
consciousness, the V im arsa or Cit akti It is also described
as the reflection o f pure being aspect o f the Absolute, on
its own m irror-like self. It is the self-awareness o f the
Supreme Existent.
T h e T is the integral and all-com prehensive reality and

indicates the all-inclusive and all-pervading nature o f the
absolute. Its essential nature is absolute freedom and
1. m t o rai srcrcrcrcKg: sttc q*
i ibid, i. v in , il.
2. T A. II 195.
3. S .N . 1 ,1 4 -1 6 .
194 KASHMIR SAIVISM
power. Vim arsa or free consciousness identifies itself with

others and negates itself, merges both in*o one state (as in
Sadsiva) and denies both, which have been m erged into
o n e.1 It is, in its essential nature, the inner speech which
is independent o f the indicatory signs and is unbroken self
experience, which is free from 11 ob jectivity. It is like the
inward shaking o f the head and is the very life o f all
thought and language. Tt is the background and source o f
all experience.
The S elf is the centre o f all existence. It is not merely

a whole or a system but the O n e, Eka, in w hich everything
is identical with it. In other words, it is the All wherein
all becom e O n e. There are no internal or external
relations in it. As opposed to the finite, or the m iddle state
o f existence (m adhya avasth), the I is the ultimate state
where beginning and end, front and rear, are one. T h e
state o f ob jectivity, Idamta, appears mysterious or unreal
only to the ignorant who do not see that it has origin and
end in the Supreme I . 2 F or, it is the *1* which provides
the connecting link to the various states o f existence.
Being unable to see the uniting light o f the Self, the
ignorants take the intermediate state o f existence, the state
in which we are, as inexplicable or illusory. In reality,
the entire finite existence and experience originate from ,
are sustained by, and m erge back in, the Self. This is the
basic feature o f self-consciousness.
T hough the objects are apparently different from one

another, in reality there is no difference between the Self,
which is the creator and is o f the nature o f self-consciousness,
and the created, because they ultimately rest upon the CI\
T he things created by the L ord are ultim ately to be con ce-
I, p. v. I, V. 13.
2 5 fa ijm t m m i
S ffT V 1 Ibid, I, V, 11.
ived on ly as F , which is the highest point o f rest in the

thought process. A ll cognitions regarding activity, m ovem ent,
rest, relation, etc , finally rest upon the P . T h e poin t o f
rest in the m iddle is essentially o f the nature o f objectivity
and is purely tem porary in thought process. It is like the
rest under the shade o f a tree while one is on the way to a
village. U ltim ately, the cogn ition s, such as blue , pleasure ,
etc., though constituting the interm ediate state ch a ra cte
rised by this-ness , are really identical with the self or
I*, because they ultimately rest upon it. Even the con sci
ousness I know the blu e is in reality nothing m ore than
I shine .1 A ll consciousness, whether objective or su bjec
tive, is ultimately nothing but self-consciousness, a form o f
1* consciousness. The I is the ultim ate subject o f all
judgm ents. I f it were otherw ise, n othing w ould ever be
k now n.2 T h e ultim ate end o f all ob jective consciousness is
its m erging in the S elf and is known as the visrnti or the
rest.s Th u s, S elf is the ultimate rest o f everything (aham
visrnti ). R esting within the self, entire objectivity shines
as I consciousness. T h e S elf or Supreme Ego is the entire
universe, not as we generally understand it but in its ideal
state, as a vision o f the integral unity. The I* is the
infinite M other o f all finitude. T h e ah' in aham represents
all the letters o f the D evangari alphabetic system from a
to k, and as such signifies all the basic ideas manifested by
the absolute consciousness. Am stands for bindu and
signifies that the absolute, the Anuttara, though manifesting
itself in the various forms o f thought, does not lose its
essential nature but ever remains in its own unbroken light
o f consciousness.4 All the ideas, which are represented by
the letters from A to H, arise from and rest in the absolute
in so far as they are the manifestation o f its power o f
1. f f '^sTFi^r i
I. P. V .. I, V , 17.
2. g rg snf o t rai ?rra q * h m fa i s. d . p . 8.
3. I. P. V . I. i, 1.
4. T . A., II. 193-4.
196 KASHMIR AIVISM
freedom .1 Thus, the supreme I* stands for the absolute

unity o f subject, object and means o f k n ow ledge, i.e. for
the Bhairava itself.2 In practical life, efficacy o f all the
mantras and determ inate ideas ultim ately depends u pon
the rise to the state o f suprem e unity, viz., the I .
In the V ednta also the absolute has been described in
terms o f self-hood. T he Self alone has that im m ediacy
and self-evidence w ithout w hich the absolute cannot realise
its own nature, as infinitely great. The p r o o f o f the
reality o f Brahman is that it is the ground o f the self o f
every individual. A ll the positive attributes o f Brahman
derive their m eaning from the con cep tion o f absolute as
Self. But, the V edntin insists that the absolute self cannot
be regarded as self-consciousness. F or, egoity is ultim ately
linked up with the adjuncts o f subjectivity and ob jectivity.
Self-consciousness is possible on ly in the realm o f difference.
There can be no possibility o f self-conciousness in the
absence o f dualism or differen ce. Consciousness reveals
and, as such, it cannot itself be an object o f revelation. If
consciousness were to know itself, it w ould be like fire
burning itself. N or can it be held that consciousness is
the knower in one m om ent and known in the other m om ent.
F or, being successive, these moments cannot be available
together. M oreover, the succeeding moment w ould itself
stand in need o f being revealed, and so on ad infinitum , so
that nothing is revealed. N or can consciousness be revealer
and the revealed at the same m om ent. That is why arhkara
holds that the distinction between consciousness and the
content it reveals is too patent to be explained away b y any
lo g ica l'ju g g le ry .3
o
^ T h e (notion o f an awareness which is just an awareness
o f itself is a very difficult one. N o cognitive state ever has
itself for its o ^ e c t . I f it is what is meant by self-conscious
ness, then there is no such thing as self-consciousness. A nd
1. Ibid. 196.8 q .a a
2. Ibid. 198 ; Pandey, K . C ., op. cit., p p. 6 6 7-8.
3. S. B., II, ii, 28.
i f it is said that this is a pp licable to finite consciousness

alone, the realist may retort that we have n o right to c o n
ceive, for the purpose o f describing the real, o f a type o f
cog n ition which differs from human cog n itio n in what seems
a n essential feature o f the latter, viz., a reference to an
o b je c t other than itself.1 Professor A lexander has rightly
rejected the view that the self can be an object to itself.
A ccord in g to him , our experience shows that the o b je ct
revealed in consciousness is different from consciousness.2
I f it is asked as to how it is possible for the self to be identified
with the changing modes o f consciousness, the Vedntin
points cut that in the case o f finite know ledge, consciousness
does not differ with the differing cognitions. In all cases
of know ledge, consciousness reveals itself as the non-dual,
unm odified reality. Even when we have different cognitions
o f one and the same ob ject, as in the case o f perceiving or
recollectin g the same object, there is no difference in co n
sciousness. T h e know ledge o f p ot is not different from the
know ledge o f cio V : It is the same knowledge which appears
to be limited first by pot* and then by cloth etc.3 H ence
amidst all changing cognitions, consciousness is one and the
same. As regards the question, why does consciousness appear
to be m ultiple, the V edntin holds that the mental modes
w hich precede know ledge or awareness are distinct with
every distinction o f objects and it is because o f these modes
that the universal cosciousness appears to be lim ited. In
reality consciousness is one and the objects are distinct from
it. This consciousness is the Suprem e Self. T h e S elf is
self-luminous because it does not contain the negation o f
lum inosity.4 But the self-lum inosity o f consciousness does
not mean that it is an object to it3elf. T h e subject can know
itself on ly in one o f the tw o ways. It can either know itself
partially, i.e. one part o f it can know the oth er; but this
1. Cleobury, F. H ., o p p . cit., p. 13.

2. Space, Time 6* D eity, O p. cit. p. 16.
3. Self and Falsity in Advaila Vedanta, p. 76,
4. srrccti Rsrîa: sr$rer5lifa t? i
Advaita Siddhi, (T L S. Ed. ) p. 781,
198 KASHMIR s a iv is m
w ould mean that there are internal divisions within the

subject. It is not possible to conceive consciousness as having
parts. N o distinction o f parts and parts, aspects and
and aspects, part or aspect and w hole, can be made in the
nature o f consciousness. F or, in that case, consciousness
would becom e luminous or conscious in one part, and non-
luminous or unconscious in the other. T h e second way in
which the subject may know itself is that it may know itself
entirely. In this case the knower and the known would
only be coin cidin g with each other. But this alternative is
also not acceptable as it w ould be illogical to hold the same
thing as the agent and the patient in respect o f the same act.
Thus the subject, which is the very ground o f all experience,
cannot be known as an object. It is always the seer and
never the seen.1 T h e self-revealing consciousness cannot
be regarded as consciousness o f consciousness. W hen one
says CI know that I know the p o t / what happens is that the
first awareness, I know the p o t / has already ceased as soon as
the second awareness I know that I know the pot* begins;
and so the form er awareness cannot be directly cognised by
the subsequent awareness. H ence when one knows that one
knows the p ot, it is a case o f another state o f cognition and
not the cogn ition o f cogn ition . K n ow ledge is self-revealed.
It canot becom e an ob ject in any sense. W hen the scriptures
say that the sight o f the seer is never destroyed, it only
emphasizes the eternal nature o f cogn ition and does not im ply
a relation between the seer and seen. H ence, strictly speak
ing, the self cannot be regarded as being o f the nature o f
self-counsciousness. It is only the finite ego, w hich is o p p o
sed to the n on -eg o, w hich can be regarded to be self-consci
ous. T h e Suprem e Self is indeterm inate pure consciousness.
T h e aiva absolutist insists, as we have seen, that the

pure I* is not determ inate. As determ ination requires
duality, and as there is no duality in the self, the self or the
*1* is non-relational. It is o f the nature o f im m ediate and
1. Hiriyana. Indian Philosophical Studies, I. p. 135.

d irect self-awareness,1 T h e Supreme Ego is essentially per

fect and is independent o f everything else. Because it
lacks determ inacy, therefore, it has been described as Pure
and Perfect.*
5. The Absolute and Godhead

W hen the aivite holds that the Absolute is self-conscious
he means that it is both personal and impersonal. O w ing to
i s nature as vimaria it is personal; it is also impersonal in
its nature as praknia. It is characterised with both being
and b ecom in g, transcendence and im m anence, as it is the
integral unity o f Purusa , the transcendental aspect o f the
Absolute ( i va ), and Prakfti, the self-manifesting power
o f the L ord (a k ti). It is the R eality which assumes the form
o f the conscious b ein g, regarding and accepting, or ruling
over the works o f its ow n nature.8 It is the personal G od ,
the Suprem e I,* which is conscious o f itself and presides
over its own pow ers. But, at the same time, it is impersonal
also, as it is w holly indeterm inate and transcends all m ani
festations. It might be described as both qualified and unqua
lified (Saguiia and N ir g u a ), and yet it is neither qualified
nor unqualified.
It is not merely the G od w hom the religious people

worship. It can neither be lim ited by any attributes, nor
can it be defined in terms o f pure transcendence. Like the
Saguoa, the N irguija also is a manifestation o f the unm ani
fest A bsolute. A ll these predicates ultimately refer to the
A bsolute, w ho can neither be defined nor be lim ited by them.
T h e A bsolute is manifest as a Personal G od for the sake o f
worship. But, evidently, he is not the personal god o f
religions, a being w ho is lim ited by his qualities, and who is
individual and separate from all other beings. For, all such
1. *r: JPfrcn?*Tfa 1
fa * ?* : fa fa s * * : n 1. p. k . 1 . vi, 1.
2. Tvnrrafr qts* *r anrftsfa 1
p. s., p. 33.
3. L. D . p. 17.
200 KASHMIR SAI VI SM
personal gods are only lim ited representations or names

and divine personalities o f the one Suprem e. Neither is
it the Sagupa Brahman, for that is only one side o f the
Absolute. T h e N irgupa, the im m obile and w ithout qualities,
is another aspect o f the A b solu te.1
W hen the aivite attributes self-consciousness to the

Absolute the question arises, how can the non-dual absolute
reality have a personal awareness ? O bviou sly, the
absolute unity cannot have any personal self-consciousness.
I f it is said that his personality consists in his knowing o f
himself, is this a knowledge on his part like the knowledge
we have o f ourselves ? O b viou sly, the absolute cannot be
aware o f itself in the sense in which we are aware o f our
selves. In our case, individuality is the basis upon w hich
personality evolves. But, this cannot have any relevance
to the nature o f the absolute who is not an individual.
Thus personality, w hich is w holly a human idea or category,
cannot be applicable to the Absolute. That is why the abso
lutists, like Bierdm ann, V on H artm ann, Bradley and
Bosanquet in the W est, and the V edantin and the Buddhist
in the East, hold the view that personality involves a
contrast or opposition and, as such, it cannot be ascribed to
the A bsolute. O n the other hand, there are absolutists,
like the Hegelians, and the aivites, who identify the
G od with the Absolute and regard H im as personal. They
hold that while personality is incom plete and finite in
m ankind, it need not be so in the case o f G o d . T h e finite is
not a com plete or true p erson ; the Infinite or A bsolute alone
is the Supreme person. There is a contrast between the.
S elf and the n ot-self in the case o f finite individuals. No
contrast or op position , whatsoever, can exist in the A bsolute.
T h e aivite holds that the personal and the im personal
aspects o f the A bsolute d o not conflict with each other.
The conflict between these tw o aspects appears only in the
realm of finitude, w hich involves a disintegration or
1. Ibid, pp. 317-20.

separation o f the integral and inseparabie reality. In the

integral vision there is no irrecon cilable opposition between
the personal and the im personal, the finite and the infinite
(Mara and aksara). W e might hold that the impersonal is
only a pow er o f the personal; the spirit is the Purusa, the
all Person.1
O f course, it is true that finite personality depends upon

som ething other than itself. H ow ever, this dependence
need not be an essential characteristic o f all personality.
The finite depends upon its opposite, as it is not a
sufficient con dition o f its own existence. But this is not
the case with the absolute which alone is the true existence.
Thus, the conditions which are im plied in em pirical per
sonality d o not operate in the case o f the supreme per
sonality. T h e finite is not a norm for all personal existence.
T h e absolute is personal in a sense different from the finite.
T h e Brahman is described as absolutely indeterminate

in the V edanta. The words do not denote Brahman in
any sense recognizable. T h e best way to describe it is to
em ploy the method o f dou ble n eg a tion . The m om ent we
try to apply human categories to it, or make it an object
o f thought, it no lon ger remains the absolute in-itself but
becom es the absolute in relation to us. In itself, Brahman
transcends all categories; it is neither personal nor imperso
nal. T h e personal Brahman, the absolute lim ited by the
adjuncts o f M Sy, is a lower R eality. The Highest Brahman
is devoid o f personality. Its godhead is a relational mani
festation and depends upon the limitations o f M yS. The
L ord depends as L o rd , upon the lim iting adjuncts o f name
and form which are the products o f avidy5. In reality,
none o f these attributes b elon g to H im . For, He is free
from all adjuncts whatsoever. N or does the relation o f
ruler and the ruled exist in reality. G od is on ly a phen o
m enal ruler whose being depends upon avidyS. Together
202 KASHMIR SAIVISM
with avidya, the lordship also vanishes at the dawn o f right

know ledge. Brahman is pure being w ithout any lim itation
or qualification.
Brahman cannot be called a person as personality is

constituted o f tw o elements, the self and the not-self.
Personality is realised only through the not-self. Personality
disappears the m om ent the not-self is destroyed. From the
logical point o f view, the con cept o f a personal god cannot
be true, Isvara or personal god is not the absolute, but
the highest manifestation o f the absolute. A personal god
can only be an aspect o f the absolute and not the absolute
itself.1 am kara has rightly emphasized the non-relational
nature o f absolute consciousness.
Brahman cannot be regarded as both personal and im per

sonal, as the relation between these two aspects o f its nature
cannot be logica lly determ ined. Analysis w ould reveal
that personal Brahman is a patch-up reality consisting o f
two irreconcilables, viz., Brahman and M y5. am kara
insists that the same thing cannot be said to be with and
without attributes as it involves self-con tra d ictio n .2 A
thing cannot possess two essentially opposed characteristics*
It is im possible to think that one and the same thing should
possess by itself certain characteristics and also should not
possess them. T h erefore, it must be definitely asserted that
the absolute is d evoid of all forms. T h ou gh Brahman
appears in the form o f svara, and C reator, Sustainer and
Destroyer o f the w orld, ultim ately all appearances are unreal.
T h e appearance o f Brahman as qualified (Sagupa) Brahman
is only a low er form o f reality. U ltim ate R eality is abso
lutely pure and indeterm inate.
As we have seen, the aiva absolutist insists that the

absolute, being the integral reality, is the A ll. It is both
N irgupa as well as Sagupa and is always endow ed with the
1. Radhakrishnan, S., The Reign of Religion in Contemporary

Philosophy, p. 410.
2. S. B., I l l , ii 11.
pow er o f free consciousness, W hat the V edntin describes

as the highest reality, the N irgu pa Brahman, is in reality
a low er form o f reality. Beyond the N irgu oa, there are
higher forms o f manifestation o f the absolute w hich cannot
be lim ited to this or that form . T h e main con cern o f the
Saivite is to establish the absoluteness o f G od . A cco rd in g
to him , the G od o f religion is itself the absolute and
ultim ate reality.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ABSOLUTE AND MANIFESTATION
We bow to that iva, w ho, because o f his free will,

creates variety o f forms, by separately manifesting the objects,
which in the state o f identity with H im , are like one solid
mass, by means o f His pow er o f differentiation which is like
a chisel, 1
Manifestation, bhsa, shining or being known, are the
different names o f the objective. A ccording to the aiva
absolutist, everything that shines objectively is a mere bhsa,
an appearance o f Consciousness. The object exists as long as
it is illum ined or manifest in consciousness. Thus, the crea
tion o f an object is nothing but its manifestation in conscious
ness. The creation o f universe is, likewise, an act o f manifes
tation o f universal consciousness. The aiva theory o f know
ledge is also, at the same time, the theory o f manifestation.
Abhsavda is both epistem ologica! and cosm ological doctrine.2
The divine om nipotence, which is in reality the power o f free
dom o f consciousness, is manifest both in the sphere o f knowle
dge as well as action. His freedom being o f two kinds, the Lord
is described as K now er and Doer ( JhLt and Aar/3 ). Though
in reality there is only one L ord, this difference between the
two aspects o f His freedom has been brought about by H im
self in order to make others understand His real nature. T h ere
fore, freedom in the act o f knowing is identical with the power
o f action.8 The power o f knowledge having been established,
the view that Samvid has unlimited power o f action is also
automatically established.4 Th e fact is that the powers o f
knowledge and action are inseparable.5
1. I. P. V ., I, vi, Intr.,
2. C f. Supra, Chapter V pp. 112-125
3. lihskarl, vol. J, p p. 397-8.
4. I. P. V., I I . i; Intr.
5. Ibid III. I. 1.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M A N IF E ST A T IO N 205
1. The Absolute and Causality

T h e A bsolute is regarded as the source o f the manifesta
tion o f the w orld. It is the absolute which manifests itself in
the form o f the world. Every appearance or abhasa is a
real manifestation o f the Absolute. H ow ever, the Absolute
being the cause o f all manifestation, no m anifestation, in
so far as it is a m anifestation, can be identified with the
Absolute. The Absolute is, thus, both the manifest and the
unmanifest (SbhSsa and nirabhasa) according to aiva A bsol
utism. But in V edntism . on the other hand, the appearances
are regarded as illusory manifestation o f the Absolute (viva-
rta). Brhaman is the source o f world appearances only in the
sense o f being their unconditional ground. It is the
ultimate substratum underlying the appearances. A nd, as it
does not really manifest itself, all manifestation is ultima
tely false. There can be no phenom enalisation of the
absolute. The appearances do not belong to Brahm an;
they are merely and wholly superficial, having no depth.
But the aiva Absolutist holds that appearances really
belong to Brahman. Parama iva, being both transcen
dent and im m anent, visvottlrrja and visvamaya, is manifest as
well as unmanifest. In its unmanifest aspect, it is pure pra-
ka or iva which is the transcendental background o f all
appearances. In its vimarsa aspect, it is the entire universe
both in its manifest und unmanifest form s.1 All causality or
activity ultimately belongs to Parama iva. He alone is the effi
cient, material, first and final cause o f the world. It is only the
sentient who can be regarded as the real cause o f all manifesta
tion. For, the manifestables, having no existence o f their own,
always depend upon the subject for their manifestation.
Creation o f objects or events is nothing but their manifestation
in consciousness, which alone is the cause o f their internal as
well as external existence. In the case o f all w orldly transac
tions, such as sprouting, etc., the Highest Lord alone must be
admitted to be the real cause. For nothing else, not even the
seeds etc., can reasonably be represented to be the cause. It is
the Lord H im self who, in union with other manifestations, such
17 "P^ H", p , 9(f: T .L . p, 69 ; S. D . p, p. 194,
as seed, water, earth, etc., appears as the sprout.1 Ultimate

causality cannot be ascribed to anything other than the
absolute.
Matter cannot be regarded as the ultimate cause o f the
universe. The material is nowhere found to be self-sufficient.
The very being or shining (i.e. manifestation) o f the
material depends upon the light o f consciousness. If it
were not illumined by consciousness, it would be as good
as nothing.* Powers o f knowledge and action cannot
belong to the insentient which has no freedom. That is
why, it is maintained that in statements, such as the chariot
is going,* the use o f the verb go* is merely due to trans
ference o f epithet. Thus, the being o f the insentient
entirely depends upon the sentient, and knowledge and
action are the very life o f the sentient.2 The insentients,
being objects o f determinate cognition, do not have
independent being. They have their being only as related
to and dependent upon the sentient subject, as is testified
by the perceptual judgment the blue shines to me,* or the
blue is the object o f my knowledge.* I f the pot* could
produce itself, where would be the necessity o f the potter ?
The fact is that whenever the insentient appears to be the
cause, it really depends upon some sentient as its prompter.
The refusal to admit this would involve the fallacy o f
assuming the absence o f a prompting cause. In the case o f
the creation o f the pot, the potter, who is the prompting
cause, is himself the Lord. The law, in accordance with
which he brings the pot into existence, is essentially the free
will o f the Lord who has manifested his power called
Niyati which necessitates the operation o f the wheel
etc., in the case o f the pot. If it were otherwise, then why
only the insentient clay etc., and not the insentient, like
thread and others, follow and respect the will of the
potter ?3 Hence it has to be admitted that causality or
creativity really belongs to the insentient.
1. I. P. V .. II. iv, 8.
2. Ibid. I. i. 3.
3. I. P. V. II. IV. 2-9.
the: ab so lu te and m a n if e s t a t io n 207
It is also untenable to regard, like the Smkhya, Prakrti

to be the primary cause o f the world manifestation. The
insentient Prakrti cannot be held to be the originator,
prompter and guide o f the process o f evolution o f the
world. For, evolution shows that there is a planned scheme in
the process o f manifestation.1 Prakrti cannot be source o f such
contradictory manifestations as one and many, change and
permanence. It is illogical to make contradictory assertions
with regard to one and the same thing. Unity and Multi
plicity cannot be the essential characteristic o f the insentient.
Both these characteristics may, however, be attributed to
the self-luminous consciousness. These mutually opposed
phenomena are nothing but manifestations o f consciousness.
They shine in the universal consciousness exactly as rest
and movement, one and many, identity and difference
shine simultaneously in a mirror, without destroying the
identity o f the mirror. There is however a difference,
between the manifestation in mirror and that in conscious
ness. While the mirror has no power o f reflection and
depends upon some other cause such as light etc., conscious
ness being self-luminous reveals the objects owing to its
own free will. Accordingly, it is consciousness alone which
can be represented to be the real cause o f all manifestation.2
While establishing the view that causality belongs to the

sentient alone, the aivite also rejects the view that pure cons
ciousness alone is the ultimate cause. According to him, cons
ciousness which is devoid o f freedom cannot be the source
of world manifestation. In the absence o f the desire which
presupposes a determinate consciousness o f identity o f the
manifested with the self, there can be no act o f creation or
production.3 I f it is contended that consciousness is really
pure and non-dual and the manifestation o f duality is due
to avidy, the question would arise: T o whom does avidy
belong ? It cannot belong to Brahman which is pure
1. Ibid. 17-19.
2. I. P. V . II. iv. 19.
3. Bhskarh vol. II pp 201-6.
203 KASH M IR SA IV ISM
consciousness. Nor can it belong to anything else, as there

is nothing other than Brahman. And if the mystery o f
avidyfc or MSya is regarded to be essentially inexplicable, to
whom is it inexplicable ? I f its inexplicability means that
it cannot be defined or explained through reason, then why
should we accept a reasoning which is opposed to the facts
o f experience ? M ultiplicity is a given fact o f experience
and if reason is unable to explain this fact, it alone is to be
blamed for its failure and not the reality. Attempts at
explaining the world o f plurality in this way, really am ount
to explaining it away. No better reason for establishing
the existence o f the multiplicity o f objects can be possible
than the recognition o f the facts o f experience. It is not
satisfactory to hold that though duality is manifest
it is proved to be false in the end. For, on the
contrary, it is non-duality which is sublated by the appear
ance o f duality. The awareness o f the falsity o f something
is due to the rise o f the consciousness o f its opposite. I f the
Vedntins view be accepted, then even the scriptures
would also becom e unreal, as they also involve the idea o f
duality.
It has to be accepted that Samvid unfolds the universe
upon its own screen like background, through its own free
will and not by the will o f something else.1 Everything
shines on the background o f consciousness, nothing can
shine outside o f it.2 Absolutism requires that the ultimate
causality should belong to the absolute alone. The ultimate
can neither be the pure unity, nor a duality composed o f
separate and independent entities.0 Thus, neither the
Samkhya nor the VedSnta theory o f creation is acceptable
to the aiva absolutist.
1. ^5 r sgpTT, a f o ^ 5 OTWRrcfiSWT,
q# srrgrfi^TcFîwir f a j i t a * 3
Rlfa, snsF fr o ' SfaRRfa fa sfa *
I p . H. p. 39.
2. reftwfinft ^ * sw r ^ stwottPt srera \ p. s. p. 75.
3. Pandey, K . C., opp. cit. p . 653.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M A N IF E STA TIO N 209
The manifestation o f the objects is possible because o f

the power o f freedom o f consciousness, the essential feature
o f which is free will, which expresses itself in the form o f
desire to act.* All the manifest and the manifestable are
ever present in the free will as one with it. Ultimately it
is the free will o f the Highest Lord which gives rise to the
manifestation. The manifested universe is identical with
the absolute. It does not lose its identity with the universal
consciousness.1 The creativity o f the Lord is his inscru
table will which appears in the form o f the universe
constituted by various SbhSsas whi^h are in the different
stages o f creation, sustenance etc., and thousands o f their
sub-varieties.2
Vastu, Tattva and Prameya are synonymous terms in
AbhSsavSda. Thus, everything is essentially an abhsa.
And an bhsa is essentially one with the light o f conscious
ness. In the absence o f oneness with the light, it would
be regarded as non-exir tent. Both in its manifest and
unmanifest states, the object is essentially o f the nature o f
- Prakasa; it is Prakasa itself.* Before its manifestation, in
its indeterminate state, the object exists as one with the
universal light, as omniform and perfect4 Its manifestation
or creation is essentially an ideal process and not a physical
one. According to ibhasavSda, the production or creation
o f an object is merely an externalisation o f the idea*
which previously existed as one with the light o f conscious
ness.
Creation is nothing but an objectification o f that which j
is essentially subjective. It is o f the nature o f self-conscious
ness and might be described as His knowing o f Himself.
On the basis o f experience, logic and scriptural authority,
self-consciousness appears to be the very life o f the self-
luminous subject.5 Through the process o f manifestation,
1. IP V . II. iv. 20.
2. Bhfikar. vol. IT, p. 208.
3. IPV . I. V . 11.
4. Ibid. I. vi. 3.
Bhskan, vol. I, p. 195.

the Self knows itself in various ways. In other words,

creation might be described as a determinate awareness o f
the Indeterminate. As all the subjects are essentially one,
all knowledge, whether it be in Sadaiiva or in a worm, is
the knowledge o f the Subject.1 During manifestation, the
indeterminate and absolute self-consciousness assumes the form
o f determinate and relative consciousness. However, even
when it becomes an object o f determinate knowledge, it
remains in its essential nature as the absolute subject. It
is only on this supposition that the relationship between
the creator and the created might be explained. By esta
blishing this explanation, 011 the basis o f valid arguments,
the aiva absolutist attempts to show that no other expla
nation o f creation is possible.2 The only valid explanation
o f creation is that, knowing himself through the multiplicity
o f objects, Siva alone shines.3
Parama iva, who is essentially the subject, becomes
manifest as an object through his own free will. Creation
is, thus, an apparent bifurcation o f the absolute subject as
finite subject and object. While creation is the manifestation
o f the subject as an object, destruction or involution is the
assimilation or merger o f the object in the subject.
Accordingly, the entire process might be described as a
subject-object and object-subject circularity.4
Creation is nothing but externalization o f that which
is already one with consciousness.5 Creation is not a new
production, it is a mere externalisation o f that which is
internal. It can be compared to the creation o f a new piece
o f art by the artist. In this case, novelty consists in the
1. IP V . I, i. 4.
2. SHTOTcRT
Ib id, I, v, 15.
3. *33 faPP. 1 SD. V. 109; PS., p. 9 7 .
w fo fa I Bhskar, vol. I, p . 47.
m 351 3 3 3 : Il Bhskar, vol. I, p . 193

TH E ABSOLUTE AND M ANIFE STA TIO N 211
external manifestation o f the ideas which previously

existed as identical with the consciousness o f the artist.
The universal creation might also be conceived on the
analogy o f creativity o f the individual. Actions o f an
individual are nothing but the external manifestation o f
his ideas which in the original state were one with his self-
consciousness. When the individual wakes up, his indivi
dual creation, or manifestation o f his ideas and activities,
begins. The universal creation, likewise, begins with the
awakening, which is nothing but externalisation o f the
universal consciousness (Unmefa). Again, when the indivi
dual goes to sleep, all his ideas and activities o f waking
life cease to become manifest and merge back with his self-
consciousness. In the same way, the dissolution o f the
created universe might be described as a sleep o f the
absolute consciousness ( Nimesa) * The universe is nothing
but the psychical life o f all the subjects projected outwardly.
When iva awakens, the world which is potentially latent
in Him starts becoming manifest (creation). The world
exists, when He is awake. The world merges and rests in
a potential state in Him, when He is asleep.
Creation might also be described as the external manifes
tation o f the transcendental speech, or a manifestation o f
the word* as the object. First o f ail, the word arises in pure
consciousness; later on, during the state o f creation, it is
manifest as the object. The whole process might be compared
to Yogic creation in which the object follows the thought o f
the Yogin.
The object might be regarded as the manifestation o f the
subject. Both the finite subject and object, which were in a
state o f perfect unity with pure consciousness prior to
creation, appear separate from each other as well as from
the universal consciousness during creation. But in reality,
they always remain inseparable from the universal conscious
ness. Hence, creation is merely an apparent separation o f
the subject and the^ object. It is the manifestation o f
1. PH, IV. ; BhskarT, II. pp. 221 4.

separation or difference on the background of consciousness.

Similarly, destruction is nothing but a removal of difference
and the manifestation o f unity. It is the nature o f cons
ciousness that it manifests difference in unity and unity in
difference (Abhede bhedanam, bhede ca abhedanam). As the multi
coloured feathers o f a peacock lie in a state o f undifferen
tiated unity, sitmarasya, in the egg o f a peacock, so do the
multiple objects o f the world exist in unity with conscious
ness prior to their external manifestation. The internality
o f - objects consists in their oneness with consciousness,
while their externality consists in being separate from it.1
Here, it might be asked as to how can it be possible for
consciousness or subject to appear as object. In reply to this
it may be stated that creation is nothing but the manifestation
o f the vision o f difference. Consciousness has freedom to
manifest difference and still remain unaffected. Like an actor
or sportsman, the absolute subject may indulge in the play
or game o f world manifestation. The Lord, though having
perfect knowledge, becomes manifest as limited or ignorant
for the sake o f play, like the king who assumes the role o f
a beggar in an act o f play. No object is really created or
destroyed ; there is no absolute creation or destruction.
Separation, disintegration, or differentiation, is the mark o f
creation. Unification or integration characterises the
phenomena o f dissolution.
As there is nothing like an independent or real object,
creation o f objects is the manifestation o f the ideas. Like
a sculpture, the subject carves out various figures or forms
upon its own background. The manifested forms are
neither different nor separate from the manifesting subject;
otherwise, they coiild not be manifest at all. Accordingly,
creation is nothing but a manifestation o f difference within
the unity o f consciousness.2 However, it does not imply
that creation is unreal. The main difference between the
aiva and Vedanta Absolutisms lies in the fact that while
1, IPK. I. V I I I . 8
2. IP V . I, III. 7
TH E ABSOLUTE AN D M ANIFESTATION 213
the former regards creation as real, the latter regards creation

as illusory. The aivite holds that creation is essentially
a form o f self-manifestation o f the absolute. The universe
appears as reflected in consciousness and is not a mere
figment o f imagination.1 Manifesting the various types o f
subjects as different from objects, causal relations and so on,
on its pure mirror-like self, the absolute itself shines as the
creator.2 The glorious and the Highest Lord, who is
perfectly free to follow or transgress the laws o f nature
(Niyati), Himself assumes the various forms.3 He is
the ultimate principle which performs the five-fold functions
o f creation, maintenance, etc. Manifesting the universe
which has both succession and simultaneity, He alone shines.
The process o f manifestation might appear to be illusory
or unreal to the finite intellect, but in reality it is not so.
Even if it is an illusion, it is a real illusion.
The aiva Absolutist would have to face a dilemma.
I f the universe is different from consciousness, it is nothing
whatsoever, i.e. it is as good as non-existent; but if it is non-
different from consciousness, how can we establish the rela
tionship o f cause and effect between them ? This dilemma
is solved by the aiva Absolutist by using causality in a
special sense. What is meant by causal relation in this
context is that the Divine consciousness, which is luminous,
absolute, and free-willed, alone flashes forth in the form of
numerous worlds. There is no successive causal connection in
it. The cause and effect are not successive in consciousness?
A mere flutter o f consciousness is simultaneously the manifes
tation o f the universe.4
The Vedntin, on the contrary, regards the world as
an illusory manifestation o f Brahman. The aiva
criticism o f the Vednta theory o f creation is not very much
1. Bhaskar, v ol. II, p. 220.
2. Ibid, p. 150.
3. IP V ., II, iv, 10.
4. Tf f^reft fa?;* ^ ?
ftiramrolsT i ph . p. 36.
214 KASH M IR SAI VISM
relevant. For, the Vedntin is not interested in deducing

the world from Brahman. According to him, there is no
legitimate process from the noumena to the phenomena.
Though the existence o f the world cannot be denied, we
should not overlook the demands o f reason in our haste to
lodge the empirical in the absolute. We need not sacrifice
the rational in order to satisfy the non-rational or the
emotional in us. The first and foremost question, before
we discuss the process o f creation, is whether the world is
real or not.
Logically it is not possible to maintain the theory o f a
real creation or transformation. After an analysis of the
different theories o f creation, the Vedntin arrives at the
conclusion that all change is illusory. There can be no
real creation or production o f the effect from the cause.
Likewise, the world as a whole cannot be regarded as a
real effect o f Brahman. It is ignorance or lower knowledge
which applies to the absolute attributes which imply
relation, such as creatorship and rulership o f the universe.
In itself the absolute is beyond all these attributes.
Establishing the validity or superiority o f Satkryavda
over Asatkryavda, the Vedntin proceeds to point out
the inconsistency in the foimer. Although the effect is not
independent o f the cause, nor is it altogether a new
beginning, it is only an illusory manifestation o f the cause.
T here can be no real process from the cause to the effect,
either as self-transformation or as self-manifestation, without
modifying the essential nature o f the cause. bhsavda,
the Saiva theory o f manifestation, is basically the same as
Satkryavda. Any real manifestation o f cause as effect
would really amount to self-transformation o f the cause
into the effect. When the aivite holds that the Parama
Siva himself undergoes world transformation, or that
creation does not mean a modification o f the cause, the
question arises : what is the actual difference between the
two states o f the cause, the unmanifest and the manifest ?
These two states cannot be regarded as identical, as in
TH E ABSOLUTE AND M ANIFESTATION 215
that case there would be no difference between the cause and

the effect. However, if they are supposed to be different,
it follows that the cause does not remain self-identical, but
becomes modified or changed. I f it is held that externality
and internality constitute the main difference between
the two states, or that the internal state o f manifestation is
the cause and its external manifestation the effect, then
also it would amount to some kind o f modification o f the
cause.
The absolute does not really transform itself into the
world. Undoubtedly Brahman, being the sole reality, alone
can be regarded as the ultimate cause o f the world. That
is why the Vedantin also defines Brahman as the cause o f
the world and thereby distinguishes it from entities like
Prakrti etc. However, it merely shows that there could
be no world if there were no Brahman. It does not imply
that the world has actually emerged from Brahman. It is
merely an accidental characteristic o f Brahman (tatastha
laksaa), in that the characteristic o f being the cause o f
the world does not really pertain to Brahman.1 It
indicates that Brahman is not compelled to appear but
merely condescends to appear. Being not necessarily
connected to the world, it can appear in any form.2 The
Vedantin does not hold the view that the world cannot be
the effect o f Brahman or that Brahman cannot produce
the world. For, that would amount to a limitation o f the
absolute. The postulation o f a necessary causal relation
between Brahman and the world would imply that the
world is the only manifestation o f Brahman and would
amount to a denial o f the absoluteness o f the absolute.3
The important question is whether the world could
really be produced out o f Brahman, I f it were a real
production out o f Brahman it would be as real as Brahman
itself, and in that case there would be two realities. Hence,
in order to avoid the dualistic predicament, we have to
1. Hiriyana, Indian Philosophical Studies, I.
2. T h e two Definitions o f Brahman in Advaita.
3. Ibid.
216 K A SH M IR SAIVISM
reject the view that the world is the real effect o f Brahman.
The world is a mere modification or transformation o f
My, and an illusory manifestation ( Vivarta) of Brahman.
There is no substantial change ; all change is mere
appearance or vivarta. The absolute does not really
transform itself in the world o f effects* Though Brahman is
the support and substratum o f all manifestations, they are
really due to My or Avidy. Without assuming some
principle o f Avidy or ignorance, it would not be possible
to account for the appearances. Avidy is the power
which superimposes the manifold o f sense on the super*
sensuous and Supreme Brahman.1 This can be observed in
the illustration o f rope-snake illusion. In this illustration, the
illusory manifestation o f the snake takes place owing to the
ignorance o f the real nature o f its substrate, viz. the
rope. Even when it appears as snake, the rope is not
really transformed into snake but remains identical. When
knowledge takes place, no change takes place in the
nature o f the rope, but only its illusory appearance, the
snake, is cancelled. The rope is, thus, affected neither by
the appearance nor by the cancellation o f the snake. The
reality o f the snake is merely derivative. It appears to
have existence because o f a false identification with the
rope. The relationship between Brahman and che world
is analogous to the relationship between the rope and
the snake.
There can be no real transformation o f the absolute
into the phenomena. It is only because o f ignorance that
Brahman appears as the world o f change or becoming.
We must remember that the so-called creation is not
absolutely real, for the entire expanse o f things is mere
illusion.3 Although Brahman might be described as the
material and the efficient cause o f the world, in reality it
is neither. Causality might be attributed to Brahman as
its qualification par accidens and not as an essential
qualification.
1 Mahadevan, T . M . P., Philosophy o f Advaita p. 313.

2. S B., I l l , ii 6.
th e absolute an d m a n if e s t a t io n 217
It is untenable to hold that the world somehow* belongs

to Brahman, or that it cannot be rejected completely.
For, if there is only a partial rejection, which part is to
be rejected and which is to be retained ? And if the
rejected part is also regarded as somehow real we will
not be rejecting anything. But the appearances cannot be
regarded as constituting reality. Nor can it be held that
the rope somehow* assumrs the appearance o f the snake
for some moments and later on at the dawn o f right know
ledge resumes its original form. The fact is that it never
assumed the form o f snake.
The relation between appearance and reality is o f the
nature o f adhyasa or superimposition, which has been
defined as the apparent presentation to consciousness, in
the form o f remembrance o f something previously observed
in some other thing.1 Thu*, the relation between them is
only one-sided. While the appearances imply the real, the
real need not imply the appearances. T o appear is essentially
to appear in the place o f the real, but to be real is not
necessarily to appear.
Brahman is neither a knower nor a doer. It is due to
the confusion o f the subject with the object that we falsely
attribute activity, agency and enjoyment to the Subject.
Without the delusion o f the 1 and M ine in the body,
sense organs, and the like, there can be no knowership, and
consequently no means o f knowledge is possible. For,
without calling in the aid o f sense organs no perception is
possible, but the action o f sense organs is not possible
without a resting place, viz. the body. And no action at all is
possible without transferring the being o f the Self to the
b ody; and without all this taking place no knowledge is
possible for the soul, which is independent o f the embodied
existence. But without the action o f knowing, no knowing
is possible. Consequently, the means o f knowledge, per
ception and the rest, belong to the realm o f avidy.2
1. S. B. Intr.
2. Ibid. I, i, 1.
218 KASH M IR SAIVISM
2. The How and the Why of Creation
According to the aiva Absolutist, the manifestation o f

the universe o f contradictory forms becomes possible due
to the power o f freedom o f the absolute. His freedom
represents the capacity for manifesting the w orld.1 It is
this power o f freedom which performs miracles in the state
o f finite existence.2 It is known under various names,
such as perfect egoity, energy, spanda etc.3 It implies
unobstructed freedom in creating that which appears
extremely difficult.4 When compared with the powers o f
other gods who are its creations, it is called the independent
and great power. It constitutes the volitional aspect o f
the absolute which brings about the manifestation o f the
world, like reflections in a mirror. The universal cons
ciousness manifests externally the objects which ever shine
as I, because o f its omnipotence, the chief characteristic
of which is freedom.6 The power o f freedom is called
Afahsatt as it is the cause o f all that can be said to exist
in any way. It is also called Para VSc because it represents
speech in its most subtle form. Its essential nature consist*
in bringing about diversity in unity and unity in diversity.6
The distinctive feature o f this freedom consists in the power
o f free consciousness 7
It might be asked as to how can we establish the existence

o f the powers o f knowledge and action in the subject, which
t. s w r o w lr w r a w r ; ip v ., i . . 7 .
fa f a : w p h . i.
2. Ibid, II, iii, 17.
3. S N . III. 13.
4. R R r f S f a H f a , Rfl*qT<3&
f * 3*t: s fa c r i i p v . i., v. 16.
s.
Ibid I. V . 10-16.
6. r ^ i mietei i nft ^ 113 .
ibid. 1. 1 . 1 .
7. T S . p . 11.
TH E ABSOLUTE AN D M A N IF E STA TIO N 21$
alone can justify the attribution o f fieedom or lordliness to

him P1 In reply to this, the aivite holds that the power
o f knowledge is s^lf-established, so also is the power o f
action. When associated with a particular body, this
power o f action is perceptible to the other finite perceivers.
From this, the presence o f the power o f knowledge is
also guessed. The Tact is that all the forms o f cognition
o f past, present and future, shine on the background of
self-luminous consciousness alone It is so obvious that
it does not require any discussion. For, if the self were
not shining, the whole world would be reduced to a mass
o f darkness, or it would not even be so. Even the
statement o f a child indicates the self-luminosity of the self.
If we deny the self-luminosity o f the subject, there would
be no question, nor any answer.2 In the case o f cognitions,
such as I k n ow / besides the self-luminosity o f the self,
there is a consciousness o f association with a stir also.
It is because o f this stir that the self is admitted to
be sentient in nature. This sir is technically called
vimarsa. It is the power o f action. This is what
Somnanda said, at the time o f cognition (say, o f a jar)
the cognitive stir in relation to the object is a ction /
Then fore, the internal power o f action like that o f
cognition is self-established This very internal power o f
action, because o f its inherent power enters into body,
through vital air and the Puryastaka and, being o f the
nature o f stir in itself, becomes directly perceived as
physical action in the sphere o f mSyS That physical
action, when seen in another persons body, logically
makes us guess the power o f knowledge which is its
essential nature. Knowledge cannot shine as an object,
for objectivity is opposite o f knowledge.3 The light o f
1. *rg ^ fa f ^ i p v . i. 4.
2. fani, cTCFt 3T t w r, arraisfa
WRJ-Sfa I Ibid. BhSskari, vol. I, p. 71.

3. * ^ ff I Ib id. p . 75.
220 KASH M IR SAIVISM
consciousness which is associated with another person at

the empirical level is non diffrent from the light o f
consciousness o f one who congnises. 1 he otherness is due to
limiting conditions o f it. And if we proceed to think
rationally, we discover that the limiting condition itself is
non-difTerent from the self. Hence, from the philosophical
point o f view all subjects are one. That one alone is. It
is one and the same self that shines as ones own self as
well as the selves o f others.1 Therefore, all knowledge,
whether it be in Sadsiva or in a worm, is the knowledge
o f one knower. Thus the omniscience o f the subject is
established. The same can be asserted with regard to the
action o f the Subject.2
iva does not require any instrument for bringing about
the manifestation o f the world. Without any break in
continuity, He manifests the objects by virtue o f His will
which has no definiteness or succession. All the 'objects,
both before and after manifestation, exist as one with Him,
s He is absolutely powerful. His creativity is nothing
more than this manifestation o f His will.3 A free being
means one whose nature is to employ without fail the
means for the accomplishment o f the end, or he who
employs himself in his work without requiring any other
prompter. The universal Samvid, in a certain order, or
even without any order, manifests the objects externally in
various ways because o f his omnipotence, the chief
characteristic o f which is freedom .4 Freedom, being just
the opposite o f dependence, implies independence in all
respects. I f the Self is to seek the help o f something
other than itself, it would cease to be the self whose chief
characteristic is freedom. Moreover, it cannot seek help
1. q t im fa q n fa ; 3qr?$r:, *r ^Tfq frqrftai

snr 'T to ffa f w : snrnj*pf: m r a : q *: amar qq h
rf3 I Ibid. p. 76.
2. Ibid.
3 qfcarera m a lf a r i, m foqr, *i?q v roa I
Ibid. II. iv. 1.
4. Ibid. I. v. 10
TH E ABSOLUTE A N D M A N IF E STA TIO N 221
from the not-self, which is essentially insentient and which

itself depends upon the self. It follows that the self does
not seek external help and manifests itself as an object of
knowledge owing to its free will.1
According to this system, in reality action is nothing else
than the very will o f the Lord, which is independent o f
all the rest, and which is o f the nature o f unbroken self-
consciousness and is the unchecked power o f perfect freedom. 2
The power o f action, the essence o f which is omnipotence and
which includes all other powrrs, is the nature o f free cons
ciousness.*3 Causality is nothing but making that, which
revolves within, the object o f both internal and external
senses; the same universe which shines resting within the
Lord as one with Him, because o f its connection with
different times and places etc. and, therefore, its objectivity
to senses, is perceived as many. 4 Thus, action is basically
nothing but the external manifestation o f the creative will
o f the L ord.6 Ultimately, Highest Lord alone is the
^Creator.6 The entire universe is a creation o f the Divine
will, it does not involve any self-modification o f the Lord.
This creativity o f free will can be observed even in
ordinary life. It is a well-known fact that the Yogins
create various objects due to their will power alone.7 This
q s rr** I Ibid. I. V. 15
FT'lfriprcireqT f o qr | Bhskar, vol. II, p. 24.

3. iVarcfn HfaTfa 1 AT ^ - |
IPV., I. v. 15.
4. Ibid. II, il. 2.
5. Ibid. I. v. Intr.
6. Ibid. II iv. 21.
7. nif*Hi <*r %*i gm
qrf? I H gqi T'I
sifaTrcifTinwisiftu *> w * %f q fa g sRqfr, mfrg
g<ggg?gT^*wrfcnFiTgi<mJTgiTr giT
I SD. pp. 111-. Also 10-13
aKig SfFT5i:rg-5tf-5lFl!IcrF sff^5îrzi g I

IPV. I. V .7.
will power is also known to the individuals, through self

experience, as being identical with their own nature and is
manifest everywhere. It is recognized in that state to
which our ego is reduced at the moments o f excessive
anger, jo y , pain etc. In other words, its presence can be
felt during the intense feeling o f fear, grief, hunger,
curiosity etc.1 It is o f the form o f *aurmukhyatS which
can be witnessed at the time o f suddenly remembering or
forgetting, during intense pleasure, at the beginning o f fear,
when suddenly seeing the unseen, at the climax o f sex
enjoyment, at the end o f a speech, and while quickly reading
the text.2
Pure consciousness, which is devoid o f freedom, cannot
be the cause o f manifestation o f the world. Consciousness
which is essentially free alone can manifest the world
appearances.3 This is evident in the case o f a Y ogin s
creation, wherein the Yogin produces pot, etc., which have
permanency and serve their respective purposes, by his
sheer will power, without taking the help o f clay etc.4
Similarly, the universal consciousness, whose power o f
freedom is acknowledged, manifests the objects externally
by virtue o f its free will. Therefore, instead o f feeling
the weariness due to search for some other cause, why not
admit the freedom o f the Self in the manifestation o f the
world ? The manifesting o f objects is the chief character
istic o f consciousness and is self-established truth. Its
sentiency itself is its power o f freedom. Hence, as there
is this possibility that the Lord makes everything manifest,
what then is the use o f believing in the other cause which
is not based on reason ?5
1. SK.i 22,
2. SD., pp. 11-12,
3. IPV. II. iv. Intr.
4. SfTPTfa I
srcrfe sar g T f f w w n f a r o J v j it ibid. ii iv. io
s. %% fasreqraraSftr f a s i c i c*ar fa * r*g<riTwrf

fafafa fasr i
Bhaskarl ,vol. I. pp. 228-9,
The creativity o f the Lord can be seen on the analogy

o f the reflectivity o f such things as mirror, crystal etc,
As the limpid crystal assumes a semblance o f diverse
colours, likewise G od also assumes the semblance o f god,
man, cattle, trees, etc.*1 The only differr nee between the
reflectivity o f these objects and o f consciousness is that
these objects do not have freedom o f reflection, but have
to depend for it on some external cause; on the other
hand, consciousness is absolutely free.2 The Lord, though
really one and independent, assumes in the clear mirror o f
the self, the forms o f individuals created by himself.3
The free will o f the Lord is always manifesting itself

in the form o f the five-fold function o f universal creation,
maintenance, destruction, self-concealment and self
revelation. Thus, the Lord always performs these five-fold
functions, and there is no break in his shining as the
universe in various ways, such as creation, destruction etc 4
- He always diverts himself in creation, ever rests in pleasure
o f maintenance, and is ever satisfied with the food o f the
three worlds. 5 While the functions o f creation, destruction
and maintenance operate on the phenomenal plane, the
functions o f self-concealment and self revelation, nigraha
and anugraha, operate at the transcendental level. Creation
is the manifestation o f separation; keeping the manifest
as separate, is maintenance ( sthiti ) ; the manifestation
o f unity or integrality is destruction fsariihSra) All these
functions re manifest simultaneously in the absolute. There
1. qt iws<Tsr: 'Bfev: i
II PS. Kriktt 6.
2. T . S. pp!*18-19
3. 53: I Bhskari, vol. II,
p. 157-9
4. bt fa s ic i
I PH. p. 62 -6 4.
5. sfgfaftsro 551 feqfaggrfr i
55f 53^ 33: Il i p v ., I. v . IO. (Bhskari
I. p. 239).
appears to be a gulf between these various functions from

the point o f view o f the finite alone, in reality each function
includes all others. For example, when a flower is manifest,
i.e. when it becomes an abhsa to a subject, its creation is no
thing but its appearance in consciousness; similarly, its main
tenance also is nothing but its being apparent. It exists only
as long as it appears. Its appearance and its existence fsrsti
and sthiti) are identical. But its very appearance or existe
nce involves its destruction (samhra). It is being destroyed
or submerged in consciousness during the very process in
which it is appearing or existing. Here a question arises as
to how there can be the possibility o f functions such as
creation etc., if there is no succession in the absolute.
Moreover, when the five-fold functions are supposed to
operate simultaneously, there can be no possibility o f
succession. Anticipating such questions, Abhinavagupta
holds that in the case o f the Lord, the determinate cons
ciousness, in the form o f the will Let me lord over,
Let me m o v e / Let me be self-conscious, is in reality
nothing else than the I* consciousness in its essential nature
and there is nothing like succession in it. 1 At the level
o f the absolute everything shines as self-consciousness. T o
the subject, who is perfect and free from all limitations,
the objects shine as his very self. Therefore, in this state the
objects are also perfect in every way. For, such is His
real nature. Everything is perfect in form and action, in
every way, in Him.2 The process o f distinct manifestation
o f object begins only at the time o f creation.
The Divine Sakti is simultaneously identical with

emanation and absorption. It assumes the creative function
1. fWCTFr fe-
fa w rr n n 1 a aa w : l
IP V . II, i, 8
2. s f a a ^ 5 s fa T re s a *T s r : f a r d a i s^rra
aa * if a tra: s if: aa: a r w a*a
aa ra qa - 1 ib id . 1.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M A N IF E S T A T IO N 225
and appears in the state o f emanation with reference to

those manifestations which are about to come into being.
The same Power appears as constituting the state o f absorp
tion, when appearing as the destroyer o f the previously
manifested objects. The state o f beginning o f manifestation
might be regarded as an awakening o f the outward consci
ousness o f the subject and the state o f disappearance as the
awakening o f the inward consciousness.1 However, in
reality He alone, who essentially is nothing more than the
five powers o f creation etc., shines.2 At one particular
time, He brings about identity with particular subjects,
imposes obscuration by obscuring perfection or essential
nature, bestows favour by bestowing perfection insofar as
He makes the identity o f the subject shine in relation to the
limited manifestation. Thus, the Lord always performs the
five functions, not only in case o f cosmic creation, destruc
tion etc., but also in practical life.3
Creation at the higher level is different from the creation

at the lower level. At the higher level, creation is the
manifestation o f the state in which the entire manifestables
exist in a potential or subtle form. There is no spacio-temoo-
ral succession during this state o f manifestation. In it all
the manifestables are one with self-consciousness and are
illumined as one with it.4 For the knowledge o f ones own
self is direct and immediate and does not follow any process.
The variety o f manifestations shine to the limited subject
alone. It does not shine to the universal subject who is
perfect.5 That which is integral and one in the sphere o f
higher consciousness appears as successive and different in
the realm o f finite consciousness.
1. SN I. 1.
2. IP V . IE. iv. 10.
3. fa 'T iTSTffafag
Ibid. I. v i. 7.
4. SD. 1.
5. IPV . II. i. 6-7.
The universal is not absolutely consumed when, on the

occasion of a particular destruction, it is devoured by con
sciousness, but continues in a potential state. Later on, at
the time o f a new creation, it arises again from the potential
state. This is also seen in the personal experience of all finite
subjects. Every subject possesses a similar power o f
devouring the objects at the time o f sleep and manifesting
them again when he wakes up.1
In the transcendental state ( para avasth ), the subject
holds within itself the unmanifest universe as His ideal
experience. In the perfect apprehension o f Supreme
Egoity, all objects shine in identity with the subject.2
There is no feeling o f want and the consequent rise o f will*
in the Subject who is all perfect. But, when there arises a
tendency towards self-forgetfulness, there appears a limi
tation in the infinite bliss o f self-consciousness. This limi
tation in the perfect experience gives rise to the creative
will which is the whole universe in its unmanifest state.
The limitation or negation o f the Supreme Bliss gives rise
to the state prior to desire, from which spring all desires.
Henceforth starts the search for perfection or the blissful
supreme egoity and thus begins the entire process o f
evolution and involution.
Thus, creation which consists in the objectification o f
consciousness begins owing to the rise o f a feeling o f want
or desire This feeling takes place when the Supreme Self
manifests itself through its own free will as limited.8 This
state has been described in various systems as nyat,
vacuity, indeterminateness, avidy etc. It represents a
slight vibration in the dynamic nature o f free consciousness
which in itself is both dynamic and static simultaneously.
It produces the universe out o f itself, just as the Banyan seed
produces the Banyan tree.4 It might also be described as
the state o f apparent forgetfulness, self-negation or self-
1. -P H . p. 68.
2. SD. I. 10.
3. SD. 10.
4. PH . IV .
concealment, contraction or limitation ( tmakhti, tirodhnay

and ramkochana) of the absolute self-consciousness. The
Divine akti manifests the universe after concealing or
obscuring the experience o f Supreme Egoity. This state of
limitation or negation o f consciousness is the source o f all
subsequent tension, unrest and struggle. As Sri Aurobindo
says, at this state the infinite consciousness loses itself in
the appearance o f non-being and emerges in the appearance
o f a finite soul, infinite consciousness loses itself in the
apearance o f a vast indeterminate and emerges in the
appearance o f a superficially limited consciousness. The
infinite self-sustaining force loses itself in the appearance of
insensible matter and emerges in the appearance o f discor
dant rhythm o f varied pain, pleasure and neutral feeling,
love, hatred and indifference; infinite unity loses itself in
the appearance o f a chaos o f multiplicity and emerges in
a discord o f forces and being which seek to recover unity
by possessing, dissolving and devouring each other.1
The process o f manifestation represents a gradual bifurca

tion o f the unity o f iva and akti, being and becoming,
bodha and svatantrya. These various forms o f manifestation
o f consciousness have been classified into thirty-six categories
or tattuat. The exact number o f these categories is a subject
o f dispute among the aivites. Counting the transcendent
and immanent forms o f iva separately, Abhinava Gupta
advocates thirty seven categories. But UtpalSchirya does
not accept the categories to be thirty seven 2 According to
Abhinava Gupla, the division o f the manifested universe
into categories is based neither wholly on empirical obser
vation nor purely on logical analysis. It is based mainly
on the authority o f the Agamas and is also partly a result
o f long Yogic experiments and careful study o f mind and
matter. It has to be noted that the objects o f the world,
characterised by sentiency or insentiency are simply mani
festations. Therefore, the question arises as to what are the
1. L D . p. 103.
2. Pandey, K . C ., op. cit. pp. 363-4, 525.
categories under which they are subsumed ? The direct

perception o f the finite subject does not lead us anywhere and
similar is the case with inference, because we cannot have
the knowledge o f distinguishing characteristics and invari
able concomitances o f all things. But Agama in its essence
is simply the determinate thought o f the Highest Lord, who
is unlimited pure light o f knowledge. Nothing is, therefore,
beyond its view. Hence the group o f categories is based on
the authority o f the aiva Agamas and is also supported by
reason.1
This group o f categories begins with iva and ends with
earth.3 Each one o f these categories is a single abhasa or
universal, and the entire domain o f bodies and worlds etc.,
which is consequent upon the peculiar combinations o f
these abhasas, which give rise to the innumerable definite
objects, is due to the fact that all abhasas rest on one
common basis.8
A tattva may be defined as that which lasts through the
dissolution o f the universe and is always present in its effects
or collocations. Being mere manifestations o f the absolute,
these tattvas are essentially identical with their source.
Tattvas are not dependent upon the finitesubject. They
constitute the fundamental or basic elements o f the uni
verse. Being a constituent o f Universe, a tattva has two
aspects, the macrocosm and microcosm. In its former aspect
it pervades the universe and in its latter aspect it signifies
a constituent element o f body-apparatus.4 A collocation
1. % ^ dr i s m f :, s fa i q * srH aassN n r:
rsroft ^ ftn a r ^ < ir d jfp dr, sc t HTurswr:
sf>fa I t r w n r fc r , a asrcfta a * a *
" I Bhskar, v ol. II, pp. 212-13.

2. srfacasTfspftaresrTWT i
iR ?a f f a a r e r a i ^ d n ib id . n , p. 2 11 .
3. Pandey, K . C ., o p . cit. p. 357.
4. Sen, Sarma, Devabrata, T h e Conception o f Tattva-Â Study,
Gopinath Kaviraj Abhinandan Granth.
TH E ABSOLUTE AND M A N IFE STA TIO N 229
is said to belong to one category or the other in so far

as a particular tattva forms its basis by being the chief cons
tituent o f it. The process o f manifestation o f tattvas may be
described as a gradual objectification o f the Subject. These
tattvas are separate neither from iva nor from each
other. For, in each tattva all other tattvas are present. Just
as the higher tattvas include and involve all the lovver
tattvas, the lower tattvas also include within them all the
higher tattvas. The separate manifestation o f a particular
tattva only means its individual shining on the background
o f the unity o f consciousness. In the absence o f this
background, nothing would shine. The fact is that Parama
iva stands behind and above all these tattvas as their one
and supreme synthesis.1
The tattvas are not subjective or psychological
experiences. They were originally conceived in the
Smkhya as psychologically distinguishable stages o f the
progress o f the individual. Later on, however, the Srnkhya
became metaphysical in hypostating the tattvas into
ontological entities.2 The aiva absolutist holds that
these tattvas are real and can be realised in Yogic experi
ence. A large part o f aiva literature is devoted to the
demonstration o f the evolution o f these tattvas beginning
from the highest state o f reality to the lowest.
Amongst these tattvas, the twenty-five lower tattvas
from Purusa to eartha, resemble the Srhkhya categories.
The other eleven categories are accepted only in Saivism.
O f these, the first five categories represent the five powers
or aspects o f the Absolute. The remaining six represent
the limitation o f the individual soul. All the tattvas have
been classified into three groups, viz. pure, pure-impure and
impure, depending upon the nature o f creation. The first
five tattvas represent the sphere o f pure creation because
they are manifested directly by iva himself without
involving any prompting cause.3 The impure creation
1. Chatterjee, J. C ., op. cit. p. 162.

2. Sasiri.S. S. S., Samkhaya Karika o f lsvara Kr*na, Intr. p. X V I I I .
3. T A . V I. 55. ^ '
230 KASHMIR gAIVISM
depends upon the instrumentality o f My5. The intermediate

order o f creation, or the pure-impure creation, is so called
as it is the state o f manifestation o f MyS and is in between
the pure and the impure. From another point o f view,
these tattvas are divided into three classes iva tattva,
VidySL tattva and tma tattva. In the first class o f tattvas
are included the iva and akti tattvas ; Vidy tattva
includes SadSiva, livara and Vidy; tma tattva includes
the remaining thirty-one tattvas from Mya to the earth.
There are five kinds o f supersensuous beings called

smbhava, ktaja, Mantra Mahevara, Mantreivara
and Mantra, according as any o f the five powers o f Parama
iva predominates in them.1 The predominance o f any
one o f these powers results in a certain state o f conscious
ness, which is similar to that in which a Yogin
descends from the transcendental state to the waking.
In every manifestation o f pure creation, however,
all the five powers are essentially present, the
difference being only o f predominance o f a particular
power in a particular tattva. The Siva tattva is the first
manifestation o f reality. In it the power o f consciousness
predominates. It is the state o f experience o f pure T.*
The subjects who belong to this state are called Smbhavat.
The Sakti tattva becomes manifest almost simultaneously
with the iva tattva. As soon as the desire for creation
takes place in the heart o f the Lord, there arise the iva
and akti tattvas. However, as consciousness presupposes
being, the akti tattva is presupposed by iva tattva.
The experience at the level o f akti tattva assumes the
form I am. The nanda akti predominates in this
state and the beings who belong to this state are called
Sftktajas. At the level o f Sadftsiva tattva the power o f will
becomes predominant. The experience in this state assumes
the form I am this.* As it is the beginning o f the mani
festation o f being, or the first stir o f consciousness, it is
l. i^d. v i. 52.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M A N IFE STA TIO N 231
called Sdkhya tattva.* The experiencer in this stage is

called Mantra Mahesvara. The whole universe constitutes
an object o f their experience. The Isvara tattva is the
state o f manifestation wherein the power o f knowledge
predominates The element o f objectivity or iditiit becomes
prominent in it The experience now assumes the form
This I am.9 It is called Isvara tattva because here
lordliness becomes more important than self-consciousness.
While Sadsiva is the state o f internalisation o f Siva and
akti, Isvara is the state o f their externalisation.2 The
Sadvidy tattva is the state o f manifestation in which the
power o f action becomes predominant. Here the subjective
and the objective consciousness become equally manifest
and the experience takes the form I am this. It differs
from the Vidya tattva in as much as the latter constitutes
a limitation o f the finite subject.
So far we have considered only the pure order o f
creation. In this order, the experiencer realises his
Universal nature and has an experience which is
free from limitation. Accordingly, this order or realm of
creation is also described as the sphere o f true knowledge.
Henceforth, the order o f creation becomes impure inasmuch
as the knowledge o f reality becomes more and more
obscured. Instead o f unity, the consciousness o f plurality
becomes the dominant feature o f the impure creation.
The M j tattva is the state o f manifestation from which
the unity o f the subject becomes manifest as divided.
MyS is the principle o f obscuration as well as o f the
manifestation ol self.3 It makes the universal self appear in
the form o f the finite self. It destroys the unity o f the
subject and object and manifests them as separate. The
Aham element becomes manifest as Purusa and Idam as
Prakrti. In order that the absolute subject may appear
1. s fa m a rc i
I d egree i i p v . m . i . 2.
2. fa N t s ? a : B T taq: 1 i b id 3
3. T A . V I . 116.
232 K A SH M IR Sa i V ISM
as Purusa, My also produces the five cloaks (Updhis

or Kaficukas). As it hides the true nature o f the self, not
only the five powers o f the self but also the universe as a
whole which was previousiy identical with the self becomes
obscured.
Kal tattva is the first product o f My. It partly
restores to the self its power o f action which has been
obscured in the state o f My. Accordingly, it gives rise
to finite doership and limits the om nipotence o f the self.
It is related to the individual self as its causal agent, and
not as an instrument to an agent. The individual gets
freedom from Karma and attains the state o f Vijnnkala
only when he is able to transcend this tattva.1
Vidy is the limited power o f knowledge, which gives

rise to the finite knowership in place o f omniscience. It is
different from Buddhi tattva which is insentient. Rga
produces attachment in the individual for objects. Instead o f
the feeling o f eternal satisfaction it gives rise to finite desire
in the soul. Kla constitutes the limitation o f the self in
respect o f time. Because o f it, the eternal appears as
temporal. Henceforth, consciousness becomes manifest with
in time. Niyati is the power which limits the freedom o f the
subject as regards its causal efficiency. It controls the
activities o f the finite agent. These four tattvas are the
effects o f the Kal tattva.2
When the absolute subject assumes the form o f limited

subject under the influence o f My and its cloaks, it is
called Purusa. In this state, the self becomes limited and
forgets its essential nature. In place o f the original five
supreme powers, viz. cit, nanda etc., the soul now
possesses the attributes o f Kal, Vidy, etc., which in
effect obstruct the true nature o f the self. The Purusa
assumes different names in different states o f existence.
When it identifies itself with the body etc., it is called
1. T A . V I . 143.
2. Ib id . V I, 161.
THE ABSOLUTE AND MANIFESTATION 233
Deha PramZt; when it is free from any association with

the objects o f the world, as in pralaya and deep sleep, it
is called Pralaykala ; when it is free from Karma, it is
called Vijnnnkala.
Prakfti is the first purely objective manifestation. It is
an effect o f Kla. It is as innumerable as the Purusa.
Buddhi is the tattva which receives the reflection o f the
light o f the self from within as well as o f the objects from
without. Ahaiikra arises due to the superimposition o f
the self on Buddhi1 and thus is a product o f Buddhi.
Manas is the product o f Ahankra.
The remaining tattvas are : the five sense organs called
Jnnendriyas, viz. the poweis o f smell ( Ghrna), taste (Rasa),
seeing (Caksu), touch (Sparsa) , hearing (Sravana); the five
organs o f action are five Karmendriyas, viz. resting and enjoy
ing (CJpasthendriya), rejection ( Payvindriya), locomotion
( Padendriya), handling (Hastendriya) , voicing (Vgendriya) ; the
five subtle elements ( Tanmtras), viz. smell ( Gandha), taste
(Rasa), form (Rpa), touch (Sparsa) and sound ( abda) \ the
five gross elements arise from the subtle elements; ether
(Aktisa); is manifest, from sound; Sparsa from air ( Vyu),
Rupa from fire (Agni), taste from water (Jala), Gandha from
earth (Pfthvi). The first three o f these groups originate
from Ahankara, with the predominance o f Sattva, Rajas
and Tamas respectively, and the fourth group, viz., the
five gross elements, is the effect o f the preceding group
o f TanmStras.
Fiere, even if we admit the possibility o f the above

mentioned process o f self-manifestation, the question arises
as to why should the absolute manifest itself ? What is
that motive or purpose which impels the all perfect Parama
iva to forget his real nature ? What makes Him indulge
in the game o f self-concealment, self-limitation or suffering ?
Manifestation o f the absolute as limited obviously cannot
be due to any compulsion or pressure. It would be con-
1. Ibid. 185.
234 KA SH M IR SAIVISM
tradictory to hold that the absolute is compelled to appear

in the phenomenal form. The only plausible explanation of
His b*. ing manifest in the world would be to regard creation
as a play or a self-amusement o f the absolute. Perhaps, it
is His pretension o f acting as undivine, o f putting on such
appearance like the mask or make-up o f an actor, solely
for the purpose o f enjoying the drama. 1 No other purpose
can be attributed to the creative will o f the Lord except
that it is a manifestation o f His sporting nature, which
makes him indulge in the game o f hide-and-seek.
First, He throws himself into the world process and becomes
a SamsSrin. Then, after passing through the ordeals o f the
play, He returns to Himself. This might be compared to the
sporiive behaviour o f a king who, inspite o f his being very
rich and having many servants, becomes a pedestrian and
himself runs on foot while playing the game. In order to
play, the king forgets that he is the monarch and assumes
the limitation o f an ordinary man. If he is always conscious
o f his being a king, no game would be possible. Likewise, the
Lord, though perfect and enjoying the Supreme Bliss, puts
limitations on Himself and manifests the plurality o f subjects
and objects and enjoys the game o f five functions.2
But, why should there arise even the will or desire in the
Lord who is supreme and perfect ? The world play cannot
be for the sake o f doing good to creatures, as it would
amount to putting the cart before the horse. Neither can
it be held that it is for the sake o f self-enjoyment or self-
satisfaction, for the absolute is Saccidnanda itself. Thus
the desire for creation seems to imply an imperfection or
limitation in the nature o f the absolute and is contradictory
to its nature.
1. L D . p. 369.
air qîrw:
q : s ta i sd . i. 37-8.
In answer to this, the aivite points out that it is His

very nature to indulge in the sport o f five functions. It is
due to His creative nature that He enters into the bodies of
finite beings and enjoys pleasures and suffers.1 It would
rather be strange if some one were to ask why fire burns.
For, the nature o f a thing cannot be questioned. Just as it is
the very nature o f fire to burn, similarly it is the very
nature o f the Self to know itself determinately as this.* As
He does not enjoy His being alone, therefore, He manifests
Himself into the various forms o f subject and object.2 Owing
to this self-limiting nature, the Lord is ever busy in the
function o f self-concealment and self-realisation.3 Moreover,
if the absolute did not manifest itself, it would no longer
be the Self but would be reduced to the level o f an object.
If the highest reality did not manifest itself in infinite
variety, but remained cooped up within its solid singleness,
it would neither be the highest power nor consciousness,
but something like a ja r .4
Just as milk naturally flows out o f the breast o f a
mother due to the intense love or happiness aroused at the
sight o f the child, similarly the infinite bliss of Supreme
Egoity naturally overflows and throws itself out, due to its
own free will, into the game o f the five functions. The
scriptures also declare chat all beings are born out o f
nanda, exist in Snanda and merge back in it. Such an
overflow o f nanda is the very nature o f the absolute bliss
o f the Self. The absoluteness o f Being-Consciousness is
unlimited Bliss, the jo y o f self-existence; and it is the
overflow o f jo y , the infinity o f bliss, which spontaneously
throws itself out and seeks self-enjoyment in the game of
hide and seek. Just as the force o f consciousness o f reality
throws itself into forms o f infinite and endless variations,
1. Ibid.
2. PS. pp. 73-74.
3. *t: sr i
m u s ix g ii ^ > ifT fa 3 : < R R 3T : II PS. p. 1.

4. T . A. 11. 100.
so also self-delight is capable o f revealing in that infinite

flux and mutability o f itself represented by numberless
teeming universes.1
Can this spontaneously overflowing Snanda itself be
regarded as a conscious process ? If it is not a conscious
process, does it not follow that the whole process o f mani
festation is essentially unconscious or material ? T o this,
the Saivite replies that the will* is identical with, or in
cluded in, the overflowing Snanda. Will is only a later
manifestation o f Snanda. Therefore, the process at this
stage cannot be regarded as a determinately willed process.
It cannot be described as a conscious process, as it is a super-
conscious process. Instead o f employing some kind o f
limitation, the will shows the Supreme glory o f the Lord.
For, it is a product o f infinite bliss and does not arise due
to want or shortage. Unlike the logical process o f the
Hegelian absolute, through which the absolute becomes
richer and fuller, the ll o f Parama iva does not aim at
any achievement. It is merely a spontaneous expression o f
the infinite Bliss.
The creative will being the necessary manifestation o f

the infinite bliss, creation might be regarded as a natural
or necessary development o f the absolute. But, if the
process is necessary on His part, does it not imply a limi
tation o f His freedom ? How can freedom and necessity
go together ? It appears to be impossible to reconcile the
necessity o f manifestation with the concept o f Divine
Freedom. The aiva absolutist attempts to avoid this
dfficulty by asserting that this very fact, that He manifests
Himself as limited and yet remains absolutely perfect,
shows the freedom o f the Lord. The strange and mysterious
appearances could be accounted for only on the view that
the absolute is essentially free.2 Being eternally free and
perfect, Parama iva can have no real want or desire ; it
1. L D , p. 87.
2. IP V ., II. iv. 4.
TH E ABSOLUTE AND M A N IF E STA TIO N 237
is His very nature to manifest the world.1 His freedom

constitutes the capacity to bring about manifestations which
appear impossible and paradoxical to the finite subject
Though the Vedntin also regards Brahman s creative
activity to be a mere sport, yet he holds that the theory o f
real creation cannot be logically maintained. The view
that Brahman really creates or manifests itself would imply
division in the nature o f Brahman and would make it a
being o f complex nature. Like all composite baings, it
would also become perishable, i.e. it would be subject to
origin, decay and destruction. I f it is said that there is
no difference o f parts in Brahman, then it cannot be
regarded both as being and becoming. I f akti manifests
itself in the world, and if iva and akti are identical,
it means that iva Himself becomes manifest. But if it
is held that the absolute remains perfect even after mani
festing itself in the world, then we should explain how
it is possible. Either the absolute becomes modified in the
process o f manifestation or the process itself becomes
unreal. T o maintain the identity o f the absolute, we have
to accept that the absolute remains unmodified inspite o f
its being manifest through various forms, like the individual
who remains identical in and through the various mental
modifications. Here the question would arise as to whether
this manifestation is exclusive or inclusive to the absolute. It
cannot be regarded as exclusive, for it would amount to a
surrender o f absolutism. Nor can it be inclusive, for then
it would introduce difference in the heart o f the absolute.
Nor can it be said that there is change in one aspect and
changelessness in the other, as it would give rise to the
question o f relation between these aspects. Further, are
these aspects essential to the absolute or not ? I f the
former be the case, it would be difficult to explain how
change in one aspect does not affect the other. In the
l. a ty* ^ at anrfa
* a * fa g a * n s r r \ p s. p. 74.
238 K ASH M IR SA IV ISM
latter case, change would become merely accidental- And

change being accidental to it, the absolute should not be
regarded as essentially the Creator. Its creatorship would
be merely accidental.
Hence the Vedntin holds that the changing aspect o f
the absolute is merely an accident; only the changeless aspect
constitutes its essential nature. It would not be possible
to maintain the absoluteness o f the absolute on any other
view. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the
accidental and essential nature o f Brahman according to
the Vedntin. In order to preserve the freedom and
purity o f the absolute, it is ail the more necessary to hold
that manifestation o f Brahman is purely accidental.
According to the Vedntic theory o f causation,
Vivartavday the unchanging cause gives rise to the changing
effects. That which changes is unreal; the real is that
which does not change.
A critical examination o f the power or potency which
gives rise to the manifestation o f the world reveals that it
is an unique, inscrutable or inexplicable mystery. At best,
it can be regarded as the principle o f ignorance or cosmic
illusion, having no independent existence o f its own. It is
the source, or the self-producing material cause, o f the cosmic
illusion. Through the agency o f this principle, Brahman
appears as the multiplicity o f objects. Brahman is the
Creator o f the world only in the sense o f being its ground.
Although the production o f the insentient from the sentient
appears to be strange, the notion o f Brahman cannot be
discarded.1 This creativity o f Brahman is a mere sport or
Ilia. Just as in the world a rich man who has no wants
acts, without any specific purpose, only for the sake o f
play, so also the creativity o f the Lord is due to His //.2
The theory o f limitation or self-concealment o f the

absolute has been propounded, both by the aivite and the
1. SB. II. ix. 3

2. Ib id.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M A N IFE STA TIO N 239
Vedantin, in order to explain the possibility o f its mani

festation. While in the aiva absolutism self-limitation
is taken to be a real manifestation o f the absolute, in the
Vedanta it merely denotes an apparent conditioning
o f Brahman. Although the illustration o f crystal, mirror etc.,
prominently figure in both the systems, their uses are, how
ever, different Through the help o f these illustrations, the
aivite tries to show how the one can appear as many and
yet remain one. But the Vedntins intention is to illustrate
how something can appear in something without really
belonging to it and how the attributes do not really belong
to the substance. According to him, the one space is given
different names owing to its adjuncts (UpHdhis), while in
itself it is ever unaffected. Similarly, the absolute, though
apparently suffering from limitations at the time o f mani
festation, does not really undergo any limitation.1 This
contact o f limitation is akin to the suffusion o f the crystal
by the red colour with which it is associated.2 The
Vedntin claims that the theory o f illusory creation is in
conformity with experience. A mixing o f the subject and
* object, being and becoming, and so on, is the very basis
o f practical life. In the illustration o f the rope-snake,
shell-silver etc., we find instances o f illusory creation.
The sea and the waves, the clay and the pots, the crystal
and its reflection, appear different, though really non-
different. Similarly Brahman and the world, though
really non-different, appear for all practical purposes
as different.
The fact is that the Vedntin is not interested in
explaining the world. The function o f cosmology in the
VedSnta is merely to establish the non-duality o f Brahman
by showing the absolute dependence o f the world upon it.3
On the other hand, the aivite is anxious to establish the
integral nature o f the absolute. He, therefore, holds that
1. Ibid I. ii. 5.
2. Ibid. III. ii. 15.
3. Sarfikars Com m , on M . K . I. 7.
as the finite cannot grasp the integrality o f Being, there

appear conflicts, contradictions or paradoxes in thought.
They are completely harmonised in the higher .vision o f
Reality. I f the Infinite cannot be logically conceived, it
would be illogical to impose the limitations o f the finite
logic upon the Infinite. What appears impossible to the
finite need not be so to the Infinite. Even if the world
appears to be illusory, it has been manifested by the Lord
Himself. The manifestation o f the world is indeed due
to ignorance, but ignorance itself is due to the power o f
freedom o f the Lord.1 As the separate manifestation o f
the entire mass o f objects itself is beyond reason, therefore
the entire objectivity is called MSyS which is the power
o f freedom o f Consciousness in objective manifestation.2
3. The Problem of Evil
The theory that creation is a manifestation o f the free
will o f the absolute seems to be irreconcilable with the *
presence o f evil in the created world. Those systems
which regard creation to be a sport or /l/, a spotaneous
manifestation o f the self-delight o f the absolute, find it
difficult to explain the manifestation o f evil in the world.
For, if the world is the manifestation o f supreme bliss, o f
saccidnanda, how is it possible that there is evil in the
manifestation o f saccidnanda ? I f everything, whether
manifest or unmanifest, is in its essential nature identical
with Saccidnanda, how can we account for the existence
o f suffering ? How does evil originate from that which
is the Supreme G ood ? If the absolute creates the world,
and if in its essential nature it is the home o f all values, it
appears to be difficult to admit why His creatures should
be condemned to live a life in the world where all sorts
o f evil reign supreme. Having been a witness to, and
often a victim of, the innumerable sufferings, hardships and
injustices in the blissful manifestation o f the SaccidSnanda,
it would be quite natural for men to refuse to believe in
1. IP V . II. iii. 17.

2. Ibid. I. v.. 18.
the Supreme Lord. Tt would be in the fitness o f things if the

creature spits on the face o f such a devilish and omnipotent
creator who amuses himself in creating a world full o f
evil.1 The divine creature who applies the existence and
conduct in this creation as a standard to judge his creatures,
is really more cruel than the creatures. For, one who
invents torture as a means o f test or ordeal stands convicted
either o f deliberate cruelty or o f moral insensibility and,
if a moral being at all, is inferior to the highest instincts
o f His own creatures.2
Evil cannot be regarded merely as a product o f the acts
performed by the in d iv id u a l as being due to a working
o f the law o f Karma. For, it appears to be difficult to
explain how, why and whence the law started. Being
Himself the creator o f the individual as well as o f the law,
God can be held responsible for creating such individuals
who are easily tempted by evil. Being omnipotent and
good, God might have easily adjusted the feelings o f His
* creatures in sueh a way that they might not fall an easy vic
tim to evil. The question naturally arises as to who created,
or why or whence was created, that moral evil which
entails the punishment o f pain and suffering ? I f moral
evil is regarded as a form o f mental disease or ignorance,
who or what created this law or inevitable connection
which punishes a mental disease or act o f ignorance by
such terrific tortures ?3 The law o f Karma from all
accounts appears to be irreconcilable with a supremely
moral and good G od.
Some philosophers hold that Reality is supra-ethical.
According to them evil and good are not ultimate, but relative
factors which lose their special characteristics in the whole.
Evil exists only from the point o f view o f the finite indi
vidual. It does not exist in the Absolute, which is the
1. Radhakrishnan, S., Reign o f Religion in Contemporary Philosophy,
pp. 147, 397.
2. L D .# I. p. 118.
3. Ibid.
Saccidnanda. It is the Saccid&nanda who manifests

Himself in the different states o f existence, such as infra-
ethical, ethical and supra-ethical. Evil emerges only at a
particular state o f manifestation and is ultimately trans
formed in the Supreme Bliss.1 All the difficulties concer
ning the problem o f evil arise due to the false assumption
that the Creator is different from the creature, thus
implying that He indifferently watches the suffering o f His
own creatures. But the fact is that Reality being the
integral unity, the suffering creature is non-different fromj
the Creator. It is the Absolute who Himself appears as
the creature in the world. Accordingly, it is he alone who
bears the suffering, and thus the question o f the creator
merely watching the suffering o f His creatures does not
arise. However, another question arises here : how is it that
the Saccidnanda allows Himself to undergo suffering ?
How is it that the Blissful Lord appears to negate His very
nature ? I f it is supposed that He becomes involved in the
game o f suffering without really willing it, then it means that
He is not all-powerful. On the other hand, if He manifests
Himself as limited without fully knowing the implications o f
it, He cannot be an omniscient God. Tn either case, the
manifestation o f the absolute as the finite individual is against
the very nature o f the Absolute.
In answer to this, the absolutist holds that in reality the
sum o f pleasure far exceeds the sum o f evil. On the whole,
evil does not remain evil, but merges in the absolute. Evil
is evil only from the finite point o f view. It has no absolute
ness in itself. If evil becomes absolute, it loses its very nature.
I f pain becomes immeasurable, it ends itself or ends that in
which it manifests, or collapses into insensibility or, in rare
circumstances, it may turn into ecstacy o f nanda. I f evil
became sole and immeasurable it would destroy the world
or destroy that which bore or supported it; it would bring
things and itself back by disintegration into non-existence.2
1. Misra, R. S., op. cit., p p . 147-8.

2. LD . I. p. 539.
Evil is not positive, it is dependent upon the G ood. The

relationship between evil and good is like shadow and light;
like shadow, evil depends on good for its existence but good,
like light, does not depend for its existence on evil.1 But
this explanation o f evil is not satisfactory. For, evil cannot
just be swallowed up in the good. The fact that in itself
it is evil is undeniable. The suffering o f the moment cannot
be reject'd as mere illusion or privation. It is a fact that
people suffer commit sin and are disillusioned It is no
good to say that on the whole evil is transformed in the
good.
The aiva Absolutist holds that manifestation, whether

evil or good, is nothing but an expression o f the absolute.
Accordingly, there is nothing like evil in the world.
Somananda states that the world o f manifestadon is an
emanation o f Divine nature. Everything including darkness
or evil is iva. The individual who sufTers and the evil
which he suffers from both are non-different from the A bso
lute From the ultimate point o f view, suffering and enjoy
ment, pain and pleasure, evil and good are essentiaMy one.2
The entire universe, from iva to earth, flashes in identity
with the Blissful Parama iva. He transcends and is at the
same time identical with the universe and consists o f highest
bliss.3 Because o f His nature, He is always engaged in
performing the five functions. No particular motive can
be attributed to His creative will which is essentially spon
taneous. A distinction can be made between various
manifestations only in the realm o f practical life. In reality
all manifestations are expressions o f the absolute delight.
It is the ignorance o f this identity o f manifestations which
gives rise to the experience o f evil. Evil is an indication
o f separation or disintegration. The same evil is transformed
into good in the integrality or unity o f being.
1. Ib id . pp. 532-56.
2. SD. p. 14.
3. PH. II I .
According to the Saiva Absolutist, Parma iva alone is

the sufferer as well as the enjoyer in heaven and hell.1
Limitation, finitude or suffering can be accounted for on
the theory o f self-limitation o f the absolute. The main
difference o f aiva Absolutism from other systems lies
in the fact that Parama iva by His very nature performs
the five functions.2 Owing to His sportive nature, Parama
iva always passes through the ordeal o f cosmic evolution
and involution. He has been brought down to the state o f
slavery because He does not take rest even for a moment in
His own real nature.3
The Ved&ntin holds that the Absolute cannot be blamed
for inequality o f dispensation or cruelty because he is bound
by regards. Pain, pleasure and suffering, etc., are due to the
merits and demerits o f individuals w h ) are the creatures o f
AvidyS. Just as the cloud, which rains equally on all lands
cannot be blamed for the unequal yields o f different lands,
for this difference is mainly owing to the nature o f seed,
soil etc., so also the Lord, who is the substrate and support
o f the world, cannot be blamed for evil etc. The objection as
to how the individual inequality o f merit, demerit, pleasure,
pain etc., can begin, as prior to creation distinctions do
1. stem
facWfTHTfr cR II
fa^rftfa srtkrfrrr ^ r f a ttcRs t : i
I SD. I. 36-7.
Ib id . FN . 1, p. 15.
fcflrarcTWtar f y l f o t fsrct?R i
P H . pp. 61-4.
ssmfaTOiq srn f a r c i i aq ^rrf^r-
R Tq f a f f ' d , -Tfa ?5TR 5 R : " I PS. p. 73.
2. Ibid. p. 15.
3. SN . I II. 14.
Th e a b s o l u t e a n d m a n if e s t a t io n 245
not exist, is baseless. For, the world has no beginning

according to the Vednta.1 And, as the world has no
beginning, merit, demerit, equality, inequality are like seed
and sprout, cause as well as effect. Hence, there can be
no valid objection to their operation. Moreover, it is also
unreasonable to regard the world as having a beginning.
For, if it were so, then without merit and demerit nobody
can have existence, and again without a body, merit and
demerit cannot be formed, so that we would be led into a
logical see-saw. But no such difficulty remains on the
doctrine o f the beginninglessness o f the w orld.2 Prakfti, or
M y, forms a part o f the nature o f vara, the lower
Brahman. My, the world principle, is itself not an effect;
it is superior to all effects.3 The world as an effect persists
ever before it is manifest, as the Divine power o f creation.4
The Lord having regard to the inequality o f the virtuous
and vicious actions, allotts to them the corresponding results.
If it is held that in its activity the soul is dependent upon
God and therefore the soul cannot act freely, the Vedntin
^points out that though the soul is not independent insofar
as the Lord causes it to act, yet it acts by itself. The Lord in
causing the soul to act has regard to its former existence,
having regard to its efforts previous to that existence, a
regression against which, considering the eternity o f the
world, no valid objection can be raised 5
The aiva and the Vadnta absolutists try to solve the
problem o f evil in accordance with their fundamental
approaches. In the aiva view, there is no evil as such in
reality. Like Bradley, Bosanquet, Aurobindo and others, the
aivites hold that evil is really transformed in the Absolute.
Evil does not exist at the level o f absolute consciousness.
It is the freedom o f the absolute which brings about the
1. SB. II. i. 35.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. I. ii. 22.
4. Ibid. II. i. 6. Sarhkara's Coinm. on Kath. U p. I II. ii ; Cbhnd.
U p. V III . 14. K
5. Ibid.
manifestation o f such contradictory phenomena as pleasure

and pain, joy and suffering, light and darkness etc. H ow
ever, in reality they are essentially o f the nature o f Snanda.
T o the finite consciousness, they appear in their limited
form as pleasure, pain, etc. T o the absolute consciousness,
they appear identical with the bliss o f self-consciousness.
The Vedantin, on the other hand, attempts to explain evil
by denying the reality o f creation. Not being the cause o f
the creation o f the world, which is beginningless, Brahman
cannot be held responsible for the presence o f evil in the
world. Evil is due to the merits and demerits o f the indivi
duals. Just as the absolute space appears to be limited in
the form o f pot etc., so also appears the unlimited Brahman
due to ignorance.
4. The Eternal Perfection of the Absolute and the
Finite Process.
Absolutism has to face the problem that either the
Absolute loses its identity in the process o f manifestation
or the process becomes unreal. It seems impossible to
reconcile the perfection o f the Absolute with its manifes
tation in the phenomenal world. It would be contradictory
to hold that the Absolute undergoes any change in its
nature. In order to avoid this difficulty, some absolutists
hold that absolutism implies a theory o f illusion. According
to them, the finite process would have to be regarded as
illusory in order to preserve the identity o f the absolute.
We have to admit, in some sense or other, the ultimate
unreality o f the world process. The finite appearances
cannot belong to the Absolute without reducing it to a
mere bundle o f incongruant entities. In order to have
the infinite, we have to renounce the finite. We cannot
have both at the same time. I f we stick to the reality o f the
finite, we would have to give up the Infinite. Absolutism can
be maintained only if the finite process is regarded as
ultimately unreal. For this it has to be admitted that the
cause produces the effects without really undergoing any
change in its nature. In the case o f the illusory manifest
ation, the cause is not at all affected by the production,
TH E ABSOLUTE AND M AN IFESTATIO N 247
existence and destruction o f the effect. The theory

according to which effect is merely an illusory manifestation
is, therefore, the fundamental basis o f absolutism. The
Madhyamika and the Vedanta absolutists subscribe
to this view and maintain that the reality o f the
finite process cannot be reconciled with the essential
nature o f the absolute. Both o f them emphasize the
perfection o f the absolute at the cost o f the finite process.
But what about those absolutists who regard the finite

process to be real ? How far is it possible to maintain both
the eternal unchanging Absolute and the changing finite
process ? For, it is difficult to conceive how the world process
can be real without in any way affecting or modifying the
absolute.1 I f the absolute is eternally perfect, if it is com
pletely unaffected by the finite process, in what sense does
the process* take place ? If the Absolute is wholly unrelated
to the process, does it not mean that the latter is illusory ?
If the absolute could produce the world process through self
manifestation and yet remain unmodified and self-identical,
what does manifestation really mean ? The only plausible
explanation would be that the absolute is somehow
accidentally associated with the process; it does not really
undergo any process o f self-manifestation. This is exactly
the case in the illustration o f rope-snake causation. The
rope as cause remains unmodified during the three states
o f manifestation o f its effect (viz. the snake). This is possible
because the rope is merely a supporting cause o f its effect.
Otherwise, if it really becomes transformed or modified,
it would be giving up its real nature. That is why even
those absolutists who want to maintain the reality o f the
finite process are ultimately forced to admit that somehow
it is illusory. But the aiva absolutists, like the Hegelians,
insist that there is no contradiction in maintaining both
the eternal perfection o f the absolute and the reality o f the
finite process. According to them, Parama Siva, even
after manifesting the world, remains unmodified like
1. Raju, P. T ., Thought and Reality, p. 159.
the sky which is not defiled by clouds, smoke or dust.1

Although He appears as impure or imperfect, in reality
He is always pure and perfect.3 Creation, maintenance and
dissolution, waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, appear
in Him in the Fourth state (Turiya), but He reveals Himself
under their covering.8 These conditions are present as
phenomena in the consciousness of the Lord in the fourth
state in which He is pure bliss. It is the state o f infinite
egoity from which the phenomena o f the three lower
states o f consciousness originate. Their manifestation,
however, does not suppress the real nature o f the Lord
who reveals himself everywhere as higher than tinse, as the
universal subject o f cognition under all conditions.4
Even when He conceals Himself, His essential nature
remains unaffected like the sun who is really not covered
by the covering o f the clouds produced by it. In this case the
covering itself is illumined by the light o f the sun. The
objection that the manifestation o f w oild as different from
the Absolute would violate advaitism cannot be validly
raised here. For, though the world is essentially non-different
cipm m fafftifa-
vrerg: q^r jw : u
T33T sqr% w fc r i
sta r: n p s . KSrika, 36-7.

Also pp. 36, 81*85. BhskarT II. pp. 220*6.
2. Ib id. pp. 171-3.
3. fg
ggnfafa afom i
tmrfr
tl Ibid. Kurik 34.
4. Ibid.
from the Absolute, it is manifest as different like the

objects which appear as different in the reflection o f a
mirror.1 Like the image in the mirror, the Universe is in a
sense void o f distinction and is not distinct from the light in
which it is revealed, nevertheless, it appears as a manifold
o f experience, as internally differentiated complex o f
subject and object. The aggregates are not differentiated
as regards the absolute. They are differentiated only from
the point o f view o f the finite subject who is in the realm
o f Maya. But this differentiation also actually constitutes
an illusion, the non-recognition o f adoaita. Due to this
illusion there arises the conception o f imperfection and
duality in Him.2 In reality, the manifest universe is nothing
but the external manifestation o f things which lie merged
in consciousness. It is in its essential nature like the
limited manifestation o f an individual at the time o f dream,
remembrance, imagination, etc.3 Both before and after
their separate manifestation, the bhsas are within the
absolute just as the waves are within the sea. And as there
-is no substantial change in the sea due to the manifestation
o f the waves, similarly there is no real modification o f
consciousness because o f the bhsas. According to the
aiva absolutist change is only an ideal process. It does
1. dai ftr % ^ crcr sfasi

'*dd slftskT w ? fd egFdjrcqj
d jd I
*Tfd fairrN
dtmq dgd \
Tt ddispr ^
fa * T fW * n fd v r d q U PS. Krika 12-13. p. 35.
2. Ibid. pp. 35-4, 75.
3. IP V . I. 7.
250 KASH M IR SAI VISM
not involve any substantia] modification o f that which

appears as changing. Each constituent Sbhsa is a
separate entity and as such it is ever the same. All talk
o f change merely refers to the com bination o f these abhasas.
A spontaneous overflow o f ananda leads to infinite creations
without implying any change in the essential nature
o f the absolute. Just as clouds, smoke, dust etc., though
in the sky, do not affect the natural purity o f the sky, nor
do they violate its identity and eternity, but merely qualify
the sky like the reflections in a mirror, similarly the Self
is not affected by the modifications o f MyS 1 Hence it
has to be admitted that Consciousness never gives up its
essential nature as a result o f the manifestation o f the
world.2 When water assumes a gross form and appears
as ice, the latter, though really non-different from the former,
also apparently conceals the water. However, the true
nature o f water is never concealed by the manifestation o f
ice, which always presupposes water for its very
existence. This illustrates how some thing, which appears as
concealing, does not really affect the true nature o f the
object concealed. Similarly, the actors who play different roles
in the drama experience jo y , suffering, pleasure and pain
in these roles, without really undergoing any change in
their real and original nature. Although, in so far as they
enjoy different roles, the actors appear to give up their
identity or the witness character, in reality they always
remain in their original self. Likewise, the Self assumes
different forms and carries on the sport o f five functions
without involving any real change in its nature.3
Human intellect seems to be incapable o f providing a
satisfactory answer to the question as to how the pure
m f e r e w : - \ p s . p . 8 i.
2. H r o fw t: v ito :
I Ibid. p. 82.
3. Kaviraj, Gopinath, Bharaliya Sanskriti aur Sdhana, p. 46.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M ANIFESTATION 251
indeterminate absolute can give rise to the determinate

ideas. It is safer to accept both the states o f the absolute,
the eternal indeterminate pure knowledge state and the
eternal nescientic determinations, as real. The state o f
eternal flux which is beyond the sphere o f M&y is real.
But the highest state transcends both the eternal and the
non-eternal ( nitya and anitya). The Yogins realise that in
the absolute eternity and moment become one and that there
is no succession in the absolute unity which is the source o f
all manifestation, lh e absolute consciousness appears in
innumerable forms and yet remains self-identical. After
all everywhere in the innumerable experiences o f joy,
suffering, etc., it is the light alone which shines. Even
the insentient is nothing but a manifestation o f conscious
ness. The inexhaustible character o f the infinite conscious
ness is acknowledged by all. It is the endless source o f all
process or progress and is capable o f assuming these forms
without losing its identity.1
The perfection o f the absolute consists in the supreme
self-consciousness and it remains unaffected even after the
a manifestation o f objectivity. Even when consciousness
appears as objective it remains unaffected by these appeara
nces 2 In the Saiva view, both the internal as well as the
external shining o f the object depends upon the universal
subject. Their shining within is not opposed to their shin
ing without. Even when they are externally manifest,
they remain internal to consciousness. For internality is
nothing but oneness with consciousness and this oneness is
always there, because that which is not one with light does
not shine and is, therefore, nothing. Externality consists in
this consciousness, whereas rightly there should be CI*
consciousness. Thus, resting within is nothing else than
consciousness o f the objective as I 1 and not as this, a form
which befits the sentient.8
1. IPV. II, iv. 19.
2. Ibid. I . i . I.
3. stew iir n?sqar ^ r e ifa , i
Bhaskar, vol. I. pp. -236-37.
2$2 KASHMlft SAIVfSM
But, if the entirety o f the phenomena is always one with

consciousness, in what sense they might be regarded as
being created or manifested by the Absolute ? The aiva
answer to such questions consists in pointing out that the
creation or manifestation o f objects is nothing but their
being determinately known, i.e. their being manifest in
consciousness. If it is asked why the objects do not exercise
their functional capacity in the state o f their internality,
the only answer is that because they are wholly one with
consciousness, therefore, the functional capacity becomes
manifest only in the state o f externality. It is only during
the state o f their external existence that the exercise o f fun
ctional capacity becomes possible.1 The objection as to how
can that which is essentially self-identical assume variety
o f forms cannot be raised here, because it is not any object
which is so imagined. It is the Samvid itself which shines
in this manner. For, its omnipotence consists in shining in
this manner. No law o f contradiction can operate in the
case o f shining itself. The contradiction between pleasure
and pain, and so on, owes its being to shining.2 Moreover,
all finite subjects and objects shine in perfect form and
action in every way in the state o f Absolute Existence.8
The Highest Lord, holding all that is objective within Him
self and keeping the objective in its essential nature as
one with Him, is perfect, because He is self-consciousness,
the chief characteristic o f which is resting within ones own
self independently o f everything else.4
Here, the question arises that the essential nature o f
action being succession and succession not being possible
1. IPV. 1 viii. 6.
TB VJ q ITcf ttfvcqfr; f aux ?TTfa,

qnip* ^ cqr q f sreqfo,
ff qq, w t ^ i w qq \
Bhaskarl, vol. II, pp. 17-19.
3. Ibid. II. i. 7.
4. Ib id . IV . i. 1.
THE ABSOLUTE AN D M A N IF E STA TIO N 253
in the Lord who is o f the nature o f pure consciousness, how

can action be attributed to Him ? To this the aivite
replies that only the empirical activity can be regarded to be
successive. The eternal activity o f the Highest Lord is not
successive.1 The objection o f the opponent can b** refuted by
establishing the existence o f the supreme subject. For, in
the whole o f the opponent s view, the main point on which
all objections are based is that the one cannot assume
diversity o f forms. And in reply to this, it has been stated
by the aiva absolutists that in the case o f the subject,
whose essential nature is sentiency, variety o f manifestations
is possible without contradicting its oneness, as it is in the
case o f mirror. Therefore, though the light o f consciousness,
which is the underlying reality o f all objects, is one, because
o f its recognition as such, yet it assumes a variety o f
conflicting forms which shine in succession.2
But the view that consciousness alone shines in a variety
o f forms amounts to an admission that appearances are
unreal. Even the aivite accepts that in the sphere o f Maya
all duality, such as blue and yellow, pleasure and pain,
is only practical and not real.8 In reality all is one and one
is all. All that shines in the state o f Maya is illusory.4
Hence, ultimately there is no real process.5 Nevertheless,
the aiva absolutist does not fully subscribe to the theory
o f illusion. He repeatedly asserts and tries to show that
although in reality the power o f action in the Highest
Lord has no succession, yet because o f its being responsible
for the manifestation o f succession, it is successive also.0
! *3 ^ fa w n :
STftd, fa ST Ibid. pp.9-10.
2. *tc: sjtfar m fa i
IP V . II. i. 1.
3. Ibid. I I . ii. 2.
4. Ib id . II. iii. 13.
s. a * ^ * *isf<r $ 3 : a ? 3 3 : i tr^ ^
33 ?3 3 3 3 I Bhskar, II. p . 25.

6. Ib id . p. 6.
The world appearances are not mere figments o f nescience.

They are the different ways in which the absolute mani
fests or knows itself. They are not projections o f an alien
power like MSyS. Like the individual who has different
experiences from his childhood to youth, the absolute light
reflects various forms without undergoing any change. The
Light is both o f the nature o f being and becom ing; in
other words, both are identical in it. While all other kinds
o f change involve a modification o f the object in which
the change appears to take place, no real modification takes
place in the case o f self-manifestation. In this case
change refers only to an ideal or apparent separation or
objectification o f that which is always one and subjective.
The conception o f Trinity (iva, akti and Parama
iva) occupies a significant place in Saiva absolutism.
Parama iva, which is Pfiroa or perfect, represents the
supreme unity o f iva and akti, being and becoming.
Accordingly, it is within the process o f becoming and
also transcends all becoming. It is the eternity which
can be described as the supreme time (MahS. K la). Past,
present and future are divisions in the realm o f finite time.
They are not manifest in the absolute or eternal. Time
and space are but categories o f the limited individual
consciousness and do not apply to absolute. What
appears as a sequence or gradation o f antagonistic states
to the human mind is not a sequence at all from the stand
point o f the absolute. The truth is voidness and plenitude,
everything and naught.1
In brief, the aiva absolutist asserts that the essential
nature o f consciousness does not really change, though it
appears to be changing as it were.2 Like the waves which
are always one with the sea, the manifestations are always
one with consciousness both before and after their separate
manifestation. The change in the absolute is only a change
o f appearances.
1. Zimm er, Myths and Symbols in Indian A tt and Civilization, p. 210.

2. IP V . I . v . 14.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M AN IFESTATION 255
In the Vedanta the world appearances, the chief

characteristic o f which is falsity (mithyatva), are taken
to be illusory manifestation o f the absolute. The moment
true knowledge o f reality dawns, the world appearances
vanish like objects in dream. As the unreal cannot be the
product o f the real, the world cannot be a real product
o f Brahman. The author o f Adoaita Siddhi, after
discussing at great length the supposed reality o f the
world, comes to the conclusion that the world cannot be
real. It must be ultimately false. If the world were real,
it would imply a limitation on the part o f the absolute.
M oreover, in that case there would be no possibility o f
freedom. Therefore, the VedSntin maintains that the
perfection o f the absolute cannot be reconciled with the
reality o f the world. We have to admit that what appears
is false, the real is that which never appears. On the
Vedanta theory o f causation, called Vivartavda, the cause
does not transform itself in the effect. It is the unmodified
ground o f the appearance o f the effect. On the view that
^the effect is merely an illusory manifestation o f the cause,
it is easier to explain the world appearances. The absolute
is the ever unmodified ground o f these appearances.
Except being their supporting cause, it is not in any way
related to the appearances. H ence it ever remains perfect.
Instead o f explaining the world process in terms o f its
dependence upon the absolute, the aiva integralists
commit the mistake o f advocating a kind o f mutual
dependence between the absolute and the world, and thus
reduce the absolute to the level o f the relative.
The world appearances being merely illusory do not at
all affect Brahman. The Lord is not modified by the
world process, like the magician who is not affected by his
own magic. As the dreaming person is not affected by
the events taking place in his dreams because they do not
accompany the waking state and the state o f deep sleep,
similarly the real, which is the one unchanging witness o f
the three states, viz creation, maintenance and re-absorption
o f world, is not affected by these mutually exclusive states.
That the absolute appears in these three states is a mere

illusion. This illusion is no more substantial than the
snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight.1 The
alleged break in Brahman s nature due to the world
process is a mere figment o f nescience. By a break o f this
kind, a thing is not really broken up into parts, not
any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing
double to a person o f defective vision. By that element o f
plurality which is a fiction o f nescience which is character
ised by name and form, which is evolved and not evolved,
which is not to be defined either as the existing or the non
existing, Brahman becomes the basis o f the entire world
with its change and so on, while it is always in its true
form, as the pure, unchanged witness consciousness. And
as the distinctions arise from speech only, they do not go
against the fact o f Brahman being without parts. Such
distinctions exist in the one self o f the dreaming person.
And in ordinary life also, they exist in the case o f God
and the magician. Similarly, the multifarious creation
may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without affecting
the character o f unity. But all difference being produced
by the limiting adjuncts o f nescience, the Scriptures
declare that there is really no difference in Brahman.
In the preceding pages, attempt has been made to
discuss some o f the important points concerning the
problem o f absolute and its manifestation. The central
problem which persists throughout this discussion is
whether the manifestation o f the finite process from the
infinite can logically be possible. And if the process is
logically possible, then how and why does it take place ?
Finally, how far is it proper to uphold the reality o f the
process and still maintain the perfection o f self-identity o f
the absolute. At present, it is not our purpose to determine
the validity or invalidity o f a particular standpoint nor
would it be proper to do so. At the most, we may compare
and contrast the two s andpoiuts and thereby try to find out
1. SB. vol. I. p. 312 (Thibaut).
THE ABSOLUTE AND M A N IFESTATION 257
the consistency or inconsistency in them But this can be

possible only at the end o f the discussion o f the problem in
its entirety. Before we proceed further, it would be better
to state briefly what we have already discussed.
According to the aivite creation consists in the
external manifestation o f that which is already within
consciousness. The appearances, accordingly, have two
states o f existence, the one which belongs to them v/hen
they are internal to consciousness and the other which
belongs to them when they are manifest outside consious-
ness. The second state o f appearances, when they are
manifest as external, involves novelty. In this state o f
existence, they possess a new characteristic which was not
present previously. It consists in their being manifest
objectively, as iidam. The manifestation o f this novelty
is possible because o f the power o f free consciousness. It
is the spontaneous free will o f the Lord which gives rise to
the manifestation o f a variety o f ibhsas. Infinite
novelties arise from, and merge into, the absolute conscious
ness which is the eternally manifest and eternally quiescent
( nityodita and nitya snta). However, the novelty o f
appearances does not mean that there is any change in the
nature o f the absolute. In reality, the universe is ever
perfect and there is nothing new directly cognised or
remembered.1 Here it cannot be held that in that case
the manifestables should have been the object o f both
internal and external senses even before creation. For,
the truth is that just as in the case o f the reflection o f jar
etc., which are being made by the potter in a mirror, so
also in the case o f the objects which shine in dream and
waking life, the power o f making them so manifest belongs
to the absolute whose glory is beyond the reach o f finite
thoughts and as such cannot be questioned.2 Novelty or
externality itself is an appearance or Abhasa which the
~1. IP V . I. iii. l\
3Tf I Ibid. II, iv. 4.

Lord manifests, together with the other appearances,

owing to his power o f freedom.' And just as the other
appearances do not affect His identity, so also the appear
ance o f novelty or externality does not affect Him in any
way. Moreover, there can be no contradiction in manifes
tation itrelf which is nothing but a form o f consciousness.
Even such contradictory manifestations as pleasure and
pain owe their being to the light o f consciousness.1
The Vedantin appears to be more concerned with maint
aining the perfection o f the absolute rather than deducing
the world from it. Unlike the aivite, he does not face
any serious difficulty in accounting for both the novelty of
the appearances and the identity o f the absolute. Brahman
can produce any number o f appearances without in any
way being affected by them. W hile accommodating the
practical importance and novelty o f the world process
with the absoluteness o f Brahman, the Vednta represents
a vigorous attempt to defend the absolute purity o f the
substratum or the ground o f appearances. Strange though
it appears, this standpoint has led the Vednta to the
advantageous position wherefrom it can easily explain
the emergence o f effects from the causes. The tatastha
lafcsana emphasizes the free nature o f Brahman. As it is
not necessarily connected with the world, Brahman may
freely appear in any form .2
5. T h e A b so lu te and the in d iv id u a l
Admittedly, the crux o f absolutism lies in the relation
o f the finite mind to the absolute. When we consider the
relationship between them, the problem arises that if the
absolute consciousness is exclusive to the finite mind, in
what sense can it be regarded as the absolute ? But, if the
individual consciousness is also included in the absolute, then
in what sense does it remain as absolute ? The contrast
between the finite experience o f separateness and the absolute
experience o f unity should be resolved in absolutism.8,
1. Ibid. II. i. 5.
2. T h e two Definitions o f Brahman in Vednta.
3. Cleobury, op. cit. p. 26.
THE ABSOLUTE AND M ANIFESTATION 259
Ultimately, we cannot attribute a substantial existence

to the individual; the absolute alone is the true individual.
All individuals are expressions o f the absolute at differ
ent stages. The absolute itself sleeps in the stone, breathes
in the plants, feels in the animals and awakens to self-consci
ousness in men. The entire finitude is rooted in the
absolute. But the question arises whether on the theory
o f the absolute the human beings could have any real
freedom o f their own. One o f the criticisms of absolutism
is that it tends to make the human being a mere objective or
superfluous manifestation o f the absolute and denies to him
substantive existence. Many o f the absolutists regard reality
as the ultimate subject o f every judgement, and the whole
proposition, whether categorical or hypothetical or disjunc
tive, whether singular, particular or universal, is the predi
cate. According to them, the real subject o f a judgement,
as distinct from the grammatical, is the Absolute. It is
difficult to understand how the finite mind can be the indi
vidual mind and also a part o f the divine mind, at the same
.time. The central problem is to explain how the individ
ual consciousness can also be absolute consciousness without
ceasing to be individual. The aiva absolutist anticipates
this difficulty and holds that in reality there is no indivi
dual consciousness. The main aim o f the scriptures is to
remove the ignorance regarding the true nature o f the
individual. In reality, the individual himself is the abso
lute. The objection that if the Lord Himself is the creator
in all cases the potter ceases to be the creator o f jar, and
the line o f demarcation, therefore, between merit and
demerit will disappear would be valid if we believe in
reason and the authority o f the Scriptures.1 But the aivite
would reject the charge that on his view moral and
"1 7 f erteci
'n i t w i t fafafl
*r ifg sfa, Rr smft w f i

Bhskar, vol. i l , p. 168.
260 KASHMIR SAIVISM
spiritual experience would become meaningless because

there is only one supreme will in the universe. Nor would
he accept the objection that his view would lead to absolute
determinism, as there would be no scope for individual
initiative. For, the individual is really free to act in his
own way. Being the absolute, he is omnipotent and om ni
scient. As iva, he is perfectly free from all impurities.
But when he is associated with My and is, therefore,
manifest as limited, he is called Pasu> the bound.1
There is no essential difference between the absolute and
individual. T o the finite vision they appear as different
but in reality they are always identical. In spite o f the
assumed limitation, the individual is the same as the abso
lute. This identity between them is established on the basis
o f self-experience, reason and the scriptures.2 Individuality
is produced when He is led away by His own powers.3 It
consists in forgetting ones own powers and believing oneself
to be limited.4
Both the absolute and the individual preform the five

functions o f creation etc. The individual preforms these
functions on a limited scale due to being limited by My
which covers the true nature o f the individual. My
produces limitation in the form o f limited activity, limited
knowledge, etc.5 The difference between the absolute and
the individual is that whereas everything appears as pure
unity to the absolute, it appears as essentially discursive or
relational to the individual. While the individual has the
finite vision, the absolute has the vision o f the whole. T o
livara, the prameyas (objects) are the object o f pure
consciousness, unmixed with the element o f determination.
1. 3 fro w w r: irrorr 5 H fP w w ura: t o : i

ipv. 11 . Ti. 3 .
2. ibid. iv . i. ; p s . PP. 13- 17.
SD. II. 34.
3. PH. IX .
4. Ibid. ; PS. pp. 56-59.
5. SN. III. 14.
THF ABSOLUTE AND MANIFESTATION 261
T o the limited subject they shine as related to determinate

cognition.1 The variety which is due to being and not-
being o f manifestations and which has been represented to
be the basis o f temporal succession in all external objects,
which are unity in multiplicity can shine only to the limited
subjects, e.g. nya etc., which are o f limited light only. T o
shine is not the essential nature o f the limited subject,
because it is insentient like other objects, such as blue etc.
Its shining as subject consists in the slight stir in the light
o f consciousness. Therefore, when that is absent, as in the
case o f body, or o f a subject in the state o f deep sleep, or
senselessness, or that o f the vital air, then the continuity o f
its shining is broken There is temporal succession in the
lim ited subject due to being and not-being o f manifestation,
as in I am no longer a child , Now I am young . And
because the empirical subject is identified wi'.h the limited
I consciousness, the temporal succession is evident in it.
It is such a subject who is responsible for the appearance o f
temporal succession in the external object, e.g. I was a boy
. and the pot also had simultaneous existence with me as
such*. But there is no temporal succession in the eternal
subject who is essentially consciousness and is, therefore, ever
shining. Nor is there such a succession even in the objects
related to him. For they ever shine as one with Him.
Similarly, spatial succession also shines only in the indivi
dui. It also shines in the objects, because o f their being
related to him, (e. g that which is in close proximity
is near and that which is contrary to it is far ). T o the
absolute who is perfect the objects shine as his very self
and are perfect in every way.2
According to the Vedntin the absolute cannot be reg
arded as the totality o f individuals. Nor can it be held
that it excludes them. The main difficulty is that finite
thought by its very nature cannot give us any knowledge
o f the relationship between the absolute and the individual.
1. IP V . IV . i. 8.
2. IP V . II. i. 7.
262 KASHMIR AIVISM
Any view o f a real manifestation o f the absolute as the indi

vidual would imply a phenomenalisation o f the transcendent.
It is not possible to apply the finite categories to the Infinite.
The inexplicability o f the individual consists in his being
neither different nor non-different from the absolute. It
cannot be different, because nothing can be really different
from the absolute. I f it were different, then the saying o f
the scripture through the knowledge o f the One everything
becomes known* would become meaningless.1 Freedom also
would become impossible if the individual were different
from the absolute.2 Nor can the individual be non-different
from Brahman as in that caie no words can be used for it.
The individual cannot be regarded as a part or aspect o f
the absolute which is without parts or aspects. The analogy
o f the self and its states also does not lead us anywhere. For,
there can be no relation o f one consciousness and another
in the case o f absolute consciousness. Therefore, being
neither a part of, nor different from, nor a self-modification
or self-limitation o f the absolute, the individual has to be
regarded as an illusory appearance. The question o f the
how* and why o f the finite remains an inexplicable my
stery which our thought is unable to solve.3
The difference between the two arises due to ignorance. It
consists in the limiting adjuncts presented by nescience con
sisting o f the organs o f action etc. The simile of one cosmic
space appearing as many due to the limitations superimpo
sed by physical objects brings out the nature o f relationship
between the absolute and the individua). Owing to the
limited adjuncts o f body etc., the one universal self is pra
ctically treated as if it were many, just as the one
cosmic space is treated differently as the space o f jar, the
space o f room etc. And as space is not really divided by
its apparent division in the case o f jar, house etc., so also
the absolute consciousness is not really divided by the
adjuncts o f body etc.
1. SU. I. iv. 20.
2. aikara s Com m, on Tait. U p. U . 8. 15.
3. Raju, P. T ., opp. cit. p. 86.
th e abso lu te and m a n if e s t a t io n 263
6* The Indeterminate and the determinate

While the Vedntin regards individuality to be a crea
tion o f avidyfty the aivite holds it to be a self-determina
tion o f the absolute. All absolutists, however, generally
subscribe to the view that the absolute is indeterminate.
Strictly adhering to the demand o f logic, some absolutists
take special care not to ascribe any determination to the
absolute. According to them, the so-called logic o f self-
determination o f the absolute really amounts to a deter
mination o f the inderminate by the finite logic. But against
this, the aiva absolutist emphasizes that if the absolute did
not have the freedom o f self-manifestation or self-determi
nation, it would no longer be absolute. The denial o f freedom
o f self-limitation to the absolute would amount to an im pu
tation o f the finite thought upon the infinite. The mani
festation o f the determinates could be explained only on
the view that it is the Indeterminate itself which shines as
the determinate. But determination being limitation or
negation, the question arises as to whether a real determi
nation o f the indeterminate is logically possible. And if it
is possible, can the Indeterminate any more remain unaffe
cted by limitation ?
In the integral vision o f the aivite, the Indeterminate
does not appear as a rigid indeterminable. The deter
minate emanates from, and shines within, the Indeter
minate. The indeterminacy o f the absolute does not
mean that it is incapable o f determining itself. It, rather,
indicates a complete freedom from limitation in spite o f
its being self-determined. O f course, the absolute cannot be
determined by the categories o f thought, o f affirmation,
negation, both affirmation and negation, neither affirmation
nor negation. But this freedom from all bm itation, from
any binding by its own creations, cannot be itself turned
into a negation or limitation, an absolute incapacity or
denial o f all freedom o f self-determination.1 All conscious
self-limitation is a power for some special purpose; it is
1. L D ., vol. II. pp. 302, 269-292.
264 KASHMIR SAIVISM
not a weakness. This power o f self-limitation, instead of

being incompatible with the nature o f absolute conscious
ness, is precisely one o f the powers we should expect
in the absolute.1
The Indeterminate always includes the determinate in
it. At the time o f the indeterminate experience also
there is determinate consciousness. For, there would be
no possibility o f running etc. if there be no determinate
consciousness (though in a subtle form ). The determinate
is, therefore, never separate from the Indeterminate.2
Determinacy is the power o f the Highest Lord and is
called Vimarsa. While Praka denotes the indeterminate
nature o f Reality, Vimarsa stands for that aspect o f it
which leads to free determinations. The indeterminate
consciousness is always in association with inner speech,
which is an essential characteristic o f the Self. It is
similar to indication by finger etc. Otherwise, how can
a child, on seeing a paiticular transaction for the first
time, have any knowledge ? The whole process is some
thing like this : the child hears the word spoken by another
person through a regular succession o f indeterminate
cognitions, he sees the object in regard to which the word
has been used before, then he sees the place without the
thing. Now on hearing the words bring the jar,* how can
the consciousness that that particular thing is the meaning
o f a particular word, viz., this is the meaning o f the word
ja r , this is the meaning o f the word b rin g / arise in the
heart o f the child ? For, the consciousness that this
particular object is the meaning o f this particular word,
depends essentially upon unification which is a determinate
cognil.ve activity.8 All words are capable o f expressing
all meanings. But at the time o f acquisition o f convention
a particular word is unified with a particular meaning.
This shows that there is an element o f determinacy in the
1. Ibid.
2. 3f*TI^ ^ ^ I IP V . I. y , 20.
3. IP V . I. V . 19.
TUF ABSOLUTE AND MANIFESTATION 265
indeterminate experience. However, it does not imply

that the absolute itself is determinate. There being
nothing similar to, and independent of, the light o f
consciousness and, therefore, differentiation being
impossible, the absolute subject cannot be regarded as
determinate, Even though He is at every moment
ceaselessly creating the three worlds by hundreds o f
determinate thoughts, the eternal being ever remains
indeterminate.1
The Vedantin holds that in order to be consistent
absolutism has necessarily to exclude empirical determina
tions o f the Real. Determination being limitation, the
absolute cannot be regarded as determinate. In itself, the
indeterminate does not imply any determination. For, if
it were so, the determinate being ever present in the
indeterminate, there would be no possibility o f pure
indeterminacy. If the indeterminate always includes
determinacy there would be no possibility o f such states as
dreamless sleep, swoon, samdhi etc. In fact, without the
indeterminate, even the determinate would not be possible.
The determinate always presupposes the indeterminate
as its support. But the indeterminate is independent o f the
determinate, which is the adjunct o f ignorance and is supe
rimposed upon the former. It is nescience which gives rise
to determinate cognition in the case o f the child who gains
knowledge at the first sight o f a particular transaction.
This illustration does not really support the aiva theory.
On the other hand, it only shows the validity o f the
Vednta view that the determinate arises as a superim
position upon the indeterminate.
The absolute in its essential nature cannot be regarded
both as indeterminate and determinate. For two essential
characteristics cannot belong to one and the same thing.
Only one o f them can be essential and the other accidental.
q u in ti sisdfa h
Uhbskari, l.p .-2 4 0 , Stava Cintamani. 121.
266 KASHMIR AIVISM
Indeterminacy alone, being more fundamental than deter-

rainacy, is the essential nature o f the absolute. The indeter
minate Brahman does not become limited on the theory o f
accidental determination. For, by being connected with
limitation in this way a thing o f one kind cannot assume
another nature, just as the transparent pure crystal does
not become opaque by being connected with limitations
such as red colour and the like, on the contrary, it is a
misconception that opaqueness permeates it. Similarly,
Brahman must be regarded as absolutely free from all
determination and differences, and not that it really
assumes self-determination.1
7. Unity and Multiplicity

The aiva absolutists describe reality as the One (eka)
which manifests itself as many ( bahu). The eka as the
bahu is the fundamental reality. The entire universal
existence moves between these two poles, a diversification
o f the one and a unification o f the many (abhede bheda-
nam, bhede ca abhedanam). It must be so because the
one and many are the fundamental aspects o f the absolute
reality.2 Like a mirror, the self-luminous sathvid assumes
various conflicting forms and at the same time remains
identical. The mirror assumes several forms,
such as those o f mountain, elephant etc., which are
reflected in it, without undergoing any change in its
essential nature.3 Our own experience also supports this
view. The subject manifests or knows itself through
various states o f consciousness without giving up its
essential nature. Just as the self, though present to
each part o f the body, 9 individual and one, in that it
simultaneously holds whole parts o f that body together,
sustains and moves it, ao also the being o f the universe is
one in the Infinite and not less present in any one o f the
1. Deusscn, P., Systems o f Veddnta, pp. 102-3.
2. LD . pp. 302-8
3. IPV . II. 1 ; SD . pp. 40-2, 120-4 ; PS. pp. 15.-30, 58. PH.
p. 26-9.
individual beings, so that in every truth, the whole and

every part is one in substance.1 The absolute is thus an
integral unity o f all duality. Although the various colours
are present in the suns rays, they do not appear different
from each other. Similarly, everything is potentially and
actually present in the absolute, the One which is the All.
Unity and multiplicity both are revealed in experience.

For example, in the perception o f a city from the top o f a
hill we apprehend unity and m ultiplicity at the same time.
There is a clear awareness o f unity and multiplicity in
such cases. In the actual life there is no opposition between
them. Entire practical life presupposes the experience o f
one in many or many in one. They always appear in a
state o f smarasya. Only in the case o f determinate cognition
they shine separate. In reality they are always united.
As regards the objection that how can the one simultane

ously be many, the aivite raises a counter-objection : how
can that which is the cause at one time or place cease to be
* so at another ? If it is said that this is due to the difference
o f relationship with soil etc., it might be asked ; who has
given this boon that contrariety is no contrariety if there
be difference o f soil etc. ? Obviously, it is experience
which gives the final verdict in every case. The one and
the many are facts o f experience.2 The shining o f both
becomes possible because o f their resting on samvid who
is absolutely free. Even the animals and birds know this
through their own experience that resting within the
absolute samvid even the blazing water and fire do not
contradict each other.8
1. L D ., o p . cit.
2. rf fa, a*
9FTTnitt 3^-fa'TOrrcJ cT*TT ff,
afgqur qer ^ fa li faataotas*: ? " \
IP V. II. II. 2.
iraHI 3l5I3i|5HlTFq * l Ibid II. III. 14.

In reality all is one. But because the one appears as

many, therefore, the many is also real. And the cause o f
this appearance is the power o f freedom. The introvert
Reality is unity, the same being associated with the
manifestations o f time, space etc. appears as multiplicity
when it becomes object o f sense perception. Reality is
the pure unitary consciousness which shines as, and through,
multiplicity. It is like the seed which functions both as
cause and not-cause.1 Those who try to explain everything
in terms o f indeterminate cognition find it difficult to
explain the identity o f a thing which appears in more than
one place. But there is no difficulty in explaining unity
and multiplicity through the concept o f vimaria. It is due
to the Vimarsa akti, the power o f freedom o f the Lord, that
unity and multiplicity both become manifest.2 Although
unity and multiplicity, one and many, appear to be
different, in reality, it is ignorance to regard them so.3 For
there are no contradictions or differences in consciousness.4
All entities or categories from earth onward shine in
inseparable unity with Reality.5 As all categories rest
upon consciousness, hence duality is only practical, not
ultimate.6 Like images in a mirror, the universe is in
essence void o f distinction and is not distinct from the
light in which it is revealed. Nevertheless, it appears as
a manifold experience, an internally differentiated com plex
o f subject, as though it appeared from the power o f cosmic
vision (bodha), which seems to be some thing higher as the
mirror is higher than its reflections. Thus, the light
reveals itself in all forms. The differentiation in consc
iousness really constitutes an illusion, viz. the non-intuition
1. Ibid. II. ii. 2.

2. Ibid. II. iii. 9-11
3. Ibid. II. v. 17.
4. fw zi h ?tsfa rs: Tft'ruN r i
T S . p. 98
5. lit spftci: s fare i t s . p. ioo .
6. IP V . II. 2.
or absoluteness o f the self. From this illusion arises the

conception o f the imperfection and duality in Him, hence
that o f cosmic differentiation.1
Although the VedSntin regards unity to be more funda
mental than multiplicity, ultimately both are relative to
him. The absolute is neither one nor many; it is the non
dual pure consciousness. The Scriptures declare that for
him who sees that everything has its reality in Brahman,
the entire phenomenal world with its actions, agents etc.,
is non-existent. T o him unity alone is true and multiplicity
is a product o f wrong knowledge. We cannot regard the
absolute as the unitary principle undergoing modification
or manifestation in the world o f plurality. Being absolutely
changeless, the real can have no connection with change
or plurality.2 T o the question, if nothing exists other than
the non-dual Brahman how there can be any possibility o f
its appearance as the world o f manifold, the VedSntin holds
that Brahman appears as manifold due to the adjuncts o f
nescience. As the reflected image o f the Sun dilates when
the surface o f the water expands, it contracts when the
water shrinks, it trembles when the water is agitated, it
divides itself when the water is divided, and so on, while
the real Sun remains all the time unaffected, similarly,
Brahman, although in reality uniform and never changing,
participates as it were in the growth, development and
decay o f the adjuncts.
Unity is more fundamental than multiplicity. It is the
latter which presupposes the former, and not vice versa.
The category o f difference cannot stand logical scrutiny.
For, it cannot be recognized by perception, whether deter
minate or indeterminate. It can neither be cognized as a
separate entity independent o f the terms which it relates.3
Nor can difference be interpreted as the very nature o f
the thing that differs. I f the thing itself be supposed to
1. PS. p . 13.
2. SB. vol. I. pp. 154, 321-7; v o l l i . 1S7. ( Thibaut )
3. Rai Choudhury, A.K.., Self and Falsity in Advaita Vednnta, pp. 48-9
270 KASHMIR gAIVISM
be o f the nature o f difference, it would lose its own

nature1 T o regard difference as something positive in
itself would lead to insuperable difficulties. Positive
difference may be conceived either as an attribute qualifying
the diffrents or as identical with one o f them. Neither o f
the two alternatives is satisfactory. Those who regard
difference to be negative also fail to explain its real nature.
According to the Vedntin, we cannot ultimately choose
between the two views. The notion o f difference has to be
rejected as it cannot be satisfactorily explained either as
positive or negative. Difference is not real but only an
appearance o f Reality.2
8* Absolute and Negation

The aiva absolutists assert that though the absolute is
free from contradictions, it is also free from limitations.
As nothing can really be excluded from it, the absolute
even contains an element o f self-negation. It becoms
active through its own opposition or negation. Negativity
is thus not only consistent with, but also indispensable to,
absoluteness. Without negativity, the absolute would
reduce itself to an abstract unity; with negativity it is
raised to concrete totality. God or the whole has the
element o f negation; for the richer the whole, the greater
is its negativity.3 It is the presence o f this negativity in
Reality which gives rise to the manifestation o f the world.
Manifestation o f finitude, individuality and multiplicity
can be accounted for only on the notion o f negativity. With
out negation, the absolute cannot manifest itself as
limited.
The problem o f negation arises differently in the
Vedanta and aiva absolutisms. Whereas in the Vednta
negation is o f the nature o f rejection or cancellation, for
the aiva absolutism negation is grounded in reality and
1. Ib id. pp. 50-52.
2. Hiriyana, Indian Philosophical Studies, Pt. I., p. 141.
3. Radhakrishnan, S., Reign o f Religion in Contemporary Philosophy,
pp. 81-2.
performs a positive function. Negation is the power o f

self-limitation o f Parama Siva. The aivite holds that
the indeterminate absolute manifests itself as determinate
or limited through its power which is o f the form o f self
negation.1 Animated by the desire to manifest the universe,
which is founded on identity with Himself, the magnificent
Parama iva at first flashes in the void, the absolutely
void .2 At the transcendental level o f manifestation, the
divine power is responsible for bringing about an apparent
negation o f supreme egoity, a concealment o f the ideal
universe. Negation thus serves as the principle o f mani
festation. It represents the passage from the noumena to
phenomena, from the absolute to the relative. In order
that the ideal universe may be negated and thereby the
finite manifestation may take place, He brings out into
operation that aspect o f His power which manifests itself
as the principle o f negation, and is called akti Tattva. It is
due to the operation o f the akti Tattva, which primarily
works as the principle o f negation, that the manifestation
o f iva Tattva becomes possible. Negation constitutes
His self-concealment or disappearance (Tirodhna). As
a result o f it, there begins the concealment o f Saccid-
nanda into its own opposite. The divine akti which is
o f the nature o f self-forgetting and self-differentiating,
conceals the supreme egoity o f the Lord and thereby
manifests the finite universe. 3 Because o f this act o f self
concealment, existence loses its integral nature and
consciousness no more remains self-conscious or free, and the
integral unity o f being and becoming, iva and akti,
consciousness and freedom, gives way to dualism or
opposition. Bodha becomes devoid o f soatantrya and
svntantrya also becomes manifest without bodha. Negation
1. PS. Krik 4.
2. PH. IV .
W fO T T ! PS. pp. 10, 86-87

272 KASHMIR SAIVISM
is, thus, the principle responsible for self-limitation o f the

absolute and for the subsequent manifestation o f the
universe.
There is no absolute negation in aivism. Negation at

the highest level is nothing but the manifestation o f the
Supreme W ill. The absolute is so rich and full that even
negation itself is included in it. Although negation is trans
formed into integral harmony in the absolute, this transfor
mation does not imply a cancellation or rejection o f its
nature. On the contrary, it is an expression o f the fullness
o f Reality. A ccording to this system the existence o f one
thing means the existence o f another. This is what we know
from the experience o f ordinary everyday life. The relation
o f existence with non-existence is the same as that o f two
things which stand in the relation o f container and the
contained. Therefore, whatever is seen on the ground as
different from the jar, it may be a piece o f stone or mass o f
light etc. as perceived by an eye, is in ordinary life spoken
as the non-being o f the jar on the ground , or there is
no jar on the ground .1 Negation is not something external
to the absolute, it is the power o f freedom o f conscious
ness. He possesses the power, the chief function o f which
is to obscure the state o f being the Highest Lord, which is
characterised by a perfect rest in His essential nature. 2 It
is owing to the power o f freedom that there is manifest in
Him, who is essentially light, that which is the negation o f
light, rightat the time when His essential nature, the light o f
consciousness, is shining in full.8
The Absolute must have the power o f self-limitation or

self-negation. Otherwise we cannot account for its determi
nate and limited manifestation. In fact, the very distinction
between the real and the abstract becomes significant only
on the notion o f determination or limitation which is absent
1. IP V . I. vii. 10.
2. Ibid. I V . 10.
3. Ib id . IV . 10.
in the latter and present in the former. The concreteness

o f reality lies precisely in the readiness with which it can
fall into contradiction with itself.1 The absolute cannot be
regarded either as negative or as abstract; it must be the
the fullest positive reality. Though as a self-revealing
principle the absolute always involves negation, it cannot
be regarded as a self-fulfilling process as it is eternally
perfect. But negation cannot be exclusive to the absolute;
for, if there is an entity outside o f it, and which it cannot
observe, how can it significantly be called the absolute? T o
regard negation as external would amount to a negation of
the absolute itself. Therefore, the aivite asserts that in
fact negation is the manifes ation o f the absoluteness o f
reality and does not involve any contradiction in it. Contra
dictions do not operate in reality which is absolute unity.
All determination or differentiation is based upon negation.
We speak o f certainty, e.g. o f a jar, that this is jar and
nothing else , only on the basis o f differentiation, the chief
.characteristic o f which is negation. Although Pica is not-
light, or is different from light, yet, just as there is a possi
bility o f his being within the ground unseen, so there is a
possibility o f his being within the mass o f light also.2 The
fact is that nothing can be absolutely negated. Even nega
tion also exists because it shines.8
According to the Vedntin, however, the attempts to
combine the concepts o f existence and non-existence are
bound to fail. Being and not-being both cannot equally
retain their nature within the absolute. I f not-being is so
much identical with being that it is indistinguishable from
the latter, we have no ground to draw any distinction
between the two. We would not even be able to say that
not-being is included in the absolute being. Therefore, we
have to admit that negation, even when it is manifest or is
being experienced, is not real. Otherwise, if it is really
1. Maitra, S. K ., Problem o f Negation M alaviya, Commemoration
Volume.
2. IP V . 1. vii. 11.
3. Ibid. II. iv. 20.
274 KASHMIR gAIVISM
manifest, it would not be cancelled. As contrasted with the

real which is never an object o f negation, the unreal is that
which is liable to be negated at all times. Negation is not
ultimately real. It not only negates the illusory, but also
negates itself. By its very nature negation is that which is
an object o f absolute negation (atyanta nisedha, or mithyStva
o f mithyStva). Negation cannot have an independent status o f
its own. All significant negation must ultimately rest upon
the absolute. It presupposes as its ground that which is
real. It is not possible by any amount o f logical jugglery
to allot any place for it in the absolute. Negation means
rejection or cancellation, and not assimilation or supple
mentation. It is the aim o f all spiritual disciplines to get
rid o f limitation or negation. There can be no conscious or
Self-willed limitation. For there is no passage from the real
to the unreal.
Only the determinate or the finite contains the element
o f negation. The indeterminate absolute is devoid o f all
negations and determinations. Ultimately, the nature o f
negation is inexplicable. The how* and why o f its origin
is a mystery which transcends the finite reason. Negation
appears to be rooted in difference which itself is inexplicable.
All that we find is that after the negative is cancelled, the
original ground is revealed in its place. It cannot be held
that the negative and the affirmative are reciprocally depen
dent; for it is the former which depends upon the latter.
Every negation presupposes an affirmation. Though nega
tion depends upon Brahman, it could not have originated
from Him. The eternal perfection o f the absolute is incom
patible with real negation. Negation is a product o f
nescience which vanishes at the dawn o f right knowledge.
Accordingly, although negation is beginningless, it is can
cellable in the end. Without the absolute, negation is
insignificant and unreal. The absolute negation o f the
phenomenal world ib certified by the Scripture, according
to which the world o f difference is not in Brahman.1
The illusory silver is negated for all time in the nacre. The
1. Saiftkara1 a Comm, on Bfh. Up. IV. iv. 19.
THE ABSOLUTE AND MANIFESTATION 27 5
experience that the shell silver does not, did not, and will
not exist, proves its eternal negation. The reality o f
Brahman means the negation o f unreality. And the nega
tion is nothing but the locus (viz. Brahman) itself. The
substratum is the essence o f the superimposed and also of
the negation o f the superimposed.
In brief, while negation serves as the principle o f phe-
nomenalisation in aivism, it plays the double role o f the
denial o f the phenomena and affirmation o f the noumena
in the Vednta.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SAKTI
Unlike other absolutists, the aiva absolutists regard
negation or limitation as a power o f the absolute. Negation
represents the power o f self-limitation o f the absolute.
Though the Hegelian absolutists also regard world evolution
as a product o f self-limitation o f the absolute, there is no
concept o f free will in the Hegelian absolute.1 The aiva
absolute manifests itself as limited owing to its free will.
The power o f freedom o f consciousness plays a vital role in
the manifestation o f the universe. It is this power or
akti in the absolute which gives rise to evolution and
involution o f the world.
akti is witnessed everywhere in the universe. There
is no object or event which does not disclose the presence o f
akti. These different aktis in the universe are ultimately
non-different from each other. They are the various mani
festations o f the one universal akti. The universal akti
is present in all its manifestations like fire in all combustible
materials. That the various powers are manifestations o f
one absolute Power becomes evident on the theory o f
evolution and also on considering the relationship between
these powers. It is one and the same akti which is
manifest as poverty in the poor, as sin in the sinner, as
glory in the glorious, as intelligence among the intelligent,
as modesty in the well-bred, as feminine charm in the
ladies, and so on. There is but one potency or power in
all the contraries. For, where the principle by which two
1. The Hegelian absolute seems to be confronted with its opposite.
Self-lim itation is not an act o f free will, but a logical necessity on
the part o f the absolute. The Spirit in Hegelian absolutism,
though infinite, must pretend to itself to be finite, only in order
to overcome this pretence, to distinguish itself from everything
finite and to becom e aware o f its infinity. Findley. J. N ., Hegel :
a Re-examination. p. 38 (A llen & U nw in).
SAKTI 277
things are comprehended is the same, the principle o f their

being is also the same. And as the contraries are percei
ved by one and the same sense, therefore, they belong to
one and the same substrate.
Even those thinkers who regard that the cause does not
have an inherent potency to produce the effect have to
admit that the causes possess various powers. Nobody can
regard akti or powers to be unreal like the skyflower.
Although the powers are not known independently o f their
substrates, it does not mean that they are unreal. There
are innumerable powers in every object. Although these
powers themselves cannot become object o f our knowledge,
they are, however, inferred from their effects. It is
difficult to explain why fire is hot and water is cool.
Though power cannot be pointed out as this* or that,* as
it is not an object o f thought (acintya), it can be recognised
from the effects it produces. A power is the inherent and
inseparable nature o f an object. We have to admit the
power o f burning in fire, even though it is concealed or
hidden.
According to the aivite, it is wrong to assume either
that akti is the supreme reality in itself or that it is
jperely an illusion. In order to arrive at the true concep
tion o f akti we have to avoid these two extreme views.
These extremes can be reconciled on the view that akti is
the manifestation o f absolute consciousness. It is conscious-
ness-power, cit akti9 which gives rise to the manifestation
o f innumerable aktis in the world. It is because o f their
resting on iva, which is the only place o f rest, that the
innumerable powers produce various effects, just as gems
do the variegated light.1 The divine Sakti, residing in all
objects in a subtle state, performs the various functions.
The universal akti, which gives rise to the various powers
in the world, is really the power o f consciousness, akti
t . R * a * if a r c c T r c 1
N IPV. vii, Intr. (Bhas-

kar, vol. I. p. 345).
278 KASHMIR 5$AIVISM
rannot itselfbe material, nor can its substratum be material,

akti ultimately belongs to the absolute alone. Parama
Siva assumes the form o f iva and akti, PrakSsa and
Vimarsa, during the process o f manifestation. Like these
forms o f the absolute, the process o f manifestation is also
eternal. It assumes the form o f the universe during
evolution and the form o f destruction during involution.1
akti has also been described as Svtantrya, Kartftva,
Sphuratt, Sara, Hjdaya, Spanda etc. akti gives rise to the
manifestation o f the world which includes the thirty-four
categories from Sadaiva to arth. While the iva and
akti tattvas are always manifest, the tattvas from SadSt-
siva to Earth are subject to evolution and involution.
Sakti is the universal principle which gives rise to the mani
festation o f the process o f evolution and involution. It is also
responsible for the manifestation o f the absolute as finite.
Many systems failed in their attempt to explain the
relationship between the absolute and the phenomena
because they created an artificial gulf between conscious
ness and freedom. They could not realise that devoid o f
freedom, consciousness would become inert. Those who
hold the view that consciousness and power are different
are ultimately led to the conclusion that they both are
inert and, consequently, nothing ; the development o f
Indian thought from the Smkhya dualism ultimately leads
some thinkers to this conclusion. But we have to accept that
Reality is iva-akti, Prak&ia-Vimaria, or consciousness-
freedoin. Only by recognizing this dual nature o f Reality,
we can hope to avoid the riddles or paradoxes o f thought.
That is why the revealed texts have proclaim ed the
Supreme Lord to be infinite as regards His powers. He
alone is the cause or source o f the glory o f the universe.*
Unless we admit consciousness to be endowed with
power or freedom, no human transactions would be
1. * ^
I Parpraveaik. p. 2,
2. SN. I. 11. PS. KrikSa 10-11.
SAKTI 279
possible. Consciousness and freedom cannot be separated

from each other. Siva as the substratum or pure Praka
is never devoid o f akti or Vimarsa. Similarly, akti
also can never exist in separation from iva. The introvert
akti itself is iva, the extrovert iva itself is akti ;
introversion and extroversion both are the eternal mani*
festations o f Reality. Although the iva tattva includes
akti and the akti tattva, likewise, includes iva, the
difference between them in the realm o f manifestation
consists in the predominance o f the one over the other.
In the transcendent absolute both represent a state o f
equilibrium. The state o f equilibrium is called *Smatasya*
which itself is the absolute and is called Parama iva by
the aivites and Par akti by the ktas.
akti is the very nature (svarapa) of iva According

to the aivite, those systems which regard that akti exists
in itself, as independent o f iva, and also those which hold
iva to be absolutely pure, devoid o f any power, are ulti
mately led to nihilism. As consciousness cannot be devoid
o f freedom, similarly power also cannot be independent o f
its substratum, which is ultimately and invariably the
absolute consciousness That power cannot be regarded
as material is the main contention o f the aivite. The
S&mkhya and the Vedntin both were wrong in holding
akti to be inert. For, in reality, the insentient is now
here found to be powerful It always presupposes conscious-*
ness as its substratum. But if sentient substratum be
accepted, then it is none other than iva, the absolute
consciousness.1 iva is the only place o f rest o f all
innumerable powers. The powers produce their effects
because they rest on Him. However, iva is not merely
the support; He is also the possessor o f these powers.
Unlike the Vednta Absolute, iva has the power o f
freedom as His essential nature. In His very nature, He
possesses the powers o f will, knowledge and action, and is
1. SD. IV. i. p. 145.

180 k a s h m ir a iv is m
not an inanimate or inert being devoid o f powers.1 Indeed

even the SSmkhya and the VedSntin are ultimately forced
to admit this, though they are not prepared to admit it
openly. The Smkhya, while postulating the indepen
dence o f Prakrti, also make it at the same time depen
dent upon Purusa, The very functioning o f Prakfti,
the urge or drive for evolution and involution, is possi
ble owing to its contact with Purusa. The VedSntin
also regards MSyS as a akti o f Brahman. However,
because the Skihhya and VedSnta regard power as
essentially material, both o f them fail to explain the
relationship between akti and consciousness. If Sakti
depends upon consciousness for its functioning and
existence, and if consciousness is devoid o f freedom or
causality, where is the principle which gives rise to move
ment and becoming ? And as there cannot be a satisfactory
answer to this question if consciousness and freedom are
regarded as separate, ultimately we would be forced to
accept the doctrine o f avidy. But acceptance o f the
notion o f avidy does not amount to an explanation.
Although the aivite agrees with the ihkhya in regard

ing the world as real, he emphatically rejects the dualism
o f Smkhya; for Prakfti is not independent, nor separate
from , Purusa . He also agrees with the Vedntin in accept
ing the world as non-different from Brahman. But he rejects
the Vedntic view that the world is illusory. For him
the world is a real manifestation o f the absolute. The uni
verse is essentially identical with the absolute2. The universe
comprising o f thirty-six tattavas shines in the supreme
element ( para tattva ), which is radiant, perfect, mightily
blissful from itsbeing merged in the Self, fully stored with
will and consciousness, replete with endless powers, void
o f all determination, pure, still and without origina-
si??? 1% fr I ps. P. 32,

2. PH. III.
ÂKTl 281
tion and dissolution.1 iva, which is pure being, akti

which is pure becoming, and the world, which is the offspr
ing o f the two, are all eternal. Ultimately, they are not diffe
rent from each other. The world is a manifestation o f akti,
which is the manifestation o f iva. Unlike the Vedntin,
the aivite prefers the concept o f Sakti or vtantrya
and regards My as a lower manifestation o f the divine
akti. According to him there are higher levels o f reality
over and above the level o f My. The view that our expe
rience is confined to the realm o f My amounts to limi
ting experience to a lower state o f reality. We would have
no ground, in that case, even to refute the materialists
view that our experience is confined to matter. The fact,
however, is that different individuals stop at different levels,
depending upon the stage o f their realization o f reality.
The Yogins who have transcended the state o f M y have
declared that there are still higher levels o f truth. If the
Vedntin attempts to explain the higher states o f manifesta
tion on the notion o f pure ( suddha ) My, then he gives
up his concept o f My and accepts the aiva notion o f
cit akti. According to aivism My actually means the
principle which differentiates the universe into a complex
o f subject and object o f thought. It is styled as Goddess, as
belonging to the G od, and is, unlike the My in the Veda
nta, not something different from Him. It hides ivas
real nature when He, o f His own free will, enters into the
condition o f finite individuality by imposing thereupon
the three defilements.2
Siva and Sakti

As regards the question o f the relationship between iva
and akti, the aivite holds that Sftmarasya, the equilibrium
1.
fasTTfart I
fatffter It PS. Karikas 10-11.

2. Ibid- p p . 44-45.
282 KASHMIR gAIVISM
o f iva and akti, is the very nature (Svarpa) o f the Abso

lute.1 Parama iva is not a conglomeration o f the two;
it is an essential unity, o f which these two are eternal mani
festations. It is from this unity that the two appear as
distinct. Though in reality they are never separate, they
are distinguishable in the realm o f manifestation. They
represent the two-fold manifestation o f the absolute. It is
only from the standpoint o f the phenomena that we talk o f
a relationship between them. Otherwise, thought cannot
penetrate the veil o f phenomena and arrive at the noumena.
It is only when an apparent schism takes place in the
integral reality that we talk o f the relationship. In itself,
the absolute might be described as either Par akti or
Parama iva. The absolute is not a state o f predomi
nance o f either iva or akti ; it is a state o f perfect
integrality. Depending upon individual taste and temper,
those who worship Reality in the form o f male call it
Parama iva and those who worship it as female call it
Para akti.2
When considered as distinct, Siva represents the pure
light o f consciousness (bodha), the pure being without any
becoming, and akti stands for the power or freedom
( SvStantrya ) o f consciousness, the infinite form without
light, or the principle o f becoming. Only when the integral
reality appears as self-limited, does there appear this distin
ction between consciousness and freedom. In reality, neither
light can be without form nor form can be without light. It
is only in the practical sphere that the distinction becomes
possible. Form always presupposes light as its background;
likewise, light also always appears with a form. If light did
not reveal itself it would no longer be light. However, in
spite o f this dual mode o f distinction, as light and form, it
is the light itself which appears as the multitude o f forms.
Though distinguishable, like the sun and its rays, the light
and its forms are always inseparable. From the point o f
view o f change or multiplicity, the absolute is described
1. Ib id . p. 34.
2. Kaviraj, G ., Bharatiya Sahskrji aur Sdhan, p. 17.
SAKTI. 283
as akti; from the standpoint o f being or unity, it is

called iva. In itself it is both iva and akti, Male and
Female (Ardhanrluara).* Just as fire and its burning power
are spoken o f as different from the practical point o f view,
while in reality they are always identical, similarly, the
integral non-dual Reality is spoken o f as iva and akti from
the empirical point o f view.2 As there can be no Vimarsa
without Prak&a, there can be no Praka without Vimara.
Just as reflection cannot be possible without a background,
so Vimarsa also cannot exist apart from PrakSâ; and, simi
larly, Prak&a too ceases to be Praksa without Vimarsa. Pra-
kaaand Vimara, iva and akti, are essentially inseparable.
Siva is pure light without awareness. Just as the honey is
sweet in itself without being aware o f its sweetness, or as
wine is intoxicant without being so aware, like wise, iva is
also not conscious o f himself without akti. Devoid o f Sakti,
Siva would be insentient ( ja d a ) and, consequently, as
good as dead* ;ava). iva knows Himself only through
His akti. But akti also depends upon iva for its func
tioning. Both are essentially dependent upon each other.8
Though the God and Goddess appear as two, fundament
ally they are one. For the sake o f the universe and its
creatures, the absolute has apparently unfolded into this
duality, and out o f them derive all the life polarities, anta
gonism, and distinction o f power and elements that chara
cterise the phenomenal world.4 The unqualified pure
substance, which is the support o f the entire universe,
has been called cit in masculine gender, and citi, in the
1. The two are the first revelation o f the Absolute. Male being the
passive aspect, the eternity, the female the active, the dynamism
o f time. T h ough opposite, they are in essence one. She is the
universal power ( akti ), fairest o f the three worlds, Um3,
Durg, Cmund, Gaur, Hemavati Vindhyavsin. She has her
living counterpart in every woman, as the G od has in every man.*
Zim m er, H. M yth s and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization
pp. 137-8.
2. SD. III. 7.
3. Ibid. III. ii.
4. Zimmer, op p . cit.
284 KASHMIR SAIVISM
Feminine. These are merely two names o f one and the

same entity which in its female aspect is worshipped as
Svar, DurgS or Bhagavati, and as Isvara, iva or Bhaga-
vn, in its male aspect.1
As the innumerable rays are nothing but a manifestation
o f the sun, so akti also is nothing but a self-manifes
tation o f iva Himself. Like moon and moonlight or sun
and sunlight, iva and akti are eternally united. They
are united with each other in the relation o f tdtmya or
stmarasya, which means that they are inseparable and yet
distinguishable in thought. The relationship between
them, viz. tad&tmya, is o f the nature o f unity in difference.
It might also be characterised as non-duality tolerant o f
duality* (bheda sahinti abheda). For instance, the light
which pervades a room is identical with the lamp burning
in that room. I f the light and the lamp were different
from each other like the pot and the cloth, then with the
removal o f the lamp light should not vanish. Nor can
they be regarded as purely identical, for whereas the
burning lamp burns the objects, the light does not. Hence,
they are both identical and different. This is the true
nature o f identity.
The nature o f tdtmya consists in relating the two
identicals which are apparently given as different. At first,
the two are known to be different but afterwards they are
recognized to be essentially identical. As long as they are
regarded as two, they stand to each other in the relation o f
substance and attribute. The attribute itself is really
identical with the substance. Identity might be compared
to the relation which exists between the multi-coloured
parts o f a peacocks body when they are united with each
other during the early stage o f the plasma in the egg. It
may also be compared to the relationship which holds
between the various colours which exist as one with the rays
o f the sun. This constitutes the nature o f lraarasya or
tdatmya, the relation which is the exemplar o f all
1. Kaly&na, ahti Anka p. 29.
SAKTI 285
relations in the world. A and B are first given as separate,

later on we recognize them as identical. Although we
proceed from difference to unity, we cannot reject difference
as unreal. The difference between A and B, both o f
which are in reality identical, is also real. Although power
is identical with the possessor, like salt and the sea-water,
the distinction between them cannot be ignored.1 Just as
one A is perfectly identified with the other, in the assimi
lation o f the following A with the preceding A , according
to P acin is rule *atogune,* and it is only the analytical
approach that brings out the distinction o f the one from
the other, so in the absolute Anuttara and AnuttarV,
Bhairava and akti, are thoroughly identical.* There can
be no real difference between iva and akti, both
being perfectly identical. In reality, the difference between
consciousness and its powers is purely imaginary and non-
essential.8 There can be no dualism o f substance and attri
bute, for the distinction between them is merely imaginary.
The supreme Being is always one with the principle o f
spanda, never otherwise.4 Consciousness and its luminosity,
though distinguishable like sun and light, are in reality
always identical. Consciousness is luminosity and lumino
sity is consciousness. Just as the power o f producing
the tree is not different from its seed, similarly, the power
o f consciousness is non-different from consciousness.
In the state o f unity, all aktis remain in identity
with consciousness. akti is related to the Anuttara in
the same way in which the creative energy o f an indivi
dual is related to him. In the final analysis, it is nothing
but self-consciousness in which the objective, which is
but the grossification o f the is present like flower in the
seed.6
1. T A ., II. 157,
2. Pandey, K . C ., opp. cit. p. 666.
3. SD. I. ii. p . 5, T A . I. p. 1 0 9 .-
4. SN. I. i.
5. SD. p. 10.
6. PTV ., 45,vide Pandey, K .C . op. cit. p. 6S5.
286 KASHMIR Sa IVISM
Here the question may arise as to why should akti be

admitted in the pure Being when it can be easily accounted
for as a mere accident or adjunct ? In answer to this,
the aivite states that as nothing can come out o f nothing,
or as asat cannot become sat, or as the sat cannot become
asat, the supposed accidental power or Maya akti must
also have its source somehow in the Real. But this can
be so, only if akti is regarded as one with its source or
substratum, which is consciousness alone. Accordingly,
the so-called accidental akti would be nothing but the
inherent power o f consciousness. Even in the state o f trans
cendental reality akti exists as one with it. The main
difficulty is that this state o f reality is beyond the grasp o f
thought or speech. But commonsense and practice demand
that that which is manifest in the empirical sphere must be
regarded as being rooted in the Ultimate. The view that
akti is unrelated to the absolute really amounts to an
admission o f dualism and, consequently, o f nihilism. In
order to avoid nihilism, we have to admit that consciousness
and its power are inseparable, like fire and heat, or ice
and cold.1
With regard to the question as to how can the absolute in

itself may be regarded as powerful, the aivite points out
that it is only from the standpoint o f the finite individual
that Parma iva is regarded as having infinite power (akti).
Being and becoming, Prakasa and Vimara, both appear as
separate only in our finite experience. Hence, the distin
ction between them is possible only from our finite stand
point. The distinction between them presupposes their integral
unity. In the absence o f this unity, nothing would be mani
fest, and no practical life would be possible. However, the
finite standpoint in which the two appear as distinct is
also real. It is the Parama iva Himself who appears
in these forms.
1. SD. III. vi. p. 100.

Sa k t i 287
There is no relationship o f parts or aspects in the abso

lute. In itself the absolute shines being absorbed in the
experience o f consciousness-bliss. During this state, this
much experience (being absorbed in perfect egoity) consti
tutes His will, knowledge and action. Till the rise o f the
world-state, which is o f the form o f negation o f oneness
with the absolute and which is illusory, Sakti constitutes
the form o f Siva. The view that prior to creation all the
powers exist in the form o f unity is established both on
the basis o f practical experience and on the principle o f
causation.1
But how can the Saktis be present in the non-dual state
o f reality without making any reference to it ? In answer
to this question, the Saivite holds that the powers in this
state do not require any object to operate upon. During
the state o f non-duality their existence and functioning
coincide with the experience o f dt and nanda. Normally
we infer the cause from the observation o f the effect. The
world effects which are given in experience point to their
ultimate cause. It is only Sakti which can reasonably be
supposed to be the ultimate cause o f the world effects. From
the actual we infer the potential; fire is potentially present
in the combustible materials; the tree is present in the seed.
Similarly, all the causes and effects, which constitute the
universe, are potentially present in their ultimate cause.
The concept o f Sakti is, thus, necessary in order to explain
the actual manifoldness o f causes and effects. Although the
question regarding the presence o f Sakti in the Transcend
ent cannot, strictly speaking, be raised from the finite point
o f view, however, it has to be assumed that the Saktis are
present even in the highest Reality. For, the effect must
be potentially present in the cause.2
It might be asked here, if iva and Sakti are essentially

identical, how do we make a distinction between them ?
T o this the aivite points out that in the realm o f concepts
r .l. SD . I. 3-4.
" 2. Ibid
we always proceed from the given. From the effect we

proceed to the cause. The world is there, given as a
matter o f fact. In our search for its cause we arrive at
the conclusion that it is only the power o f consciousness,
Cit akti, which is non-different from consciousness, which
alone can be regarded as the ultimate cause. The insentient
cannot be a power in the ultimate sense. For the insentient
always depends upon the sentient. The dual mode o f
description o f the absolute, as consciousness and freedom,
iva and akti, cannot be avoided. In the absence o f this
duality, even the affirmation o f advaita would not be possible.
Without the experience o f duality, the experience o f non
duality would have no meaning. The notion o f duality is esse
ntial before we form the conception o f non-duality. The Real
is Eka, which means samatu or equilibrium. Though appearing
as two, iva and akti are really one. There is no discord
or difference between them. Consciousness and its lumi
nosity, iva and akti, though identical and inseparable,
like sun and its light, can be distinguished from the
practical point o f view. TadStmya for the aiva Absolutist
does not mean absolute identity or negation o f distinction.
Identity for him is non-difference in difference. First,
we have the finite vision in which the two are distinguished.
Later on, when we have the vision o f Unity, the two are
regarded as identical. In the beginning power and
consciousness, Sakti and aktimn, are experienced
separately. Later on they are found to be essentially
identical.
Evolution of Sakti
The one universal akti itself appears in the form o f
different aktis during the state o f worldly existence, as
different-cum-non-different in the state o f Sdhan, and as
non-different in the highest state o f realization. These three
states o f manifestation o f akti are described as aparV%
parpara and par avasths. In the par state all the aktis
are in absolute identity both between themselves and with
iva. It is the state o f eternal identity or supreme unity.
Sa k t i 289
In this state, Sakti is manifest in the form o f being-cons-

ciousness-bliss. All the other Saktis are present as one
with the power o f consciousness and bliss, or Cit Sakti and
nanda Sakti, which are fully manifest during the parS-
para and apar states also. The remaining three Saktis,
viz. Icchn, Jnna and KriyHi exist during this state in identity
with Consciousness and Bliss. They can never exist
independent of, nor separate from , the parS state which is
pre-supposed in all states o f experience. No experience
whatsoever would be possible in the absence o f the para
Sakti.
In the parixpara state, there is both unity and difference
between the various Saktis. During this state, icch
becomes fully manifest. When there arises self-consciousness
(Cit Sakti) out o f consciousness, bliss or Snanda becomes
manifest. It is a function o f the absolute Power and is o f
the nature o f self-consciousness. It is not o f the nature
o f sensuous pleasure but is absolute in every sense. The
universe is a manifestation o f Bliss-Consciousness. From
this state arises aunmukhya, the first flicker o f Will. It can
be experienced in the states o f rememberance, jo y , anger,
fear etc. Its external manifestation might be observed
during the moment when the calm water becomes disturbed
and there arise subtle vibrations in it. It is the slight stir
in the undisturbed pure consciousness, such as it happens
when the hand is about to close in a fist for attack. It is
the earlier part o f the manifestation o f the will.
During the apar avasth, which is o f the form o f unmesa,
or awakening, the powers o f knowledge and action ( Jfina
akti and Kriy akti) become fully manifest. The
will power opens up the cognitive faculty and there arises
the power o f knowledge (jfiSna akti ). In the beginning
it is only pure and formless cognition as there is no object
o f knowledge. But henceforth the formless consciousness
becomes informed with various forms. Later on, when
Maya Sakti gives rise to a variety o f objects out o f the pure
flux o f consciousness, there arises the power o f action
290 KASHMIR AIVISM
(Kriy aktij. When the ideal this appears split up into

innumerable objects, the powers o f knowledge, action, and
self-limitation appear as sattva, rajas and tamas.1
In every manifestation, all the Saktis work together.
The activity o f the following aktis also presupposes the
working o f the preceding aktis. For example, cit is presu
pposed by nanda, ananda by icch, icch by jnna and jM n a
by kriy. Even if one akti be absent, no action would ever
be possible. Hence it has to be assumed that in all objects
and events, all these aktis are present in a state o f Sma-
rasya.2 Though infinite in number, these Saktis are mainly
divided into five kinds. The Saktis are o f the nature o f
unity. Being composite in nature, like the Prakfti o f the
SSmkhya, each akti has infinite number o f aktis in it.8
The entirety o f these aktis constitutes the third eye o f Siva
in the state o f their complete fusion as Bindu.
According to the VedSnta, reality is the non-relational
pure unity. I f at all the world existence is to be explained,
it can be possible only on the view that it is a manifestation
o f the absolute. Though ultimately all qualities are denied
o f Brahman, we may nevertheless consider it to be endowed
with powers, only if we assume in its nature an element o f
duality, which is a figment o f nescience. What is merely
due to limiting adjuncts cannot constitute an attribute o f a
substance and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented
by nescience only. The primeval nescience leaves room
for all practical life and activity.4 The admission o f akti,
on the other hand, would introduce difference in the nature
o f pure differenceless Brahman. If akti and aktimSn are
really non-different, there is no justification for describing
them in terms o f duality. If they are regarded as inseparable
aspects o f a W hole, it would amount to an admission o f
1. Pandey, K C ., opp. cit. p. 673.
2. irTSTfauftiT w f 3113 1 m r I
n sd . i . 23.
3. ' m r f o q # * sifffi: sis q fr e t fa 1 s d . 1.19.
4. SB. III. 16.
SAKTI 291
parts or aspects in the absolute. Nor is it correct to intro

duce substance-attribute relationship within the non-rela
tional reality. It is even more difficult to conceive how
akti can be present in the transcendental state in which
none o f its functions or characteristics are manifest. The
Vedntin insists upon the reality o f the transcendental
aspect o f Brahman and regards its phenomenal aspect as
unreal. Only in its latter aspect Brahman can be regarded
as the source o f world evolution and involution.
In the Vednta logic akti itself is regarded as My.
Whatever suffers change has parts and is, therefore, com po
site. But that which is composite is liable to be destroyed
and is, therefore, not self-existent. Moreover, the sublation
o f the superimposed entity shows that the entity is found
to be absolutely unreal. The world which is superimposed
upon Brahman is ultimately unreal. This analogy o f
superimposition can be extended to the whole phenomenal
world on the basis o f the declaration o f the Scriptures.
As Prof. Murti holds, the transition from the real to the
appearances could only be posited or presumed, as what
must have transpired prior to the empirical experience.
Thus, the function o f avidy can only be presumed.
Though it is not known at the time o f its formation, it is
revealed at the time o f its sublation. It is the principle o f
creativity (Vikepa Sakti) owing to which the non-dual
Unity appears as different. Although it is a necessary
condition o f phenomena, yet it is contingent in being; it
is in being but not o f it.1 Otherwise, if avidy were an
integral part o f Brahman, everything would be determined
and necessary and the distinction between the necessary
and contigent would be obliterated. There would be no
temporal process, but only a logical sequence or equation.
Any species o f integralism is subject to this predicament.2
Avidy or My is the principle opposed to reason and
incapable o f standing the test o f critical reflection.3 My
1. M urti, T . R, V ., op. cit., Vedanta and Buddhism.
2. Ibid.
3. wfaiPfTraMt i ^ ^ fairer sr
Nai^karmya Stddhi, I I I .66.
292 KASHMIR SAIVISM
is the name for something which does not exist.1 T o know

it through logic would be to illumine darkness with dark
ness. My is without any real support and is opposed to
all canons o f reasoning. It cannot tolerate reason like dark
ness which cannot withstand light.2 This tendency to
shirk all proof is itself the true nature o f avidy (avidyatva).
The potency o f avidy which gives rise to the manifestation
o f Brahman is called ouyakta. My is thus the avyakta akti
o f God. It is beginningless and is known through its
effects. It is neither sat nor asat, nor both; neither it is
different, nor identical, nor both; it is neither having parts,
nor is it without parts. In itself it is strange and indescri
bable.3 It has two potencies, viz. concealment and
manifestation, or varano, and viksepa.
The world is My because it can neither be made out
as a being o f the nature o f consciousness nor as different
from it. If the world is real, then no amount o f knowledge
will remove it, and liberation would be impossible. The
relation between Brahman and My, like all relations,
exists only within the sphere o f illusion. But the question
o f relationship does not arise when illusion is cancelled.
Brahman is not merely the passive ground o f the illusion as
the rope is o f the snake. The world illusion has no
existence apart from pure consciousness.
In contrast with the Vednta, the aiva Absolutist holds
that My is nothing but an appearance o f the divine akti.
When it exists in identity with iva, prior to creation, it
is known as Sakti My, the divine freedom itself. It is
known as Tattva My when is manifest as the world.
Further, when it is manifest into different parts, it is known
as Granthi My.
Like the Vedntin, the aivite also regards akti as

acintya or indescribable, akti veils ivas real nature,
1. Sarfikara s Com . on Gau<1apda Krik, IV . 58.

2. Naiskarmya Siddht, II. 66.
3. Viveka Cudamani, 11, 111.
SAKTI 293
when He, o f his own free will, enters into the condition o f a
finite soul by imposing thereupon the three defilements.1
M y akti is the principle which is responsible for the
appearance o f the not-self in the self. It is o f the nature o f
negation or darkness Owing to it, the true nature o f the
self is concealed. In itself it is the negation o f Bliss and is
o f the form o f the power o f action.8 However, in order to
avoid dualism, My akti has to be regarded as the essen
tial nature o f Reality. We can solve dualism either by
postulating an illusory power, My akti, or by assuming
an inherent akti in iva. While the Vedntin has recourse
to the former alternative, the aivite prefers the latter. He
calls M y those manifestations which cannot reasonably be
explained.8
1. hth htj *Hran

|H2HiTTHH I
I at trnrnifts: I
It PS. ICrikS 15.
mar h hth Ih?h afosafatfaiHt i
S r c w m iM i s f i a m a a m r a : n t a . i i i . i i .
2. trionfa WTasifaiftmdj fa hi hT^ mnrafa>.*i ipv . i.i.
3 h n n a a i m a r f a n if s H hut s i f a : i o p . cit.
3. HHHtHH Him ffa 3=3#, aHSH fPH SCRITTI HH-

hthhth wtht, an h N ^ h?4 h aa^H HTHwfa.-, m
IP V . I. v. 18.
Htm T-HW î h tph : HHrsiTHin^ hht ht htht; fasHHtf-
*aHT HT HTHT I HHT ^HfH jtfSTOHH HHfHH-fH ftHT *hV ,
H 1H: H^THTfHHTfHH SHfafTHir HhN?I HTHT I 3^
HiaH ? ^ H IT H H *! fa I PS. P. 44.
P A R T IV
THE SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE

CHAPTER NINE
THE NATURE OF SELF

1. Knowledge of the Self
Know thyself has been the key-note o f Indian Thought.
The realization o f the true Self has been the principal aim
o f philosophising in India. dhytma Vidya could be
regarded as a kingly science, the royal secret. It supplies
the only sanction and support to righteousness and its
benefit may be seen even with the eye as bringing peace and
permanent happiness.1 The sages, therefore, sought for
the permanent self which alone was valuable in the midst
o f mundane changes. Their metaphysical quest represented
a restless yearning for the vision o f highest Self (tma dariana).
Philosophical discussion was supposed to be valuable only
in so far as it helped in the attempts at realising the self.2
The aim o f both aiva and Vedanta Absolutisms is to
help the individual in attaining self-realisation. Since
liberation is possible only through a correct knowledge o f
the true nature o f the self and world existence is due to
incorrect knowledge, the aiva thinkers propose to analyse
the true nature o f the self bit by bit.8
The entering into ones own real nature, i. e. realisat
ion o f oneness with his true self, which is o f the nature o f
1. Gt, I X . 2.
2. T he science o f self is the religion and philosophy o f India. This
science recognises the unity of oil life one source, one essence,
and one goal and regards the realisation o f this unity as the
highest good, bliss, salvation, freedom , the linai purpose o f life.
T h is is eternal life, not an eternity o f time, but the recognition
here and now o f all things in the Self and the Self in all.*
Coomaraswamy, A ., Danc o f Siva, p. 27.
3. w r a r a itt *ra sram* 5 srrc:, tra: f t m
PH., V II, pp. 51-8.

298 KASHMIR ÂIVISM
iva and is the highest object o f achievement, is possible

when the limited subject knows what to shun and what to
seek after, as also what is his real nature. Then one gets
liberation right in his life time.
How can the self, which is essentially the subject o f all

knowledge, itself become an object o f knowledge ? How can
the knower be known ? Consideration o f such questions
leads us to the recognition o f the primacy o f the knower in
all knowing. The object which is not an object for a
subject is nothing in itself. The Self is presupposed in all
distinctions, such as between form and matter, reality and
appearance, subject and object, and so on. Considered in
this light, the Self may be called the centre o f an indefinite
number o f concentric circles, each periphery being occupied
by different class o f objects.2 Kant rightly held that
noumenal Self is unknown and unknowable. In order to
explain the phenomena o f knowledge, we have to admit
the transcendental unity o f consciousness. The phenomenal
self is not the real subject, which cannot become an object
either o f experience or o f reason.
The Indian thinkers, however, assert that the self,
though not an object o f knowledge, is immediately present
in all experience. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as
wholly unknown. Those thinkers who assert that the
permanent self is never found in empirical experience are
wrong. For, they fail to recognise that the self which is
supra-logical cannot be given as an object in experience.
It is the infinite, the which cannot be an object o f
empirical knowledge. Though it is not an object o f know
ledge, the self is not unknowable. The very denial o f self
proves its existence. Everybody is conscious o f the self,
nobody thinks I am not. 3 The very existence and
functioning o f understanding presupposes the self which is
1. Bhaskari, vol, II, p. 244.

2. M ukherjec, A. C ., The Nature oj Self, pp. 6-9.
3. S3 srrfa *T SB. I. i. 1.
THE NATURE OF SELF 299
different from them and which is self-established.1 The

self is the essential nature o f one who doubts it.2 The
knower cannot be subject to change ; eternal existence is
its very nature.8 It cannot be grasped through the catego
ries o f thought. T o attempt to do so, would be like
attempting to roll up the sky like a skin, or to ascend the
space like a staircase, or to trace the footprints o f fish in
water, or o f birds in sky.4 The Self has been described
as immediate experience ; it is intuitively given in every
experience as its veiled background.5
Being the presupposition o f all proof, the Self cannot
be proved. Its existence is known on account o f its
immediate presentation. Proving the Self cannot mean
bringing it into being, for it is eternal. If it is held that
the Self is not essentially sentient, then also we cannot
prove its existence. That which is insentient cannot shine
by itself. Like a stone it cannot prove or disprove anything.
The Self being essentially self-luminous, the means o f right
knowledge cannot operate with regard to it. Just as there
^ can be no activity o f causal agent in relation to the
Supreme Lord, similarly there can be neither that o f the
means o f right knowledge as He is self-shining.6 By its very
nature the Pramoa cannot operate in the case o f the Self.
Pramna is so called because o f its appearing ever anew
and bringing about the rest o f the object in the subject,
which is called Pramiti. And the subject, being o f un
broken light, has all the Pramitis in His introvert aspect.
How then can Prama which appears ever anew operate
in his case ? Where will rest Pramiti which owes its
existence to the former ? Pramôa is possible only in the
case o f subject limited by body etc. And here too, it operates
only on the objective aspect, not on the subject. With
1. SB. II. iii. 7; I. iii. 32.
2. * f fTOTOf I
3. * 5 TCWTCTOTcTOJ 1 SB. II. iii 7.
4. Atreyabhaaya, II. i. Intr.
5. Brh. up. I II. v. 1; Ken a up. II. iv; Pancadaai I. 11.
6. IP V . I. i. 1.
300 KASHMIR SAIVISM
regard to the subjective aspect, ones own experience alone

is the means.1
The aivite holds that the Self is essentially free. If it is
said that it is essentially o f the nature o f pure unchanging
consciousness, then the differentiation o f cognition and
putting together of the differentiated would not be possible.
It has to be admitted that the Self shines in the form o f the
objects and yet remains free from all limitation.
2. Discrimination between Self and not-Self.
The aivite adopts integral method o f distinguishing the
Self from the not-Self in order to arrive at the true nature
o f Self. According to him, the different conceptions o f Self,
as formulated in the various systems o f thought, do not
adequately represent the true nature o f Self. These concep
tions might be described as the different roles which the
Highest Self itself assumes owing to its sportive nature.
Although these conceptions, when taken by themselves, are in
complete, they are partially true representations o f the nature
o f Self. In support o f his view, the aivite gives the illustra
tion o f the actor and the various roles played by him in the
drama.2 All theories about the nature o f Self, including
that o f the Cstrvaka, no matter how much removed from
the highest truth they may be, are partially true. Each o f
them succeeds in representing some aspect o f Self. Every
philosopher has realised the Self in one o f its impersona
tions and is, therefore, in possession o f some truth. However,
in order to realise the Highest Self, one has to transcend
these finite standpoints, which are the roles through which
the Subject disguises Himself. For, it is darkness upon
darkness, a great fistula upon a boil, when that which is
not really the Self, such as body, breath etc., is imagined
to be the Self. 3
1 I P v T I I . III. 16.
2. a f fa v i: ii w fa rfa rs fa H t * fw w :,
fTOFar: aw* qaw sirw ri ffiw r i
PH. V III .
3. PS. Kriku 3.
W hile attaining the higher visions o f the Self in the

aiva tradition, the lower visions are not rejected but are
included in the higher visions. The higher visions include
all the lower visions. In the highest and perfect vision o f the
Self, all the finite views or standpoints are recognised to be
the manifestations o f the Supreme Self. It is the Supreme
Self, the Parama iva, in all the different experiences o f
the Self, as syrup, molasses, jaggery, sugarballs etc. are all
alike juices o f the sugarcane.1
These various roles are the disguises in which the self

hides itself like an actor and keeps them apart because o f its
free will.2 It is because o f this disguise that the materialist
holds that the atman is identical with the physical body
which is characterised by consciousness.3 There are some
who regard the Self as the vital breath (prilna), as they think
that without prdna body cannot function. The NySya-
Vaiêsika regards the Self to be almost identical with the
substratum o f the group o f qualities beginning with jfiSna
^ etc. as long as it is in the wordly state ; in the end when
its connection with buddhi etc. is severed, it is supposed to
be almost identical with the void. The MimSmsaka also
stops with the notion o f intelligence. Similarly, the Buddhist
too arrives at the function o f intelligence and regards
the flux o f cognition to be ultimate.4 The nyavdins
regard the Self to be something like void. According to
them, pleasure, pain etc. are determinations o f intelligence;
the Self is that where all determinations cease.6 The
Brahmavdins, who believe in nihilism and hold that
this universe was non-existent , also arrive at the concept
1. Idid. KSrika 26.
2. PH . V I I I ,
3. PS, pp. 69-72.
4. fiPTCFtiPT akar f f s f f o ^ 'rfofacir: i
PH. op. cit.
5. ^ i ^ 5 qw : ? crai
^.5mn-wtf*ip?TPTT s *n<*n,-sfci 1 ps.
op. cit.
o f void and remain content with it.1 The Paficaratras too

stop at the notion o f avyakta. The Samkhya and others
arrive at the sphere o f Vijnnkalas and cling to it. The
Grammarians prefer the sphere o f Sadasiva and describe the
Self as the absolute W ord . However, in the final analysis
all these philosophers hold the insentient to be the Self.2
For, the Self which is devoid o f the power o f consiousness is
as good as the insentient.
So far, we have mentioned the views o f non-Agamic
systems only. The followers o f the Tantras advance further
than these systems and regard the Self as transcendent. But
those who follow the principal texts o f the sacred traditions
regard the Self as immanent. The highest view, which is
held by those who know the Trika and the allied systems, is
that the Atman is both transcendent and immanent simulta
neously.3
These various roles, which are assumed by the Subject
owing to its own free will, represent the various grades o f
reality. These roles form an ascending order o f existence,
depending upon the extent to which freedom is revealed in
each state. The lowest or narrowest vision o f the Self is
attained by the materialist, wherein the freedom o f
Self is completely concealed. Similarly, the highest or all-
inclusive vision o f the Self is achieved in the Trika,
wherein freedom is completely revealed.4 In reality, the
Self is always one, though it may appear to be o f various
forms. It is due to the will o f the Lord that persons
having limited visions arrogate to themselves a view o f
their own in accordance with their partisan standpoint.
1. m i * ^ q g q im i^ r forai: f
qRRci^-sfct \ ph. pp. 54- 6.

2. Ibid.
3. Ib id.
4 faRRi m m : qqfcqi
t ibid.
It is due to this reason that such persons are unable to

comprehend the great pervasion o f the Atman, unless the
highest akti descends upon them. Though the Self
pervades all the lower spheres o f body etc , and is self-
evident, these persons do not realise its real nature. M&y
indeed misleads them in bondage, utilizing just their
craving for liberation.
The aiva way o f discrimination between the Self and
the not-Self might be described as an integral method.
According to this method the not-Self is not really opposed
to the Self. Nothing can be separate or independent o f Self.
Whatever is known or imagined is not different from the
Self, which cannot be limited by any o f its objective mani
festations. The witness self, the ego, the void, or the
nya* are mere manifestations o f the Self Whatever is
given in experience is, for that very reason, a manifestation
o f the Self. Though it is always and everywhere trans
cendent, the Self is at the same time immanent in every
thing. Being both immanent and transcendent, it appears
as both the manifest and the agent o f manifestation. It is
manifest in every experience as an object o f cognition. It
remains manifest as the experiencing subject. The Self is
o f the nature o f Supreme Egoity or the Supreme experi-
encer and always shines in the form o f knower, known, act
o f knowing and the transcendent (anakhya).1
According to V edinta everything which becomes an
object o f knowledge is ultimately unreal. For, that which
is experienced or known is for that very reason false.
Even the awareness that *1 am Brahman* belongs to the
intellect which is mutable and not to the Atman which is
changeless witness consciousness. Nor is the bliss o f Atman
known in liberation ; for, if the Self cognizes the bliss
in liberation, it will contradict its non-duality.2 The Self
is o f the nature o f bliss itself. A person knows that the
highest Self is identical with his own Self merely through
1. T A . I II. 125.
2. arfikara* s Com m , on Brh, up. I II. x.
304 . KASHMIR AIVISM
negation o f the notion I am the suffering Jiva*.1 Thus,

we can get the notion o f the Atman if we divest it o f all
that surrounds it, discriminate it from the not-self, from
the bodily frame with which it is encompassed, and strip it
o f all contents o f experience.2 For, the Self is always
silent. When by the practice o f discipline outlined in the
VedSnta texts all duality is negated, all that remains is
the Self alone. The Self does not tolerate any other entity
outside o f it, nor does it have any internal distinctions.
When by discarding the aggregate o f body, mind, sense
organs etc. one arrives at the knowledge that he himself
is not the aggregate and that he does not form part of the
transmigratory existence, but is the true and real Self, he
lifts himself above the vain conceit o f being one with the
body and realizes his true Self.3
The Vednta retains the Ssrtikhya method o f discrimi
nation between Self and not-Self. Before the rise o f discri
minative knowledge the real nature o f the soul, which is
pure light, is not discriminated as it were from its limiting
adjuncts consisting o f body, senses, mind, sense objects and
feeling, and appears as consisting o f the energies o f seeing,
and so on.4 When discrimination takes place, rthe Self is
taken to be the witness o f physical and mental states,
as one and the same witness or knower o f all the appea
rances.5 Hence the Self should be distinguished from the
not-Self. Throughout the analysis o f the meaning o f the M
the Vedntin adopts the criterion that the essence o f a thing
is that which persists through all the states o f the thing.6
What is comme n to body, senses, mind etc. is consciousness.
Pure consciousness, though it might appear in a multitude
o f forms, alone is the essence o f Self, I he method which
enables us to have a clear knowledge o f the Self has been
1. Udadesa Sahaarri. X V I I. 189.
2. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, I, p. 480.
3. SB. I. 19, III. 17.
4. Ib id.
5. Upadeaa Sah. X V . 12. also NS. II. 89.
6. q * **<5 f's w fw eft s: sb. ii. i. 1 1 ,
called AdhyUropavda. It is the method o f figurative supe-

rimoosition followed by subsequent negation. First begi
nning with the assertion that the body is the self, we
proceed from one not-self to the other till we arrive at the
notion o f the highest Self and describe it as that which does
not think and move, but thinks as it were, moves as it
w ere.1
The body cannot be the Self. For, even when the body
exists, there is no cognition without senses. When the soul
departs the body also gets destroyed.2 Moreover, if the
body be regarded as substratum o f consciousness, the phe
nomena o f memory cannot be explained 3 Nor can the
body be regarded as the material cause o f consciousness.
It is equally wrong to identify the Self with the senses.
There can be no personal identity or self-consciousness, if
there were as many selves as the senses. Moreover, various
qualities such as colour, sweetness, hardness etc. would
be experienced simultaneously and not successively. Further,
there are cases like dream, sleep, etc. in which consciousness
îs present even when senses are inactive. The fact is that
senses are always dependent upon the self. It is the I
which sees through the eye, hears through the ear, and so
on. That is why people say : My ear is d ea f/ my eye is
blind , I who saw the thing am now touching it . The
fact that the mere sight or smell o f some delicious food
produces a pleasant feeling in the perceiver further indicates
that the Self is different from the senses.
Nor can the self be identified with the vital airs (Prpa),
in the absence o f which body and senses do not function.
If Prna were the self it should direct the senses even in
sleep. Similarly, the self cannot be identified with the mind
which is the organ for the internal perception o f pleasure
and pain only. The knower cannot be identified with the
instruments o f knowledge. Mind cannot be the substrate
1. I Hid. II. iii. 30.
2. Pancadas, V I . 62.
3. Kusumnjal. I. 15-
of knowledge. Nor can the Self be identified with unya

which cannot be the substrate o f the cognition I*. As the
sun shines without anything to shine upon, the Self has
consciousness even when there is no object.1 The empiri
cal ego cannot constitute the real nature o f the Self. Self-
consciousness is not prior to knowledge, it is itself an object
o f knowledge.2 While the self is independent o f self-con
sciousness, self-consciousness is always dependent upon the
self.3 It would be contradictory to hold that the Self is the
subject as well as object. The self can be object to itself
only if we regard objectivity as a superimposition. The
objective element in consciousness is false, the subjective
alone is real.4 T o say that the self is self-conscious only means
that it does not depend for its revelation upon anything else.
Were the self really identical with egoity, it would have
been so manifest even in deep sleep. In this state there is
no self-consciousness ; pure consciousness alone shines here.
The presentation o f egoity just before and after deep sleep is
due to nescience which is impregnated with the impressions
o f past awareness o f bliss.6 T o say that the self and egoity
are identical is to disregard the facts o f deep sleep, swoon
and other states in which there is no self-consciousness. The
concept o f egoity involves self-contradiction. The subject
cannot be identified with the object. The subject is so
called because it is not the object. The self is pure consci
ousness; everything else except the self is false.
3. The True Nature of Self
The aivite holds that the Self in its essential nature is
identical with the highest Lord. This, according to him, is
established on the basis o f self-experience, reason and scrip
tures.6 The absolute reality is not alien to the individual
1. SB. II. iii. 18.
2. Ibid. iii. 40.
3. Ibid. II. ii. 28.
4. Rai Chaudhuri A. K ., op. c:t. pp. 53-6.
5. Ibid.
6. R* i
Bhiipkar, It. p. 280.
self. In fact, it alone is the real essence o f the indi

vidual. Fecause o f its association with the darkness o f
ignorance, the self conceives itself in manifold diversity as
subject and object, whereas in reality it is one and identical.1
As we have already seen, the aivite adopts the integral
method in order to arrive at the notion o f the highest Self.
The Vedantin, on the other hand, employs mainly the
method o f discrimination when he conceives the self as
witness consciousness. Because o f this difference in the
methodology o f the two systems, there develop two different
conceptions about the nature o f the self. According to the
aiva absolutist, the self is the all-inclusive, integral and
supreme self-consciousness. In the Vedanta, on the contrary,
the self is regarded as pure consciousness. The aivite holds
that perfection (prnatva) constitutes the essential nature o f
the self, which is o f the nature o f free consciousness. Owing
to its nature as vimarsa, the self is fully conscious o f itself.
It is the supreme Unity which is the universal subject and
object o f all congition. Tts essential nature consists in the
rapture o f supreme egoity (prna ahamt camalkHra), as
opposed to the fictitious egoism o f the finite self. It is abso
lute ego which is both immanent and transcendent. It is
the perfect equilibrium o f consciousness and freedom, inte
lligence and bliss.
The self cannot be o f the nature o f fleeting consciousness;
nor can it be o f the nature o f pure witness consciousness.
The self in its essential nature is free consciousness. The
entire practical life depends upon conjciousness which is
essentially free. The changing and the witness conscious
ness cannot be possible if the self does not possess the
power o f freedom. All flux presupposes some unchanging
background. In order that the varying cognitions may
l. qstR-fafTTJTqr^
sr^r-TT^H T-
<9 n PS Kfirik 25.

308 KASHMIR gAIVSM
take place, it has to be admitted that consciousness is

unitary and eternal. But, we also cannot deny the chang
ing aspect o f consciousness. For, even the pure witness
self cannot be established if we deny the fluctuating
consciousness. The pure witness self, which is devoid o f
freedom, is as good as the insentient. It can neither be
proved nor disproved. No knowledge would be possible
on the basis o f such self. The Vedntin and the Buddhist
both are wrong in so far as they neglect the one or the
other aspect o f the self. The aivite holds that in order
to avoid the mistakes committed by such thinkers it has to
be accepted that the self is essentially o f the nature o f
Praka Vimara. Freedom, omnipotence and self-cons
ciousness constitute the essential nature o f the Self which
is nothing but the highest Lord, Parama iva.
Through the Vednta logic, however, we arrive at a
different conclusion. The true self is not something wholly
unknown it is universal and all-pervasive. It is fully and
wholly present in all experience. The method o f persistence
and variation ( anuoftti and vy^vftti ) proves that the self
alone is real. The adjuncts o f consciousness are products
o f avidy. The self is different from the adjuncts.1 Pure
self-luminosity is the only essential characteristic o f the se lf3
Pure consciousness is the persistent factor in the various
states, such as waking, dreaming, sleep, etc., o f the self.
The principle is that whatever persists when others are
changing is different from others, just as the thread that
persists is different from the changing flowers which are
strung together by it. The essential nature o f the self is
existence-consclousness-bliss.3 Being, consciousness and
bibs indicate the very nature o f the self and thus differen
tiate it from all objects in the world.4 They do not determine
the self but merely point to it. Directly referring to the
1. Rai Chaudhuri, A. K., opp. cit. p. 42.
2. SB. I iii. 22, also Sarftkara* s Comm, on Prasns Up V I. 3.
3. rffc, sfajfTfir*'! arftkara* s Comm, on Tait. Up. II. 1.
4. Ibid.
self, each o f them independently expresses the full nature of

self.1 They also show that the self is not their opposite.
1 he self cannot be conceived as a substance possessed o f
attributes, because the substance-attribute notion signifie*
a relation and relation always implies distinction. There is
no distinction or difference in the self. The self is one and
partless. That which is composite and have parts is peri
shable. The self, on the other hand, is universal and all-
pervading. As such there cannot be a plurality o f selves.
The distinct feeling o f pleasure and pain in different selves
can be accounted for on the notion o f adjuncts o f the all-
pervading self.2
Activity or agency cannot be ascribed to self. Action
cannot be possible without modifying the agent.3 Moreover,
action which is motivated by desire is ultimately painful.4
Agency, which belongs to the realm o f relativity, presuppo
ses a limitation o f the self, body etc. Therefore, the self
by itself does not have any activity. The activity o f the soul
depends only on the qualities o f the adjuncts being ascribed
to it and not to its own nature5 Like the aivite, the
Vcdantin also contends that the entire practical experience
ultimately depends upon the self which is o f the nature
o f witness consciousness. All phenomena can be accounted
for on the theory o f pure consciousness which is the very
presupposition o f all experience.0 Everything in the world
ultimately depends upon the Self.7
4. Atman and Jiva

Here the question arises as to how can the Self, which has
been identified with the absolute or SacciJananda in both
1. Ibid.
2. Madhusudana s Co.nm . on the Gita, II. 13.
3. SB. I. i. 4.
4. I SB. II. iii. 40. w t .V ^ ' Intr
to Tait. Up.
5. TTHartcFT: * 2 ? } ^ I S13. i x t
iii 4U.
6. $atkara s Connu, on M und. Up. II. 7.
7. SB. I. i. 1.
310 k a s h m i r s a iv is m
the systems, appear as the limited self or jlva ? What

constitutes the relationship between the self or Stman
and the jlva ?
According to aiva Absolutism the highest Self appears
as the limited individual (pasu or jlva) when it becomes
defiled by the impurities o f M aya.1 Due to the free will
of the Lord, the universal vision loses its omniscience and
becomes 'anu,* i.e., it assumes the anava defilements which
consists in the non-intuition o f its real nature. It becomes
manifest as limited because o f its being cut off from
absolute consciousness, as the ether confined in
the jar becomes limited by being cut off from the
universal ether.2 Thus, it becomes the individual
who is subject to the fetters o f three defilements naray
M ly and Karma. Prior to such defilement, the Self
exists in its own absolute nature throughout the pure order
o f creation (beginning from the iva tattva to the Vidy
tattva) which consists in the rapture o f supreme egoity,3
It is the absolute Self which dwells within the gross body
as the experiencer o f pleasure and pain. The individual
is the Stman itself, who like an actor conceals its real
nature and enters the stage o f embodied existence.4 It is
the supreme Self which is present in all the different
experiences o f the self like syrup, molasses, sugar-balls etc.
which are all alike juices o f the sugarcane. In all these
states, it is the juice o f the sugarcane which is manifest in
different forms. Similarly in all the states o f existence of
the finite subject, whether it is waking etc., or subject-
object form, it is the highest Self which is present. The
1. ranfwTOr
srtt f t R : 2*TR rcnfafer i P S . K ariku 16.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Krik3 5.
s.
2 qirsrcfl I
crat'itfc u
e ft: N Ibid. Krik5 26.
T1IE NATURE OF SELF 311
self-created forms arc in reality r.on-different from the

self. Just as the moonj image moves in the moving water,
similarly the self also moves through the series o f bodies,
organs and the w orld.1 Because o f ignorance, the self
appears as diverse, whereas in reality it is always
identical.2 W hile active as subject o f all perception, the
self still remains self-identical. For, nothing is really
different from the self.3
As regards the question, how the self which is absolute
and pure consciousness can appear in a multiple form o f
experiencer and experienced, the Saivite holds that the
individual souls which undergo differentiation in joy and
sorrow do not affect the absolute self, just as the ether does
not become defiled because o f its defilement in different
jars.4 From the aggregate o f modes, which constitute his
own person, the Lord converts some into the subject o f
thought by infusing finite egoity in them by His power o f
My while making others the objects o f thought.5 Though
it appears to be very strange, the self evolves itself in the
v a riou s forms o f subject and object. In the final analysis,
sutantrya alone can be regarded as the cause o f limitation
o f self.6
We have already seen that the individuality o f the self
is a creation o f M y and is a phenomenon in the realm
o f impure creation. My obscures and limits the Experi
encer both in regard to what is experienced and the
experiencing subject. It is like the experience o f falling
asleep. When the subject falls asleep, he is overtaken by
1. Ibid. K rik i 6.
2. Ibid. Karika 25.
3. qa: h qq *qqrq s q q *qtcR $q : q q r a ^ q c i e t a m f t
aqr qqr sw w :; * 3 *:
tq iw f: fVrq fofaci a f a r .- f a q * qq, s q f q w g
I Ibid. p. 58
4. Ibid pp. 42-5
5. Ibid.
6. PS. Karika 33.
the power o f M5yS. Consequently there takes place a

limitation in the nature o f the subject and the object of
experience. Simultaneously, there also takes place a change
in the relationship between the Experiencer and its uni
versal experience. In place o f eternity or nityaiva there
arises time or kla; universality is replaced by order or
regulation (niyali); in place o f all-interestcdness, there
arises limited interest (rZga) which causes dissatisfaction;
omniscience appears as limited consciousness (vidya);
omnipotence is replaced by the finite power o f action.1
Thus, when the self becomes manifest as limited its
experience also becomes limited. The experiencer thus
put to sleep by Mya and forgetting his own divinity and
glory, and being wrapped up by the five limitations,
becomes manifest as a limited individual. The five wraps
together with M&y are called the six sheaths or cloaks
{kancukcts) covering the individual.2 In this state o f
experience the experiencer is called Purusa, the limited
individual self. Each o f these numberless Pururas becomes
an anu> a non-spatial point, because o f obscuration,
limitation, differentiation and m ultiplication by M y.3
The powers o f being, self consciousness and action o f
the self become limited in the individual subject. That
aspect o f se lfs power which is bliss o f being becomes
manifest as sattua when it appears as the light o f knowledge
and pleasure in the individual. 1 he apparent negation o f
consciousness and bliss is manifest as tamas. Although
saitva and tamas mutually exclude each other, like blue
and its negation, yet they shine also as mixed up with each
other like different colours harmoniously mixed up in a
bird o f variegated plumage. Accordingly, that which
consists o f sattva and tamas, and is o f a mixed nature, is
r s a r fi' ^ fe r \ ph. P. 58.

2. PS. Karik 34.
3. Chat erjcc, J. C ., op. cit. p p . 74-87.
called rajas. It is o f the nature o f pain, because in it

sattva and tamas are mixed together. For example, the
consciousness o f son as dear is sattva, which is pleasure;
the total absence o f ic is moha; consciousness of some other
aspect such as his body being subjected to disease is pain.
There is no state o f the limited subject which is fr*e from
both sattva and rajas.1
Because o f its free will the absolute presents itself at
the stages o f seven kinds o f experiencers and their respective
experiences 2 In accordance with their association with the
three impurities, the individuals are classified into seven
categories. Thus, because o f each o f the three impurities
separately, and three groups consisting o f two impurities
each, and one group consisting o f all three impurities,
there arise seven kinds o f subjects from iva to Sakala.
The three impurities separately give rise to three experi
encers, viz., &iva, Makes vara and Manlresvara. In grouping
o f two each, these impurities give rise to three more
subjects, viz. Vidyesa, Vijnnkala and Pralaykala. All
the three impurities combined together give rise to the
seventh experiencer called Sakala.13 O f these, first four belong
to the state o f pure creation. The Vijnnkalas belong to
the transitional state between pure and impure creation.
rIh e Sakala and Pralaykala, on the other hand, belong
to the realm o f impure creation. During the state o f
creation the self is called Sakala as it is subject to all the
three impurities. In the state o f Praiaya it is called
Pralaykala as it does not have the covering o f My.
During this state the various means o f enjoyment for the Self,
which are the effects o f My, are dissolved in order to
provide rest for the individual souls. It also leads to the
maturation o f the various Karmas and re-invigorates the
potencies o f My. Here, although the Karmas are not
1. IPV.
2. SN. I. i.
3. ft jft jr-rii<
gftrafa I IPV. III. 1'); PS. Krik* 23. PH. III.
314 KASHMIR SAIVISM
really destroyed, all the individuals exist in a state devoid

o f Karmas. The souls whose impurities have not yet
ripened wait in this state till the beginning o f another
creation. When MSya again evolves the world these
souls appear in the world as Sakala. Some o f these souls
assume the governing powers (adhikra) when their
impurity becomes ripe.1
Although the Self is not conscious o f its perfection when
it is manifest as limited, in reality it is always perfect. The
limited self is called Purusa because Purusa is essentially
nothing more than the ignorance o f being perfect in reality.
It is because o f the limitation through association with
different bodies, vital airs, buddhi etc. that Purusas are
many.2 Though apparently the sentient appears to be
multiple, its multiplicity is due to the limiting conditions
constituted by body etc. which are essentially insentient.
Hence, its multiplicity is unreal, because it involves the
logical fallacy called anyonysraya. For, the variety o f the
sentient is due to the variety o f the insentient and the diffe
rence o f the insentient is due to that o f the sentient, e.g.
this is his body , this is his object o f knowledge .3 There
fore, it is established that all the individual subjects are
really one and that subject is characterised by life. And
life consists in doing the act o f living, in the form o f knowing
and acting. For only he is said to be living who knows and
acts. Therefore, the individual subject is to be looked upon
as the Lord. Like the Lord, o f whom we know from
Paur&oic and Agamic traditions, he too possesses the powers
o f knowledge and action. Even if he be not known as such
1. Bhratiya Sarmkrit aur Sadhann, p. 31.
2. i ip v . iv 3.
3. a ta aita-
q p a ^ ^ sisrit? -
sw ram iair: l sfai

TOnt<Ft;
Ibid. lihnskari I. p. 66.
from the tradition, he has to be admitted as such on the

basis o f inference.1 The self-luminous consciousness being
the essential nature o f the subject, the light of consciousness
which is associated with another person at the empirical
level is really non different from the light o f consciousness
o f the knowing subject. The otherness is only due to the
limiting conditions. And if we analyse rationally we would
find that the limiting condition itself is non-different from
the self. Hence, all subjects are one. That One alone is
real. It is one and the same self that shines as ones own
self as well as the self o f others.3
Analysis of the Four States

Through an analysis o f the different states o f experience,
the aivite arrives at the conclusion that it is the highest Self
which reveals itself during these states. Waking, dreaming
and deep sleep, which are like creation, maintenance and
dissolution, appear in Him in the Fourth abode.3 These
three states originate from the Self, which is o f the nature o f
the Fourth and is pure Bliss, the Supreme Egoity. These
states correspond to the different stages o f manifestation.
Waking state corresponds to the condition o f impure My,
dreaming to that o f pure knowledge, dreamless to L'vara
and the Fourth to SadSsiva. All these conditions are present
in the consciousness o f the Lord in the Fourth state, in which
He is pure Bliss. Their presence in this state does not
suppress His real nature, for He reveals Himself every where
as higher and more inclusive than they, as the universal
subject o f all knowledge. If you really observe*, tells
i. smrar 'H H u m m fc-
^ *4 * l Bhuskar, I. p. 68,
tiifaqR a 3 ara:
W R 3 f a f a 3 rr a r; tfr ft m f t f t n g r a ; 3 *
1 i >h . p . 4 2.
3. F. S. Krik 34.
316 k a s h m i r s a i v is m
Hemalekha, every moment is a moment o f pure conscious-

ness or objectlessness. If this is not so, then it is non-existent
as the hares horn .1 Objectless samSdhi, deep sleep and the
consciousness o f objects, are ultimately the same from the
point o f view o f pure consciousness. So it stands that
samfldhi is present in sleep as well as in waking states But
this is not to be called the main samSdhi.2 In all the condi
tions o f the finite soul, waking, dreaming, deep sleep and
the Fourth, the Self appears determined as subject and
object. Nothing is separate from Him. For, consciousness
is present throughout these states.3
All these states might be called the different stations o f
the Lord.4 The waking is called Visva> or the Viraj form
of Brahman, because o f differentiation. The dreaming state
is called Tejasy i.e. the Tejas form o f Brahman, because o f
the greatness o f light. The deep sleep is called P/ajna or
understanding, i.e. the prajfta form o f Brahman* In it the
universe as a com plex o f subject and object is dissolved and
a great void reigns. It is a state o f pure potentiality ( sams-
khra bhutni ) out o f which emerges the vision o f the universe
having the qualities blue and pleasure* etc. It is a
compact o f knowledge like the Fourth state. 'J hough esse
ntially a state o f light, its brilliance is darkened by the
potentialities remaining from the dissolved universe. But
this is not so with the Fourth, which consists of pure consci
ousness and is the highest state. All the influences o f the
finite existence having vanished from the Self, it is now a
state o f absolute bliss and consciousness in which the three
1. Tripura Uahasya, p. 103.
2. Ib id . pp. 100-1,
3. PS. KarikI 26.
4 . As the Self, G od has four stations. In the state o f wakefulness
it is aware o f all gross and external things. In that o f dream, it
is conscious o f all subtle internal things the Ideas which are
the prototypes o f all manifested objects o f the w orld, its third
state is a massed consciousness where there is no distinction, here
it is the Lord and master o f all, and in the Fourth state, the Self
is transcendent, immeasurable. *Basu, A ., Tad Ekam: That One;
Durham Universiiy Journal, M arch, 1967, p. 60.
previous states are merged.1 In the case of the finite self,

it is the objectivity o f the transmigratory beings, in which
the subjectivity ( ahamta ) is merged, that shines, The trans
migratory state, which consists o f waking, dreaming and
deep sleep, is nothing but this state o f objectivity f idarhta )
in which the subjectivity is merged. But that state-in which
all, from nya to body etc., are converted (in to self) by
self-consciousness, which has the consciousness o f possession
o f the above described glory o f omnipotence and eternitv etc.,
as a metal is converted into gold bv the alchemic process,
is called the Fourth or Turtya. Tn this state, body etc. give
up, as if it were, their objective nature.2 The TurTva is an
aspect o f the manifestation o f the Supreme Power and is the
source o f all the three functions etc.3 The Fifth state, the
TurlytXta is the condition byond the Fourth. It is like the
ocean without ruffle?. Ttis the state in which free consciousness
or self-consciousness shines, because o f the instruction o f a
teacher or any other similar reason, in its full freedom
and there is full coscinusness o f the qualities o f omnipotence,
-omnipresence etc.4 The Fourth and the Fifth constitute the
state o f liberation and are known as samivesa in the Scri
ptures.5 They are in fact the states o f Parama iva.0
Ahamtd. shines in all these states. It is known to all
persons through self-experience both in waking and dream
ing. Though self-consciousness does not appear to shine
in the state o f deep sleep, yet there too it shines. Because,
otherwise subsequent remembrance would not be possible.
I f ahamtS itself were annulled, nothing could be known.7
In reality, the fact is that ahamta shines in deep sleep as
PS., p. 80.
2. IP V . III. ii. 12.
3. SSV. Sutra 38.
4. IPV . I II. ii. 12.
5. Ib id . III. ii. 11.
6. Ibid. II I . ii. 19-20.
7. s fe f
Sprto I SN . I. 3.
its luminosity is eternal, and also because there is nothing

to limit it. Moreover, it also shines to the other subjects
at that time.1
The manifestation o f these various states cannot be
regarded as different from the absolute Sartivid. For, if
it were so, the latter would be subject to modifications
because o f the manifestation o f the states. In fact, nothing
would be illumined. Hence it has to be admitted that He
is verily afikara who thus observes and investigates His
own nature, although talcing His stand in such states as the
waking, etc.*2 Through the manifestation o f these states,
the Absolute realises His own nature.
As regards the question whether these different states
do not really cover the essential nature o f Reality, the
aiva Absolutist holds that the Lord is not really covered
or concealed by the manifestation o f these states. Both
the forms o f universal creation etc. and the states o f
experience o f the individual subject, such as waking etc.,
shine in the Fourth, or the state o f the form o f Supreme
Egoity, which is absolute and infinite bliss. That which does
not shine on the background o f the Lord can never shine
anywhere else. Hence in all states the Lord exists in
unity, in the form o f Turya. This is the ultimate Truth.3
The three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep, have
to be given up because o f the predominance o f Priia and
subordinate position o f freedom in them. Ih ere is pleasure
1. Sfa STVTOrf q *, flfqqi ST?TSg ^

^ * i i p v . i . . i .
2. SN. I. 3.
3. f w i t o m * swfcgi, m q n r w y ia m
tpfCTi wqfer m w st
rfar dfg[^ctr: *rer: sacrar
i qq q sqroclr, sra:
F ^ R , Fd q w * \ p s . pp. 74-81.
and pain in them according as the predominance o f the

power o f freedom increases or decreases. Therefore, the
states o f Turlya, in which there is the predominance o f
freedom, and TuryStta, in which there is its continuity,
are to be coveted.1 In the states o f both waking and
dreaming, the principle o f life (PrSpa) manifests itself
primarily in inhaling and exhaling. In the state o f deep
sleep it is called samUna, the most essential feature o f which
is the rest o f PrSiia. In the state o f TurTya, it moves up
through the Susumrtl, the central nerve, and as such it is
called Udnna. Here the dissolution o f the physical world
begins. The souls from VijflSnSkala to Sadîva are in
this state. The TurlyatTta, which is the state o f Parama
iva, is characterised by the working o f Vydna. Thus, the
individual subject who is nothing more than the principle
o f life (P rn aropa)y assumes the form o f Pra, apSna,
udSna, samSna and vySna. Although in the states o f
Turlya and TurySLtta the principle o f life is present,
because o herwise there would be no rise o f it from them,
yet, because there is dissolution o f duality during these
states which are characterised by rest on unity, therefore,
there is no variety o f pleasure and pain in them. They
are nothing more than the highest Bliss which is charac
terised by perfect rest on the Self.2
Thus deep sleep consists in the rest o f self-consciousness in

nya or Prtia and is like the state o f disillusionment. It is
o f two kinds that in which objective consciousness persists
and that in which there is no objective consciousness. In
the former the self has the impurity o f M y, but in the
latter it is free from it. The absence o f objective knowledge
characterises the nya Pramt, who is nothing more than
not-being o f Buddhi etc., and who experiences subjectivity
as I, which is related only to the vague and absolutely
formless residual trace. In the nya resides the power
which sets vital air etc. in motion and is the internal
1. IP V . III. ii. 18.

2. Ibid. Ill 20.
320 KASHMIR *AIVISM
activity o f the senses. This power is called life ( jivana).

Another view of life is that it is nothing but self-conscious
ness identified with PrSna which is identical with the
Puryastakas.1
Because o f the power o f freedom there arises a state in

which the essential nature o f consciousness is obscured. Tn
this state there is no other consciousness left except that o f
nothing. Its object is the residual trace o f previous exis
tence. Thus, the &fmya is so called because it is essentially
nothing else than not-being o f all and the essential nature
o f not-being consists in existing nowhere than in the
residual trace. This is the only wav in which the objects
can be said to be non-existing in any context, for thev are
never totally destroyed. Tn this very nya subject there
is a power which is responsible for the working o f the
PrSpa, ApRna etc. and this is nothing but the inner working
o f the senses. Thus, self-consciousness, resting on finya
and associated with the senses, is life. Therefore, finva
is the transmigratory soul (J iv a ). In other words, if self-
consciousness be resting on that power which is responsible
for the working o f PrRpa etc. and is called PrSa, then
PrRpa itself is Jiva and the same is fnya. When self-cons
ciousness rests on Purvastaka it is described as Susupta. The
subject falls ashep because o f impurity, but does not have
deep sleep becaue o f Kal. When Kala gets merged in
sleep, the subject is in deep sleep (Susupta). Such state
and the act therein is Sausupta. It is o f two kinds, savedya
and apavedya. In the case o f the Sausupta o f iinya, there
is no separate object o f knowledge; hence, because o f the
absence o f the impurity o f MRyR, it is called apavedya;
without object. But in the case o f Sausupta o f PrRpa, there
being the experience o f pleasure and pain, because o f the
1. Five vital airs, group o f senses o f perception, group o f organs o f

action, and that which is responsible for the rise o f certain
knowlcdge-âre called Puryastaka. Others hold the five T a n -
matras manas, buddhi, and ahamknra to be the Puryastaka IP V .
III. II. 15-17.
MSyTya Mala, the object is present. Hence it is called

savedya. Pralaya also has to be assumed to be o f two kinds,
deep and not deep. But Pralaya is due to destruction o f
body etc. and is therefore o f longer duration than Susupta
which is due to the absence o f attention. While sleep is due
to fatigue and fainting is due to something being wrong in the
body, Sam&dhi is due to the free will o f the self. During the
state o f dreaming the objects, though only mental, are so
created that they shine as external objects. In the waking
state, the objects are common to all subjects and have stabi
lity and externality. The dreams are created by the Lord.
They are not the creation o f the individual, because he sees
the undesired. Even when the desired is seen, it is found
connected with different times and places. Wherein the
objects are perceived by external senses and have uncontra
dicted continuity,. Such a creation in relation to the limited
subject is technically called wakeful state. It lasts only so
long as there is continuity o f certainty in regard to the exis
tence of external objects. But when the continuity o f the
consciousness o f certainty is broken in the middle, then that
is dream state. In a long dream, the shorter dream that
comes within is jgar as compared to the long dream. And
similarly, what is considered to be jgar, there being a break
in the continuity o f consciousness o f its certainty at another
time, is simply a dream as compared to another j&gar1.
Although the aivite and the Vedantin both employ

similar terms for describing the four states o f experience, yet
they hold essentially different views about the nature of the
Self.2 For the Vedantin, the self is purely cognitive and not
active. It is only the empirical self which may be described
as the agent.8 An analysis o f our experience comprising the
waking and other states shows that pure consciousness alone
is the essence o f the Self. While the Self persists all alone,
the objects o f the world vary. This proves that the Self is
1. IPV I I I . ii. 13-17.

2. PS P. 76.
3. SB. II. iii. 40, 1. i. 4
322 KASHMIR AIVISM
different from the objects. The consciousness o f the external

objects constitutes the main characteristic o f the waking state.
But this ceases in the state of dream. In deep sleep even the
internal differences in consciousness are dissolved. However,
pure consciousness remains ihe persistent factor in all these
states. The pure self alone is revealed in the state of deep
sleep where the self is directly aware o f itself. In all the
three states, pure consciousness alone is the continuing factor.
Through these states, the self gradually or successively frees
itself from all that is not-self. This freedom o f the self is
revealed completely in the Fourth state wherein there is
no trace o f objectivity. The Fourth state is not merely a
state among states, it is the truth o f all other states.1
Explaining the limitation o f the self on the analogy
o f reflection o f the sun in water, or the division of space
into different particular spaces through the jars etc. (Prati-
bimbavda and Avacchedaitlda), the VedSntin asserts the
purity and unity o f consciousness. Just as the same space
is conceived to be all-pervasive and yet conventionally
divided into the space o f pot, room, and so on, similarly, the
Atman, though one and all-pervasive, is supposed through
ignorance to be limited and divided into different subjects
and objects. Accordingly, the individual soul has to be
regarded as a mere appearance o f the absolute Self. Just as
when one reflected image o f the sun trembles, another reflec
ted image does not on that account tremble also, so when
one soul is connected with actions and their results, another
soul is not on that account connected likewise.2 Ultimately,
the identity between the self and the individual soul is real,
the difference between them is only phenomenal. That is why
the difference between God and Jiva does not oppose their
ultimate identity.8 The self, apart from the limiting adjunctsf
is nothing but the absolute. Just as the space within the
jars etc. is really identical with the universal space, so the
1. Bhatrachurya, K . C ., Studies in Vedantistn, pp. 15-17.

2. SB II. iii. 20.
3. Rai Chaudhuri, opp. cit. *p. 148.
souls are essentially one with the Atman.1 As long as the

soul does not free itself from'nescience in the form o f dua
litywhich nescience may be compared to the mistake o f
him who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man and
does not rise to the real knowledge o f self, so long it
remains the finite individual soul 2 Just as the ignorant
ascribes blue colour to the colourless ether, the opposite
characteristics o f the individual soul are erroneously ascri
bed to the self.3
The soul is affected with definite attributes only so
long as nescience remains. As soon as nescience is destro
yed, the soul is one with the Self, as is taught by the
Scripture * Thou art that .4 Therefore, the Ved&ntins
admit that the difference is due to the limiting adjuncts
which are the product of name and form as presented by
nescience.6 Ultimate release is possible only if the distinc
tion is regarded as due to adjuncts only. It is nescience
which makes them appear as different, just as rope appears
as snake due to ignorance. The relation between Atrnan
and Jva is analogous to that o f the snake and coils.
Viewed as a whole, the snake is one; the element o f
difference appears if we view it with regard to its coils,
hood, erect, posture and so on .0 Like light and sun,
self and jva are spoken o f as different, though really non-diff-
ernt Scriptures do not teach their identity in a positive
sense. In fact, there is no such thing as the individual
soul absolutely different from the Atman. But Brahman is
called the individual, the ragent and enjoyer, due to the
limiting adjuncts.7 The Ekajlvaudins hold that there is only
one Jlva, while Anekajvavdins hold Jvas to be many8.
1. S . B. I. iii. 7
2. Ib id , (T h iba u t) I. p. 281.
3. Ib id . I . iii. 81
4. Ib id. I. iv. 6
5. Ibid. I, p. 281.
6. Ibid. I. iv. 6 ; I I I . ii. 25, 29; II I . ii. 27.
7. Ibid. IV. i. 3; I. i. 31
8. S. L. S. II. p. 28
CHAPTER TEN
BONDAGE AND LIBERATION
We bow to that Siva who, having manifested the

diversity o f the universe as the prima facie view, leads it up
to unity, the real view .1
1. Bondage
The absolutistic systems face great difficulty in explaining

the phenomenon o f bondage. The question as to how
does the infinite subject appear as the finite is generally
raised against absolutism. And even if bondage is
regarded as unreal, the problem remains as to how
can the unreal appear as real. Either bondage is real, or it
is unreal. In the former case, it has to be explained how the
absolute can really become limited and, above all, how can a
real bondage be destroyed. But if bondage is unreal, the
question arises : how and why does the unreal appear ? The
individual need not undergo so many hardships and sufferings
to remove the bondage which is unreal.
The problem assumes greater dimensions in those absolu

tisms where in bondage is regarded as a manifestation o f
the free will o f absolute. Two serious difficulties arise
particularly on the view that bondage is a self-willed process.
First o f all, there would be no need even to discuss or
consider the problem o f release, i f bondage is due to the divine
free will. The entire concept o f spiritual discipline could
have no significance on this view. Secondly, as a consequ-
enee of this, there would be no ground left for distinguishing
between bondage and freedom. Freedom, on this view, would
have no more value than bondage. Nor would there be any
3 it i p v . i. h . intr.
BONDAGE AND LIBERATION 325
reason either for avoiding limitation or for choosing freedom.

In anticipation o f such objections, Abhinava Gupta
himself fi**st raises the question: if the one highest Lord alone
is the Self, what then is bondage for freedom from which
attempt is to be made ? Who is there other than the Lord to
be in bondage P1 While answering such questions, he asserts
that although from the absolute point o f view there is no
bondage2, yet, when the Subject due to his all-transceuding
power o f freedom manifests himself as limited, he forgets
his own perfection and becomes bound. But even in the
state o f apparent limitation, he remains pure and perfect.
This is the reason why he is called Purusa. For, Purusa is
essentially nothing more than the ignorance o f being perfect.
Because o f the limitation owing to the association with
different bodies, vital airs etc. there appear to be raauy
Purusas, The Purusa is enjoyer o f the fruits o f the deeds
performed by him and, therefore, he is in bondage. When
the self, which is essentially absolute consciousness and
bliss, assumes the form o f Purua it becomes qualified by
three guâs, which are the limited manifestation o f his
abolute power. Enjoyment or bhoga is nothing but limited
action and bliss. Limited action i? suffering, because rajas
which is a mixture o f knowledge and ignorance characterised
by motion is pain; sattva> which is essentially the light o f
knowledge is pleasure; tamas is complete igaoiance and is
the rest between the two, like the state of'pralaya* Thus the
same self-identical powers o f knowledge and action o f the
Lord together with My are spoken o f as the three gunis o f
1. ^5 m w s rc * r r a a f n z w m m m im : ?
spuFj f f *is?aisrg ?
Ibid. IV , i. 2-3, Bha'kar II pp. 2-3 283.
qsi cif sjwcnuwKrater a n*, gr jfcq sqrw
Ibid. vol. II. p. 280, SN. I. 5.

2. IPV. IV. . 3-4.
326 KASHMIR AIVISM
the individual.2 All consciousness and freedom that is in

the universe is identical with the Lord who Himself is the
universe. Consciousness and freedom are the powers of
knowledge and action respectively. MayS is the Lords power
which is responsible for the consciousness *1 am this. These
three powers are recognised to be natural in the self. But
when there is the ignorance o f the essential nature o f the
self and cognition and action refer to objects which are
recognised to be separate and devoid o f Praka and Vimarsa,
there arise sattva, rajas and tamas, which are characterised
by pleasure^ pain and delusion, and the functions o f which
are knowledge, action and lestriction.1 While the Lord has
the power of being (rtff), self-consciusness and action (Ariyfl),
(he limited subject has both being and its negation, action
and its negation.2
Here, it might be asked that if the limited subject is
also capable o f creating and if he is the Lord Himself, why
is his individual creation not universal? In answer to this,
the aivite holds that the individual would certainly be the
absolute creator if he could know his own powers. Because
he does not know his powers, therefore, his creation is not
similar to that o f the Lord. Limitation or bondage takes
place whea owing to his power o f freedom, the self forgets
its real nature. The nature o f this limitation consists in the
loss o f freedom. Limitation pervades every subject, from
iva to Mya Praint, and is nothing but a non-manifesta
tion o f absoluteness or perfection. It is o f the nature o f
ignorance o f oneself. Ignorance is o f two kinds, viz. mis
taking the self to be the not-self, and the not-self to be the
self.** It is the product o f divine akti. He possesses the
great power, the chief function o f which is to obscure the
1. Ib id.
2. Ib id.
3. 9 $ v f e 1SIW 9 {franc ? Sctr, i m x qrsfa I
trrarecg?? fa ? r q fw ft-
w ?, w a r s i a w rfarrar sa i
*lfd*Sfa I Ibid. Bhskar II p. 296.
state o f being the Highest Lord, which is characterised by

perfect rest in His essentia] nature.1 He does not take rest
even for a moment in His own real nature. Being shorn of
glory, or being led and re-led into the moods o f pleasure and
grief by his powers, He indulges in the sport of bondage
and liberation. However, even in the state o f bondage He
is essentially free. The jva remains identical with iva even
in the state o f limitation. In the absence o f this identiy, the
manifestation of individuality could not be possible.2
But how can anybody deliberately fall in bondage ?
Or, how can one consciously forget onself ? T o such ques
tions, the Saivite reply is that it is owing to His freedom that
the Lord cannot rest in his own nature. The absoluteness of
Being cannot be confined to any particular state o f existence.
As it is His very nature to perform the fivefold functions, the
question o f how or why* does not arise in His case. By
His very nature, the Lord is always manifest in different
forms. It is not legitimate to question the nature of a thing.8
Limitation is a given fact. Accordingly, we have to start
with the recognition o f the fact o f bondage. Various systems
try to explain the phenomena o f limitation or bondage in
their own ways. In the knowledge approaches, ignorance
which is the cause of bondage has been regarded as beginn-
ingless. In certain devotional* approaches bondage lias been
regarded as the result o f the misuse by the individual o f the
1. Ibid. Tv, i. 10.
2. q 5 a?qq; faqreqr Rwrisfq qqrfq qq:, rqfa fa q qq q
t SN. I II. 13.
3. qqqiq qTqfaq: 3q}fqqrq?$*qq qqqtqq-
*reat?qqqigq$q* tqreqrqn
fama, qq spaisi ^ qftf fqqqifa; atfq ^q: q^r:
tsrfqsnriijMqjq fqqr, q qq
qqqfa;Sfa gqqqj qqqtenfqqT qHNqqqeqrqqqqq
jftst %a JKHify fqarwfa 'qrt q *qr*q|q sfa i
qxrq qq qq ^q*q, qq at arqfq wqqiq titst: fqqq;
i q q qqq p q -jq q r srqr*i p s. PP. 73.4.
328 KASHMIR SAIVSM
authority which was delegated to him *by God. In the

aiva approach, bondage is conceived as a self-limitation.
Owing to its sportive nature, the absolute voluntarily accepts
a limitation o f self-consciousness which gives rise to limited
desires. Because o f these limited desires the finite self
performs various finite actions and experiences their result
ant fruits. Accordingly, the chain o f karmas leads the
individual from bondage to bondage. Thus, the real cause of
bondage is self-forgetfulness which is a spontaneous manifes
tation o f the Divine freedom. In other words, bondage takes
place when the absolute self-consciousness becomes manifest
as finite or limited. With the limitation o f consciousness
freedom also becomes limited. The limitation which consti
tutes the essential nature o f the finite self is called impurity
or viala. It is represented to be o f three kinds in the
Agamas, viz. nava Mala, Knnamala and Mylya Mala.1
Though Mala is one, it has innumerable aktis, each of
which covers one o f the potencies o f the self. Agava Mala
represents the primal ignorance because o f which the indivi
dual imagines himself to be imperfect.a Mala is itself
called Agava and is a manifestation o f divine free will.3 Its
is due to the loss o f the essential nature o f consciousness
(bodha), and is manifest in two ways, loss o f freedom (svat-
antrya) and loss o f the power o f knowledge (jfiatftva). It
does not mean a complete loss o f freedom and knowledge,
but merely a limitation o f the Self with regard to these
powers.4 It is the mere consciousness o f supposed imperfec
tion which gives rise to individuality. Agava is *responsible
for the rise o f the impurity called Karma Mala. When the
power o f action becomes limited, the limited power is known
as Karma Mala. The chain of Karmas is beginningless.
The universal power o f action becomes manifest as the
finite power because o f the Karma M ala.6 It is different
1. IP V . i l l . ii. 4 PH. V I I .
2. PH IX
3. Ibid. V U ; IPV I I I , 1 1 .4 -1 1 ,
4. T A I . 58
5. PH IX
BONDAGE AND LIBERATION 32$
from Karma SaAskra, which is an effect left on the soul

by the performance o f various acts* It is essentially o f the
nature o f pure desire, without any reference to objects which
lead the soul to associate with the manifestations o f My.
It depends upon the innate ignorance, both for its existence
and functioning. When the power o f knowledge becomes
limited, it appears as Myya Mala. Owing to it, the
universal knowledge becomes knowledge o f particulars.1 In
reality all three impurities, being due to M y, are Myya.2
The awareness T am lean*, *1 am fat*, constitutes the Myy
Mala, as opposed to the consciousness I perform sacrifice
etc. , which is Krma Mala. The entirety of tattvas from
Kal to earth, which aie derived from My and which
produce different bodies, senses etc., constitute the M yya
Mala. The performance o f good and evil etc., which consti
tutes Karma mala, is based upon the Myya Mala. The
Myya Mala is different from My tattva. All that the
self is associated wiih, because o f both Krma Mala and
Karma Saskra, is called Myya M ala.3 The Mala is
associated with the individual soul differently in different
states. These diflerent states o f relationship are when the
Mala is active, when it is not active and yet present, when it
is not wholly present and yet there is some kind of relation
ship, when the soul transcends it and has no relationship
with it.
Ignorance is of two kinds: loss of freedom in conscious

ness and loss o f consciousness in freedom. In the l n tric
tradition they are known as paurusa ajnna and bodha ajh&na.
Ajfina is nothig but imperfect knowledge and is a manifesta
tion o f divine freedom. Y\ bile intellectual ignorance is an
affectiou o f the self caused by internal or external stimulus,
spiritual ignorance is purely the consciousness o f limitation
aud is present in the transcendental state o f the limited self.
It continues to exist throughout the four states o f M ala,
1. Ib id .
2. 1PV III. ii. 4-5
3. Pandey, K. C., op. cit. p* 311
330 KASHMIR SAIVISM
before reaching the state o f final annihilation. It is beyond

internal or external sensation.
If bondage is ultimately unreal, if it is only the non
intuition o f the rapture o f Supreme Egoity (purna ahUmtd.
camatkra akhyti), the question arises as to how can it produce
real suffering. In answer to this the aivite holds that
though bondage is purely mental, it gives rise to real suffer
ing. The soul ifalsely imagines that the world is separate
from itself, and looks for separate fruits for its works; hence it
goes through the cycle o f birth and death, in paradise and
hell etc., experiencing these fruits.1 Although there is no
snake in the rope, the illusion causes terror which may often
end in death. Certainly, the power o f delusion is very great.
It is by the power o f delusion that merit and demerit, para
dise and hell, birth and death, which really do not exist,
arise in the self. As the rope which is falsely imagined to be
the snake has the same deadly effect as the snake, so merit
etc., which are really figments o f imagination, arise in the
mind o f those who confound the body with the self under
the illusory influence o f My and undergo endless suffer
ings in the cycle o f bodily biith and death/2 It is darkness
from darkness when the not-self is imagined to be the self.
It is a mistake to imagine that the modes ol being which are
constituted by the sell are other than the self and absolutely
inanimate* But it is the worst of errors to single out front
these an inanimate object, such as the body, the breath etc.,
and to regard it as the one and the only self by forming
such conceptions as I am lean*, I am hungry , when in
truth it is only the body that is hungry, not the subject o f
such thought.*
1 PS. Kariku 25-30
2. Hi w wrreai
ufasw ff, N vrWci mqmnftitrracqfti H* 'vrfei 'qafcr

fa barreur s a t r - ibid. P . 64.
3. *ta ** mi m a rn a r kqwnmim
I ib id . K uriku 31.
BONDAGE AND LIBERATION 3 ii
The absolute being neither the doer nor the knower,

ultimately there can be no self-willed bondage according to
the Vedanta. If the cause o f bondage constitutes the essen
tial nature o f Brahman, if it is natural to him, there would
be no possibility either o f freedom or of release, Final relea
se is possible only if the bondage is due to nescience which is
destructible. If the soul is really and truly bound whether
the soul be considered as a certain condition or a state o f the
highest S elfits real bondage cannot be done away with, and
thus the scriptural doctrine o f final release becomes absurd.1
The deeper implications o f spiritual life, therefore, necessitate
the doctrine o f nescience or M y.2 Moreover, if the cause
o f suffering and the sufferer constitute one self, then also there
can be no final release. The cause of suffering and the
sufferer cannot be related to each other as cause and effect, as
they are one. If fire, which possfsses different attributes, such
as heat and light, and is capable o f change, does neither burn
nor illumine itself, since it is one only, how can the one and
unchanging brahman enter with reference to itself into the
relation o f cause o f suffeiing and sulfeier ?3
m In reply to the question as to how Brahman which is
pure consciousness can appear as its opposite, the Vedntin
holds that no contradiction is involved in holding the view that
Brahman appears as bound. In fact, it is only the Caitanja
which can be regarded as ignorant; the insentient cannot be
regarded as ignorant. The Vedntin is not interested in show
ing the origin o f ignorance. According to him, there can be
no conscious fall into ignorance or bondage. Ignorance is
ultimately false; it is inexplicable. In reality, nescience does
1. SB. III. ii. 29.
2. S piritual life is a realisation or a rediscovery of oneself and not a
new acquisition. Otherwise it would be transitory and be subject
to degrees. There is thus an element of negation or.transcendence in
all spiritual life. And yet this negation cannot be deemed to be a
real or integial feature of ultimate reality. It is a fact and not a
reality. Sankaras theory of My is the best expression of this
spiritual predicament. -Murti, T . R. V ., Foreword to The
Itilcgtal Advaitism o f Shri Aurolindo by R. S. Misra.
3. SB II. ii. IB
332 KASHMIR SAIVISM
not make any difference in the nature o f the thing itself. The
case o f the individual soul is similar to the rope-snake.
Though the individual soul is in reality one with the highest
Self, nescience makes it appear as different.1
The Jva is a complex o f subject and object. Ignorance
causes the sense o f individuality, the distinctive character o f
which is its connection with buddhi or intelligence, which end
ures as long as the state o f Samsara is not terminated by
perfect knowledge,2 Souls connetion with buddhi is poten
tial during waking and rebirth. The assumption o f such a
potential connection is necessary, otherwise the law o f causa
tion cannot be maintained.3 It is only the Jlva who under
goes the ordeals o f trials and suffering. The Self is free from
these*4 The Jva is all-pervading ( Vibhu) and not atomic (anu),
otherwise it could not experience sensation extending over
the whole body.6 The limiting adjuncts supply individuality
to the different souls. On account o f these adjuncts, the
souls are different and there is no confusion o f actions or fruits
o f actions.6 When the adjunct are produced or dissolved,
the individual soul is said to be produced or dissolved.
2. Liberation
All spiritual disciplines begin with the assumption of
bondage and aim at the realization o f ultimate release. But
serious difficulties arise in those systems wherein it is held that
bondage is nothing but self-willed limitation of the absolute.
If bondage is regarded as a manifestation o f the divine free
will, how aud why should the finite individual strive for
freedom? If bondage is a spontaneous manifestation o f divine
nature, if it is His Li/fl, how can the individual have any
urge to transcend it? In reply to such questions, the aiva
absolutist asserts that though the phenomenal existence is a
manifestation o f the Divine nature, it has to be avoided
because it is a state o f limitation or imperfection. The three
1* ibid. 1. iv. 6.
2. Ibid. II. ii. 20.
3* Ibid. 1* iii. 31
4. S b 1, iii. 19
5. Ibid II. iii. 39
6. Ibid. 1119 ii. 9 ;ll. 49
states o f waking, dreaming and deep sleep, comprising the

whole o f phenomenal life are painful and consititute the level
o f toil and suffering. During these states Proa etc. become
predominant and freedom is reduced to a subordinate
position. Turya and Turyatta, which constitute the state
o f liberation, are to be striven after as there is the predomin
ance o f freedom in them. After the realisation o f this state
which is also ones essential nature and is absolute bliss,
there is an end to ones sufferings.1
As regards the objection that if the process o f self
concealment and self-revelation forms a part o f Divine
nature, then bondage and liberation would become auto
matic and the individual would have no freedom or
initiative, the aivite holds that these functions (tirodhna
and anugraha) operate only at the level o f the absolute.
The will and thought o f the individual work only at the
lower level, or within the realm o f creation. Moreover,
the process o f bondage and liberation is not automatic in
the sense o f being mechanical. For, it is due to His free
will that He ceaselessly carries on the miraculous sport o f
limitation and freedom.2 It is owing to His free will that
He first assumes the state o f limitation through ignorance
and then resumes perfection through knowledge.3 The
Supreme iva, solely composed o f infinite consciousness
and bliss, carries on the sport, in which He conceals His
own nature by converting it into diverse subjects o f finite
thought so as to imprison it and again, o f his own free will,
realise it. It is His nature that He cannot rest alone and
constantly passes from one condition to another without
losing His self-identity.4
1. |?ir v fW 5mnr: i
n i p v . i i i . ii. is.
2. PH. I X - X I I .
3. PS. p. 73.
4.
STCRfa Wlfira; U Idid, Krik 33.

The question further arises that if everything is done by

iva, where is the scope for individual efforts or Karmas ?
On this view the distinction between good and evil, right
and wrong, would no longer exist and moral responsibility
would be meaningless. If (he Lord Himself is the Creator
in all cases, the potter would cease to be the creator o f jar
etc. As no agency or causality can be attributed to the
individual, the line o f demarcation between merit and
demerit will disappear.1 But such objections are baseless
according to the aivite. For, according to him the
ascription o f agency or causality by the individual to him
self is the root cause o f bondage or suffering. Once the
individual realises that it is not he but the absolute who is
the real agent, he ceases to be responsible for good or evil.
The individual is, however, responsible as long as there
exists the sense o f finitude or egoity in him. In so far as
there is the lack o f realisation o f ones identity with Siva,
one has to obey the laws o f morality. Though in reality
there is no bondage, the individual is in bondage as long as
there exists the feeling o f limitation in him. However, if,
one does not feel bound, there is no real problem for him.
But so long as there is egoity and identity with the body
etc. one is in the realm o f limitation and has to undergo
trials and sufferings. In fact, such suffering is essential for
any spritual awakening. The individual who enjoys the
state o f bondage and is unable to discriminate between
limitation and freedom is a deeply bound soul, a pasu. In
fact there never has been any veiling or covering anywhere
in reality, No one has ever been in bondage. Please show
me where such a bondage can be. Besides these two false
beliefs that there is such a thing as bondage and there is
such a thing as mind, there is no other bondage for any one
anywhere. 2
But if there is no real bondage or liberation, what then
does realisation mean ? In reply to this, the aivite holds
IPV . II. IV . 9,
2. Tripurrahasya, p. 120.
that the realisation o f the Self is nothing but bringing to

notice the powers o f the Self which, though known, is not
fully realised. For, its power* are obscured by ignorance,1
The power o f the Lord partly obscures the Self which is
ever self-luminous. Therefore, the Self is not realised in all
its aspects and consequently, it has no causal efficiency,
such as when it is fully realised. Hence, in order to arouse the
consciousness o f perfection o f Self, the way o f recognition
is important.2 The act o f bringing about the recognition
o f the Lord is not the act o f causal agent, nor that of one
who makes things known. It is simply the removal o f the
ignorance. The ignorance and its removal both are simply
manifestations o f the Lord and nothing more.3 Suppose
one who has no eye for the worth o f jewels goes to a treasury
full o f jewels. In spite o f seeing all o f them, he would be
unable to distinguish between one jewel and another
because o f ignorance. Similarly, the individual who is
ignorant o f the true nature o f Self cannot realise it. MSy
or ignorance which is the root cause o f world appearance,
will be dispelled only if one has realised the Self even
though he may still be conscious o f body and other objects ;
this constitutes liberation. Liberation is neither on earth
nor in the underworld, nor somewhere in heaven. It is
whatever one realises when one has transcended the
activity o f thought.4
From the highest point o f view, there is no difference
between bondage and release in absolutism. NirvSna is Sarti-
sSra, Samsara is nirvana. For, Brahman is all this. This has
l7 IPV. I; i. 2.
2. sifo:, agsirq afimmercr saaq
awaaftsfq mm ft *ft>r
p ifta w ia r qa atnaraTOrcewtq m ffoatq f f a
ajqqfmqwgsnmmfanrRftSftfasSt 'am fosn' r o r a f
T O * , ' Ibid.
3. t simrci rniaft, aifa srmstrrqtTisaq qfq 5
'ranqpiraiftq, amqiRt aiafta f t m ft : 1
asms aiaw m qj ^ ft, ajaaafa naaa qa faatarareq
*T 5 f p f a q "I Ibid. Bhskar, v ol. I. pp. 58-59
4. Tripur&rahasyt, pp. 105-12.
336 KASHMIR AIVISM
been emphatically asserted in the agamic tradition, where

there is no fundamental difference between Bhoga and
Moksay wordly enjoyment and spiritual release.1 For,
Bhoga is nothing else than limited action and bliss. It
constitutes suffering owing to its being limited and imper-
fect.2
Liberation is nothing but the revelation o f the powers

o f Self when the bond o f ignorance is burst.3 No change
is introduced in the nature o f reality by the manifestation o f
either bondage or release. When the bond o f ignorance,
i.e., the illusion that the real Self is not self and that the
body etc. are Self, is destroyed by knowledge, the Self is
revealed in its supreme native powers, as omnipresence etc.
Release is thus the attainment o f the original, innate
absolute and pure self-consciousness. It is the awareness
o f one s true nature.
Here the objection might be raised that if the individual
is really identical with the absolute, how can recognition
or non-recognition o f this fact affect the causal efficiency o f
o f the individual ? Does the recognition o f a seed as such,
or the absence therof, affect its caual efficiency to sprout ?
T o this the reply is that causal efficiency is o f two kinds
external, e. g. the sprouting o f a seed, which does not affect
the mind, and internal, such as the causal efficiency to give
delight, which does affect the mind. While the recognition
1. Kaviraj, G ., Introducion to Pratyabhjna Philosophy, in Alaha.
2. IP V . IV . i 3.
3. qq
rtss: Il PS. Krik 60

%5FrfafrT fo r , sttPt atrs&$rarpi srw *r,
s w m r * it* qcj 'q sr^rr scufVmr a sm rr i fo
wafo-afwraitf i ipv. n . n i . n. Bhns-

kar II. pp. 143-4.
or non-recognition does not have any effect in the former

case, it does afTect the internal efficiency. The former does
not pre-suppose recognition, but the latter does. Though the
individual is really identical with absolute, he does not
get happiness from this identity unless he is conscious o f it.
Only when the identity o f Jva and tman is pointed out,
as in the statement Uat ivam a s i9 does one realise ones sple
ndour. The function o f revelation is only to point out this
identity, and not to make any change in Reality.1
The knowledge o f the identity between Jva and iva,
which has been proclaimed in the Scriptures, constitutes
liberation, lack o f this knowledge constitutes bondage.2
When one realises that everything is o f the nature o f iva,
one becomes free. In other words, when it is recognised
that iva is one only, that he consists o f thirty-five catego
ries, that His nature appears in a heptad o f knowing subject,
and His character in a pentad o f powers, then He bestows
salvation. Otherwise, He leads to SarhsSra.3 Recognition
o f the authorship o f five-fold act leads to release, absence o f
it to bondage.4 Vmesvari and other goddesses are able to
bring about both, liberation and bondage, through know
ledge the one, through lack o f it the other.5 When there
is full knowledge o f the authorship o f the fivefold process
the delusion by one s own aktis ceases because the source
1. I P V . I I . I I I . 17.
2 ^ ; ph. iv.
W T r r c r v i f a : w v w 3 s r t t : ~i ib id . v r .
3i tre* ^ q^fas
3 I Ibid. v i i .
4. tnifir 8 *r WffFcTTW V t t i W v m
1 a q* it m i raej
o
a; a aai, ^ aaai fafa?a iwara awat arsiccia: i
PH. p. 63.
5. Ibid.
338 KASHMIR SAIVISM
out o f which ignorance grows vanishes and absoluteness is

realised.1
The aivite distinguishes between Moksa and Prnatva.
According to him what the other systems regard as release is
in reality merely a state o f pure being ( Kaivalya) and not the
highest state o f release. When, either through discrimination
or through some other method, the bond o f Karma is broken
and transmigration stops, the individuai soul transcends
the sphere o f Maya arid attains purity. This is only the
transitional state o f release. Final release consists in the
realisation of absolute freedom or perfection.2 The mere
dissolution o f Karma and attainment o f purity does not
constitute real freedom. The attainment o f freedom is possi
ble only when one transcends the realm o f M aya. The
state o f purity, advocated by the Samkhya, the Vedantin,
the Buddhist, the Jainas and others, is in reality a state
wherein innate ignorance still exists. Hence this state o f
liberation is only partial and incomplete. It is an illusory
release.8 There can be no possibility o f final release with
out the realisation o f absolute freedom. T he Vedntin stops
at the level o f Maya, the Buddhist at the Buddhi Tattva,
the Samkhya at the Purusa Tattva, and the followers o f
Patahjali at the Niyati Tattva.4 Thus, by the will o f the
Lord those persons having limited vision are caused to
arrogate to themselves a view o f their own in parties and
sectarian schools. So, unless the highest Sakti descends
upon them, they do not comprehend the great pervasion o f
the Atman. Maya indeed misleads them in bondage, utili
zing just their craving for liberation.5 The aivite in a way
propounds the theory o f Svadharma> own morality, and
emphasizes that each individual has his unique spiritual sta
tus. It would be illogical to impose the aim o f self-reali
sation upon those members o f the society who belong to a
1. Ibid.
2. T A . I. 119.
3. Ibid. I. iv. 21-35.
IP V . I. i. Introduction.
.
4 T A . 1. 9-70.
5. PH. I X
BONDAGE AND LIBERATION
different stage o f realisation or those who are not yet weary

o f self-assertion.1 O f the three prominent types o f men, the
lowest type is o f those who belong to the mob or the herd.
They are the Pas? ( the slaves of Nietzsche ) who are
occupied with the thought o f I and M ine 2
Just as a foul mirror presents a distorted reflection and

a clean mirror a true image, the mirror o f intelligence
when cleansed and illumined by iva s power o f grace
reveals the true nature o f the Self as possessing absolute
freedom and perfection. Those who are thus enlightened
attain release and enjoy miraculous powers. But in other
souls, their intelligence being darkened by the three
impurities, because the Lord s obscuration power lies on
them, the radiance o f the Self, though present, is imper
ceptible. Being thus bound to the embodied life, they are
called the herd (pasu).Q
True knowledge, which is the most essential character
istic o f release, consists o f equal predominance o f conscious
ness and freedom (bodha and svStantrya), Release consists
in the recognition that the Self is all this universe. Such
recognition causes the power o f knowledge and action in
the liberated souls who realise that the universe consists in
the unfolding o f their own real nature.4 When he looks
upon the objects as non-differetit from himself, the
individual himself is called the Lord (Pali). But when he
regards them as different from himself, he is the Pasu and
is defiled by miseries and impurities.5 The individual,
who has realised his identity with the universe and knows
that all that is manifest is simply his own glory is the highest
Lord even when determinate thoughts (oikaipa) arise in
him .6
1. C oo ruaras wamy, op p . cit. pp. 30-31.
2. Ibid.
3. PH IX .
4. Ibid. X .
5. IPV III ii. 2.
6. mi jP u r b : \
f i r a i w i f W T H t sro*srqr n ibid. i v . i. 12 .
340 KASHMIR AIVISM
Though the aivite and the Vedantin both admit that

liberation consists in true knowledge, they hold different
views regarding the true nature o f this knowledge. Accor
ding to the aivite, the knowledge which leads to (or cons
titutes) liberation is essentially o f the nature o f recognition
of the oneness o f the individual and the universe. The
Vedantin, however, holds that true knowledge consists in
the realisation o f the pure Self and the consciousness of
the falsity o f the world. According to him, before the
attainment o f knowledge o f the unity o f the Self, the
whole course o f life, real and unreal, secular and religious,
remains intact. But once the Pramna has brought home
the final truth o f the unity o f the Self, the entire course o f
the world based on distinctions is sublated and there is no
more opportunity for imagining the element o f purity.1
That the attainment o f Brahman is figurative is evident
from such statements as being already released he is
released/2 That is the state o f liberation which is real in
the absolute sense, immutable, eternal, all penetrating like
nkasa> exempt from all change, all-satisfying, undivided,
whose nature is to be its own light, in which neither good
nor evil, nor effect, nor past, present and future, have any
place.8
In the Vednta view, the final release cannot be charac

terised as Puroatva. For, release consists essentially in
being free from* the principle o f bondage Release cannot
be regarded as ultimate, if the cause o f bondage be present
even in the state of release. It has to be admitted that the
world o f experience, with its distinction o f souls, objects
and Isvara, disappears for him who recognizes the oneness
o f Brahman and the self.4 Just as the rope-snake dis
appears at the perception o f the rope, or as the dream world
1. SB. II. i. 14.
2. Katha. Up. V . 1.
3. 5 fa fo q i-
I se. i i. 4.
4. ilt fr f |
SB. I. ii. 6.
vanishes when one is awake, the world ceases to exist in

the state o f release. Nothing empirical remains in the
state o f release. When the illusory is negated, only the
Real remains.1 In release it is the adjuncts o f avidy
which vanish, not the Self.2
3. Divine Grace and Individual Efforts

It is generally agreed that left to himself the individual
is not capable o f attaining the vision o f the Infinite. It is
not the choice o f the individual but the choice o f the
Infinite which prevails in the understanding o f the Infinite.3
Throughout the chain o f causal relation, beginning right
from Lords sportive act to the sakala state o f the bound
soul, the individual is wholly dependent upon G od. Both
the theories, the monkey salvation and the cat' salvation,
concerning the role o f significance o f individual efforts,
emphajize in their own way the importance o f both the
individual efforts and Divine Grace. While in the former
case the monkey child saves itself by hanging on to its
mother through its own efforts, in the latter case the kitten
merely surrenders itself to the mother. Though surrender
is the ultimate goal in all spiritual traditions, the individual
also has to make some efforts.
According to the Saiva Absolutist, the absolute is
spontaneously realized by him on whom the higher grace
o f God has fallen. Here the individual efforts do not play
any part. For, the individuality and everything else being
essentially a manifestation o f My, which is the principle
o f obscuration and is, therefore, unilluminative like darkness,
cannot be a means to the knowledge o f pure luminosity
which is beyond M y.4 Divine Grace is the fifth and the
1. Ib id . I. ii. 12, 20; Saikara s Com m , on Mandukya U p. II. 7.
2. OTTMsremU trrcTO aqq I Ib id . II. i. 14.
3. Katha. U p.
4. qsjrq nwiasswcqifamereq qqit%qfrat
q q w icqiq: *Ts q q aq
a s c i s i q a t a t 'S a ra a q r.
W a V U f t V * " ! IPV. I .i .1 .
34-2 KASHMlfc SAIVISM
last act o f the Supreme Power, which leads to the attain

ment o f final release. Perfect freedom is attained only
through Grace. Grace cannot be clearly conceived because
it is different from the ordinary causal relation which is
established by invariable concommitance and logical dis
continuance in life. The essential nature o f Grace is
revealed only in liberation. Its miraculous nature is due
to the operation o f the supreme creative power, character
ised by the bringing about o f the impossible. It cannot be
attained merely by hundreds o f longings for the removal
o f the beginningless dark veil which hides the true nature
o f the S e lf1 'akara means one through whose favour
one gets the recognition o f the full play o f consciousness,
which is absolute and supreme bliss, and wherein all
troubles cease completely. It is o f the nature o f Self.2
Divine Grace, or Saktipta, leads the individual to the
path o f spiritual realisation. It is the only cause o f Self-
realisation and is independent o f human effort.3 Without
it mere individual efforts cannot lead us anywhere. In fact,
the Divine Grace is operative everywhere and at every time.
The very desire for God arising in the heart o f the indivi
dual presupposes the operation of Grace. The nature of
SaktipSta has been explained differently from different view
points. Some hold that it descends at the dawn of know
ledge; others hold that the fire o f knowledge burns all
Karmas und prepares the ground for Saktipta. The
fruits o f Karmas, either in sequence or without it, cannot
ri* \ i q^rq;
a f f w t w q r qvrm ataw \
Ibid.
2. sn . 1.1 .
3b sfaifoqraisq ifc f: i ta . v i i i . 173.
We* ITCTcqfa mqrfqqH * faa:, anr
qtT^sfq spifa ?r fasfta; hw RRqfa qreqr-
fqq^qfa^TSIlcJ, SUcqfa fWIciTfanwfcr qTqfrtfq q?qq|-
m t OT9FI3 f a q m f a , *T m S W i r II PS. P. 87.
result in the absolute destruction o f Karmas. Hence,

as the experience o f the fruits o f Karmas cannot lead to the
destruction o f Karmas, knowledge alone can destroy them.
But the problem arises as to how knowledge which destroys
the Karmas can take place. If it is held that such know
ledge arises due to Karmas, then knowledge itself becomes
the fruit o f Karmas.
Some hold Karmas^mya to be the real cause o f the descent
o f Divine Grace. It is *aid that aktipta takes place when
two or more equally powerful Karmas oppose each other
and, as a result, none o f them can be operative. It happens
when due to the gradual experience o f Karmas, many
Karmas become weak and the equally powerful and opposite
Karmas are unable te produce their fruits. As a result o f
this no Karma can be experienced. However, on this view
the difficulty aiises that if the Karmas give rise to their fruits
in sequence, there can be no conflict between various
Karmas, for being subject to sequence the Karmas cannot,
be together. Nor can it be held that the Karmas give rise to
the fruits simultaneously.
According to the dualistic followers o f the Taniras neither

knowledge nor KarmasSmya can be regarded as the cause
o f aktipSta. They hold Mala Paripftka, the maturation o f
impurities, to be the real cause o f aktipSta. There can be
no aktipSta when two opposite Karmas, e. g. religious and
irreligious, intermingle. The fact is that when Mala becomes
mature for destruction, Grace descends and Self is revealed in
its true nature. The Lord sends the Jlvas into the world for
the sake o f Mala Paripftka. The differences in the nature o f
aktipSta are dependent mainly upon the differences
in the degree to which the Mala becomes ripe.
But the theory o f Mala ParipSPa also does not providea
satisfactory answer to the problem. For, what is the cause
o f the maturation o f M ala ? Neither Karma, nor knowledge,
nor the Divine W ill, can be regarded as the cause. I f the
Divine Will is supposed to be the cause, the question arises.
344 KASHMIR SAIVISM
whether the Divine Will itself is determined by some causes

or not. There can be no particular cause for the Divine
W ill, nor can it be arbitrary. Hence Mala Paripaka can
have no understandable cause. But it cannot be without a
cause, otherwise, why does it take place now and not before
or after ? In fact, none o f the views according to which
Mala Paripka is uncaused can be acceptable.1
The notion o f Mala ParipSka, however, brings home

the fact that the Mala akti, the energy which imppls the
individual to indulge in phenomenal experiences, must be
exhausted before the realisation o f the Self takes place.
The finite individual should surrender itself before the
Infinite. Before the revelation o f ihe absolute Ego takes
place, the finite ego should be dissolved. Illustrations,
such as the ripening o f the cataract or o f the mango fruit,
are often given to point out the nature o f Mala ParipSka.
Simultaneously, with the maturation oT impurities, emerges
the feeling o f 'nothingness/ the realisation o f one s utter
poverty and G od s absoluteness. Without this feeling o f
nothingness there can be no descent o f grace, But it does
not mean that the operation o f grace is conditional. For,
free grace constitutes the very nature o f the Divine.
Even the maturation o f Mala itself takes place due to
grace.
The maturation o f Mala takes place in two ways.
Firstly, time itself is responsible for the maturation. It is
found to be the chief cause o f the exhaustion o f the energies
o f the finite soul. After passing through the various
phases, o f birth, development etc. things come in due
course to their natural end. The other method might be
described as the method o f artificial maturation. It consists
in the souls passing through the unique and intense
experience o f pain, suffering, humiliation etc. ^ During such
moments o f existence the impurities o f the soul are
quickly ripened. In ordinary life also it is seen that
1. Kaviraj, G .# BhZratxya Sahtkrti aur Sadhana, p p . 222*35.

suffering destroys all finite weaknesses and reveals the

stronger and finer elements in man more quickly than is
normally possible. Suffering is the quickest and surest
means o f enlightenment. The path o f misery and suffering,
o f obstacles and hurdles, is the shortest and surest path to
self-realisation. This artificial maturation, or shock
therapy/ has b :cn specifically employed in the Tantric
tradition. It constitutes the distinctive feature o f certain
aiva and akta disciplines. It is supposed that through
powerful shocks the knots or bonds o f finitude are dissolved
immediately. T o bring about an early maturation, some
times the best thing is to indulge in highly immoral and
unsocial acts and becom e an object o f extreme humiliation,
abuse and ridicule in the eyes o f society. As a result o f
this, within a very short time the Mala will be washed
away completely. Through this artificial method the
process o f maturation, which could have taken ages, may
often be campleted within a few moments. In effect, it
only means the complete surrender o f the ego. When the
finite soul surrenders itself it is not just left hanging in the air.
As soon as the surrender takes place, the infinite takes care
o f the finite.
Abhinava Gupta arrives at the conclusion that Grace is
absolutely undetermined and unconditioned. I f it were
dependent upon some conditions, it would not be absolute
and independent grace. It is the uncaused cause o f the
release o f the soul. What appears at first as the condition
o f grace is in reality the consequence o f it. The postulation
o f conditions or qualifications would be against the doctrine
o f free will o f the absolute which carries on the sport o f self
bondage and release.1 While the three cosmic functions,
creation etc., are governed by the law o f Karma, self
concealment and self-revelation (nigraha and anugraha)
depend entirely upon the free will o f the Lord. The
learned men o f all times always hold that the descent o f
grace does not have any cause or condition. Divine
1. MSlin Vijaya Vdrtiki, Slokaa, 611-90: PS. K*rikd 31.
546 KASHMIR AIVISM
Grace has been classified into various types as slow, fast,

faster (Manda, Ttvra, Tlvratara) etc., depending upon the
nature o f its intensity.1 Throughout all these forms, it is
the Lord who illumines His own nature. In reality, there
is no other cause o f these manifestati jns except His freedom,
which alone gives rise to bhoga or moksa.2
The VedSnta Absolute is unrelated to the world o f

becoming. The five functions do not really belong to
Brahman. Accordingly, Brahman is neither the cause o f
bondage nor o f freedom in the absolute sense. Ultimately,
it is avidy which is the cause o f bondage and also o f
release. As the false appearance o f the snake leads to the
discovery o f the rope, likewise the world itself becomes a
means to release. This manifestation o f the world by
vara may be regarded a free act o f grace. In the realm
o f Avidy, the Jtva is blinded and is unable to realise his
true nature. The release o f the individual can only take
place through knowledge, proceeding from the grace o f
Brahman.3 The knowledge which helps the individual in
becoming free from the bonds o f My and in rejecting ail
appearances as illusory can arise only through the spiritual
discipline prescribed in the Vednta. All that is spiritually
valuable in the world is a manifestation o f the power o f
svara. In all such cases o f power and glory, svara appears
in forms suitable for worship.4 Brahman can be known
only through the traditionally handed down teachings o f
the Scriptures and not through reasoning, eloquence, deep
learning, ascetic practice or sacrifice.5 Without association
with a teacher, there can be no iravana o f the Holy texts.0
For, mind by itself is not an instrument for the knowledge o f
the Self, nor even for the removal o f Avidy.7
1. T A ., v ili. 163,
2. q- Ri Rrqi ? fa
i p s . P. 71 .
3. SB. III. iii. 41, N S . II. 57.
4. Ib id . I. 1. 11.
5. Samkara* s C om m , on Kena U p . I 3.
6. NS. II. 7.
7. N S . II. 11, 15, 16.
If final release depends upon Divine Grace, what is the

use o f individual efforts ? If the individual is really identical
with the absolute, there is no need of making efforts ; and
if he is different from the absolute, no amount o f efforts can
bring about the identity. According to the aivite, however,
these difficulties do not arise in the aiva Absolutism.
Bondage and release are significant only for one who is
conscious o f the limitations o f finite existence.. If the
individual realises that he is identical with the absolute, the
problem does not exist for him. With regard to the difficulty
as to how can the unconditioned and absolute grace be
reconciled with the efforts on the part o f the individual, the
Saivite holds that the descent o f grace presupposes the
capacity for its reception in the recipient souls. The
Tantras, attempting to reconcile grace with individual
efforts, hold that so long as the individual lives in the
attitude o f finite egoity, he is entirely responsible for his
acts. However, as soon as he gives up the feeling o f being
finite agent ( aham kartftva bhva ) , he ceases to be responsi
ble for his acts, If the individual does not put up best
efforts due to either laziness or ignorance, nobody can
help him. But if it is a case o f real helplessness or complete
surrender, then blindfolded he will be led to his ultimate
destiny by the Divine grace.
Here, the question arises that if Divine Grace has no regard
lor the merit and demerit o f the recipients, does it not
amount to an act o f partiality on the part o f God ? How is it
that He favours some individuals by bestowing His grace and
disfavours others by keeping them away from it ? In short,
why does he choose some and reject others ? Such questions
are however based upon two presuppositions : firstly, it has
to be presumed that the Divine Grace is undetermined, other
wise, it would imply that the Lord is not free. Secondly,
grace cannot descend without any reason or rhyme for, other
wise, it would become arbitrary. In short, the diffi;ulty
arises because o f two mutually conflicting beliefs grace
appears to be unconditioned and, at the same time, it seems
KASHMIR Sa VISM
that it must have some cause. But it is wrong to suppose

that Divine Grace should have a cause or a condition.
On the contrary, the fact is that Grace is operative all.the
time on all the individuals. The differences in the descent
of Grace are really the differences in the receptivity o f the
individuals. The cloud rains equally on different fields,
but the productivity o f the fields depends upon their fer
tility. Moreover, this problem does not have much
significance in the absolutislic systems. It is the absolute
who himself appears first as bound, and then as liberated,
owing to His free will. He cannot be blamed for partiality
because it is He who favours or rejects Himself.
4. Means of attaining release
Both the aivite and the VedSntin emphasize the im por

tance o f spiritual initiation or dlks for attaining release.
Spiritual knowledge can be achieved by the individual
only when he is initiated by a Guru. Dlks is an act where
by the spiritual knowledge is imparted and the bondage of
innate ignorance is removed. It is a revelation by the
Guru o f the highest Reality. It is a process o f grace or a
manifestation o f the connection betwten Jiva and Is vara,
finite and Infinite, a divinization o f the individual. The
descent o f grace is for the sake o f initiation, and initiation
is for the sake o f gaining release. The intellectual know
ledge which arises on hearing the Scriptures destroys the
intellectual ignorance and starts the process o f liberation in
life. But one who does not have initiation cannot attain
intellectual knowledge, for he does not have the right
(adiikra) to study the stras. Hence in order to have the
true knowledge o f the Self, initiation is essential.1 By
himself, the individual is unable to destroy the innate
ignorance. No amount o f meritorious deeds can lead to
the dissolution o f paurua ajntia. It can be removed only
through dk:S, which is the process o f joining the finite
with ihe Infinte. Just as the origin of the pauru$a
\. Kaviraj, G .. Bharatiya Samskrti aur Sadhana p. ISO.
ajft&na is independent o f the individual, likewise its dis

solution also does not depend upon the efforts o f the
individual.
Although the authorship o f the fivefold functions is
ever latent in every individual, nevertheless, it does not
shine forth without the instruction o f a good teacher. Hence
one ought to approach a teacher respectfully so that it may
becom e manifest. Again, one who has no knowledge
without the teaching o f a wise guru, is deluded due to the
concealment o f his own nature through his own aktis.1 In
reality, guru is not wholly different from the individual.
The guru represents the higher consciousness o f the disciple.
Accordingly, it is ones own consciousness which reveals
the truth.2 Thus dks also is nothing but the self-revealing
consciousness o f the individual himself. It is his own higher
self which appears as a guru. 1 hat is why the guru is called
faith. He is o f the nature of Isvara. For, none else has
the capacity to lift the individual from the fetters o f My.
Like lvara, guru has both knowledge and ignorance. That
is how he can impart knowledge to the ignorant disciple.
Though he has knowledge, yet he is also aware o f the ignor
ance on the part of the pupil. Guru only lights the lamp
o f knowledge by making the disciple recognize his own
nature. Fire burns the wood only because the latter already
contains fire potentially. While other qualities might be
imparted from outside, perfection cannot be a gift. It is
only a manifestation of the unmanifest. If we start
with the assumption o f separation between jlvatva
and Isoaratva)we cannot arrive at their identity. The Jlva
can never become Isvara if the two are really different.
The lvara also, similarly, cannot descend to the level o f
Jlva. If, however, we begin with the assumption o f their
identity, the Jiva can become one with Isvara. He has
1. ^ n fa sifftw f'T fw t
^ Hsrsut ,, TA j 80
PH. X I.
2. T A . IV . 101.
KASHMIR Sa IVISM
merely to recognise the identity. Hvara himself is the Guru

and whatever the Guru has is already possessed by the
disciple, who does not recognize this fact. By making him
recognise his true nature, the Guru awakens Isvaratva in
the Jlva like the., lamp which illumines other lamps.
Thus the Paurua Ajfina is removed through proper
initiation alone. The innate ignorance is twofold firstly
the powers o f the Self are hidden and secondly, the individual
is also ignorant o f the possession o f these powers.1 For attain
ing final release both these forms o f ignorance should be
removed. T he first is removed through DlksS. and the
second through the study o f the stras. Paurusa Jnna,
which takes place only through Dikâ, is that perfect know
ledge which arises when innate ignorance is completely
destroyed. It is beyond speech and thought and can only
be realised through direct experience.2 However, mere
initiation without the help o f intellectual knowledge cannot
bring about final release. Hence, intellectual knowledge
( bodhajnna ) might be regarded as more important than
spiritual knowledge attained through Diksft.3 Through it
the individual realises unity or identity with the universe
and transcends all differences.4 Because o f the proximity
o f external objects, which are real according to the Saivite,
there arises a corresponding difference in the bodha jnna.
Though there is difference in the bodha jil&na due to the
proximity o f different objects, the ground or support o f this
knowledge, the tinan, always shines as pure unity. This
pure eternal and unmodified knowledge is called paurusa
jina.6
The integral method

The aiva Absolutist makes a vigorous attempt at synthe
sizing knowledge and action. While the Vedntin appears
1. Pandey. op. cit. p. 311.
2. T A . 1. 78-9
3. Ib id . 1. 83.
4. Ibid. 81-2.
5. Kaviraj, G. Bharatiya Sathshrti aur Sadhana, p. 40.
to be more interested in relegating duty, devotion and

worship to a lower realm or inferior status, the aivite aims
at giving them equal importance with knowledge. The path
which he propounds is neither the dry path o f knowledge
nor the path o f blind devotion devoid o f knowledge. He
works out a complete harmony o f knowledge and devotion.
Liberation is the state o f attainment o f consciousness-bliss,
or the rapture o f supreme egoity. The element o f consci
ousness in it represents knowledge and the bliss stands for
devotion Accordingly, it is the state of perfect Smarasya
o f consciousness and freedom. It is the supreme Self-consci
ousness which is the basis o f all devotion. But according to
the Vedntin, devotion always involves dualism and hence
belongs to the realm o f AvidyS. Action, far from getting
rid o f nescience, presupposes it.1 The Scriptures do not
prescribe action for obtaining the bliss o f the Self. Ultima
tely, it is erroneous knowledge which is associated with
action.2
While the Vedantin and others aim at the realisation o f
Kaivalya alone, the aivite believes that it is not the highest
state o f release. T o attain the Perfect Self, we have to adopt
the integral method o f affirming the Self in everything.
Only through an assimilation o f the object ( idam ) in the
subject (aham) perfection can be attained. What we attain
through the method o f discrimination is not the highest but
the pure Self. The highest release consists in the realisation
o f the identity o f the subject and object, Brahman and MyS,
Siva and akti. The initiate should constantly strive to assi
milate the Self. After its initial rejection, the not-self should
be affirmed in the Self in the final state. First, employing
the negative method, one should discern between what is
mine* and what is I . The Self is something different from
all that can be considered as mine*. This something diffe
rent is the essence o f Self. One should meditate over this
in a lonely corner and turn away from all that appears as
mine*.8 One should think seriously about his body: It is
1. N S. I~28~
2. Ibid I. 60.
3. Tripurrah9ya# p. 47.
352 KASHMIR AIVISM
covered by flesh, full o f blood, joined by muscles and pla-

stered^by skin. It is all pervaded by cough, phlegm, etc. and
the inside is full o f dirt and urine*. How strange that a man
full o f dirt thinks himself to be beautiful, one that is made
out o f blood and semen and brought out through the passage
o f dirt*. What difference is there between a worm loving his
dirt and one loving such a body ? This is also the case with
other objects o r enjoyment. Just think closely what happens
to sweets and tasty food one takes so much and eats with so
much relish. There is only one result dirt*.1
After the employment o f such negative method, the
whole activity in the world appears as tasteless as reminders
o f sugarcane from which juice has been extracted. But
this is only the first step. In order to realise the ultimate
unity one should try to see non-difference in the difference
o f manifestations and see them as one with the Self.
Practical life is not a positive obstruction on the way to
union with the Highest Lord.2 When the six cloaks which
cover the absoluteness o f soul are stripped from it, there
arises the identity o f the individual with the universe.
The consciousness arises in him that *1 am composed o f
thought and bliss o f Supreme Unity, mine is this universe,
which is merely the evolution o f my powers. 3
Depending upon the degree in which the Divine Grace

has fallen upon him, the initiate adopts a particular means
for self-realisation. Four successive means o f attaining
release have been prescribed in aivism. They are called
Anavopara, faktopllya, SHmbhavopHya and Anuplya* All o f
these tipyas do not directly lead to self-rellisation. The
1. Ibid, Jnnnakanda. Chap. I X .
t 5 sjnrrlsflr % sfaqifaci^ n
IPV. II. iii. 13.
3. qr*nqfa5ip favi i
P S K . 18.
4 . TA. I. 258.
preceding one among them leads to the succeeding one and,

accordingly, only the last, viz. AnupSya, can be regarded
as the direct means o f release.1
Those who live mostly in a dual consciousness have to
follow naoopya, or the lowest path. Such individuals are
dominated by the thought o f the objects. The path which
they follow is essentially the path o f action, which is also
called KriyopHya. External forms o f worship such as the
worship o f the images, the recitation o f the Mantras etc.
are predominant in this path. The ktopya is also called
jnllnopnyo, because knowledge plays an important role in
this path. Here the main attempt o f the initiate is to realise
the Self through knowledge. Meditation and contempla
tion over the identity o f the individual and the universe lead
to self-realisation. Through purification o f the determinate
ideas ( vihalpas ), pure knowledge is aroused in the soul.2
T he mbhauopya, which is also called Icchopdyay is the
path in which self-realisation is attained through the mere
exercise o f will. Here there is a predominance o f will over
all other aspects o f experience. Observance o f external
discipline, meditation or contemplation etc. are not regarded
as important in this path. It might be compared to the
state o f experience which immediately precedes the emer
gence o f deep sleep.3
Anupya is the path wherein very little effort is made.
It might be compared to the state o f consciousness preceding
the immersion into the Fourth state. Being the highest
state o f mbhavopaya, it has also been often referred to as
ambhavopSya. As the experience o f Bliss is predominant
in it, it is also called as nandopya.
As constituting the recognition o f the true nature o f the
Self, it is also called Pratyabhijnopliya.4 Pratyabhijfia
enables the individual in attaining self-realisation without
1. Ibid. 203, 255-6.
2. PH. pp. 75-78.
3. T A . I. 235.
4. T A . II. 39-40.
354 KASHMIR gAIVISM
being initiated.1 In a way it represents an unique synthesis

o f all the Upftyas. It is also called Ananyopya and tmopya.
PratyabhijftS, or recognition o f the Lord, means
shining as facing oneself o f what was forgotten. It is not
that the consciousness o f the Self has never been a fact o f
experience; because the Self always shines. The fact is
that the Self appears as limited through its own power.
Recognition consists in the unification o f what appeared
once with what appears now as in the judgment, it is the
same Caitra .2 As regards the question, whether there is
any mark appropriate to iva state by which the Self even
in the state o f worldly existence may be recognised as
iva Himself appearing in that condition, it is pointed out
that the authorship o f the fivefold functions is manifest
even in that state.3
However, obstinate insistence on a particular means is
not right. For, the ultimate goal to be realised is nothing
but ones own consciousness and all means ultimately lead
to this goal. One should enter into that path which is most
suitable to him 4 Although there are many means, such
as the disappearance o f Vikalpa, contraction or unfolding
o f akti, cutting o f both the Bhas, and so on, no strict
adherence to any one o f them can be advocated. Though
not taught in the doctrine o f PratyabhijftS, many o f these
means are communicated because they belong to the
sacred tradition. It is the aivites opinion that if many
means are enlisted, they might suit persons o f different
tastes and temperaments.6
Ib id . V III . 107.
2. sraifafrr i p v . i.
i. 1, Bhskar vol. I. pp, 34-4.
3. sigsrsRfawrani ct ft fa q flwaifaaR afVrarpnrfw fa*
qq OTrafwer:?-- fcgstor i sfo-eqT
i ph . p p . 61-63.
4. Paryanta Pancsika, 50.
5. ^23^ sreftrrg rwfa i ph. is.
The Saive Absolutist propounds the new path when he

advocates A nupya or Pratyabhijfiopya as the highest
means o f self-realisation. The chief characteristic o f this new
path consists in the fact that in it the very thing which
deludes or binds the ignorant is employed as a means for
self-realisation.1 Jagadnanda, the bliss o f the world, itself
is considered as the highest form o f bliss. To the liberated
soul, the entire world appears to be iva Himself. The
initiate should enjoy everything that is enjoyable. One
should be busying onseif with the phase o f unfolding o f joy .
Under this are included tasting and the other enjoyments o f
the beautiful sensuous objects. Out o f the blossoming
o f bliss which savours o f the pleasure caused by
eating and drinking will bring forth a state o f
fulfilment and great bliss. Thus, everything else
also is to be sanctioned as far as it fills one s own self
with bliss.2 A Yogin who has reached union with that
incomparable bliss which consists in the enjoyment o f music
and other sense objects, possesses identity in essence with
the Supreme Bliss. He who realises fully that Ail these riches
are mine possesses absolutenss [Mfie i varya), even when the
determinate thoughts arise in him, for then he is essentially
identical with all. The different devotee may however, adopt
different attitudes towards the Divine akti in order to
please H er.8
The Upyas are also called Samvesa, which means
merging o f the individual self in the Absolute Self. It
1. ^ o r c i a i v
a q* scufaTRf nar-ffa
*Tnf sf BhSsk.ri, I. p p . 40-1
2. PH. pp. 90-4.
3. Individuals with Rajas, Tamas and Sattva characteristics w ill
require different disciplines. These three types are known in
the TSntric vocabulary as Vira, Pasu and Divya. The devotee
may assume various attitudes towards Sakti in order to propitiate
her : The attitude of a handmaid, a hero, or a child. Zimm er,
op . cit. p. 588.
3S6 KASHMIR AIVISM
represents a complete reversal o f the process o f manifestation.

avopSya stands for the manifestation o f K riy i akti,
aktopSya for Jlna akti, im b h a v o p iy a for I ech i akti
and Anupaya for nanda akti. These levels o f immersion
also correspond to the four states o f experience, such as
waking, dreaming, etc.1
The sthitis, i. e., the inward cessation o f all Darianas,
i. e., the experience o f blue*, pleasure , etc.* become a
means o f the manifestation o f the essential nature o f iva
who is Consciousness and Bliss. Even so, whenever the
external form comes to rest in its essential nature (subject),
there comes to be a cessation o f the external thing, i.e. resting
in a condition o f inner peace. When re-absorbing the object,
Consciousness flashes in her own nature. She makes her
devotees one with herself when they resort to the re-aborp-
tion o f the objects more and more.3 The fact is that Consci
ousness being ever present, self-evident and already attained,
none can attain or And it. Like something which is not
visible due to darkness, and becomes visible when light is
brought, the Self becomes manifest at the dawn o f knowledge.
All that we have to do is to feel ourselves into that state
which is ever present. It is something which is in between
the state before we saw darkness and the state o f our strain
ing our mental faculties.8
5. The Liberated Soul
The possibility o f gradual release (Krama Mukti) has
been accepted in the aiva Absolutism. When grace desce
nds, Prakia or kivatva becomes equally manifest in all the
realising souls. However, there still remains difference
betw<n these souls as regards the achievement o f Svita
nti ya. i he aegiee of achievement o f Svitantrya depends
upon the extent to which the objects are assimilated in the
~1. 1PV. III. II. 11-12.
2. ^ g rfw pim?* w rw rrm ir*

H pu, vili.
3. TripurSrahaeya, p. 52.
Self. Final release consists in the attainment o f Perfect

freedom, wherein the entire objectivity is assimilated in the
subject. The process o f this assimilation is just the reverse
o f the process o f manifestation o f objectivity. Accordingly,
the progress towards the attainment o f release is characte
rised with more and more inwardization and universaliza
tion o f the rvision* and a corresponding realisation o f Sv-
tantrya. Finally, when the objective is completely absorbed,
the bipolarity o f the subject and object ceases to be mani
fest and the soul attains the state o f SSmarasya. This consti
tutes the realisation o f supreme Self (Pfirna aham), Resting
o f all objective consciousness within oneself is what is meant
by *1* feeling. This resting is called sovereignty o f will,
primary doership and lordship because o f the cancellation
o f all relational consciousness and o f dependence on anything
outside oneself. This CT feeling is the source o f all power,
for all Mantras arise from and come to rest in it, and by its
power all activities are performed.1 The objects o f know
ledge and the knowing process are not different from the
knowing consciousness to such a realised soul. It transc
ends the triad o f knower. kncwn and knowing. It no longer
lives like a Pasu, because Pasutva is nothing in itself except
the mistaking o f the subject and the object. T o the realised
soul, everything previously known as external appears as
internal. He who knows the Self fears nothing, for the
whole universe is his native form. Nor does he grieve, for
in the Supreme variety there is no perishing.2
Beside gradual release, aivite also accepts the possibility

o f immediate release. In the case o f immediate release, God
1. q fa ^ frwTOnriT cis&qq ^
I P H . p p . 97-98
2. HcRU
f f a w ffa s q * I
qifam qtfai n ps. Krika 58

58 KASHMIR gAIVISM
Himself is the direct prompter. In such cases, the individual

immediately attains the highest state o f release without pass
ing through any process or stage. However, such a reali
sation is not very com m on.
When through the reflection, contemplation and other
methods ignorance is destroyed, the individual attains the
Self in his life-time ( jivanmukta). He who has burst the
bond o f ignorance, whose doubts have passed away, who has
overcome delusion, for whom merit and demerit and guilt
have alike vanished, is redeemed, though he may be still
united with the body.1 The Yogin thus redeemed still
lives on in the flesh for the benefit o f the fellow creatures
until his final redumption on death. Thus, the conscious
ness, lastingly purified by the instruction o f the good teacher,
reveals itself in the form o f Lord iva when it is released
from the surrounding medium o f the body and is ever free
from all conditions.*
Liberation as Purnatva
According to the aivite, in Kevala Mukti, the state of
release as admitted in the S&rtikhya, Vednta etc., there
is only the removal o f ignorance. Although the super-
imposition o f the not-self upon the Self is removed through
discriminatory knowledge, it does not constitute the state
o f absolute release. For, there is no realisation o f the
1. fnwiTW HTf*-
qTrawrfa:
ralrrwrcroi
faflsqiscqg R35: il ibid. 61,
U PH. X V I .
sTiqjr^f Rfo:; ibia P. so,
2.
foraforfa aTr: i
fa w * U PS.KIrik* 88.
perfect and supreme Self in this state. Even when the

innate ignorance is removed, there are further stages
through which the souls have to pass before attaining
Prnatva. Firstly, the unmanifest has to become manifest
through initiation by the Guru. But Guru only reveals the
highest nature o f the Self. The lower self still remains
discarded. Final realisation is possible only when the
com plete nature o f the Self is realised. Though there
might be release after death, there can be no release in
life unless the universal Self is grasped through intellect.
When through various disciplines, Buddhi becomes purified,
the realisation of the Self becomes possible in the intellect
itself. Hitherto the intellect has been concealing the nature
o f the Self, but now it assumes transparency and reflects
the pure Self. Yet, even in this state o f release, there is no
manifestation o f the capacity to perform the five functions,
as there is still an absence o f Sudlantrya. Hence final release
would take place only when absolute freedom or Prnatva
becomes manifest in the soul. This alone would consti-
tute complete and final release.
The chief characteristic o f release, according to the
aivite consists in the manifestation o f absolute perfection
or freedom. The attainment o f Prnatva consists in the
realisation o f non-difference in sensuous enjoyment and
spiritual release ( Bhoga and Mokia ). Release in life is
nothing but equanimity between Bhoga and M okla. When
the experiencer and the experienced become one, their
unity might be referred to both as Bhoga and M okia.1
Indeed, the equanimity in the experience o f Bhoga and
Moka alone constitutes Jlvanmukti. According to M ahei-
varSnanda this might be regarded as the chief characteristic
o f aiva Absolutism.2 The achievement o f Pratva
varies with the degree in which self-consciousness becomes
manifest. In other words, the realisation o f Purriatva
1. crest: *ta>r: wrcraronftrifaim* m i

T tr^ BT T TGT 9^*1 11 Prabodha pancadasika.
2. Mahrthamafiinri, p. 171.
360 KASHMIR SAIVISM
depends upon how much consciousness has become all-

inclusive. It is also related to the dissolution o f the knots
o f finite egoity. That is why, all individuals do not attain
freedom equally, though all are recipients o f Divine Grace.
/11 released souls equally achieve omniscience, but all do
not attain omnipotence equally and fully. Even lvara
does not have complete Purrntva, which can be attained
only in the state o f Parama iva.
Realization of Puma aham
In the state o f release, the Yogin realises his identity
with the whole universe and attains Perfect and Supreme
Egoity. The individual who has the cognition o f identity
and regards the universe to be a sport and is always united
with it, is undoubtedly liberated in life.1 To him the
entire objective world appears merely as a reflection in the
Self. Though the world appears different, it is really non-
different like the reflection o f the city in a mirror. The
released soul looks upon the universe as his own self. T o
him the entire universe appears as Bliss and identical with
Vimarsa. When Spirit and Bliss are attained, release
in life means lasting acquisition o f the condition in which
cit* is our only self-let the body and other physical objects
still be noticeable.2 The released soul realises that the
universe consists in the unfolding o f his own nature, so say
the sacred tradition concerning them. But those who are
unable to realise their identity with the objects remain
bound.3 The knowledge referred to in the Upanisadic
passage. 'The Self should be known consists in the recogni
tion o f the Self as essentially identical with &iva. It does
not consist in the knowledge, as the VedSntin mistakenly
holds. This whole is Purusa ( Witness Consciousness ) *.
When the consciousness that Even this determinate cognition
is nothing but my glory, known as the power of freedom*
grows firm, the individual becomes liberated in his very
1. SN. II. 5.
2. PH. X V I .
3. PH . p. 53.
4. t z l ftfttTCTOT \ SN. II. 6-7.
life, even though his Vikalpas might not have been destro
yed. 'That is surely a state o f freedom from doubt, in
which even doubt is not doubted. 1 The Yogin realises
that all activity o f the mind evolves from the Supreme Power
and that the universe is really absolute being identical with
the Absolute. This true conception figures in his conscious
ness by the activity o f the mind. He sees that the Universe
revealed to him in modes o f imagination as an operation o f
the mind is real and identical with the light, for conscious
is present in it through and through.2 As the potters wheel
continues to revolve for a short time after his hand has been
withdrawn, so the Yogin for a while continues to live on
in the flesh in a state o f absolute bliss, because he is consci
ous o f being the subject o f universal thought in all condi
tions.8
The difference between the bound and released souls is
that while the bound understands and experiences the
objects as different from himself, the released looks upon
them as one with himself. The Y ogin regards himself to be
identical with the Absolute Ego, which is the prompter o f
all subjects from Sadiva to a worm. Accordingly he thinks,
All that can be an object o f cognition in the universe is also
mine, similarly, what is my object o f cognition, the same
is the object o f cagnition o f all beings in the universe. That
object is a part o f myself and so are others also.* Thus all
figure in his consciousness as ultimately merged in the pure
unity o f the Self.4 It is like the embrace o f the dearest be
loved for the first time, wherein one has no consciousness o f
the outer or inner, nor is one conscious o f sleep. It is sheer
awareness, pure consciousness and objectlessness. Similarly
one also experiences a similar state when one expectedly
gets what he was longing for, but what he thought
unattainable. One falls into trance in such moments,'5
1. IP V . IV . i. 12.
2. PS. Krik 77. ?
3. PH . X V I PS. p . 157.
PS. p. 157.
4. IP V . I V . i, 13.
5. Tripurrahasya, p. 102.
362 KASHMIR SAIVISM
Fully knowing the Self and its powers o f knowledge

and action, and realising the powers to be non-different
from the Self, the released soul knows and does all that
it desires.1 He who knows the Self cares nothing, for the
universe is his native form. Nor does he grieve, for in the
Supreme Self there is certainly no perishing.2 When the
state o f Lordship is attained with the rise o f consciousness
*1 am all , what misfortune can betide, and to whom ?
The Yogin knows that the objects are essentially one
with him and so cannot really change, therefore, he can
have nothing to fear from them.3
The activities o f a yogin, between the moment o f
enlightenment till the time o f his physical death, are
like those o f a priest, as he accepts no fruits thenceforth
for himself, they do not bear his name. Being inspired
by the thought that he is one with absolute consciousness,
the Yogin renounces all determinations. He renders himself
one with the transcendental Self in which determinations
vanish.4 He finds his redemption in being one with the
Supreme Self, because he thereby becomes the self o f all
beings and they become his self.5
He who knows the Self is not affected by merit and
guilt but remains pure and perfect. Whatever good or bad
work is done by him, bears no fruit for him. For, he
performs it without any idea o f being personally conce
rned with it as a subject or beneficiary. He' does it with
the consciousness o f being merely an instrument o f the
Divine W ill.6 The works o f merit and demerit accumula
ted during the time o f ignorance, vanish through the
powers o f the flame o f understanding. The Yogin s know
ledge that he is the Absolute immediately destroys all
T. IP V . IV i. 15.
2. PS. Knrik 58.
3. Ibid. 59.
4. Ibid. 68.
5. PS. Krikn 69.
6. Ib id. 70.
the influence o f the works previously done by him in the

days o f ignorance. He becomes no longer liable to pleasant
or painful experiences o f the body. The accumulated
Karmas are not only destroyed, but for future too they
become barren and produce no fruit. When knowledge
dawns actions performed afterwards bear no fruit. The
union with the bond o f transmigration is broken and the
realised soul is revealed in the lustre o f the Self as pure
light. As the seed stripped o f involucre, bran, and awn
puts forth no sprout, so the Self stripped o f Anava, Maya
and Karma, puts forth no sprout o f physical life.1 The
works burned in the flame o f knowledge are unable to
cause rebirth as the seed scorched by fire is incapable o f
sprouting.
There is the fullest harmony and integration in the
personality o f the Yogin. For, conceit, jo y and the rest
o f the passions arise from the illusion o f differentiation,
division or separation in the Self. How can he be affected
by disintegration who has the vision o f the Self ? All
defilement implies a distinction between the agent, act
and the object. But there is no such distinction in the
case o f the Yogin. For, the emotions, being realised as the
aspects o f the Self, become homogeneous with him. He
has himself become the absolute Self and as such views
all shings as neither desirable nor undesirable, but as
one with himself.2
The Yogin does not have any need for external worship.
His prayer is the intuition o f suprem* Rgoity constantly
applied to the universe.3 The temple o f the Yogin is his
own body and the whole universe built o f thirty-six tattvas
and fully set with windows consisting of the bodily organism
1.
i $ I
3ar WTOWRlf
* 3 farfii W W f j t U Ib id . 55-7...K *rikn 57.
2. PS. K.rik 72.
3. Ibid. 78.
364 KASHMIR a IVISM
or composed o f jars etc. As a temple in which to worship

the self, the Yogin has his own body and any external
structure as well. For, the latter, he knows to be formed
o f the same elements as his own body. His ow n body is the
temple or seat o f consciousness. As the temple has windows,
so the body has its organs o f sense. The external material
o f sense, e .g . the objects o f sight, such as jars etc. are
informed by consciousness through the agency o f the
appropriate organs, e. g., the eye, so that the whole pheno
menal world is to the Yogin a temple o f his own indwelling
consciousness.1
A complete synthesis o f devotion and knowledge has been
the chief aim o f Saiva Absolutism. While worship leads to
ultimate jina, true knowledge also leads to the devotional
attitude. Worship in Saivism assumes the form o f self
worship. While there is no place for real worship in the
VedSnta, it is given an ultimate status in aivism, where
the attempt has been to establish the compatibility o f
devotion with Advaitbm. Even in the state o f final release,
the soul may continue to worship the highest Self. To say
that there is no place for devotion in Advaitism, because it
presupposes dualism, is to take a wrong view o f devotion.
The devotion that arises after the dawn o f the knowledge o f
the Absolute is an end in itself. It alone is the real
devotion. Before the rise o f knowledge duality produces
delusion. But after its rise duality becomes manifest as
supreme bliss. However, after the attainment o f advaita,
dtvotion does not necessarily arise in all released souls. It
arises only 111 the hearts o f those who are by nature inclined
towards devotion. It need not arise in the case o f those
souls which by nature are inclined towards knowledge,
but whether devotion arises or not, in the end knowledge
1. * e
rcrfc s w n * 3 ^ n ib id . 74.
and devotion will become one or merge into each other.

Prna Aharritft, or the rapture o f supreme egoity, is the
final state o f knowledge as well as the highest culmination
o f devotion. That is why it is often described as the state
o f perfect integration, the fountainhead o f both knowledge
and devotion. In it, knowledge assumes the form o f
devotion, and devotion the form o f knowledge. It is the
state o f Smarasya.1
Kashmir aivism has revealed a profound truth by
accepting devotion to be a ' rasa\ Utpalacrya lays great
emphasis upon this aspect o f aiva Absolutism in his iva
StotrSvali.2 The chief characteristic o f such devotion
( pard. bkakti ) is that, though in reality, there is no duality,
duality is assumed for the sake of worship. This devotional
experience is itself a perfect synthesis o f unity and multi
plicity. The idea is that no one who is not himself divine
is qualified to worship the divinity. Having become the
deity, one should worship the deity.
Here the question arises as to how the diversity
of behaviour among the realised souls can be
possible when the experience o f realisation would
be the same for all. According to Datttreya,
the diversity is due to three factors intelligence, the kind
o f discipline us'd, and the past dispositions (samskras).
The last is o f three kinds lack of faith in revelation,
impurity o f mind due to past Karmas and the craving "
for actions. And as there can be no purpose in the
assumption o f this difference, it has to be admitted that
it arists due to the difference o f taste, attitude or temper
ament1. Wise men could be graded into three categories
those with many minds, those with no mind, those with
a single mind. While the first two are liberated in life, the
last one are wise but liberated after death. Those belong
ing to the first grade burn ignorance with the fire o f
1. Kaviraj, G ., Bharattya Sahshrti aur Sdhan a, p.
2. stufai qiw T a r g a r c i arfggfafa fjjgtar sfa
JWtS Utpaia Siva Slotrvah I
366 KASHMIR SAIVISM
knowledge. Since they h ive wisdom, they do not practise

discipline. Naturally, their cravings and desires have not
been burnt up. Though they crop up here and there after
realisation, these desires do not obscure the light o f know
ledge. The Karmas are destroyed as soon as they arise.
Their desires lead them to a varsiety o f experiences in life,
but they remain unaffected, for they are ever in the state
o f self-realisation. Outwardly, they seem to behave like
all mortals, but in their depths they are untouched. The
forces o f past dispositions do not bother them. That is
whv, the diversity o f behaviour is intelligible among them.
King Janaka continued to rule, Vaistha was engaged in
rituals, DurvSsSl was ever full o f rage. While Datttraya
lived in complete detachment, his own brother Candra, a
realised soul, was given to a life o f luxury and love.
A large part of the life o f sages belonging to the
second grade is spent in disciplining themeslves. They
gain wisdom and realise the self, yet the past tendencies
have still a hold on them, as they are mostly busy in
overcoming the force o f the tendencies, their sphere o f
activity is limited. They have periods o f illumination and
darkeess. As they are able to burn up their Karmas
in the end, the periods o f darkness are also finally
destroyed. The last o f their lives appear to be like that o f a
lunatic shut within himself. Vmadeva and Jada Bharata
are the typical examples o f this class. The sages belonging
to the last type have one track mind and are liberated
only after death.
In the Vednta action is supposed to be impossible on
the part of the released soul which no longer identifies itself
with the empirical factois o f his personality. All adjuncts o f
the Self are destroyed in the state o f release.1 In final
release the soul passes from the state o f witness-consciousness
to that of pure consciousness. Its witnesshood is merely
imagined through vidySL,2 When the association with the
1. Saifikara* s Com m . 011 lirh. U p. II. iv. 2; Chand. U p. V I I I . xii. 3.
2. N S . II. 58.
samskSras is destroyed, the soul sinks into pure conscious

ness and is no longer aware o f even the body which is
carried on because o f the momentum o f the past saitiskSras.1
The Yogin has a kind o f double vision and dual personality
residing in the world and outside it at the same time. It
can also be compared to the parts played by the actor in
the play. Like the actor, the yogin is not afTected by
these roles.
In the aiva approach, the liberated soul, by virtue o f
its attaining the state o f absolute subject, does not lose its
individuality. It realises the state o f supreme *r in which
all individual selves are realised as one with itself. Nothing
is negated, but everything, including the negating con
sciousness, is included in the Self. In the Vednta, on the
other hand, the individuality being a product o f nescience,
is also destroyed at th destruction o f the nescience.
1. S. B, III. iiL 32.

B IB L IO G R A P H Y
BhaskarT, A commentary on the VimarSinl o f A bhinava-^

gupta, vols. I-II. Lucknow.
Bhagvadglta with the Comm, called Sarvatobhadra by
Rsjnaka RSmakintha, No. L X IV , 1943.
BodhapartcSdaika by Abhinava gupta. K. S. T . S.
l:?varapratyabhijfla o f Utnala with the Commentary o f
Abhinavagupta. K. S. T . S., vol X X X I I I , 1921.
varapratvabhijfia Vivriti VimarsinI by Abhinavagupta.
vols. M V . K. S. T . S.,
JognT-Hrdaya-DTpik, Edt. by MM. Pdt. Gopinatha
Kaviraja.
MahSnava PrakSLsha o f RajSnaka Shiri Kantha. K. S. T. S.,
V ol. X X I , 1918.
MahSrtha Manjarl o f Mahe^varSnda with the Commentary.
Malinvijaya Vflrttikam o f Abhinavagupta. K. S. T. S., V ol.
X X X I , 1921.
Netratantram, Vols. I-II, with the Comm, by KêmarSja
K . S. T. S., Vol. X IV I, 1926.
ParamSrthasSra o f Abhinavagupta with the Commentary
by Yogaraja. K , S. T. S. vol. V II, 1916.
Para Praveika o f Kêmarja. K. S. T. S., Vol. X V , 1918.
Parfl Trimika with the Commentary o f Abhinavagupta.
K. S. T. S., vol. X V I II, 1918.
Paratrimîka Laghuvritti. K . S. T. S. Vol. L X V III, 1947.
Paratrimika Vivriti o f Rajanaka Lakshm Rama. K. S. T.S.,
Vol. L X IX , 1947.
Paratririiika Tatparyadpika and akti Vijflanarp. of
Somananda. K. S. T. S., Vol. L X X IV , 1947.
Pratyabhijfta Hridavam o f Ksemaraja. K . S, T. S., vol. III.
Also Motilal Banarasidas edition.
Sat-Trirhâ-Tattva Sandoha with Comm, by Reajanka
Ananda. K. S. T. S., Vol. X I I I , 1948.
370 KASHMIR AIVISM
SiddhtrayT and the Pratyabhijfta Kariks Vritti of R jinake

Utpala Deva. K. S. T. S., Vol. X X X I V , 1921.
ivadfsî o f SomSnanda with the Commentary of
Utpaldeva. K . S. T . S.
iva Sutras with the Vimarsini o f Ksemaraja, Kashmir
Series o f Texts and Sludies, vol I. 1911.
s
&iva Sfltras with the VBrttika o f BhSskara. K. S. T. S., vol.
IV . 1916.
iva Sutra with the Vrtti o f Bhskara. K. S. T . S , vol. V.
6iva Satras with the Vartikam o f VaradarSja, K. S. T. S.
vol. X L III , 1925.
Spanda Kariks with Kaliata s Vftti. K. S. T. S.
Spanda KSrikas with the Vrtti o f Rftmakantha. K. S. T. S.
vol. V I, 1913.
Spanda Nirnaya o f Ksemarja. K. S. T . S., 1925.
Spanda Saiidoha o f Ksemarja. K. S. T. S., vol. X V I, 1917.
r Mlinwijayottara Tantrarp.. K. S. T. S , Vol. X X X V II,
1922.
ri Mrgendra Tantram with the Commentary o f Narayan
Kantha. K. S. T. S., 1930.
Sri Vijftanabhairava with Commentary by KsemarSja and
ShivopdhySya. K. S. T. S., vol. V III, 1918,
with Commentary called Kaumudi by Ananda Bhatta.
K, S. T. S , vol. IX , 1918.
Svacchanda Tantra with Commentary o f Ksemaraja, Vols.
I-V I. K. S. T . S.
TantrSloka o f Abhinavagupta with the Commentary by
Rajn&ka Jayaratha, Vols. I-X II. K. S. T. S.
Tantra Sra o f Abhinavagupta. K. S. T . S.
Vatulanatha Stras with the Vrtti o f Ananta aktip&da,
K. S. T. S., 1923.
I N D E X
Abh2sav9da 9 7 .1 0 6 ,1 1 2 , Caste 62
93, 112, 125 distinction 20, 23, 62
Abhinava Gupl a 17, 50, 52, Git akti 17, 79, 99,
163, 85-89 276-290
Absolute 25-31,, 34-36, 44-70, the only pramSpa 97-109,
136-203 Conflict 1, 5,6 -9 , 12,61
Advaita 10, 11, 14-43 Culture 22-25
Agama 14-23, 102-105
AkhySti 79-89 Daksinamarga 15, 59-60
Anuttara 147-M9 Dka 75, 348-350
Apobana akti 105 Discipline 2, 59, 297
Approaches 1-17, 32-34, Dualism, doaita 10, 31-34,
141-151 47, 50, 163
An&tmav&da 34-36, 44-48, Dutl 64
163-168
tmavda 6, 33, 44, 47, Ego 1, 5, 8-13
162, 168, 176 Energy 1. 21
Aurobindo 17, 18, 162 Error 79-89, 109
Experience 5, 14, 109
BaodhajftSn, ajfiSna 3,29-33,
Being 8, 15, 32-35, 48 Finite 3. 9
Becoming 32, 35, 48
Freedom 3-5, 8, 15. 46
Beyond 2, 7, 9 10
Bhairava 55, 60, 63-64 Given 2, 10, 13
Bhoga 13, 19,59 Goal 7, 8
Bondage, 4, 5, 17, 30, 33, G od 21, 29-30, 199-203
0 11 4 non
324-332
Goddess 50. 63. 140. 276-290
Brahman 15, 17, 26, 29, 39,
Grace 341-350
42. 46. 143. 161. 130
Gupa 324-331
Buddhism 34-47, 99, 107,
77, 121 Guru 349
Caitanya Icchopya 61
( Mahprabhu) 13, 139 Iccha Sakti 276-293
372 K ASH M IR A IV IS M
I-consciousness 6 1 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 2
Momentariness 35, 48, 164,
Ignorance 4-6, 16-18, 26, 165
30, 74-79 Morality 65
Illusion 5, 6, 16, 74, 79-89 Mftyukali 56
Indian Philosophy 24-26,
Inference 31-38, 43, 60, Nagarjuna 41
162, 79, 101, 78 Naiyayika 7, 49, 80, 81,
Nirnanda 61
Jlva 22, 41-43 NijSnanda 61
Jftna 15, 105, 106, Nirvana 7-13, 46, 161
Nitya Pannami 32, 161-2
Kaivalya 7-10, 13-23 Kutastha 31, 161
Kail 56
Karma 6 One 37, 143
Kaula 57-67
Khecarl 56
Paftcamakara 63
Knowledge 3, 4, 26, 27, 37
PaficavSha 55-57
90-131
Palu 59, 65
Krama 54-57
Pramata 131, 142, 74-75,
93, 117
Laksaga 28
Par Saihvid 53, 57
Liberation 4, 332
Paripamavada 41-43
Path 7, 8, 13-20, 50, 59
Msdhyamika 35-39, 138,
142, 74, 79 Pereption 99-1UI
M adira 63 Philosophy 2'13, 33, 35,
MahSrtha 55 130, 144
Maithuna 63, 64 Prakasa 48, 60, 90, 92, 177
Manifestation 10 Prakfti 32-34, 42, 50,
Mantra 21, 26, 63 161, 162
Materialism 163 PramQa 95-014, 79
Maya 15, 30, 42, 161, 162 Pratyabhijn 51-58, 67-79
Meer 13, 139 Process 8-11, 33.
Memory 106-112 Pure and impure 13-18
Metephysics 1-14, 33 Purga 8-15 , 44, 46. 48
Method 161 Prpatva' 8, 15, 23. 44, 46
Mfm&rhsaka 81 Puru$a 31-34, 39, 50, 99,
Moka 3, 59 100, 161, 162
n d e x 37
Ramanuja 25-28, 82 Spiritual 1 ,2 , 17, 18

Rakta kri1i 56 Suffering 2, 5 ,7
Rasa 49 unyat 165-168,35, 45-51,
Real 3-9, 12, 16, 29, 45 138, 162
Reason 5, 35, 53, 55 Sunya Vd 89
Recognition 1, 45, 54, 67-79 Svitantrya 8, 46
Reflection 1, 2,
Relation 125-131 Tantra 19-23 , 49, 50, 52, 63
Tiodhna
Sad Siva 79 Tradition 14-23, 36-39
Transcendent 5, 7
SadvidySL 55
akti 17, 20, 42, 45, Trika 53, 54
50, 54, 64 Turfyatita 23
ktop5ya 53, 55
Upanisad 25-31
SakbSdupaya 61
Upya 352, 67, 68
Smarasya 10, 17, 47, 48
Smbhavopya 53, 58, 61 Vaikhari 57
Smkhya 31--34, 38, 41, 50 Vaioavism 13, 139
99, 161-163 Valuation 2, 9-13
Samvid 97-99, 100, 106, 114 Veda 3, 18-23, 49, 102, 103
Sdhaka 13, 59, 65, 66 Vedanta 8-23, 36, 37, 42,
Sstra 22 44,, 62, 82-85, 141
Scripture 102, 104 Vidy 4, 6, 26, 27
Satkflryavda 39 VijftSnavada 36, 100
Search 1, 26 Vimaria 90-92, 119
Vra 59
Self 1-5,. 6 . 16. 27. 28,
Vivarta 38, 42
31, 40, 48, 131
Sex 21, 62-67
Wine 64
Sin 5 Worship 20, 63
Silence 7, 35
Siva 20, 45, 50, 57 Yogcra 46, 139, 74, 81
Nagerjuna Philosophy K. F. Ramanan
The Present Work is devroted primarily to a

study of the Maha-Prajna*Paramita Sastra, This is
a philosophical study intended to give as far aa
possible an objective & complete picture of the
Madhyamika Philosophy as it can be gathered
from this text. Rs. 40.00
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( An Assessment of fundamentals ) K. D. Sethna
The writings collected here have appeared

at different times in the monthly review of Culture
published from Pondichery Mother India, whose
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The Indian Religious Tradition Paul you n ger

Within the compass of this book the author
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SAIVISM

w -**%, 7 ^ - s ir jc tiiJ J w + - - -* * * *> * HE **17?, * - 7 ^ ' - *->--

BHARATIYA VIDYA PRAKASHAN

MM. PdK GOPINATH K AVI RAJ

One should be grateful to Dr, L, N. Sharma for expound

The most valuable feature o f this book is its comparative

The aiva absolutist thinks that he has successfully resolved

is associated with MyS. and is, therefore, manifest as limited,

This and most other philosophical issues are discussed in

Dr. Sharmas work is an excellent and sustained piece o f

November 20, 1972. T . R . V. M urti

Kashmir aivism, which represents the absolutistic

comparative study. It is the first attempt to expound

The work is divided into four parts. Approaches o f

The value o f the present study is not in the direction o f

Being an interpretation, such a study may appear to be

It is my great privilege to record my gratitude to the

M y deepest and most sustained obligations are due to

6. The Advaita Vednta 39

III. E m erg en ce o f Saiva A b so lu tism 44-70

THE ABSOLUTE REALITY

1* Absolutism : a problem 135

sciousness, VedSntic absolute as Pure witness con-

VII T h e A bsolu te and M an ifestation 204-275

X. B ondage and L ibera tion 324-367

THE TWO APPROACHES

1* M e ta p h y sics as the D o ctrin e o f S alv ation

Recognition o f this painful situation constitutes the

the root o f a man s life in order that it may spring again

Valuation o f the given is the first and foremost pre

It is followed by an introversion o f the ego. When dis

1. Bfh. U p. III. 9.28

Knowledge o f the true nature o f the self alone leads to

1. Coomarswamy, A ., The Dance o f Siva f p. 23

4. Slfasn ^ fTrj ^TctsiT sjfa

Vedngas constitute lower knowledge (apar vidy) through

Knowledge is freedom, ignorance is bondage. There is no

Obviously this 'absolute knowledge* cannot be gained by

6. g%>:, o ... i ibid P. 46

qualification for seeking knowledge. The individual, due

Metaphysical awareness presupposes a descent o f trans

1. Katha U p . II. 1., Quoted in PH. p, 85

taking the self to be the not-self. These engender new

The illusion which is the cause o f bondage is two-fold.

However, the view that illusion consists in mistaking the

Reality view is implicit in our world view. Our attitudes

1. Karl Potter, Presuppositions o f Indian Philosophy9 p. 11

intensity o f the conflict.* Our attitude towards the Tran

I f there is a predominant consciousness o f the conflict*

There is another approach, however, in which the path is

From another point o f view hotK

The highest state o f release should not be described, strictly

Though there might be many more approaches to the

the beyond* is determined by this pessimistic outlook. On

But, inspite o f the fact that there are some fundamental

in terms f the what, It is the stage o f realization o f the f

Although these approaches represent different stages or

The realization o f the Absolute or advaita may be

1. W . E. H ocking compares a num ber o f lines o f inquiry which end

The Absolute represents the highest value. Ultimate

o f attaining the state o f dissolution o f the ego. The indi

no approach excludes the other elements o f experience. It

to a summary statement o f some o f the most fundamental

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