18. SIBAL v.

VALDEZ
G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927

Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue
of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant
Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Plaintiff offered
to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by
the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase,
and the interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane
to the plaintiff.
Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property hence not subject to redemption.

Issue :
1. Whether or not the sugar cane is to be classified as personal property
2. Whether or not future crops to be harvested can be considered a valid object of sale

Held :
1. No. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may
be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment creditors. Ungathered products
have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase personal property should be understood to
include ungathered products . Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when
produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.
2. Yes. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to
come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence, and then
belonging to the vendor, and then title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence (Emerson
vs. European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387; Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep., 63 .). A man may sell property
of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.
19. Pichel v. Alonzo
G.R. No. L-36902, January 30, 1982

Facts:
Prudencio Alonzo (VENDOR) executed a deed of sale for the coconut fruits of his land in Balactasan
Plantation in Lamitan, Basilan, in favor of Luis Pichel (VENDEE). The land from which the subject coconut fruits are
derived from was subjected to a cancellation of the award in 1965, due to the reason of violation of the law that
disallows alienation of land (the vendors rights to the land were reinstated in 1972).
The vendor and his wife sold to the vendee the fruits of the coconut trees from 1968 to 1976 for
consideration of 4,200. Even during the date of sale, the land was still leased to one Ramon Sua, and it was part of
the agreement of the sale that the sum of 3,650.00 was to be paid by the vendor to Ramon Sua as to release the
land.
The RTC decided in favor of the vendor, due to the fact that the deed of sale that was executed was invalid,
due to its supposed violation of RA No. 477, in which they equated the deed of sale executed by the parties as a
contract of lease.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale is valid.

HELD:
Yes. The RTC erred in constructing the deed of sale as a contract of lease. There was no need on the part
of the RTC to interpret the contract, since there was no ambiguity, it merely contracts the sale of the fruits of the
land, not the land itself. The S.C. relied upon ART 1370 of the Civil Code, regarding the rule on interpreting
contracts. Its interpretation in express form is the preferred. Construction shall be employed when such literal
interpretation is impossible. The possession of the coconut fruits for 7 years is different from possession of the
land, since the coconut fruits are mere accessories and the land is the principal- a transfer of accessories does not
necessarily mean a transfer of principal, it is the other way around. The vendor after having received the
consideration for the sale of his coconut fruits cannot be allowed to impugn the validity of the contracts he entered
into, to the prejudice of petitioner who contracted in good faith and consideration
The difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things is that the delivery of the thing sold
transfers ownership, while in a lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to
the use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Contract of Lease is defined as giving or the concession of the
enjoyment or use of a thing for a specified time and fixed price.
20. BUCTON V. GABAR
G.R. No. L-36359, January 31, 1974

Facts:
In 1946, Josefina bought a parcel of land fr. the Villarin spouses, payable in installments. Josefina, then
entered into a verbal agreement w/ Nicanora whereby the latter would pay 1/2 of the price (P3,000.00) & would
then own 1/2 of the land. Nicanora paid P1,000 in 1946 & P400 in 1948. Both were evidenced by receipts issued by
Josefina. After payment of the P1,000, Nicanora took possession of the portion of the land indicated to them by
Josefina & built thereon a nipa house. Subsequently, the nipa house was demolished & replaced by a house of
strong materials, w/ 3 apartments for rental purposes. In 1947, the Villarin spouses executed a deed of sale in favor
of Josefina. Nicanora then sought to obtain a separate title for their portion of the land but Josefina refused on the
ground that the entire land was still mortgaged w/ the PNB as guarantee for a loan. Nicanora continued enjoying
possession of their portion of the land, planting fruit trees & receiving rentals fr. the buildings. In 1953, w/
Josefinas consent, Nicanora had the land resurveyed & subdivided preparatory to their obtaining separate titles
thereto. A fence was thereafter erected to demarcate the division. Nicanora continued to insist on obtaining a
separate title but Josefina refused. Nicanora engaged the services of Atty. Bonifacio Regalado, & then Atty. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. to intercede, but to no avail. Hence, case in TC. TC rendered judgment for Nicanora. On appeal, the CA
reversed on the ground that since Nicanoras right of action is allegedly based on the receipt executed in 1946, the
same has prescribed pursuant to Art. 1144 of the CC w/c must be brought w/in 10 years fr. the time the right of
action accrues. When the complaint was filed, 22 years & 26 days had elapsed. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of Nicanora has prescribed.

HELD:
The real & ultimate basis of Nicanoras action is their ownership of 1/2 of the lot coupled w/ their
possession thereof, w/c entitles them to a conveyance of the property. In Sapto, et. al. vs. Fabiana, the Court,
through J.B.L. Reyes, explained that under the circumstances, no enforcement of the contract is needed, since the
delivery of the possession of the land sold had consummated the sale & transferred title to the purchaser, & that,
actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon Nicanoras ownership by the
refusal of the Josefina to recognize the sale made. We held therein: The prevailing rule is that refusal of the
Josefina to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. We held therein that "... it is an established rule of
American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet
title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 20 L.R.A.
930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).
21. REPUBLIC V. LICHAUCO
GR NO. L-21436, August 18, 1972

FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines, by authority of Republic Act No. 1400, represented by the Land Tenure
Administration, filed on December 2, 1957, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against the
defendants for the expropriation of the lands of the "Hacienda El Porvenir", having an area of 1,352.84245
hectares, situated in the municipalities of Tayug, Natividad, San Quintin and Sta. Maria, province of Pangasinan. In
the complaint it was alleged, among other things, that the aggregate assessed value of the property was
P434,440.00, and that the continuous agrarian conflicts between defendants and their tenants could be solved only
through the purchase of said property by the government. Defendants, in their amended motion to dismiss, sought
the dismissal of the complaint, alleging that the hacienda was no longer a co-ownership but had been partitioned
among the several heirs of Crisanto Lichauco, and that Republic Act No. 1400 was unconstitutional. On March 23,
1961, the plaintiff and the defendants filed in court an "Agreement and Joint Motion. The defendant-co-owners do
hereby agree, as evidenced by their signature affixed hereto, to the expropriation of their property. . That the
defendant-co-owners have agreed to the condemnation of their property in view of the conformity of the plaintiff
to grant them the right of retention of the areas stated in the agreement. Acting on the foregoing Agreement and
Joint Motion, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan issued, on March 23, 1961, the order of condemnation of
the property sought to be expropriated and set the provisional value of the property at P990,172.50.
Inasmuch as the defendants were not agreeable to the price of P1,787,048.80, or an average of P1,945.36
per hectare offered by the plaintiff in its memorandum-report dated June 15, 1961 (Exhibit A), the court created a
Committee on Appraisal and appointed as members thereof Atty. Rodolfo E. Vinluan, to represent the Court; Mr.
Alfredo Balingao of Tayug, Pangasinan, to represent the plaintiff; and Mr. Hermenegildo Acosta, also of Tayug, to
represent the defendants. After hearing on the reports, the Court rendered its decision on October 26, 1962 in
favour of the dependants. From this decision, plaintiff appealed, by reason of the amount involved. The Higher
court affirmed the decision made by the trial court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court erred with the classification and appraisal of the value of the
property expropriated.

RULING
No. the trial court did not base the market value of the Hacienda El Porvenir on the prices of the land
expropriated in the cases mentioned by the plaintiff-appellant. The trial court simply considered the principles
enunciated in those cases as guided in fixing the market value of the lands sought to be expropriated in the present
case. With modifications as stated in this opinion, the decision, dated October 26, 1962, and the order, dated
February 9, 1963, appealed from, are, in all other respects, affirmed.
The trial court simply considered the principles enunciated in those cases as guided in fixing the market value of
the lands sought to be expropriated in the present case. The principles regarding evaluation enunciated in the
Bustos case, namely: that the reasonable market value of a property is what it would bring when offered for sale by
one who desires but is not obliged to sell, and is purchased by one who is under no necessity of having it; that the
value of the property should be fixed as of the date of proceedings; and that the sales of properties in the same
locality are creditable in determining the market value of lots in that vicinity, can not be said to be erroneous and
without basis in law.
22.
23. LUTERO v. SIULIONG
G.R. No. L-31125 January 21, 1930

Facts :
Plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to sell the formers future sugar crop harvest to the latter
at a price depending on the class of the sugar. The defendant bound itself to pay an advance amount of Php. 3,000
and the remainder shall be paid from time to time. The contract also stated that should the plaintiff fail to deliver,
he shall pay the amount of the undelivered portion to the defendant. The plaintiff also entered into a mortgage
agreement to secure his performance in the contract.

Issue :
Whether or not future products are invalid subjects in a contract of sale

Held :
No. The contracts of sale of agricultural products to be delivered in future, fixing a selling price, are not
usurious or illegal, even when the market price of the products sold should turn out to be higher at the time of
delivery.
24. KERR & CO V. LINGAD
GR No. L-20871 April 30, 1971

Facts:
CIR assessed the sum of P20,272.33 as the commercial brokers percentage tax, surcharge, and
compromise penalty against Ker & Co. Ker and Co. requested for the cancellation of the assessment and filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA ruled that Ker and Co is liable as a commercial broker.
Ker has a contract with US rubber. Ker is the distributor of the said company. Ker was precluded from disposing the
products elsewhere unless there has been a written consent from the company. The prices, discounts, terms of
payment, terms of delivery and other conditions of sale were subject to change in the discretion of the Company.

Issue:
Whether the relationship of Ker and Co and US rubber was that of a vendor- vendee or principal-broker

Ruling:
The relationship of Ker and Co and US rubber was that of a principal-broker/ agency. Ker and Co is only an
agent of the US rubber because it can dispose of the products of the Company only to certain persons or entities
and within stipulated limits, unless excepted by the contract or by the Rubber Company, it merely receives, accepts
and/or holds upon consignment the products, which remain properties of the latter company, every effort shall be
made by petitioner to promote in every way the sale of the products and that sales made by petitioner are subject
to approval by the company. Since the company retained ownership of the goods, even as it delivered possession
unto the dealer for resale to customers, the price and terms of which were subject to the companys control, the
relationship between the company and the dealer is one of agency.
25. INCHAUSTE & CO V. CROMWELL
20 Phil. 345 October 16, 1911

Facts:
Inchausti is engaged in the business of buying and selling wholesale hemp on commission. It is customary
to sell hemp in bales which are made by compressing the loose fiber by means of presses, covering two sides of the
bale with matting, and fastening it by means of strips of rattan; that the operation of bailing hemp is designated
among merchants by the word prensaje. In all sales of hemp by Inchausti, the price is quoted to the buyer at so
much per picul, no mention being made of bailing. It is with the tacit understanding that the hemp will be delivered
in bales. The amount depends under the denomination of prensaje or the baled hemp. CIR made demand in
writing upon Inchausti for the payment of the sum of P1,370.68 as a tax of one third of one per cent on the sums of
money mentioned as aggreagate sum collected as prensaje or the baled hemp. Inchausti paid upon protest,
contending that the collected amount is illegal upon the ground that the said charge does not constitute a part of
the selling price of the hemp, but is a charge made for the service of baling the hemp.

Issue:
Whether or not the baled hemp constitutes a contract of sale

Ruling:
Yes, the baled hemp constitutes a contract of sale. In the case at bar, the baled form before the agreement
of sale were made and would have been in existence even if none of the individual sales in question had been
consummated. The hemp, even if sold to someone else, will be sold in bales. When a person stipulates for the
future sale of articles which he is habitually making, and which at the time are not made or finished, it is essentially
a contract of sale and not a contract for piece of work. It is otherwise when the article is made pursuant to
agreement. If the article ordered by the purchaser is exactly such as the plaintiff makes and keeps on hand for sale
to anyone, and no change or modification of it is made at the defendants request, it is a contract of sale, even
though it may be entirely made after, and in consequence of, the defendants order for it.
26. MAJARABAS V LEONARDO
G.R. No. 4348 September 12, 1908

FACTS:
Mauricia Majarabas had rendered services as wet nurse and governess to an infant daughter of the
Inocencio Leonardo by virtue of a verbal agreement entered into with the now deceased parents of the Leonardo,
who, to use the language of the complaint, " promised to liberally compensate the services of the plaintiff,
providing the maintenance of herself, her husband and their child, during all the time that the services of the
plaintiff where required as such wet nurse and governess."
An objection was made by Leonardo to holding of the court below on the contract set out in the
complaint, is that the fixed price for the services required of the plaintiff is not stipulated therein, and that without
specified price no lease of services can exist, said requirement being essential to such contract. Article 1544 of the
Civil code provides as follows: In a lease of works or services, one of the parties binds himself to execute a work or
to render a service to the other for a specified price.

ISSUE:
W/N the cost of maintenance of Majarabas her family is considered a fixed price.

HELD:
YES. In the matter of contracts of purchase and sale wherein the said requisite is also a necessary and
indispensable condition, article 1447 of the said code provides:
In order that the price may be considered fixed, it shall be sufficient that it be fixed with regard to another
determinate thing also specific, or that the determination of the same be left to the judgment of a special person.
According to this it is not necessary that the certainty of the price be actual or determined at the time of executing
the contract, but that it is sufficient compliance with the law if the same can be determined by the speculations of
the contract made by the party thereto. In the present case the contracting parties fixed the maintenance of the
plaintiff and her family as the price for the services required of her. Said maintenance is the specific and
determinate thing that in its turn fixes the price, inasmuch as its cost determines the price according to the
agreement of the parties to the contract. There might be a question as to the actual cost of the plaintiffs
maintenance, but this is a matter of fact which in such a case would have to be proven. Be it as it may, whatever
might be the cost of said subsistence, it would constitute the price for the services rendered by the plaintiff; said
price is unquestionably the specified one since it refers to a specified thing designated by the parties as the rate
regulating the amount thereof. therefor, the appellant's allegation is unfounded, and the order of the court below
overruling the demurrer must be affirmed
27. MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA V. MANILA
G.R. No. L-13753, February 15, 1919
28. MCCULLOUGH V AENLLE & CO
3 PHIL 285
29. ROBLES V. LIZARRAGA
50 Phil 387, July 13, 1927

FACTS
Anastasia de la Rama died on the 17th of October, 1916, leaving six children, to wit, Magdalena, Jose,
Evarista, Zacarias, Felix, and Purificacion, surnamed Robles, and some properties, among which is house No. 4 on
Iznart Street in the city of Iloilo.

The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and
settlement of their accounts, by virtue of which the competent court awarded to said partnership the properties
left by the deceased, including the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street.

Evarista Robles, one of the aforesaid heirs, since before the death of her mother Anastasia de la Rama, has been
with her husband occupying the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street, at the beginning, by permission of her
mother, later on by the consent of her coheirs, and lastly by agreement with the partnership, Lizarraga Hermanos,
to whom it had been awarded, having made some improvements on the house, the value of which is fixed at four
thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500), and paying to said partnership forty pesos (P40) monthly as rent of the
upper story.

On March 18, 1918, Lizarraga Hermanos notified Evarista Robles (Exhibit J) that beginning April next the rent of the
upper story of the house would be raised to sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she did not agree to the new
rate of rent, she might vacate the house. Evarista Robles refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the
house, and Lizarraga Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment. Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos
afterwards to recover the value of the improvements, and demanded, in another action, that said value be noted
on the certificate of title as an encumbrance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Evarista Robles is the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand
payment of their value.

RULING:
Yes. Attention is called to article 453 of the Civil Code which reads: Necessary expenditures shall be
refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him.
Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right to retention, the person who has
defeated him in his possession having the opinion of refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the
increase in value which the thing has acquired by reason thereof.
This provision of law is in force and applies to personal as well as real property. The expenditures incurred
in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to stand
just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the house better serves the purpose for which it was
intended, being used as a residence, and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen,
closet, and bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and
dwelling, it is beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the building. One of the chiefs of the firm of
Lizarraga Hermanos, on the occasion of a luncheon in the house, on noting the improvements, could not refrain
from expressing that such improvements added much to the value of the building (folio 25, stenographic notes).
Now then, was Evarista Robles a possessor in good faith when she made those improvements? Article 434
provides that "good faith is always presumed and the burden of proving bad faith on the part of the possessor rests
upon the person alleging it." Lizarraga Hermanos did not allege, nor prove in the first instance the bad faith
characterizing Evarista Robles' possession, who, as shown in the records and heretofore stated, began to occupy
the house by permission of the former owner, her mother Anastasia de la Rama, and continued later in the
occupation by the consent of her coheirs, and afterwards by considering herself the future owner of the building by
virtue of the contract with the present owner, Lizarraga Hermanos.
30.
30. ASKAY V. COSALAN
31. NATIONAL BANK V. GONZALES
32.
33. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. TIMOTEO ABARCA
GR NO. 38581, DEC 18, 1934

FACTS
The lot No. 700 of cadastral No. 1 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, was the subject of litigation
between Datu Bualan and his co-claimants, on the one hand, and Ciriaco Lizada, on the other. Juan A. Sarenas and
Domingo Braganza were the attorneys for Datu Bualan and his co-claimants in that suit, wherein a judgment was
rendered declaring Datu Bualan and his co-claimants the owners of the land involved in the litigation.
Subsequently, a controversy arose between the Bagobos and their attorneys as to the amount of fees due the
latter, whereupon the attorneys took possession of the property now in question. Action was brought by the
Bagobos against their former attorneys for the recovery of the land. In this action (civil case No. 607) judgment was
rendered ordering the attorneys to return the property seized by them, and requiring the Bagobos to pay their
former attorneys the sum of P6,000 as fees. As a result of this judgment Datu Bualan and his co-claimants paid
Sarenas and Braganza the sum of P5,126.13. They also paid to the municipal treasurer of Davao in the name of
Sarenas and Braganza, for taxes and penalties due on the property in the year 1926, while the same was in the
possession of the latter, the sum of P1,035.87. The Bagobos assumed that, by these payments which amounted in
all to P6,162, the judgment rendered against them for P6,000 together with interests due thereon, was fully
satisfied.
Claiming that the sum paid to the municipal treasurer of Davao should not be credited on the amount of
the judgment obtained by them, Sarenas and Braganza caused the clerk of the court to issue a writ of execution on
the said judgment. By reason of the writ of execution so issued, the sheriff levied on the property here in question
and sold it to Sarenas and Braganza for the sum of P877.25. Upon the failure of the Bagobos to redeem the
property, they filed their claim in the present cadastral case, alleging that they were the absolute owners of lot No.
700.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by the sheriff of the property in question in favor of Sarenas and Braganza is null
and void.

RULING:
Yes. The lower court was right in declaring the sheriff's sale null and void on the ground of the inadequacy
of the price paid. It appears that in 1927 the assessed value of the contested property was more than P60,000. A
judicial sale of real property will be set aside when the price is so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the
court. In the instant case there is another important consideration. In fairness and equity, which after all are the
true aims of the law, the amount paid by Datu Bualan and his co-claimants for taxes and penalties due on the
contested property should be credited on the judgment obtained by Sarenas and Braganza in civil case No. 607.
Such taxes and penalties accrued while the property was in that possession under a claim of ownership. It follows
that the error assigned by Datu Bualan and his co-claimants against the judgment below, to the effect that the
lower court erred in subjecting the property sought to be registered to a lien in favor of Sarenas and Braganza for
P877.25 with interests, must be sustained
34. DE LEON V. SALADOR
G.R. No. L-31603, December 28, 1970

FACTS:
A judgment for P35,000.00-actual, moral and exemplary damages obtained by Enrique de Leon against
private respondent Eusebio Bernabe in Civil Case No. C-189 of Branch XII of the Rizal court of first instance,
Caloocan City branch presided by Judge Fernando A. Cruz, having become final and executory, a writ of execution
was issued by said court. Pursuant thereto, the city sheriff, on November 8, 1966 levied on execution on two
parcels of land of 682.5 square meters each registered in the names of Bernabe under T.C.T. Nos. 94985 and 94986
of Caloocan City. At the execution sale held on February 14, 1967, the city sheriff sold the said properties to herein
petitioner, Aurora (sister of the judgment creditor) as the highest bidder for the total sum of P30,194.00, (the
property then being subject to an existing mortgage lien in the amount of P120,000.00). The sheriff executed the
corresponding certificate of sale in her favor, which was duly registered on February 21, 1967 with the Caloocan
City register of deeds.
On February 7, 1968, just about two weeks before the expiration of the one-year period to redeem the
properties sold in execution, the judgment debtor Bernabe filed a separate civil action docketed as Civil Case No. C-
1217 against his judgment creditor Enrique de Leon, herein petitioner Aurora P. de Leon as purchaser and the
sheriff as defendants for the setting aside or annulment of the execution sale on February 14, 1967 "for being
anomalous and irregular," and for the ordering of a new auction sale. The sheriff had allegedly sold the
two parcels of land jointly instead of separately, and that the total sales price of P30,194.00
was shocking to the conscience, alleging that the two parcels, if sold separately, could easily
be sold at P235,000.00 and P150,000.00. Pending decision and without ruling squarely on
his courts lack of jurisdiction over the properties, Judge Salvador peremptorily issued his
redemption order on Bernabes bare manifestation that" (he) has but barely two days left of
the one (1) year period granted by law to redeem" and that" (he) is now ready and willing
to redeem" the properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a gross inadequacy of price

RULING:
No. The applicable rule on forced sales where the law gives the owner the right of
redemption was thus stated by the Court in Velasquez v. Coronel: 13 "However, while in
ordinary sales for reasons of equity a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of
inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks ones conscience as to justify the
courts to interfere, such does not follow when the law gives to the owner the right to
redeem, as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price
the easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption. And so it was aptly said: When there
is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material, because the judgment
debtor may reacquire the property or also sell his right to redeem and thus recover the loss
he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the auction sale."