Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rem 276 635
Rem 276 635
Ramos
G.R. No. L-24358, 38 SCRA 194, March 31, 1971
Facts:
The petitioner files an action for the satisfaction of a final judgment for damages rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Quezon City. The provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon on
February 25, 1963. But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of the deceased David Guevara, together with the judgment
debtors, sought to prevent the sale at public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way of
inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated
thereon. On account, however, of an indemnity bond posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment creditors the
provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded with the auction sale at which said Bernabe Flores was the successful bidder.
Immediately thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned his right as such purchaser to Maximo Calalang, the judgment creditors'
own counsel.
The judgment debtors in civil case having failed to redeem the property within the one-year period for
redemption, the provincial sheriff of Rizal executed in favor of Bernabe Flores an "Officer's Deed of Absolute
Sale". Thereafter Bernabe Flores moved in the court below for a writ of possession directing the judgment debtors to
vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession of the same to Bernabe Flores, his heirs, representatives
and assigns. This was opposed by the judgment debtors, who pointed out that the parcel of land sold at the execution
sale was owned and possessed by the third-party claimants who had filed their claim with the provincial sheriff and, in
fact, had earlier brought the corresponding action in court to vindicate the same. The opposition was overruled; the court a
quo granted the writ of possession prayed for and accordingly directed the provincial sheriff of Rizal to place Bernabe
Flores and/or his representative in possession of the property. But the provincial sheriff of Rizal was unable to enforce the
writ of possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants, who had meanwhile taken possession by virtue of
their claim of ownership over the same.
In an order dated March 23, 1965, the lower court served notice upon the third-party claimants to vacate the
premises in question on or before March 31, 1965, on pain of being punished for contempt. Soon thereafter they and the
judgment debtors came to this Court on the instant petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction principally to prevent
enforcement of the aforementioned "writ of possession." On March 31, 1965 this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction asked for, enjoining respondents . . ." from enforcing the order of March 23, 1965, in Civil Case of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, for the purpose of preserving the rights of the parties to the case, until further orders from this
Court.
Issue :
1. Whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants' assertion of ownership over a portion of the land
sold on execution may defeat the purchaser's right to have possession of the same after the expiration of the
one-year redemption period allowed by law.
2. Would such right to possession be defeated by the fact that a third party, not privy to the judgment debtor,
claims to be the owner of the same property?
Held:
The petition is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved.
It has been held that where a parcel levied upon execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the
procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Such a hearing,
however, was not necessary in this case for two reasons: The third party-claimants here were not in possession of the
disputed land when it was sold at public auction on February 25, 1963, pursuant to the writ of execution. By the judgment-
debtors' own admission in their opposition to the motion for a writ of possession, the third-party claimants occupied the
said land only after they had commenced Civil Case on June 10, 1963. They were not in possession when they filed their
third-party claim February 13, 1963. (2) When the land was levied upon and when it was sold on execution it was declared
for taxation in the names of the judgment debtors, who were the ones then in possession. Quite obviously the third-party
claimants belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser's right to the same in accordance with
the provision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set
aside only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties' claim of ownership.
The said claim is not foreclosed by the writ of possession issued by the lower court, being precisely the subject of
litigation in Civil Case No. 7720 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Since the issuance of such writ was proper, the
court a quo acted within its jurisdiction when it poised the threat of contempt against any willful defiance thereof by the
third-party claimants.
Facts:
In this case, notice of levy was filed with the City Assessors Office on two tax declarations covering the properties
in question and not on the title itself as provided for by the Land Registration Act, which requires all transactions
respecting property covered by Torrens Titles to be recorded with the Register of Deeds. Consequently, the levy made by
the Special Sheriff herein could not bind the land nor create a lien on the property.
The spouses Manuel and Natalia Carpena Opulencia became indebted to petitioner Delta Motor Corporation for
the construction of the building, supply and installation of their ice plant equipment the total amount of P1,438,090.58. As
security for the payment of these obligations, they executed a real estate mortgage over their land, building and ice plant
equipment in favor of Delta. Ms. Opulencia failed to pay their obligation, Delta filed a complaint against them before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch.
Opulencia entered into a compromise agreement confessing to an obligation plus 12% annual interest, payable
without need of demand in eighty-four (84) equal monthly installments beginning 30 April 1978. The Trial Court approved
the aforesaid agreement, for failure of the Opulencias to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise
Agreement, the Trial Court issued a Writ of Execution for the full compromise amount. The sale, however, was not
registered and annotated at the back of the covering title of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, until approximately four
(4) years later, for the reason that the title still had to be judicially reconstituted after the said title was burned when the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City was razed by fire and the owners copy was also lost.
Issue :
Whether or not the the levy and sale on execution and of the Writ of Possession ensued is valid.
Held:
It was held that on a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, the Appellate Court, in its Decision promulgated on
19 February 1987, reversed the Trial Court holding that the actuations of the special sheriff from levy on the properties to
the issuance of certificates of sale. Not only are the foregoing findings of fact of respondent Appellate Court entitled to the
highest respect from, and binding, on this Court but its conclusions derived from those facts are supported by law and
jurisprudence.
It is basic that sales on execution must be preceded by a prior levy on execution. The levy on execution of a
judgment consists in the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the property of the
judgment debtor for purposes of the prospective execution sale. Levy is the essential act by which the property is set
apart for the satisfaction of the judgment and taken into custody of the law. And in case of levy upon a realty, notice of
levy is required to be filed with the Register of Deeds.
In this petition for review, petitioner Philippine Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. takes exception from the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that notice to the occupant of a real property is a prerequisite to a valid levy of execution
upon that property, and reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Sheriff of Manila, on June 17,
1960, levied on all the interests and participation of Candido Fajardo in a parcel of land registered in his name. Beatriz
Zabal presented for registration a deed of sale whereby Candido Fajardo appeared to have conveyed to her the parcel of
land. Thereupon, the Registrar of Deeds cancelled the certificate in the name of Fajardo and issued in the name of Beatriz
Zabal. But, as the notice of levy in favor of the surety company was carried at the back of the new certificate, Zabal went
to the Court of First Instance of Manila praying for the cancellation of the annotation, on the ground that she was already
the owner of the land when it was registered, and that the levy on the property was irregular and improper.
Therein defendants Philippine Surety & Insurance Company, the Sheriff of Manila and the Register of Deeds for
Manila, set up as defense the alleged superiority of the lien, created by the prior registration of the levy, over the sale in
favor of the plaintiff. The trial court thereafter ruled adversely against the plaintiff and ordered dismissal of the complaint.
On appeal by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals, however, the decision of the trial court was reversed. The
appellate court, ordering the dissolution of the attachment and the cancellation of the notice of levy at the back of TCT No.
64730.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals cancellation of the notice of levy is valid. And
how various classes of real and personal property attached.
Held:
The Rule has been held essential to the validity of an attachment lien; so where the return of the sheriff shows
that this step was not taken, the attachment is invalid and no lien in favor of the attachment creditor is acquired thereby. It
results that the notice to the occupant is essential to the validity of the attachment, non-compliance with which renders the
attachment invalid and ineffective particularly to herein plaintiff who was in possession as vendee.
The property of the defendant shall be attached by the officer executing the order of the following manner , that
registration of an attachment makes it superior to a prior unregistered sale presupposes a valid levy and plaintiff
challenges the efficacy of the levy. In violation of the requirements of Section 7(a) of Rule 59. A proceeding by attachment
being in derogation of the common law, the officer must comply with the statutes in making the levy. Under a statute
similar to Section 7(a), Rule 59, it has been held that failure to comply with such a requirement is fatal to the validity of the
levy. Otherwise stated, service on the occupant, if any must appear from the return or else the service on its face is
unauthorized and invalid.
To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific things: (1) file with the register of deeds a
copy of the order, description of the attached property and notice of attachment, and (2) leave with the occupant of the
property copy of the same order, description and notice. These are prerequisites to a valid levy, non-compliance with any
of which is fatal. For the weight of authority is to the effect that a special statutory provision, respecting the manner of
carrying out levy of attachment, must be strictly complied with, and departure there from shall invalidate th
279 Top Rate International Services Inc.. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
The two consolidated petitions before us seek to annul the decisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R.
No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in G.R. No. 68257 dated June 6, 1984, respectively. The two decisions both upheld
the validity of the levy made on two properties whose ownership is claimed by petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the
value of said properties are far in excess of the amount of the liens thereon. The decisions are based on the ground that
what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but only the vendor's equity of redemption. The
petitioner also asks that the resolutions of the appellate court denying its motions for reconsideration be set aside,
The Petitioner Top Rate International, Inc. (Top Rate) filed a third-party claim in Civil Case alleging that the
properties involved therein had been sold to it for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) with the approval of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceeding in the course of the involuntary insolvency proceedings filed against
Consolidated Mines. Petitioner, therefore, asked that the attachment made on these properties be discharged.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court ordered the lifting and setting aside of the levy on attachment on the
two properties involved while in Civil Case No. 142443, the trial court issued the same order maintaining, however, the
levy on attachment on the property covered by TCT No. 79776 in favor of plaintiff Rodrigo Tan. The plaintiffs in the above
civil cases appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled.
Held:
It was ruled that levy upon the mortgagor's incorporeal right or equity of redemption, it was not necessary for the
sheriff to have taken physical possession of the mortgaged taxicabs. Levying upon the property itself is distinguishable
from levying on the judgment debtor's interest in it. That interest could be levied upon by means of writ of execution issued
by the Manila Court as had been done in the case of property encumbered by a chattel mortgage. It is, therefore, error on
the part of the petitioner to say that since private respondents' lien is only a total of P343,227.40, they cannot be entitled
to the equity of redemption because the exercise of such right would require the payment of an amount which cannot be
less than P40,000,000.00.
The decisions are based on the ground that what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves
but only the vendor's equity of redemption. It was found that no merit in the contention of respondent Top Rate
International Services that its right over the properties in question based on the deed of sale in its favor confirming the
contract to sell of in favor of El Grande Development Corporation, should be recognized as superior to the right of
petitioner under the writ of attachment issued in his favor and registered on October 1, 1981 because it succeeded to the
rights of the twelve (12) consortium of banks which hold a mortgage over said properties registered on December 20,
1978. Said sale was not actually a sale or assignment by the banks of their rights as mortgagee over said properties but a
sale of said properties by the mortgagor, Consolidated Mines, Inc. with the consent of the mortgagee. The consortium of
banks could not have sold the properties to Top Rate International Services except through foreclosure proceedings, for
as mortgagees they have no right to appropriate for themselves or dispose of the mortgaged properties (Article 2088, Civil
Code Appropriation of the mortgaged properties of sale by the mortgagee of said property even if stipulated by the parties
would be nun and void being what is known as pactum commissorium. In the present case the sale of the properties by
Consolidated Mines, Inc. to Top Rate International Services with the consent of the mortgagee banks under an
arrangement where the purchase price of P40,000,000.00 would be paid directly to the banks did not adversely affect the
rights of plaintiff under the writ of attachment issued in the present case.
The appellate court also found that the Regional Trial Court in the insolvency proceedings dismissed the petition
to declare Consolidated Mines, Inc. insolvent on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the same because the
petitioners in said case were not residents of the Philippines and, thus, not qualified to file said petition. It, therefore, ruled
that the claim of Top Rate over said properties based on the approval of the sale in its favor by the insolvency court must
necessarily fail.
Facts:
Eusebio Bernabes (judgment debtor) properties were garnished and sold in an auction sale to satisfy a judgment
in a civil case for damages, ordered by the court of Judge Fernando Cruz, in favor of EnriqueDe Leon. The highest bidder for
the total sum of P 30,194.00 was Aurora de Leon, sister of judgment creditor and herein petitioner. Bernabe was given a redemption period
of one (1) year commencing from the time of the auction sale, however, instead of redeeming his properties, he filed a case to annul the
auction sale on the ground of gross inadequacy of price and for the ordering of a new auction sale. He claimed that his
properties, taken together, can cost around P400, 000.00. This second case was assigned to the court of Judge Serafin Salvador who
issued a writ of injunction against respondents and summarily granted the motions of Bernabe. Hence, Aurora files this
case questioning the jurisdiction of Judge Salvador to issue such orders.
Issue:
1. Can the auction sale be annulled on the ground of inadequacy of price?
Held:
No. In ordinary sales, by reasons of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of
price. In forced sales, as when a sale is made at a public auction, the owner has the right to redeem. When there is a right
to redeem, inadequacy of price is immaterial because judgment debtor can better acquire the property or also sell his right
to redeem and thus recover the loss claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained from the auction sale.
An action of desahuciowas instituted in the City Court of Quezon City by petitioner Ong against his lessee,
Evangeline Roces. In Court of First Instance, the judgment of the City Court was set aside and Roces was then ordered
vacate plaintiff's premises and to pay rentals in arrears. The decision became final and executory. The City Court
then directed execution of the judgment. Accordingly, the sheriff cleared the premises of its occupants, which included
Anacleto Tating (Evangeline's stepfather and lawyer), Marilyn Tating and Robert Tating.
The sheriff also levied on certain chattels found in the place. Marilyn and Robert sought to retrieve these
appliances from the sheriff, alleging that the articles belonged to them and not to Roces. Robert and Marilyn then filed
with the sheriff a third party claim. They later filed with the City Court an urgent motion for suspension of Sheriff Sale and
for Release of Properties Wrongfully levied upon on execution. In order for the execution Saleto proceed, Ong posted
two surety bonds to indemnify the sheriff for any liability for damages. However, the City Court later restrained the sale
and set the Tatings' motions for hearing.Ong presented an "Omnibus Opposition" contending that the Tatings' motions
should have been filed with the Court of First Instance since it was the latter's decision which was being executed; and
that, the Tatings' remedy was to file an action for damages against the indemnity bonds after the auction sale. A motion to
inhibit was later filed by Ong but was denied by the City Court .Ong then filed with the CFI a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with application for preliminary injunction but the CFI directed the maintenance of thestatus quoand
commanded that the City Court refrain from hearing and deciding the third party claims and the urgent motion
for suspension of Sheriff's Sale, etc. until the resolution of the injunction.
Later, the CFI ruled that the procedure followed by said private respondents in vindicating their rights over levied
appliances is not the one sanctioned by law for they should have filed a separate and independent action. Thus, the
parties, the deputy sheriff and the petitioner are responsible for the execution and Ong is entitled to relief.
Thus, the Tatings appealed to the CA via a petition for review. The CA expressed puzzlement why the matter of
the execution and related incidents were passed upon by the lower court, when the only issue was the correctness of the
City Judge's refusal to inhibit himself. The CA then denied the motion for Judge Laquio, Jr. to inhibit himself from the
ejectment case and remanded the case to the City Court presided over by Judge Laquio, Jr. for further proceedings. Ong
now prays for the reversal of the decision of the CA, and the perpetual inhibition of the City Judge from further hearing
and deciding the Tatings' third-party claims.
Issue:
Whether the correct remedy by the Tatings to the CA from the decision of the CFI was appeal a petition for
review and not appeal?
Held:
Yes. Money judgments are enforceable only against property unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.
Therefore, the sheriff acts properly only when he subjects to execution property undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor.
When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor holds no right or interest, the
supervisory power of the Court which has authorized execution may be invoked by the third person. Upon due application by the third
person, and after summary hearing, the Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the
rightful owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to a determination of whether the
sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment. The Court can require the
sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence. It is rather simply an invocation of
the Court's power of supervision and control over the actuations of it officers and employees.
Facts:
Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development Corporation. To satisfy
the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest development Corporation with
the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial
court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not
there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same
intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information concerning to bank deposits.
Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processes garnishing the bank
deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
Held:
No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not
the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until
further order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405
does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case,
and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to
conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if
ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
Facts:
On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of
garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) in the sum of P12,724.66 deposited with
the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La Union filed an administrative complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse
of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore may
not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability,
putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not PNB may be sued.
Held:
Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. PVTA is also a
public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has entered with them into a
commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation.
Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB
La Union is denied.
2. No. The filing by a party of two apparently different actions, but with the same objective, constitutes forum-
shopping. Here, the special civil action of certiorari before us is an independent action. The ultimate purpose
of such action is to keep the inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from
arbitrary acts of the court.In contrast, the petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule 42
involves an evaluation of the case on the merits. Clearly, petitioner did not commit forum-shopping.
In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other
positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFIin 1973 declared
abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and
other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed.
In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full.In
1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The
City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at
public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The
City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution.
Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three (3) more vehicles.
On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14
claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the
check but the City Treasurer can not do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde
ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of
Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the
garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the
funds of the city.
Issue:
Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished to satisfy Santiagos claim.
Held:
Garnishment is considered a species of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim
property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the
defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities whether by general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation
as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suie is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when
the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to
determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such
statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that
the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is
not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by
law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of
Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for
Santiagos back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court
could then be validly enforced against such funds.
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant Carlos Doronilla filed civil case in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in which it was asked that
the auction sale above referred to be set aside and that he be declared the sole owner of the property in question, it being
claimed by him that the same was conveyed to him by Mariano B. Arroyo first, under a sale by installment executed on
June 10, 1933 and, later, under a definite sale executed on February 11, 1935. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo
rendered judgment declaring the transfer relied upon by Carlos Doronilla null and void of the levy and sale sought to be
annulled. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals this judgment was affirmed on March 31, 1937. On April 12, 1937, Carlos
Doronilla offered to redeem the controvert property, at the same time depositing with the provincial sheriff of Iloilo the
sum of P4,608.00 covering the full amount of the purchase price at the auction sale plus the corresponding interest.
Redemption was refused on the ground that the period provided by law for that purpose had already expired. In view of
such refusal on the part of the provincial sheriff to allow the tendered redemption, Carlos Doronilla instituted this civil case
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the purpose of annulling the deed of absolute sale executed by the provincial
sheriff in favor of Dolores Vasquez and of compelling the latter and the said sheriff to permit Carlos Doronilla to redeem
the land in question. The trial court dismissed the complaint principally on the ground that the period for the redemption of
the land sold at public auction by the provincial sheriff to Dolores Vasquez on July 27, 1935 had already expired. it is from
this decision that plaintiff-appellant Carlos Doronilla had brought the present appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the rights of Carlos Doronilla to redeem the property in question.
2. Is there error on the expiration of the time of redemption.
Held:
Following the line of approach of the trial judge, we do not consider it necessary to determine the first question for
the reason that if, as found by the trial court, the time for redemption had already expired, it would serve no purpose to
consider whether the appellant had that right.
Section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment debtor or redeemer may redeem the
property from the purchaser at any time within twelve months after the sale, and it is admitted by the appellant that, if the
time during which civil case was pending from September 23, 1935 to March 31, 1937 is not deducted, the tendered
redemption was made beyond the twelve months period fixed in the aforesaid legal provision. The appellant, however,
invokes equitable considerations in favor of the redemption and argues with vehemence that it would be unfair to count
the period during which civil case No. 10269 was pending, because he could not be expected to claim merely the right of
redemption when in said action he sought a judicial declaration of absolute ownership. While redemption must be effected
within the time prescribed, there are indeed cases where, having in view the purpose sought to be achieved by statutory
provisions of this kind and principally to promote justice and avoid injustice, courts may be reasonable construction allow
redemption notwithstanding the actual expiration of the period fixed in the statute. We have, however, inquired into the
equities of this case and have come to the conclusion that the judgment of the lower court should not be disturbed.
As herein before mentioned, the conveyance alleged to have been made by Mariano B. Arroyo in favor of the
appellant and relied upon by the latter in claiming ownership in civil case was found to be fraudulent. The appellant
cannot be said to have had no conscious collaboration in the fraud intended by Mariano B. Arroyo to defeat the judgment
for alimony rendered against him in civil case No. 9031 in favor of the herein appellate, Dolores Vasquez.
In view of all the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we are convinced that the appellant has not come to
the court with clean hands and we are accordingly constrained to rule that this case is not a fitting example that calls for
the extension, on equitable considerations, of that period of redemption fixed in section 465 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in the sense desired by the appellant.
Issue: Whether or not UNICOM had validly redeemed the subject property.
Held: No. his claim has no merit. Petitioners maintain that the CA committed grave and reversible error when it declared
that the Compromise Agreement between petitioner IBMC and respondent Dy did not preclude the filing of the mandamus
case.
The CA held that the May 7, 1990 Compromise Agreement did not bar the filing of the present suit. It ratiocinated
that while there was an identity of parties between Civil Case and the petition for mandamus, there was no identity of
subject matter; hence, res judicata did not apply.
On the issue of redemption, the CA concluded that UNICOM failed to pay the additional amount
demanded by the Provincial Treasurer as additional redemption price. Due to such failure, UNICOM failed to
satisfy the total redemption price; thus, the redemption made by UNICOM was not valid. The CA also held that
since UNICOM failed to properly redeem the subject property, respondents purchase of the disputed lot at the tax
delinquency sale had become final; thus, Henry Dy was entitled to the issuance of a final bill of sale.
facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu declaring the deed of
redemption executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the petitioners motion that the Registrar of Deeds of the
City of Cebu be directed to transfer the Owners Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from
Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name.cralawnad
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued on February 5, 1979 by the
respondent judge and to a court order dated June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, Et. Al. v. Marcelo Sotto,
Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
Issue/s:
whether or not "RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ENTITLED TO REDEEM
UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION
AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
held:
Yes.Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
"SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or
any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following
persons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property;"
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof,
subsequent to the judgment under which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a
redemptioner."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his successor-in-
interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent courts orders declaring the deed of redemption null
and void and denying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilde Palicte are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as stated above.
Facts: petitioners are precisely claiming title adverse to that of the judgment debtor. The judgment debtors are the widow
and children of the deceased David Guevara, while petitioners are brothers and sisters of said deceased who are
"asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one-
half of the value of the house situated thereon.
Issue: whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants assertion of ownership over a portion of the land sold on
execution may defeat the purchaser s right to have possession of the same after the expiration of the one-year
redemption period allowed by law.
Held: No. redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a
conveyance and possession of the property (sold on execution). This of course, is on the assumption that the property
belonged to the judgment debtor or to one who claims under him as his successor after the execution. As the purchaser in
the present case has already received the definitive deed of sale and become the owner of the property bought, he should
be entitled to its possession and cannot be excluded therefrom by one, who, according to the same complaint, merely
claims to be a successor in interest of the judgment debtor. unless it is adjudged that this alleged successor has a better
right to the property than the purchaser.
291 . Uchuan v CA
facts: On November 3, 1976, Flora Jaldon, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Manuel Jaldon, Jr., mortgaged a parcel
of land located in Cagayan De Oro City, containing an area of 184 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-7564, to the Philippine Banking Corp. On December 10, 1976, petitioner Unchuan, claiming to be the owner of
one-half of the mortgaged property, caused to be annotated on the title an adverse claim.
Hearing was set several times. On July 16, 1986, notice was sent setting the hearing for August 19, 1986, but due
to the failure of Unchuans counsel to appear, said hearing had to be reset for September 2, 1986. The hearing set for
September 2, 1986 had to be reset again for September 23, 1986 upon motion of counsel for Unchuan. Finally, on
September 23, 1986, hearing proceeded as scheduled and the case was submitted for resolution upon agreement of the
parties. However, on September 25, 1986, Unchuan filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal/suspension of the
petition for writ of possession on the ground that he had filed an action for quieting of title on the property.
On October 3, 1986 the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
bank. Unchuan brought a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence,
the present recourse.
Issue:whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of possession even without a full-blown
trial to resolve the claim of Unchuan, and despite the pendency of the action to quiet title.
Held: Even as Unchuan concedes that proceedings were held to determine the nature of his possession, he questions
the summary manner by which his claim was resolved. It is too late in the day for Unchuan to question the summary
nature of the proceedings in the lower court. In the hearing of September 23, 1986, his counsel agreed to submit the case
for resolution, even as on said date, all that he had submitted for consideration of the court was his Opposition to the
Petition of Philippine Banking Corporation. He is now estopped from questioning the procedure adopted by the trial court.
There is nothing objectionable in the summary disposition of third-party claims. On several occasions, the Court had
sanctioned summary proceedings to determine the nature of the possession of third-party claimants.
In 1965 Paz Tanwangco sued Francisca Gatchalian in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya for the recovery of her
alleged share in Lots 25 and 28 which were registered in Franciscas name (Civil Case No. 1454).
Francisca Gatchalian appealed to the Court of Appeals. Her appeal was dismissed because she did not file her brief on
time (Tanwangco v. Gatchalian, CA-G.R. No. 45054-R, Resolutions of October 16, 1970 and August 31, 1971).
Former Judge Tupasi, as guardian ad litem of his minor grandson, Florante, filed in Civil Case No. 1454 a petition dated
January 21, 1974 to declare Tan Chiao Chay, Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay, as alleged occupants of Lot 28-A, in contempt
of court for having disobeyed the writ of possession (the same writ that Judge Tupasi issued on January 25, 1972). He
prayed that an order be issued for the demolition of respondents improvements.
Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay, in their answer to the petition to declare them in contempt of court, alleged that the parents of
the minor, Florante Tupasi, should act as his guardians and not Judge Tupasi; that the lower court had no jurisdiction over
them, and that the building on the lot sold to Florante Tupasi belongs to Solodonia Ramos and Rogelio Tiu and not to
Tang Tee and Tiu Tik chay and, therefore, they (Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay) did not disobey any court process and were
not guilty of contempt of court.
She filed in this Court a petition for certiorari to annul those resolutions. Her petition was dismissed for lack of merit
Gatchalian v. Tanwangco, L-34138, Resolution of October 26, 1971. Entry of judgment therein was made on November
16, 1971).
issue: Whether Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay could be adjudged in contempt of court
held:
We hold that in civil Case No. 1454 the lower court has no jurisdiction to adjudge petitioners Tang Tee and Tiu Tik
Chay in contempt of court and to eject them from Lot 28-A.
The 1969 judgment of Judge Parayno is a judgment in personam, requiring Francisca Gatchalian to deliver to Paz
Tanwangco the possession of "one-half undivided portion of" Lot 28. It is not a judgment in rem. It is conclusive, not
against the whole world, but only "between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action", "litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
Benjamin Marual is a member of petitioner association being the owner of two condominium units at the Cardinal Office
Condominium, covered by Condominium Certificates of Title No. 14335 (1st floor) and No. 17730 (2nd floor). Due to his
failure to pay assessment dues in the amount of P530,554.00, petitioner association filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, Manila, a complaint for sum of money against him, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74919.
During the course of the proceedings, or on September 13, 1996, petitioner and Marual filed with the RTC a Compromise
Agreement,3 declaring that they have amicably settled their controversy under some of terms and conditions.
On October 9, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision4 approving the Compromise Agreement and enjoining the parties to
strictly comply with its terms. However, Marual failed to comply with his obligation, prompting petitioner to file with the
RTC a motion for the execution of the compromise judgment.
On July 30, 1999, upon petitioner's filing of the required bond, a writ of possession13 was issued.
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53216.
Respondent alleged mainly that the RTC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Order dated June 8, 1999 and the writ of possession which are in variance with the compromise
judgment and the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 95-74919.
Held: No.
There is nothing in the provisions which authorizes the RTC, Branch 4, Manila to issue a writ of possession over the two
condominium units in favor of petitioner. As we held in Abinujar v. Court of Appeals.
A judgment is the foundation of a writ of execution which draws its vitality therefrom. An officer issuing a writ of execution
is required to look to the judgment for his immediate authority.
An execution must conform to and be warranted by the judgment on which it was issued (Francisco, The Revised Rules of
Court, 641 [1966]; Kramer v. Montgomery, 206 Okla. 190 242 P. 2d 414 [1952]). There should not be a substantial
variance between the judgment and the writ of execution (Avery v. Lewis, 10 Vt. 332). Thus, an execution is fatally
defective if the judgment was for sum of money and the writ of execution was for the sale of the mortgaged property (Bank
of the Philippine Islands v. Green, 48 Phil. 284 [1925]).
As petitioners' obligation under the compromise agreement as approved by the court was monetary in nature, private
respondents can avail only of the writ of execution provided in Section 15 (now Section 9), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, and not that provided in Section 13 (now Section 10 [c] 18 ).
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision. We DENY the instant
petition.
facts: In July 1997, Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado A. Sanao and Soledad F. Sanao and the spouses
William (Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao (all respondents herein), as joint and solidary debtors, obtained a loan in the
amount of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00) from PNB secured by a real estate mortgage of several
parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Pili, Tigaon and Camaligan, all of Camarines Sur, and Naga City. The
contract expressly provided that the mortgage shall be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended.
Respondents then filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of
Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC of Pili in the issuance of the two assailed orders. The
Petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order which the Court of Appeals granted on 15
February 2001, enjoining the RTC of Pili and PNB from implementing the challenged orders.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of herein respondents.[27] The Court of Appeals rendered a litany of lapses that the
notary public committed in the conduct of the foreclosure proceedings which in its estimation had effectively undermined
the soundness of the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Provisional Certificate of Sale, upon
which the issuance of the writ of possession was based, is fatally infirm, and that consequently, the writ of possession was
not validly issued as the procedural requirements for its issuance were not satisfied
Aggrieved by the Decision, PNB filed the instant petition, arguing in the main that in nullifying the orders of the RTC of Pili,
the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as the issuance of writs of
possession is purely ministerial on the part of the trial court.
Held: Yes.
PNB has sufficiently established its right to the writ of possession. It presented as documentary exhibits the contract of
real estate mortgage[53] and the Provisional Certificate of Sale[54] on the face of which appears proof of its registration
with the Registry of Deeds in Camarines Sur on 3 May 1999. There is also no dispute that the lands were not redeemed
within one year from the registration of the Provisional Certificate of Sale. It should follow, therefore, that PNB has
acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession.
Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB Board amply demonstrates Mrs. Domitila A. Amons authority to sign
and verify the instant petition. PNB likewise was not obligated to disclose the alluded case pending before the Court of
Appeals as it was not initiated by the bank and, more importantly, the subject matter and the properties involved therein
are altogether different.[64] It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.[65] In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or
suspended in the interest of substantial justice.[66] And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules
whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.[67]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11 June 2002 in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 63162 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 24 November 2000 and 24 January 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 in Spec. Pro. No. P-1182 directing the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of PNB are AFFIRMED.
295.
CENONA OLEGO, Petitioner, v. HON. ALFREDO REBUENO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, Branch IV and ATTY. PEDRO SERVANO, Respondents.
facts:
Pedro D. Servano sued Cenona Olego, for a declaration as to the legality of his title to a residential lot, alleging that he
acquired by purchase the said lot, which he had possessed en concepto de dueo, but his possession was disturbed by
Cenona who claimed to be the owner of the lot. Olego, on the other hand, claimed that she was the "absolute owner and
lawful possessor of the land." After several postponements, the parties submitted a compromise whereby Olego admitted
Servanos ownership of the lot and "that judgment be rendered declaring" him the owner thereof. The decision approving
the compromise agreement did not order Olego to vacate the lot, although it followed the usual pattern of judgments in
such cases: ordering the parties to comply with the terms of the compromise. No further proceedings was had in the case
for more than ten years after the alleged compromise settlement was concluded, until Servano sued Olego for contempt
on the ground that the latter prevented the former from having the peaceful use and enjoyment of the land, and that she
branded the decision as "fake" and "not worthy of respect."cralaw virtua1aw library
Olego moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the grounds (a) that the amicable settlement was obtained through fraud
and misrepresentation, (b) that the execution of the judgment was barred by statute of limitations, and (c) that the Court
had lost jurisdiction over the case. The trial court denied the motion and set the contempt charge for hearing. Her motion
for reconsideration having been denied, Cenona filed the instant special civil action of certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Olegos failure to vacate cannot be the basis of a contempt charge against her
Held: An order or judgment which declares the rights of parties without any express command or prohibition is not one
which may be the basis of a contempt proceeding. A violation of the rights of ownership does not constitute contempt of
court, even though they have been ascertained and declared by judgment, unless it consists in doing something that was
prohibited, or in failing to do something that was required, by terms of the judgment.
Where there is no decree or order commanding accused or anyone else to do or refrain from doing something or
anything, disobedience of it is impossible, and therefore one cannot be held guilty of contempt for disobedience
thereunder.
facts:
Petitioner obtained a loan from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (respondent) and as security therefor, he
executed a Deed of Mortgage over a parcel of land located in Pampanga. Due to his failure to pay the loan, respondent
extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property. Respondent was the highest bidder at the public auction sale, and the
Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was annotated on the title of the subject property on May 20, 1999. Petitioner failed
to redeem said property within the redemption period which expired on May 20, 2000. Respondent then consolidated its
title to the foreclosed property. Petitioner's certificate of title to the property was cancelled and a new one was issued in
the name of respondent on August 30, 2000.
Thereafter, on January 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an Ex-Parte Petition for the
Issuance of Writ of Possession Under Act No. 3135. On March 22, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Opposition to
Petition, alleging that there was still a pending action between the parties for declaration of nullity of the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings which was filed as early as May 16, 2000. Nevertheless, on May 18, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order granting respondent's petition for issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On March 14, 2003, the CA promulgated the herein
assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit, ruling that under the law, the purchaser in the foreclosure sale
should be placed in possession of the property without delay, and that it was the ministerial duty of the courts to uphold
the mortgagee's right to possession even during the redemption period.2 The CA added that an appeal, which was
available to petitioner, was the appropriate remedy, and therefore, he could not avail himself of the writ of certiorari.
First to be resolved is the issue of whether the remedy of certiorari may be availed of by petitioner in assailing the RTC
Orders granting the issuance of a writ of possession. The well-trenched rule provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and elucidated in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission,4
is that:
Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed
against the tribunal, board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board or officer must
have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS: Spouses Homobono and Lusdeldia Tarampi (Spouses Tarampi) obtained loans from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), which were secured by real estate mortgages over a parcel of land. Spouses Tarampi failed to comply with
their obligation, prompting BPI to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. During the auction, BPI was the highest
bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. The same was registered and annotated on the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) of the said parcel of land.
Since the one-year redemption period expired without Spouses Tarampi redeeming the mortgage, BPI executed an
Affidavit of Consolidation. A new TCT was issued in favor of BPI. In the meantime, Spouses Tarampi filed an action for
annulment of the real estate mortgages. BPI, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Writ of Possession over the property
including all improvements thereon which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. A Notice of Appeal was
filed by Spouses Tarampi alleging therein that a writ cannot be issued on the ground that there is a pending
action concerning the validity of the mortgages. The RTC ordered the suspension of issuance of writ of possession.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, held that since BPI is now the registered owner of the property, it is entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right; and that any question regarding the validity of the mortgages or their foreclosure cannot
be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession after the consolidation of title in the buyers name,
following the debtor-mortgagors failure to redeem the mortgages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of possession should be implemented during the pendency of the case for annulment of
mortgages
HELD: In the case at bar, Spouses Tarampi failed to redeem the mortgages within the reglementary period, hence,
ownership of the property covered thereby was consolidated in the name of BPI who had in fact been issued a new TCT.
Issuance of a writ of possession thus became a ministerial duty of the court.
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the
property and can demand it any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title.
The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such
possession being founded on the right of ownership. To underscore this mandate, the law further provides that the debtor-
mortgagor may petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled in the proceedings in which
possession was requested; and the courts decision thereon may be appealed by either party, but the order of possession
shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.
To stress the ministerial character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance,
just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure
itself.
Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is true with its implementation;
otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment - a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession
in the purchaser immediately.
Facts: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Sally Sueno (Sueno) seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated 13 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79566, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated 24 January 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 192, inLRC Case No. R-
2002-551-MK; and the Resolution3 dated 20 September 2006 of the appellate court which denied Sueno's Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC, in its Decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, issued the Writ of Possession authorizing
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to take physical possession of the two disputed parcels of land pursuant to
its Consolidation of Ownership dated 2 April 2001.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES TO
LBP IS VALID.
Held:
We are not persuaded. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a
subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by
substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In order for
novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites are indispensable:
There must be a previous valid obligation;
facts: On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential
house and lot in favor of private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure the loan of P78,328.08 granted by the latter to the
former.
Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
which was duly published and advertised for public auction by Olongapo City Sheriff Ramon Y. Pardo on September 29,
1977. Private respondent was the winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale duly
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds on October 26, 1977. Valentin had a period of one (1) year from the
date of registration within which to redeem the mortgaged properties. The period for the redemption of the property in
question having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a Final Bill of Sale was thereafter issued by the
City Sheriff on November 3, 1978.
After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed before the Court of First Instance of Zambales a
"Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession."
Issue: whether or not there respondent trial court exercised grave abuse of discretion
Held:
As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as would warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for, tainted the issuance of the assailed order, the petition must jail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 19,
1980 is LIFTED.
300.
SILANGAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. DEMETRIA
[518 SCRA 160, March 12, 2007]
FACTS: Luzon Spinning Mills, Incorporated (LSMI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, a Complaint
for Collection of Sum of Money against Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corporation (STMC). In its Complaint, LSMI
alleged that Anita, Jimmy and Benito, all surnamed Silangan, in their capacity as stockholders and officers of STMC
ordered 111,161.60 kilograms of yarn, valued in the total amount of P9,999,845.00. The yarns were delivered at the office
of STMC as evidenced by delivery receipts.
When presented for payment, the foregoing postdated checks were dishonored for the reason, Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund (DAIF). LSMI demanded from STMC the immediate payment of the obligation. STMC failed and refused
to heed the demand of LSMI; hence, the latter filed the Complaint before the RTC. In accordance with the prayer of LSMI,
and finding the same to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against STMCs properties. In this connection, a notice of attachment on the properties in the name of STMC covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title No. 202686 and No. 202685 was issued.
Apparently, LSMI had already previously instituted before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lipa City, Branch 1,
criminal cases against the Silangans for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Thus, STMC was prompted to file a Motion,
praying to dismiss the civil Complaint before the RTC, to cite STMCs lawyer for contempt for forum shopping, and to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court. After LSMI filed its Comment/Opposition to the
motion of STMC, the RTC resolved the said motion by denying it for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conclusion of the public respondent Judge
Demetria when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of the private respondent.
HELD:
SECTION 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry
of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause
of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the
Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors.
x xxx
SEC. 2. Issuance and contents of order. An order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with notice
and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must
require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued,
not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicants demand, unless such party makes deposit or
gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to
satisfy the applicants demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of
costs. Several writs may be issued at the same time to the sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions.
SEC. 3. Affidavit and bond required. An order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the affidavit of the
applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is
one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by
the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to
recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond
required by the next succeeding section, must be duly filed with the court before the order issues.
Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon
relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights
and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action and they are
ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a collateral proceeding, permitted only in
connection with a regular action, and as one of its incidents; one of which is provided for present need, or for the
occasion; that is, one adapted to meet a particular exigency. On the basis of the preceding discussion and the fact that
we find the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-00420 to be in order, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court
in the said case must perforce be lifted.
301.
COOTAUCO v. COURT OF APPEALS
June 16, 1988
162 SCRA 122
This is a contest which began in 1980 between two rival cockpit operators for the right to operate in the one-
cockpit town of Labo, Camarines Norte, whose population does not exceed 100,000 residents. The temporary restraining
order (later replaced by a writ of preliminary injunction) which the trial court issued, and which the Court of Appeals
declined to set aside, is before us for determination.
The petitioner, Ricardo L. Cootauco is a duly licensed operator of a cockpit, known as "GalleraLapu-Lapu" in
Labo, Camarines Norte. In 1979 he built another cockpit in the new recreational zone in Bo. Bocal where he planned to
transfer the GalleraLapu-Lapu.
The private respondent Felix L. Luzarraga, is the owner and operator of a rival cockpit, known as "GalleraPlaridel"
whose license was revoked by the Municipal Mayor of Labo on September 14, 1977, on recommendation of the PC
Provincial Commander because it was inside the residential district and near public buildings and the church, in violation
of Section 5 (c) of P.D. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974).
In 1979, Raul Luzarraga, brother of Felix, filed an application with the PC Regional Commander for a Renewal
Permit to operate the "Plaridel Cockpit." The application was denied on the ground that the Plaridelhad been phased out
or ceased to operate in 1977, hence, "the application for renewal is out of place." Luzarraga filed against Ricardo
Cootauco, Sergio Cootauco and Mayor Mario Villafuerte of Labo in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte for
Specific Performance, Annulment of Ordinance, Damages with a Prayer for Preliminary injunction. The complaint prayed
for annulment of the permit which Mayor Villafuerte had issued to the GalleraLapu-Lapu and also asked for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the operation of the Lapu-Lapu and the construction of a new cockpit by the
Cootaucos in Barangay Bocal, Labo. The defendants filed separate answers to the complaint.
On June 2,1980, the Court of First Instance issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining Cootauco and his
agents from proceeding with the construction of their new cockpit in Barangay Bocal and from conducting cockfights
therein. On June 4, 1980, Cootauco filed an urgent motion to lift the temporary restraining order. The court set it for
hearing together with Luzarraga's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On June 9, 1980, the trial court issued an
order of injunction.
However, on January 12, 1981, it denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the temporary restraining order which
it had issued. It held that the error, if any, of the respondent Judge in issuing the Order of June 2, 1980, was "an error of
judgment correctable by appeal in due time, but definitely not one made in grave abuse of discretion ..."
Cootauco appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
The petition alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for certiorari and in not holding that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in enjoining the operation of the petitioner's
new cockpit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court should issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:The appeal is meritorious.
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy to which parties litigant may resort for the preservation or protection
of their rights or interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action Thus, Section 3, Rule 58
enumerates only three (3) grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and they are:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-performance
thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act,
probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
The issuance of the injunction order by the trial court, at the instance of Luzarraga, to stop the petitioner Cootauco from
operating his cockpit at its new site in Barrio Bocal was improper for several reasons: First, because the plaintiff
Luzarraga had no right that needed to be protected or preserved by a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of
the case. The operation of petitioner's cockpit did not, and would not, violate any right of Luzarraga who was not
operating, and had no license to operate, a cockpit.
Secondly, the status quo at the commencement of Civil Case No. 4753 and 1980 was that Cootauco was duly licensed to
operate, and was operating, the "GalleraLapu-Lapu," had been authorized to transfer its location to the new recreational
zone in Barrio Bocal, and had constructed a new cockpit arena there which was almost completed and was operational.
On the other hand, the plaintiff Luzarraga was not operating the "GalleraPlaridel" because his license had been cancelled
in 1977, three (3) years before the filing of the case. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of
closing the new "GalleraLapu-Lapu" during the pendency of the case, disturbed that status quo instead of preserving it.
Thirdly, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction would irreparably damage the petitioner because it would, for no
lawful cause, deprive him of the use of his license to operate his cockpit. On the other hand, Luzarraga would not be
prejudiced by the lifting of the writ for the simple reason that he does notfor want of a licenseoperate a cockpit with
which Cootauco's cockpit would compete.
The appealed decision of the CA and the writ of preliminary injunction which were issued by the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Norte in are set aside. The case is dismissed.
302.
BUYCO v. BARAQUIA
December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 699
FACTS:NelsonBuyco filed a case for the establishment of a permanent right of way, injunction and damages with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, against the Buycos to enjoin them from closing off a private road
which the respondent had been using to go to and from the public highway. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary
injunction. After trial, the RTC, however, dismissed the complaint. Thus, respondent filed a notice of appeal of the
decision to the CA. Later, respondent filed a motion to cite PurisimoBaraquia in contempt of court, alleging that he
violated the writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC, noting that the decision had not yet become final and executory, cited
the petitioner in contempt. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, however, the RTC granted the same, holding
that the brothers cannot be held in contempt by mere motion, but thru a petition. On the issue of whether or not the writ of
preliminary injunction subsisted while the case is on appeal, the RTC held that it is its illumined opinion that the matter of
whether a writ of preliminary injunction remains valid until the decision annulling the same attains finality is not firmly
entrenched in jurisprudence, contrary to the position of the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the complaint is immediately executory,
even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely a provisional
remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary
or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in
the case.
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is
ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial
controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act
that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits
of the case.
Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon respondents showing
that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court
found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential
requisites for such entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is
deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
303
CRUZ v. MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY CO.
1953
92 Phil 699
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31 1951, which reverses a judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal according to petitioner an indemnity in the amount of P2,750.
This case stems from an action for forcible entry instituted by Concepcion and Andrea Enciong and Filemon Leonardo in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Paraaque, Rizal, against Gregorio Cruz, docketed as civil case No. 12 wherein they
obtained the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing a bond in the amount of P3,000. After the issuance of
the writ, the plaintiffs took possession of the property in litigation and harvested the palay standing thereon. Later, the writ
was lifted when the defendant put up a counter bond in the amount of P6,000. The land was returned but after the palay
had been harvested.
In the meantime, Gregorio Cruz, the defendant, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for certiorari assailing
the proceedings had in the forcible entry case then pending in the Justice of the Peace Court of Paraaque, Rizal, which
resulted adversely to the plaintiffs therein in that the court declared all the proceedings null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Five months thereafter, Gregorio Cruz initiated in the same Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages against
the same persons who succeeded in dispossessing him of the property in the forcible entry case wherein for the first time
he averred having incurred losses in the total sum of P2,950 not only because of his dispossession of the property in
litigation but also because of the consequential damages he has suffered as a result of the institution of the forcible entry
case against him. In this case the bonding company was made a party defendant.
On October 28, 1947, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending, among other grounds, that this action for
damages has no legal basis because the same was not included in the judgment rendered in the certiorari case as
required by the Rules of Court (Rule 60, section 9; Rule 59, section 20). This motion having been denied, the defendants
filed their answer wherein they reiterated the same special defense. And on November 25, 1947, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,750 as damages and to pay the costs. But when the
case was taken to the Court of Appeals, this decision was reversed and the defendants were absolved from the
complaint. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
RULING OF THE CA: Petitioner-appellant has no cause of action against respondent-appellees to recover the damages
which he has allegedly sustained as a result of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the justice of the peace
court Paraaque, Rizal.
One of the grounds on which the Court of Appeals has predicated its ruling that petitioner-appellant has no cause of
action against respondent-appellees to recover the damages which he has allegedly sustained as a result of the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction by the justice of the peace court Paraaque, Rizal, is the failure of said petitioner-
appellant to press his claim for damages in the forcible entry case wherein the writ was issued as expressly required by
section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, in connection with section 20, Rule 59. Because of such failure, the Court of
Appeals says, the petitioner-appellant is now barred from instituting the present action. This ruling is now assigned as
error. We find this ruling of the Court of Appeals correct. This is in line not only with the Rules of Court (section 20,
Rule 59 and section 9, Rule 60), but also with well-known jurisprudence on the mater. Thus, it has been held that "A claim
for damages suffered by reason of the issuance of a preliminary injunction must be presented in the principal action, and
judgment therefor must be included in the final judgment of the case. The remedy is exclusive and by failing to file a
motion for the determination of the damages on time and while the judgment is still under the control of the court, the
claimant loses his right to such damages.
The procedure for the recovery of damages on account of the issuance of writ of attachment, injunction, receivership, and
replevin proceedings, as interpreted in the cases adverted to, requires that the claim for damages should be presented in
the same action which gave rise to the special proceeding in order that it may be included in the final judgment of the
case, and it cannot be the subject of a separate action. The philosophy of the ruling seems to be that the court that had
acted on the special proceeding which occasioned the damages has the exclusive jurisdiction to assess them because of
its control of the case. This ruling is sound and tends to avoid multiplicity of action.
We believe however, that the action of petitioner-appellant is not entirely lost it appearing from the record that the forcible
entry case pending in the case pending in the justice of the peace court of Paraaque, Rizal, is still open and has not
been dismissed by the court in the certiorari case. The only import of the decision in the latter case is to declare the
proceedings of the justice of the peace court in connection with the issuance of preliminary injunction null and void for
having been issued in excess of its jurisdiction by it did not throw the case out of court. Petitioner herein may still press his
claim for damages before that court.
We notice that the Court of Appeals has likewise ruled that petitioner herein has no right to claim for damages for the loss
of the palay standing on the land in dispute on the sole premise that he is not the lawful owner of the land, as shown by
the records, wherein the ownership well says, the ownership of the land is one thing, and the ownership of the
improvements is another. The record does not seem to justify any finding relative to the improvements because the
evidence presented seems to have been limited to the ownership of the land. Petitioner may have made the
improvements in good faith although he may not be the lawful owner of the land. The claim of petitioner that seem to be
without reason or justification. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the finding to the effect that petitioner has no
right to claim from damages has no basis in the evidence.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in so far as it hold that petitioner has no right to institute
the present action for damages, but is reversed in all other respects, without prejudice on the part of petitioner to
presenting his claim for damages in the forcible entry case pending in the justice of the peace court of
Paraaque, Rizal, and without pronouncement as to costs.
304
SANTOS v CA
1954, 95 Phil 360
FACTS:
On May 20, 1950, Ofrecino T. Santos (hereinafter to be referred to as petitioner) filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato an action for the recovery of the sum of P1,628 against Teodulo M. Cruz and Valentin C. Garcia (Civil Case No.
241). The petitioner secured a writ of preliminary attachment which was levied upon a tractor which, though believed by
the petitioner to belong to the defendants in Civil Case No. 241, in fact was owned by the Philippine Reconstruction
Corporation Inc. (hereinafter to be referred to as respondent), which in due time filed a third party claim. The petitioner
filed an amended complaint including the respondent as a defendant, but upon motion filed by Teodulo M. Cruz and
Valentin C. Garcia, Civil Case No. 241 was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato for lack of jurisdiction, the
amount involved being less than P2,000. The petitioner filed a similar action in the Justice of the Peace Court of Buayan,
Cotabato, against the respondent as sole defendant, wherein the petitioner was awarded the sum of P1,638.10, with
interest and costs, but this decision is still the subject matter of a pending certiorari proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato instituted by the respondent.
On May 9, 1951, the respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila Civil Case No. 13778 against the petitioner,
for damages resulting from the levy of its tractor under the writ of attachment issued in Civil Case No. 241. Paragraphs III
and VII of the respondent's complaint in Civil Case No. 13778 read as follows:
III
That on or about the month of September, 1950 and in connection with the execution of a preliminary writ of
attachment secured by the herein defendant Ofrecino T. Santos in Civil Case No. 241 of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato entitled Ofrecino T. Santos, plaintiff vs. Teodulo M. Cruz and Valentin C. Garcia,
defendants, the above-named defendants conspiring, confabulating and conniving with one another procured and
caused to be attached a certain Caterpillar D-8 tractor of herein plaintiff who was not a party in said case and that
defendants herein fully knowing that the said tractor does not belong to any of the defendants Teodulo M. Cruz
and Valentin C. Garcia in said Civil Case No. 241 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato;
VII
That due to the said wrongful and malicious attachment levied by the herein defendants on plaintiffs' tractor and
their subsequent refusal to release the same from attachment as above stated plaintiff was consequently forced
to violate its contractual undertaking with a certain Mr. Tomas Gonzales as stated in the sworn third party claim so
that it was compelled to pay a liquidated damages in the sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000) aside from
having lost a sure income from rent on said tractor in the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500);
The other necessary details are recited as follows in the decision of the Court of Appealspromulgated on October 30,
1952 in CA-G.R. No 9925-R, Ofrecino T. Santos, petitioner, vs. Philippine Reconstruction Corporation, Inc., and the
Honorable Demetrio B. Encarnacion, Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents:
On June 10, 1951, petitioner (defendant in Civil Case No. 13778 of Manila) was duly summoned to answer the
complaint filed in said Civil Case. A motion to dismiss, filed by defendant's counsel, was received on June 23,
1951, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the other hand, counsel for plaintiff Philippine Reconstruction
Corporation (now respondent) filed on July 12, 1951, an ex-parte motion, praying that defendant Ofrecino T.
Santos was declared in default on the ground that his motion to dismiss does not contain a notice for hearing as
provided in Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and therefore not a valid one. Copy of said order was received by
defendant's counsel on August 2, 1951. On August 26th, plaintiffs counsel moved that the aforesaid Civil Case
No. 13778 be set for hearing. In his turn, counsel for defendant Ofrecino T. Santos filed on September 1st a
petition praying that the order of default dated July 23rd be set aside; that his motion to dismiss be given due
course, either by sustaining or denying the same; and that if denied, defendant be allowed to file his answer.
By virtue of an order dated February 12, 1952, the case was set for hearing on February 28th, and on the
following day decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the later to pay
the sum of P4,500 with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and to further pay the sum
of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. Consequently, on April 5, 1952, defendant Ofrecino T.
Santos, thru his counsel, moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, to which motion counsel for the
plaintiff filed his opposition on April 20, 1952.
The said motion for reconsideration was denied.
Ofrecino T. Santos now comes before us as petitioner, alleging that the respondent court committed a grave
abuse of discretion when, as defendant in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 13778, he was arbitrarily declared in
default; and when it declared his motion to dismiss not a valid one. Petitioner further claims that the respondent
court again committed a grave abuse of discretion when, instead of acting upon his petition for relief from the
order of default, it set the case for hearing a proceeded to hear plaintiff's evidence and rendered a decision. It is
also alleged by petitioner that the Court of First Instance of Manila acted without jurisdiction, the cause of action in
Civil Case No. 13778 having arisen from a supposed wrongful attachment ordered by the Court of First Instance
of Cotabato in Civil Case No. 241, and for that reason, that the latter court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether its legal processes are wrongful or not; and even granting that the Court of First Instance of Manila had
proper jurisdiction, the particular cause of action in said Civil Case No. 13778 is banned by the decision of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Buayan, Cotabato.
From the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for certiorari, the petitioner has interposed the present
appeal by way of certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in holding Ofrecino T. Santos under estoppel to raise the issue of jurisdiction.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining a decision that was null and void, emanating as it did from
a court which had no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 13778.
HELD:
Without deciding whether the petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 13778 was a mere scrap of paper for
lack of notice of hearing, it is clear that he could and should have appealed from the decision on the merits rendered
therein by the Court of First Instance of Manila, of which he was duly notified, raising in said appeal the propriety of the
ruling of default against him, the failure of the trial court to expressly dispose of his petition for relief, and the principal
question of jurisdiction. It is elementary that certiorari will not lie where the remedy of appeal is available.
On the issue of jurisdiction, it is to be recalled that, when respondent's tractor was levied upon, it was not a party in Civil
Case No. 241, and although an amended complaint was filed, no new writ of attachment was issued so as to cover
respondent's properties. It is also significant that Civil Case No. 241 was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato for lack of jurisdiction. We have no hesitancy in declaring that the Court of First Instance of Manila correctly took
cognizance of Civil Case No. 13778, because the respondent sought damages, not on the allegation that the writ of
attachment was illegally or wrongfully issued by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato in Civil Case No. 241, but on
theory that said writ was caused by the petitioner to be levied upon the tractor of the respondent which was not a party
defendant. The filing of the amended complaint did not cure the defect, since the seizure continued to be in virtue of the
original writ, none having been issued under the amended complaint.
The petitioner is invoking the following pronouncement in our decision in Cruz vs. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc., et
al., 49 Off. Gaz. (3) 964; 92 Phil. 699:
The procedure for recovery of damages on account of the issuance of a writ of attachment, injunction,
receivership, and replevin proceedings, as interpreted in the cases adverted to, requires that the claim for
damages should be presented in the same action which gave rise to the special proceeding in order that it may be
included in the final judgment of the case, and it cannot be the subject of a separate action. The philosophy of the
ruling seems to be that the court that had acted on the special proceeding which occasioned the damages has the
exclusive jurisdiction to assess them because of its control of the case. This ruling is sound and tends to avoid
multiplicity of action.
The citation is not controlling, for the reason that, apart from the circumstance that, as already stated, the respondent has
never claimed that the writ of attachment was wrongfully issued in Civil Case No. 241, it appears that the latter case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and no claim for damages could therefore properly have been presented in said case,
because the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, thus lacking jurisdiction, was in fact prevented from rendering any final
judgment therein which could include such damages. Avoidance of multiplicity of suite presupposes the competence of
the court in the first or earlier case. Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against
the petitioner.
305.
MANGILA v COURT OF APPEALS
August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 162
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against herein petitioner. On August 1, 1988, the
sheriff filed his Sheriffs Return showing that summons was not served on petitioner. A woman found at petitioners house
informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out
further that petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioners departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her
creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an
Order of Preliminary Attachment6 against petitioner. The following day, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.
The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from their counterparts in RTC, Pampanga. Thus, on
October 28, 1988, Sheriff Alfredo San Miguel of RTC Pampanga served on petitioners household help in San Fernando,
Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond.
Petitioner filed a motion to discharge attachment claiming that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioners counter-bond.
The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Thereafter private respondent applied for an alias summons which was granted by the court.
HELD:
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.23
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on October
28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the
implementation of the writ of attachment.
The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its issuance can be
filed at the commencement of the action. However, on the day the writ was implemented, the trial court should have,
previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was
shown in the records of the case, the summons was actually served on petitioner several months after the writ had been
implemented.
Private respondent never showed that she affected substituted service on petitioner after her personal service failed.
Likewise, if it were true that private respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry,
still she had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first
obtaining jurisdiction over her person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant
whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law
does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
306
TORRES v. SATSATIN
November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 453
FACTS:
Siblings Torres (petitioners) each owned adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land in Dasmarias, Cavite.
NicanorSatsatin, through petitioners mother AgripinaAledia, was able to convince the siblings to sell their property and
authorize him via SPA, to negotiate for its sale. Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, to which Solar
allegedly agreed to buy the three parcels of land plus the property of one RusticaAledia for P35, 000,000. Petitioners
claimed that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price, however Nicanor only remitted P9, 000,000 out of the P28,
000,000 sum they are entitled to and that Nicanor had acquired a house and lot and a car (which he registered in the
names of his children). Despite the repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit the balance prompting
the petitioners to file a complaint for sum of money against the family Satsatin.
Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other things, that
respondent was about to depart the country and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by court. After filing a Motion for
Deputation of Sheriff, which the RTC granted, it issued a Writ of Attachment (WOA) on November 15. On November 19,
after serving a copy of the WOA upon the Satsatins, the sheriff levied their real and personal properties. On November 21,
the summons and copy of complaint was served upon the respondents. Respondents filed their answer and a Motion to
Discharge Writ of Attachment, claiming, among others, that: the bond was issued before the issuance of WOA, the WOA
was issued before the summons was received. Respondents posted a counter-bond for the lifting of WOA, which was
denied along with MR. Aggrieved, they filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and TRO under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of respondents and denied petitioners MR hence the petition for
review on certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not erred in finding that RTC was guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance and implementation of the Writ of
Attachment.
HELD:
No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an
action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by
the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all
the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the
issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction
is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to
validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves
three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to
the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to
act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the
motion for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment.
However, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondent since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously
with the implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the
trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of
attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.
Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial court later acquired
jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated service of summons on
respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court
cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the
defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances
of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction
307.
CUARTERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 260
FACTS:
On August 20, 1990, Cuartero filed a complaint before the RTC of QC against the spousesEvangelista for a sum
of money plus damages with a prayer for theissuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.The RTC issued an
order granting ex-parte Cuarteros prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.The writ
of preliminary attachment was issued pursuant to the trial courts order dated August 24, 1990. On the same day, the
summons for the spousesEvangelista were likewise prepared. A copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, the summons
and the complaint were all simultaneously served upon the spousesEvangelista at their residence. Immediately thereafter,
Deputy Sheriff Sila levied, attachedand pulled out the properties in compliance with the court's directive. Subsequently,
thespouses filed motion to set aside the order dated August 24, 1990 and discharge the writ ofpreliminary attachment for
having been irregularly and improperly issued.
RTC denied the motion for lack of merit. Spouses Evangelista then filed aspecial civil action for certiorari with the CA
questioning the orders of the lower court with a prayer for a restraining order or writ ofpreliminary injunction to enjoin
the judge from taking further proceedings below.CA granted the petition for certiorari. It nullified the orders of the RTC
and cancelled the writ of preliminary attachmentissued on September 19, 1990.
CA grounded its decision on its finding that the RTC did not acquire any jurisdiction over theperson of the private
respondents: It is not disputed that neither service of summons with acopy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of
petitioners was had in this case beforethe trial court issued the assailed order dated August 24, 1990, as well as the writ
ofpreliminary attachment dated September 19, 1990.
Cuarterio filed a motion for reconsideration however, itwas denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition forreview
on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the CA
ISSUES:
Whether or not issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment is valid. YES
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. YES
HELD:
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order ofthe court where an action
is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of thedefendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the
sheriff as security for the satisfaction ofwhatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor
against thedefendant.
Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance of the writ are the affidavit and bond of
the applicant.
As has been expressly ruled in BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, citing MindanaoSavings and Loan Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, no notice to the adverse party orhearing of the application is required inasmuch as the time which the
hearing will take could beenough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ ofattachment
issues.
The writ of preliminary attachment can be applied for and granted at the commencementof the action or at any time
thereafter (Section 1, Rule 57, Rules of Court). "At thecommencement of the action" is interpreted as referring to the date
of the filing of the complaintwhich is a time before summons is served on the defendant or even
before. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we
have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendantuntil jurisdiction over his person is eventually
obtained. Therefore, it is required that when theproper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment,
service of summons should be simultaneously made. In the case at bar, when the writ of attachment was served on
thespouses Evangelista, the summons and copy of the complaint were also simultaneously served.
The petition is granted. CA decision is reversed. Order and writ of attachmentissued by the RTC Judge are reinstated.
308.
SPOUSES SALGADO v. CA
March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 395
FACTS:
This is a petition for review filed by the spouses Jose Salgado and Julieta Salgado to set aside the resolution of
the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-09407-R, dated September 18, 1980, which authorized the issuance of a
writ of attachment against the property of said petitioners.
On May 8, 1978, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, hereinafter referred to as the Bank, filed an action
against petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to recover on a promissory note in the amount of P1,510,905.96,
inclusive of interest and other bank charges. In its verified complaint, the Bank further prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment. As grounds therefor it alleged that petitioners had fraudulently misappropriated and/or converted to their own
personal use and benefit the sugar proceeds given as security for the payment of the indebtedness; that petitioners are
guilty of fraud in contracting their obligation and have concealed, removed or disposed of the properties mortgaged or
assigned to the plaintiff, or are concealing, removing or disposing or about to do so, with intent to defraud their creditor;
that the obligation sought to be enforced is genuine and, therefore, a sufficient cause of action exists; and that there is no
sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action. Attached to the complaint was the affidavit of Mrs.
Helen Osias, Senior Branch Credit Division Manager of the Bank, wherein she stated, among others, "that there is no
sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by this action."
On May 9, 1978, the trial court issued an order granting the Banks prayer for preliminary attachment. Upon the filing of
said bond, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon several parcels of land of petitioners situated in the province of
Negros Occidental.
On September 15, 1978, petitioners Salgado moved to quash the writ of attachment on the ground that respondent Bank
made fraudulent misrepresentation in securing the writ by deleting the words "R E M" or "Real Estate Mortgage" from the
xerox copy of the promissory note attached to the complaint, thereby "making it appear that the note was unsecured when
in truth and in fact it was fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate mortgages duly registered and
annotated in the titles of the affected real properties in favor of the plaintiff Bank." In the same motion, petitioners stressed
the lack of factual basis of the Banks claim as to their alleged fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of the sugar
proceeds given as security for their obligation.
After due hearing, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1979 granting petitioners motion and lifting the writ of
attachment previously issued.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration the Bank went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari to annul the
order of the trial court lifting the writ of attachment.On November 29, 1979, the respondent Court of Appeals, finding that
the order of the trial court was not arbitrarily issued, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
However, on motion of the Bank, the respondent Court reconsidered its decision of November 29, 1979 and issued the
questioned resolution dated September 18, 1980, which authorized the issuance of a writ of attachment.
HELD:We find the petition impressed with merit, The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent
lien on defendants property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property
applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof
are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the
reach of creditors.
The grounds upon which attachment may issue are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. But quite apart
from the grounds stated therein, it is further provided in Section 3 of Rule 57 that "an order of attachment shall be granted
only when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the applicant or some other person who personally knows the facts, that
. . . there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action."
The reason for the rule prohibiting attachment where indebtedness was already secured is to prevent the secured
creditors from attaching additional property and thus tying up more of the debtors property than was necessary to secure
the indebtedness. 2 Thus, to sustain an order of attachment, "it is incumbent upon plaintiff to establish either of these two
facts, to wit: (a) that the obligation had not been secured originally, or (b) that, if secured at its beginning, the security later
became valueless."
In the instant case, the allegation in the affidavit of the Banks Credit Division Manager, Mrs. Helen Osias, to the effect
that "there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by this action" has been shown to be false. It is
undisputed that the note sued upon "is fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate mortgages duly registered
and annotated in the titles of the affected real property in favor of the plaintiff Bank."
Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court authorizes the discharge of an attachment where the same had been improperly
or irregularly issued. In National Coconut Corporation v. Hon. PotencianoPecson, this Court ruled that when the facts or
some of them, stated in the plaintiffs affidavit, are shown by the defendant to be untrue, the writ of attachment may be
considered as improperly or irregularly issued.
Since attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, the rule
authorizing its issuance must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. It should not be abused as to cause
unnecessary prejudice. It is the duty of the court before issuing the writ to ensure that all the requisites of the law have
been complied with.
309
QUASHA ASPERILLA ANCHETA VALMONTE PENA v JUAN
November 19, 1982
118 SCRA 505
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks the annulment of the order
of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 105048 dated August 25, 1978 which
approved the sale of the subject cargo and prays instead that the writ of preliminary attachment over the same property
issued by Hon. Gregorio Pineda of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 28710 be allowed to remain in
force.
On October 22, 1976, respondent Filipinas Carriers (Filcar), filed a complaint for sum of money, enforcement of lien and
damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was presided by respondent Judge, against AB Charles
Thorburn& Co. , through its receiver Sjoegren and Winstrand; Estero Shipping and Trading; Bank of Melli of Iran, Jeddah
Branch; Perstorp AB; Skogshgarnas Industries; Ekman and Company AB; and Abdullah Baroom. In the complaint Filcar
alleged that it is the despondent owner of a vessel, MV San Vicente, which was duly registered with the Republic of the
Philippines. that on April 2, 1976, defendant CarlesThorburn& Co. chartered said vessel by time charter for two or three
months for a voyage from Sweden to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia at three thousand two hundred US dollars (US $3,200.00) a
day, that Abdullah Baroom was impleaded as defendant for being the agent of Charles Thorburn& Co. at Jeddah and
Sjoegren and Winstrand of Sweden for being the receiver of Charles Thorburn& Co.; that the vessel left Sweden with
construction materials as cargoes belonging to the following shippers and consignees, namely, defendants Bank of Melli
of Iran, Jeddah Branch; the National Commercial Bank, Jeddah Branch; Perstorp AB of Perstorp, Sweden; Skogshgarnas
Industries of Sweden; Ekman and Company of Sweden; that after the second month, Charles Thorburn failed to pay the
daily hire, that the vessel has been in Jeddah since May 19, 1976 and is now in international waters; that in view of
Thorburn's failure to pay the charter hire, it had struck a lien through the vessel's captain; that the charter party has
expired but the vessel has not yet discharged the cargoes due to inadequate port facilities and failure of the shippers,
consignees and charterer to pay the charter hire; that Filcar demanded from Charles Thorburn the payment of the charter
hire but Thorburn failed to pay and instead declared bankruptcy and is now under receivership in Sweden; that on
demand, Baroom, the agent of Thorburn in Jeddah, and the consignees and shippers refused to pay; that consequently,
Filcar was forced to exercise its lien on the cargoes, notice of which was sent to defendants. The plaintiff thus prayed,
among others, that the defendants pay the daily charter hire from the time they were in arrears until payment is made and
that the Court allows the sale of the cargoes to satisfy its claims.
On November 25, 1976, Sierra Madre Wood Industries, Inc. (Sierra Madre) the alleged owner, end-user and operator of
MV San Vicente filed a motion to intervene in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the purpose of enforcing its lien over
the cargo, claiming that it had chartered the vessel to Filcar for six months renewable every six months at agreed charter
hire fee.Respondent Judge allowed the intervention of Sierra Madre as plaintiff-intervenor.
On December 2, 1976, Filcar filed an extra-parte motion to sell the goods subject of lien, alleging among others, that the
MV San Vicente had arrived in the Philippines, and was due for dry-docking and needed urgent repairs; and that the
goods subject of its lien were in danger of deteriorating and losing their market value and if the goods were not sold
immediately, the plaintiff would have to pay a staggering amount for warehousing so that the value of the goods
On August 15, 1977, petitioner law firm filed with respondent Judge a special appearance for defendant Ahmed Baroom
contesting the Court's jurisdiction over Baroom's person and property and a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
Court had not acquired jurisdiction over Baroom's 'person or property aboard the MV San Vicente. Respondent Judge
issued an Order directing petitioner law firm to show on or before September 20, 1977 a written authorization signed by its
client, Baroom, "since the latter is a foreigner".
On November 15, 1977, petitioner, as Baroom's counsel, filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim, claiming that
defendant Baroom is not an agent of Charles Thorburn since the cargoes belong to him, and denying the validity of
plaintiff's lien over the cargo. Petitioner reiterates the defense that plaintiff's action being in personam involving defendant
who is not a resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, and there is no showing in the records that the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 in relation to Section 1, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court have been complied with to
convert the action in rem, the Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Baroom, through petitioner, prayed that plaintiff be
directed to deliver the cargoes to Jeddah, pay damages corresponding to the full value of the goods and to the lost
income and profits he could have realized had plaintiff delivered the cargo to him. Baroom, likewise, filed a cross-claim
against Sierra Madre, plaintiff-intervenor.
On January 23, 1978, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a manifestation and motion that it be "allowed to withdraw
from this case and charging lien be recorded against the properties of Mr. Baroom now aboard MV San Vicente for unpaid
professional fees and reimbursement expenses. "
Thereafter, on February 17, 1978, petitioner filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment for the recovery of professional fees and reimbursement of expenses against Baroom
whom it alleged to have represented in Civil Case No. 105048, CFI, Manila. By virtue of the order dated February 28,
1978 issued by Judge Pineda in the new case, petitioner obtained a writ of preliminary attachment against Baroom's
alleged cargoes which is the subject matter in Civil Case No. 105048.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 105048, on August 2, 1978, respondent Judge gave Attys. Quasha and Valmonte ten (10)
days from receipt of order within which to explain why they should not be held in contempt of court for filing a case entitled
"QuashaAsperillaAnchetaValmonte Pea and Marcos vs. AlSayed Abdullah Mohammed Baroom" docketed as Civil Case
No. 28710 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, where they obtained a writ of preliminary attachment over
the cargoes, which they knew to be subject matter of Civil Case No. 105048 pending before his sala." A compliance with
said order was filed on August 24, 1978, with petitioner alleging that their cause of action against Baroom was for
payment of professional fees and reimbursement of expenses while Case No. 105048 before Judge Juan was for alleged
unpaid charter hire fees.
Thus, petitioner, on October 23, 1978, filed before this Court the instant petition. Petitioner assails the order of August 25,
1978, not the earlier order of April 28, 1977 approving the sale in favor of Apollo Kokin Trading Co., Ltd. of the questioned
cargo for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion considering that subject cargo was allegedly earlier attached by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Without giving due course to the petition and pending the filing of comments by respondents, this Court issued on October
24, 1978 a temporary restraining order,enjoining respondents to immediately cease and desist from taking, unloading,
transferring, conveying, transporting or disposing of the cargoes or any part thereof aboard the MC San Vicente and Dong
Myung.
On October 30, 1978, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion informing this Court that notwithstanding the restraining
order, the MV Don Myung, with the cargo aboard left surreptitiously at midnight of October 24, 1978 without the
assistance of any pilot in violation of Harbor rules. The goods were then allegedly sold for US.
In the meanwhile, a compromise agreement dated October 16, 1978 and filed on November 2, 1978 wherein Filcar
assigned its interests and rights in the proceeds of the sale of the subject cargoes to Sierra Madre which the latter
accepted was approved by the respondent court in its decision of November 3, 1978. An amended petition was thus filed
in this Court impleading Sierra Madre as partly respondent in his case with prayer that a writ of garnishment be issued on
the proceeds of the sale of the cargoes which are in the possession of Sierra Madre, and an order be issued directing
Sierra Madre and all those to whom such proceeds may subsequently be reassigned to deliver to petitioner such portion
of the proceeds of the sale as would satisfy the attorney's lien in the interest of justice.
Coming back to the omnibus motion of Filcar for the lifting of the preliminary attachment issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, the said court on December 7, 1978 dismissed petitioner's case and lifted the preliminary attachment
issued therein. Upon motion for reconsideration dated April 7, 1979, the said preliminary attachment was reinstated by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in its order dated July 5, 1979.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the defendants, Baroom and over the cause of
action.
HELD: We hold that respondent acquires jurisdiction over it. Where a property is burdened by a lien, a writ of attachment
is no longer necessary in order that jurisdiction over the property may be obtained by the court. In the same cited case by
petitioner, in the BancoEspaol case, it was clarified: In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not
personally served, the preliminary seizure is to be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In
this case the lien on the property is acquired by seizure; and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject the property to
that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the preliminary seizure is not
necessary, and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law precisely as though the property
had been seized upon attachment.
The reason for the rule is obvious. An attachment proceeding is for the purpose of creating a lien on the property to serve
as security for the payment of the creditors' claim. Hence, where a lien already exists, as in this case a maritime lien, the
same is already equivalent to an attachment. Moreover, since the property subject of the action for the enforcement of the
maritime liens was already in the possession of private respondent, there is no need for seizure for the court to obtain
jurisdiction over the rest. Where a party in actual possession of the res subject to the lien is before the court, the res is
within the jurisdiction of the court for the enforcement of the lien a suit may be maintained to foreclose a lien on property
within the jurisdiction of the court, although some interest or claim therein is held by a non-resident.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed.
310.
MERCEDES GRUENBERG and ALBERT GRUENBERG, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HONORABLE LINO L. AOVER and ELDA R. FLORES, respondents.
September 10, 1985, 138 SCRA 471
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of CA (now IAC) which affirmed the order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment & other related orders of the trial.
Flores, the respondent, filed for annulment of sale, recovery of ownership and possession of the house and lot situated in
Diliman, QC, as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the late William Gruenberg. Flores alleged that:
the house & lot (sold to defendant Albert Gruenberg) form part of the conjugal partnership of the Gruenberg spouses,
which must answer for the obligations that deceased William Gruenberg might have incurred during his lifetime as
manager & administrator of the conjugal partnership;
the sale was before the death of William Gruenberg, when two creditors had already filed suits against him for collection
of unpaid obligations, and the latter had unpaid obligation to Flores in the amount of P13k, exclusive of interest and
collection charges, patently and clearly can no longer be paid or liquidated.
Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. Flores filed a 'Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment' against
the properties of petitioners that the latter are indebted to her in the principal amount of P13k which she seeks to recover.
Petitioners opposed the motion for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment alleging that this is an action for
annulment of sale and recovery of the house and lot & not for recovery of sum of money; that a writ of preliminary
attachment is not the proper remedy for the protection of the rights of the estate. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of the petitioners and served by the sherrif. Allegedly the order of respondent Judge
was not received by petitioners new counsel but upon being informed of the writ of preliminary attachment and notice of
garnishment, petitioners' new counsel promptly went to the trial court & then and there he discovered that Ps' opposition
to the motion was not attached to the record, because the same was forwarded to Branch XVIII to which this case was
originally assigned. Petitioners filed a motion for Reconsideration and motion to recall the writ of preliminary attachment
and notice of garnishment, on the ground that it is not true that petitioners did not oppose the motion of Flores, and that
there is no valid basis to grant the motion. Respondent Judge denied the motions of the petitioners and he required
petitioners to appear before his court to explain why they should not be punished for contempt for denying/disobeying the
lawful processes of the court ("show cause" order).
This prompted the petitioners to file a petition for certiorari in the CA but was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of attachment and garnishment against the petitioners properties issued by the trial court
and affirmed by the appellate court proper.
Flores' remedy to recover the outstanding debt of the deceased is to follow the procedure in Rule 86 on claims against an
estate. Section 8 of Rule 86 calls for the appointment of a special administrator to defend the estate against such claim.
Allowing Flores in the annulment case to attach the petitioners' properties for the benefit of her 13k claim against the
estate would give her an undue advantage over other creditors against the estate. Moreover, 13k claim of Flores cannot
be settled in the case for annulment of the deed of sale, wherein the writ of attachment is sought. What she seeks to be
secured is not the judgment in the main case but a mere claim against the estate which is still to be considered and
adjudicated by the court.
The rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly in favor of the defendant. The remedy of
attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature. If all the requisites for the issuance of the writ are not present,
the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Following the principle of strict compliance with all requisites,
Court ruled that "when the facts, or some of them, stated in the plaintiff's affidavit are shown by the defendant to be
untrue, the writ may be considered as improperly or irregularly issued." (National Coconut Corporation V. Pecson, et al.,
90 Phil. 809).
The motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment & the affidavit of preliminary attachment are misleading. Flores
states that the "defendants are indebted to plaintiff in the amount of P13,000.00" exclusive of interests and collection
charges. Then, she avers that the "defendants are guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation due
plaintiff ".
The facts in the motion and the affidavit are deceptively framed. The obligation which the respondent seeks to secure by
an attachment was between her and the late William Gruenberg, Sr. What she seeks to establish as fraudulent was the
sale between the late Mr. Gruenberg and his son. These are two entirely distinct transactions.
One of the reasons for granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was the court's
finding that the petitioners failed to file an opposition thereto. Petitioners filed a timely opposition to the motion but in
another branch where this case had earlier been assigned. Despite this timely opposition, the MR of the order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was summarily denied for lack of merit.
So the Court found the writ of preliminary attachment to have been improvidently issued. The petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the former Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary attachment and the notice
of garnishment are DISSOLVED. The other related orders issued in connection with the writ of attachment are SET
ASIDE.
311.
DY v. ENAGE
March 17, 1976, 70 SCRA 96
Facts:
Petitioner, on April 8, 1991, file a Complaint against private respondent Bernardino Villanueva, private respondent
Filipinas Textile Mills and one Sochi Villanueva (deceased) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In the said
Complaint, petitioner sought the payment of P2,244,926.30 representing the proceeds or value of various textile goods,
the purchase of which was covered by irrevocable letters of credit and trust receipts executed by petitioner with private
respondent Filipinas Textile Mills as obligor; which, in turn, were covered by surety agreements executed by private
respondent Bernardino Villanueva and Sochi Villanueva. In their Answer, private respondents admitted the existence of
the surety agreements and trust receipts but countered that they had already made payments on the amount demanded
and that the interest and other charges imposed by petitioner were onerous.
On May 31, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Attachment, contending that violation of the trust receipts law
constitutes estafa, thus providing ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Issue:
Whether Or Not there was a sufficient basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Held:
NO. The Motion for Attachment filed by petitioner and its supporting affidavit did not sufficiently establish the
grounds relied upon in applying for the writ of preliminary attachment. While the Motion refers to the transaction
complained of as involving trust receipts, the violation of the terms of which is qualified by law as constituting estafa, it
does not follow that a writ of attachment can and should automatically issue. Private respondents claimed that substantial
payments were made on the proceeds of the trust receipts sued upon. They also refuted the allegations of fraud,
embezzlement and misappropriation by averring that private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills could not have done these
as it had ceased its operations starting in June of 1984 due to workers' strike.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sievert.
Held
No.
Ratio Decidendi
A preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy. Hence, the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in the principal action would necessarily mean that it likewise lacks such jurisdiction in the ancillary proceeding.
In this case, jurisdiction has not been acquired over Sievert in the principal action as no summons has been served upon
him. Hence, it was an error for the trial court to proceed with the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary
attachment.
ISSUE:
WHETHER or NOT, the remedy ofattachment is valid even if the debt is already secured by other means.
HELD:
Petition is impressed with merit.
We find the petition impressed with merit. The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a
contingent lien on defendants property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such
property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of
satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise
placed beyond the reach of creditors.
Sec 1 Rule 57 states the grounds on which attachment may issue.
Sec 3, Rule 57. An order of attachment shall be granted only when it appers by the affidavit of the applicant , or
some other person who personally knows the facts that XXXX there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to
be enforced by the action.
The reason for the rule prohibiting attachment where the indebtedness was already secured is to prevent the
secured creditors from attaching additional property and thus tying up more of the debtors property tan was necessary to
secure the indebtedness.
To sustain an order of attachment, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish either of these 2 facts:
a) That the obligation had not been secured originally
b) That, if secured at its beginning, the security later became valueless.
Sec 13, Rule 57 authorizes the discharge of an attachment where the same had been improperly or irregularly
issued.
FACTS:
Respondents Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu filed a civil action against petitioners to annul the deed of sale of Lot
No. 5 executed by administrators of the Hodges Estate in favor of the Spouses Ricardo T. Salas and Maria Salas and for
damages. The annulment was upon the averment that Lot No. 5, being a subdivision road, is intended for public use and
cannot be sold or disposed of by the Hodges Estate. The claim for damages was based on the assertion that after
defendant spouses purchased Lots Nos. 2 and 3, they also purchased Lot No. 5 and thereafter "erected wooden posts
thereby preventing Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu from using the road on the afore-mentioned lot, Lot No. 5, and that as a
result of such obstruction, private respondents Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu sustained actual damages, plus and damages
due to the stoppage in the construction of their commercial buildings on Lot No. 3.
In their answer to the complaint, the Salas spouses denied the allegations in the complaint.
In a motion dated May 12, 1977, private respondents filed a Motion for Attachment, alleging, among others, that
the case was "for annulment of a deed of sale and recovery of damages" and that the defendants have removed or
disposed of their properties or are about to do so with intent to defraud their creditors especially the plaintiffs in this case.
HELD:
It appears that petitioners have adequate remedy under the law. They could have filed an application with the
court a quo for the discharge of the attachment for improper or irregular issuance under section 13, Rule 57, of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides the following
SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. - The party whose property has been
attached may also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or before any attachment shall
have been actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who Salas vs. Adil granted
the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the
ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party
whose property has been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or
other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order the discharge of
the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not cured forthwith.
Considering that petitioners have not availed of this remedy, the instant petition is premature.It is necessary, however, for
the guidance of respondent Court and of the parties, to stress herein the nature of attachment as an extraordinary
provisional remedy.
A preliminary attachment is a rigorous remedy, which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, such it
should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is, therefore, the duty of the court, before issuing the writ, to
ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with; otherwise the judge acts in excess of his jurisdiction and
the so issued shall be null and void .
317.PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD., Petitioner,- versus - DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 172242
Facts: Perkin Elmer Asia entered into a distribution agreement with Dakila, a domestic corp. Under the agreement,Dakila
was appointed its sole distributor in the Phils and thus, shall receive commissions for its sales from Perkin Asia.Dakila
was supposed to order the products either from Perkin Asia or from Perkin Elmer Instruments Philippines (PEIP),an
affiliate of Perkin Asia, 99% of the shares of which is owned by Perkin Asia.However, Perkin Asia unilaterally terminated
the agreement with Dakila. So Dakila sued both Perkin Asia and PEIP Dakila filed a Complaint for Collection of Money
(an In Personam suit) with a prayer for a Writ of Attachment (for theproperties of PEIP since 99% is owned by Perkin Asia
anyway). The Alias Summons was, however, served uponPerkinelmer Asia, a Singapore based sole proprietorship owned
by Perkin Asia but was allegedly, a separate and distinctentity from it.So in response to Dakilas collection suit, PEIP filed
a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action. Perkinelmer Asiainformed the court of the wrongful service of summons
upon it. Dakila then filed an amended complaint saying thatPerkin Asia is now Perkinelmer, it became a sole
proprietorship and changed its name but its the same people/interestso they should still be accountable for their
obligations. Perkin Asia, herein petitioner and the proper party, on the otherhand, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over its person.
RTC denied petitionersMotion to Dismiss stating thatsince the action is one for damages, it relates to Perkin
Asiasproperty and since Dakila alleged in its complaint that Perkin Asia owns shares in PEIP, the extraterritorial service
of summons was sufficient to acquire jurisdiction ( RTC relied on Sec. 15 of Rule 14 - (2) when the action relates to, or
thesubject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual
orcontingent).
Issue: Whether of not the service was summons was defective.
Whether or not jurisdiction was validly acquired.
Held: No.Extraterritorial service of summons applies only in in rem and quasi in rem cases, where only jurisdiction over
the res isrequired and such extraterritorial service of summons is done not for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over
theperson of the defendant, but to inform the defendant that there is a suit involving his property (due process). On
theother hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
actioninvolved isin personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.The present case is an action in personam
because it deals with Perkin Asias personal liability to Dakila because of itsunilateral termination of the distribution
agreement. Hence, there should have been personal service of summons.
Dakilas allegation that Perkin Asia had properties in the Philippines did not convert the case into an action quasi in remas
to make the extraterritorial service valid.
ISSUE
Whether the issue of the writ of preliminary attachment is proper.
RULING
1. There was no ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Sec. 1.Grounds upon which attachment may issue. A plaintiff or any proper party may, at thecommencement of the
action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party attached
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of action arising from contract, express
or implied, against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditor;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use
by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the
course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly detained, when the property, or
any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by theapplicant or an
officer;
(d) In an action against the party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking,
detention or conversion of which the action is brought;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with
intent to defraud his creditors;
(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served bypublication.
Also, The affidavit submitted by Pinzon does NOT comply with the Rules.Under the Rules (Sec. 3), an affidavit for
attachment must state that
(a) Sufficient cause of action exists
(b) Case is one of those mentioned in Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 57
(c) There is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action
(d) The amount due to the applicant for attachment or the value of the property the possession of which heis entitled to
recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit of Pinzon lacked
(b), (c) and (d). Failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for theissuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment renders the writ issued against the property fatally defective, and thejudge issuing it is deemed to have acted
in excess of his jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Metro inc,Frederick juan are guilty of fraud. Through employment of machinations and schemes,
Metro Inc. successfully enticed LGD to enter into the2001 Agreement. To secure LGDs full trust in them and lure LGD to
endorse more Purchase Orders and increase thevolume of the orders, Metro Inc during the early part, remitted to LGDs
shares under the Agreement and justwhen the orders increased and the amount involved likewise increased, Metro Inc.
suddenly, without any justifiable reasons and inpure bad faith and fraud, abandoned their contractual obligations to remit
to plaintiffs their shares. Also Metro Inc. transacteddirectly with LGDs foreign buyer to the latters exclusion and damage.
Metro Inc.are likewiseguilty of fraud by violating the trust and confidence reposed upon them by LGD. Metro Inc. received
the proceeds of LGDs LCs withthe clear obligation of remitting 15% thereof to LGD. Their refusal and failure to remit the
said amount despite demand constitutes abreach of trust amounting to malice and fraud. LGDs allegation that petitioners
undertook to sell exclusively and only throughJRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted
directly with respondents foreign buyer is sufficient allegationof fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for damages with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against private respondents.the Trial Court thru the Hon. Rosario A. de Leon, issued an order
allowing the issuance of the writ, due to fraud committed by the defendants in promising to give as security or collateral to
their Indemnity Agreement, which caused the plaintiff to release the security bond, when as it turned out that the TCT of a
parcel of land turned out to be fake, as the true land title number was issued over a different parcel of land issued in the
name of a person other than defendants, while defendant AtillaArkin delivered an official receipt in the name of a third
party but which vehicle was allegedly sold to him free from lien and encumbrance, when it turned out that the car was
heavily mortgaged to a third party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment in question was properly or regularly issued.
HELD: In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, Section 1 (d) of Rule 57 authorizes the plaintiff or any proper party to have the property of the
adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered therein.
But to sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have
been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given.
321. y v. CA
Facts:
Petitioners William Uy and RodelRoxas are agents authorized to sell 8 parcels of land. Petitioners offered to sell
the land to NHA for a housing project. On February 14, 1989, NHA passed a resolution approving the acquisition of said
lands, and pursuant to this the parties executed Deeds of Absolute Sale. However, only 5 out of 8 lands were paid for by
NHA because of a report from DENR that the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and are therefore not
conducive for housing. On November 22, 1991, NHA issued a resolution canceling the sale of the remaining lands and
offered P1.225 million to the landowners as daosperjuicios. On March 9, 1992, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
against NHA and its general manager Robert Balao. The RTC declared the cancellation to be justified, but awarded the
amount offered by NHA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but deleted the award.
Issues:
Held:
(1) Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between their principals and NHA. They are mere agents of the
owners of the land subject of the sale. As agents, they only render some service or do something in
representation or on behalf of their principals. The rendering of such service did not make them parties to the
contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as
against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon that contract
must, generally, either be parties to said contract. Petitioners have not shown that they are assignees of their
principals to the subject contracts. While they alleged that they made advances and that they suffered loss of
commissions, they have not established any agreement granting them "the right to receive payment and out of the
proceeds to reimburse [themselves] for advances and commissions before turning the balance over to the
principal[s]."
VENTURA GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO CATOLICO and SIMEON RAMOS, Judge of First Instance of Isabela,
respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Alfredo Catolico brought an action against the petitioner in the for the recovery of the amount of his
fees for services rendered by him as attorney, praying, at the same time, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against all of the properties adjudicated to said petitioner. He alleged that the defendant is trying to sell and
dispose of the properties adjudicated to him, with intention to defraud the herein plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites prescribed by law for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment have been
complied with.
HELD:
Section 426 of the Code of the Civil Procedure provides that "A judge or justice of the peace shall grant an order
of attachment when it is made to appear to the judge or justice of the peace by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or of some
other person who knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, and that the case is one of those mentioned in
section 424, and that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the
amount due to the plaintiff above all legal set-offs or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is granted."
For the foregoing consideration, this court is of the opinion and so holds that failure to allege in a complaint or in
the affidavit solemnizing it, or in a separate one, the requisites prescribed by section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be
enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the plaintiff above all legal set-offs or counterclaims is as much as the
sum for which the order is sought, renders a writ of preliminary attachments issued against the property of a defendant
fatally defective, and the judge issuing it acts in excess of his jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. (JARDINE) filed a complaint against private respondents Impact
Corporation (IMPACT), Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon, to collect various sums of money allegedly due from
therein defendant IMPACT under a credit accomodation by way of a discounting line agreement. Private respondents
Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon were included as defendants by virtue of their undertaking covered by a Surety
Agreement under which they bound themselves jointly and severally with defendant IMPACT to pay herein petitioner all of
IMPACT's obligations under the aforesaid agreement.
It was alleged that IMPACT assigned its receivables to JARDINE on the condition that IMPACT was to collect
them on their due dates from their issuers and remit the collected amounts to JARDINE and/or repurchase the assigned
receivables; but despite the fact that IMPACT had collected the amounts due on said receivables, it failed or refused to
turn over the amounts so collected to JARDINE.
Likewise contained in said complaint is petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary attachment against private
respondents.
Defendants filed a motion to set aside the writ of preliminary attachment. They also submitted to the court a quo a
memorandum in support of their motion to dissolve the attachment contending that the grounds alleged by the plaintiff in
its application for a writ of attachment are not among the grounds specified under Section 1 of Rule 57; that the
defendants have other sufficient security; that there was no affidavit of merit to support the application for attachment as
required by Section 3 of Rule 57 and that the verification of the complaint was defective as it did not state that the amount
due to the plaintiff above all legal set-ups or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is sought. 9
ISSUE:
Whether or not non-compliance with the formal requirements invalidate the writ of attachment.
Held:
Failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, renders the
writ of preliminary attachment issued against the property of the defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is
deemed to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction. In fact, in such cases, the defect cannot even be cured by amendment.
The general rule is that the affidavit is the foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly fails to
set out some facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and the proceedings are null and void.
Thus, while not unmindful of the fact that the property seized under the writ and brought into court is what the court finally
exercises jurisdiction over, the court cannot subscribe to the proposition that the steps pointed out by statutes to obtain
such writ are inconsequential, and in no sense jurisdictional.
Considering that petitioner's application for the subject writ of preliminary attachment did not fully comply with the
requisites prescribed by law, said writ is, as it is hereby declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
324-339 MISSING
340. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. HON. ELPIDIO M. CATUNGAL, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 121863, May 5, 1997
FACTS:
On 5 October 1994, the RTC of Quezon Cityissued an Order granting the application filed by the Quezon City Central
Police District Command for the issuance of a search warrant against Carlos. With the cooperation of the UP Diliman
police. Carlos was arrested and detained at the Quezon City jail for illegal possession of firearm.On 6 October 1994,
petitioner Dayco ordered a preliminary investigation of the matter and designated Atty. Marichu C. Lambino of the UP
Diliman Legal Office to conduct the investigation. Atty. Lambino submitted her Preliminary Investigation Report wherein
she confirmed that a prima facie case existed against Carlos and recommended that Carlos be charged with grave
misconduct and placed under preventive suspension for ninety days.
The Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman, through petitioner Dayco as officer-in-charge, filed a Formal Charge for grave
misconduct against Carlos. That same day, petitioner Dayco issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Carlos.
The pleadings disclose that Carlos thrice sought the postponement of the hearings, and the Tribunal granted all his
requests.
Unknown to the Tribunal and the UP prosecutor, Carlos filed on 8 December 1994 a complaint for injunction before the
RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed and assigned to Branch 85 thereof. In the complaint Carlos prayed for (1)
the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the petitioners, (2) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for
the Tribunal to cease and desist from proceeding with the administrative case during the pendency of the case, and (3)
his reinstatement and payment of his withheld salary and Christmas bonus. The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order against the petitioners in its order of 12 December 1994. The following day, the Tribunal issued an order granting
the request of Carlos for the resetting of the presentation of his evidence, subject to the outcome of the hearing on the
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. Q-94-22364.Pending the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the petitioners moved to dismiss the said civil action.
On 6 January 1995, after the lapse of the effectivity of the restraining order, the Tribunal issued another order setting
the administrative case for the presentation of Carlos' evidence. Carlos was warned that failure on his part to present his
evidence would constitute a waiver and the case would be submitted for resolution. On 1 February 1995, the trial court
issued the assailed order which granted a writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners were directed to refrain from
proceeding with the administrative case against Carlos. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the order. This was
followed by a motion to resolve the motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss.
In the order of 24 April 1995, the trial court denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration and the motion to
dismiss. Two subsequent orders were issued setting the case for pre-trial on 31 August 1995 and resetting it on 5 October
1995.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court shall grant the petition for preliminary injunction?
2. Whether or not there is prior exhaustion of administrative remedies?
RULING:
1. No.Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the following as grounds for the grant of a preliminary
injunction:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-
performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. This
is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. We are
convinced that Carlos did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean hands. It is patently clear from the
above summary of the facts and from that made by the trial court in its order of 1 February 1995 that the conduct of Carlos
and his counsel before the Tribunal can by no means be characterized as nobly fair, just, and reasonable. The various
strategies adopted by them could lead rational minds to only one conclusion: they were intended to unduly delay the
investigation, if not to gain time to prevent the witnesses from testifying.
2. Carlos did not exhaust administrative remedies, which were available, as he admitted in paragraph 25 of his complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-94-22364. His claim that the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to his case
is nothing more than a self-serving conclusion and is speculative. Indisputably then, Carlos' immediate recourse to the
court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the
principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and speedier solutions to disputes. Where the
enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts -- for reasons of law, comity, and convenience -- will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
341-343 MISSING
344.FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CHRISTOPHER SAN AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 144499, February 19, 2002
FACTS:
The subject matter of the instant controversy is a parcel of land, including the house built thereon, located
at Makati City. The subject property was sold to spouses Enrique and Angelina Camacho (spouses Camacho) in 1994 for
the amount of P2.5 million pesos. The records show that spouses Camacho convinced petitioner to accept a partial
payment of P100, 000.00 pesos upon the execution of a deed of absolute sale in their favor over the subject
property.Thereafter, [respondent] executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses Camacho, who in turn paid respondent] the
amount of P100, 000.00 pesos. It appeared that First Global Realty Development Corporation (FGRDC), [herein
petitioner], granted spouses Camachos loan application with the subject property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190
million. However, spouses Camacho did not pay the remaining balance of the subject property. FGRDC filed a special
civil action for the foreclosure of the subject property inasmuch as spouses Camacho defaulted in the payment of their
loan obligation. On June 28, 1996, Branch 143 rendered a decision ordering the foreclosure of the subject property and
the subsequent sale thereof at public auction.FGRDC filed a motion for execution which was granted on February 7,
1997. Spouses Camacho executed in favor of FGRDC.Accordingly, on September 8, 1997, FGRDC demanded rentals
but when FGRDCs demand was unheeded by [respondent], it filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
possession.Apparently, on November 20, 1997, [respondent] filed a motion for interventionwherein he asked for the
rescission of the deed of absolute sale/mortgage, dacionenpago and cancellation of FGRDCs title over the subject
property.
However, finding the motion for intervention to be a futile undertaking, [respondent] filed a separate complaint the
court a quo issued an order denying [respondents] prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction complaint for
rescission of the deed of absolute sale, annulment of the dacionenpago and cancellation of title and issuance of a new
title with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of injunction against FGRDC, seeking to
enjoin the latter from taking possession of the subject property. The case was raffled to Branch 141 (court a quo), where
public respondent is the presiding judge, and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2673.tion. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but [it] was denied in an order dated June 26, 1998 for lack of merit.the RTC denied the application of
respondent for a preliminary injunction to prevent petitioner from evicting him from the subject property. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief prayed for by respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction should be granted?
RULING:
NO. Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates various grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
as follows:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period
or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights
and interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante -- the last actual, peaceful, and
uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy. [10] In Saulog v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain
from a particular act. It may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before final judgment, when
it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; that the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the
non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of
the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal
action and its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action and/or the relation between the
parties, in order to protect the right of the plaintiff respecting the subject of the action during the pendency of the suit.
Otherwise or if no preliminary injunction were issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing
of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards
granting the relief sought by the plaintiff. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of
the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard fully.Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that
is violated. Moreover, an urgent and permanent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.
In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved is the possession of the property by respondent
and his right to use it as his dwelling, pending determination of whether or not he had indeed sold it to the Camachos and,
consequently, whether the latters transfer of its ownership to petitioner via dacionenpago should be upheld.
345-346 MISSING
347.ALEJANDRO RODULFA, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO ALFONSO, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan, and
PABLO DEL MORAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-14 ,February 28, 1946
FACTS: The petitioner Alejandro Rodulfa allegesin this court of First Instance of Pangasinan, instituted by him against the
respondent Pablo Del Moral, on September 19, 1945, he has demanded the return and reconveyance of fifteen parcels of
land, with an aggregate area of about thirty-one hectares. And on October 26, 1945, Pablo del Moralfiled a motion praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction againstAlejandro Rodulfato desist and refrain from molesting, retarding,
or otherwise disturbing the possession of respondent Pablo del Moral of said fifteen parcels of land, until further orders
from the Supreme Court. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order, praying that it be set
aside and that another be issued denying the motion of respondent Pablofor the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction because the petitioner alleged, under oath, that for many years previous to the filing of the complaintand up to
the present time, he has always been in the material possession of the parcels of land in question. But on November 14,
1945, said motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge. And herein petitioner further alleges that said
order dated November 7, 1945, authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction said order of November 14,
1945 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are both illegal and have been issued without or in excess of the
respondent Judge's jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and are probably not in accord with law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent Judge is in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: NO. Injunction, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and
place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law. (Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil., 273;
Evangelista vs. Pedreos, 27 Phil., 648: Asombra vs. Dorado and Gesmundo, 36 Phil., 883; Kabankalan Sugar
Co. vs. Rubin, 54 Phil., 645.)
The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. The status quo is the
last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (Fredericks vs. Huber, 180 Pa., 572;
37 Atl., 90.)
The plaintiff's offer to file a counterbond was properly denied by the lower court, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, for the preservation of the status quo; as the plaintiff's right and interest, if any, in the property in question are
amply protected by the bond executed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The fact that no copy of said bond was given to the plaintiff in said civil case No. 8930, now petitioner herein, before it was
submitted to the court for approval, cannot and will not invalidate said bond, as the failure to send copy of the bond to
enable said plaintiff to object to the sufficiency was a mere formal defect, which might be waived, either expressly or
impliedly, as by the filing in said civil case No. 8930 of a petition for permission to file a counterbond.
In cases involving the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower
court will not generally be interfered with; and the refusal of the trial court to permit the plaintiff in this case to file a
counterbond cannot be considered as an abuse of sound judicial discretion.
348-361 MISSING
362.EMERITO M. RAMOSet. al VS. COURT OF APPEALS, THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
COMMERCIAL BANK OF MANILA, THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON and EDGARDO L. TORDESILLAS
173 SCRA 550 May 24, 1989
FACTS: On June 15, 1987, the petitioners filed before the RTC in Makati a Complaint for specific performance, rescission
of contract and damages against the private respondents (GSIS), the (COMBANK) and the Atrium Capital Corporation.
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the GSIS and
COMBANK from pushing through with a reported plan to sell COMBANK to the private respondent FNBB and a group of
Filipino investors represented by the private respondent Edgardo L. Tordesillas. The petitioners alleged that the GSIS has
no legal right to sell COMBANK inasmuch as both the GSIS and COMBANK failed to comply with their obligations to the
petitioners as embodied in an Agreement of May 9, 1980 executed by the petitioners and the IUCP investors group where
petitioners sold to the latter 187,649 shares in the Overseas Bank of Manila under the terms and conditions provided
therein. In sum, the petitioners maintained that they have considerable proprietary interest in COMBANK and, accordingly,
their consent must be obtained before COMBANK can be legally sold to interested purchasers.
On July 24, 1987, the trial court issued the restraining order and on September 7, 1987, the FNBB and Tordesillas sought
a reconsideration of the action taken by the trial court.On the same day, September 25, 1987, the GSIS and COMBANK
filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus , with the Court of Appeals and on September 30, 1987, the
Seventh Division of the appellate court resolved to give due course to the Petition. Lastly, on December 7, 1987, the
Eleventh Division resolved to convert the restraining order issued by the Seventh Division into a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE: In issuing the resolution dated December 7 1987 converting the restraining order of September 30 1987 into an
injumction, responded court overstepped its jurisdictional bounds or committed graved abuse of discretion by making
findings and conclusions without factual or legal basis but based merely on speculations and conjectures.
RULING: NO. This Court finds that the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. The court
reproduces with approval the disquisition of the respondent court in its resolution of December 7, 1987
The principal relief sought by private respondents as plaintiffs in the court below is one for specific performance.
Rescission is invoked merely as an alternative remedy should specific performance be impossible of compliance. This is
as it should be because 'the action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted except when the party suffering
damages has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.' (Art 1383, Civil Code; Vinco v. Fuentebella, 12 C.A.
Rep. 645; Guash v.
362-367 MISSING
368.PHILIPPINE PACIFIC FISHING CO., INC.,petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-59070 March 15, 1982
FACTS: The Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. through its of. Officers, Yoshio Yamamoto anterior Marilyn Javier, private
respondents herein, mortgaged to the Philippine Banking Corporation the fishing vessels, PACIFIC I and PACIFIC II, to
secure payment of a debt. Upon default of the Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. to pay its debt, the Philippine Banking
Corporation instituted foreclosure proceedings and filed an action for replevin.Upon failure of Philippine Pacific to pay the
debt, Cheng Yong foreclosed the mortgage. Yamamoto and Javier then went to the Securities and Exchange Commission
and filed a complaint, alleging that the controversy between Cheng Yong and Philippine Pacific was intra-corporate.
On October 22, 1979 private respondentsfiled with the respondent court a complaint for declaration of rescission and
injunction, with ex-parte preliminary injunctionentitled 'Yoshio Yamamoto and Marilyn A. Javier, plaintiffs, versus,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Jose Maria Hilado, Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. Cheng Yong, Lilia Gaw and
Cheng Guat. Thereafter, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendants, particularly the Securities
and Exchange Commission, from enforcing and implementing the orders complained of and from disturbing or interfering
in the exercise by private respondent Yoshio Yamamoto of his rights to the ownership and possession of the two fishing
vessels, PACIFIC I and PACIFIC II.
ISSUE:Whether or not theres excess of jurisdiction and or an abuse to discretion the order of respondent judge.
RULING: NO. The organic act creating the Commission, Presidential Decree 902-A, provides the appropriate remedy,
first within the Commission itself, and ultimately in the high court. Nowhere does the law empower Court of First Instance
to interfere with the orders of the Commission. Not even on grounds of due process or jurisdiction. The Commission is,
conceding arguendo a possible claim of respondents, at the very least, a co-equal body with the Courts of First Instance.
Even as such co-equal, one would have no power to control the other. But the truth of the matter is that only the Supreme
Court can enjoy and correct any actuation of the Commission.
Moreover, it is obvious that since the Commission has its offices outside of Manila, under settled jurisprudence, a Manila
court's writ of preliminary injunction much less a restraining order, can have no binding effect outside the Manila area.
369.MAXIMO NOCNOC, petitioner, vs. HON. ISIDORO A. VERA District Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte
G.R. No. L-37737 February 27, 1979
FACTS: Norberto Nocnoc died in an accident on June 9, 1970, while employed as a bus conductor in the
transportation business of private respondent, Ernest Manarang. And on September 19, 1972, petitioner-claimant filed a
claim for compensation under Act 3842. And on August 7, 1973 respondent Judge ordered defendants, WCU Chief
Referee and the Provincial Sheriff to "cease and desist from further orders.And on September 18, 1973 respondent Judge
enjoined the execution of the order of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU) Regional District No. 6, dated March 14,
1973, directing inter alia private respondent to pay petitioner-claimant the sum of P3, 910.00 for the death of his son, as
well as the order of the same Court dated October 10, 1973 which denied the motion for reconsideration of above order of
September 18, 1973. In the resolution of November 5, 1973, petitioner-claimant's motion to litigate as pauper was
granted, respondent was required to file an answer to the petition not to move to dismiss the same and a temporary
restraining order was issued enjoining respondent Judge from further proceedings effective immediately and until further
orders from the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to entertain a Workmen's Compensation case or
impugning the validity of an award/decision of the WCU.
RULING: NO. The decisions, orders and awards entered by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are appealable to
the Supreme Court. The Court of First Instance is not empowered or clothed with jurisdiction to review or modify, much
less, annul an award or order of execution issued by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
The law and jurisprudence are thus clear, unequivocal. No further interpretation is necessary. The proper forum to thresh
out the validity of the WCU's award which is allegedly null and void because it was rendered without giving the private
respondent his constitutional right to due process, as well as the validity of the ensuing writ of execution to enforce the
same is the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and, on appeal, this court and not any other, much less
respondent's court.
370.G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A. LANZANAS,
TWO THOUSAND (2000) TRANSPORT CORPORATION, NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILIPPINES, INC., MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY AND GUILLERMO G. CUNANAN
G.R. No. 120287, May 28, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), with the name and style Avis Rent-A-Car, was the exclusive
operator of taxi services at (NAIA) under a five (5)-year contract of concession with respondent Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA).The concession contract expired on 31 January 1994 but was renewed by the parties on a
monthly basis until such time when a new concessionaire (shall have been) chosen. Under the arrangement, G & S was
able to operate the coupon taxi service uninterruptedly beyond the period of five (5) years originally awarded by MIAA.On
12 July 1994 MIAA initiated proceedings for public bidding to choose two (2) concessionaires of the coupon taxi services
at the NAIA. Five (5) firms pre-qualified to join the bidding including petitioner G & S and respondents Two Thousand
(2000) Transport Corporation (2000 TRANSPORT) and Nissan Car Lease Philippines, Inc. (NISSAN), after complying
with the terms of reference, the instructions to bidders and the invitation to bid. Consequently, on 5 December 1994 MIAA
selected 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN as the winning bidders and issued in their favor the respective notice of awards
of the coupon taxi service concession. On 10 January 1995 petitioner G & S filed a complaint for injunction and
mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against MIAA and its General Manager Guillermo
G. Cunanan, 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSANAs prayed for in the complaint, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining MIAA from awarding to 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN the new concessions to operate the NAIA
coupon taxi service and from removing G & S as such concessionaire, and thereafter scheduled for hearing the
application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN each moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for improper venue and to lift the temporary restraining
order. Respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN assailed before the Court of Appeals the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction through their respective petitions for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.On 6 February 1995 the appellate court issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction. On 16 May 1995 the Court of
Appeals granted the petitions for certiorari of 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN, set aside the 30 January 1995 Order of
the trial court issuing the writ of preliminary injunction .G & S argues in its petition for review that irregularities attending
the bidding for the coupon taxi service at the NAIA warranted the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and that PD
1818 was not applicable to divest the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the complaint. G & S asserts in its petition under
Rule 65 that allegations in the complaint that 2000 TRANSPORT falsified its Articles of Incorporation and income tax
returns, and was a dummy corporation for two (2) Korean nationals, and that irregularities rigged the bidding stated fully a
cause of action against 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN which would have justified the disqualification of respondent
2000 TRANSPORT from the bidding and the continuation of the month-to-month renewal of the concession contract in
favor of G & S. Petitioner also justifies resorting to Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals to
question the Order of dismissal of the trial court on grounds of expediency and necessity for a speedier remedy than
appeal and further explains that joining the petitions for review and for certiorari in just one (1) pleading was essential to
avoid conflicting rulings in case the petitions were brought separately in different fora.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court which would justify the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65?
RULING:
1. NO. The high court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
95-72586 for failure to state a cause of action against respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN.As admitted by
petitioner G & S itself, the trial court used the correct guidelines by which the failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action as a ground in a motion to dismiss must be considered.Concededly therefore the only errors involved in this petition
are mere errors of judgment, if any, and not errors of jurisdiction for which the instant petition would be the inappropriate
mode for seeking a reversal. The allegations of errors of judgment are in fact fairly obvious on the face of the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We nonetheless examine the Order of the trial court in the interest of justice. The elementary test for failure to state a
cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise,
may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts which in the first place should not have been alleged in the complaint are considered for purposes of
applying the test. Furthermore, actions which are prematurely commenced would fall under the objection
371.EMERITO M. RAMOSet. al VS. COURT OF APPEALS, THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
COMMERCIAL BANK OF MANILA, THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON and EDGARDO L. TORDESILLAS
173 SCRA 550 May 24, 1989
FACTS: On June 15, 1987, the petitioners filed before the RTC in Makati a Complaint for specific performance, rescission
of contract and damages against the private respondents (GSIS), the (COMBANK) and the Atrium Capital Corporation.
The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the GSIS and
COMBANK from pushing through with a reported plan to sell COMBANK to the private respondent FNBB and a group of
Filipino investors represented by the private respondent Edgardo L. Tordesillas. The petitioners alleged that the GSIS has
no legal right to sell COMBANK inasmuch as both the GSIS and COMBANK failed to comply with their obligations to the
petitioners as embodied in an Agreement of May 9, 1980 executed by the petitioners and the IUCP investors group where
petitioners sold to the latter 187,649 shares in the Overseas Bank of Manila under the terms and conditions provided
therein. In sum, the petitioners maintained that they have considerable proprietary interest in COMBANK and, accordingly,
their consent must be obtained before COMBANK can be legally sold to interested purchasers.
On July 24, 1987, the trial court issued the restraining order and on September 7, 1987, the FNBB and Tordesillas sought
a reconsideration of the action taken by the trial court.On the same day, September 25, 1987, the GSIS and COMBANK
filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus , with the Court of Appeals and on September 30, 1987, the
Seventh Division of the appellate court resolved to give due course to the Petition. Lastly, on December 7, 1987, the
Eleventh Division resolved to convert the restraining order issued by the Seventh Division into a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE: In issuing the resolution dated December 7 1987 converting the restraining order of September 30 1987 into an
injumction, responded court overstepped its jurisdictional bounds or committed graved abuse of discretion by making
findings and conclusions without factual or legal basis but based merely on speculations and conjectures.
RULING: NO. This Court finds that the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. The court
reproduces with approval the disquisition of the respondent court in its resolution of December 7, 1987
The principal relief sought by private respondents as plaintiffs in the court below is one for specific performance.
Rescission is invoked merely as an alternative remedy should specific performance be impossible of compliance. This is
as it should be because 'the action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted except when the party suffering
damages has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.' (Art 1383, Civil Code; Vinco v. Fuentebella, 12 C.A.
Rep. 645; Guash v.
Facts: Diosamer Development Corporation filed a complaint against the Chief of staff, AFP for stopping, preventing,
molesting, driving or threatening to stop, prevent, molest from passing through the bignay and sumandig- Alulag roads for
its logging operations. Hon Guadiz acted on the motion of diosamer Development Corporation for the clarification of
restraining order where they shall be allowed to cut and remove logs and seeking for a right of way inside or outside the
military camp. The Chief of staff, AFP, filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue: whether or not Juadge Guadiz acted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction favoring the
corporation on the clarification of restraining order.
Ruling:
Yes, Judge Guadiz acted grave abuse of discretion denying the motion to set aside the restraining order allowing the
company to pass through the areas of Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation.
#373 Romero vs Chief of Staff, AFP Brig. Gen Casaclang February 20, 1989- 170 SCRA 408
Facts: Petitioners were among the military personnel charged for a suit to the unsuccessful coup d' etat of 28 August
1987.Petitioners seek reliefs and filed a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents
from continuing with the court martial proceeding. The solicitor General opposed the issuance of Temporary restraining
order.
Issue: Whether or not the application for a restraining order granting to restrain a criminal prosecution against the
petitioner.
Ruling: NO, Injunction shall not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The trial shall proceed before the General
Court Martial No. 9 without any further delay and let full and speedy justice be accorded.
#374 192 SCRA 182 December 10, 1990 - LINO BROCKA vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Facts: Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a demonstration held in
sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers for illegal
assembly. All petitioners released on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and
RodolfoS a n t o s ( B r o c k a , e t a l . ) , w h o w e r e c h a r g e d a s l e a d e r s o f t h e o f f e n s e o f I l l e g a l
A s s e m b l y f o r w h o m n o b a i l w a s recommended. Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC. QC Judge Miriam
Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each but despite service of
release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka. On Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition. Panel of
assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as condition for
the grant of the counsels request that they be given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their
clients a no such requirement required under the rules. Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on
orders of then Pres. Marcos a release narrated in Co urts resolution in petition for habeas corpus file.In Return
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released a four on Feb1585 and one on
Feb.8 85. Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused
continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined
RULING:The Supreme Court rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the
second offense of inciting to sedition.
GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final
Facts: Justiniani and alacapa filed a petition with preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin respondent Jose Castillo
(Provincial Fiscal of Pasig) from conducting a preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint for libel filed by Brig.
General Montoya against the Petitioners.
A complaint for libel alleged that it caused damages which intended to cause dishonor, discredit, public contempt
and ridicule to his personal worth integrity, honor and position.
Issue: Whether or not the provincial fiscal may be perpetually enjoined from conducting preliminary investigation on a
complaint for libel instituted on the basis of statements embodied in a separate complaint.
Ruling: Yes, Justice would be sub served by enjoining respondents from further proceeding with the questioned
preliminary investigation. Indeed, it would be futile endeavor to conduct an investigation where no crime was committed.
Facts: Amando Ang filed an administrative complaint against Judge Castro for ignorance of law and gross inexcusable
negligence. Judge Castro ordered petitioner to appear before him and to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards court and towards
him. The said Judge sentenced Ang for 5 days imprisonment. Ang filed for notice of appeal which was denied by the
Judge.
Issue: Whether or not Ang may be held liable for contempt in basis of the language he used in his letters and complaint to
the office of the president and the Supreme Court.
Ruling: No, because it was not uttered in the presence of the Judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings rather it was
contained in the pleadings filed by petitioner.
#377Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating
Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated
by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code
Ruling: Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law
prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the
statute.
# 378 Pelejo vs Court of Appeals- October 18, 1982- 117 SCRA 666
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Deed of Sale, title, conveyance and damages alleging that the Deed of
Sale petitioners executed in favor of respondents is merely simulated to accommodate the latter in obtaining a loan from
the bank. The complaint was dismissed on the motion of private respondent pointing out that the complaint states no
cause of action. No appeal was taken by petitioners and instead another complaint but with the same cause of action was
filed on the ground of resjudicata.
The complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals meanwhile respondents filed
Accion Reinvendicatoria or publiciana, the dismissal was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction was mandatory.
Ruling: Yes, to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the following must be shown: (1) that the
complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has been violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (3)
that there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
#379 TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.
FACTS:
The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees. After the holding of a
certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary. Thus, Toyota
refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said appeal. The Unions subsequent notice to strike was converted
into a preventive mediation case.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and
2. Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.
HELD:
1. Yes. The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota plants
constituted illegal strikes. Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a lack of permit
from the City of Manila to hold rallies, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just to attend
DOLE hearings.
# 380 Gordillo vs Del Rosario
Facts:
An Action was instituted against Gutierrez, Gordillo and Salgado y Martinez who are engaged in general merchandise
business and conducting the establishments, on the Escolta, known as the "New York-Paris-Manila" and "St. Louis Dry
Goods Store.it was alleged that the defendants, in the abuse of their authority as managers, had unlawfully diverted large
sums of money from the legitimate uses of the firm and had appropriated the same to their own use in violation of law and
the articles of partnership.
The Honorable Judge issued an exparte injunction upon execution of bond without preliminary notice to the defendants.
Defendants moved to dissolve the injunction however it was denied. They applied petition for certiorari and asked the
Supreme Court to supersede, quash and dissolve the injunction in the ground of irregularity and grave abuse of discretion
by the Judge.
Issue: Whether or not the action of the Court of the first Instance in granting the injunction in question was irregular and in
excess of its jurisdiction.
Ruling: The petition is without merit. The granting of preliminary injunction is proper and sufficient itis in the conformity of
the articles on partnership and it does not ask that the firm be liquidated under judicial supervision.
#382 Ramos v. CA
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr.
Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC Dra. Gutierrez, the
anesthesiologist botched the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain
damage.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners
showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
reasonable care in intubating Erlinda. Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.
HELD:
Whether or not the respondents were negligent and solidarily liable for damages.
Ruling: Yes, they are solidarily liable for negligence and liable for damages. Res ipsa loquitor, the thing speaks for itself.
In the case at bench, however, the judgment was never executed since petitioners filed different actions to stave off the
execution of said judgment. Petitioners were at fault and consequently caused the delay in the execution of judgment for
almost ten years.
In ejectment cases, the rule is explicit in that the judgments must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the
plaintiff. This is to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession. The sense of urgency is more
pronounced in the instant case where the ejectment in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents herein) was decided in 1983
but the judgments therein were subsequently appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.
397. CIRILO D. DOLAR v. CARLOS L. SUNDIAM, 38 SCRA 616. April 30, 1971.
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated
December 1, 1966, in Special Proceeding 472, granting the petition of the herein respondent RemigioLumampao for the
appointment of a receiver over two (2) parcels of land subject of a motion, filed by the said respondent Lumampao, to set
aside the sale thereof made by the herein petitioner Luis Tupas, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the testate
estate of one GenerosoTupas, Sr., in favor of his herein co-petitioner Cirilo Dolar.
FACTS:
GenerosoTupas, Jr. filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the allowance of his father's will and the
appointment of an administrator for the deceased's estate. After the probate of the will and the appointment of the
deceased's widow later replaced by Luis Tupasas judicial administrator of the testate estate, GenerosoTupas, Jr., sold to
the herein Lumampao, two (2) parcels of land bequeathed to him by his father. Lumampao, by virtue of this purchase,
asked the surrogate court to be allowed to intervene in the proceedings which the court granted.
Luis Tupas sold to his herein co-petitioner CiriloDolar for the four (4) parcels of land specified in the motion, inclusive of
the 92 hectares previously sold to Lumampao byGenerosoTupas, Jr. It will be noted that at this time, the validity of the
sale to Lumampao was still pending adjudication in the Court of Appeals.
Lumampao, in his capacity as intervenor in the settlement proceedings, filed with the surrogate court an amended motion
to set aside the order of the said court insofar as it authorized the sale of the two (2) parcels of land conveyed to him by
GenerosoTupas, Jr. Lumampao filed with the probate court a petition for the appointment of a receiver over the two
parcels of land conveyed and adjudicated to him.The probate court granted Lumampao's petition. Tupas and Dolar filed
petition to set aside the receivership order.
ISSUE:Whether or notthe respondent court has no jurisdiction to grant receivership over the said parcels of land in
dispute
HELD:
A piece of property which originally is a part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by an heir of the deceased having
a valid claim thereto, and said piece of property is, by mistake, subsequently inventoried or considered part of the
deceaseds estate subject to settlement, and, thereafter, with the authority and approval of the probate court, is sold once
more to another person, a receiver of the property so sold may, during the pendency of a motion to set aside the second
sale, be appointed by the court when in its sound judgment the grant of such temporary relief is reasonably necessary to
secure and protest the rights of its real owner against any danger of loss or material injury to him arising from the use and
enjoyment thereof by another who manifestly cannot acquire any right of dominion thereon because the approving
surrogate court had already lost jurisdiction to authorize the further sale of such property to another person.
Ordinarily, a receiver cannot be put on property which is already in custody of the law under process from another court of
competent jurisdiction; and there cannot be more than one receiver over the same property. In appreciating the foregoing
principles, it must be borne in mind that, thus far, we have proceeded upon the assumption that the estate upon which
receivership is prayed for is under the custody of law. Apparently, the two parcels of land in dispute cannot be said to be
within this category, judged from the records of this case. The said two parcels of real estate were, by virtue of a final and
executory judgment, adjudicated in favor of Lumampao Consequently, they can no longer be said to form part of the
testate estate of the late GenerosoTupas, Sr. over which the probate court can validly exercise jurisdiction in connection
with the distribution and liquidation of the said estate.
398. DOMINADOR BASAYA, JR v. MILITANTE, 156 SCRA 299. December 11, 1987
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners challenge the assumption of jurisdiction by Respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch XII, over a complaint for Replevin filed by private respondent, Philippine Tuna
Ventures, Inc. against petitioners, upon the allegation that it is intertwined with a labor dispute so that exclusive jurisdiction
belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Tuna Ventures, Inc. (TUNA), is the charterer of the fishing vessel, the F/B Caribbean (Vessel).
TUNA, Inc. Sometime in 1985, TUNA, Inc. transferred the operation of the Vessel to a sister corporation, the Eastship
Fishing Corporation (Eastship). Petitioners, twenty-four (24) in all, constitute the crew of the Vessel, with petitioner
DominadorBasaya, Jr., as its Captain.
TUNA, Inc. sought the remedy of Replevin against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court praying that petitioners be
ordered to deliver to it the possession of its Vessel, which petitioners were allegedly possessing in violation of its rights.
In their defense petitioners maintained that they were in possession of the Vessel as its crew; that their possession is "an
extension of the possession of the plaintiff over the Vessel" and that to deprive them of its possession by a Writ of
Replevin would amount to an illegal termination of their employment.
The Writ of Replevin was ordered issued upon TUNA, Inc.s filing of a bond in the amount of P2M. The Sheriff served the
Writ on petitioners and they disembarked from the Vessel. However, after about an hour, they re-embarked and re-took
possession.Judgment was rendered in the Replevin Case declaring TUNA, Inc. to have a better right to the possession of
the Vessel and ordering petitioners to immediately deliver possession thereof.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the Replevin Case
HELD:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought
therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding
to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property.
The Trial Court, therefore, rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the Replevin Case and aptly held that, as charterer of the
Vessel, TUNA, Inc. has the better right of possession and that petitioners alleged right to possess the Vessel as the crew
thereof is not in any way superior to the right of TUNA, Inc. as such charterer or lessee.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each
forum can be resolved independently of the other. In fact, on 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had
issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering
petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code.
399. BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS 258 SCRA 102,July 5, 1996
FACTS:
The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed a promissory note binding themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc..
To secure payment, the Manahan spouses executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle. Carmasters later
assigned the promissory note and the chattel mortgage to petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the
Manahans. When the latter failed to pay the due installments, petitioner sent demand letters. The demands not having
been heeded, filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the spouses, as well as against a John Doe, praying for
the recovery of the vehicle with an alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the vehicle not be
returned. Upon petitioner's motion and the filing of a bond in the amount of P169,161.00 the lower court issued a writ of
replevin.
ISSUE:Whether or not a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any possessor of the object of a chattel
mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the mortgage
HELD:
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to the possession of the property unless and until the
mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee thereupon seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee's right of possession is
conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties like the debtor or
the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. When the
mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but
also the mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to replevy the
property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not
the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage
contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.
400. THOMAS YANG vs. VALDEZ, 177 SCRA 141, August 31, 1989
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an action in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner
Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. In their complaint, the
Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and possession of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them. The
trucks were, however, registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante spouses'
business. TheMorante spouses alleged that they were deprived of possession of the vehicles when petitioner Yang had
the vehicles taken from where they were parked to the warehouse of Manuel Yaphockun and there they were thereafter
held.
To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses applied for a writ of replevin and put up a
replevin bond of P560,000.00lThe respondent judge issued an order of seizure directing the Provincial Sheriff of to take
immediate possession and custody of the vehicles involved. The Sheriff carried out the order. law library
Petitioner Yang moved, on 21 January 1985, for an extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file an answer to the
complaint for replevin. Four days later, on 25 January 1985, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the amount of
P560,000.00 which counter-bond was, however, rejected by the respondent judge for having been filed out of time.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the spouses are entitled to the writ of replevin
2. Whether or not the defendants right to counteredbond has prescribed
HELD:
1. The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate
possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he
applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession
thereof."chanrobles virtual law library
law library
2. Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff" require the return
of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer."
Both these periods are mandatory in character. Thus, a lower court which approves a counter-bond
filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction. In the instant case, the cargo trucks were
taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond was filed on 25
January 1985. The conclusion of respondent judge that petitioner's right to file a counterbond had already
prescribed is correct.
401. PAGKALINAWANv. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ 21SCRA 1275, Dec. 18, 1967
FACTS:
This decision deals with the specific question of. In brief, this petition presents this situation: Respondent Judge, the Hon.
Amador E. Gomez, acting on a complaint for replevin filed by the other respondent Norberto L. Dayrit directed petitioner,
Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the National Bureau of Investigation to turn over to the Sheriff of Cebu
City an automobile which was seized under a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon.
Guillermo Santos presiding, as a subject of the offense of theft or as stolen property.
ISSUE:Whether a court of first instance of one district in a replevin proceeding may ignore a search warrant issued by
another court of first instance
HELD:
Once a court of first instance has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance,
it cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore
it came into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such
a search may order its release. A contrary ruling would be subversive of a doctrine steadfastly adhered to, the main
purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise
ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each others lawful orders.
402. BAGALIHOG v. HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ 198 SCRA614 June 27, 1991
FACTS:
Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. The petitioners house,
which was near the airport, was searched with his consent to see If the killers had sought refuge there. The search proved
fruitless.chaTwo days later, Capt. JulitoRoxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioners
motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded
on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.
The petitioner and several others were charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder for the killing of Espinosa and
three of his bodyguards and the wounding of another person.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the motorcycle with an application for a writ of
replevin, plus damages in the total amount of P55,000.00
The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the clerk of court on motion of the
petitioner did not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The respondent judge had no authority over it because it had not
been lawfully seized nor had it been voluntarily surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The private respondent
observed in his comment that "it is only when the exhibits are offered in evidence and admitted by the court that they are
submitted to the custody of the Court, and, before that, "they are usually in the possession of the prosecution." Even he
agrees therefore that the motorcycle is not in custodia legis.
Our finding is that the action to recover the motorcycle in the Regional Trial Court of Masbate will not constitute
interference with the processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and that, consequently, the complaint should not
have been dismissed by the respondent judge.
403. CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 222SCRA 85, May 17, 1993
FACTS:
Judge Lauro V. Francisco of after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other witnesses, issued a search warrant
directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Canoy
seized the vehicle and took custody thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by
petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by
Judge Leonardo B. Caares.The petitioneralleging among other things that lawful ownership and possession of the
subject vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor carnapped it.
Judge Caares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond. The writ of replevin was also issued
on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized on by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.cCanoy filed a motion for
the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin.
ISSUE:Whether or not the vehicle can be a subject of replevin
HELD:
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodialegis when it
is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with
the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the property was
taken.virtual law library
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to
petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional
dismissal", of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in
jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders
issued by another branch of the same court because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must
always be adhered to.chan
404. LA TONDEA DISTILLERS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA 553, June 8, 1992
FACTS:
The appellate proceedings at bar originated from an action of "replevin with damages" instituted in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila by La Tondea Distillers, Inc. against a person named "Te Tien Ho," described in the complaint as a "junk
dealer" or owner of a "second hand store".
La Tondea Distillers, Inc. (La Tondea) manufactures and sells a gin popularly known as Ginebra San Miguel, which is
contained in 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of ownership LA TONDEA, INC. and GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL
stamped or blown-in to the bottles which specially ordered from the bottle manufacturers for its exclusive use. The
defendant "Te Tien Ho" has in his possession a quantity of the registered bottles worth P20,000.00.
Judge Santillan issued the writ of delivery prayed for upon La Tondeas posting of a bond in the amount of P40,000. Tee
Chin Ho" in his answer prayed for the issuance of "a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant may be allowed to file a motion to dissolve the writ of seizure
HELD:
The law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery) on the
ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the ground relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment
or injunction, and thereby put at issue the matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied,
the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the trial on the merits.
Thus if a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within
five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, 30 and (2) serve plaintiff with a
copy thereof, both requirements as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned being
mandatory. Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond, or of the surety or sureties
thereon;" but if he does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Sections
5 and 6.
405. ONG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 201 SCRA 543, Sep. 13,1991
FACTS:
To secure the fulfillment of the obligations of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. to the Solidbank, and credit accommodations
which the former may from time to time obtain from the latter both parties executed a document denominated as "Pledge
Agreement".Under the said Pledge Agreement, Madrigal Shipping, Co., Inc. gave additional securities or collaterals in the
form of a pledge in favor of the bank, its barge and tugboat particularly described.
Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. failed to pay its obligation to the Solidbank. The creditor bank had to sell the pledged
properties. Nevertheless, when the pledgee bank was to sell the pledged properties, it found out that the tugboat and the
barge had surreptitiously been taken without the knowledge and consent of the Solidbank. Honesto Ong bought one (1)
MSC Barge No. 601 the same barge which was subject of the pledge from Santiago S. Ocampo, a successful bidder in a
public auction by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) .
Solidbankfiled a complaint against Honesto Ong, et al. for Replevin with Damages . The respondentcourt issued an order
for the seizure of the above described personal property upon posting of a bond in the sum of P1,000,000.00.Honesto
Ong filed a Motion to Lift Order of Seizure, claiming great and irreparable damage would be suffered by him if the Court
would not recall the above stated order. In the same motion, he maintained that he purchased in good faith MSC Barge
No. 601 and even offered to post acounterbond.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a necessity for the Ongs to post a counterbond
HELD: This Court has explained that a defendant in a replevin suit, (petitioners Ong in this case) may demand the return
of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the
property as stated in the plaintiff s affidavit, within the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section D, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff' require the return of
the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer. The intent of
the law requiring the posting of the bond by the applicant is clear and manifest, which is to cover and insulate the
defendant's interest from undue damage. In short, whoever holds the property must post the bond to stand as security to
the non-holder pending the final determination of the case.
Verily, respondent Appellate Court aptly observed that the questioned orders reveal that the Court a quo exercised
prudence in the highest degree. Solidbank was required and has already posted a bond in favor of the Ongs should the
suit for replevin be declared improper. Conversely, petitioner Ong must post a bond if he seeks the continued possession
of the property, in favor of Solidbank should the suit for replevin prosper.
406. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. BAUTISTA 505 SCRA 748, Oct. 27, 2006
FACTS:
Noel Tabuelog, et al, imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the shipment arrived the District
Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc.
(ATI), a customs-bonded warehouse. Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the District
Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint against the shipment and set the sale at public auction.
The Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion stating that shipments of right hand wheel vehicles loaded and exported at
the port of origin before February 22, 1998 were not covered by RA No. 8506 unless the same were loaded and imported
after said date.
The importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Paraaque City, against the Secretary of Finance, Customs
Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the SocieteGenerale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages.The RTC granted the application for a writ of replevin on a
bond.
ISSUE:Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents
HELD:
Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the writ of
replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at
public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of respondents
(plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction
over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof. It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau
of Customs is a proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e.,
directed against the res or imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of their importation. In this
proceeding, it is, in legal contemplation, the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as the
offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.36
In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and its implementation are void.
407. SAN JUAN v. VALENZUELA, 177 SCRA 926, October 23, 1982.]
FACTS:
The marriage between Mejia and petitioner San Juan was declared null and void on the ground of a prior and subsisting
marriage between petitioner and one Isabel Bandin. Mejia instituted the instance action against San Juan seeking support
for herself and her two minor children. Mejia entered the challenged order granting support pendente lite. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied.Hence this petition. However, during pendency of said petition, petitioner filed with
the trial court a manifestation proposing a scheme of payment for the amount of support which had accrued, and seeking
to reduce the amount of support pendente lite to P1,000.00 on the ground that the sum previously fixed by respondent
judge is now beyond his means to pay.
HELD:
Unquestionably, the petitioners willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the manner indicated in his
manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have rendered this petition moot and academic. The trial
courts order fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in the sense that is can be the subject of
modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
Hence, in the instant certiorari petition, the factual issue of whether the amount of P2,500.00 previously fixed by
respondent judge is now beyond the means of petitioner, should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of the
evidence to be presented at the proper hearing.
408-443 MISSING
444. Ollada vs. Central Bank G.R. No. L-11357 May 31, 1962
Facts: Ollada, a CPA authorized to practice accounting at Central Bank filed in the CFI a petition for declaratoy relief
after his petition for a writ of prelim injunction had been dismissed in the CFI assailing the enforcement of the Bank
with two requirements for CPAs, re: that the applicant CPA should sign a statement under oath and that, upon
accreditation, a CPA would be governed by the rules and regulations of the Central Bank and not by those of the
Philippine Institute of Accountants. He alleges that because of these requirements he had suffered serious injury,
and that such enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in the practice of CPAs in the Office of the Central
Bank. The CFI dismissed the petition.
Held: No. The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been
breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition
for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his
right and caused him injury all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary
civil action or proceeding.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and
that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which would constitute actionable violation.
The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of
other existing forms of action or proceeding.
445. Kawasaki Port Service Corp. v. Amores
Doctrine: An action purely for injunction is a personal action as well as an action in personam. As a personal action,
personal or substituted service of summons upon the defendant, not extra territorial service, is necessary to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court over the defendant
Facts:
C.F Sharp Kabushiki (Kabushiki) incurred several obligations from several creditors, including petitioners herein
C.F. Sharp & Co (CF Sharp) anticipated that the creditors of Kabushiki will run after it
Hence, C.F. Sharp prayed for injunctive relief against the petitioners' demand for the payment of C.F. Sharp
Kabushiki Kaisha's liabilities
C.F. Sharp alleged that it is separate and distinct from Kabushiki. That the former is organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines while the latter is under the laws of Japan.
o That it had no participation whatsoever or liability in connection with the transactions between the latter
and the defendants.
CF Sharp also prayed for declaratory relief that it is separate and independent corporation, it is not liable for the
obligations and liabilities of Kabushiki. (Note: not available according to the court as no action in court has yet
been filed by the creditors)
As the creditor-defendants are non-residents, without business addresses in the Philippines but in Japan, CF
Sharp asked the court to effect extraterritorial service of summons.
Judge Amores authorized the extraterritorial service of summons on creditors
Naturally, the creditors opposed and filed "Special Appearance to Question Jurisdiction of This Honorable Court
Over Persons of Defendants"
o Alleged that lower court does not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the persons of defendants on the
grounds that private respondent's action does not refer to its personal status
o The action does not have for subject matter property contemplated in Section 17 of Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, that the action does not pray that defendants be excluded from any interest or property in the
Philippines;
o And that no property of the defendants has been attached
o Action is in personam; and that the action does not fall within any of the four cases mentioned in Section
17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Defense: affects status of CF Sharp and liability for Kabushikis indebtedness
ISSUE: WON an extraterritorial service of summons is allowed in this case and therefore the Court obtained
jurisdiction? NO
HELD:
Extraterritorial service of summons is proper only in four (4) instances:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs:
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines
Injunction was asked to enjoin petitioners from demanding from private respondent the payment of the
obligations of Kabushiki. It was not prayed that petitioners be excluded from any property located in the
Philippines, nor was it alleged, much less shown, that the properties of the defendants, if any, have been
attached
Complaint does not involve the personal status of CF Sharp, nor any property in the Philippines in which
creditors have or claim an interest, or which was attached, but purely an action for injunction, it is a personal
action as well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem
As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial
service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.
In an action for injunction, extra-territorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident
defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach
them outside the region over which they exercise their authority.
446
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al, respondents.
G.R. No. 97827 February 9, 1993
FACTS: The petitioner University of the Philippines questions, in this petition for review on certiorari the Order of the lower
court denying the motion to dismiss the complaint for damages filed against two of its professors for alleged derogatory
statement uttered concerning the Tasadays, the cave-dwelling inhabitants of the rain forest of Mindanao.
On August 15-17, 1986, the "International Conference on the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent
Anthropological Issues" was held at the Philippine Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City. Jerome Bailen,
Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Department of Anthropology was the designated conference chairman.
He presented therein the "Tasaday Folio," a collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading anthropologists who
disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and suggested that the "discovery" in 1971 by a team led by former
Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde, Jr. was nothing more than a fabrication
made possible by inducing Manobo and T'boli tribesmen to pose as primitive, G-stringed, leaf-clad cave dwellers.
In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus Salazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of the Tasadays
to T'boli and Manobo ethnic groups. He likewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped television documentary showing
interviews with natives claiming to have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays.
UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the 12th International Congress of
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a
hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in several dailies. Elizalde and Tasaday representatives Balayem,
Mahayag, Dul and Lobo, filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against Salazar and Bailen and alleged that
defendants' conduct and statements that the Tasadays were nonexistent or frauds deprived them of their peace of mind
and defiled the Tasadays' "dignity and personality;" that defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the Tasadays to pose
and pretend was defamatory and pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and publicity-seeking persons, thereby besmirching
their reputation and causing them serious anxiety; that the defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly deny plaintiff
Tasadays' personality and their existence as a distinct ethnic community within the forest area reserved under the
Proclamation (No. 995) unjustly becloud or tend to becloud their rights thereunder, and hence entitle plaintiff Tasadays to
a judgment declaring them a distinct ethnic community qualified to receive the benefits of Presidential Proclamation No.
995," and that defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaign to vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of "false and
perjured 'evidence' to debase and malign" them.
UP filed a motion to intervene with supporting memorandum asserting that, having authorized the activities of
Bailen and Salazar, it had a duty to protect them as faculty members for acts and utterances made in the exercise of
academic freedom. Moreover, it claimed that it was itself entitled to the right of institutional academic freedom.
At the hearing on the motion to intervene on November 28, 1988, the lower court required UP to submit its answer in
intervention "to enable the Court to better appreciate the issue of whether or not the motion for leave to
intervene should be granted.
Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: the complaint failed to state a
cause of action; the cause of action, if any, had already prescribed; they are protected by the guarantees of free speech
and academic freedom; the court had no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in a civil action and no justiciable
controversy exists. Said motion to dismiss was denied. The Court resolved to "dismiss the petition for failure of the
petitioners to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its
questioned judgment." Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of said Resolution was denied "for having been filed late,
the motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration having been previously denied.
The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to declare defendants in default which, on March 10, 1989, the lower court granted.
The defendants tried to set aside the order of default but the lower court denied it on April 11, 1989. 7
In the same Order, the lower court also resolved UP's motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 16, 1989
striking its motion to dismiss from the record. The court explained that after it had filed the answer in intervention, UP
could no longer file a separate motion to dismiss because under Section 2 (c) of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, an
intervenor may only file two kinds of pleadings: a complaint if he joins the plaintiff and an answer in intervention if he
unites with the defendant. Consequently, by admitting UP's proposed answer in intervention, the court deemed the same
as UP's answer to the complaint because the proposed answer in intervention may not, as incorrectly claimed by UP, be
considered as filed only for the purpose of enabling the court to better appreciate the issue of whether or not its motion for
leave (to intervene) shall be granted and nothing more. 8
On May 3, 1989, UP filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on the special defenses it had raised in its answer-in-
intervention, specifically lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
On May 15, 1989, the lower court, after allowing the parties to argue orally on UP's motion for a preliminary hearing,
issued an Order denying "intervenor's special defenses (in its answer in intervention), as grounds for a motion to dismiss."
After noting that UP's answer-in-intervention had not explicitly alleged lack of cause of action or that the court had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, the lower court said:
But, even granting arguendo, that what the intervenor raised in its answer in intervention to the effect that:
(a) the acts of defendants subject of the complaint are protected by the mantle of the institutional
academic freedom of the University of the Philippines; and (b) the statements made in the exercise of
academic freedom are privileged, amounted to an allegation of the lack of cause of action of the plaintiffs'
complaint, this Court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs' complaint does not state a cause of action, as
contended by the intervenor.
For, while it may be true that the plaintiffs' complaint does not state a cause of action against the
intervenor, as, in fact, it is admitted by plaintiff's counsel, in oral arguments, that the plaintiffs have no
claim against intervenor University of the Philippines, however, since what is sought to be dismissed by
the intervenor is the plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants, intervenor University of the Philippines
being unwilling to withdraw its answer in intervention to which the plaintiffs even conceded, undoubtedly,
the plaintiffs' complaint states a cause of action against the defendants on the basis of the allegations
therein. For, this alleged protective mantle of institutional academic freedom of the University of the
Philippines over the defendants and its privileged character, were already alleged by the defendants in
their motion to dismiss filed on December 8, 1988, and this was denied by this Court in its order dated
January 9, 1989.
What is more, this order was sustained by the highest court, for these grounds were also squarely raised
by the defendants' in their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order, with the Supreme Court. But, this petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its
Resolution dated April 3, 1989, in G.R. No. 87248, on the ground that the petitioners, the defendants
herein, failed to sufficiently show that this Court had committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering
its questioned order dated January 9, 1989.
For this reason, the intervenor's move to question the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint against the
defendants is already foreclosed by the aforesaid resolution of the Supreme Court.
Besides, from a perusal of the plaintiffs' complaint, there is no allegation therein that the activities of the
defendants were sanctioned by intervenor University of the Philippines. And since, the motion to dismiss
of the intervenor is predicated upon lack of cause of action of the plaintiffs' complaint, this must be
resolved only on the basis of what are alleged in the complaint and nothing more, for which reason,
necessarily, the special defenses of the intervenor seeking the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint for
lack of cause of action is without merit. 9
In its petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this Court on June 23, 1989, UP assailed the said Order. The petition,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 88664, was referred to the Court of Appeals "for proper disposition" in the Resolution of
June 29, 1989. 10 The petition was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 18074.
On March 12, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 11 dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order it had earlier issued. It held that the motion to dismiss may not be granted on the ground of insufficiency
of cause of action predicated on matters not raised in the complaint. It ruled that the lower court had jurisdiction over the
complaint for damages as the action was aimed at recovering relief arising from alleged wrongful acts of the defendants.
A relevant portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner contends that the acts of the defendants having been actually sanctioned by the University,
are within the "protective mantle of academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution" for which the
defendants can not be made liable for damages. But this argument fails to consider that such allegations
are not stated in the complaint and may only be properly raised in the answer and determined after trial
for, as already above alluded to, by filing a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are
hypothetically admitted and it is not the office of the order to determine whether the allegations of facts in
the complaint are true.
The other argument is that the question of the Tasaday, that is, if the find of this ethnic group is a hoax as
the defendants had claimed in a public discussion, "is an academic and scientific question which courts
do not have the expertise to inquire into." But this again does not appear anywhere in the complaint and
so may only be properly raised as a defense to be proved during the trial of the case.
The petitioner argues too that the cause of action for declaratory relief is not proper in an ordinary civil
action. Granting this arguendo but the action may not be dismissed on that account alone for as may be
noted, the declaratory relief is only one prayer and the principal object is to hold the defendants liable on
what is claimed as the commission of a tort by the defendants which injured the plaintiffs.
The main concern of the plaintiffs is evidently only on the responsibility of the two (2) defendants
concerning discussions they made for which the plaintiffs seek to hold them liable for damages. The
prayer for declaratory relief is only a minor aspect of the case about which neither
the defendants nor the intervenors have any apparent interest of whatever kind. 12
Hence, the instant petition for review, on certiorari.
We are confronted here with a situation wherein an intervenor who made common cause with the defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint after filing an answer in intervention and after the original defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint had been denied. What is more striking is the fact that the same intervenor sought the dismissal of a complaint
where its interest is not apparent. Moreover, the intervenor founded its motion to dismiss on an extraneous matter which
is not even obliquely alluded to in the complaint.
With this unique set-up, we cannot subscribe to private respondents' contention that the resolution of this petition is
foreclosed by the principle of res judicata. While it is true that the instant petition and that in G.R. No. 87248 revolve
around the issue of whether or not the lower court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-88-1028, there is an aspect of the case which takes it out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata.
The said principle applies when there is, among others, identity of parties and subject matter in two cases. 13 Concededly,
the fact that UP is the petitioner herein while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in G.R. No. 87248 is not a hindrance
to the application of res judicata because the situation is akin to the adding of other parties to a case which had been
finally resolved in a previous one. 14 UP was not an original party-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-88-1028, but it intervened
and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate
academic freedom, both individual and institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial identity of parties, as both
UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand, represent the same interests in the two petitions. 15
However, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the two petitions is wanting. Private respondents identify the subject
matter as "the trial judge's refusal . . . to dismiss the complaint against Bailen and Salazar." 16 This, of course, refers to the
Order denying the motion to dismiss. It should be noted, however, that two motions to dismiss the same complaint were
filed in this case and they were separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen and Salazar which became the
subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. 87248. The second motion to dismiss was filed by UP but on February 15, 1989,
the lower court struck it off the record. UP filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said order of February 15, 1989, but
the lower court denied it on the ground of impropriety of the motion to dismiss as UP had already filed an answer in
intervention.
Following the provisions of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in Section I of the same Rule "except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense," UP filed a
motion for a preliminary hearing on the special defenses, specifically lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action which it pleaded in its answer in intervention. As Section 5 provides, the result would be the same
"as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." It was the lower court's Order of May 15, 1989 ascribing no merit to UP's
special defenses, which was first presented to this Court for nullification on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
through the petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 88664. The petition having been referred to the
Court of Appeals, the propriety of the same Order of May 15, 1989 was resolved against UP by said appellate court on
March 12, 1991.
Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to herein facts would be stretching to its limits the requirement of identity of subject
matter. Moreover, the fact that the resolution of Civil Case No. Q-88-1028 would inevitably create an impact, not only on
the academic community but also on the cultural minorities, we need to scrutinize more closely the validity of the Order
denying the motion to dismiss. It bears stressing that res judicata may not be held applicable where justice may have to
be sacrificed for the rigid rules of technicality. 17
What the foregoing disquisition boils down to is that instant petition fails for lack of merit.
As its first ground for the allowance of the petition, UP contends that the allegations in the complaint regarding the acts
and statements of Bailen and Salazar are "protected by the mantle of the institutional academic freedom of UP and are
therefore privileged communications which cannot give rise to any cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the
Civil Code in favor of the herein private respondents." 18 Actually, this ground is a restatement of the two affirmative
defenses cited by the petitioner in its answer in intervention. 19 The lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly
interpreted these defenses as falling within the purview of Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which considers as
a ground for a motion to dismiss failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
The lack of cause of action must be evident on the face of the
complaint 20 inasmuch as in a motion to dismiss based on said ground, the question submitted for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. 21 On its face, herein complaint, however, does not allege any right or
interest of the petitioner that is affected by the complaint simply because it was not an original defendant. As correctly
observed by the lower court, the complaint does not even show that petitioner authorized Bailen and Salazar to conduct a
study on the Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was
sanctioned or sponsored by the petitioner. 22 Hence, by filing the motion to dismis the complaint against Salazar and
Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which amounted to invoking lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal,
the petitioner confined itself to the allegations of the complaint.
On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and Salazar can be made out from the complaint: their acts and
utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to have staged a fraud. The
fact that the "hoax" was played up in the media allegedly aggravated the situation.
This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was improper. In fact, it eventually proned to be necessary. Coming to
the defense of its faculty members, it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar
were circumscribed by the constitutionally-protected principle of academic freedom. However, it should have championed
the cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course of the trial of the case. Iterred in trying to abort the proceedings at its
inception through the device of filing the motion to dismiss. This procedural lapse, notwithstanding, no irremediable injury
has been inflicted on the petitioner as, during the trial, it may still invoke and prove the special defense of institutional
academic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Pao 23 and in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology. 24 Mayhap, in the process, it may invoke and dwell upon the individual academic freedom of its faculty
members.
Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby forfeited their right to notice of subsequent proceedings and to
participate in the trial, 25 petitioner's answer in intervention shall be the gauge in determining whether issues have been
joined. The fact that the defenses raised in said answer were denied grounds for a motion to dismiss does not affect their
value as affirmative defenses in an answer to a complaint within the purview of Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.
The Order of May 15, 1989 merely "denied" petitioner's affirmative defenses as grounds for a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the failure of some defendants to answer cannot prevent the
court from trying the case noon the answer filed and thereafter rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence
presented.
With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community
within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a
prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. 26 A
sprivate respondents themselves declare in their comment, "(t)he complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiffs' dignity
and honor, and to protect them from further
vexation. 27 More explicitly in their comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 18074 before the Court of Appeals, they declared:
Plaintiffs below do not ask the court to rule on so-called scientific or anthropological issues, nor to
interpret scientific or anthropological findings pertaining to the Tasaday. They merely ask the court to find
from the evidence to be presented below
Whether or not Bailen and Salazar infringed on plaintiffs' civil and human rights when
they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers
and impostors collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with and under the
supervision of plaintiff Elizalde.
Indeed, it is not the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure,
in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field
of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues.
2. The spouses filed again a complaint for estafa (criminal case no. 129).
3. The CFI dismissed the civil case on the ground that upon motion of the counsel of the spousesdespite the objection of
Tadeo.
4. Tadeo filed a complaint for declaratory relief (Civil Case D-413) in the CFI against the spousesand co-defendant
Vicente Torralba praying that the deed of quitclaim executed by them in favor of Francisco Bongato be declare "the
genuine document representing the true intention" of thespouses and that he (the appellant) relieved from civil and
criminal liability arising from the part hehad taken as lawyer and notary public in the drafting and execution thereof.
5. The criminal case was subsequently dismissed on the ground that the dismissal of the civil casewhich was prejudicial
precluded the continuation of the criminal case which arose from the sametransaction alleged in the civil case.
8. Tadeo filed a complaint against the spouses for declaratory judgment alleging that the dismissalof the civil and criminal
cases constitutes a bar to further criminal prosecution of the appellant for estafa; that all these notwithstanding the
appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and theappellee Justice of the Peace Court were conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminalcase No. 263 against the appellant; that the act of the aforesaid appelleesin
conducting thepreliminary investigation in the said criminal case constitutes a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack
of jurisdiction; and that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
available to the appellant. The appellant prayedthat the appellees be enjoined from conducting the preliminary
investigation in criminal case No.263 for estafa against him.
HELD:No. The pendency of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment, commenced by the appellantagainst the
appellees spouses in the Court of First Instance, was one of the reasons given by the Justiceof the Peace Court to
dismiss criminal case No. 129. However, the appellant not being one of thecontracting parties to the deed of sale
executed by the appellees spouses but took part only as notarypublic before whom they acknowledged the execution
thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder need be
declared. Another valid and good reason relied upon by the Court in denying the writ prayed for is that theappellant has a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the appropriate caseand at the opportune time, he
may set up all defenses available to him and may appeal from an adverse judgment.
448 MISSING
449. Chua v. Hon. Manuel Lim
G.R. No. L-19639 February 26, 1965
CHUA U, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs.
HON. MANUEL LIM, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants
Facts:
Petitioners were and are still owners and operators of the Bijon Factories before the passage of RA 3018
In The manufacTure of Bijon, petitioners are using rice and/or corn as The principal ingredient. The congress passed a bill
regulating The Trade of palay,rice, and corn (RA 3018). The federaton of Chinese Chamber of Commerce sent a
letter To The government requestnginformaton as To wheTher The manufacTurers of Bijon are wiThin The scope of
The RA
5.RespondenTs ruled ThaT They are included
6.Pettoners, in a declaraToryjudgmenT, prayed To annul Resoluton No. 10 which declared ThaTBijonindusTry is included
in RA 3018
7.Petitioners and respondenTssubmiT for deTerminatonwheTher RA 3018 is applicable To TheBijon industry
8.LowercourT found for The petitioners, RA 3018 did noT include bijonmanufacTures because The latter did noT deal in
rice or corn or any of iTsby-producTs
9.OSG appealed direcTly To The SC
ISSUE:WheTher or noTdeclaraTory relief should be granTed.
Ruling: We agree with the Solicitor General that this case for declaratory judgment should have been dismissed for
several reasons. In the first place, from the time the Rice and Corn Board issued a ruling that the petitioners-appellees
were covered by the terms of Republic Act No. 3018, the way was open for said petitioners to appeal the Board's ruling to
its administrative superiors, and thereafter institute an ordinary judicial action to contest the Board's ruling and prohibit it
from enforcing the ruling. This Court has repeatedly ruled that the remedy of declaratory judgment is proper only if
adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of action or proceeding (Ollada vs. Central Bank, L-11357,
May 31, 1962; Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York, 85 Phil. 201, cit. 1 C.J.S., 1027). As ruled in Elliot vs.
American Manufacturing, Co., 138 Fed. 2d, 678, courts are loath to interfere prematurely with administrative proceedings,
and will not assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted. 1
A second reason for denying relief is that the declaratory judgment herein sought would necessarily affect also other
manufacturers and processors of rice and corn derivative products (such as gaw-gaw, face powder, etc.), which were not
represented in these proceedings.
In the third place, it is also the rule in this jurisdiction that action for declaratory judgment must be brought before any
breach of the statute or ordinance sought to be tested (Rule 66, sec. 2; Santos vs. Aquino, 94 Phil. 65).
But even if the declaratory judgment were proper, we believe that the facts stipulated are insufficient to warrant a verdict
in this case. As observed in the appealed decision itself (Rec. App. p. 26), the avowed purpose of Republic Act No. 3018,
as shown in the explanatory note to the original bill, was to do away with the possibility and practice of aliens creating
artificial shortages of rice and corn by hoarding these commodities, or cornering the market therefor, so as to enable them
to dictate prices thereof. It is thus a necessary point of inquiry whether or not the producers of derivatives, in which rice or
corn is the main ingredient, could singly, or in combination with others, create an artificial scarcity of the cereals at any
given time; and for that purpose complete data of the consumption capacity of these producers are material. Such
particulars are not available in the record before us.1
450 MISSING
451. Tolentino v. The Board of Accountancy
G.R. No. L-3062 September 28, 1951
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 3105 was enacted. Section 16-A thereof, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342,
authorized accountants to practice their profession under a trade name. Assailing the constitutionality of the
aforementioned provision, plaintiff, an accountant, filed an action for declaratory relief in the CFI of Manila on the ground
advanced that the assailed provision is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings
or professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the practice of such callings or
professions. Included as defendants are Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann, foreign accountants practicing their
profession in the Philippines under the trade name Fleming and Williamson.
Issue: Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 342?
Held: No, plaintiff has no sufficient cause of action. Plaintiffs main objection centers on the exclusive character of the law
which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the
declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are
not parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives
as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the
propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public.
Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him the right to
secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. In order that an action for declaratory relief may be
entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. These requisite
facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
451-455 MISSING
456. NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
G.R. NO. 165001
January 31, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J.:
Facts:
NEW FRONTIER Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of raw sugar milling.
August 2002 New Frontier filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval
of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
August 20, 2002 RTC found the petition sufficient and issued a Stay Order dated, appointing Manuel B.
Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and setting the initial hearing on the
petition.
One of New Frontiers creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB), filed a Comment/Opposition with Motion to
Exclude Property, alleging that:
o New Frontier is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no
assets left.
o New Frontiers financial statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of assets, affidavit of
general financial condition, and rehabilitation plan are misleading and inaccurate since its properties have
already been foreclosed and transferred to EPCIB before the petition for rehabilitation was filed
o New Frontier, in fact, still owes EPCIB deficiency liability.
January 13, 2003 - RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing the case. New
Frontier sought reconsideration but the RTC denied its Omnibus Motion.
New Frontier then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari
July 19, 2004 CA DECISION
o Dismissed New Frontiers petition
o HELD: Findings of the RTC must be sustained. Since New Frontier no longer has sufficient assets and
properties to continue with its operations and answer its corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible for
rehabilitation.
o Even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be corrected anymore because what
New Frontier filed before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court instead of an ordinary appeal.
Issue:
(1) W/N CA erred in dismissing the petition for suspension of payments?
(2) W/N CA erred in holding that certiorari was an improper remedy?
Ruling:
Petition denied.
457. JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 137914.
December 4, 2002
CORONA, J.
Facts:
Petitioners Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno were charged by Neugene Marketing, Inc. (NMI, for brevity), through
its designated trustee, Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, with the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Bacolod City. On December 14, 1988, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution absolving the petitioners from
criminal liability due to lack of malice on the part of the petitioners in retaining the money of NMI. The appeal by NMI to the
Department of Justice (DOJ, for brevity) was denied on the ground that the petitioners did not misappropriate corporate
funds.
NMI then filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On January 4, 1991, the DOJ, through then
Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, ordered the reinvestigation of the case. Upon recommendation of City Prosecutor
Augusto C. Rallos on March 9, 1991 to charge the petitioners with estafa, Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 were
filed.
The petitioners, on May 4 and 21 of 1992, filed at the DOJ petitions for reinvestigation of the cases but the same
were denied on the ground that the trial courts permission should first be secured before reinvestigation can be conducted
in accordance with this Courts ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.[4] Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
before the trial court on the ground that there was a need for reinvestigation and there was a prejudicial question in a
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) case pending before this Court docketed as G. R. No. 112941. The
SEC case questions the validity of the dissolution of NMI and the designation of Atty. Reyes as trustee.
Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the prosecutor, the trial court reversed itself, set aside the previous order and scheduled the
arraignment of the petitioners. On January 19, 1996, the petitioners filed another motion to suspend the proceedings,
based on the same ground that the prejudicial question in the SEC case would determine the petitioners guilt in the
criminal cases, thereby necessitating the suspension of the same.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the first assailed order denying petitioners motion to suspend the
proceedings. Arraignment was scheduled on June 28, 1996. But on the day of the arraignment, petitioner Lee failed to
appear. The trial court then issued the second assailed order, directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixing an
additional bond in the amount of P30,000 by petitioner Lee.
The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
questioning the said orders of the trial court. On August 24, 1998, the appellate court rendered a decision denying the
Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals is correct in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari under rule 65 filed by the
petitioners?
Ruling:
Yes. We have consistently ruled that certiorari lies only where it is clearly shown that there is a patent and gross
abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded
its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law
and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only
when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this
Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also
unduly burden the courts.
We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting
the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The petitioners present factual contentions to absolve them from the criminal charge of
estafa. The criminal cases concern corporate funds petitioners allegedly received as payment for plastic bought by
Victorias Milling Corporation from NMI. They refused to turn over the money to the trustee after NMIs dissolution on the
ground that they were keeping the money for the protection of the corporation itself. Thus, the elements of
misappropriation and damage are absent. They argue that there is no proof that, as officers of the corporation, they
converted the said amount for their own personal benefit. They likewise claim that they already turned the money over to
the majority stockholder of the defunct corporation.
Clearly, the said allegations are defenses that must be presented as evidence in the hearing of the criminal
cases. They are inappropriate for consideration in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court inasmuch as they do
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court hearing the said criminal cases but instead are defenses that might absolve
them from criminal liability. A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the
respondent court acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment which can be reviewed or corrected on appeal
458. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER CORPORATION, et
al, respondents.
G.R. No. 148029. , September 24, 2002
Facts:
MICROSOFT CORPORATION assails the Order of Judge Florentino M. Alumbres, RTC-Br. 255, Las Pias City,
dated 26 December 2001 in its Civil Case No. 00-0237 denying its application for an ex parte order for the seizure and
impounding of relevant and infringing evidence and the Order dated 1 March 2001 denying reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner is a US-based corporation. It is not doing business in the Philippines but has sued in the court below solely
to protect its intellectual property rights.
On 4 December 2000 petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional Measure of Preservation of Evidence against Best Deal Computer
Center Corporation, Perfect Deal Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte Computer Center. It
alleged that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded software
programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them to their customers in violation of its intellectual property
rights. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from illegally
reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs. It also applied for the issuance of an ex parte order for
the seizure and impounding of relevant evidence that can be or may be found at defendants' business premises.
On 26 December 2000 the Las Pias trial court set petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order for hearing but
at the same time denied its application for an ex parte order ratiocinating that the Intellectual Property Code does not
expressly allow its issuance and that, in any case, the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)
AGREEMENT cannot prevail over it. The court a quo also opined that petitioner's application partook of a search and
seizure order available only in criminal cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied on 9 January
2001.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing evidence?
Ruling:
No. The quest for speedy justice should not be used as a devise to trample upon other equally laudable policies
of this Court. Petitioner's direct resort to this Court in the guise of speedy justice was in utter disregard of the hierarchy of
courts. We find no exceptional or compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Our pronouncement in People
v. Cuaresma is most instructive -
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra -
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" - was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with
it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the
light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications
for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly
and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and guidance of all
concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof.
459. MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., et al, respondents.
G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002
Facts:
Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a
salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said university. They
enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first
semester of 1994-1995. At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5,
respectively.[3] They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a
special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers.
Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school
year 1994-1995, there were ghost students in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these ghost students,
namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades despite their failure to attend classes.
On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner requested the latter to furnish him with
photocopies of exams, term papers, and record of attendance of the students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the request.
On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that the University
President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the complaint.
In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to petitioners letter-request
dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding
their course without petitioners approval.
Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be required to attend regular
classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the
recommendations. However, on December 1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the
grades given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed its Resolution No.
2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao. The complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770 was docketed as OMB-
ADM-3-96-0132.
On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to Complaint-Affidavit for
Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP
Board of Regents, including Dr. Prantilla. On July 24, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order
directing respondent members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No. 96-
602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said criminal complaint
forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative complaint.
On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents. Approved by
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, committed grave abuse of discretion
when it affirmed the impugned BOR resolution as it is contrary to the University Code, violates due process and is based
on self-serving hearsays?
Ruling:
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Courts power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that
respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule 65.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997. We note that the conclusions in said resolution are
based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such findings are
supported by substantial evidence, as in this case. Graft Investigation Officer I Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of said Office gave
weight to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon as corroborated by the affidavit of Prof. Concesa P. Lagare, Professor 2 of
the College of Education, USP. These affidavits averred that during the graduate school orientation program sometime in
July 1995, the universitys Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Luz D. Ancheta, declared that special arrangements
between a professor and a graduate student may be allowed on a case-to-case basis. Dr. Ancheta made this statement in
reply to Dr. Daleons query on the policy of USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether Dr. Daleon could
give grades to students who do not attend classes. In her reply to Dr. Daleons query, the VPAA even cited her experience
when she pursued her doctoral course at UP Los Baos. According to Dr. Ancheta, she was given a special arrangement
by one of her professors. She added that she, too, had allowed the same special arrangement for her students at the USP
Graduate School.
Public respondent also anchored his decision on Article 140 of the University Code, which provides that the rules on
attendance of students shall be enforced in all classessubject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate
students and other courses.[16] It is undisputed that at the time that Dr. Daleon handled the graduate class in Ed.D. 317,
he had already been duly designated Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and was
even entitled to the emoluments inherent to the Office of the Dean of the Graduate School. [17] Accordingly, as OIC,
performing the functions of the Dean of the Graduate School, Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on
attendance without seeking permission of petitioner.
Further, Dr. Daleons teaching style had the support of the members of the Board of Regents, the body with the
authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the graduate school. In
passing Resolution No. 2432, S. 1995,[18] not only did they validate the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo, but they also
gave an imprimatur on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleons instructional approach. In said resolution,
the BOR cited Article 155 and Article 3 of the University Code, thus:
In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of the University of
Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest partiality in the performance of their official
duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of
discretion in exonerating respondents below from both administrative and criminal charges. The resolution of that Office is
in order for it accords with the facts and the law.
460. ROBERT DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA EBERSOLE DEL MAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 139008, March 13, 2002
Facts:
The parcels of land covered by the land titles that are sought to be nullified are all owned by [private] respondent
NORMA EBERSOLE DEL MAR by way of inheritance from her lawful [ascendants]. The original titles were all issued in
her name and favor.
In the early 1970s [private] respondent together with her two children, GERALD and FLORENCE went to the
United States with the intent of obtaining domicile there[i]n and leaving behind the other son petitioner, and entrusting [to]
his [administration] their properties.
In 1974, [private respondent] came back to the Philippines and stayed up until 1978 and thereafter went back to
the US. During her stay, the properties were intact.
Sometime in 1996, [private respondent] discovered that the properties were already in the name of [petitioner]. [Private
respondent] protested because she never had done any act of transfer of the properties in favor of [petitioner], because
her intent was to have these properties to be eventually divided into THREE (3) equal parts for her THREE (3) children
The transfer was [without] the knowledge of [private respondent]. It was fraudulent and unlawful
Private respondent also claims that petitioner had been duly served summons, but neither he nor his counsel
appeared for pretrial. Hence, petitioner was declared in default. While he did receive the Order of Default, he never
bothered to have it lifted. So, trial proceeded and evidence ex parte for private respondent was received by the trial court.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 7, 1998, Noel T. Tomas, legal researcher and officer in charge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City (Branch 35), forwarded to the CA the records of Civil Case No. 35-
2373. Buenaventura B. Miguel, chief of the Judicial Records Division of the appellate court, thereafter wrote a letter dated
August 13, 1998, addressed to Atty. Federico Abuan Jr., counsel for petitioner, stating the following:
Pursuant to the resolution en banc of the Supreme Court, dated February 23, 1984, you are hereby required to file
with this court SEVEN (7) printed copies of the brief, or SEVEN (7) eleven inches in leng[th] by eight and a half inches in
width - commonly known letter size[,] written double space, copies of said brief together with the proof of service of TWO
(2) printed typewritten or mimeographed copies hereof upon the appellee. The decision of Trial Court shall be appended
to the brief.
On December 8, 1998, Atty. Amado C. Vallejo Jr., counsel for private respondent, moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that petitioner had failed to file the required brief within the reglementary period.
As already stated, the CA granted the Motion to Dismiss via the first assailed Resolution.
Issues:
Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal for his mere failure to file his
Brief within the reglementary period? And that
Ruling:
No. Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of Court, expressly authorizes the CA to dismiss an appeal for, inter
alia, failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time
provided by these Rules.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when the following requisites concur: (a) a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for annulling or modifying the proceeding.
It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Exceptions to this rule arise when (1) such negligence
is so gross, palpable, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of the due process of law; and (2) the
application of such due process results in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality.
The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in this case was his inexcusable
failure to file the required appellants Brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not
without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuans failure to appear at the pretrial conference, a failure that had placed him in
default. Because petitioner was in default, private respondents evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder,
the trial court decided against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuans services for the appeal. One is bound by the decisions of
ones counsel regarding the conduct of the case, especially where the former does not complain against the manner in
which the latter handled the case.
Petitioner cannot be said to have been denied due process, because he was afforded the opportunity to be heard. In
fact, he filed an Answer to private respondents Complaint. That he did not present evidence in his favor was the effect of
his being in default and his continued failure to move that such status be lifted. His claim that he was abroad is unavailing.
We cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Court of Appeals which merely followed Rule 50 in dismissing
the appeal.
.
Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the release of the cash
dividends, with interest, to Silangan and Polygon because (1) the cash dividends were under custodia legis, and (2) the
acts of PCGG in managing Oceanic including the declaration of cash dividends were void?
Ruling:
In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must show that respondent tribunal acted
with grave abuse of discretion. In Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, the Court held that:
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility
tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior
tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [43]
In Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined grave abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan correctly
held that Silanganand Polygon were entitled to their Oceanic cash dividends, with interest, because the declaration of
cash dividends was valid. PCGG declared the cash dividends before the Sandiganbayans 25 April 1994 Decision came
out. At that time, the 11 April 1986 and 15 June 1988 writs of sequestration were presumed valid.
On 22 June 2005, respondent Dancel filed against petitioner corporation a complaint for Specific Performance
with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order before the trial court,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6108. The trial court denied respondent Dancels application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order for lack of jurisdiction. When the trial court denied his motion for
reconsideration, respondent Dancel filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 00740. In January 2006, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the Temporary Restraining Order, effective for 60
days from notice, restraining or enjoining petitioner corporation from terminating the franchise agreements. On 14 August
2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. Petitioner corporation
then filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In a Resolution dated 12 February 2007, this Court denied the
petition for late filing since the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days. [5] Petitioner corporation twice
moved for reconsideration, which this Court denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assiled writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts committed or about to commit outside the trial courts territorial
boundaries?
Ruling:
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[13]
We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, which
merely issued the questioned Writ of Preliminary Injunction in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals which
has already attained finality. The propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was already ruled upon by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 14 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00740. Such decision has become final and
executory after petitioner corporations appeal to this Court was denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
Except to correct clerical errors, a judgment which has acquired finality can no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct a perceived erroneous conclusion of fact or law. There would be no end to
litigation if parties are allowed to relitigate issues which were already resolved with finality.
Facts:
The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a member, issued Resolution No. 115, Series of
2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang, and Uno,
for a new city hall site. During the public hearing, the choice for the new city hall site was limited to properties owned by
Pamana and a lot in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.
The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots
owned by Pamana with a total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of P129,017,600. Mayor Lajara was also
authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required documents.
The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara, entered into the following agreements:
MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).
The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council. Petitioner, however, alleged that all these
documents were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on Audit.
The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of
Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior
authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given
prior authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact
Resolution No. 280.
The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not a condition sine qua non for the local chief
executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council and in this
case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City Councils stamps of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase
the subject lots.
Issue:
Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the ratification by the City Council of
Calamba?
Ruling:
The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave unwarranted
benefits. In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
pointed out that the ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into
contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution No.
280 is the City Councils stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization or authority from
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No. 280
authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor
Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there was
evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the
properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue injury to
Calamba City.
Issue:
Whether or not admitting the facts alleged to the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer thereof?
Ruling:
It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, only the
statements in the complaint may be properly considered Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts
found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant
and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless
of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants
In the case at bar, the complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) was married to Amado
Quiros Daffon and that they begot an only son in Joselito DaffonThe complaint further alleged that Joselito Daffon later
got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes Osmea and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) children
who are now plaintiffs with their mother. This, to our mind, was sufficient allegation that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate
son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs (i.e., respondents herein) were likewise legitimate
heirs of Joselito Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments, there was, therefore, no need to inquire whether
respondent minor children were duly acknowledged by the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the
said children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters which petitioner may raise as a defense in her answer and
threshed out by the court during a full-blown trial.
In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to specifically allege respondents claim of co-ownership of
the properties. The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which the plaintiffs rely for their claim
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the
essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable
elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
.
465. Gabriel L. Duero vs. CA and Bernardo A. Eradel
G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002
Facts :
1988 According to petitioner, private respondent occupied petitioners land in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur,
with an assessed value of P5,240. Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to vacate the land.
June 16, 1995 Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership against
private respondent and Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.
Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas entered into a compromise agreement whereby the latter bound themselves to
recognize and respect petitioners ownership. Respondent was not a party thereto.
January 12, 1996 Partial judgment was rendered by RTC on the basis of the compromise agreement. Respondent
was declared in default for failure to file his answer.
February 13, 1996 Petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.
May 8, 1996 Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner, copy of which was received by respondent on May
25, 1996.
June 10, 1996 Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of
Artemio Laurente, Sr., and that he turned over the summons to Laurente in the honest belief that the latter had a
better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. RTC denied the motion.
Meanwhile, an administrative case between petitioner and the Laurentes remained pending before the DENR regional
office.
July 24, 1996 Respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation
in his motion. He also averred that he cannot be made to vacate the land pending determination of who owned the
land, and that the judgment is void because the indispensable heirs of Laurente were not impleaded.
September 24, 1996 The grandchildren on Laurente filed a Motion for Intervention, but the same was denied by
RTC.
October 8, 1996 RTC denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment.
In a Motion for Reconsideration, respondent alleged that RTC had no jurisdiction since the value of the land was only
P5,240. RTC denied the Motion.
January 22, 1997 Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on January 28.
February 27, 1997 Writ of Execution was issued by RTC.
March 12, 1997 Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA declared the judgment of RTC null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it held that the MTC had jurisdiction, and that private
respondent was not stopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it
Ruling:
Respondent is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. While participation in all stages of a case
before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel
from challenging the court's jurisdiction, estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial
and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. For estoppel to apply, the action
giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Under the circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private
respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the
doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at anytime and at any stage of the action.
Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. This
farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake
when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's
cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the MTC. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his
avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be
evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a
technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies
as tenant-lessee.
466. ELADIO DILLENA petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA CARREON, respondents.
G.R. No. 77660, July 28, 1988
Facts:
Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on March 7, 1974 and August 21, 1974, in Quezon City and
Manila, respectively, leaving an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon, private respondent herein. On October 21, 1974,
Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the deceased Rufino Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian Petition for Letters of
Administration" before the then CFI, Branch XXXI, Quezon City. On November 7, 1974, the said court appointed Fausta
Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the purpose of receiving and collecting all sums of money due and
payable to the estate, in addition to the powers and duties provided for under Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
On October 3, 1975, private respondent executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased
spouses, adjudicating to herself all the real properties of the said spouses.
Meanwhile, on November 8, 1978, private respondent, while being the administratrix of the estate, executed an
extrajudicial adjudication of the three (3) fishpond properties of the deceased spouses in Hagonoy, Bulacan. By virtue of
said extrajudicial adjudication, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 140243, 140244 and 140245 in the names of the
deceased spouses were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of private
respondent.
On November 13, 1978, private respondent sold in favor of petitioner the three fishponds in question without the
knowledge and approval of the probate court.
The aforesaid vendees were duly furnished with copies of the order dated September 22, 1981. Only Starlight
Industries, Co., Inc. appeared on October 23, 1981. Again, the vendees were required to submit their respective
explanations and the hearing on the incident was re-set to November 11, 1981. Petitioner was again duly served with a
copy of said order.
At the scheduled hearing, Starlight Industries Co., Inc. submitted an explanation, thus, the sale in its favor was
approved and confirmed by the probate court. However, vendees Luisa S. Rodriguez and petitioner Eladio Dillena neither
appeared at the scheduled hearing nor submitted their explanations as to why the sales in their favor should not be
cancelled for having been executed without court approval.
On August 10, 1984, acting on the claim of Atty. Eugenio Balatbat for attorney's fees on account of his legal
services rendered to private respondent and to the estate, the probate court approved the payment of said fees to be paid
out of the properties of the estate. The same was ordered annotated as a lien on the transfer certificates of title of the real
properties of the estate, including those properties transferred by private respondent without court approval.
On September 13, 1984, the lower court, on motion of Atty. Balatbat for a definitive ruling as to the validity of the
sale made by administratrix-private respondent to Luisa S. Rodriguez and petitioner, declared that the transfers in favor of
the aforesaid vendees are null and void and without force and effect for having been made without court authority and
approval. Petitioner was served with a copy of the said order on December 13, 1984.
On July 25, 1985, or after seven (7) months from the time the order of September 13, 1984 was received by
petitioner, the latter filed a petition before the probate court in the same Sp. Proc No. Q-19378 by way of special
appearance alleging that said court, in view of its limited jurisdiction as a probate court, has no power to annul the sale of
the fishponds in question; that the orders annulling the sale are void because he is not a party to Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378;
that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the res, which are located in Bulacan province.
After hearing the petition and the opposition therein, the lower court, on October 28, 1985, denied the petition and
ordered petitioner to return physical possession of the fishponds to private respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration
of the aforesaid order which was denied.
On February 20, 1986, a petition for certiorari was instituted by petitioner before the respondent Court of Appeals
and as earlier mentioned, the said court, on November 14, 1986, dismissed the petition. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on March 2, 1987; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court, in view of its limited jurisdiction, cannot declare as null and void, the sale of the
questioned properties?
Ruling:
This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. de Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797)
wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Consequently, it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of,
any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs.
Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without authority from the said court. It is the
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is
said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
petitioner's contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. Sales of properties under administration which do not comply with the requisites under
sections 4 and 7 of Rule 89 are null and void.
467-
468 MMDA v. Jancom
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Facts of the case: After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the MMDAs San Mateo
waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between Jancom and the
Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor
Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President
Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San
Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition
with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
contract with Jancom was not binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were not
complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only
apply in cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained
only by an appeal from the final decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and gone beyond the
reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the court took it up just the same, if only to put the petitioners
mind to rest.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract
does not bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in the contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault; though the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway
his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its perfection; and that the two-month period within which
Jancom should comply with the conditions had not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of
the absence of the Presidents signature.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. Although the contract is a
perfected one, it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be rendered only by the Supreme Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says: A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when
concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Sec 4 (3), Article
VIII, 1987 Constitution.
The facts:
On May 24, 1990, the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), now Philippine National Police or PNP, launched
OPLAN AJAX to minimize, if not entirely eliminate, the extortion activities of traffic policemen at the vicinity of Guadalupe Bridge,
Makati, Metro Manila.
On July 5, 1990, at about three oclock in the afternoon, two operatives of OPLAN AJAX, namely, 2LT Federico Bulanday, PC and
Intelligence Agent Angelito C. Leoncio, both members of the Counter-Intelligence Group (CIG) stationed at Camp Crame, Quezon
City, were on board a car with Plate No. NDK-238. They were traveling along J.P. Rizal Street, Makati, when they were flagged down
by three policemen in uniform. These were petitioner PFC Rodolfo Rodriguez, PFC Arsenio Silungan, and PFC Rolando Pilandi. All
were members of the Metropolitan Traffic Command assigned with the Makati Police Station.
Upon pulling up, Bulanday and Leoncio were informed by the three policemen that they had violated traffic regulations. The three
policemen demanded money. Bulanday and Leoncio handed over cash amounting to one hundred pesos consisting of two P20 bills,
one P10 bill, and one P50 bill. The bills were marked with ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
On seeing what happened, other CIG operatives who were behind the vehicle of Bulanday and Leoncio immediately swooped down
on the three policemen. However, they were able to arrest only petitioner and PFC Silungan. PFC Pilandi was able to escape by
commandeering a private vehicle at gunpoint.
Petitioner Rodriguez and PFC Silungan were then brought to the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. A physical examination was
conducted on their persons. Both were found positive for the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. The P50 bill, which formed
part of the entrapment money, was recovered from PFC Silungan while the two P20 bills were retrieved from petitioner.
An administrative case for grave misconduct was subsequently filed against Rodriguez, Silungan, and Pilandi, who was at large, with
the National Police Commission.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner appealed the summary dismissal to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board. He alleged that the
summary dismissal proceedings violated his right to due process. He claimed that only a preliminary inquiry had been conducted by
the NAPOLCOM hearing officer and that he had not been afforded a chance to present his side.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner PFC
Rodolfo Rodriguez.
HELD: Clearly, where a police officer is dismissed by the PNP Director General and the dismissal is affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, the proper remedy is to appeal the dismissal with the DILG Secretary. That the
NAPOLCOM Chairman is also the DILG Secretary is of no moment, for under the aforecited laws and regulations, only the DILG
Secretary can act on the appeal. Besides, what is involved here is not the sole act of the NAPOLCOM Chairman, but the decision of
the Commission. Should the DILG Secretarys decision prove adverse to appellant, then he as the aggrieved party may bring an appeal
to the Civil Service Commission. In instances where the CSC denies the appeal, the remedy under R.A. No. 7902 [10] would be to
appeal the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. In the instant case, petitioner had three opportunities to appeal the decision of the
NAPOLCOM. He chose not to avail of them, but instead opted to file an action for certiorari and mandamus with the appellate court.
Thus, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals when it observed that there were lapses in procedure which can adversely
affect the fate of the instant petition.[11]
Neither certiorari[12] nor mandamus can substitute for appeal where the latter is the proper remedy. The extraordinary remedies of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus will lie only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[13] The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law in dismissing petitioners special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus.
Petitioner cannot now claim that he was not afforded due process by the NAPOLCOM. In administrative proceedings, the filing
of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process.[14] The essence of administrative due process is the opportunity to be heard.[15] As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
Records show that, contrary to his allegation, respondent-appellant Rodriguez as well as respondent-appellant Silungan were afforded
opportunity to be heard. In fact during the summary dismissal proceedings, they submitted their respective counter-affidavits to
disprove the accusation leveled against them, thus; respondent-appellant and his co-respondent were not denied their constitutional
right to due process.
470 TERESITA PACAA CONEJOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EUTIQUIO PLANIA, respondents.
Respondent EUTIQUIO PLANIA alleged in his Complaint for specific performance/rescission with damages[1] filed with the
municipal trial court that on 19 September 1989 he entered into a Memorandum of Agreement[2] with Teresita Pacaa Conejos whereby
they agreed that each of them would pay half of the purchase price of the 134-square-meter residential lot situated in Tisa, Labangon,
Cebu City, subject matter hereof, and that upon full payment they would equally divide the lot and register it in their individual names.
Plania averred that after paying P22,804.91 corresponding to the value of his one-half share, petitioner Teresita Pacaa Conejos,
despite repeated demands, refused to divide the subject lot and register it in their individual names conformably with their agreement.
On 9 March 1999 the MTCC, dismissed the complaint[5] ruling that Plania had failed to present sufficient evidence to
substantiate his allegations.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City[7] reversed the MTCC.
Conejos moved for reconsideration[8] but the same was denied,[9] hence she filed a Petition for Review[10] with the Court of
Appeals. Finding no merit in her arguments, the appellate court affirmed the Regional Trial Court concluding that there was dearth of
evidence that the Memorandum of Agreement had been mutually abandoned by the parties.
Petitioner basically argues that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Petitioner filed on 13 August 2001 a petition for certiorari or one (1) month and twenty-five (25) days after the lapse of the
allotted period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: whether the special civil action on certiorari can be use as substitute for an appeal
HELD: Apparently, petitioner resorted to this special civil action after failing to appeal within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period. This cannot be countenanced. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner
already lost. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. There is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been raised on appeal. [16]
Concededly, there were occasions when this Court treated a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, the circumstances prevailing in the instant case do not justify a deviation from a general rule. Notably, the instant
petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period allowed under Rule 45 without any justifiable reason therefor nor any
reasonable explanation being proffered by petitioner. In addition, the arguments she cited are without merit and are in fact mere rehash
of the issues raised before and judiciously resolved by the courts a quo. The issues require a review of the factual findings which,
verily, could not be done because this Court is not a trier of facts.
the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED as a wrong remedy and for utter lack of merit.
Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and lot located at No. 63-20th St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City,
filed on February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioner Quintin Felizardo. On February 27, 1992, summons was issued directing the petitioner to file an answer and
informing him that the Rule on Summary Procedure would be applied. 2
In his answer, the petitioner averred inter alia that the private respondent's allegations to support his prayer for a preliminary
injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of P.D. 1508 3 for prior barangay conciliation. 4
At the preliminary conference and in his position paper, the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of
the private respondent's cause of action for non-compliance with the said decree.
On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the petitioner. 5 On September 17, 1992, upon motion of the private
respondent, the court issued an order for the execution of its decision. 6
On that same date, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for certiorari with an application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. 7
On October 7, 1992, that court issued a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the writ of execution. 8 Later, however,
on October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari with injunction was not the proper remedy of the
petitioner, appeal being then still available to him. 9
The dismissal was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 10 His motion for a reconsideration having been denied, 11 Felizardo
is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:: Whether or not the court acted correctly in proceeding with the case even without the prior barangay proceeding is a
procedural question that could not be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari but only in an ordinary appeal.
There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case lodged by the
private respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had filed his answer to the complaint. The only question is whether that
court, in continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, committed a mere error or judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal or an error of jurisdiction
correctible by certiorari.
Sec. 412. (b) Where the parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent contained an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the
exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. A different conclusion must be reached, however,
after a closer look at the attendant circumstances in light of the following allegations made by the private respondent in his complaint:
Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on March 7, 1974 and August 21, 1974, in Quezon City and Manila, respectively,
leaving an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon, private respondent herein. On October 21, 1974, Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the
deceased Rufino Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Spouses
Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian Petition for Letters of Administration" before the then CFI, Branch XXXI, Quezon City.
On November 7, 1974, the said court appointed Fausta Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the purpose of receiving
and collecting all sums of money due and payable to the estate.
On October 3, 1975, private respondent executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the deceased spouses, adjudicating to
herself all the real properties of the said spouses.
On October 14, 1975, private respondent filed a motion to revoke the letters of administration issued to Fausta Carreon Herrera.
Accordingly, the lower court, on March 31, 1976, granted the motion and allowed private respondent to administer the properties of
the estate
On November 13, 1978, private respondent sold in favor of petitioner the three fishponds in question without the knowledge and
approval of the probate court. Prior to the sale, petitioner had been leasing these fishponds for several years. As a result of the sale,
transfer certificates of title over the said properties were issued in favor of petitioner.
Both sales were likewise made without the approval of the probate court. The said court, having learned of the aforesaid transfers of
the real properties without its approval
On September 13, 1984, the lower court, on motion of Atty. Balatbat for a definitive ruling as to the validity of the sale made by
administratrix-private respondent to Luisa S. Rodriguez and petitioner, declared that the transfers in favor of the aforesaid vendees are
null and void and without force and effect for having been made without court authority and approval.
ISSUE: Wether Petitioner was afforded every opportunity to present his explanation
On February 20, 1986, a petition for certiorari was instituted by petitioner before the respondent Court of Appeals and as earlier
mentioned, the said court, on November 14, 1986, dismissed the petition.
Petitioner was afforded every opportunity to present his explanation but he repeatedly failed to appear on the two scheduled hearings
for the purpose. There is no denial of due process where petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present his case.
Moreover, petitioner, on July 25, 1985, filed a petition before the probate court, by way of special appearance, precisely questioning
the power of the said court to declare null and void the sale of the fishponds involved herein. As has been stated, the lower court after
hearing the petition and the opposition thereto denied the same.
Clearly, petitioner was given full opportunity to present his case. Thus, We give no credence to petitioner's assertion that he was
denied due process of law.
On 18 July 1979, petitioner Araceli D. Escudero, wife of petitioner Paterno D. Escudero, executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale under
Pacto de Retro" in favor of private respondents, the Amistad spouses, over a parcel of residential land in Lapu-Lapu City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9223 of the Register of Deeds of that city. The consideration stated in the document was P42,350.00.
Redemption was to be made by the vendors within three (3) months after the execution of the Deed of Sale, at the same price of
P42,350.00. 1
The period of redemption expired without an offer of repurchase being made by petitioner wife or her husband, petitioner Paterno D.
Escudero, who had earlier given his wife a special power of attorney "to sell, transfer, mortgage and convey" the land subject of the
pacto de retro sale, which was the spouses' conjugal property.
On 28 October 1979, or ten (10) days after the expiration of the redemption period, private respondent spouses filed a petition for
consolidation of title over the parcel of land in question. This was opposed by petitioner wife in an Answer, duly verified by her,
where she alleged as an affirmative and special defense that the transaction between her and private respondents was actually one of
loan of P 35,000.00, as principal, with 7% monthly interest, thus totalling P 42,350.00, with the land mortgaged as collateral or
security. That the transaction was an equitable mortgage can be gleaned, according to her, from the gross inadequacy of the purchase
price and the fact that she, the alleged vendor, remained in possession of the land and continued to enjoy the fruits thereof. 2
On 16 November 1979, or nearly a month after the expiration of the redemption period, and upon advice of petitioners' then counsel,
Atty. Emmanuel Seno, petitioner wife deposited P42,350.00 in the form of a bank manager's check, as redemption money, with the
Clerk of Court of respondent trial court. Atty. Seno then manifested at the pre-trial conference held on 10 March 1980 that he was
moving for a judgment on the pleadings after agreeing to the characterization of the transaction between the parties as a sale with
pacto de retro, because under Article 1606 of the New Civil Code, the vendors (petitioners) may still exercise their right of repurchase
within thirty (30) days from the time final judgment is rendered in a civil action, if the contract is a true sale with right to repurchase.
Issue:
Decision:
The respondent trial court rendered judgment against petitioners. The court held that the interpretation by petitioners' counsel of par. 3
of Art. 1606 of the Civil Code was misplaced, as decisions have uniformly held that the provision applies only to situations where
there is a dispute as to the nature of a transaction either as a true sale with right of repurchase or an equitable mortgage, and not where
the parties admit or agree that the transaction is a true sale, as petitioners' counsel did admit or stipulate in this case.
The Supreme Court held that Article 1606 contemplates a case involving a controversy as to the true nature of the contract, and the
court is called upon to decide the debatable question as to whether it is sale with pacto de retro or an equitable mortgage. Where, as
here, the transaction is admittedly and clearly a deed of sale and the stipulated period of redemption or repurchase had expired, said
legal provision does not apply.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Court of First Instance of Lapu-Lapu City, now Regional Trial Court of
Lapu-Lapu City (Branch XVI) in Civil Case No. 438-L and of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 67058-R are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is ordered to cancel private respondents' title to the property, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 12401 and, in lieu thereof, issue a new Certificate of Title in petitioners' names, after which, the amount of
P42,350.00 deposited by petitioners with the Clerk of Court of said respondent trial court on 16 November 1979 is to be released to
private respondents. No costs.
474 CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and
ROSA DIONGSON
PARAS, J.:
Facts:
Constantino Acain filed on the RTC, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same
petitioner of letters testamentary, on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio,
Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will contained provisions on burial
rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house,
lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN
Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-
deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given
to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the
petitioner. The oppositors filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
Ruling:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance,
for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the
will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located in the municipality of Mabinay, Negros Oriental, whose previous owner
Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank (PNB, for short). In 1971, said parcels of land were bought by
spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria who assumed the mortgage with PNB (Rollo, Comment, p. 90).
In 1974, defendant PNB requested defendant Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the mortgage on the aforesaid parcels
of land after the failure of the owners thereof to pay certain amortization and the same was sold at public auction to the defendant bank
as the highest bidder (Rollo, Brief for Private Respondents. Notwithstanding the fact that said lands were already brought under the
Land Reform Program of the government, the PNB caused the titles to said parcels of land transferred in its name to the prejudice of
plaintiffs On May 28, 1982, private respondents Vivienne Viloria, et al. moved to further amend their amended complaint. Notable
amendment introduced in the First Amended Complaint is the inclusion of another parcel of land as subject matter thereof, Said
property belongs to the spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria and mortgaged also with PNB.
Petitioner PNB's motion for reconsideration of the above order was denied by respondent Judge Florendo in an order dated June 28,
1981.
Upon the abolition of the Court of Agrarian Relations by BP 129 enacted on August 10, 1981 and fully implemented on February 14,
1983, jurisdiction over agrarian disputes is now vested in the appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 19(7)
of the said law.
In view of such supervening event, it is now the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental that has
jurisdiction over the case. Be that as it may, the same law provides that whenever a Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of agrarian
cases, the special rules of procedures applicable under the present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless amended by
law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court (Sec. 24, BP 129).
It being apparent that the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction over Lot No. 787-B-2-A aside from the fact that said court
has already been abolished by BP 129, the issue as to its territorial jurisdiction has become moot and academic.
476 LOURDES MARCELO, doing business under the name and style "KANEBO LABORATORY", petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch III of the City Court of Quezon City,
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG,
At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of June 21, 1966, Sgt. Alejandro Quirante, a PC officer detailed with the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations, PARGO for short, applied with Judge Jose C. de Guzman, presiding judge of the City Court of
Quezon City, Branch III, for a search warrant to search the premises of the KANEBO Laboratory at No. 55 Times St., Quezon City.
The application was filed in connection with Criminal Case No. 558, wherein, curiously enough, the "KANEBO Laboratory" was
named as accused. 1
Agents of the PARGO, led by Capt. Reynaldo San Gabriel and Sgt. Alejandro Quirante, proceeded to the premises of the KANEBO
Laboratory, owned by appellee Lourdes Marcelo, and then and there seized various goods and articles consisting of perfumes,
essences, pomades, demi-johns, drums, packages of various sizes containing bottles of perfume and pomade. They also seized certain
commercial documents and papers.
On November 17, 1966, Marcelo filed a motion seeking to quash the warrant and to recover the seized articles and documents. 5 In a
minute order dated December 5, 1966, Judge de Guzman denied the motion for lack of merit. 6
Her motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, Marcelo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for
certiorari and mandamus against Judge Jose C. de Guzman
the lower court erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari, mandamus and recovery of personal property filed by petitioner
(appellee herein) considering that the orders of the respondent judge are not interlocutory, but final in character and, therefore, the
remedy is appeal.
ISSUE; Wheter respondent judge are not interlocutory, but final in character and, therefore, the remedy is appeal.
It is indeed a well established principle that an interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the
merits. This rule of practice and procedure, constituting one of the basic precepts of our remedial law, is embodied in Section 2, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal. Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or
incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
rendered for one party or the other.
The evident reason for the rule prescribing appeal for an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 7
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. 9 Tested against this criterion, the search warrant
issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character because it leaves something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.
After trial, the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The Memorial
Park and Banco Filipino, on June 23, 1973, filed their joint motion for reconsideration of the decision. On June 30, 1973, they filed a
joint motion for new trial. On July 9, 1973, the Memorial Park filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration with prayer for
new trial. Plaintiffs opposed the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. On January 10, 1974, the plaintiffs moved for issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction and restoration of receivership. On February 5, 1974, the trial court denied new trial. On February 21,
1974, Banco Filipino and the Memorial Park filed their notice of appeal from the decision of May 2, 1973, and filed their cash bond.
Within the reglementary period they filed their joint record on appeal.
On February 28, 1974, the Memorial Park filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
(L-38280) against the trial judge and the plaintiff spouses, seeking annulment of the court's order denying new trial, on the ground that
the same was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: is whether or not the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied in its order of February 5, 1974
the motion for new trial of the Memorial Park.
a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy
determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which
both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The dispensation of justice and
vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities (Sec. 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court; Talavera vs.
Mangoba, L-18373, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 837).
Gauged by these standards, we find the evidence proposed to be presented by petitioner in a new trial are newly discovered evidence
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court. The said evidence could not have been produced during the trial because the subject-
matter of the trial was Lot No. 719. Petitioner correctly searched, discovered and presented during that trial, all documents pertaining
to Lot No. 719 only.
The grant of new trial necessarily vacates the judgment (See. 5, Rule 37, Revised Rules of Court; Knowles vs. Thompson, 65 P 468;
Evansville vs. Cooksey, 112 NE 541) subject of the appeal which, consequently, becomes moot.
The records show that on June 20, 1974, petitioner filed with respondent court an action for recovery of real property against
Aliwanag B. Valleramos. Later, the complaint was amended to implead and include other defendants, the other private respondents
herein, as indispensable parties. 1
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial on August 9,1974, but this was deferred to a later date due to the absence of
petitioner and her counsel. 2 On April 4, 1975, the same case was again scheduled for pre-trial but the same did not proceed due to the
fact that petitioner appeared without her counsel while only one of the defendants appeared with counsel. 3 Later, informed of her
lawyer's inability to attend the pre-trial, petitioner secured the services of another lawyer, Atty. Dominador Monjardin, who was
present at the next pre-trial conference.
On January 7, 1976, Atty. Monjardin filed a motion for postponement for the reason that he was taking the examination for
government prosecutors in Manila The motion to dismiss, which was made orally in open court, was submitted for resolution by the
trial court.
Issue: whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering
the dismissal of the case and, consequently, denying petitioner the right to fully prosecute her case.
The Court has given due course to the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the f6ytuirst time we have passed
upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is appeal, 9 where the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse. This is
especially true where, as in the case, petitioner's affidavit of merits shows that she has a good cause of action, that her counsel's
affidavit of merits avers justifiable reasons for his non-appearance at said hearing, and the trial court is faulted with gravely abusing its
discretion to the extent of denying due process to therein plaintiff. Significantly, it was respondent judge himself who advised
petitioner to avail of said remedy in his order dismissing petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, 10 obviously because appeal
would not be a speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with
disapproval.
It is, therefore, the absence of the plaintiff, and not the absence of the lawyer, which may warrant the dismissal of the case on the
ground of non-suit. 11 In the case at bar, only the counsel for plaintiff was absent, plaintiff herself being in attendance in court.
There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to proceed with the scheduled trial. 12 In the
instant case, petitioner did not in the least manifest unwillingness to proceed with the hearing. Upon the call for appearances,
petitioner responded that her counsel was in Manila and that he had not yet returned. Unschooled as she is in the vagaries of
procedural law, petitioner indeed could not have responded otherwise nor done any better.
Further, when a party, without malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not really prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its
discretion if a reasonable opportunity is denied him for preparing therefor and for obtaining due process of law. 1The writ
of certiorari is hereby granted
479 ASIAN TRADING CORPORATION, MIGUEL L. ROMERO AND EDCEL C. LAGMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, Eight Division AND PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
On November 25, 1983, Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank) filed a Complaint against the petitioners, which was later
amended, for the collection of the sum of P2,700,000.00 plus interest and attorneys fees. Docketed as Civil Case No. 5775 before
Branch 136 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
After the Bank has adduced evidence and rested its case, petitioners interposed a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
obligation in question was not yet due and demandable, as it fell due only on August 9, 1984, after the case was instituted.
On July 25, 1985, the trial court denied the Demurrer to evidence and rendered judgement in favor of the Bank.
What petitioner did next was to bring a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision
of the trial court for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
On February 4, 1988, the Bank, citing Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court in its Brief, contended that the lower
court merely exercised its adjudicatory power most judiciously and wisely, taking into account the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.[6]
ISSUE: whether the dismissal is proper:
HELD: yes In dismissing petitionerss petition for certiorari, the respondent court relied on Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court prescribing the requirements for a petition for certiorari, to wit:
Well entrenched to the point of being elementary is the doctrine that certiorari will only lie if there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
xxx a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, xxx. (Bernardo v. The Hon. Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413, 426)
xxx Certiorari will only lie if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
xxx. (Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 268 SCRA 666)
xxx the special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration must first filed before the respondent court to
allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. xxx (Tan v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 568)
Apt and proper is the observation by the respondent court that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of or appealing from,
subject judgement, the petitioners resorted to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is unavailable under the antecedent facts
and circumstances.
Anent petitionerss protestation of deprivation of due process, the respondent court erred not when it considered the yearning of
petitioners to present evidence before the trial court, as an empty formality and exercise in futility. xxx The sole office of the writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of
480.
Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano vs Hon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, Judge of the Regional Trial Court
G.R. No. 143951
October 25, 2005
Facts:
On May 10, 1999, private respondent Serquina, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Mangaliag
and Solano, before the RTC. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries
and permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners dump truck and the gross negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction. The
respondent RTC Judge Pastoral ruled in favor of relying upon the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 09-94,
paragraph 2which provides that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Also, the petitioners defense of lack of jurisdiction
has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTCs lack of jurisdiction.
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that, in the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a
matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does
not control the present controversy. that happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only
after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the
question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are note stopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not
only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent
facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case
falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-
delict causing physical injuries.
Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a
consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable
tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated,
damages are due and assessable.Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of
action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount, in
clear consonance with paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
The courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for actual
damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional
limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law.
481.
Spouses Conrado and Ma. Corona Romero vs Court of Appeals and Saturnino S. Orden
G.R. No. 142406
May 16, 2005
Facts:
On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona and her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell with private respondent
Orden. In said contract, private respondent proposed to purchase from Romero a property located Quezon City, covered
by TCT No. 145269, for the total amount of P17M. The parties stipulated in their contract that private respondent shall pay
petitioner the amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale, the balance of P10M not later than
December 19, 1996 and shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property. The private respondent failed to
pay the down payment thenrescinded the contract to sell.The respondent then filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages, alleging that he has complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to
demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract. Simultaneous with the filing of the
complaint, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 145269. The motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent was denied by the RTC. The private respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA seeking the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC and asked for the re-annotation of the notice of lis
pendens on the TCT. The CA granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the lis pendens.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that, the Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction,
power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within
the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over said property.
482.
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Hon. Achilles Melicor
G.R. No. 140954
April 12, 2005
Facts:
On May 21, 1991, Private respondents Balane owned a 1,399 sq. Mt. Parcel of land in Bohol, a part of which was
allowed to be occupied by Bertuldo Hinog, predecessor of petitioners. After the expiration of their 10-year agreement, the
Balanes demanded the return of the occupied portion but Hinog refused, showing a Deed of Absolute Sale which he
claimed was acquired with permission from the respondents. Respondents filed for Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages but during the pendency of trial, Hinog died. As a result, the counsel
for Hinog withdrew his services and a new lawyer, Atty. Veronico Petalcorin entered his appearance as new counsel. Atty.
Petalcorin filed a to expunge the respondents complaint and nullify all court proceedings because the respondents
failed to specify the amount of damages claimed in their complaint so as to pay the correct docket fees. Respondents
averred that the motion was filed more than 7 years after the institution of the case and that according to Rule 3, Section
16 of the Rule of Court, the death of the original defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have
legal personality to represent a litigant. His motion to expunge did not mention any party whom he represented.
Furthermore, any insufficiency in the docket fees will only constitute a lien on the judgment. The Trial Court ruled that a
specified amount should be stated in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction and thus ordered the complaint to be
expunged from the records. It noted that there was no formal substitution of petitioners as mandated by the Rule of Court
to which Atty. Petalcorin complied. The respondents then paid the deficiency and filed a motion to reinstate the case
which the Trial Court granted. In response, the petitioners filed a supplemental pleading, attaching the alleged Deed of
Sale which was denied since the Deed of Sale was never mention in their original answer prepared by the original lawyer.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition directly before the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated since the complaint failed to state the specific amount of damages resulting
in insufficient payment of docket fees. The trial court had already expunged the complaint and that the respondents did
not oppose this ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are allowed to directly file the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Supreme Court.
Held:
No. The concurrence of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of correct forum.
It would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Court; (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay
in the adjudication of cases. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts and only under exceptional and compelling circumstances. In this case, no special and
important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioners to justify their direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. The present petition should have been filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Besides, the writ of certiorari and prohibition does not avail since they never
sought reconsideration of the Trial Courts order to expunge and only opposed the reinstatement of the case averring lack
of jurisdiction after their supplemental pleading was denied.
483.
Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol & Tibayan, Danilo M. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan vs.
The Court of Appeals and Erlando A. Abrenica
G.R. No. 143706
April 5, 2002
Facts:
Petitioners and respondent are the registered partners in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan, a
professional law partnership duly organized under Philippine laws. On May 6, 1998, petitioners Tungol and Tibayan filed
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint for accounting, return and transfer of partnership
funds with damages and application for issuance of preliminary attachment against their partner, respondent Abrenica,
and claim that a real estate transaction entered into by the herein respondent Abrenica, defendant therein, was a law
partnership transaction. After several hearings SEC Hearing Officer Roberto O. Sencio, Jr. issued an Order which granted
the preliminary attachment of respondent Abrenicas assets but the respondent Abrenica filed an Omnibus Motion for the
inhibition of Hearing Officer Sencio and the reconsideration of the Order.The motion was denied. The respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the SEC en banc contending that Hearing Officer Sencio and the Hearing Panel acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in granting the petitioners application for issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment.The CA denied the motion. The petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the SEC en banc, exercising purely appellate jurisdiction, has jurisdiction and can take cognizance of the
issue of excessive attachment which was raised for the first time on certiorari and not raised before or brought to the
attention of, and acted or ruled upon by, the SEC Hearing Officer/Panel.
Issue:
Whether or not CA exercising its appellate jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court has ruled that the foregoing citations specifically referred to appellate courts but are
equally applicable to appellate administrative agencies, such as the SEC, where rules of procedure are liberally
construed. However, the foregoing rule and the exceptions thereto are not applicable to the circumstances of the case at
bar.
The SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals overlooked the nature of respondent. The SEC en banc was not
acting on an ordinary appeal which opens the entire case for review. It was not exercising its appellate jurisdiction; which
process is merely a continuation of the original suit. The petition was brought under the SEC en bancs original jurisdiction
via the commencement of a new action, that is, a special civil action for certiorari.
A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. When a court exercised its jurisdiction and an error was committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. An error of judgment that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil action of certiorari. The SEC en banc
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it addressed a non-jurisdictional
issue in a special civil action for certiorari. It sought to correct an error in the enforcement of the writ of attachment, an
error of judgment which is clearly a factual issue involving appraisal and evaluation of evidence. No grave abuse of
discretion may be attributed to the SEC Hearing Officer/Panel simply because of the alleged misappreciation of facts and
evidence. Erroneous factual findings amount to no more than errors in the exercise of jurisdiction which are beyond the
ambit of the sole office of a writ of certiorari, namely, the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of
grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
484.
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporationvs.
Honorable Court of Appeals, Honorable Judge Henedino P. Eduarte
G.R. No. 110701
March 12, 2002
Facts:
On November 11, 1988, Isabela 1 Electric Cooperative, Inc. secured Fire Insurance Policy from petitioner for Two
Million Pesos and was later on expanded coverage to include typhoons and floods of one year. During the subsistence of
the insurance policy, the insured properties of ISELCO-I were destroyed by two typhoons. ISELCO-I filed successive
claims with petitioner but the later refused to pay the claims.The ISELCO-Ifiled a complaint against petitioner for a sum of
money with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela. RTC rendered a decision in favor of ISELCO-I.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and ISELCO-I filed its Opposition to the said Motion for Reconsideration.
Trial court denied the said motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge abused his discretion in issuing a writ of execution pending appeal despite
the fact that its appeal is clearly not dilatory.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that, as a general rule, the execution of a judgment should not be had until and
unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the
court of origin, in which event, execution "shall issue as a matter of right." Execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 3926 of the Rules of Court is, therefore, the exception.
The requisites for the grant of a motion for execution pending appeal are:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
Being an exception to the general rule, the requisites of execution pending appeal must, therefore, be strictly construed.
Thus, anent the requisite that there must be good reason justifying the execution of the judgment pending appeal, we
have consistently held that such good reason must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will
outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Beyond the guideline set by
jurisprudence, however, statute does not determine, enumerate, or give examples of what may be considered good
reasons to justify execution pending appeal.
485.
Metro Transit Organization, inc. and Jovencio P. Bantang, Jr.vs.
The Court of Appeals, National Labor Relations Commission and Ruperto Evangelista
G.R. No. 142133
November 19, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. is a government-owned and controlled corporation operating a light rail
transit, while petitioner Bantang, Jr. is an officer of MTO. Respondent Evangelista worked as a cash assistant in the
Treasury Division of MTO.On December 29, 1989, after completion of an inventory count of tokens, petitioners discovered
that 2,000 pieces of tokens were missing. Petitioners conducted an investigation which resulted in implicating Evangelista
as one of the alleged perpetrators responsible for the loss of the tokens and filed a criminal case for qualified theft against
Evangelista before the prosecutors office but the investigating prosecutor dismissed the case. Evangelista filed a case for
illegal dismissal against petitioners. On September 5, 1991, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo rendered a decision
declaring that petitioners illegally dismissed Evangelista. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to reinstate Evangelista to
his former position, with payment of full back wages. Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration. Instead,
petitioners directly filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals rendered a
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals ruled that the special civil action of
certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in holding that the petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the rules of court is not the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to petitioners.
Ruling
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before
resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The
rule is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions.
Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the
respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized
as exceptions to the rule:
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
An examination of the records reveals that petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
decision. As petitioners alleged in their petition before the Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration is not necessary
as the questions raised before the court are the very same issues which the NLRC already considered.4 Except for this
bare allegation, petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners failed to state any justification that their case falls within any of the exceptions.
486.
Government of the United States of America vs.
Hon. Guillermo Purganan
G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002
Facts:
The Facts
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to
the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and
0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as
Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them
to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also
known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the
said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held
that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No.
01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section
7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and
437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of
an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,"
10 which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.
In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in
an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the
Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition
proceedings.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a
matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of
special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that
he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its
obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs.
The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in
granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari
arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals
(CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in
disposing of the substantive issues.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the
issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position
papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed
orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the
passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues
raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is
lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties
would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding
precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue
by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might
likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the
Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to
grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on
the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain
exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As
a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy
of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely
argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present
case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are
special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz,
Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed
by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only
result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the
proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases
where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it
best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is,
as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument
of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent
that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to
the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence
of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the
concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose
of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of
civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of
the person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition
to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the
treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself --
they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar
practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands
of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of
the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch
ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure
would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on
reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set
forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the
law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government
is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. 45
Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the
crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well
as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight.
He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to
avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to
be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth
the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the
formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest? We rule in the negative.
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of
the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant.
Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving
them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
"immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a
sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.
The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately
upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get
a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H,
the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force
of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits
that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the
Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex
MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make
an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve
the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually
concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein
respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the
extraditee."
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined
therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for
hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to
answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have
easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence,
the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate
with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore,
the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ."
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither
the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from
the requested state.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination --
under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we
required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or
at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing
a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the
certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it
is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their
witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused
were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial
of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set
of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not
the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If,
in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including
those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not
before the extradition court.
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x
liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to
be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64
Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental
fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to
his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts
custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already
been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could
be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he
ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to
accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His
supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the
suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating
our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able
to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty --
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their
detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional
duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is
"dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles
of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision
and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising
from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this
power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it
also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant
his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On
that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded.
In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations
on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly
confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her
infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the
final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that
his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine
him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are
summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to
the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to
the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another
matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition
request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the
request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its
conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled
from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been
taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition
court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines
in this Decision.
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The
parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and
this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing
not only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter
required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position
Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in
the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the
potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear
factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual
matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by
the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this
case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings,
74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed,
not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath,
this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist
the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the
criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness
of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic
rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It
is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at
scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there
exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition
cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always
call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the
conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave
abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to
our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should
not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark
Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to
conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
487.
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporationvs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and Diamond Machinery Co., inc.
G.R. No. L-45473
April 28, 1980
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals 1 in Special Civil Action for certiorari With Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. SP-05622, entitled "Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Buenaventura J. Guerrero, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV, and Diamond Machinery Co., Inc., Respondents,"
denying the petition for certiorari and setting aside the restraining order issued by the court as well as the Resolution of
December 27, 1976 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of said decision.
This case finds its genesis in Civil Case No. 23226 for replevin before the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by the
Honorable Buenaventura J. Guerrero, instituted by private respondent praying the court that, pending trial, an order be
issued directing the sheriff to take into his custody and to dispose of in accordance with the Rules of Court the following
personal properties which petitioner allegedly bought from defendant Diamond Machinery Co., Inc., now the private
respondent herein, on installment basis, but defaulted in the installment payments due thereon:
(1) One (1) Unit TREE FARMER MODEL CSA Log Skidder powered by Cummins V-504C diesel engine, complete
with gearmatic 190 winch assy., 24, 5x32-12 ply tires, canopy and standard accessories, S.N. 8412-031; and
(2) One (1) Unit TREE FARMER MODEL C6D Log Skiddler powered by GM 4-53 diesel engine, complete with Can-
Car 20 inch 23.1 x 26 - 16 PR United Tires, canopy and standard accessories, Serial No. 6402-056.
On April 1, 1976, private respondent Diamond Machinery Co., Inc. filed a verified complaint for replevin against petitioner,
docketed as Civil Case No. 23226 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV, presided over by respondent
Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero. On the same day, private respondent filed its "Bond for Manual Delivery of Personal
Property" in the amount of P898,440.28, and on April 2, 1976, respondent Judge issued a writ of seizure.
On April 8, 1976, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside the Order of Seizure.
On April 19, 1976, private respondent filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and to Set Aside Order of Seizure, to
which petitioner filed its Reply on April 26, 1976.
On April 27, 1976, petitioner filed an Ampliatory Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. On the same day
Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado, temporarily presiding over Branch XXIV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued an
order, temporarily restraining the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Sur from further enforcing and implementing the writ of
seizure, dated April 2, 1976, and to maintain the status quo of the parties.
On May 4, 1976, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April 27, 1976, to which petitioner
filed its opposition on May 7, 1976. On the same day, private respondent filed its Rejoiner to petitioner's reply to the
opposition to dismiss, to which petitioner filed its Sur-Rejoinder on May 10, 1976. On that day, May 10, 1976, petitioner
presented evidence in support of its motion to dismiss and set aside order of seizure in the course of which, it presented
as witness Roberto S. Aquino, the President and General Manager of petitioner. Private respondent's motion for
reconsideration dated May 4, 1976 was likewise submitted for resolution.
On June 1, 1976, respondent Judge issued an order which reconsidered and set aside the order of April 27, 1976, and
held in abeyance the resolution of petitioner's motion to, dismiss and to set aside order of seizure until after resolution of
the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent, as defendant, in Civil Case No. 1844, Court of First Instance of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City, Branch I, and in Civil Case No. 143, Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur.
On June 11, 1976, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the order of June 1, 1976.
On June 18, 1976, private respondent filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration. Earlier on June 16, 1976,
petitioner filed a Manifestation and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 22, 1976, when respondent Judge was attending a seminar for Judges at the Development Academy of the
Philippines, petitioner filed an urgent motion, praying that the motion for reconsideration and supplement to motion for
reconsideration be resolved, or that an order be issued reiterating the order of April 27, 1976.
On June 23, 1976, Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado, who was temporarily Presiding Judge of Branch XXIV of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal issued an order disqualifying himself from sitting in the case, and forwarding to Judge Leo D.
Medialdea, 1st Assistant Executive Judge, the records of the case.
On June 28, 1976, and order was issued by Judge Leo D. Medialdea, denying petitioner's urgent motion, dated June 22,
1976, "in the interest of the orderly administration of justice." 2
On July 1, 1976, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-05622-R.
On July 7, 1976, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial Judge from enforcing his
order dated June 1, 1976 until further orders from said Court.
On November 22, 1976, the Honorable Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied, and the restraining order issued by this court is recalled and set aside.
This case is dismissed with costs against petitioners. 3
On December 27, 1976, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
It will be noted that petitioner filed three (3) civil cases relative to the properties subject of replevin in Civil Case No.
23226.
The first of these cases is Civil Case No. 1844 for Damages filed on March 26, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. Upon the plaintiffs' (Roberto S. Aquino and Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation)
manifestation that the cause of action had been rendered moot and academic as the machineries desired to be restrained
had been given back to plaintiffs and already being used in their logging operations by virtue of a restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. CA- G.R. No. SP-05622-R, this case was dismissed with prejudice on September 6,
1976 (See p. 92, Records of Case).
The second case is Civil Case No. 143 for Injunction with preliminary injunction and annulment of contract filed on March
29, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur which was dismissed on October 18, 1976 due to improper
venue. This case is now on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The third case is Civil Case No. SP-326 for Injuction with preliminary injunction and damages filed on May 26, 1976 with
the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. On May 27, 1976, the Presiding Judge issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining private respondent and all acting in its behalf from disturbing or depriving petitioner's
possession of the skidders or machineries being used for its logging operations until further orders from the court. This
case was dismissed without prejudice on May 3, 1977.
1. Whether or not the disputed order of June 1, 1976 was issued by the trial Judge without, or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and
2. Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction with
respondent Court of Appeals, (CA-G.R. No. SP-05622-R) was premature.
Petitioner seeks to impress upon this Court that the disputed order of June 1, 1976 issued by Presiding Judge
Buenaventura J. Guerrero of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV, was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner further asserts that the restraining order issued by the Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City in Civil Case No. SP-326 on May 27, 1976 was
still valid and subsisting as of June 1, 1976 when Judge Guerrero issued the questioned order. This same issue was
raised in the court below and respondent Court of Appeals found petitioner's claim unmeritorious. It is not disputed that
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV has jurisdiction over the replevin case. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that respondent Judge erred in reconsidering and setting aside the order of April 27, 1976 and held in abeyance
the resolution of petitioner's motion to dismiss and to set aside the order of seizure until after the resolution of the motion
to dismiss filed by private respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. 1844 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City, Branch I, and in Civil Case No. 143, Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur, said error is not an
error of jurisdiction which may be reviewed in certiorari proceedings. Said error would at most be an error of judgment or
of procedure. The rule is well-settled that errors of judgment or of procedure not relating to the court's jurisdiction or
amounting to grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari. The order complained of by petitioner is merely
interlocutory or peremptory in character which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 4 This Court has,
likewise, held that where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or soundness of the decision, not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision or its validity, the same is beyond the province of the special civil action for
certiorari. 5
Petitioner's allegation that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion or had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction is without merit. As pointed out by petitioner himself, there is a grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance
of a writ of certiorari where there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. The case at bar evinces no
proof demonstrating that respondent Judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment or that he exercised his
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal animosity. A sedulous perusal of
the questioned order brings to the fore the lack of factual and legal basis of petitioner's assertion. Pertinent excerpt of
Judge Guerrero's disputed order reads thus:
The controversy centers on the alleged operation of the rule on pendente lite to the case at bar. It is claimed by the
defendant (petitioner herein) that there is another action pending between the same parties and involving the same
properties and cause of action before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, specifically Civil
Case No. 1844, filed in said Court on March 26, 1976 where summons was served upon the defendant therein, plaintiff
herein, on March 29, 1976. By way of reply to this assertion, plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that it has filed a motion to dismiss
said Civil Case 1844 on the ground that under the contract which gave rise to their jural relations, "any legal action arising
out of this transaction may only be filed in the Courts of the Province of Rizal." As an alternative to plaintiff's prayer to
dismiss the instant motion to dismiss, it submitted the proposition "that it would be better that resolution on the same
(meaning instant defendant's motion to dismiss) be held in abeyance until after the motions to dismiss the Agusan cases
shall have been finally resolved.
The Court finds this suggestion well-taken to achieve an orderly administration of justice. It is, however, suggested that
the parties notify the Court as soon as resolution is handed on the motion to diss the Agusan cases.
Cming now to the restraining order of April 27, 1976 issued upon motion of defendant, plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration of its issuance is meritorious. To each kind of action or actions a proper provisional remedy is provided for
by law. The Rules of Court clearly specify the case in which they may be properly granted (Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan,
76 Phil. 452). The provisional remedy prayed for in the case at bar is for delivery of personal property under Rule 60,
Rules of Court. Hence, this rule alone must apply to the operative facts, to the exclusion of the other rules; more so, that
there was compliance with the provisions of Rule 60 by the party invoking it, the plaintiff herein. Application for relief by
the party adversely affected should be had pursuant to the procedure decreed under this rule; otherwise it would be a
departure from the pronouncement that "to each kind of action or actions, a proper provisional remedy is provided for by
law." Specifically, under Section 5, Rule 60, defendant has the remedy to maintain and continue ts possession on the
personal property in question by putting up a counterbond if he had not objected to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond.
The record does not show that he has availed of the provisions of this section; hence, he cannot defeat the application of
the plaintiff for replevin made in compliance with the requisites provided by law, by resort to a restraining order. Indeed, if
defendant suffers damages by reason of plaintiff's application for replevin, plaintiff's bond in double the value of the
property stands to answer for it thru judgment of the Court, under Section 9, Rule 60. 6
Apropos the second issue, petitioner contends that the Petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction which he filed with the Court of Appeals is not premature. Petitioner argues that as Civil Case No. 23226 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal now stands, his motion to dismiss and set aside order of seizure is held on abeyance
pending resolution of private respondent's motion to dismiss the Agusan cases and that if the temporary restraining order
is not restored, or if the order of June 1, 1976 is not reconsidered, he wig be deprived of the use of the machineries in
question and his logging operations seriously crippled such that he might not be able to meet his contractual obligations
and settle his outstanding accounts with private respondent. We find respondent Court of Appeals' ruling that petitioner's
recourse to certiorari is prematurely filed to be correct as petitioner still has an adequate and more expeditious remedy
than the present petition for certiorari, and that is the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
In the case of Maritime Company of the Philippines, et al. vs. Paredes, 7 We held that:
Where the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration in
the lower court, the writ cannot be granted. If there is an appeal or other adequate remedy, like a motion for
reconsideration, which is still pending in the court below, the petition for certiorari should be denied.
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all available remedies must be
exhausted. 8 Likewise, in a host of case 9 We ruled that before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the attention
of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the
petition for certiorari should be denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to
decide should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an appellate court without first giving such lower courts
the opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation.
488.
Philippine Consumers Foundation, inc., vs.
National Telecommunications Commission and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.,
G.R. No. L-63318 August 18, 1984
FACTS:
On March 2, 1983, petitioner filed the instant petition praying, among others, that the decision of respondent NTC dated
November 22, 1982 and the order dated January 14, 1983 be annulled and set aside on the grounds therein stated (pp. 2-
19, rec.).
After the petitioner, the private respondent, and the Solicitor General for public respondent NTC filed their respective
comments and memoranda (pp. 47-53, 96-106, 109-116, 127-142, 147-164, 206-221, rec.), on November 25, 1983, the
decision sought to be reconsidered was promulgated, annulling and setting aside the challenged decision and order,
respectively dated November 22, 1982 and January 14, 1983 (pp. 225-232, rec.).
Said decision is not unanimous as it bears the concurrence of only 9 members of this Court, while 3 members took no part
and 1 member reserved his vote (p 232, rec.)
In a resolution dated January 10, 1984 and released on January 17, 1984, the Court granted respondent PLDT's motion
for 15-day extension from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file a motion for reconsideration (pp.
233, 236, rec.).
On January 12, 1984, PLDT filed its motion for reconsideration (pp. 237-268, rec.).
On February 27, 1984, respondent PLDT filed a motion to admit attached supplemental motion for reconsideration (pp.
281-301, rec.).
On February 27, 1984, public respondent NTC, thru the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation and motion that it is joining
core, respondent PLDT in its motion for reconsideration thereby adopting the same as its own (pp. 302-303, 305-306,
rec.).
In a resolution dated March 1, 1984 and issued on March 2, 1984, the Court admitted the supplemental motion for
reconsideration of PLDT, noted the manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General for and in behalf of respondent NTC
that it is joining the motion for reconsideration of PLDT and adopting it as its own, and required petitioner to convenient
within 10 days from notice on the aforesaid supplemental motion for reconsideration of PLDT (p. 304-A, rec.).
On March 28, 1984, petitioner filed its comment on respondent's motion for reconsideration (pp. 310-317, rec.).
In a resolution dated April 3, 1984 and issued on April 11, 1984, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration (p. 318A,
rec.).
On April 6, 1984, respondent PLDT filed a motion to strike out "discussion (e)" in petitioner's "comment on respondents'
motions" dated March 20, 1984 (pp. 319-321, rec.).
In a resolution dated April 12, 1984 and issued on April 16, 1984, the Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Tomas
Llamas to comment within 10 days from notice on the aforesaid motion to strike out (p. 323, rec.).
On April 17, 1984, respondent PLDT, thru counsel, filed a motion for leave to file within 15 days from date a second
motion for reconsideration (pp. 324-326, rec.).
On April 27, 1984, petitioner filed an opposition to the aforesaid motion of PLDT for leave to file within 15 days to file a
second motion for reconsideration (pp. 328-330, rec.).
On May 2, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed a second motion for reconsideration with an annex (pp. 332-344, rec.).
In a resolution dated May 8, 1984 but issued on May 11, 1984, the Court granted the motion of PLDT to file a second
motion for reconsideration within 15 days from April 16, 1984, noted the opposition of petitioner to said motion, and
required petitioner to comment within 15 days from notice on the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration of PLDT for
the reconsideration of the decision of November 25, 1983 (p. 345, rec.).
On May 4, 1984, petitioner filed its comment on the second motion for reconsideration of private respondent (pp. 346-350,
rec.).
In a resolution dated May 10, 1984 and issued on May 16, 1984, the Court required respondents to file a reply within 10
days from notice on the aforesaid comment of petitioner on private respondent PLDT's motion praying that the discussion
(par. 3) in petitioner's comment on the first motion for reconsideration and the supplemental motion for reconsideration be
deleted (p. 352, rec.).
On May 21, 1984, public respondent NTC filed a manifestation joining private respondent PLDT and adopting the latter's
second motion for reconsideration (pp. 353-354, rec.), which the Court granted in a resolution dated May 29, 1984 and
issued on June 6, 1984 (p. 355-A).
On May 28,1984, respondent PLDT filed a motion for extension of 10 days or until June 7, 1984 within which to submit the
required reply in the resolution of May 10, 1984 and issued on May 16, 1984 (pp. 356-357, rec.), which was granted in a
resolution dated June 5, 1984 and issued on July 3, 1984 (p. 357-A, rec.).
On June 1, 1984, petitioner filed its comment on PLDT's second motion for reconsideration, with a motion to declare final
the decision with respect to public respondent NTC (pp. 358362, rec.).
A day before June 1, 1984, or on May 31, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed its reply to petitioner's "comment on
motion of private respondent" dated May 4, 1984 [motion to strike] (pp. 366-369, rec.).
On July 16, 1984, after its motions for extension were granted, public respondent NTC thru the Solicitor General, finally
filed its reply (pp. 370-371, 372-A, 373, 375-381, rec.).
It should be emphasized that the resolution of this Court dated April 3, 1984 but issued on April 11, 1984, denying the first
motion for reconsideration did not state that the denial is final (see p. 318-A, rec.).
And the motion of May 29, 1984 but filed on June 1, 1984 of petitioner to declare as final the decision of November 25,
1983 (which motion was included in plaintiff's comment on PLDT's second motion for reconsideration) with respect to
public respondent NTC (pp. 361-362, rec.), was not acted upon by this Court, ostensibly because as early as May 21,
1984, public respondent NTC, thru the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is joining private respondent PLDT in
its second motion for reconsideration dated May 18, 1984 and adopting it as its own (pp. 353-354, rec.).
II
It is not disputed and should be emphasized that on August 31, 1982, this Court set aside the NTC order dated April
14, 1982 in the case of Samuel Bautista vs. NTC, et al. (16 SCRA 411) provisionally approving the revised schedule of
rates for the Subscriber Investments Plan, on the ground that there was necessity of a hearing by the Commission before
it could have acted on the PLDT application for said revised schedule, to give opportunity to the public, especially herein
petitioner and the Solicitor General to substantiate their objections to the said schedule as excessive and unreasonable,
especially for the low-income and middle-income groups, which cannot afford telephone connections and that there is no
need to increase the rate because PLDT is financially sound.
Thereafter, in NTC Case No. 82-87 entitled "Re Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. respondent NTC conducted
several hearings on PLDT's revised Subscriber Investments Plan schedule at which written oppositions were filed by
herein petitioner PCFI, the Solicitor General, Atty. Samuel Bautista, Flora Alabanza, the municipality of Marikina, and the
Integrated Telecommunications Suppliers' Association of the Philippines (ITESAP). Other oppositors failed to file their
written oppositions. The hearings on the merits actually started on August 4, 1982 and continued for four (4) subsequent
dates.
The oppositors, thru counsel, thoroughly cross-examined the witness for the applicant, Mr. Romeo Sisteban applicant's
Vice-President for Budget and Financial Planning.
None of the oppositors opted to present evidence but merely filed Memoranda and thereafter manifested that the case is
submitted for decision Because PLDT made some concessions in favor of the oppositors, oppositors ITESAP, Eastern
Telecommunications, Inc., Philippine Global Communications, Inc. (Philcom), Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) withdrew their opposition and manifested that they are no longer opposing the application after
which respondent NTC issued the challenged decision of November 22, 1982.
Respondent NTC rendered the challenged decision dated November 22, 1982, approving the revised schedule on the
ground that the rates are within the 50% of cost limit provided in P.D. No. 217, that they are just and reasonable and in
consonance with the public policies declared in said decree, and that such approval is in the public interest (see NTC
decision of Nov. 22, 1982, pp. 2-19, rec.).
It is undisputed therefore that petitioner and the other oppositors were accorded due process.
From said decision dated November 22, 1982, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The decision promulgated on November 25, 1983 interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P.D. No.
217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications as mandatory, which construction is not
supported by the actual phraseology of said Section 2, which reads thus:
The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, through its Board of Communications and/or
appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented
and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated (emphasis supplied).
The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a
contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean
"shall" or "must". It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary on the part of the delegate
department or the Board 6f Communications then, now the National Telecommunications Commission whether or not
to promulgate pertinent rules and regulations. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 which commands that the phrase "may be
promulgated" should be construed as "shall be promulgated." The National Telecommunications Commission can function
and has functioned without additional rules, aside from the existing Public Service Law, as amended, and the existing
rules already issued by the Public Service Commission, as well as the 1978 rules issued by the Board of
Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC. It should be recalled that the PLDT petition for approval
of its revised SIP schedule was filed on March 20,1980.
P.D. No. 217 does not make the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the respondent NTC as essential to the
exercise of its jurisdiction over applications for SIP schedules. In Ang Tibay vs. CIR (69 Phil. 635), this Court, through Mr.
Justice Jose P. Laurel, did not include the promulgation of rules and regulations as among the seven (7) requirements of
due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before a quasi-judicial body such as the respondent NTC.
What is patently mandatory on the ministry or National Telecommunications Commission is the immediate implementation
of the policies declared in P.D. No. 217. To repeat, the ministry or the NTC "shall see to it that the herein declared policies
for the telephone industry are immediately implemented ..." The formulation of rules and regulations is purely discretionary
on the part of the delegate.
Both words "shall and "may be" are employed in the lone sentence of Section 2 of P.D. No. 217. This graphically
demonstrates that P.D. No. 217 preserves the distinction between their ordinary, usual or nominal senses.
This is emphasized by the fact that under Section 3 of P.D. No. 217, only "the pertinent provisions" of the Public Service
Act, as amended, which are in conflict with the provisions of P.D. No. 217, had been repealed or modified by said P.D.
No. 217.
The pertinent provisions of the Public Service Act, as amended, the franchise of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company under Act 3436, as amended, all existing legislative and/or municipal franchises and other laws, executive
orders, proclamations, rules and regulations or parts thereof, as are in conflict with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
And under the Public Service Act, as amended (C.A. No. 146), the board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a
provisional amount for the subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing (par. 3 of Sec. 16, C.A.
146, as amended).
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
communication, mileage, kilometrage, and oilier special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter
by any public service: Provided That the Commission may, in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services
provisionally and without necessity of any hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon
publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affects Provided further, That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said
private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
The Rules of Practice and Procedures promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate
predecessor of respondent NTC, pursuant to Section 11 of the Public Service Act, otherwise known as Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended, govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC. Section
2 of said Rules defines their scope, including exempting parties from the application of the rules in the interest of justice
and to best serve the public interest, and the NTC may apply such suitable procedure to improve the service in the
transaction of public service. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 1 of said Rules reads:
Sec. 2. Scope. These rules govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Board of Communications in all
matters of hearing, investigation and proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of
justice and in order to best serve the public interest, the Board may, in any particular matter, except it from these rules
and apply such suitable procedure to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 2 of said rules insure the appearance of the Solicitor General and other consumers or users. The
notice of hearing is required to be published and to be served on the affected parties by Section 2 of Rule 8; while Section
I of Rule 9 allows the filing of written oppositions to the application Under Section 3 of Rule 15, the BOC then, now the
NTC, may grant, on motion of the applicant or on its own initiative, provisional relief based on the pleading, supporting
affidavits and other documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which
shall be caged within thirty (30) days from the grant of the provisional relief.
Finally, Section 1 of Rule 19 provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court governing proceedings before
the Court of First Instance then, now the Regional Trial Courts, which are not inconsistent with the rules of practice and
procedure promulgated by the BOC on January 25, 1978.
There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 modifying, much less repeating Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended.
It is true that P.D. No. 1874 promulgated on July 21, 1983 amending Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 expressly authorizes the
National Telecommunications Commission (now the successor of the Board of Communications) to approve "such
amounts for subscriber investments as applied for provisionally and without the necessity of a hearing; but shall call a
hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all parties affected." But such amendment
merely reiterates or confirms paragraph (c) of Section 16 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Service Law, and serves merely to clarify the seeming ambiguity of the repealing clause in Section 3 of P.D. No. 217 to
dissipate an doubts on such power of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The construction of the majority decision of November 25, 1983 of the word "may" to mean "shall" is too strained, if not
tortured.
IV
WE cannot subscribe to the view that the National Telecommunications Commission should or must promulgate "pertinent
rules and regulations because the existing substantive and procedural laws as well as the rules promulgated by the Public
Service Commission under and pursuant to the Public Service Law, otherwise known as CA No. 146, as amended, are
more than adequate to determine the reasonability of the amounts of investment of telephone subscribers, the viability of
the company and the other factors that go into determining such amounts and such viability. The existing laws and rules
on rate-making are more than sufficient for a proper determination of such amounts of investments of individual
subscribers and the profitability of the venture.
The adequacy of the existing Public Service Law, otherwise known as C.A. No. 146, as amended, and rules had been
demonstrated, because they have been applied in the following cases involving PLDT:
1. PLDT vs. PSC, G.R. No. L-26762, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 609;
2. Republic vs. PLDT, G.R. No. L-18841, Jan. 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 620;
3. PLDT vs. PSC, G.R. Nos. L-24198 & L-24207-10, Dec. 18, 1968, 26 SCRA 427;
4. Republic Telephone Co. vs. PLDT, G.R. No. L-21070; PLDT vs. Republic Telephone Co., G.R. No. L-21075, both
decided on Sept. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 80;
5. PLDT vs. Medina, G.R. No. L-24658, April 3, 1968, 23 SCRA 1; and
6. PLDT vs. Medina, G.R. Nos. L-24340-44, July 18, 1967, 20 SCRA 669.
As heretofore stated, as early as January 25, 1978, other pertinent rules of practice and procedure were promulgated by
the then Board of Communications, now the respondent National Telecommunications Commission, implementing P.D.
No, 217, in addition to the applicable provisions of the Public Service Law, as amended, and the rules previously issue by
the Public Service Commission (Annex 2 to the Memo of respondent PLDT filed on August 15, 1983, pp. 147-165, rec.).
Even before 1978, respondent applied the procedure prescribed by the Public Service Law, as amended, and the rules
previously issued by the Public Service Commission, the NTC predecessor, in several cases involving similar applications
for SIP schedules of Filipino Telephone Corporation (BOC Case No. 73-064; see BOC decision in said cases dated
December 5, 1974, May 11, 1978, March 15, 1977, Feb. 19, 1976 and Aug. 31, 1978 Annexes 3, 4, 4-A, 5, pp. 166-
195, rec.).
The majority opinion recognizes that for the last three years, the PLDT had earned a yearly average net profit of over
P100 million and the existing subscribers have been receiving their corresponding quarterly dividends on their
investments.
It should be stressed that Section 5 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, expressly directs that "the State
shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public." As above-stated, the existing individual
subscribers of PLDT had been sharing in the net profits of the company every quarter after the promulgation of P.D. 217
on June 16, 1973.
The amount that is provisionally approved under the subscriber's investment plan for PBX/PAEX trunks and for business
telephones in Metro Manila and the provinces, whether new installations or transfers, appears to be reasonable, including
those for the leased lines or outside local.
To lighten the burden of subscribers, investments may be paid in installments or under some convenient arrangements
which the NTC may authorize, which is now expressly provided for in Section 1 of P.D. 1874 amending Sec. 6 of P.D.
217.
Section 1, paragraph 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 217 is hereby amended to read as follows:
6. In any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of subscriber self-financing wilt in no case, exceed fifty per
centum (50%) of the amount which results from dividing the telephone utility's gross investment in telephone plant in
service by its number of primary stations in service, both as reported in the utility's latest audited annual report rendered
he National Telecommunications Commission; PROVIDED, however, that the amount payable by the telephone
subscriber may be paid on installment or under such payment arrangement as the National Telecommunications
Commission may authorize.
V
It should be likewise emphasized that pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, the law-making authority, in issuing both P.D. Nos. 217 and 1874, established the all-important policy of making
available on regular and uninterrupted basis the telephone service because it is
a crucial element in the conduct of business activity ... and is essential for the smooth and efficient function of industry,
... efficient telephone service contributes directly to national development by facilitating trade and commerce;
... the telephone industry is one of the most highly capital intensive industries;
... the telephone industry has fundamentally different financing characteristics from other utilities in that capital
requirements per telephone unit installed increase as the number of customers serviced also increases instead of
decreasing in cost per unit as in power and water utilities;
... continued reliance on the traditional sources of capital funds through foreign and domestic borrowing and through
public ownership of common capital stock will result in a high cost of capital heavy cash requirements for amortization and
thus eventually in higher effective cost of telephone service to subscribers;
... the subscribers to telephone service tend to be among the residents of urban areas and among the relatively higher
income segment of the population;
... it is in the interest of the national economy to encourage savings and to place these savings in productive enterprises
and
... it is the announced policies of the government to encourage the spreading out of ownership in public utilities (see
Whereases of P.D. 217; emphasis supplied).
P.D. No. 217 further states as the basic policies of the State concerning the telephone industry "in the interest of social,
economic and general well-being of the people ...
1. The attainment of efficient telephone service for as wide an area as possible at the lowest reasonable cost to the
subscriber;
2. The expansion of telephone service shall be financed through an optimal combination of domestic and foreign
sources of financing and an optimal combination of debt and equity funds so as to minimize the aggregate cost of capital
of telephone utilities;
3. Consistent with the declared policy of the State to attain widespread ownership of public utilities obtained from
ownership funds shall be raised from a broad base of investors, involving as large a number of individual investors as may
be possible;
4. In line with the objective of spreading ownership among a wide base of the people, the concept of telephone
subscriber self-financing is hereby adopted whereby a telephone subscriber finances part of the capital investments in
telephone installations through the purchase of stocks, whether common or preferred stock, of the telephone company;
5. As part of any subscriber self-financing plan, when the issuance of preferred stock is contemplated, it is required
that the subscriber be assured, in all cases of a fixed annual income from his investment and that these preferred capital
stocks be convertible into common shares, after a reasonable period and under reasonable terms, at the option of the
preferred stockholder; and
6. In any subscriber self-financing plan, the amount of subscriber self-financing wig, in no case, exceed fifty per
centum (50%) of the cost of the installed telephone line, as may be determined from time to time by the regulatory bodies
of the State.
The same policies and objectives are substantially re-stated and capsulized in the three Whereases of P.D. No. 1874
amending P.D. No. 217 as pointed out in the basic policies aforestated in P.D. No. 217 that the cost per telephone unit
increases in proportion to the increase in the number of customers served; and that foreign borrowing will impose heavy
cash requirements for amortizations of such foreign loans which would result in the higher effective costs of telephone
service to subscribers and ultimately would be a heavy drain on our dollar reserves, which will result in our inability to
meet our other foreign commitments and mark the image of the Republic of the Philippines in international trade relations.
Thus, P.D. No. 217 stresses that in the interest of the national economy it is essential to encourage savings and to place
these savings (subscriber's investments) in productive enterprises.
PLDT is profitable for the subscribers-investors as shown by its net profit and the dividends received quarterly by the
existing subscribers.
There is no showing not even an allegation that the net profits realized by PLDT all these years have been
dissipated and not plowed back into the firm to improve its service.
But the rising cost of materials and labor needed to improve the PLDT service, aggravated by the devaluation of our
currency, all the more justify the revised SIP schedule approved by the respondent NTC.
With the dividends that will be received quarterly under the revised SIP schedule, the subscribers (whether of phone
installations for business with or without trunk lines, as wen as transfers of the same; or of residential phones whether
single or party line as well as transfers of the same), will recover their investments after some years and will thereafter
remain stockholders and part-owners of PLDT. All the subscribers therefore, are assured not only of profits from but also
preservation of, their investments, which are not donations to PLDT.
There are always two sides sometimes more to a case or proposition or issue. There are many cases decided by
this Court where this Court had reconsidered Its decisions and even reversed Itself, conformably to the environmental
facts and the applicable law.
After a re-study of the facts and the law, illuminated by mutual exchange of views the members of the Court may and do
change their minds.
To repeat, the decision of November 25, 1983 was not a unanimous decision for it has the concurrence of only nine (9)
members of the Court, because three (3) took no part and one (1) reserved his vote (p. 232, rec.).
489.
FACTS:
The twin petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court
of Appeals.
Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 6 dated March 27, 1991 in Civil Case No. CEB-2058, entitled "Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation, et al.," which included Silverio as one of the defendants. The decision became final and executory
and, accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992.
Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including
Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. The only asset of Silverio that could be found for the satisfaction of the judgment was
his proprietary membership share in the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila Golf). Accordingly, the sheriff levied
upon the Silverio share on December 7, 1992. At the public auction sale on December 29, 1992, Yau emerged as the
highest and only bidder of said Silverio share at P2 Million and the corresponding Certificate of Sale issued in his name.4
However, at the time of the execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy
pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment dated March 27, 19905 and October 17, 19906 obtained by the
Manila Banking Corporation (Manilabank) from Branches 62 and 64 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City before
which complaints for sums of money, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 90-5137 and 90-271,8 respectively, were pending, in
which Silverio is also one of the defendants.
On February 11, 1993, Yau filed separate motions to intervene9 in both cases pending before Branches 62 and 64 of the
RTC of Makati City. In an Order10 dated March 29, 1993, Branch 62 denied the motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-
513 on the ground that the motion was filed after the parties have rested their respective cases and the same will only
unduly delay the disposition of the case. Branch 64, on the other hand, granted Yaus motion to intervene in Civil Case
No. 90-271 in an Order dated July 1, 1993.11 Manilabank sought reconsideration12 but Branch 64 denied the same in an
Order13 dated August 30, 1993. Hence, Manilabank interposed a petition for certiorari14 before the Court of Appeals
(CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32405.
Meanwhile, in a letter15 dated September 20, 1993, Yau formally requested Manila Golf, through its transfer agent, Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), to cancel the certificate in the name of Silverio and issue a new certificate in his
name by virtue of the Certificate of Sale dated December 29, 1992 issued in his favor. Yau expressly agreed in the letter
that the certificate to be issued in his name shall be subject to the preliminary attachments issued in other cases. Manila
Golf, however, refused to accede to Yaus request, expressing the apprehension that it could be cited for contempt in view
of the fact that notices of garnishment against the Silverio share directed the club "not to remove, transfer or otherwise
dispose of" said share.
Thereupon, Yau filed in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 before the RTC Cebu City, (Branch 6) a motion for order directing
Manila Golf to issue a certificate in his name.16 Acting upon the motion, the said court issued an Order dated March 6,
1995,17 which was subsequently amended on March 30, 1995,18 directing Manila Golf and/or its transfer agent, FEBTC,
to cancel the certificate of proprietary membership share in the name of Silverio, and in lieu thereof to issue a new one in
Yaus name, subject to the preliminary attachments in favor of Manila bank.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed on May 2, 1995 a petition for certiorari19 before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.37085, assailing issuance of the Order of RTC Cebu City dated March 6, 1995, and
amended on March 30, 1995. On April 29, 1996, the CA rendered a Decision20 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37085 nullifying the
Orders of RTC Cebu City. The appellate court found and declared that when the RTC Cebu City ordered the cancellation
of the Silverio share which was in custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, it interfered with or invaded the
jurisdiction of the latter coordinate and co-equal court, hence, said order is null and void. With his motion for
reconsideration21 thereto denied on October 14, 1996,22 Yau filed the petition for review subject of G.R. No 126731.
Subsequently, on January 9, 1997, the CA rendered a Decision23 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32405 sustaining the Order of RTC
Makati City (Branch 64) dated July 1, 1993, which allowed the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.1wphi1 A
Motion for Reconsideration24 of the said Decision was denied by the CA on March 13, 1997.25 Hence, Manilabank
interposed the petition for review subject of G.R. No. 128623.
In G.R. No. 126731, Yau assails the reversal of the Orders of RTC Cebu City, directing the issuance of a new certificate of
title in his name. Yau firstly condemns the Court of Appeals for not dismissing outright the petition of Manilabank in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37805 for its failure to seek reconsideration before RTC Cebu City, of the latters assailed orders prior to
filing the petition for certiorari with the CA. He then contends that he is entitled to the issuance of a new certificate in his
name after he had purchased the same in an execution sale, despite the Silverio share being subject to a preliminary
attachment in favor of Manilabank. Thus, he submits that in issuing the questioned orders, the RTC, Cebu City, did not
interfere with or invade the jurisdiction of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, which issued the writ of preliminary attachment
pursuant to which the Silverio share was attached.
In G.R. No. 128623, the issue revolves on the legality of the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC
Makati City (Branch 64). Manilabank argues that Yau has no legal interest to justify intervention in Civil Case No. 90-271
before RTC Makati City, Branch 64 nor does he have standing and legal basis to assail the Writ of Attachment dated
September 27, 1990. Manilabank submits that whatever rights Yau may have in the subject property can be fully
protected, as in fact they are already protected, in a separate proceeding. Besides, the intervention of Yau will unduly
delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties in Civil Case No. 90-271 before RTC Makati City,
Branch 64. Finally, Manilabank contends that allowing intervention after trial had already been concluded is in violation of
the rule that intervention may only be allowed before or during trial.
At the outset, this Court notes that, admittedly, Manilabank did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Orders of RTC
Cebu City, which directed Manila Golf to issue a certificate in Yaus name, prior to initiating its petition for certiorari (CA-
G.R. SP No. 37085) in the CA. Thus, the petition before the appellate court could have been dismissed outright since, as
a rule, the CA, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
unless the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court has settled that as a
general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie. However,
there are settled exceptions to this Rule, one of which is where the assailed order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction,28 which is evident in this case.
The Notice of Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf brought the property into the custodia legis of the court
issuing the writ, that is, the RTC Makati City Branch 64, beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such as
the RTC of Cebu, Branch 6. "The garnishment of property operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien
by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis, under
the sole control of such court. A court which has control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same,
retains all incidents relative to the conduct of such property. No court, except one having supervisory control or superior
jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to interfere with and change that possession".29
Thus, the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference30 in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an
accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the RTC Cebu City to
entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to the Silverio share which is under the custodia legis of RTC Makati
City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the
same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Parco v. Court of Appeals,31 thus:
...[J]urisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of
the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the same level
as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the
language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the
same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on the orderly
administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their
cause.
It is furthermore evident from the records that Yau is guilty of forum shopping in seeking relief before Branch 6 of RTC
Cebu City, despite being allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 90-271 before Branch 64 of RTC Makati City to protect his
interests in the Silverio share. A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court. And what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists is
the vexation caused the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.32 Since Yau recognized the jurisdiction of RTC Makati City, Branch
64 to protect his interest in the Silverio share, he should have desisted from pursuing a similar remedy or relief before
RTC Cebu City inasmuch as the assailed Orders issued by the latter RTC had the effect of pre-empting the authority of
RTC Makati City, Branch 64, to act and decide upon the intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.33
Moreover, the contention of Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in the matter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under
Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court,34 which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided
by the trial court and the appellate court, "a person may, before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its discretion to
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof." Yau falls under the last instance. It is recognized that a judgment
creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene35 and a purchaser who acquires an interest
in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of
attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment.36
Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 and the purchaser at the public auction
sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected by the disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of
attachment issued by Branch 64 of RTC Makati City, should a decision be rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such,
has standing to intervene to protect his interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect his
interests before Branch 64 where the Silverio share is under custodia legis. If we follow the contention of Manilabank, this
would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of judicial stability or non-interference.
Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow intervention "before
rendition of judgment by the trial court."37 After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted.38
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure
of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same.39 The rule on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and
economize in litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to adjust the
matter in one instead of several suits.
490.
Roman P. Aquino vs. The National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 98108 September 3, 1993
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul the March 26, 1991
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which set aside its February 18, 1991 Resolution that
dismissed the appeal of private respondent. The assailed resolution also directed petitioner to file his answer to the
private respondent's memorandum on appeal (Rollo, pp. 101-104).
It appears that petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent (NCR-2-
396-87). He alleged that he was removed from the payroll in January 1987 and was not paid his salary. Private
respondent answered that petitioner had abandoned his work after he was held accountable for advances amounting to
P48,921.94.
On May 30, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, finding petitioner's dismissal as illegal. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this case, declaring respondent Roblett Industrial Construction, Inc. guilty
of illegal dismissal and ordering it to reinstate complainant Roman P. Aquino to his former or equivalent position, with full
backwages. It is therefore ordered to pay complainant his backwages for three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification in the amount of Eighty thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Pesos (P80,820.00) (Rollo, p. 17).
The counsel for private respondent received a copy of the above decision on June 13, 1990. The last day to appeal
therefore was on June 23, 1990, which fell on a Saturday. The counsel, however, filed the appeal on Monday, June 25,
1990, two days beyond the reglementary period. On July 4, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and for
the issuance of a writ of execution based on the following grounds:
(2) Private respondent did not post the surety or cash bond required by Section 223 of the Labor Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 6715.
Finding that the Labor Arbiter did not abuse his discretion in rendering his decision and that private respondent failed to
file a cash or surety bond to perfect its appeal, the NLRC, dismissed the appeal in a Resolution dated February 18, 1991.
However, upon motion of private respondent, the NLRC set aside the aforementioned resolution in its March 26, 1991
Resolution.
The March 26 Resolution of the NLRC justified the reversal of its February 18 Resolution on the following grounds:
(1) The memorandum of appeal could not be filed on June 23, 1990, because the NLRC has no office on Saturdays.
Hence, the filing of the memorandum of appeal on July 25, 1990 was timely; and
(2) When the appeal was filed on July 25, 1990, the Rules implementing R.A. No. 6715 on the requirement of an
appeal bond to perfect an appeal, had not been promulgated. While the Interim Rules promulgated by the old NLRC
required the filing of appeal bonds, the new NLRC created under R.A. No. 6715 was authorized to promulgate the
implementing rules and therefore it was not bound to follow said Interim Rules.
On April 22, 1990, petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
NLRC, filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The NLRC, aside from justifying
its reversal of the February 18 Resolution, questioned the propriety of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
(1) Whether or not a memorandum on appeal due on a Saturday can be filed timely on the following Monday; and
(2) Whether or not the filing of a bond to perfect an appeal, under Art. 223 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A.
No. 6715, was required for appeals before the adoption of the NLRC Rules implementing said amendatory law.
On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before this Court on a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the order until the appeal from the decision
of the main case, would not afford the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy
(Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 343 [1991]).
Regarding the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, such failure may be excused
where the order sought to be reviewed is a patent nullity (Saldana v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 396 [1990]).
The governing law on the question of the timeliness of the appeal of private respondent is Article 223 of the Labor Code,
which states that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter must be made within ten calendar days from receipt of
such decisions. Said provision of the Labor Code, however, is silent with regard to cases when the ten-day reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal falls on a Saturday, which is not a holiday.
On January 9, 1989, in SM Agri and General Machineries v. National Labor Relations Commission, 169 SCRA 20 [1989],
the Court held that where the tenth day to appeal to the NLRC falls on a Saturday, which is not a holiday, the appeal must
be perfected on that day and not on the next succeeding business day. The Court noted that Saturday is ordinarily a
business day.
On April 18, 1989, this Court reversed SM Agri and General Machineries in Pacaa v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 172 SCRA 473 [1989], wherein it held that when the reglementary period of ten calendar days prescribed by
Article 223 of the Labor Code falls on a Saturday and the offices of the NLRC are closed, the appeal is seasonably filed
on the following Monday, being the first day the appeal can be filed after the lapse of the reglementary period. Pacaa
was followed in Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency v. National Labor Relations Commission, 174 SCRA 347
[1989], which held that: "[w]hen the deadline for the filing of an appeal falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, and the
government office concerned is closed on such a day, the appeal may be filed on the next working day. In this case, the
next working day was Monday, May 25, 1986. The parties had until May 25, 1986 to bring an appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission."
On August 5, 1991, in Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. National Labor Relations Commission, 200 SCRA 178 (1991),
the Court mentioned that as held in SM Agri and General Machineries, Saturday, unless legally declared a holiday, is
considered a business day and therefore, if the last day to appeal falls on a Saturday, the act must be done on that day.
Again, on October 28, 1991, in Lucero v. National Labor Relations Commission, 203 SCRA 218 [1991], the Court cited
SM Agri and General Machineries as holding that Saturday is a business day.
On January 14, 1992, the NLRC, amended its Rules of Procedure to conform with the decision of this Court in Pacaa. As
amended, Section 1, Rule VI of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC now specifies that if the tenth day to perfect an
appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC falls on a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the next
working day.
To remove any doubts that may possibly arise as a result of the obiter dictum in the cases decided after Pacaa, we
hereby reiterate the Pacaa ruling and uphold the amendment to Section 1 of Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC enforced on January 14, 1992 on the principle that the law does not require the performance of an impossible act
(impossibilum nulla obligatio est).
We hold that the filing of the appeal by private respondent on June 25, 1990 was timely.
However, while the appeal to the NLRC was filed on time, it must be dismissed for failure of the appellant to file the cash
or surety bond required under Article 223 of the Labor Code.
The decision of the Labor Arbiter in this case included a monetary award, i.e., award for 3-year back wages amounting to
P80,820.00. Therefore, to perfect its appeal before the NLRC, private respondent should have posted a cash or surety
bond equivalent to the money judgment in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. In justification of the non-
posting of the bond, both respondents argued that the NLRC issued the rules implementing R.A.
No. 6715 only on August 31, 1990, which took effect on October 9, 1990. They claimed that the requirement of R.A. No.
6715 on the filing of a bond was not yet in force when private respondent filed its appeal on June 25, 1990. The NLRC
further alleged that it was not bound to follow the Interim Rules promulgated by its predecessor because it was the one
created under R.A.
No. 6715 and authorized to promulgate the implementing rules.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the provisions of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715,
requiring the posting of cash or surety bond in appeals from decisions of Labor Arbiter granting monetary awards, are self-
executing and do not need any administrative rules to implement them.
The appeal made by private respondent, not having been perfected on time for failure to file the appeal bond, the decision
of the Labor Arbiter became final and executory (Filcon Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814 [1991]).
491.
Bache & Co. (PHIL.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerma vs Hon. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
G.R. No. L-32409, February 27, 1971
Facts:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or
keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on
petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects,
and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53,
72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file
the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Veras
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an
affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court
to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him
her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him
that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge
signed respondent de Leons application for search warrant and respondent Logronios deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at
the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the
ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search
warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages
and attorneys fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After
hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents
thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court
are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself
and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion in
the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is
enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la justicia mediante el
registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Seoria que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento
apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Seoria encuentra un remedio
para esto casos con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes
etcetera, etcetera.
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Seoria pregunta por la siguiente razon: el que
solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que
alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el
mismo denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos
consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a
ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos.
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Seoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito siempre requeriria algun
tiempo?.
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las vejaciones
injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males debemos escoger. el
menor.
x x x
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution
something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation
to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the
judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts
and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent De
Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainants application for search warrant and the
witness printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of
the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable
cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that
notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient
facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this
case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk
of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs.
Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the
hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent
Judges chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the
stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them, requested
Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and without legal basis, he can be
charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his
deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was
thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the
Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was
precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing
judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed
by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings
quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on
account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the
all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to
all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question is: Was the said search
warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to above. Thus
we find the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the information required under
the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article subject to a
specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying,
compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a
corporation, partnership, or association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output removed, or to pay
the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation
of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of
Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value
of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions
are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209
are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable,
because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National
Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill
incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court
amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the
sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we
said in Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of
sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs;
records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant nevertheless
tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used
therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly
render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the
requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made, that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of
this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as
the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of
fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of
the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search
and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the
herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding
the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and
communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in
the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judges order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first place, when the questions raised
before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo,
etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax
assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner
corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et
Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners fundamental right
to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute
v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a
violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding
that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot
be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation,
the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful
search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne
Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were
searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and
whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a
different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely as claimed by petitioners at least partly
as in effect admitted by respondents based on the documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70.
Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure on
February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those
assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge
is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents,
papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in
Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized
under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
CASE NO 492.
G.R. No. L-32490 December 29, 1983
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, represented by its Administrator RIZALINO LOPEZ (Now
PEDRO G. DUMOL), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special 8th Division), HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan
(Lingayen Branch), THE RURAL POWER CORPORATION, the Spouses EUSEBIO FERRER and LOURDES
FERRER, and EDUARDO FERRER, respondents.
FACTS:
On June 14, 1965, respondents Rural Power Corporation executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Petitioner NAtional Electrification
Administration (NEA) in the sum of P985,00.00 for the purpose of improving the foremer's services to the public. Rural power was required to
execute two other real estate mortgages to secure two other loans for the amunt of P98.000.00 and P81,000.00, but said amounts were never
released. Of th three deeds of mortgages, only the first in the amount of P985,000.00 has been the object of implementation.
The mortgage deed provided fpr a program of world divided into Phases A, B and C and pursuant thereto P68,000.00 was released on
July 8, 1965, P247,000.00 on Spetember 19, 1965, and P125,000.00 on January 16,1966. Among the conditions of the mortgage were that the
amount to be released to Rural POwer would be utilized for the purposes therein specified subject to availability of funds, and that the respondents
shall adhere strictyly with the progra, of work and specificiations attached to the deed. DDue to aleeged violations of the above-stated concditions,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the deed of real esttate mortgage for the amount of P985,000.00, Sheriff of
Pangasinan set the sale of the properties involved for public auction.
Rural Power iniciated Civil case No. 14742 with CFI PAngasinan for Injunction, release of sum of money, cancellation of mortgages, and
damages. Respondent TRial Judge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction stopping the auction sale and subsequently decided in favor of Rural
Power after trial on the mertits.
Petitioner filed its Record on Appeal. However, this was disapproved by respondent Judge in an order issued on January 14,1970 for
alleged non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and directed petitioner to comply therewith and file an Amended Record on
Appeal.
On February 13, 1970, petitioner filed an amended Record on Appeal supplying the deficiencies with the prayer that all oral and
documentary evidence presented in the instant case be elevated together with all the records to the Court of Appeals. Again, respondent Judge
disapproved the Amended Record on Appeal for alleged non-compliance with Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On May 27, 1970, petitioner instituted a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before respondent Court of
Appeals, denied for failure to MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner's omission to
move for reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus was fatal to the
petition.
Whether or not respondent Trial Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioner's Record
on Appeal and the subsequent Amended Record on Appeal.
HELD:
The respondents Trial Judge's Order of January 14, 1970 as well as that of March 4, 1970 disapproving
petitioner's original and amended Record on Appeal, respectively, for alleged non- compliance with Section 6 of Rule 41
were both vague because they did not specify the requirements not complied with nor the errors or additions that had to
be corrected or added. As the Appellate Court had observed "it is possible that the respondent (Judge) was referring to
deficiencies other than that specified in the order of January 14, 1970". Hence, petitioner cannot be faulted if its Amended
Record on Appeal did not meet the standards set by the Trial Judge as there weren't any.
Also, whatever defects the original Record on Appeal may have contained had been cured in the Amended
Record on Appeal by petitioner's prayer that all the documentary and oral evidence be elevated to the Appellate Court as
expressly provided for by Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, respondent Judge's disputed Order
was arbitrary and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
That petitioner is a government corporation performing governmental functions pursuant to Republic Act, No.
2717, as amended. Public interest being involved, a Motion for Read consideration need not be availed of and a Motion
for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government.
The Decision of respondent Appellate Court (former Special 8th Division), dated August 17, 1970, is annulled and
the Regional Trial Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Lingayen Branch)was directed
to transmit the entire original record of the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS:
The Central Bank of the Philippines seeks a writ of certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Hon.
GaudencioCloribel as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the Petitioner and the Monetary Board, as well as its officials and agents, from enforcing Central
Bank Circulars Nos. 185 and 222, and Monetary Board Resolutions Nos. 805 and 1566, respectively, insofar as they
restrict the payment by Banco Filipino of "monthly" interest on savings deposits and "advance" interests on time deposits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority of the Monetary Board to fix the maximum rates of interest which banks may pay on
deposits and on any other obligations includes the power to determine and fix the manner in which said interests may be
compounded and paid.
HELD:
It is significant that the law does not merely authorize the Board to fix the maximum rates of interest which banks
may pay on deposits and on any other obligations. It, also, expressly empowers the Board in order to avoid possible
evasion of maximum interest rates set to fix also the maximum rates that banks may pay to or collect from their customers
in the form of payments of any sort. Indeed, the authority to establish maximum rates of interest carries with
it, necessarily, the power to determine the maximum rates payable as interest for given periods of time. In other words, it
connotes the right to specify the length of time for which the rates thus fixed shall be computed. Consequently, it cannot
but include the prerogative to regulate the manner of computing said rates and the manner or time of payment of interest,
insofar as these factors affect theamount of interest to be paid. In fact, the record shows that, since, at least, May 25,
1956, when Central Bank Circular No. 67 was issued, the Monetary Board has consistently regulated the time or manner
of payment of interest on bank deposits. What is more, it would seem that the validity of such regulation had never before
been contested.
497. MISSING
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.In issuing the June 22, 2007 Resolution relieving the Mabutay PBOC and creating
theMarajucon PBOC, the COMELEC First Division was merely exercising its mandate under Sec. 227 of the
Omnibus Election Code which reads:Sec. 227. Supervision and control over board of canvassers. - The Commission shallhave
direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers.Any member of the board of canvassers may, at any time, be
relieved for cause andsubstituted motuproprio by the Commission.
Petitioners contention that the COMELECs choice of officials to substitute themembers of the BOC is
limited only to those enumerated under Sec. 21 of RepublicAct. No. 6646 is untenable.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the enumeration above is not exclusive. Membersof BOCs can be filled up by
the COMELEC not only from those expressly mentionedi n t h e above-
q u o t e d p r o v i s i o n , b u t f r o m o t h e r s o u t s i d e i f t h e f o r m e r a r e n o t available
It bears noting that pursuant to Rule 18 of the Omnibus Election Code, decisionsand resolutions of
any division of the COMELEC in special cases become final andexecutory after the lapse of five days, unless a
timely motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc
CASE NO. 500
G.R. No. 135547 January 23, 2002
GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR.,
JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI ALDEA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL Inter-Agency Task Force created under
Administrative Order No. 16; HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and
Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E.
AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, Respondents.
Facts:
PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with bankruptcy and was forced to adopt
a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-
day strike to protest retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.
PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA
CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA members accepted such terms through a referendum
on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998.
Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998 agreement entered into between
PAL and PALEA.
Issue:
Whether or not negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.
Held:
YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light
of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting
industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure.
There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor
Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought
to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article.
The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing
in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to
enforce the same.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed
on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No.
43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and
the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it
is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only
Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming
the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or
privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to
seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43,
as amendedby E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a
real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of
the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
503. TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the
Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San
Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC
scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P.
885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of
Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is
lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.
Held: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries
of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of
those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the
dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
504-515 MISSING
FACTS: The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office, Malacanang, Manila,
having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. He is a third grade civil
service eligible. Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed the plaintiff that his
services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were "terminated effective today." Sometime in May 1962,
when the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles, etals. was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The dismissed
employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the President, plaintiff was one of those
who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications. He waited for Secretary
Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other
executive secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at "the opportune time."
ISSUE: Is the principle of laches or non-compliance with the "Statute of Limitations" applicable against appellant?
HELD:
No. Laches not applicable to Appellant. - Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it. - There are certain exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule
enunciated above and lead us to grant relief to appellant. 1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose
Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.Cristobal, with the other dismissed employees,
sought reconsideration in a letter dated January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Executive Secretary
AmelitoMutuc that he (Cristobal) was a civil eligible employee with eight years of service in the government and
consequently entitled to security of tenure under the Constitution. This was followed by another letter of January 26,
1962.Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of
action. During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with the
other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement. The essence of laches is not merely
lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy.
2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Executive Secretary
AmelitoMutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for
reinstatement.
Fortuno argues that the power to determine and decide the residence qualification is vested in, and falls within the
peculiar function and competence of the NEA, acting through its duly created District Election Committee and that since
the decision rendered by the latter had already become final, said resolution may no longer be questioned elsewhere.
Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving the qualification for membership of the
Board of Directors of an electric cooperative?
Held: A quo warranto proceeding maybe instituted to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well- founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the
privilege. Where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be ousted or disqualified a
quo warranto is the proper action.
The Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in the
province in which the defendant or one of the defendants reside, or when defendant is a corporation, in the province in
which it is domiciled or has a place of business; but when the Solicitor General of the Philippines commences the action, it
may be brought in a Court of First Instance in the City of Manila or the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 170 (23 years of age) should give way to Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age).
Held:
No. Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) should prevail. RA 484 amending Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter (RA
170), took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas RA 2259 became law on June 10, 1959.
The question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is
dependedt mainly upon the intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show
beyond doubt that its members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 2259,except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. All cities not particularly
excepted from the provisions of said act are subjct thereto. Hence, the age-limit provision in RA 2259 is continuing,
because Dagupan City was not excluded. Therefore, its charger provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. This is
because the last statute si so broad in terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to
cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the prior staute.
519
Castro v. Del Rosario
19 SCRA 196, Jan. 31, 1967
FACTS:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court ofFirst Instance of
Manila.The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional RevenueDirector II, Manila, which became vacanton
August 24,1959, upon the promotion of itsoccupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in
his place, and it isthis appointment that is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their rights to the positionby their failure to
complain against Toledo's appointment.
RULING:
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other AssistantRevenue Regional
Directorsdoes not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must bepredicated on more concrete grounds. The
evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant afinding that the intent to waive is unmistakable.
Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight others were notinterested in the position. Not
having shown either seniority in rank among the nine AssistantRevenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or
waiver on the part of those who weresenior to him Castro has failed to establish a clear right to the office which would
entitle him tooust respondent Toledo
520
Palma-Fernandez v. De La Paz
160 SCRA 751, April 15, 1988
FACTS
In 1985, Nenita Palma-Fernandez was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the
Hospital ngBagongLipunan (East Avenue Medical Center) by the Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Center, Jesus Azurin. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center entitled the position of the
Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. Hospital Order No. 30 was issued designating Palma-
Fernandez as Asst. Director of Professional Services.
In 1987, EO 119 (Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health) was promulgated. Hospital Order No. 22 was issued
relieving Palma-Fernandez as Chief of Clinics and transferring her to the Research Office. Dr. Aguila was designated to
her former position.
Palma-Fernandez, thereafter, filed a letter-protest with the Secretary of Health. Failure to secure any action on her
protest, she filed an instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against Dr. de la Paz (Medical Center
Chief), Dr. Aguila and the Secretary of Health.
ISSUE
Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the filing of this petition
HELD
NO. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief. This
rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute is "purely a legal
one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal." The questions involved here are purely legal. The subject Hospital
Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of tenure and were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial
intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts.
There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she
had filed a letter-protest With the respondent Secretary of Health, with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service,
and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission, but the same remained unacted upon and proved an
inadequate remedy. Besides, an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues
(Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the running
of the one-year period.
521
Galano v. Roxas
67 SCRA 8
522
Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna
402 SCRA 440, April 30, 2003
Facts:
Two lots measuring 144 squaremeters was to be expropriated byBargy.Masili for the purpose ofconstructing a barangay
hall.However, the barangay and the lotowners could not agree with thepurchase price of Php 200,000.The first complaint
was filed beforethe MTC. Whereas, the secondcomplaint was filed before the RTC.The MTC dismissed the complaintfor
lack of interest of the petitioner lotowners.The RTC stated that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. It also ruledin
favor of BrgyMasili.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdictionover the case of expropriation.
Ruling:
The SC held that the expropriationproceedings is within the jurisdictionof the RTC because it is incapable ofpecuniary
estimation. As discussed:
xx An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum ofmoney. Rather, it deals with theexercise by the
government of itsauthority and right to take property for public use.
As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts. xx
523. LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP, Petitioner, vs. THE CITY OF PASIG, et al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square
meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its
intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and
recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993
enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line
with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community." Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation that the trial court, after due notice
and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of
determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff has no cause of action for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the
issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it
appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This
prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. The Appellate Court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.:
ISSUE: Whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property.
HELD: The motion to dismiss contemplated in Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly constitutes the
responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading
that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendants property for the use specified in the complaint. All
that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiffs attorney of record. It is the court that at its
convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, "specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property
for public use." Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues. What the trial court
should have done was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine
necessity for the taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and
appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. This is especially so considering that the purpose of the expropriation
was squarely challenged and put in issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer
was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly
mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss
should govern. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the
public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the
power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and
inherent in government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public
entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent
domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvementnamely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation
was necessary.Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, whichhad been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres
and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street forpublic purposes.The lower court ruled that
there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.Petitioner therefore assails the
decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the
onlyfunction of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire intothe advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the
necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the landinvolved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the
value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of thedefendant for its value.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD:
Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposesdesignated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditionsaccompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
theconditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.
FACTS: On September 7, 1954, petitioner J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. entered a contract to sell with respondent Ligaya Javier
a parcel of land known as Lot No. 28, Block No. 356, PSD 30328, of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision for the sum of
Php3,691.20 with 10% interest per annum; Php396.12 will be payable upon execution of the contract, and an installment
of Php43.92 monthly for a period of ten (10) years. It was further stipulated in the contract, particularly the sixth
paragraph, that upon failure of respondent to pay the monthly installment, she is given a one month grace period to pay
such installment together with the monthly installment falling on the said grace period. Furthermore, failure to pay both
monthly installments, respondent will pay an additional 10% interest. And after 90 days from the end of the grace period,
petitioner can rescind the contract, the payments made by respondent will be considered as rentals. Upon the execution
of the contract, respondent religiously paid the monthly installment until January 5, 1962. Respondent, however, was
unable to the pay the monthly installments within the grace period which petitioner, subsequently, sent a letter to
respondent on May 22, 1964 that the contract has been rescinded and asked the respondent to vacate the said land. So,
upon failure of respondent to vacate the said land, petitioner filed an action to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the
rescission of the contract. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of respondent in applying Article 1592 of the New Civil
Code. Hence, petitioner made an appeal to the Supreme Court alleging that since Article 1592 of the New Civil applies
only to contracts of sale and not in contracts to sell.
ISSUE: Did the CFI erroneously apply Article 1592 of the New Civil Code?
RULING: Yes. Regardless, however, of the propriety of applying Article 1592, petitioner has not been denied substantial
justice under Article 1234 of the New Civil Code. In this connection, respondent religiously satisfied the monthly
installments for almost eight (8) years or up to January 5, 1962. It has been shown that respondent had already paid
Php4,134.08 as of January 5, 1962 which is beyond the stipulated amount of Php3,691.20. Also, respondent has offered
to pay all installments overdue including the stipulated interest, attorneys fees and the costs which the CFI accordingly
sentenced respondent to pay such installment, interest, fees and costs. Thus, petitioner will be able recover everything
that was due thereto. Under these circumstances, the SC feel that, in the interest of justice and equity, the decision
appealed from may be upheld upon the authority of Article 1234 of the New Civil Code.
526
Municipality of Binan v. Garcia
180 SCRA 576 Dec. 22, 1989
Facts:
The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Bian, Laguna filed in the RTC. The land
sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public market and
the acquisitionwas authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. One of the defendants, Francisco filed a MTD.
Her motion was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67. Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the
place of an answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss"
within the contemplation of Rule 16. Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.
Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as against defendant FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possessions
as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant and her property ..."
The Municipality filed a MR. Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order," contending that
the Order had become "final and executory for failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal
within the reglementary period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order .. appealed from.
The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in actions of eminent domain, and hence the period
of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15) days;the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69.
Issue:
whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, as
regards which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, instead of fifteen (15) days
Held: In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the
period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary
period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of BP129 to the
effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.
The municipality's MR was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it
was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had
become final and executory.
527
National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo
404 SCRA 389, June 19, 2003
Facts:
NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent domain against Heirs of
Guivelondo docketed as civil case.
The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the land which the petitioner intends to
develop a socialized housing project.
Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the amount of just
compensation, however the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment . but the trial
court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioners motion and of just compensation.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a motion for execution since the
trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.
The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of partial judgment and omnibus order
became a final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it
was denied by the court. The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a
Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent power of eminent
domain.
Ruling:
The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power of eminent domain provided that
the just compensation for the property sought is taken. After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldnt be permitted
to dismiss or discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable.The order was final after the
non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of
Guivelondo. Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it is public in character since it is
arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate expropriation proceedings that seize a private owners property.
Petition was DENIED and the trial courts decision denying petitioners motion to dismiss expropriation proceeding was
AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED.
The temporary Restraining Order was LIFTED.
528
City of Ilo-Ilo VS Hon Lolito Contreras Besana
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent elpidio t.javellana and southern
development bank, the latter as a mortgagee. The complaint soughtto expropriate two parcels of land registered in
javellanas name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School.
ISSUE: what is the reckoning point for the determination of just compensation.
HELD: When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings or takes place subsequent to the filing for eminent domain, just compensation should be determined as of the
filing of the complaint.
Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 rules of procedure , under which the complaint for expropriation was filed , just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of filing of the complaint.
529
APO FRUITS CORPORATION VS CA
FACTS: Apo Fruits Corporation (afc) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (hpi) filed a separate complaints for determination of just
compensation with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board(DARAB). Despite the lapse of more three
years from the filing of the complaints DARAB failed and refused to render decision on the valuation of the land. Hence
two complaints for determination of just compensation were filed by the AFC and HPI before branch 2 of the regional trial
court of Tagum city( acting as a special agrarian court), which were subsequently consolidated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a just compensation on the land.
HELD: The plaintiffs have presented evidence to established the value of their properties. It may be admitted that plaintiffs
properties are agricultural, however it is simply beyond dispute that in going about the task of appraising real properties as
in the instant case, all the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings its improvements and capabilities,
may be shown and considered in estimating its value.
It is undeniable that plaintiffs agricultural landas borne out from the records hereof and remaining lots shows that
all weather roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing house and among numerous other improvements are
permanently in place and not just a measly but substantial amounts investment have been infused.
530
MANILA RAIL ROAD VS VELASQUEZ
FACTS: The property involved is situated in the municipality of San Pablo of Laguna. It contains 6208.7 square meters.
Apparently it first belonged to three owners latter transferred their rights to the Tayabas Land Company. The contest has
finally resolve itself into one between the Manila Railroad Company and the Tayabas Land Company.
ISSUE: whether or not the trial court is correct in determining the fair market value of the subject land.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agree with the trial court that both 8.50 and 5 per square meter, as determined by two
commission, was grossly excessive, but cannot agree with the Railroad Company that .51 per square meter is just
compensation.
The decision of the trial court fixing the value of the property at 5772 with interest at 6 percent per annum from
December 1, 1909, until the date of the last payment is affirmed.
531. BPI VS CA
FACTS: Banks of the Philippine Island filed for review on certiorari of the decision of the court of appeals in affirming on
toto that of the Regional Trial court, which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner BPI against private respondent
Benjamin C. Napiza for the collection of sum of money.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Napiza is liable under his warranties as a general indorser.
HELD: While it is true that private respondents having signed a blank withdrawal slip set in motion the events that resulted
in the withdrawal and encashment of the counterfeit check, the negligence of the petitioner personnel was the proximate
cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent , is that cause which
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause producing the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred.
533
National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992)
Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in violation of
deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of
right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the
common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process.
However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the
eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby
issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties.
The petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of
said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for
reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as
P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the
motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order
while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately
complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated
property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the petitioner was
deprived of due process of law.
Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding and after
due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount
of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent
judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit
the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional
value of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside
the temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.
534. BIGLANG AWA VS BACALLA
FACTS: The petitioner are the registered owners of a certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa Novaliches Quezon city.
The government needed to expropriate part of the aforementioned property of the petitioner for the construction of the
Mindanao Avenue.
Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic to submit documents to determine just compensation of
the property and failed to do so would give rise to an expropriation proceeding for the said property. Petitioner failed to
submit the said documents and thus the Republic through the Department of Public Works and Highways filed with the
RTC an expropriation suit for said properties.
Respondent deposited the amount for compensation of the properties of the petitioners thus the RTC issued a
writ of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the petitioners was violated by respondent Republic.
HELD: No. expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial
court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property pursuant to Section 2 of sais Rule , without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited.
535. Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620)
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in
Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP
refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and
already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the
republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
FACTS: This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order
No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20
June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the
laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new
name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering
the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress
and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private
lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized under
Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of
areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE
UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION
OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned contractor, disqualified
to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the
mine infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor,
through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is
not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than
expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and
shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just
compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide
for the payment of just compensation.
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private
respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the
expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42)
defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. The
complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at
Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321
square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the
parties failed to reach an agreement.
The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just
compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of
the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent
court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its
own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception
of evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an
expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
Ruling: Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared
for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing
Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to
the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own,
without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have
not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not
been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an
expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to
the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to
ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While
it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the
value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with
the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.
Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own
estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement
relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to
determine just compensation.
The defendants prayed for the modification of the condemnation-order, to exclude therefrom eight lots . One such
lot was the parcel of land, Lot 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017. Then, another motion was also filed by defendants, increasing
to sixteen the number of lots sought to be excluded from the condemnation-order. The lower court granted the
defendants motion and directed the exclusion of the enumerated 16 lots from the order of condemnation. The court
changed its stand and ordered the re-inclusion of Lot 6, Block 6 in the list of expropriable properties, declaring further that
the issues of the validity of the two sales and the propriety of the cancellation of the titles issued to the vendees should be
determined at the instance of the affected party or parties.
Punzalans once more applied to the court for the exclusion of the lot , and for the cancellation of the lispendens
notice at the back of their certificate of title. This motion was denied by the court , reasoning that to grant movants prayer
at that point would amount to prejudging the matter of the validity of their (movants) title to the land. The court issued
another order giving the government 30 days within which to initiate the necessary action to settle the question of the
Punzalans title over the property. When the given period elapsed without the governments making any move on the
premises, the Punzalans filed another motion in the expropriation case reiterating their prayer for the exclusion of the lot
from the condemnation order and for cancellation of the lispendens annotation on their title. The court denied movants
motion; ordered the lifting of its previous order , and declared itself possessed of authority to pass upon the issue raised in
that incident, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 69 3 of the Rules of Court. There was a lull in the proceeding in the
lower court , when the judge to whom the case was reassigned 4 issued an order disavowing jurisdiction over the
question of the validity of the subsequent sales of the lot, and directing its exclusion from the order of condemnation .
When its motion for reconsideration of this latest order was denied, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines came to this
Court by way of the present certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the sale
proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned.
RULING:
Must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of
the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation
case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
"SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to
be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff
can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made."
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the
properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming
jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain
should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.
Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court
taking cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan spouses by Antonio
Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money
will be paid to someone else.
541. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
[55 Phil. 776/ G.R. No. L-33545 March 7, 1931]
FACTS: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal on the 27th day of October,
1826. The plaintiff is a public corporation, with its central office in the City of Manila. It was organized under and by virtue
of Act No. 2832, for the purpose of furnishing an adequate water supply to the City of Manila and the nearby
municipalities. The purpose of the action was to secure the expropriation of the land of the defendants situated in the
municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal, with an area of 171.8861 hectares, more particularly described in Exhibits A
and B attached to the complaint. The plaintiff alleged that said land was necessary in the construction of the Angat
Waterworks System, and that a portion of said waterworks, to wit, the watershed, was definitely located by the plaintiff
over and through said land of the defendants.
Upon petition of the plaintiff the Court of First Instance of Rizal on October 27, 1926, fixed the provisional value of the land
at P2,000, and authorized the plaintiff to enter into and take possession of the land upon deposit of P2,000 with the
provincial treasurer of Rizal.
On November 9, 1926, the defendants answered, denying generally and specifically each and every allegation of the
complaint, and prayed that the same be dismissed with costs.
Tthe lower court rendered a judgment in accordance with the recommendation of the majority of the commissioners, fixing
the value of the land at P58,750.60 and the improvements at P15,1510, and ordered the plaintiff to pay said amounts to
the defendants with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date the plaintiff took possession of the land, with costs
against the plaintiff.
Both parties appealed. The plaintiff-appellant contends that the value of the land and improvements is grossly excessive,
exorbitant, unreasonable and unjust. On the other hand the defendants-appellants claim (1) that the value fixed by the
lower court is less than the actual value of said land and improvements, and (2) that they are also entitled to damages
equivalent to 6 per cent of the total value of the land and improvements.
During the pendency of this appeal, and on July 14, 1930 the Metropolitan Water District Board passed a resolution
requesting the Attorney-General to petition the proper court to quash these condemnation proceedings.
To said petition the defendants filed a vigorous opposition contending that it would be improper and unjust for this court to
set aside and quash all the proceedings had after five years of litigation, during which time the plaintiff has been in
possession of the land, and after the defendants have incurred heavy expenses and other troubles incident to a long
litigation. They also contend that at this stage of the case, after a judgment has been rendered and after both parties have
perfected their appeal, it is too late for the plaintiff to withdraw. The defendants, however, prayed that in case the plaintiff's
petition is granted, that the record be returned to the lower court for the determination of the damages which they may
have suffered by reason of these condemnation proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff or petitioner has the right to have the complaint dismissed.
HELD: The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with certain
well-defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he commenced was brought for the purpose of
enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity of which he later discovers no longer exists, or that the result of
the action would be different from what he had intended, then he should be permitted to withdraw the same, subject to the
approval of the court. The plaintiff should not be required to continue the action, subject to some well-defined exceptions,
when it is not to his advantage so to do. Litigation should be discouraged and not encouraged. Courts should not require
parties to litigate when they no longer desire so to do. Courts, in granting permission to dismiss an action, of course,
should always take into consideration the effect which said dismissal would have upon the rights of the defendants.
In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public
use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appearing
positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be
dismissed even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings
that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be
relieved from further annoyance or litigation. Therefore, in view of all of the facts of the record, we are forced to the
conclusion that the motion to dismiss the action should be, and is hereby granted.
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of the decision in G.R. No. L-6191, Republic of the Philippines vs. CiriloBaylosis, et al.,
promulgated January 31, 1955, sustaining the motions to dismiss of appellants and ordering the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings filed by the Republic of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to expropriate
seven lots formerly constituting part of the Lian Estate (Hacienda Lian) .
It appears that after the records were returned by the Supreme Court ( SC ) to the Court a quo, the plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to withdraw its preliminary deposit of P27,105.22 made pursuant to section 3,
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, and by virtue of which it was placed in the possession of parcels in question, on the ground
that whatever claims for damages the finality of the decision in G.R. No. L-6191, which made no pronouncement on nor
contained a reservation of defendants' right to claim damages. Defendants opposed the motion, claiming that their losses
and damages resulting from the transfer of the possession of their lands to plaintiff and which they alleged in their motions
to dismiss had not yet been determined by the trial court. Notwithstanding the opposition, the court below, ordered the
result of the deposit to plaintiff, for the reason that "the defendants have not taken any step towards the recovery of such
damages," nor "is there any assurance that they would do so in the immediate future, on the assumption that their right to
pursue such claim for damages is not barred by laches". Defendants accordingly moved for the reconsideration of such
order, and before their motion for reconsideration was resolved, also moved that their counterclaims for the damages be
set for hearing. Both motions were denied by the court; whereupon, defendants interposed the present appeal to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants can still prove and recover their damages in this same action.
RULING:
Yes.
In view of the antecedents, it cannot be said that appellants are now barred from proving their alleged in this case
simply because their right to do so had not been reserved in our decision in G.R. No. L-6191. The reservation had already
been made in the court below and duly approved therein; the reservation was not questioned by the Government, and it
did not appeal therefrom. As there was already that reservation, it was needless for appellants, to raise such matter on
appeal or ask for a reservation of their right to prove damages in our decision in G.R. No. L-6191. In a similar case
wherein agreed to the appointment of commissioners and presented evidence before them, upon the understanding that
said hearing was without prejudice to discussing later the question relative to the right to plaintiff to expropriate, we held
that the reservation was "very expressive in the sense that in the mind of the court, defendants never had the intention of
waiving that defense as otherwise it would not stated in its order such reservation. Such reservation negatives the idea of
waiver." (Republic vs. G.R. No. L-6161, May 28, 1954.) The reservation made by appellants and approved by the court in
this case can not be any less effective than the reservation in the Gabriel case.
FACTS:
The appellant herein is by the defendants from the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The action was
commenced to recover a balance of interest alleged to be due upon a mortgage indebtedness. The judgment awards to
plaintiff a portion of the interest claimed, holding that the remainder has become barred by the statute of limitations. From
this judgment only the defendants have appealed.
Antonio Enriquez executed a mortgage for P5,000 in favor of ObrasPias upon certain real estate . Said
mortgage, by express stipulation, bore interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. It is admitted that the interest was
paid by the mortgagor. Antonio Enriquez sold said real estate to defendant, Carmen de la Cavada, for P8,000, of which
P3,000 was paid in cash and, as to the remainder, the purchaser expressly assumed the mortgage debt and agreed to
pay the same. ObrasPias commenced an action to foreclose this mortgage. Neither the mortgagor nor Carmen de la
Cavada was made a party. The action was against the persons then owning the mortgaged premises or having some
interest therein. By a decision rendered , the foreclosure of the mortgage was decreed against the property to satisfy the
principal amount and interest for two years at 6 per cent, but without personal liability on the part of the defendant to pay
any deficiency judgment. Before the sale under the foreclosure, ObrasPias sold and transferred to the plaintiff all of its
right, title, and interest in and to said mortgage and in and to said mortgage and in and to the judgment of foreclosure
already referred to. The property was sold, pursuant to such judgment of foreclosure, and brought a sum sufficient to pay
the mortgage debt and the two years' interest, after deducting all costs and expenses. The plaintiff, standing in the shoes
of ObrasPias, commenced this action against Carmen de la Cavada and her husband to collect the deficiency between
the amount due upon the mortgage and the amount realized by the foreclosure sale.
So far as appears from the record the amount received from the property on foreclosure sale, less costs and
expenses of foreclosure, was the same sum which was found due to the plaintiff in the foreclosure action, namely,
P5,600, P5,000 being of principal and P600 being of interest. It was found upon the action of foreclosure when the case
was appealed to this court that the defendants, being third persons within the mortgage law, were not responsible for
interest upon the principal except for the two years immediately prior to the time the action was commenced. This, then, is
an action to recover interest only, being the interest on the mortgage debt from 1881 down to the beginning of the two
years for which interest was allowed in the foreclosure action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action to recover mortgage debt has prescribed.
RULING:
The conclusions having been reached that article 1964 of the Civil Code is applicable to the present case and that
the period of prescription had not been interrupted except upon the date on which the ObrasPias presented its complaint,
it is undeniable that the action in the present case has prescribed, particularly the annual interest corresponding to the
years from the 30th of May, 1881, to the 23rd of December, 1890, these years being prior to the fifteen-year period which
began on the 23rd of December, 1890, and continued until the 23rd of December, 1905, on which date the complaint was
presented. The defendants, Carmen de la Cavada and Francisco Enriquez, are therefore obliged to pay to the plaintiffs in
this action the interest on said sum from the 23rd day of December, 1890, until the 30th day of January, 1909, inasmuch
as the land was sold by the sheriff on the 31st day of January, 1911, and only so much of the interest was paid as was
included in the last two years prior to such sale, or from the 31st day of January, 1909, to the 31st day of January, 1911.
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed this action before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to foreclose the mortgage executed
by defendants covering two parcels of land situated in the same province. Defendants, after having been duly served with
summons, filed a motion to dismiss, which was sustained, but, on appeal, this Court set aside the sustaining order and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in a foreclosure mortgage , the mortgage debtor and the person to whom it is sold must be both
made defendants in the suit.
RULING:
Yes. In a foreclosure of mortgage if the encumbered property is sold to another person, the mortgage debtor, as
well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be made defendants in the suit.
We agree with the trial court that said purchasers are necessary parties to this action. This is clear from Section 1,
Rule 70, of the Rules of Court which provides that "All persons having or claiming an interest in the premises subordinate
in right to that of the holder of the mortgage . . . shall be made defendants in the action." And this Court has held that if the
mortgaged property is sold to another person, the mortgage debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be
made defendants.
FACTS:
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant Marceliano Reynoso to foreclose the second real estate
mortgage which the latter executed in his favor. In the complaint La Urbana was joined as defendant because it has a first
mortgage on the same real property executed by the said Reynoso.
After trial, judgment was rendered ordering Reynoso to pay La Urbana, and to pay De la Riva. Reynoso
appealed.
But in his appeal he contends that his demurrer, based on the misjoinder of La Urbana as defendant because the
plaintiff was without right to join it as defendant being a first mortgages, should have been sustained; that he neither
applied for the loan from the La Urbana nor executed the mortgage deed with full knowledge of the facts and of the deed
which he executed, and that his cross complaint against the said party should have been granted. Reynoso died during
the trial of the case; and at the instance of his judicial administrator, the appeal against the plaintiff was dismissed, leaving
only the pending appeal against La Urbana.
The administrator-appellant argues that La Urbana cannot be joined in plaintiff's complaint because it was the first
mortgagee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not La Urbana cannot be joined in plaintiffs complaint.
RULING:
No. It is true that section 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure only requires the inclusion in the complaint for
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage of the second mortgagee or of any other person claiming a right or interest
subordinate to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed; but it will be noted that there is no provision in said Code prohibiting
the joinder of a first mortgagee in a complaint filed by the second mortgagee for the same purpose. And the prohibition is
even less justified where, as in the present case, the joinder of the first mortgagee was with the latter's consent and
conformity. We see no good reason to hold that in a suit to foreclose a real estate mortgage, the second mortgagee
cannot join the first mortgagee as defendant, with the latter's consent and when the principal obligation or the terms of the
mortgage had become due and payable.
FACTS:
These are two consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court ( SC ) seeking to annul the decisions of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in G.R. No. 68257 dated June 6, 1984,
respectively. The two decisions both upheld the validity of the levy made on two properties whose ownership is claimed by
petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the value of said properties are far in excess of the amount of the liens thereon.
The decisions are based on the ground that what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but
only the vendor's equity of redemption. The petitioner also asks that the resolutions of the appellate court denying its
motions for reconsideration be set aside.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that "because
the private respondent through the sheriff could not have levied on the properties but only on the right of redemption or
equity of redemption thereon, there could not have been an over-levy sufficient to justify a quashal of the notice of levy on
attachment on the properties claimed by the petitioner."
RULING:
We, therefore, hold that the appellate court did not commit any error in ruling that there was no over-levy on the
disputed properties. What was actually attached by respondents was Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption,
an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither be quantified nor equated with the actual value of the
properties upon which it may be exercised.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 67496 and G.R. No. 68257 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decisions of the respondent court are AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
Private respondent instituted a civil case as mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting to P8.5 million obtained by
petitionerfrom Intercon. In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage private respondent sought the foreclosure of (4)
parcelsof land mortgaged by petitioner to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. (Intercon), which was granted by the CA. On
September 6, 1994, private respondent was declared the highest bidder during the auction sale and the Certificate of Sale
issued in itsfavor was registered on October 21, 1994. In opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession,
petitioner filed aMotion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept Redemption on May 2, 1995 ,invoking for the very first
time its alleged rightto redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 (General Banking Act).
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 provides that in case of a foreclosure of amortgage in favor of a bank, banking or
creditinstitution, whether judicially or extrajudicially, the mortgagor shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the
realestate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the property.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner had the right of redemption or equity of redemption over subject properties.
RULING:
From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo , petitioner has been adjudged to have was only the
equityof redemption over subject properties. The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage - understood in the sense of
aprerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale - exists only in the case of
theextrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only where
themortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution. Where a mortgage is foreclosed
extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the
sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale.In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner to invoke a
right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A.No. 337. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to the beneficial provisions of
the said law -since private respondents predecessor-in-interest is a credit institution - is in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which should have been averred in petitioners answer to the complaint for judicial foreclosure.There then
existed only what is known as the equity of redemption, which is simply the right of the petitioner to extinguishthe
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
judgmentbecame final. There being an explicit finding on the part of the CA - that the petitioner failed to exercise its equity
of redemption within the prescribed period, redemption can no longer be effected.
FACTS:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and MarcelinaAquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela
(sincedeceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. Themortgages were registered. Two of the lots, those covered
byTCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were afterwards sold by theAquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation,
whichcaused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificatesof title.Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money
judgment againstButuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in Court of FirstInstance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the
lots coveredby TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 were levied upon on and soldat public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder
for the sumof P517,485.41.On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and issued to Limpin. Limpin sold
the two lots to Rogelio M.Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and285451 were cancelled on November
4, 1983, and TCTS werereplaced in Sarmiento's name.Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicialforeclosure
of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots.Judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgmentbecame final, the
Trial Court, directed the sale at publicauction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment.The 4 lots, including those
formerly covered by TCTs Nos.92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself whose bid wasthe highest and exactly
correspond to the judgment debt. Onthe same day, the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered.Ponce then moved for
the confirmation of the sale and theissuance of a writ of possession in his favor covering the fourlots. But the Trial Court
confirmed only the sale of the lotscovered by TCTs Nos. 02839 and 92840, refusing to confirmthe sale or issue a writ of
possession in regard to the lotscovered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground thatthose titles had already been
cancelled and new ones issuedto Gregorio F. Limpin.Limpin refused to participate in the hearings contending thatthe
Court had no jurisdiction over his person; but he didcomment that the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTsNos. 92836
and 92837 had been released by Ponce by virtueof a "Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage". The Trial Courtdenied
Ponce's motion for reconsideration, whereupon hesought corrective relief by filing a special civil action forcertiorari and
mandamus in the Intermediate AppellateCourt, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, as privaterespondents.IAC set aside
the judgment of the Trial Court and issue a writof possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject toSarmiento's equity
of redemption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IAC erred in according superiority to themortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of
Limpin and the subsequent sale to Sarmiento.
RULING:
NO. The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of asubsequent judgment creditor is now expressly provided
inRule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, whichstates with regard to the effect of levy on execution that itshall
create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over theright title and interest of the judgment debtor in suchproperty at the
time of the levy, subject to the liens orencumbrances then existing.Using jurisprudence in Santiago v Dionisio, the Court in
that case held that: ... [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both is to
render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the "unforeclosed equity
of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit. (Ibid; 2 Moran's Rules of Court, 3rd ed., p.
239)
FACTS:
The spouses Patricio and Angelina Reyes were the registered owners of a residential house and lot . The spouses Reyes
sold said mortgaged property to herein petitioners who all assumed the mortgage with the knowledge and consent of the
mortgagee bank, pursuant to a "deed of sale with assumption of mortgage." However, said deed was not annotated at the
back of the title of the mortgaged property nor registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Petitioners failed to fully pay the loan as it fell due, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed by the
mortgagee bank, and the property was sold at public auction to Alfredo Garcia.
Petitioners offered to redeem the property. The City Sheriff and the Pasay City Development Bank refused to
issue in favor of petitioners a certificate of redemption and deed of conveyance over the property. Petitioners filed a
petition for mandamus. The court a quo denied the petition. The IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court; hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are redemptions or successors-in-interest in contemplation of Sec. 6 of Act No.
3135 and related rules under the Rules of Court.
RULING:
The sale of a mortgaged property at public auction by reason of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is governed by
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Under the cited law, a right of redemption is granted to the debtor, his
successor-in-interest or any judicial creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the
mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, within a period of one (1) year from the date of the sale: and
such redemption is governed by Sections 29, 30 and 31. Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The matter of redemption is wholly statutory. Only such persons can redeem from an execution sale as are authorized to
do so by statute.
In determining whether a person is included within the terms of a redemption statute, the principle is stated to be that, if
one is in privity in title with the mortgagor, and he has such an interest that he would be a loser by the foreclosure, he may
redeem. Redemption is proper where made by debtors, grantee, or assignee for the benefit of creditors, or assignee or
trustee in insolvency proceedings. In Gorospe vs. Santos , the Court, citing Magno vs. Viola and Sotto, said: We held in
Magno v. Viola that the successor-in-interest includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of
redemption; or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption; or one
who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law; or one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the
property sold; or the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's
title passes to her.
In the instant case, the petitioners, as the assignees or transferees of all the rights of the original debtors, i.e., spouses
Patricio and Angelina Reyes, over the subject property by virtue of a "deed of sale with assumption of mortgage" may
validly exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-interest" of said debtors.
FACTS:
This is an action involving a disputed assessment for deficiencies in the payment of creditable withholding tax and
documentary stamps tax due from a foreclosure sale.
Respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) granted loans to George C. Co, Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc.,
and Tesco Realty Co. . When the latter later failed to pay their loans, UCPB filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgaged properties.
UCPB presented the certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds of Manila for annotation on the transfer certificates of title
of the foreclosed properties. The bank paid creditable withholding taxes (CWT) and documentary stamp taxes (DST) in
relation to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), however, charged UCPB with late payment of the corresponding DST
and CWT. These taxes accrued upon the lapse of the redemption period of the mortgaged properties. The CIR pointed
out that the mortgagor, a juridical person, had three months after foreclosure within which to redeem the properties.
The CIR theorized that the three-month redemption period was to be counted from the date of the foreclosure sale. Here,
he said, the redemption period lapsed three months. Thus, UCPB was in default for having paid the CWT and DST
UCPB protested the assessment issued by the CIR. It claimed that the redemption period lapsed on June 1, 2002 or three
months after the executive judge of Manila approved the issuance of the certificate of sale. Foreclosure under Section 47
of the General Banking Law, said UCPB, referred to the date of approval by the executive judge, and not the date of the
auction sale. But the CIR denied UCPBs protest, prompting UCPB to file a petition for review with the CTA .
The CTA Second Division set aside the decision of the CIR .Hence, UCPBs payments of CWT and
DST in early July were well within the prescribed period. On appeal to the CTA En Banc in CTA EB 234, the latter
affirmed the decision of the Second Division. With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner has taken
recourse to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three-month redemption period for juridical persons should be reckoned from the date of
the auction sale.
RULING:
No.
On August 15, 2008, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular 58-2008 which
clarified among others, the time within which to reckon the redemption period of real estate mortgages. It reads:
For purposes of reckoning the one-year redemption period in the case of individual mortgagors, or the three-month
redemption period for juridical persons/mortgagors, the same shall be reckoned from the date of the confirmation of the
auction sale which is the date when the certificate of sale is issued.
The CIR must have in the meantime conceded the unreasonableness of the previous position it had taken on this matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by LeoncioBarrameda against the
respondents.
LeoncioBarrameda was the registered owner of three parcels of land which he mortgaged to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). Because of his failure to pay the indebtedness when it became due, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgage. In the auction sale, the DBP was the highest bidder. Barrameda failed to redeem the land. Soon thereafter
the DBP sold the property to Carmen Gontang and Rodolfo General.
In the meanwhile, Gontang and General, requested the DBP to deliver to them the possession of the land. Pursuant to
this request, the DBP filed an ex parte petition in the Court of First Instance. A writ of possession was issued to install the
DBP in possession of the property and to eject therefrom all adverse occupants, including LeoncioBarrameda and
FidelaTerrero. The writ was not served for failure of the DBP to pay the sheriff's fee. An alias writ was subsequently
issued and by virtue of this alias writ, the DBP, represented by its successors-in-interest, Gontang and General, took
possession of the land. But because of the repeated attempts of LeoncioBarrameda, through his armed men, to re-enter
the land and get the landowner's share of the harvest, Gontang and General asked for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction to enjoin Barrameda and his men from disturbing them in their possession of the land. After due hearing, the
court issued a preliminary injunction against Barrameda. The latter's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not preliminary injunction is proper.
RULING:
Yes.
The petition below for preliminary injunction filed by Gontang and General (Civil Case 5700 of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur) alleges that despite their possession, the petitioner herein has repeatedly attempted to
intrude into the premises; that through the aid of armed men he forcibly took the owner's share of the harvest; that he
threatened to re-enter the property and get the landowner's share of the coming harvest; and that the continuance of such
illegal acts would work grave and irreparable damage and prejudice to the rights of the landowner. The trial court found
these allegations well-founded, and, upon the filing of a written obligation by Gontang and General, issued the preliminary
injunction in question. This action of the court is perfectly proper. In Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280, this Court declared:
In the American system of procedure, from which provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to injunction are
taken, the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect the owner of the land, being in possession,
from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger, as where a person who has no right to enter from time to time,
cut wood, or carry other products. The intermittent nature of such acts, and the probability, not to say certainty, of
repetition in the future, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting
of the equitable remedy. (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 3d ed. Vol. 4, sec. 135).
552-590 MISSING
591.
RTHUR BARANDA, et al., petitioners, vs. NORBERTO PADIOS, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. L-61371 October 21, 1987]
FACTS: A complaint for ejectment, with prayer for temporary restraining order, was filed by private respondents Roberto
Padios, et al., as plaintiffs, and petitioners Rogelio Sorioso et al., as defendants, before the municipal court of Barotac
Viejo, Iloilo. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were among nine (9) tenants of a 33-hectare parcel of land belonging to
the Philippine National Bank situated in Barrio Vista Alegre, Anilao, Iloilo, each of whom occupying and cultivating portions
of the land ranging from 4.5 hectares to 3/4 hectares in area, aggregating a total of 20 hectares, more or less, devoted to
rice and corn; that their possession of the area claimed by them were recognized and sanctioned by an order of the Court
of Agrarian Relations of Iloilo. The defendants by means of force and intimidation forcibly dispossessed plaintiffs of the
areas cultivated by them. The municipal court issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order, enjoining the defendants
from interfering and disturbing the peaceful possession of their respective areas. Defendants then filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the case involved agricultural tenancy and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the municipal
court, and that a case was pending before the Court of Agrarian Relations involving the same subject matter, the same
parties and issues, the very case cited by plaintiffs in their complaint; defendants further prayed for the dissolution of the
temporary restraining order. The municipal court ordered the complaint temporarily dismissed and lifted the temporary
restraining order, but on motion of the plaintiffs the court reconsidered said order and reinstated the competent together
with the temporary restraining order. Hence, the defendants filed the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition
and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether the municipal court has jurisdiction over a forcible entry and detainer case involving agricultural tenants.
HELD:The Court of Agrarian Relations has exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to try the case.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that said
rule shall not apply to cases covered by the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
592.
FRANCISCO LU, complainant, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO, et al., respondents
[A.M. MTJ-99-1199. July 6, 2000]
FACTS: In his administrative complaint, Francisco Lu alleges that he filed an Answer with Counterclaim to the Amended
Complaint for ejectment which was later amended. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the ejectment case on the
ground that plaintiffs therein were no longer the owners of the land in question, the same having been sold to the
Shahanis and later transferred in the names of the latter under TCT No. 202393. Respondent Judge Siapno rendered
judgment against Lu which decision was allegedly received by Lu's counsel.
While on appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan issued a preliminary mandatory injunction and
declared the writ of execution earlier issued by the MTC-Urdaneta, Pangasinan to be null and void.RTC rendered
judgment modifying the MTC-judgment by deleting the paragraph "(I)n accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution
be issued." Hence, Lu filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion for
Execution with MTC which was granted by respondent Judge Siapno granted allegedly without notice and hearing.
Plaintiff filed an Ex-parte Motion to Withdraw deposit praying that the amount deposited in the municipal treasurer be
withdrawn in order to satisfy the judgmentfiled a Motion for Special Demolition. Said motions were granted by Respondent
Judge without notice and hearing. Hence, this complaint for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, abdication
of official function and gross misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge is correct in issuing a writ of execution without notice and hearing.
HELD:Respondent Judge Siapno is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he rendered judgment providing, in the
dispositive portion, for its immediate execution. It should be noted that the Regional Trial Court, while affirming the
judgment of the respondent Judge, nevertheless deleted that portion of the decision providing for immediate execution.
Basic is the rule that a judge may not order execution of judgment in the decision itself. Section 21 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure likewise provides that the decision of the regional trial court is immediately executory. Even if
immediately executory, there must first be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for that purpose. In an ejectment
case, the adverse party is entitled to notice before execution can be ordered. In disregarding the rules and settled
jurisprudence, respondent Judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. The lack of
malicious intent, however, cannot completely free respondent Judge from liability. When the law is elementary, so
elementary not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
593.
ANDRES DY and GLORIA DY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991]
FACTS: PrivaterespondentRAMON V. ROXAS filed a complaint for ejectment of petitioners from his property in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. Summons was issued requiring petitioners to answer within ten (10)
days from notice pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Petitioners filed their answer thereto to which private respondent filed a reply. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises in
question and to peacefully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs to pay the monthly rentals. An appeal therefrom
was interposed by petitioners to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and the RTC affirmed the decision appealed.
An ex-parte motion for immediate execution of judgment was filed by the private respondent in the inferior court. It was
granted on the same day and on the following day, respondent sheriff, assisted by several policemen and other persons,
ejected petitioners from the premises by throwing out all their belongings into the street and turning over possession of the
premises to private respondent.
ISSUE(S): May such a judgment or order of the regional trial court be immediately executed even before a copy thereof
was served on the losing party?
HELD: No.Given a judgment or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding, if no appeal therefrom had been
interposed within the reglementary period, execution shall issue as a matter of right. There should be proof of service of a
copy of said judgment or order on the parties to determine if the period of appeal had lapsed, before a motion of execution
thereof may be granted and implemented.
It is clear that a judgment or order of a Regional Trial Court which disposes of the action or proceeding must be served on
the losing party before the same may be considered immediately executory. While an ex-parte motion for issuance of a
writ of execution thereof may be filed in the proper court, such motion must be supported by a proof of service of the
judgment or order on the losing party. This will enable the losing party to take any appropriate steps to protect his
interests when warranted. The losing party is entitled to such notice as an essential requirement of due process;
otherwise, the entire proceedings leading to the execution of the judgment may be nullified and set aside.
594.
AliciaT. Kaw vs. Judge Casiano P. Anunciacion, Jr., et al.
[A.M. No. MTJ-93-811 March 1, 1995]
FACTS: Alicia T. Kaw,filed a complaint charging the respondents with grave misconduct, incompetence, and partiality.The
charges stemmed from an ejectment case filed by the Italy Marketing Corporation (IMC) against complainant's husband,
George L. Kaw. It appears that for more than twenty (20) years, George Kaw had leased from Margarita Manalo a unit of
a building located at 648-650 Padre Rada Street, Tondo, Manila where he conducted his business under the name
"PocketSaver's Mart and Bakeshop."
On May 20, 1989, IMC sent a letter to Kaw, informing him of its acquisition of the building and demanding that Kaw vacate
the premises. Several demands followed, the latest of which was made on February 15, 1990. As Kaw refused to leave,
IMC filed an ejectment suit. The summons, with a copy of the complaint, was served on Kaw ordering him to file his
answer.Kaw nonetheless filed a motion for extension of 15 days and another motion for extension of ten (10) days to file
his answer.
Respondent judge did not act on the two motions and rendered a decision ordering Kaw to vacate the premises. Alicia
Kaw alleges that she and her husband received the respondent judge's decision and that immediately, the following day,
they were served a copy of the writ of execution by respondent sheriff and evicted from the premises. Their personal
properties, consisting of tools and equipment used in business were levied upon and later sold at an auction sale.
Complainant contends that the issuance of the writ of execution was improper.
ISSUE(S):
1) Whether or not a motion for extension is allowed under the Rule on Summary Procedure;
2) Whether or not the issuance of the writ of execution without prior notice to complainant is proper.
HELD:
No. Complainant cannot dispute the fact that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was duly served on her
husband, George Kaw, with a warning that he should file his Answer within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice under the Rule on Summary Procedure. A motion for extension is in fact a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
On the issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent judge is liable for issuing an order of execution when no prior
notice of the motion for execution had been given to complainant's husband. The record shows that IMC filed an "Ex Parte
Motion for Execution" and that the same day respondent judge granted it. The following day complainant and her family
were ejected. The writ of execution may only be issued by the court in ejectment cases after notice to the adverse party
and if the rents have not been paid or deposited by him. Indeed, that the MeTC's decision in ejectment cases is
immediately executory does not mean that notice of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary.
595.
BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner, vs. Judge CARLOS Y. GONZALES, et al, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-44806 March 31, 1977]
FACTS: The city court of Iloilo ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an apartment in a building owned by Juanita Pea and
to pay a monthly rental. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged that he had been occupying the
apartment since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment; that the commissioner's report on the alleged
dilapidated condition of the building was not set for hearing, that he occupied the apartment as residence and for use as a
carinderiawhich allegedly was his sole means of livelihood, and that he should be given a preference to reoccupy the
apartment after the completion of the repairs. The city court denied the motion.Juanito Pea, the owner of the apartment,
filed a motion for immediate execution of the city court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file a
supersedeas bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the apartment.
Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that the execution was improper because he had
deposited in court the current rentals. The lower court denied the motion and issued a writ of execution.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court's judgment pending appeal.
HELD: Yes, the lower court committed a patent error in ordering execution of the city court's judgment on the ground that
Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged
in the city court's judgment. The attorney's fees need not be covered by a supersede as bond. Once's timely deposit of the
rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976 stayed the execution of the judgment pending appeal. In such a
situation, no supersedeas bond was required to stay execution of the city court's judgment. Consequently, the order of
execution was groundless. Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rule of Court requires a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued
rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to time.
The execution proceeding already mentioned is void.
596.
JESUS C. JAKIHACA, petitioner, vs. SPS. LILIA AQUINO and APOLONIO AQUINO, JOSE TORALDE, and HON.
EMMA CENIDOZA-ONA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 83982 January 12, 1990]
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino,
and Jose Toralde before the Municipal Trial Court on account of the latter's refusal to remove their houses which they
have allegedly illegally constructed without the knowledge and consent and against the will of the former on a residential
land despite verbal demand.
Initially, the matter was referred to the Barangay for conciliation processes pursuant to the requirements of P.D. No. 1508.
But due to repeated refusal of respondents to appear before the Barangay Lupon, the Lupon Chairman and Secretary
thereafter issued a "certification to file action."
The defendants contend that there was a verbal contract of tenancy between the defendants and the former owner of the
land in question which they planted to fruit bearing trees and devoted the same primarily to rice and corn products, and so
therefore, they cannot be ejected under the Land Reform Law more particularly P.D. No. 1 from this land which they had
occupied and cultivated for more than ten (10) years with the consent of the former owner Gloria Gener. In addition, they
said that there is no showing that the case was first brought to the attention of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for
certification that this case is proper for trial before said Court.
ISSUE(S): Whether the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes.It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. We frown upon the undesirable
practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
exception thereto, they instead invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it.
What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon that premise,
petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129. Summary
procedures have no application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court.
597.
Sps. MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA, et al, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Sps.
ARTURO REFUGIA and AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 118284. July 5, 1996]
FACTS: Sps.Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are the registered owners of a parcel of land and a duplex
apartment building constructed thereon located at as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title. Said title was issued
pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on in favor of respondent Arturo Refugia, but the purchase price was
reportedly advanced by his father, herein petitioner MamertoRefugia. Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia obtained a
housing loan from the Social Security System, using the land as collateral to secure payment thereof. After the
construction of the duplex apartment building, herein petitioners immediately began to occupy one door while respondents
stayed in the other unit.
Petitioners were told by private respondents to vacate the unit that they were occupying because, according to private
respondents, the family of one of their children who is married needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to leave,
claiming that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the fact that it was actually MamertoRefugia who bought
the lot on which the duplex apartment stood. Because of this, the matter was brought before the barangay court of
conciliation. No amicable settlement having been reached between the parties, private respondents instituted an action for
ejectment with the MTC.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower court by declaring
herein petitioners and private respondents co-owners of the lot and the two-door apartment. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, private respondents duly filed a petition for review before respondent Court of
Appeals. Said respondent court declared that the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an
ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the issue of ownership and to declare herein petitioners as co-owners
because its power is limited only to a determination of the issue of possession; that petitioners bare allegation of
ownership cannot prevail over the transfer certificate of title and deed of sale in favor of private respondents; and that
petitioners have been occupying the subject premises by mere tolerance.
ISSUE:Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer.
HELD: Yes. The Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the question of ownership.
With the enactment of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if
the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification
that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In other words,
the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the
case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.
598.
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION, et al, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. 97637 April 10, 1992]
RAMON QUE, SOUTHERN SALES CORP. and HENRY TAN, petitioners, vs. Judge RICARDO M. ILARDE, et al.,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 98700-01 April 10, 1992]
FACTS:Wilmon was the lessee of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a registered land owned in common by
the Lacsons, Solinap, and Jarantilla. The leases were embodied in deeds wherein one of the clauses provided for a
reservation of rightsthe seller has the right to encumber or sell the property provided that the transferee would respect
the lease of Wilmon. On a relevant date, after the expiration of the lease period, the premises were sold to Star Group
Resources and Development. The latter instituted an action for unlawful detainer against Wilmon. Wilmon impugned
Stars right to eject them. It alleges that its right of preemption has been violated, as well as their leasehold rights, and that
it was denied the option to extend the lease. These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with the RTC. In
the unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed against some of the lessees but not
with the others. The lessees filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and the
RTC held in the end that the pendency of the case in the RTC didn't warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer case
with the MTC.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee should be abated or suspended
by an action filed in the RTC by the defendant lessee on the claim that he is entitled to a right of pre-emption.
HELD:An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based on a tenants claim of his right of
preemption was violated. The actions in the RTC didn't involve physical possession and on not a few occasions, that the
case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding. In forcible entry and lawful detainer
cases, "the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding that issue of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and Municipal
Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership only to determine the issue
of possession."
599.
FELIPE NACORDA and LUZ NACORDA, petitioners, vs. Judge NICASIO YATCO, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. L-19520 August 12, 1966]
FACTS:J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc., sued Fernando Castro to recover possession of a parcel of land with an area of about
100 square meters, included within a larger parcel covered by a transfer certificate of title in the plaintiff's name. The
complaint alleged that the defendant entered into such possession unlawfully and without the plaintiff's consent, and
prayed that Castro be ejected. Judge NicasioYatcopresiding, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The said judgment
became final, and a writ of execution was issued, followed by an order for the demolition of the house situated on the
land.
Sps. Felipe Nacorda and Luz Nacorda, alleging that they had just learned of the proceedings abovementioned, filed a
petition praying that the writ of execution and demolition be lifted on the ground that they were the owners of the land and
the house, having acquired said land by virtue of a series of transfers from the original owner, a certain Agustin de Torres,
and that Fernando Castro, defendant in the case, was merely a tenant of theirs. The petition was denied by Judge Yatco.
After the denial of their petition, the spouses Nacorda filed a separate action against J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. in the branch
presided by Judge HermogenesCaluag, asking that they be declared the owners of the same properties and that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the execution of the judgment in the previous case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for injunction is proper to prevent enforcement of a judgement that has already
become final and executory.
HELD: It is not proper. Injunction is an ancillary writ and cannot be resorted to for the purpose of preventing the
enforcement of a judgment that has already become final, except possibly in a proper action to annul such judgment. The
validity of the judgment insofar as the parties therein are concerned, is not and has never been questioned: what
petitioners seek is to prevent its execution on the ground that they are the owners of the property involved therein. This
question of ownership is not litigated before Us in the instant petition; and the bare claim of petitioners on this point is
certainly no reason to obstruct the judgment duly rendered in a case against another party, especially considering that the
question in that case was merely one of possession. Indeed, petitioners have filed the proper reivindicatory action, and
they should pursue their remedy there to its logical conclusion.
Facts:
On September 3, 1973, private respondents Pablo Quijol, Abediano Gaanan, and Constancio Bondal, filed an
action for forcible entry against Felomino Ramirez and Rustico Valdez with the Municipal Court of Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro, to recover possession of a portion of Lot 654 of the Bongabong Cadastre, situated in Barrio Anilao, Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro. The defendants, petitioners herein, filed an answer ,asserting that Felomino Ramirez is the owner of the
land occupied by them while the defendant Rustico Valdez is his tenant.Wherefore, they prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to vacate that portion of Lot 654 unlawfully occupied and possessed by them and to pay the defendants
reasonable damages.On September 15, 1973, the defendants filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, which the court granted upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00.
On September 16, 1975, the court rendered judgment in favor of FELOMINO RAMIREZ and RUSTICO VALDEZ.
The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal without, however, submitting the corresponding appeal bond, so that on
November 10, 1975, the respondent municipal judge ordered them to submit the bond. The plaintiffs failed to comply with
the said order.
On March 18, 1976, the defendants filed a motion with the Municipal Court praying that the judgment be entered
and that a writ of execution be issued. The said court denied the motion.Consequently, the defendants filed a petition for
mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro to compel the respondent municipal judge to issue the writ
of execution prayed for. But the court denied the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judge of first instance to hold the execution of the judgment was
issued without jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes. The Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro had not acquired appellate jurisdiction because the
appellants therein (now private respondents) failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period. Well settled is
rule that if a party does not perfect his appeal within the time prescribed by law, the appellate court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Hence, the order of the respondent judge of first instance, dated February 23, 1976, directing the respondent
Municipal Judge of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro to hold the execution of the judgment rendered to await the outcome of
Civil Case No. R-436, was issued without jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders, dated February 23, October 7, and March 24, 1976, all
issued in Civil Case No. R-184 of the Municipal Court of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, are hereby annulled and set aside.
Facts:
The late Francisco Guballa, Sr. was the registered owner of a parcel of land, located at Hidalgo St., Quiapo,
Manila under TCT No. 15638 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, together with improvements existing thereon, consisting
of a building known as the Bulaklak Building. Guballa Sr. used to own and operate Bulaklak Publications housed in the
ground and mezzanine floors of said building. After cessation of Guballa Sr.'s business operations BUSCOPE LABOR
UNION, instituted a complaint for non-payment of separation pay against BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS and/or Francisco
Guballa, Sr. After hearing, judgment was rendered in favor of BUSCOPE and against BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS.The
NLRC issued a writ of execution and levied upon Gubalia's property and subsequently sold the same at public auction in
favor of BUSCOPE as highest bidder.
On July 7, 1976, and within the period of redemption, a motion for the annulment of the certificate of sale issued
in favor of BUSCOPE was filed in NLRC and, a Notice of Lis Pendens was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 15638.
However, despite the pendency of said motion, a Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of BUSCOPE over subject
property.
On March 10, 1978, BUSCOPE's President Amado Pagsanjan sold the said property to Atty. Rufino Risma but
without annotating his acquired rights thereon, in TCT No. 15638.
On June 26, 1979, an action for the issuance of a writ of possession of property covered by TCT No. 15638 was
filed by the Risma spouses against Guballa Sr. at the CFI of Manila, Branch XXXIV.In his answer Guballa Sr. prayed for
the dismissal of the case. The prayer for dismissal was denied in the Order of the lower court. On June 19, 1982, subject
property was sold by Guballa Sr. to Guballa Marketing.
On July 26, 1982, a decision was rendered granting the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject property
in favor of the private respondents spouses Risma.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all motions were all denied and instead party-appellant Guballa Sr., et al. was
ordered to be substituted by the present owner. Petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. did not comply with the aforesaid
resolutions.
A motion for reconsideration of the latter resolution was filed by private respondents Risma and on December 9,
1986, the appeal was dismissed for failure of appellant to comply with the resolution dated November 12, 1985.
From said dismissal, petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. filed a motion for reconsideration dated January 2, 1987 which
was however denied.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of party-appellant to be substituted by a transferee pendente lite is not a proper ground
for the dismissal of the appeal?
Held: Yes.
It has been held that a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be
bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and
still be binding on the transferee (Association de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88
SCRA 462 [1979]). More specifically, this Court has ruled that a transferee pendente lite is a proper party in the case but it
is not an indispensable party Fetalino vs. Sanz, 44 Phil, 691 [1923]; Jose vs. Blue, 42 SCRA 361 [1971]; Tanchoco vs.
Quino, 154 SCRA 18 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED.
Facts:
On 2 May 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch I for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages.
On 28 June 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with the City Court of
Davao City for forcible entry over the same parcel of land.Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to
order defendant-petitioner to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the former.
In a motion to dismiss dated 13 July 1968, defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
entry but the City Court denied the said motion.
On 12 December 1968, defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the forcible
entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs-respondents' evidence for the following day. On 16 January
1969 the same court rendered its decision the defendant to vacate the premises in question and deliver possession
thereof to the plaintiffs
Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of 29 November 1968 denying his
motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and also the decision of 16 January 1969. However, his motion was
denied in the City Court order of 4 March 1969.
Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for
the issuance of an order for the immediate execution of the City Court decision of 16 January 1969. On 29 July 1969, the
court a quo denied the motion to dismiss of 5 July 1969 for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the immediate
execution of the City Court judgment. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal dismissed,
defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that the lower court
Issue: Whether or not the lower acquired jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the verification of the corresponding
complaint being void?
Held:
Yes. Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly referred to the allegations in the
complaint as having been read by him. However, while he stated that "they are true and correct," he omitted to state that
said conclusion was reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically inferable since affiant was a
party and it does not appear that he was verifying upon information and belief. If petitioner entertained doubt about the
true character of the verification, he should have asked that it be made more definite.
Moreover, even if we should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not render the complaint for
forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several decisions that the
requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal.
While it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of Court requires the verification of the complaint for
forcible entry, the insufficiency of the same, or its being defective, is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the City Court or that of
the court a quo to which the case was later appealed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the same are hereby affirmed, with costs
against defendant-petitioner.
Facts:
Private respondent Rudy Velayo Inc. (Velayo) was ordered, in the interest of substantial justice and in avoidance
of multiplicity of suits, to pay petitioner, Commander Realty, Inc. (Commander), reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased premises of P15,000. 00 from 4 September 1980 to 4 September 1983; P20,000.00 from 4
September 1983 to 4 September 1985; and P25,000.00 from 4 September 1985 to 30 November 1987, the date that
Velayo vacated the leased premises.
Velayo now brings to the attention of the Court that the issue of rentals from 4 September 1980 to 4 September
1985 had already been laid to rest by the Court of when it fixed said rentals at P10,000.00 monthly. Further, Velayo
contends that there is no factual basis for the award of P25,000.00 rental from 4 September 1985 to 30 November 1987
as it had not yet filed its Answer in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the further damages in the sum of Pl-M be denied it being that its cause of action is one for
unlawful detainer and not for damages.
Held:
Yes.
The dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be reconsidered, therefore, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, Rudy Velayo Inc. is hereby ordered to pay a monthly rental of P20,000.00 from 5 September 1985
to 30 November 1987, with interest at the legal rate from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Facts:
The petitioners and the respondent entered into a contract of lease over the former's property for the expressed
period of three years beginning March 1, 1977. On January 12, 1980, the petitioners advised the private respondent that
he would have to vacate the leased premises on March 1, 1980, not only because of the lapse of the agreed term but also
because he had subleased the property in violation of their agreement.. The private respondent objected. As no
agreement between the parties appeared in sight, the private respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so to speak,
by filing on February 21, 1980, with the Court of First Instance of Iligan City an action for the continued enforcement of the
lease contract and for damages. The said court on February 28, 1980, one day before the expiration of the lease, issued a
restraining order that maintained the status quo between the parties. Ten days later, the petitioners filed their own
complaint, this time for unlawful detainer, with the City Court of Iligan City.This was followed two days later with a motion
to dismiss the private respondents' complaint before the Court of First Instance on the ground inter alia of the pendency of
the ejectment case, and for the lifting of the temporary restraining order. For his part, the private respondent moved to
dismiss the ejectment suit also on the ground of lis pendens, his argument being that the case he had filed earlier should
be decided first before the petitioners' complaint could be entertained.
In the Court of First Instance, the petitioners' motion was in effect denied with its Order dated May 27, 1981, that the
"determination of the said motion is hereby deferred until the trial. " The motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
dated September 14, 1982. In the City Court, the petitioners fared no better when the ejectment case was on April 24,
1980, "ordered held in abeyance until the case in the Court of First Instance is finally resolved." The motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 4, 1982.
Issue: Whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee.
Held:
Yes. It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a lessee to occupy the land lease as against the
demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70 (formerly Rule 72) of the Rules of Court.There is no merit to the
contention that the lessee's supposed right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in the ejectment suit. In
the case of Teodoro vs. Mirasol, supra, this Court held that "if the plaintiff has any right to the extension of the lease at all,
such right is a proper and legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a
defense to the action." In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the
ejectment suit, in consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful
detainer-ejectment case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the application of the foregoing
ruling.
It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action.
They provide that there is pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later
date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, supra.).
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and judgment is hereby rendered: a) SETTING ASIDE the Orders of the
respondent Court of First Instance.
Held:
No. It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior
pending action. They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer
suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol supra).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let the writs issue as prayed for in the petition, and the preliminary injunction
issued at the commencement of these proceedings is made permanent..
606.
ROSE DESAMITO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. TRINIDAD CASAS-CUYEGKENG, assisted by her husband ALFONSO
CUYEGKENG, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19173 December 27, 1966
Facts:
On February 10, 1959 Trinidad Casas-Cuyegkeng instituted ejectment proceedings against her tenant, Rose
Desamito, in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover possession of premises at 474 Isaac Peral, Manila, operated by
said tenant as a dress shop named "Fifth Avenue". Plaintiff averred that the defendant had failed to pay rental for
November and December, 1958 and January, 1959 totalling P1,300; that the plaintiff needed the premises for her own
use and that of her family, but the tenant refused to vacate.
In her answer to the complaint for ejectment, defendant alleges that for a period of 8 years she has been occupying the
premises in question. Subsequently, on April 1, 1959, defendant Desamito filed an amended answer reproducing the
allegations plus an additional averment that, having stayed almost 8 years in the premises, defendant was entitled to ask
the court to fix a longer period for the lease, which she prayed to be set at 5 years from the filing of the complaint.
While the ejectment case was pending, Rose Desamito as plaintiff this time, filed the present action against
Casas and her husband in the court of first, averring three causes of action on practically the same facts pleaded in
Desamito's answers. After the court had denied a motion to dismiss, defendants Casas-Cuyegkeng answered the
complaint on March 12, 1959 denying having agreed to the transfer of Desamito's lease to Mr. Gomez.
On May 20, the municipal court decided the ejectment case in favor of the landlord Casas. The tenant Desamito
then appealed to the Court of First Instance, and on July 1, 1959, there the appellant, Desamito, filed a new answer, and
reproduced the averments she had made in the Municipal Court.
Before this appealed case could be tried, Rose Desamito died and was substituted by her sister, Soledad
Desamito Reyes, as her legal representative. After trial, on January 5, 1961, the Court of First Instance decided the
appealed ejectment case, affirming the judgment of the Municipal Court and dismissing the counterclaim.
At this juncture, the spouses Casas-Cuyegkeng moved to dismiss the case for damages. One month later, on July 22,
1961, plaintiff amended the complaint by suppressing the first cause of action regarding the fixing of the lease term by the
court and retaining the others, amplifying the averment of damages. Casas-Cuyegkeng then reiterated the motion to
dismiss, on the ground of another action pending between the same parties, on the same facts and issues. After the
matter had been extensively argued, the Court of First Instance ordered the complaint dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance take cognizance of that issue on appeal from the decision of the court
of origin.
Held:
Yes. The Court of First Instance in the appealed case could, and did, take cognizance of the issue of damages in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolved it adversely against appellant Desamito. Authority for this action of the
court is found in section 11 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 11. Lack of jurisdiction.A case tried by an inferior court without jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be
dismissed on appeal by the Court of First Instance. But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if the parties therein file their pleadings
and go to the trial without
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on the merits in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction?
Held: Yes.
The fact that defendants have previously filed a separate action in the same Court of First Instance for the
reformation of the deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage, "is not a valid reason to
frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff."
Accordingly, the action filed by the plaintiffs with the City Court is one of possession, and therefore falls within the
original jurisdiction of said court in accordance with Section 88, par. 1, Republic Act No. 296, as amended which was then
the law prevailing when the instant case was filed, unlike at present when under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 which
further amended Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296, it is only city courts that are granted concurrent jurisdiction with the
Courts of First Instance to resolve question of ownership in ejectment cases. Consequently, it was erroneous for the lower
court to dismiss the appeal from the decision of the City Court for it has still the power to review said decision in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. Case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and decision on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs.
Issue:
Whether or not the third-party complaint was improperly laid against the appellees?
Held:
Yes. The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, since they were
themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon
& Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegation against it is that it had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain
Deudor in four civil cases in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of
lands involved therein (including those now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase and that the ejectment suit filed by
herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. The court failed to see how such "agreement to which
appellees were strangers, could have anything to do with their right of action to recover the material possession of the
lands in question. The prayer in the third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages
should be the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue of possession may not
unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in
the present instance there was no abuse of discretion in the order of denial complained of.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Facts:
On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case against private respondent Emeterio M. Calugay
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX. On December 29,1988, herein private respondents filed an
Answer with Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that there was pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXVI, an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance involving private
respondents' right to repurchase the subject property which had been acquired by therein defendant bank and ultimately
sold to herein petitioner.
On November 27, 1989, the trial court rendered judgments against therein defendant. On December 8, 1989, a
motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents which was, however, denied by the trial court.
On February 19, 1990, private respondents filed a notice of appeal which was denied due course. Consequently,
a writ of "Ejectment Execution" was issued on March 12, 1990 commanding the Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch XIX, Manila, to cause the herein private respondent Emeterio M. Calugay, and all persons claiming under him, to
vacate the premises.
Private respondents filed on April 30,1990 an amended petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI.
In an order dated June 18,1990, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On August 24,
1990, respondent court issued a resolution ordering the restoration of the possession over the subject premises.
On September 4, 1990, respondent court issued another resolution ordering private respondents, among other
things, to deposit in escrow with the Philippine National Bank the back rentals due on the premises in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the decretal portion of said resolution were made with grave abuse of discretion, or without or in
excess of jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the orders or decisions upon all questions pertaining to
the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction. However erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by
certiorari.
It is, therefore, imperative that under the factual ambience of this case and the events that have apparently
supervened therein, respondent court should primarily and promptly determine whether any of the aforesaid exceptions
apply to justify its assuming jurisdiction over a case the judgment wherein it is postulated to have become final and
executory.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed resolution of October 31, 1990 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, with the
directive that respondent court forthwith proceed with deliberate dispatch in CA-G.R. SP No. 22521 in the manner
indicated herein.
Issue:
Whether or not there be an execution of the judgment even when an appeal has been perfected?
Held:
Yes. Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for an immediate execution.
The rule is explicit. In ejectment cases, the judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the
plaintiff in order to prevent further damages to him arising from the loss of possession. However, the defendant may stay
execution (a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a supersede as bond and (b) by paying from time to time either to the
plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property as may be fixed by
the justice of the peace court in its judgment (Base v. Leviste, 99 SCRA 575). Thus, in an eviction case where the
defendant did not file a supersede as bond and did not make any monthly deposit of the rentals, we ruled that the lessor is
entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the municipal or city court's judgment for the restoration of
possession and the payment of the accrued rentals, or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. In such
a case, the duty of the court to order immediate execution is ministerial and imperative (Philippine Holding Corporation v.
Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent judge is directed to issue the writ of execution.
611. GEORGE V. BENEDICTO, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. CHUA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157604 October 19, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 736 square meters located in
Carlos Hilado Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into a contract of lease with private respondent Romeo G. Chua on
October 15, 2000. Under the contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The contract also stipulated that the
rent would be P7,000 monthly.
Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence.On November 13, 2000, Chua paid
Benedicto P28,000 representing deposit for one month and advance rent for three months. Thereafter, Chua failed to pay
the rent prompting Benedicto to send a demand letter after a fruitless amicable settlement at the Office of Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for unlawful detainer and damages with the
Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3. In turn, Chua filed with the same court a petition for consignation.The
MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The
MTCC found merit in the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages which rendered a decision against Chua. Chua
appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43.The RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the
case for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice; ordered Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully
surrender possession to Benedicto.
On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a Writ of Execution.
On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash
Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and Motion and decided in favor of Benedicto.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite the immediately executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment
cases?
Held:
No.
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer presupposes that the
defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and
decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to
the appeal taking its due course.
Chuas putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if the adverse judgment of the
RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a
writ of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy.
June 26, 1945, Domingo Lao brought an action in the municipal court for unlawful detainer of a warehouse (bodega) said
to be located at 528 Elcano Street, Manila, alleging that the property had been leased prior to February, 1945, to a certain
Co Tiac on
a month-to-month basis at a monthly rental of P40 payable in advance.
It was further alleged that Co Tiac, without giving any notice to the plaintiff, left the premises, and his whereabouts were
unknown at the time of the filing of the complaint; that in the same month, the defendant, without obtaining the prior
permission of the plaintiff, began to live in the said premises, telling the plaintiff that he was Co Tiacs relative; that the
defendant, notwithstanding repeated demands, refused to vacate said premises.
The defendant refused to vacate the premises, and the counsel for the plaintiff moved for the execution of the judgment
and execution was issued. Co Tiac, the present petitioner, through counsel filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash Execution,"
Judge Natividad denied the motion to quash the execution, on the ground that "the movant, Co Tiac, is not a party in this
case, either as plaintiff, or as defendant, or as intervenor." The court expressed "the opinion that said movant has no
personality to intervene in this case at this stage of the proceedings and to ask for the quashing of the writ issued for the
execution of the judgment rendered therein, which is now final and executory."cr
Issue
Ruling
No, the Supreme Court ruled that "Except as otherwise provided by statute, an action of forcible entry and detainer
may be maintained only against one in possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one who does not
in fact hold the land." This is in harmony with section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court. This rule does not require that the
lessee or the person who committed the forcible entry should be made a party even though his whereabouts be unknown.
Forcible entry or unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding, intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. Co Kay disappeared from the scene and Co
Tiac emerged, resurrected from the grave to take up the cudgels. What is more, he would not start where his partner and
kin left off; he would have all the issues fought over again. Unluckily for the petitioner, law and justice can not be
circumvented and outwitted so easily. A party will not be allowed to take undue advantage of a situation created by his
own fault, especially if it is deliberate, to the detriment of his opponent.
Facts
May 24, 1957, plaintiff Prado, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a forcible entry case
against the defendants.
Defendants presented their answer and averred that the Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
case, because it involved question of title over the property.
Plaintiff opposed, claiming, among others, that the ground on which the same was based could only be resolved in a trial
on the merits, for, whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry or not is a question of fact.
Justice of Peace Court denied the Petition for Dismissal and favors the plaintiff. Defendants perfected their appeal to the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and instead of presenting their Answer; defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, again
raising the same issue of jurisdiction of the inferior court the CFI without any hearing, handed down an Order granting the
Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether or not the JP Court had jurisdiction to entertain the case and the CFI could legally take cognizance of the
appeal
Ruling
The CFI erred in quashing the case, upon a mere motion to dismiss. The findings of the JP Court clearly show that
the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the disputed property and the alleged circumstance that the defendant
Cabrera was the registered owner of the property, did not detract from the fact that plaintiffs had a right of possession
thereof which should be protected.
When possession is the issue, an action for Forcible Entry and Detainer is the proper remedy.
The CFI should have heard the case on the merits, and find out whether the findings and conclusions of fact of the JP,
regarding the prior possession of the plaintiffs and their subsequent dispossession by the defendants are correct or not.
Insofar as the appeal with the CFI is concerned, the latter did not have to delve into the issue of ownership, which could
be threshed out in an action, to quiet title. Forcible entry and detainer lies even against the very owner of property.
614 FLORENDA ARIEM, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV; PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION and THE CITY SHERIFF,
G.R. No. L-32164 January 31, 1973
Facts
The Court rendered judgment on December 4, 1969, in favor of the plaintiff therein, respondent People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation, and against the defendant therein, Nicasio Barles, ordering the latter to vacate Lot No. 16, Block 15,
Psd-57771 situated in Project 6, Quezon City, which is the registered property of said respondent.
After the judgment had become final and executory, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of the writ of execution to
carry it into effect.
On May 14, 1970, petitioner Florenda Ariem filed in the same case a petition to lift the writ of execution, with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, or any other persons acting under its
command and/or behalf, from executing the judgment of eviction. The petition was denied by the respondent Judge in his
order of June 24, 1970, and from this order petitioner has come to this Court praying that it be nullified and set aside and
that respondents and/or any person acting in their behalf be enjoined from executing the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
12775. Basis of the petition is Florenda Ariem's claim that she is the bona fide occupant of the land involved in said case
and not defendant Nicasio Barles who was merely left as her caretaker when she left for the provinces. Court required the
respondents to answer the petition and issued a restraining order to prevent the execution of the judgment, including the
demolition of the house and improvements on said land under the order of June 24, 1970, until further orders from this
Court.
Issue
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition to lift the order of
execution so as to prevent the respondents from carrying into effect the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12775.
Ruling
No, Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit. Nicasio Barles is the real party-in-interest as he was actually occupying the
lot in question and had constructed his house thereon. The cases cited by the petitioner to bolster up her claim that she
cannot be deprived of the land involved without prior hearing to determine the extent of her right thereto, are not in point.
They deal with rights of possessors in good faith who were not parties to the action involving title to the property and,
hence, not bound by the judgment. Such possessors were not relatives or privies of the defendants and did not derive
their right from the latter. Here, petitioner Florenda Ariem is a privy to Nicasio Barles who is her son-in-law. The
respondent Judge in the hearing of the petition to lift the writ of execution gave ample opportunity to the petitioner to be
heard as regards her alleged bona fide possession. But the Court did not believe her, it being evident that her claim was
merely a pretext to frustrate the execution of the judgment ousting Barles who is a squatter on the land owned by
respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation.
615 PAZ S. BAENS, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CHUA SENG,
G.R. No. L-57091 November 23, 1983
Facts
Chua Seng filed Civil Case for forcible entry with the City Court of Manila against Dra. Baens alleging that the refusal to
remove the padlocks was a breach of the contract of lease consisting in the deprivation of plaintiff's right to occupy and
use the leased premises.
On February 12, 1976, petitioner Baens filed her answer to the complaint for forcible entry alleging inter alia that Chua
Seng right to occupy said premises had long expired and that the respondent failed to pay the rentals due and had
voluntarily vacated the premises. .
The City Court of Manila which conducted a joint trial and rendered a consolidated decision, in favor of Chua Seng,
ordering Dra. Baens to restore him to the possession and enjoyment of the leased premises at No. 2441 Oroquieta Street,
Manila, and to pay him attorney's fees in the sum of P1, 000.00.Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision
affirming the City Court's deision.
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision annulling the order of the Court of First Instance granting immediate
execution and modifying the appealed decision.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals decision is correct
Ruling
Yes,Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord,
vendor, vendee, or other person against who, the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of and contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of avail such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution to such possession, together with damages and costs. The complaint must be verified.
On the last issue of whether temperate damages may be awarded in favor of respondent landlord, it has been held that
while damages may be adjudged in forcible entry and detainer cases, these "damages" mean "rents" or "the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises." ( Mitschiener v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55. cited in Garcia v. Pea
77 Phil. 1011) or "fair rental value of the property." (Sparrevohn v. Fisher, 2 Phil. 676: Nlitschiener vs..
Barrios, supra; Castueras v. Bayona, 106 Phil. 340). profits which the plaintiff might have received were it not for the
forcible entry or detainer do not represent a fair rental value, Sparrevhon v. Fisher, 2 Phil, 676; supra; Igama v. Soria, 42
Phil. 11).
616 LAO SENG HIAN, CHENG TO, AND Y.S. WOO, vs. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of
Manila, and JOSE M. OCAMPO,
G.R. No. L-1950 May 16, 1949
Facts
The Court of First Instance, on an application for certiorari to the municipal judge, ruled against the petitioner,
defendant in the case for unlawful detainer and appellant herein. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the money claim at the rate of P5,250 a month, made in the complaint in an action for lawful
detainer, removes the case from the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
Ruling
No, the quantum of the money judgment demanded is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction. Any amount for rents or
in the nature of rents or in the nature of rents is allowable in an action of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
This is so because rents or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises is only incidental or accessory to
the main action for the restitution of possession unlawfully withheld. This rule is too familiar and too well settled to required
citations of authorities.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed with costs against appellant.
Facts
Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and ending on June 30, 1993 but renewable upon
agreement, herein petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three (3) units (C, E and F) of the building owned by private
respondent Barcelonas family. Came expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal thereof and coupled by
petitioners failure to surrender the leased units despite private respondents demands, private respondent filed before the
Municipal Trial Court an ejectment case against petitioner.
Judgment of that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional Trial Court and herein public respondent Court of
Appeals on subsequent appeals taken by petitioner, favored private respondent.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision that the only damages that can be recovered in an
ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real
property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action.
Ruling
No,This Court has often stated that inferior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
detainer regardless of the value of damages demanded. It has also ruled that the damages that may be recovered in
actions for ejectment are those equivalent to a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises by
defendant. Nonetheless, this latter legal proposition is not pertinent to the issue raised in the instant case because here,
the damage sought to be recovered had previously been agreed to by lessee (in the contract of lease) and imposed by
lessor by way of damages. Besides, nobody can affirm that the liquidated amount of damages stipulated in the lease
contract was not due to occupation or loss of possession of the premises and non-compliance with the contract.
618 JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO v. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in G.R. No. L-43345. July 29, 1976.
Fats
Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots located at the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City. The lots
were leased to Ong Cu for fifteen-year period which allegedly expired on August 31, 1974.In view of Ong Cus failure to
vacate the lots and remove his improvements thereon Mrs. Laureano filed against him an ejectment suit in the city court of
Iloilo City.
After trial, the city court rendered a judgment ordering Ong Cu to vacate the lots, and to pay compensation for the use and
occupation. Ong Cu appealed to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Instead of filing a supersede as bond based on the
findings of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu asked the city court ex parte to approve his supersede as bond. The city
court granted that ex parte motion. Thereafter, the record was elevated to the Court of First Instance.
Mrs. Laureano filed a motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore her to the
possession of the said lots. Invoking article 1674 of the Civil Code and section 9, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, she
alleged that Ong Cus appeal was frivolous and dilatory.
Issue: Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Mrs. Laureanos motions for execution
and a mandatory injunction
Ruling
No, Under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the inferior court in plaintiffs favor in an
ejectment case it immediately executory. Plaintiff in entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the city
courts judgment both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises. Thus, where the city court on the day it rendered the judgment ordered the execution
thereof and the defendant did not perfect his appeal and did not post a supersedeas bond, it was held that certiorari would
not lie to set aside the execution. Section 8 of Rule 70 is an exception to the general rule as to the execution of the
judgment of an inferior court which is found in Section 18, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.
The inferior courts judgment is immediately executory in order to prevent further damages to the plaintiff should the
defendant continue to deprive him of the possession of the premises in litigation.
The defendant may stay execution by (a) perfecting an appeal and filing a supersede as bond and (b) paying from time to
time either to the plaintiff or of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal the rentals or the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the property as fixed but the inferior court in its judgment.
Issue
Whether or not the decision of the lower court is correct
Ruling
No, From the maze of voluminous pleadings and factual allegations on petitioners part and counter-allegations on
respondents part, supported with numerous documentary evidence and exhibits proferred in respondent court as well as
in this Court, it is patent that petitioners claims are far from being baseless or unmeritorious and entitle him to a hearing
and a day in court, as urged by him from the beginning in respondent court.
It is conceded in the answers of both respondent court and private respondents that "petitioner has no house inside Lot B"
and respondent court stated that the inclusion of petitioners house in his demolition order of May 5, 1970 "was a palpable
mistake caused either by mere inadvertence or clerical error which the herein respondent would have immediately
corrected had petitioner called his attention to it." Yet petitioner had so called respondent courts attention to his wrongful
inclusion in the demolition order in his motion for reconsideration, which was denied peremptorily, as above stated.
620 ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES,
INC., [G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999]
Facts
Private respondent Angel Chaves, Inc. is the owner of a commercial building in Cagayan de Oro which he leased to
several business establishments. On January 15, 1991, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cagayan de Oro City, because of the failure of the lessees to comply with her
demand on increasing the said rental fee.
In his answer to the complaint, defendant Constancio Manzano, through his counsel, Atty. Cesilo Adaza, allegedThat it is
not true that in the said contract the monthly rentals of the defendants as stated in paragraph 3 of the complaint are to be
paid by the defendants. What was agreed was for the following defendants to pay the following rentals beginning July 1,
1988 and two years thereafter.
On July 23, 1992, the MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against three defendants, including petitioner,
but ordered the ejectment of the fourth defendant Alfredo Co.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, reversed the MTCC and ordered
the four defendants ejected from the premises.
Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which, on November 27, 1996, rendered a
decision declaring the writ of injunction as null and void, and ordering the trial court to dismiss Sp. Civil Case no. 95-
560.Hence, this petition .
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in
declaring null and void the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction as an interlocutory order issued by the RTC
Ruling
No, The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject
of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari.[8] The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[9] In the instant case, the trial court issued as writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact that the right of petitioner to
occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitioners
plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. The order granting the writ of preliminary injunction
was thus clearly erroneous and must be set aside.
Facts: As a basis for his petition, he alleges that he obtained in purchase the house located at Tambunting Street No. 29,
Rizal Extension Avenue, Manila on May 16, 1946 by Felisa Pascual;
That on August 20, 1946 Hon. Judge Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order of execution
against Felisa Pascual in civil case No. R-2184, entitled Melchor Almoro v. Felisa Pascual; That on September 6, 1946,
the appellant filed a writ of third party with the Sheriff of Manila, and he disregarded it, and threatened to execute the order
of execution against him; That it is the ministerial duty of the sheriff to give course to the third party and to require the
appealed Melchor Almoro to give bail; Which has no remedy of appeal, or any other fast and expedited remedy.
When the Sheriff of Manila was constituted in House No. 29, Tambunting Street, Rizal Extension Avenue, Manila to verify
the execution order, according to the defendant Felisa Pascual, Emilia Escobar and Juan Fernando, who begged and
asked To the applicant Melchor Almoro an extension to vacate said house until 9 of September of 1946; (Performance
Enforcement, Annex I). Melchor Almoro was satisfied (Annex lA). The appellant states in his memorandum and in his writ
of third party that he was the owner and owner of the house at the time of execution.
The sheriff did not embargo the house to be sold in publicasta. It was ordered in civil case No. R-2184, from the decree of
the Court of First Instance of Manila to remove Felisa Pascual from that house and to put Melchor Almoro in possession,
in accordance with Rule 39, Article 13 Before article 444, par.5, Code of Civil Proc.). The order of execution thus says in
part: "NOW, THREFORE, we command you to cause the defendant (Felisa Pascual) to forthwith vacate the house known
as No. 29 Tambunting. Manila, and that plaintiff Melchor Almoro have restitution of the same . The appellant, who was not
a party to the case, argued that he was the owner and owner of the house and asked the sheriff not to bother him in the
exercise of his rights over said property.
The judgment rendered in the present case is in personam, and as such is only binding for the parties and not for
strangers. (Rule 44, par. [B], Rule 39.) If the appellant Anacleto Santiago, who was not a party to the eviction case, had a
good faith belief in the estate in question, the judgment in that case could not Be validly executed against him. It may be
emphasized, however, in the execution of the sentence if it is proved that the possessor is simply a successor, or a host,
or an agent of the executed in the fraudulent purpose of frustrating the sentence; In such case, there must be a procedure
in the Court of First Instance that issued the order of execution for elucidation of the character of the possession of the
alien occupant.
The resolution of the Court of First Instance in such a proceeding, which is for the purpose of execution only, is not
conclusive in a subsequent matter that any of the parties may initiate before a court competent for the final determination
of the title on the property. That the stranger is merely a quasi-master or agent or guest of the executor, then the order of
execution will be followed against him. This is not an objection, however, so that the occupant can avail himself of any
other legal remedy for definitive determination the title or possession of the property.
Petitioner resorted to the filing of this petition simply to delay the execution of the judgment and to prolong the possession
of the premises by Nicasio Barles, his son-in-law. It is unfortunate that petitioner willingly allowed herself to be a docile
instrument for making a mockery of judicial processes and for trifling with the rule of law.
The cases cited by the petitioner to bolster up her claim that she cannot be deprived of the land involved without prior
hearing to determine the extent of her right thereto, are not in point. They deal with rights of possessors in good faith who
were not parties to the action involving title to the property and, hence, not bound by the judgment. Such possessors were
not relatives or privies of the defendants and did not derive their right from the latter. Here, petitioner Florenda Ariem is a
privy to Nicasio Barles who is her son-in-law. The respondent Judge in the hearing of the petition to lift the writ of
execution gave ample opportunity to the petitioner to be heard as regards her alleged bona fide possession. But the Court
did not believe her, it being evident that her claim was merely a pretext to frustrate the execution of the judgment ousting
Barles who is a squatter on the land owned by respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation.
FACTS: On September 10, 1986 - Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against respondents Lilia Aquino and Apolonio,
Aquino, and Jose Toralde before the San Mateo RTC on account of the latter's refusal to remove their houses were
allegedly illegally constructed on land owned by Jakihaca in San Mateo which were done without his knowledge and
consent. The matter was initially referred to the Barangay Captain of Ampid, San Mateo for conciliation processes
pursuant to the requirements of P.D. No.1508. But due to repeated refusal of the Aquinos to appear before the Barangay
Lupon, the Lupon Chairman and Secretary thereafter issued a "certification to file action."- November 3, 1986. The
Aquinos filed an answer with special and affirmative defenses, arguing that: There was a verbal contract of tenancy
between the Aquinos and Gloria Gener, the former owner of the land in question. They planted fruit-bearing trees on the
said land along with rice and corn therefore they cannot be ejected under the Land Reform Law more particularly P.D. No.
1from the land which they had occupied and cultivated for more than ten (10) years with the consent of the former owner
Gener. They said that there is no showing that the case was first brought to the attention of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform forcertification that this case is proper for tria lbefore the MTC. On December 22, 1987 , the MTC found that the
Aquinos were not tenants of either Gener nor Jakihaca and that they entered the land 10 or 20 years earlier and built their
house on the land with the tolerance of Gener. The respondents were then ordered by the Court to remove the houses on
the land and surrender possession to Jakihaca. On appeal to the RTC, the case was dismissed on the ground that the
MTC acted without jurisdiction as the complaint shows nothing when the verbal demand to remove the houses on the lot
of the petitioner was made on the private respondents. Jakihaca filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTC which
was denied. Jakihaca alleged that the RTC erred in dismissing the case on the ground of the MTCs lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. The Aquinos argued that the petition was filed out of time; that the petition was filed with the
wrong court; that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that there was no
allegation in the complaint of prior physical possession of the land by the petitioner.
HELD: NO.
a)With regard to the absence of allegation in the complaint of prior physical possession of the land by Jakihaca
The records show that the complaint explicitly alleged that "plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their house
son the lot of the former but the latter refused and still refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds."
Such is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the case of
Hautea v.Magallon where it was held that: "An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of
demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the
jurisdictional requirement of previous demand." b)As to whether or not the demand was brought within the one year
period-As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case maybe objected to at any stage of the proceeding
even on appeal, but this is not without exception.
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.(Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy )c)As to the issue of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
Petitioners, in their position paper, attached the report of Mr. Maines of the Agrarian Office which categorically states that
there is no evidence whatsoever to show that the subject land is devoted to the production of rice and corn; that the
occupants are not sharing with the present landowner, hence, they are classified as illegal occupants.
That the subject land is not tenanted, not devoted to the production of palsy and/or corn,hence, not covered by P.D. No.
27or the Operation Land Transfer of the government)As to the contention that the petition was filed out of time
They allege that when petitioner received the decision of the RTC on April 20,1988 and the appeal to this Court was filed
only on July 12,1988 or only after three months ,such appeal was definitely outside the 15-day reglementary period
within which to appeal. The SC held that this contention is erroneous. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in
cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. Summary procedures have no application to cases before the Regional TrialCourts. Hence, when the respondents
appealed the decision of the MTC to the RTC, the applicable rules are those of the latter court.
628 MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990/ 189 SCRA 67
FACTS: A complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that
petitioner refused to vacate the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of
demand which was sent to petitioner by registered mail. During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of court but without
paying the accrued rent.
The inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to give probative
value to the three letters of demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive. The
inferior court held that since none of the demand letters was served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand
upon a person found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon
pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there was no valid demand. If none was made, the
case came within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed the decision of the MTC, but on motion for
reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case. 1
A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The Appellate Court overturned the appealed
order of the trial court which had earlier sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. The decision of the Appellate Court
was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the notice to vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules
of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be served by
registered mail.
RULING: The Appellate Court took the lower courts to task for taking a rather constricted view of Section 2, Rule 70, and
declaring that the service of demand letters to vacate on the lessee is strictly limited to the three (3) modes. The notice to
vacate the leased premises required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful detainer
action can be commenced against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a substantial compliance with the
modes of service enumerated under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they involve a disturbance of social order which must
be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays.
It matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the
written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman.
FACTS:
Soco and Francisco entered into a contract of lease on January 17, 1973, whereby Soco leased her commercial
building and lot situated at Manalili Street, Cebu City, to Francisco for a monthly rental of P 800.00 for a period of 10 years
renewable for another 10 years at the option of the lessee. It can readily be discerned from Exhibit A (from SOCO) that
paragraphs 10 and 11 appear to have been cancelled while in Exhibit 2 (from FRANCISCO) only paragraph 10 has been
cancelled. Claiming that paragraph 11 of the Contract of Lease was in fact not part of the contract because it was
cancelled, Soco filed Civil Case No. R-16261 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the annulment and/or
reformation of the Contract of Lease.
Sometime before the filing of Civil Case No. R-16261 Francisco noticed that Soco did not anymore send her collector for
the payment of rentals and at times there were payments made but no receipts were issued. This situation prompted
Francisco to write Soco the letter dated February 7, 1975 which the latter received. After writing this letter, Francisco sent
his payment for rentals by checks issued by the Commercial Bank and Trust Company.
The factual background setting of this case clearly indicates that soon after Soco learned that Francisco sub-leased a
portion of the building to NACIDA, at a monthly rental of more than P3,000.00 which is definitely very much higher than
what Francisco was paying to Soco under the Contract of Lease, the latter felt that she was on the losing end of the lease
agreement so she tried to look for ways and means to terminate the contract.
In view of this alleged non-payment of rental of the leased premises beginning May, 1977, Soco through her lawyer sent a
letter dated November 23, 1978 to Francisco serving notice to the latter to vacate the premises leased. In answer to this
letter, Francisco through his lawyer informed Soco and her lawyer that all payments of rental due her were in fact paid by
Commercial Bank and Trust Company through the Clerk of Court of the City Court of Cebu. Despite this explanation,
Soco filed this instant case of Illegal Detainer.
HELD:
In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must first comply with certain requirements prescribed by
law. The debtor must show (1) that there was a debt due; (2) that the consignation of the obligation had been made
because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or
incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due (Art. 1176, Civil Code); (3)
that previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation (Art.
1177, Civil Code); (4) that the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court (Art. 1178, Civil Code); and (5) that after
the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof (Art. 1178, Civil Code). Failure in any of these
requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective. (parang wala naman tong mga to sa 1176, 1177 and
1178?)
We hold that the respondent lessee has utterly failed to prove the following requisites of a valid consignation: First, tender
of payment of the monthly rentals to the lessor. Second, respondent lessee also failed to prove the first notice to the
lessor prior to consignation,
Evidently, from this arrangement, it was the lessees duty to send someone to get the cashiers check from the bank and
logically, the lessee has the obligation to make and tender the check to the lessor. This the lessee failed to do, which is
fatal to his defense.
Third, respondent lessee likewise failed to prove the second notice that is after consignation has been made, to the
lessor. And the fourth requisite that respondent lessee failed to prove is the actual deposit or consignation of the monthly
rentals except the two cashiers checks referred to in Exhibit 12. As indicated earlier, not a single copy of the official
receipts issued by the Clerk of Court was presented at the trial of the case to prove the actual deposit or consignation.
We, therefore, find and rule that the lessee has failed to prove tender of payment except that in Exh. 10; he has failed to
prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation except that given in Exh. 10; he has failed to prove the second
notice after consignation except the two made in Exh. 12; and he has failed to pay the rentals for the months of July and
August, 1977 as of the time the complaint was filed for the eviction of the lessee. We hold that the evidence is clear,
competent and convincing showing that the lessee has violated the terms of the lease contract and he may, therefore, be
judicially ejected.
612-660 MISSING