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Fairbairn Endopsychic Structure
Fairbairn Endopsychic Structure
I
a previous paper (1941) I attempted to formulate a new version of the
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libido theory and to outline the general features which a systematic
psychopathology based upon this re-formulation would appear to assume.
The basic conception which I advanced on that occasion, and to which I still
adhere, is to the effect that libido is primarily object-seeking (rather than
pleasure-seeking, as in the classic theory), and that it is to disturbances in the
object-relationships of the developing ego that we must look for the ultimate
origin of all psychopathological conditions. This conception seems to me not
only to be closer in accord with psychological facts and clinical data than that
embodied in Freuds original libido theory, but also to represent a logical
outcome of the present stage of psychoanalytical thought and a necessary
step in the further development of psychoanalytical theory. In particular, it
seems to me to constitute an inevitable implication of the illuminating
conception of internalized objects, which has been so fruitfully developed by
Melanie Klein, but which traces its scientific origin to Freuds theory of the
super-ego (an endopsychic structure which was, of course, conceived by him
as originating in the internalization of objects).
Quite apart from the considerations advanced in my previous paper or
various other considerations which could be adduced, it may be claimed that
the psychological introjection of objects and, in particular, the perpetuation
of introjected objects in inner reality are processes which by their very nature
imply that libido is essentially object-seeking; for the mere presence of oral
impulses is in itself quite insufficient to account for such a pronounced
1
Originally published in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. XXV, Pts.
1 and 2.
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Prominent amongst these is the problem for which Freud set out to find a
solution in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) itself, viz. how it comes
about that neurotics cling to painful experiences so assiduously. It was the
difficulty of accounting for this phenomenon in terms of the pleasure principle
that led Freud to fall back upon the conception of a repetition compulsion.
If, however, libido is regarded as primarily object-seeking, there is no need to
resort to this expedient; and in a recent paper (1943) I attempted to show how
the tendency to cling to painful experiences may be explained in terms of
relationships with bad objects. In the same paper I also attempted to show
how the difficulties involved in the conception of primary death instincts (in
contrast to the conception of a primary aggressive tendency) may be avoided
if all the implications of libidinal relationships with bad objects are taken into
account.
Once the position now indicated has been reached, it obviously becomes
incumbent upon us to review afresh our theory of the mental apparatus. In
particular, it becomes a question how far Freuds description of mental structure
in terms of id, ego, and super-ego can be retained without modification. The
moment this question is raised, it is, of course, plainly in relation to the status
of the id that doubts will first arise; for, if it be true that no impulses can be
regarded as existing in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer be
possible to preserve any psychological distinction between the id and the
ego. Freuds conception of the origin of the ego as a structure which develops
on the surface of the psyche for the purpose of regulating id-impulses in
relation to reality will thus give place to a conception of the ego as the source
of impulse-tension from the beginning. This inclusion of the id in the ego will,
of course, leave essentially unaffected Freuds conception of the function
served by the ego in regulating the discharge of impulse-tension in deference
to the conditions of outer reality. It will, however, involve the view that
1
It is now obvious in retrospect that some of the conclusions recorded in this, as also
in the previous, section of the present paper were already adumbrated in my paper
entitled Features in the Analysis of a Patient with a Physical Genital Abnormality,
which was written as long ago as in 1931, and which is included in this volume.
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impulses are oriented towards reality, and thus to some extent determined by
the reality principle, from the very beginning. Thus, for example, the childs
earliest oral behaviour will be regarded as oriented ab initio towards the
breast. In accordance with this point of view, the pleasure principle will cease
to be regarded as the primary principle of behaviour and will come to be
regarded as a subsidiary principle of behaviour involving an impoverishment
of object-relationships and coming into operation in proportion as the reality
principle fails to operate, whether this be on account of the immaturity of the
ego structure or on account of a failure of development on its part. Questions
regarding the extent to which the reality principle has superseded the pleasure
principle will then give place to questions regarding the extent to which an
originally immature reality principle has progressed towards maturity; and
questions regarding the capacity of the ego to regulate id-impulses in
deference to reality will give place to questions regarding the measure in
which the ego structure within which impulse-tension arises has been
organized in accordance with the reality principle, or, in default of this, has
resorted to the pleasure principle as a means of organization.
If, then, impulse is to be regarded as inseparably associated with an ego
structure from the beginning, what becomes of Freuds conception of
repression as a function exercised by the ego in its dealings with impulses
originating in the id? I have already elsewhere (1943) considered the
implications of my theory of object-relationships for the concept of repression.
There I advanced the view that repression is primarily exercised, not against
impulses which have come to appear painful or bad (as in Freuds final view)
or even against painful memories (as in Freuds earlier view), but against
internalized objects which have come to be treated as bad. I still feel justified
in regarding this view as correct; but in certain other respects my views
regarding repression have undergone a change. In particular, I have come to
regard repression as exercised, not only against internalized objects (which,
incidentally, must be regarded as endopsychic structures, albeit not ego
structures), but also against parts of the ego which seek relationships with
these internal objects. Here it may occur to the reader to pass the criticism
that, since repression is a function of the ego, this view involves the anomaly
of the ego repressing itself. How, it may be asked, can the ego be conceived as
repressing the ego? The answer to this question is that, whilst it is
inconceivable that the ego as a whole should repress itself, it is not
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inconceivable that one part of the ego with a dynamic charge should repress
another part of the ego with a dynamic charge. This is, of course, quite a
different proposition from one set of impulses repressing another seta
conception rightly rejected by Freud when engaged in the task of formulating
his theory of the mental apparatus. In order to account for repression Freud
found himself compelled to postulate the existence of a structure capable of
instigating repression viz. the super-ego. It is, therefore, only another step
in the same direction to postulate the existence of structures which are
repressed. Apart from any theoretical reasons such as those already advanced,
there are very good clinical reasons for making such an assumption. Prominent
among these is the difficulty experienced in effecting the sublimation of
libidinal impulses. This difficulty cannot be adequately explained as due to
an inveterate and inherent obstinacy on the part of impulses themselves,
especially once we have come to regard impulses as just forms of energy at
the disposal of the ego structure. On the contrary, it can only be satisfactorily
explained on the assumption that the repressed impulses are inseparable
from an ego structure with a definite pattern. The correctness of this assumption
is confirmed by the phenomena of multiple personality, in which the linkage of
repressed impulses with a submerged ego structure is beyond question; but
such a linkage may also be detected in the less extensive forms of dissociation,
which are so characteristic of the hysterical individual. In order to account for
repression, we thus appear to be driven to the necessity of assuming a certain
multiplicity of egos. This should not really prove a particularly difficult
conception for any one familiar with the problems presented by schizoid
patients. But here, as so often, we are reminded of the limitations imposed
upon psychoanalytical theory in some of its later developments by a
preoccupation with the phenomena of melancholic depression.
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BACK TO HYSTERIA
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A MULTIPLICITY OF EGOS
Attention has already been drawn to the fact that, whereas the repressed
was eventually described by Freud as consisting essentially of impulses, he
found it necessary to fall back upon structural conceptions (the ego and the
super-ego) when he came to seek an explanation of the agency of repression.
Reduced to its simplest terms, Freuds conception of repression is to the
following effect: (a) that the agency of repression is the ego, (b) that repression
is instigated and maintained by the pressure of the super-ego (an internalized
parental figure) upon the ego, (c) that the repressed consists essentially in
libidinal impulses, and (d) that repression arises as a means of defence against
impulses involved in the dipus situation and treated by the ego as guilty
in terms of the pressure of the super-ego. That the agent and the instigator of
repression should both be regarded as structures whilst the repressed is
regarded as consisting of impulses involves a certain anomaly which appears
so far to have escaped attention. The extent of this anomaly may perhaps best
be appreciated in the light of the fact that the super-ego, which is described as
the instigator of repression, is itself largely unconscious; for this raises the
difficult question whether the super-ego itself is not also repressed. Freud
himself was by no means oblivious to this problem; and he expressly envisages
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that the man into whom the figure of herself turned was wearing a suit closely
resembling one which her husband had recently acquired, and that, whilst he
had acquired this suit at her instigation, he had taken one of his blondes to
the fitting. This fact, taken in conjunction with the fact that in the dream he
was a helpless spectator of the attack, at once confirmed a natural suspicion
that the attack was directed no less against him than against herself. This
suspicion was amply confirmed by further associations which need not be
detailed. The course followed by the associations also confirmed an additional
suspicion that the actress who delivered the attack belonged as much to the
personality of the dreamer as did the figure of herself against which the attack
was delivered. In actual fact, the figure of an actress was well suited to represent
a certain aspect of herself; for she was essentially a shut-in and withdrawn
personality who displayed very little genuine feeling towards others, but who
had perfected the technique of presenting faades to a point at which these
assumed a remarkably genuine appearance and achieved for her a remarkable
popularity. Such libidinal affect as she experienced had, since childhood,
manifested itself predominantly in a secret phantasy life of masochistic
complexion; but in the life of outer reality she had largely devoted herself to
the playing of rolese.g. the roles of good wife, good mother, good hostess,
and good business woman. From this fact the helplessness attributed to her
husband in the dream derived additional significance; for, although she played
the role of good wife with conspicuous success, her real personality was
quite inaccessible to him and the good wife whom he knew was for the most
part only the good actress. This held true not only within the sphere of
emotional relationships, but also within the sphere of marital relations; for,
whilst she remained frigid during intercourse, she had acquired the capacity
of conveying the impression of sexual excitement and sexual satisfaction.
Further, as the analysis revealed beyond all question, her frigidity represented
not only an attack upon the libidinal component in herself, but also a hostile
attitude towards her husband as a libidinal object. It is clear, therefore, that a
measure of hidden aggression against her husband was involved in her
assumption of the role of actress as this was portrayed in the dream. It is
equally clear from the dream that, in a libidinal capacity, she was identified
with her husband as the object of her own aggression. At this point it should
be mentioned that, when the dream occurred, her husband was a member of
one of the combatant Services and was about to return home on leave. On the
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eve of his return, and just before the occurrence of the dream, she had
developed a sore throat. This was a conjunction of events which had occurred
so frequently in the past as to preclude coincidence on this occasion, and
which accordingly served to confirm her identification with her husband as
the object of her aggression. The situation represented in the dream is thus
one in which the dreamer in one capacity, so far unspecified, vents her
aggression directly against herself in another capacity, viz., a libidinal capacity,
whilst, at the same time, venting her aggression indirectly against her husband
as a libidinal object. At a superficial level, of course, this situation readily lent
itself to being interpreted in the sense that the dreamer, being ambivalent
towards her husband, had diverted the aggressive component in her ambivalent
attitude from her husband to herself at the instance of guilt over her aggression
in conformity with the melancholic pattern. Nevertheless, during the actual
session in which the dream was recorded this interpretation did not commend
itself to me as exhaustive, even at a superficial level.
It is obvious, of course, that the situation represented in the dream lent
itself to a deeper interpretation than that to which reference has just been
made. The situation was described a moment ago as one in which the dreamer
in a capacity so far unspecified vented her aggression directly against herself
in a libidinal capacity, whilst, at the same time, venting her aggression indirectly
against her husband as a libidinal object. This description is, of course,
incomplete in that it leaves unspecified the capacity in which she expressed
her aggression; and it is when we come to consider the nature of this
unspecified capacity that the deeper significance of the dream becomes a
matter of moment. According to the manifest content of the dream, it was as
an actress that she delivered the attack; and we have already seen how well
suited the figure of an actress was to represent an aspect of herself hostile to
libidinal relationships. However, abundant material had already emerged during
the analysis to make it plain that the figure of an actress was at least equally
well suited to represent the dreamers motheran artificial woman who had
neither displayed any natural and spontaneous affection towards her children
nor welcomed any such display on their part towards herself, and for whom
the fashionable world provided a stage upon which she had spent her life in
playing parts. It was thus easy to see that, in the capacity of actress, the
dreamer was closely identified with her mother as a repressive figure. The
introduction of her mother into the drama as an apparently super-ego figure
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at once raises the question whether the deeper interpretation of the dream
should not be couched in terms of the dipus situation; and it becomes
natural to ask whether her father is not also represented. In reality her father
had been killed on active service during the war of 191418, at a time when she
was only six years of age; and analysis had revealed the presence of
considerable resentment towards him as a libidinal object who had proved at
once exciting and rejecting (this resentment being focused particularly upon
the memory of an early dressing-room scene). If then we are to look for a
representation of her father in the dream, our choice is obviously limited to a
single figurethe man who alternated with the figure of the dreamer as the
object of attack. We have seen, of course, that this figure represented her
husband; but analysis had already revealed how closely her husband was
identified by transference with her father. For this, as well as for other reasons
which need not be detailed, it was safe to infer that the man who was involved
in the attack represented her father at the deeper level of interpretation. At
this level, accordingly, the dream was capable of being interpreted as a phantasy
in which both she and her father were portrayed as being killed by her mother
on account of a guilty incestuous relationship. At the same time the dream
was equally capable of being interpreted in terms of psychical structure, and
thus as representing the repression of her libido on account of its incestuous
attachment to her father at the instigation of a super-ego modelled upon her
mother. Nevertheless, neither of these interpretations seemed to me to do
justice to the material, although the structural interpretation seemed to offer
the more fruitful line of approach.
At this point I feel it necessary to make some reference to the development
of my own views regarding phantasy in general and dreams in particular.
Many years ago I had the opportunity to analyse a most unusual woman,
who was a most prolific dreamer.1
1
This case is described at some length in my paper entitled, Features in the Analysis
of a Patient with a Physical Genital Abnormality (included in the present volume). It is
also the third case described in The Effect of a Kings Death upon Patients Undergoing
Analysis (also included in this volume). Although the patient in question displayed
symptoms which were mainly of a manic-depressive nature, I consider in retrospect that
she was basically a schizoid personality.
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Among the dreams recorded by this woman were a number which defied all
efforts to bring them into conformity with the wish-fulfilment theory, and
which she herself came to describe quite spontaneously as state of affairs
dreams, intending by this description to imply that they represented actually
existing endopsychic situations. Doubtless this made an impression on me.
At any rate, much later, after Freuds theory of psychical structure had become
familiar, after Melanie Klein had elaborated the conceptions of psychical reality
and internal objects and after I myself had become impressed by the prevalence
and importance of schizoid phenomena, I tentatively formulated the view that
all the figures appearing in dreams represented either parts of the dreamers
own personality (conceived in terms of ego, super-ego, and id) or rise
identifications on the part of the ego. A further development of this view was
to the effect that dreams are essentially, not wish-fulfilments, but dramatizations
or shorts (in the cinematographic sense) of situations existing in inner reality.
To the view that dreams are essentially shorts of situations existing in inner
reality I still adhere in conformity with the general line of thought pursued in
this article; but, so far as the figures appearing in dreams are concerned, I
have now modified my view to effect that such figures represent either parts
of the ego or internalized objects. According to my present view, therefore,
the situations depicted in dreams represent relationships existing between
endopsychic structures; and the same applies to situations depicted in waking
phantasies. This conclusion is the natural outcome of my theory of object-
relationships taken in conjunction with a realization of the inescapable fact
that internalized objects must be regarded as endopsychic structures if any
theoretic significance whatever is to be attached to them.
After this explanatory digression I must return to the specific dream under
discussion with a view to giving some account of the conclusions which I
subsequently reached, in no small measure as the result of an attempt to solve
the theoretic problems which it raised in my mind. As I have already stated,
none of the obvious interpretations seemed to me entirely satisfactory, although
the structural type of interpretation seemed to offer the most fruitful line of
approach. The reader will, of course, bear in mind what I have already said
regarding psychical structures; and he will also recall my having already
formulated the view that all psychopathological developments originate at a
stage antecedent to that at which the super-ego develops and proceed from a
level beneath that at which the super-ego operates. Thus no reference will be
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attacked object representing her father (for at this point it is to the deeper
level of interpretation that we must adhere).
Bearing these two main observations in mind, let us now consider the
conclusions to which I was led in an attempt to interpret the dream to my
satisfaction. They are as follows. The three ego figures which appear as
separate in the dream actually represent separate ego structures in the dreamers
mind. The dreamers ego is therefore split in conformity with the schizoid
position; and it is split into three separate egosa central ego and two other
subsidiary egos which are both, relatively speaking, cut off from the central
ego. Of these two subsidiary egos, one is the object of aggression on the part
of the other. Since the ego which is attacked is closely related to the dreamers
father (and by transference to her husband), it is safe to infer that this ego is
highly endowed with libido; and it may thus be appropriately described as a
libidinal ego. Since the attacking ego is closely related to the dreamers
mother as a repressive figure, its behaviour is quite in accord with that
traditionally ascribed to the super-ego in the setting of the dipus situation.
Since, however, the attack bears all the marks of being vindictive, rather than
moral, and gives rise to an affect, not of guilt, but of plain anxiety, there is no
justification (apart from preconceptions) for equating the attacking ego with
the super-ego. In any case, as I have already indicated, there is reason to
attach overriding psychopathological importance to a level beneath that at
which the super-ego functions. At the same time, it was shown by the
circumstances in which the dream occurred that the dreamers libidinal
relationship with her husband was severely compromised; and, so far as the
dream is concerned, it is clearly to the operation of the attacking ego that we
must look for the compromising factor. Consequently, the attacking ego may
perhaps be most appropriately described as an internal saboteur. In an
attempt to discover what this dream was stating and to determine the structural
significance of what was stated, I was accordingly led to set aside the traditional
classification of mental structure in terms of ego, id, and super-ego in favour
of a classification couched in terms of an ego-structure split into three separate
egos(1) a central ego (the I), (2) a libidinal ego, and (3) an aggressive,
persecutory ego which I designate as the internal saboteur. Subsequent
experience has led me to regard this classification as having a universal
application.
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dreamers father at a deep level, was nevertheless closely associated with her
husband. It is thus evident that, instead of being directed against her husband
as an external object, a considerable proportion of her aggression was absorbed
in an attack directed, not simply against the libidinal ego, but also against an
internal object closely connected with the libidinal ego. It is likewise evident
that this volume of aggression had come to be at the disposal, not of the
central ego, but of the internal saboteur. What then of the libidinal component
in her ambivalence? As we have seen, her libidinal attitude to her husband
showed signs of considerable impoverishment in spite of good intentions at
a conscious level. It is obvious, accordingly, that what held true of her
aggression also held true of her libido. A considerable proportion had ceased
to be at the disposal of the central ego. The object towards whom this volume
of libido is directed can hardly remain in doubt. In terms of the dream, it must
surely be the man who alternated with the libidinal self as the object of
aggression. Unlike the aggression, however, this libido is not at the disposal
of the internal saboteur. On the contrary we must regard it as being at the
disposal of the libidinal ego; and indeed it is precisely for this reason that the
term libidinal ego has come to commend itself to me for adoption. At this
point it becomes desirable to formulate a suspicion which must be already
present in the mind of the readerthat, although it is represented otherwise
in the dream, the attack delivered by the internal saboteur is only secondarily
directed against the libidinal ego and is primarily directed against the libidinal
object which alternates with this ego. Assuming this suspicion to be correct,
we must regard the ordeal to which the libidinal ego is subjected as evidence
of a very complete identification with, and therefore a very strong libidinal
attachment to, the attacked object on the part of the libidinal ego. It is evidence
of the measure of suffering which the libidinal ego is prepared to endure out
of devotion to its object. The anxiety experienced by the dreamer on waking
may be interpreted in a similar sense; and indeed I venture to suggest that this
anxiety represented an irruption into consciousness of such suffering on
the part of the libidinal ego. Here we are at once reminded of Freuds original
conception of neurotic anxiety as libido converted into suffering. This is a
view which at one time presented the greatest theoretic difficulty to me, but
which I have now come to appreciate in the light of my present standpoint,
and substantially to accept in preference to the modified view which Freud
later (and, as I think, rather reluctantly) came to adopt.
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Endopsychic Structure
Before proceeding to consider the origin of what I have called the basic
endopsychic situation, I feel it necessary to record some general conclusions
which seem to follow from the inherent nature of the situation itself. The first
and most obvious of these conclusions is that the ego is split. In this respect,
therefore, the basic endopsychic situation which has now emerged conforms
to the pattern of the schizoid positiona position which, as already indicated,
I have come to regard as central (in preference to the depressive position).
Freuds theory of the mental apparatus was, of course, developed upon a
basis of the depressive position; and it is on a similar basis that Melanie Klein
has developed her views. By contrast, it is the schizoid position that constitutes
the basis of the theory of mental structure which I now advance. It is to be
noted, further, that, whilst conforming to the pattern of the schizoid position,
the endopsychic situation revealed in my patients dream also provided a
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It is now time for us to turn our attention to questions regarding the origin
of the basic endopsychic situation which found a classic expression in my
patients dream. In the light of considerations which have already emerged, it
will be obvious that whatever explanation we may reach regarding the origin
of this situation will also serve as an explanation of the origin of the schizoid
position, the origin of repression and the differentiation of the various
fundamental endopsychic structures. As we have seen, the patient whose
dream has occupied so much of our attention was essentially ambivalent
towards her husband as an external object; and it is from the establishment of
a state of ambivalence towards objects in early life that the basic endopsychic
situation springs. The first libidinal object of the infant is, of course, his
mothers breast, although there can be no doubt that the form of his mother as
a person soon begins to take shape round the original nucleus of this maternal
organ. Under theoretically perfect conditions the libidinal relationship of the
infant to his mother would be so satisfactory that a state of libidinal frustration
could hardly arise; and, as I see it, there would consequently be no ambivalence
on the part of the infant towards his object. At this point I must explain that,
whilst I regard aggression as a primary dynamic factor in that it does not
appear capable of being resolved into libido (as Jung, for example, sought to
resolve it), at the same time I regard it as ultimately subordinate to libido, not
only metaphysically, but also psychologically. Thus I do not consider that
the infant directs aggression spontaneously towards his libidinal object in
the absence of some kind of frustration; and my observation of the behaviour
of animals confirms me in this view. It should be added that in a state of nature
the infant would never normally experience that separation from his mother
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the reader that, in my opinion, it is always the bad object (i.e., at this stage,
the unsatisfying object) that is internalized in the first instance; for (as already
indicated in a footnote) I find it difficult to attach any meaning to the primary
internalization of a good object which is both satisfying and amenable from
the infants point of view. There are those, of course, who would argue that it
would be natural for the infant, when in a state of deprivation, to internalize
the good object on the wish-fulfilment principle; but, as it seems to me,
internalization of objects is essentially a measure of coercion and it is not the
satisfying object, but the unsatisfying object that the infant seeks to coerce.
I speak here of the satisfying object and the unsatisfying object, rather
than of the good object and the bad object, because I consider that, in this
connection, the terms good object and bad object tend to be misleading.
They tend to be misleading because they are liable to be understood in the
sense of desired object and undesired object respectively. There can be no
doubt, however, that a bad (viz. unsatisfying) object may be desired. Indeed
it is just because the infants bad object is desired as well as felt to be bad that
it is internalized. The trouble is that it remains bad after it has been internalized,
i.e. it remains unsatisfying. At this point an important consideration arises.
Unlike the satisfying object, the unsatisfying object has, so to speak, two
facets. On the one hand, it frustrates; and, on the other hand, it tempts and
allures. Indeed its essential badness consists precisely in the fact that it
combines allurement with frustration. Further, it retains both these qualities
after internalization. After internalizing the unsatisfying object, accordingly,
the infant finds himself in the quandary of out of the frying-pan into the fire.
In his attempts to control the unsatisfying object, he has introduced into the
inner economy of his mind an object which not only continues to frustrate his
need, but also continues to whet it. He thus finds himself confronted with
another intolerable situationthis time an internal one. How does he seek to
deal with it? As we have seen, in his attempt to deal with the intolerable
external situation with which he was originally faced his technique was to
split the maternal object into two objects, (a) the good and (b) the bad, and
then proceed to internalize the bad object; and in his attempt to deal with the
intolerable internal situation which subsequently arises he adopts a technique
which is not altogether dissimilar. He splits the internal bad object into two
objects(a) the needed or exciting object and (b) the frustrating or rejecting
object; and then he represses both these objects (employing aggression, of
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It will be noted that the situation resulting from the sequence of processes
which has just been described has now assumed the structural pattern of
what I have called the basic endopsychic situation. It has also assumed the
dynamic pattern of this situation except in one important respectthat the
aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal
ego and its associated object (the exciting object) is still left out of the picture.
In order to explain the origin of this feature of the situation, we must return to
the original ambivalence of the child towards his mother and consider from a
fresh angle what this involves. This time we shall consider the childs reactions,
less in their conative, and more in their affective aspect. It is natural for the
child, not only to be impulsive, but also to express his feelings in no uncertain
terms. Moreover, it is through the expression of his feelings that he makes his
chief impression upon his objects. Once ambivalence has been established,
however, the expression of feeling towards his mother involves him in a
position which must seem to him singularly precarious. Here it must be pointed
out that what presents itself to him from a strictly conative standpoint as
frustration at the hands of his mother presents itself to him in a very different
light from a strictly affective standpoint. From the latter standpoint, what he
experiences is a sense of lack of love, and indeed emotional rejection on his
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mothers part. This being so, the expression of hate towards her as a rejecting
object becomes in his eyes a very dangerous procedure. On the one hand, it
is calculated to make her reject him all the more, and thus to increase her
badness and make her seem more real in her capacity of bad object. On the
other hand, it is calculated to make her love him less, and thus to decrease her
goodness and make her seem less real (i.e. destroy her) in her capacity of
good object. At the same time, it also becomes a dangerous procedure for the
child to express his libidinal need, i.e. his nascent love, of his mother in face of
rejection at her hands; for it is equivalent to discharging his libido into an
emotional vacuum. Such a discharge is accompanied by an affective experience
which is singularly devastating. In the older child this experience is one of
intense humiliation over the depreciation of his love, which seems to be
involved. At a somewhat deeper level (or at an earlier stage) the experience is
one of shame over the display of needs which are disregarded or belittled. In
virtue of these experiences of humiliation and shame he feels reduced to a
state of worthlessness, destitution or beggardom. His sense of his own value
is threatened; and he feels bad in the sense of inferior. The intensity of these
experiences is, of course, proportionate to the intensity of his need; and
intensity of need itself increases his sense of badness by contributing to it
the quality of demanding too much. At the same time his sense of badness
is further complicated by the sense of utter impotence which he also
experiences. At a still deeper level (or at a still earlier stage) the childs experience
is one of, so to speak, exploding ineffectively and being completely emptied
of libido. It is thus an experience of disintegration and of imminent psychical
death.
We can understand accordingly how precarious a matter it becomes for the
child, when confronted with the experience of rejection by his mother, to
express either aggressive or libidinal affect towards her. Reduced to its simplest
terms, the position in which he finds himself placed would appear to be one in
which, if, on the one hand, he expresses aggression, he is threatened with
loss of his good object, and, if, on the other hand, he expresses libidinal need,
he is threatened with loss of his libido (which for him constitutes his own
goodness) and ultimately with loss of the ego structure which constitutes
himself. Of these two threats by which the child feels menaced, the former (i.e.
loss of the good object) would appear to be that which gives rise to the affect
of depression, and which provides a basis for the subsequent development
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Now that the origin of the aggressive attitude adopted by the internal
saboteur towards the libidinal ego and the exciting object has been described,
our account of the processes which determine the dynamic pattern of the
basic endopsychic situation is complete. At this point, however, something
requires to be added to what has already been said regarding the nature and
origin of repression. In terms of the line of thought so far developed, repression
is a process originating in a rejection of both the exciting object and the
rejecting object on the part of the undivided ego. This primary process of
repression is accompanied by a secondary process of repression whereby
the ego splits off and rejects two parts of itself, which remain attached
respectively to one and the other of the repressed internal objects. The
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resulting situation is one in which the central ego (the residue of the undivided
ego) adopts an attitude of rejection, not only towards the exciting object and
the rejecting object, but also towards the split off and subsidiary egos attached
to these respective objects, i.e. the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur.
This attitude of rejection adopted by the central ego constitutes repression;
and the dynamic of the rejection is aggression. So far so good. But this
explanation of the nature and origin of repression is incomplete in so far as it
has not yet taken into account what is involved in the technique of reducing
the volume of libido and aggression available for expression towards external
objects by employing a maximum of aggression to subdue a maximum of
libido. As we have seen, this technique resolves itself into a process whereby
(a) the excess of aggression is taken over by the internal saboteur and devoted
to an attack upon the libidinal ego, and (b) the excess of libido is taken over by
the libidinal ego and directed towards the exciting object. When the full
significance of this process is considered, it becomes at once plain that the
relentless attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego must operate
as a very powerful factor in furthering the aims of repression. Indeed, so far as
dynamic is concerned, it seems more than likely that this is the most important
factor in the maintenance of repression. Obviously it is upon the phenomenon
just mentioned that Freuds conception of the super-ego and its repressive
functions is based; for the uncompromising hostility which, according to
Freud, characterizes the attitude of the super-ego towards id impulses coincides
exactly with the uncompromisingly aggressive attitude adopted by the internal
saboteur towards the libidinal ego. Similarly, Freuds observation that the
self-reproaches of the melancholic are ultimately reproaches directed against
the loved object falls readily into line with the aggressive attitude adopted
towards the exciting object by the internal saboteur.
There is no need at this point to repeat the criticisms already passed upon
Freuds conceptions of the super-ego and the id, and upon all that is involved
in these conceptions. It does, however, seem desirable to draw attention to
the fact that, in his description of repression, Freud left completely out of
account all that is involved in the phenomenon which I have described as the
attachment of the libidinal ego to the exciting object. As we have seen, this
attachment comes to absorb a considerable volume of libido. Further, the
volume of libido in question is directed towards an object which is both
internal and repressed; and, in conformity with this fact, it is inevitably oriented
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away from outer reality. Such being the case, the object-seeking of the libidinal
ego operates as a resistance which powerfully reinforces the resistance directly
resulting from repression, and which is thus no less in conflict with therapeutic
aims than is the latter resistance. This is a theme which I have already
developed, mutatis mutandis, in an earlier paper (1943). I add the proviso
mutatis mutandis here, because, at the time when I wrote the paper referred
to, I had not yet formulated my present views regarding endopsychic
structures; but the effect of these latter views is to give greater point, rather
than otherwise, to the original theme. This theme is, of course, in direct conflict
with Freuds statement (1920)1 : The unconscious, i.e. the repressed material,
offers no resistance whatever to curative efforts. It is, however, a theme
which develops naturally out of the view that libido is primarily object-seeking,
once we come to consider what happens when the object sought is a repressed
internal object; and, in terms of my present standpoint, there can be no room
for doubt that the obstinate attachment of the libidinal ego to the exciting
object and its reluctance to renounce this object constitute a particularly
formidable source of resistanceand one which plays no small part in
determining what is known as the negative therapeutic reaction. The
attachment in question, being libidinal in character, cannot, of course, be
regarded as in itself a repressive phenomenon; but, whilst itself a resultant of
repression exercised by the central ego, it also functions as a powerful aid to
this process of repression. The attack of the internal saboteur upon the object
of the libidinal ego (the exciting object) serves, of course, to perpetuate the
attachment of the libidinal ego to its object by virtue of the fact that this
object is being constantly threatened. Here we catch a glimpse of the original
wolf under its sheeps clothing, i.e. we catch a glimpse of the original ambivalent
situation persisting underneath all its disguises; for what the obstinate
attachment of the libidinal ego to the exciting object and the eqllally obstinate
aggression of the internal saboteur towards the same object really represent
is the obstinacy of the original ambivalent attitude. The truth is that, however
well the fact may be disguised, the individual is extremely reluctant to abandon
his original hate, no less than his original need, of his original objects in
childhood. This holds particularly true of psychoneurotic and psychotic
1
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (London, 1922), p. 19.
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individuals, not to mention those who fall into the category of psychopathic
personality.
If the attachment of the libidinal ego to the exciting object serves as a
powerful aid to repression, the same may equally be said of the aggressive
attitude adopted towards this internal object by the internal saboteur. So far
as the actual process of repression is concerned, however, the latter differs
from the former in one important respect; for not only does it forward the aim
of repression, but it also actually operates in the same manner as repression.
In its attack upon the exciting object it performs a function which constitutes
it a co-belligerent, albeit not an ally, of the central ego, whose repression of
the exciting object represents, as we have seen, a manifestation of aggression.
The internal saboteur functions further as a co-belligerent of the central ego
in respect of its attack upon the libidinal egoan attack which serves to
supplement that involved in the repression of this ego by the central ego.
There is a sense, therefore, in which it would be true to say that the attacks of
the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego and upon its associated object
represent an indirect form of repression, whereby the direct repression of
these structures by the central ego is both supplemented and facilitated.
As we have already seen, the subsidiary egos owe their origin to a split of
the undivided ego; but, as we have also seen, what presents itself from a
topographic standpoint as simply a split of the ego presents itself from a
dynamic standpoint as an active rejection and repression of both the subsidiary
egos on the part of the central ego. It thus becomes a matter for some comment
that, whilst both the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur share a common
fate so far as direct repression is concerned, only one of the subsidiary egos,
viz. the libidinal ego, should be subjected to the process of indirect repression.
When the difference between direct and indirect repression is considered in
the light of what has already been said, it is, of course, plain that the process
of repression described by Freud corresponds very much more closely to
what I have described as indirect repression than to what I have described as
direct repression. Nevertheless, when Freuds conception of repression is
compared with my conception of the total phenomenon of repression, both
direct and indirect, this common feature may be detectedthat the libidinal
components in the psyche are subjected to a much greater measure of
repression than the aggressive components. There can be no doubt, or course,
that the repression of aggressive components does occur; but it is difficult to
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see how this fact can be consistently explained in terms of Freuds theory of
the mental apparatus. This theory, conceived as it is in terms of a fundamental
divorce between impulse and structure, would appear to permit only of the
repression of libido; for, in terms of Freuds theory, the repression of aggression
would involve the anomaly of aggression being used to repress aggression.
By contrast, if, in conformity with the point of view which I advocate, we
conceive of impulse as inseparable from structure and as representing simply
the dynamic aspect of structure, the repression of aggressive components in
the psyche is no more difficult to account for than the repression of libidinal
components. It then becomes a question, not of aggression repressing
aggression, but of one ego structure using aggression to repress another ego
structure charged with aggression. This being so, my view to the effect that
the internal saboteur, no less than the libidinal ego, is repressed by the central
ego provides a satisfactory explanation of the repression of aggressive
components. At the same time, the fact that libidinal components are subject
to a greater measure of repression than aggressive components is satisfactorily
explained by means of the conception of indirect repression. The truth would
appear to be that, if the principle of repression governs the disposal of excess
libido in greater measure than it governs the disposal of excess aggression,
the principle of topographical redistribution governs the disposal of excess
aggression in greater measure than it governs the disposal of excess libido.
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child as a parent without breasts; and this is one of the chief reasons that his
relationship with his father has to be established so much more on an emotional
plane than his relationship with his mother. On the other hand, it is because
the child does have the experience of a physical relationship with his mothers
breast, while also experiencing a varying degree of frustration in this
relationship, that his need for his mother persists so obstinately beneath his
need for his father and all subsequent genital needs. When the child comes to
appreciate, in some measure at least, the genital difference between his parents,
and as, in the course of his own development, his physical need tends to flow
increasingly (albeit in varying degrees) through genital channels, his need for
his mother comes to include a need for her vagina. At the same time, his need
for his father comes to include a need for his fathers penis. The strength of
these physical needs for his parents genitals varies, however, in inverse
proportion to the satisfaction of his emotional needs. Thus, the more
satisfactory his emotional relations with his parents, the less urgent are his
physical needs for their genitals. These latter needs are, of course, never
satisfied, although substitutive satisfactions may be sought, e.g. those of
sexual curiosity. Consequently, some measure of ambivalence necessarily
develops in relation to his mothers vagina and his fathers penis. This
ambivalence is reflected incidentally, in sadistic conceptions of the primal
scene. By the time the primal scene is envisaged, however, the relationships
of his parents to one another have become a matter of moment for the child;
and jealousy of each of his parents in relation to the other begins to assert
itself. The chief incidence of his jealousy is, of course, partly determined by
the biological sex of the child; but it is also in no small measure determined by
the state of his emotional relationships with his respective parents. Be this as
it may, the child is now called upon to meet the difficulties of two ambivalent
situations at the same time; and he seeks to meet these difficulties by the
familiar series of techniques. The result is that he internalizes both a bad
maternal genital figure and a bad paternal genital figure and splits each of
these into two figures, which are embodied respectively in the structures of
the exciting object and the rejecting object. It will thus be seen that, before the
child is very old, these internal objects have already assumed the form of
complex composite structures. They are built up partly on a basis of the
superimposition of one object upon another, and partly on a basis of the
fusion of objects. The extent to which the internal objects are built up
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In the light of what has just been said regarding the genesis of (neurotic)
anxiety, it will be noted that my conception of the nature of anxiety is closely
in accord with Freuds original conception, viz. that anxiety is a converted
form of undischarged libido. Here we find but one example of the somewhat
remarkable fact that, if the general standpoint which I have now come to
adopt represents a departure from some of Freuds later views, it has had the
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structural factors and two dynamic factors to conjure with, my theory permits
of a much greater range of permutations and combinations than does Freuds
theory. Actually, however, the possibilities left open by Freuds theory in the
abstract are still further limited by his conception of the function of the super-
ego, which he regards not only as characteristically aggressive, but also as
characteristically anti-libidinal. According to Freud, therefore, the endopsychic
drama largely resolves itself into a conflict between the ego in a libidinal
capacity and the super-ego in an anti-libidinal capacity. The original dualism
inherent in Freuds earliest views regarding repression thus remains
substantially unaffected by his subsequent theory of mental structure. Such
a conception of the endopsychic drama is unduly limiting, not only so far as
its implications for social psychology are concerned (e.g. the implication that
social institutions are primarily repressive), but also so far as concerns its
explanatory value within the psychopathological and characterological fields.
Within these fields explanation reduces itself to an account of the attitudes
adopted by the ego in a libidinal capacity vis--vis the super-ego. By contrast,
my theory possesses all the features of an explanatory system enabling
psychopathological and characterological phenomena of all kinds to be
described in terms of the patterns assumed by a complex of relationships
between a variety of structures. It also possesses the advantage of enabling
psychopathological symptoms to be explained directly in terms of structural
conformations, and thus of doing justice to the unquestionable fact that, so
far from being independent phenomena, symptoms are but expressions of the
personality as a whole.
At this juncture it becomes necessary to point out (if indeed it has not
already become sufficiently obvious) that the basic endopsychic situation
which I have described, and to which I have attached such importance, is by
no means conceived as immutable from the economic standpoint. From the
topographic standpoint, it must be regarded as relatively immutable, although
I conceive it as one of the chief aims of psychoanalytical therapy to introduce
some change into its topography by way of territorial adjustment. Thus I
conceive it as among the most important functions of psychoanalytical therapy
(a) to reduce the split of the original ego by restoring to the central ego a
maximum of the territories ceded to the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur,
and (b) to bring the exciting object and the rejecting object so far as possible
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together within the sphere of influence of the central ego. The extent to which
such changes can be effected appears, however, to be strictly limited. In its
economic aspect, by contrast, the basic endopsychic situation is capable of
very extensive modification. In conformity with this fact, I conceive it as
another of the chief aims of psychoanalytical therapy to reduce to a minimum
(a) the attachment of the subsidiary egos to their respective associated objects,
(b) the aggression of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos and their
objects, and (c) the aggression of the internal saboteur towards the libidinal
ego and its object. On the other hand, the basic endopsychic situation is
undoubtedly capable of consideraable modification in a psychopathological
direction. As I have already indicated, the economic pattern of the basic
endopsychic situation is the pattern which prevails in hysterical states. Of
this I have no doubt whatsoever in my own mind. I have, however, come
across cases of hysterical individuals who displayed remarkably paranoid
traits (even to the point of having been previously diagnosed as paranoid)
and who were found, on analysis, to oscillate between paranoid and hysterical
attitudes. Such oscillations appeared to be accompanied by changes in the
economic pattern of the endopsychic situation the paranoid phases being
characterized by a departure from the economic pattern of what I have called
the basic endopsychic situation. What economic pattern the endopsychic
situation assumes in the paranoid state I do not feel in a position to say; but
I do venture to suggest that corresponding to every distinguishable clinical
state there is a characteristic pattern of the endopsychic situation. It must be
recognized, of course, that various patterns may exist side by side or be
superimposed one upon the other. It must also be recognized that patterning
of the endopsychic situation may either be rigid or flexibleextreme rigidity
and extreme flexibility being alike unfavourable features. At the same time, it
must be stressed that the basic (and original) endopsychic situation is that
which is found in hysterical states. In conformity with this consideration, I
take the view that the earliest psychopathological symptoms to manifest
themselves are hysterical in character; and I interpret the screaming fits of the
infant in this sense. If I am right in this, Freud showed no mean insight in
choosing hysterical phenomena as the material out of which to build the
foundations of psychoanalytical theory.
In the light of considerations already advanced it will be understood, of
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132
ADDENDUM
(1951)
As has been stated in the preface, the series of papers which constitute Part
1 of this book, and among which the above paper finds a place, is a series
representing, not the systematic elaboration of an already established point
of view, but the progressive development of a line of thought. In these
circumstances it is inevitable that certain of the views expressed later in the
series will be found to conflict with, and even contradict, views expressed
earlier in the series. Actually, very few of the contradictions which have arisen
are of serious moment, since in most cases the reasons for the replacement of
one view by another are clearly stated in the argument for the later view.
Unfortunately, however, this does not hold true in every case; and, in
retrospect, I cannot help recognizing the presence of two serious contradictions
between views expressed in the above paper and views expressed in A
Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Psychoneuroses. Thus in
the earlier paper my classification of the four transitional defensive techniques
is based upon a distinction between two internalized objects which I describe
as the accepted object and the rejected object respectively; and the
distinctive features of each technique is related to a characteristic method of
dealing with these two objects according as they are treated, separately or
together, as internal or external. In the later paper I do not speak of the
accepted object and the rejected object; but I do speak of the exciting
object and the rejecting object in describing the establishment of the basic
endopsychic situation. It will be noticed that, in previously describing internal
objects as accepted and rejected, I was considering their status from the
point of view of the attitude adopted by the ego towards them, whereas, in
describing internal objects as exciting and rejecting, I was considering
their status from the point of view of the light in which they presented
themselves to the ego. These two points of view are different; but I do not
think that they are irreconcilable, since the attitude adopted by an ego-structure
towards an object must necessarily be related to the light in which the object
presents itself. However, the contrast between accepted and rejected is
not strictly parallel to the contrast between exciting and rejecting; for,
whilst rejecting is the obverse of rejected, exciting cannot be regarded as
the obverse of accepted, especially since the exciting object is described
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136