Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1-Macariola Vs Asuncion
1-Macariola Vs Asuncion
Same; Same; Respondent judge did not acquire property at bar during the Same; Respondent acted in good faith in approving project of partition
prohibited period.In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge without the signature of the parties where the lawyers manifested that
purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil they were authorized to sign the same by the clients.I agree with
Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed
the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to
respondents order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of
November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition record of Mrs. Macariola, that he was authorized by his client to submit
made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969).
there was no appeal from said orders. While it is true that such, written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
Same; Same; Incapacity of judges to acquire property involved in cases corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one
before their sala does not apply where property was not acquired from that was presented as respondents Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
any of the parties to the case.Furthermore, respondent Judge did not Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of
buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto.
Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased
on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla
1
Same; While a judge may not have acquired property in litigation before law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
him in the technical sense, it was, however, improper for him to have public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
done so under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.Finally, while it is true that
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Law defined.Political Law has
respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and
litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired
defined the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory
the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that
Ethics which requires that: A judges official conduct should be free from
political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections.
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
everyday life, should be beyond reproach. And as aptly observed by the
nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
imvestigating Justice: x x it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of
business; hence, political in essence.
property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce
at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the prohibiting certain public officers from engaging in business activities is
judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust political in nature and has already been abrogated with the transfer of
of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly sovereignty from Spain, to the United States and later to the Republic of
honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for the Philippines.Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
and distrust. political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Constitutional Law; The
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
provision of the Code of Commerce incapacitating judges and justices and
other public officers from engaging in business is part of Political Law.It Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.There appears no enabling or
is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to
laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
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binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case
Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent
Same; Anti-Graft Law; A judge cannot be held guilty of violating the Anti-
Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of
Graft Law where there is no showing that he intervened in the business or
his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
transactions of a commercial firm.Respondent Judge cannot be held
liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that Same; Constitutional Law; Judges are not prohibited from engaging or
respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the having any interest in any lawful business.Furthermore, respondent is
business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the. business of the corporation in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an
which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging
with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind or having interest in any lawful business.
where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the
Same; Same; Same.It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as
Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application
amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition
prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law,
on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene. (I)t is not
the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the
enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary
district judge concerned.
that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or
transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Anti-Graft Law; Civil Service;
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this Although Civil Service regulations prohibit public officers from engaging in
crime. business without prior authority of his department head, violation of such
administrative rule does not constitute violation of the Anti-Graft Law.In
Same; Same; Same.It does not appear also from the records that the
addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made
aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business
pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee
operations by reason of respondents financial involvement in it, or that
in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or
the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the
department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of
corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No.
paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because
4234 entitled Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales,
the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the
et. al., wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E
3
Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be
business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another
service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the
from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely,
as defined by law. serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Section 12 of the Civil Service Act and RA. Same; Same; Same; Same; Only permanent officers in the classified
2260, of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations do not apply to members service are subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner.
of the Judiciary.On the contention of complainant that respondent Judges do not fall under this category.There is no question that a judge
Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government
that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid
Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do provision. We have already ruled that x x in interpreting Section 16(i) of
not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: No Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and
officer or employee shall engaged directly in any private business, employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial credit, jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
Same; Being an officer of a business corporation is violative of the Canons
the Head of Department x x. It must be emphasized at the outset that
of Judicial Ethics. However, in the case at bar respondent judge and his
respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act
wife sold their shares already without a short time after acquisitiona
No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and
commendable act.WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that
by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges are not officers or employees subject to the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties,
the disciplinary authority of the Civil Service Commission.However, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway
judges cannot be considered us subordinate civil service officers or benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed
employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the
Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on
Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the
Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said
Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
2260 [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the
other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art X, 1973 corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their
4
interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25.
Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve commendation for their
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it
became involved in any court litigation. MAKASIAR, J.:
Same; It is but natural for a judge to believe that a person who publicly In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola
holds himself out as an Attorney-at-Law is a bona fide member of the charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance
Bar.The respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with acts
impostor and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a unbecoming a judge.
bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this
assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals
to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case
Attorney-at-Law (Exh. I and I-1) to indicate his office, and it was but was referred on October 28. 1968 for investigation, thus:
natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a
that statement on its face value. complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa,
Fernando, C.J.: Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes,
plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the
Took no part. properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of
the plaintiff and defendant.
Barredo, J.:
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged
I vote with Justice Aquino.
among other things that: a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter
Aquino, J.: of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased
were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first
I vote for respondents unqualified exoneration.
marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining
Took no part. plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage
with Irene Ondes; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the
Escolin, J.: conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no
Took no part. properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d)
if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Acts unbecoming a judge.
5
first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes
to defendant it being the share of the latters deceased mother, Felisa Diaz, a hereditary share of one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of
Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil
Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages. Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the
plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion
Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola,
in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528;
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties,
Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an within thirty days after this judgment shall have become final to submit to
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, this court, for approval a project of partition of the hereditary estate in
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may,
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the
to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the
exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of the second named; and (11) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp.
her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of 27-29 of Exh. C].
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on
one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez
partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of
in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
hereunder in full:
3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the
division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner
6
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
for approval the following project of partition:
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case,
Atty. for the
to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition: Defendant
1. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Tacloban City
Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
7
SO ORDERED. wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh 11), which particular portion was declared
by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION
their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to The Traders
Judge Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. (Exh. 15 & 16). At the time of
said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan,
EXH. B. Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latters
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation
the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of of The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. which we shall
title to the respective adjudicates in conformity with the project of henceforth refer to as TRADERS were registered with the Securities and
partition (see Exh. U). Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385,
rec.].
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184
or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant
which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1]
deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the
the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita, Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which
Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by
the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the
lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V). Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 12, Rule XVIII
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by
Asuncions court (Exhs. F. F-1 and V-1). while Lot 1184-E which had an associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the
Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling
the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12). an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of Lot fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his
name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of
8
the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and
and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.). respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August
31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to
Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus,
which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In
Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla
Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigating, report and
and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty.
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted
Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant
her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge
herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First
respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by
under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National
action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234,
exonerated. rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
of First Instance of Leyte, entitled Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants. which was docketed as Civil
of the Project of Partition [Exhibit B] and the two Orders [Exhibits C
Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made
and C-3] approving the partition;
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued
by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the (2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears,
however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For (3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant
one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, (a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for
having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to moral damages;
respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.00] for
against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that exemplary damages;
she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil
9
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant
damages; and Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent
Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
(d) the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [P10,000.00] for Attorneys Fees.
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. That Article
HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN provides:
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin; a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and
the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit. xx xx xx
10
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two
1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the
rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of
portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality
the sale on March 6, 1965, respondents order dated October 23, 1963
of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010
and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October
and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11,
16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision,
1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March
can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid factsthat the
6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from
effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision
three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
or orders.
Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may
be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge
adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil
Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of
same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no
As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of
Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz
subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the
was the president and his wife was the secretary; took place long after the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether
aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition. or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or subsequent transfer of the whole lot to TRADERS of which respondent
11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as
11
was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24,
Order of respondent approving the pro ject of partition, Exh. A. January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was
any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the
appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the
transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-
only one that was presented as respondents Exh. 10, certain actuations
E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr.
of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the
Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him
contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondents Memorandum).
conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
xx xx xx
1) Exh. 9Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the
Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a
share (Exh. 9-a). On this certificate of title the Order dated November
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and
record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere dummy of registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon
appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, 2) Exh. 7Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by
and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector
faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154.
intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
394, rec.). said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her
share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The
illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not signed by deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520
the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
Justice, as follows:
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was
signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending
project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was
error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifaco complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after
Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola. that he was authorized by the preparation of the project of partition.
12
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of
her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: A judges official
3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A, Such contention conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
one-fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainants And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: x x it was unwise and
mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a
whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his
C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his
Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies
Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of
reason than that she was well aware of the distribution of the properties maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so
of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be
point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot
Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
that she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly
3010 relative to the project of partition. believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that
he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to
litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself
her the properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least
and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were
valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive
financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and
related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010.
distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010,
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market
the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the
value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the
honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of
record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the
justice (pp. 395-396, rec.).
properties of complainants father (pp. 386-389, rec).
II
Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper
13
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said
with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the
corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article
State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its
provides that:
territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled
98 that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections.
Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
Article 14The following cannot engage in. commerce, either in person nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial business; hence, political in essence.
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish
they discharge their duties:
Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department Comision de Codification de las Provincias de Ultramar, which was
of public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and
applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later
functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of
xx xx xx this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign,
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
commerce in a determinate territory. affirmative act of the new sovereign.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 s
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial [1912]) that:
laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to
another, either following a conquest or otherwise, * * * those laws which
14
are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity
government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. of the aforestated provision of the Code of Com merce after the change of
(Opinion, Atty. Gen ., July 10, 1899). sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of
the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with
legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge
the laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express
of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of
assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not.
Appeals.
(Hallecks Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the
prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated
of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Congress in time of peace. (Elys Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins, Cos. vs. 356
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
Marshall said:
hereby declared to be unlawful:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the
xx xx xx
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes
denominated political is necessarily changed, although that which or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
force, until altered by the newly created power of the State. Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened
stated that: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business
abrogated. of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no
relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said
corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in
15
his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known
case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that
which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges
indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law
official duty to intervene, (I)t is not enough to be a public official to be after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.
subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from
intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who
engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated
intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office
automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America,
cannot commit this crime (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp.
because it is political in nature.
134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. II
[1976]). Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation
court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to
gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of
respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took
respondents financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited
place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his
in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It in
two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no
undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the
longer subject of litigation.
Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party
plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled Ber nardita R. In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al., wherein the pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of
connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because
January 31. 1967. the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the
Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because
business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil
Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of
service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission
the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
16
from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service,
as defined by law. remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote
him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section
him in an amount not exceeding six months salary. Thus, a violation of
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act
Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil
of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated
service officers and employees.
thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the
members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: No officer or employee However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers
shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the
undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department x Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative
x. Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief
Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No.
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of
2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only
the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise
other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973
Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be
Constitution.
considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another
then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Comissioner of ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the
Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely,
inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which serious misconduct and inefficiency.
alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction
investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final
Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and
personnel of the Judiciary. upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such
officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: The regulations governing the administration of discipline (italics supplied).
Commissioner may, for x x violation of the existing Civil Service Law and There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
17
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
that x x in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or
emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22
the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710, 713 realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the
[1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]). aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private
incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation.
business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of III
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged
impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard
the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that: of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and
utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises
of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because
which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his
the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent
accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously
portion of her report which reads as follows:
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably The basis for complainants third cause of action is the claim that
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan
the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. x x x Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan
does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his
Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation
and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that The respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an
the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or impostor and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this
the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that
18
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge
to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more
Attorney-at Law (Exh. I and I-1) to indicate his office, and it was but discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a
natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety
that statement on its face value. but most always be above suspicion.
Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF
guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE
permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tans child at baptism (Exh. AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of
SO ORDERED.
violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with
Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez,
judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to
Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law Fernando,C.J., took no part.
from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, Barredo, J., I vote with Justice Aquino.
if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor
said Dominador Tan. Aquino, J., I vote for respondents unqualified exoneration.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising Abad Santos and Escolin JJ., no part.
attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion that his social
or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining Respondent reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
his judicial course (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does activities.
have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for
Notes.A judge is the visible representation of law and justice. Acts, such
disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations
as poking a gun, throws an indelible stain on the Judiciary. (Fonacier-
beclouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
Abao vs. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538.)
friends (pp. 403-405, rec).
Undue delay in deciding a land registration case and submitting falsified
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of
certification of disposition of cases requires imposition of penalty
the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a
equivalent to 3 months salary as fine. (Lamboloto vs. Garcia, 107 SCRA
parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in
594.)
19
A judge who imposed excessive bail bond is fined the equivalent of two Malfeasance in office cannot be charged except for breach of a positive
months salary. (Suga vs. Salud, 109 SCRA 253.) statutory duty or for the performance of a discretionary act with an
improper for corrupt motive. (Valdezo vs. Valero, 81 SCRA 246.)
Charge that trial judge erred in dismissing a estafa case based on non-
payment of lease rental is without legal basis. Complainant who is a Charges of misconduct against judges should be proven by clear and
member of the Bar should instead be the one investigated for possible convincing evidence. (People vs. Rodriguez, 81 SCRA 208.) Macariola vs.
improper conduct for making his lessees sign that they are liable for Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, Adm. Case No. 133-J May 31, 1982
estafa if they failed to pay their rent. (De la Cruz vs. De Leon, 109 SCRA
74.)
A judge may only notarize documents connected with the exercise of his
official duties. (Borre vs. Moya, 100 SCRA 314.)
Executive Judge should see to it that stenographic notes are taken during
the raffle of cases. (Borre vs. Moya, 100 SCRA 314.)
Members of the bench should refrain from any conduct that would in any
way give rise to a suspicion, whether unfounded or not, that he exhibits
more concern for those blessed with affluence. (Azurpado vs. Buenviaje,
82 SCRA 369.)
20