Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059
Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her
brother, of swindling government funds?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to
quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government
scholar.She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.[4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.[8] It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II
of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was
duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.[10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented
her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since
it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case
of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]
Sandiganbayan Disposition
(A) x x x
xxxx
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has
original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature
of their responsibilities and functions.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same
of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from
the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.[16]
Issue
Our Ruling
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion
to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further
proceeding in the case.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action
in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to
quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal
case was dismissed by this Court.[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.[29]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.[30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March
30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following:
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended
or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32]
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously
cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft
and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this
argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.[33]Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-
tawa.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created
originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No.
69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3).
Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November
27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O.
No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is,
in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43] We held that
while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court.Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed
there by express provision of law.[44]
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.[45] By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds
and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand
on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and
the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000
in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on
the merits of the instant case.[54]
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where
Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a
name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded
Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the
University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented
to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she
was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body
since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP
student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general
powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public
office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-
movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It
is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.