Professional Documents
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Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office
Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office for respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS , J : p
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from
trying Civil Case No. 779-M of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following
projects:
1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon
damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf
approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines. LLpr
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States
had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the
acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.)
The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial
stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins,
Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific,
Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The
letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of
its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the
boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects
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had been awarded to third parties.
In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of
America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members
of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to
allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The
company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which
has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in
the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the
motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice
to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit. LexLib
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public
International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].) 2006cdtai
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said
in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be
made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private,
proprietary or non-governmental acts." (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also
said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of
wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a
public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the
ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with
approval, viz.:
'It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a
private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the
level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to
be sued under the contract. . . .
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following
reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America supra, plaintiff brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on account of a
contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the
action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the
defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to
this Court for review. cdrep
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit
was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative
authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably
a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
(1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of
America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of
the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, They also asked for
increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss
the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila
granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went
to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:
In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts
notwithstanding the United States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to
be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are
set aside and Civil Case No. 779-M is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR , J., dissents:
The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M in the
defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.
In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where the contract
entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the defendant (U.S. Government)
involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic Bay area, this Court further stated
that inasmuch as ". . . the United States Government, through its agency at Subic Bay,
entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services
within the Subic Bay area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action
before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity may assume under the
contract."
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the acceptance of a
bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is
deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity
from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued,
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therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 284).
Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its
contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for
the project by the United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay should not
be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it
by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino
citizen, as in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his own country for violation
of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its
name. cdll
Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia vs.
Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:
"Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic
courts of justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign
government enters into private contracts with the citizens of the court's
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all principles of decency
and violative of all tenets of morals.
"Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and applicable as well with
regard to private individuals as with regard to governments either domestic or
foreign. Once a foreign government enters into a private contract with the private
citizens of another country, such foreign government cannot shield its non-
performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak of non-
jurisdiction. To place such foreign government beyond the jurisdiction of the
domestic courts is to give approval to the execution of unilateral contracts,
graphically described in Spanish as 'contratos leoninos,' because one party gets
the lion's share to the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract is to
sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis that all parties in
a private contract, including governments and the most powerful of them, are
amenable to law, and that such contracts are enforceable through the help of the
courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of such
contracts if the same had been entered into only by private individuals."
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this
jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its application
will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from transacting business and
entering into contracts with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines
whether naval, air or ground forces because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
enforcing a validly executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for
breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United States government,
always looms large, thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a
virtual monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for services
or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines.
The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be over
emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to be reasonably
assumed and expected that the undertakings in the contract will be complied with in good
faith.
One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation, like the United
States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak nations. The declaration in the
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United Nations Charter that its member states are equal and sovereign, becomes hollow
and meaningless because big nations wielding economic and military superiority impose
upon and dictate to small nations, subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations.
Thus, more often than not, when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the
American governmental agencies or its citizens invoke principles of international law for
their own benefit.
In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities at Subic
Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was honored more in the
breach than in the compliance. The opinion of the majority will certainly open the
floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations. American authorities or any
foreign government in the Philippines for that matter, dealing with the citizens of this
country, can conveniently seek protective cover under the majority opinion. The result is
disastrous to the Philippines. LibLex
The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further emphasized
by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas surrounding the bases, which
directs that "moreover, the United States Forces shall procure goods and services in the
Philippines to the maximum extent feasible" (italics supplied).
Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6, 1979 in
connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations of the Agreement of
May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of the principles of
equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain collectively, and respect for the
sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines" (italics supplied).
The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint statement of
President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United States dated May 4, 1978
that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty extends over the bases and
that Its base shall be under the command of a Philippine Base Commander," which is
supposed to underscore the joint Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President
Ford of December 7, 1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality, territorial
integrity and political independence of all States are fundamental principles which both
countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the dignity
of each nation shall characterize their friendship as well as the alliance between their two
countries."
The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers, duties and
responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base Commanders that "in the
performance of their duties, the Philippine Base Commander and the American Base
Commander shall be guided by full respect for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and
the assurance of unhampered U.S. military operations on the other hand;" and that "they
shall promote cooperation, understanding and harmonious relations within the Base and
with the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex
covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979, between Ambassador Richard W.
Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, italics supplied).