Desharnias Thomas v. City of Westfield
Desharnias Thomas v. City of Westfield
THOMAS DESHARNIAS
Appellant
v.
D1-09-406
CITY OF WESTFIELD,
Respondent
DECISION
pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 43, is appealing the decision of the City of Westfield Police
The appeal was filed with the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter “Commission”)
on November 16, 2009. A pre-hearing conference was held on November 25, 2009 and a
full hearing was held on January 13, 2010 at the Springfield State Building in Springfield,
MA. The hearing was digitally recorded and both parties were provided with a CD of the
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proceeding. Post-hearing briefs were submitted on March 8, 2010 (Appointing
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Twenty-five (25) exhibits were entered into evidence at the hearing (Appointing
Authority Exhibits 1-12 and Appellant Exhibits 1-13). At the pre-hearing conference
held on November 25, 2009, the parties submitted stipulated facts. Based on the
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The testimony of Police Sergeant Edward Murphy and Police Officer Michael Gamache was not taken
because the parties stipulated that the facts to which the officers were going testify (that police cruiser #7
was covered with blue-ish / green salt) would be admitted as a joint fact. It was also stipulated tha the
picture marked as Appointing Authority Exhibit 4 was accurate.
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The last name of the “police explorer”, a high school student, is withheld.
2
1. The Appellant is a forty-five (45) year-old male. He and his wife reside in Westfield.
They have six (6) children ranging in ages from 11 to 22. He is a veteran of the
United States Army and served in Iraq in 1990 – 1991 as part of Operation Desert
2. The Appellant was a tenured civil service employee in the Westfield Police
Department prior to being terminated on November 12, 2009. He had been employed
as a police officer in Westfield since July 15, 1996. The Westfield Police
3. When first hired in 1996, the Appellant served as a dispatcher until the City
4. During this five (5) year period, the Appellant became certified as a Drug Abuse
promote this program until it was discontinued as a result of state budget cuts.
(Testimony of Appellant)
5. In 2002 or 2003, the Appellant began working the 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 Midnight shift.
(Testimony of Appellant)
6. The Appellant has no prior record of discipline and has been recognized for his work
as a police officer. In 2001, Chief Camerota awarded the Appellant the “Police Star”,
the highest honor in the Police Department, for his bravery in removing a trapped and
7. In September 2007, the Appellant was assigned to take over the Westfield Police
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law enforcement about the duties and responsibilities of police officers. In this
capacity, the Appellant re-built the program through increased recruitment and
8. Explorers participate in providing security for such events as Taste of the World, the
Arts Festival, and soccer matches. Members were also organized to participate in
“tobacco stings” and other policing activities. Meetings were scheduled for training
(Testimony of Appellant)
9. The Appellant organized the Explorers into a hierarchy of ranks, with a lieutenant as
10. The Explorers’ lieutenant at the time of the subject incident of this appeal occurred
(October 4, 2009) was Heather, a 17 year old high school student, whom the
Appellant appointed to this position only a couple of months earlier. Heather had
been a member of the Police Explorers for approximately two years, and served as a
11. On numerous occasions, the Appellant took Explorers, including Heather, on “ride-
Heather)
12. On Sunday, October 4, 2009, the Appellant was working his regular 4:00 P.M. to
12:00 Midnight shift. Heather was scheduled to participate in a ride-along with the
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13. The Appellant was driving police cruiser #7. He did not conduct a visual inspection
of the vehicle prior to leaving the station nor did the officer who used the vehicle
14. The Appellant, with Heather as a passenger, drove cruiser #7 to Union Street in
Westfield where a salt barn is located and set up radar. (Testimony of Appellant and
Heather) The Appellant stopped two (2) vehicles and issued verbal warnings.
(Testimony of Appellant)
15. It is undisputed that after completing the radar duties, the Appellant eventually drove
into the salt barn on two (2) occasions. (Testimony of Appellant and Heather)
16. In regard to what occurred while the Appellant was driving into and through the salt
barn, I credit the testimony of Heather. For reasons discussed in more detail below,
she initially lied to police investigators about what occurred because she felt
pressured to do so by the Appellant who had put her in a “tough spot”. In her
testimony before the Commission, she acknowledged that this was a mistake. She
ultimately set the record straight with police investigators after speaking with her
formal setting in which the Appellant was present. She appeared to understand the
gravity of her sworn testimony before the Commission, however, and was a good
witness. She listened carefully to the questions posed to her and appeared intent on
ensuring that her testimony was accurate and limited only to what she saw and heard.
17. On the first occasion when the Appellant drove the cruiser into the salt barn, he
“drove really fast and did spins”. The cruiser was “sliding and spinning”. On this
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first occasion, the Appellant did not hit anything in the salt barn with the cruiser.
(Testimony of Heather)
18. Later that evening, the Appellant drove back to the salt barn and told Heather that he
Heather)
19. On the second occasion when the Appellant drove the cruiser into the salt barn, the
Appellant was again doing “spins” while driving very fast. At one point, he
“slammed on the brakes” and “slid into a salt pile that was on the side.” Heather felt
the right side of the car “tap” the salt pile. The Appellant slowed down, straightened
out the cruiser and then left the salt barn. The Appellant did not say anything to
20. Although the Appellant acknowledges that he was acting “cowboy-ish” on a slow
night, he maintains that he was performing “controlled spins” in the salt barn, that
there was no aspect of recklessness to his operation of the vehicle, and that he never
suspected that the cruiser made contact with anything, including a salt pile, in the salt
21. On the morning of October, 5, 2009 at approximately 8:00 a.m., Police Sergeant
Brian Boldini was called by Police Officer Gamache to observe damage to Westfield
22. Boldini is assigned to the Westfield Traffic Bureau and is the police officer
23. Police policy on cruiser maintenance requires officers to inspect their cruiser both
prior to and at the end of their shift. (Testimony of Boldini and Exhibit 6)
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24. After receiving the above referenced call from Gamache, Boldini observed that
cruiser #7 was damaged in the manner stipulated thereto and as shown in the picture
Exhibit 4)
25. The salt on cruiser #7 was the same kind of salt located at a salt barn located on
26. Boldini checked the vehicle key log and found that the Appellant was the last officer
27. At 10:48 a.m. on October 5, 2009, Boldini sent an e-mail to the Appellant (a) stating
that the Appellant signed out cruiser #7 on October 4, 2009 at 16:00 hours and (b)
requesting that the Appellant contact him [Boldini] regarding the damage to cruiser
#7. (Testimony of Boldini and Appointing Authority Exhibit 11) The Appellant did
28. Also on the morning of October 5, 2009, Murphy and Gamache notified the
Appellant’s supervisor, Police Sergeant Stephen Dickinson, of the fact that cruiser #7
(Testimony of Dickinson and Boldini and Appointing Authority Exhibits 1 and 4).
29. Boldini notified Dickinson that the Appellant was the last officer to use cruiser #7.
30. After being notified that the Appellant was the last known operator of cruiser #7,
Dickinson called the Appellant shortly after 11:00 a.m. on October 5, 2009.
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31. During the phone conversation, Dickinson asked the Appellant if he took out cruiser
#7 and the Appellant responded that he took said cruiser out at 4:00 p.m. on October
Street near the salt piles until 8:00 p.m. at which time he dropped Heather off at the
police station; and that he proceeded to the Powdermill Village until 10:00 p.m. at
which time he brought cruiser #7 back to the police station. (Testimony of Dickinson
32. Dickinson then asked the Appellant if he was involved in an accident or whether he
bumped into anything with cruiser #7. The Appellant replied “no”. (Testimony of
33. Dickinson believed the Appellant’s answer and at 2:34 p.m. on October 5, 2009,
Boldini sent an e-mail to all personnel asking if anyone was driving in the area of the
salt pile on Union Street. (Testimony of Dickinson and Boldini and Appointing
34. There was no response to Boldini’s e-mail to all personnel. (Testimony of Boldini)
35. When there was no response to Boldini’s e-mails, Captain Michael McCabe and
Dickinson, at separate times asked Detective Todd Edwards to view the videotape of
36. On October 5, 2009, Edwards viewed videotape footage of the police parking lot
from 8:00 a.m. October 4, 2009 to 7:00 a.m. October 5, 2009. Edwards is responsible
for maintaining the police video tape system. Edwards observed Lt. Lawrence
Valliere take cruiser #7 at noon on October 4, 2009 and return said cruiser at
approximately 12:50 P.M. Edwards observed that Valliere did not inspect said
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cruiser before taking it. Edwards observed no damage to cruiser #7 upon Valliere’s
return. Edwards observed the Appellant driving cruiser #7 out of the police parking
lot at 4:00 P.M. on October 4, 2009, and Edwards also observed Heather getting into
cruiser #7 with the Appellant. Edwards observed that the Appellant returned cruiser
whether there was damage due to darkness. Edwards observed that the Appellant did
not inspect the vehicle prior to and after his shift. Edwards observed that cruiser #7
was not moved from 10:00 p.m. on October 4, 2009 through 7:00 a.m. on October 5,
Edwards)
37. After being told by Boldini that the Appellant was the last person to take cruiser #7
and being told by Edwards that said cruiser was not moved after the Appellant
returned said cruiser, Dickinson made a second call to the Appellant. Dickinson
asked the Appellant whether he was sure that nothing happened when he had cruiser
#7. Dickinson asked the Appellant if maybe he bumped into something accidentally
38. The Appellant stated that nothing happened and that he simply performed traffic
Exhibit 1)
39. After talking with Dickinson on Monday, October 5th, the Appellant placed a phone
call to Heather while she was at school. Heather and the Appellant offered divergent
testimony regarding what was said during that phone call. (Testimony of Appellant
and Heather)
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40. The Appellant testified that since he planned on calling Heather in any event to confer
about the upcoming week of events, he decided to take the opportunity to confirm
that nothing had happened to the vehicle the previous evening. According to the
Appellant, he asked Heather whether at any time the previous evening, “did anybody
hit us? Did we back into anything? When I was out of the cruiser, when I left you in
the car, did someone bump into us from behind, anything like that?” According to
the Appellant, Heather responded by saying that no, they were not in an accident.
The Appellant testified that, based on Heather’s answers, he then said to her: “ …
well, if anyone calls you, if Steve calls you, tell – you know tell him we weren’t
involved in an accident or, you know, we didn’t damage the car. Obviously, you
don’t have to tell him that I did – that I went into the barn and spun around with you
in the cruiser. You don’t have to offer him – you know, don’t tell him that.”
(Testimony of Appellant)
Heather, the Appellant did not call her to discuss Explorer business. He called her at
school and asked her if Sergeant Dickinson had called her and she said no. The
Appellant then told Heather, “If he does and if he’s joking around or anything,
nothing happened during the ride-along or [you] don’t know anything.” Heather
testified that she “just agreed with him,” but “felt like something was going on” and
42. I credit the testimony of Heather regarding the phone conversation between her and
the Appellant on October 5th. The Appellant’s insistence that the primary purpose of
the call was to discuss Explorer business is not credible. Moreover, Heather’s version
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of what was said during that phone conversation rang true to me, but the Appellant’s
43. Shortly after speaking with the Appellant, Heather received a call from Sergeant
Dickinson who asked her what happened during her ride along with the Appellant.
Heather replied that they ran radar on Union Street, during which time, they stopped
two (2) vehicles; one while driving on Union Street and the other while they were
parked at the salt piles on Union Street. Dickinson asked Heather whether they may
have bumped into something at the salt piles and Heather replied “not that she was
aware of.” Because of Heather’s qualified statement, Dickinson met with the
October 5, 2009, to make a third inquiry regarding the damage to cruiser #7.
(Testimony of Dickinson)
44. Dickinson asked the Appellant whether he remembered bumping into anything with
cruiser #7 and again the Appellant responded “No”. Dickinson asked the Appellant if
he noticed the condition of cruiser #7 and the Appellant said that the car was filthy
45. At approximately 8:30 P.M. on October 5, 2009, Dickinson spoke with Heather in
person and asked if she was aware of the condition of cruiser #7 when she went for a
ride-along with the Appellant and Heather said “No”. Heather also responded that
she was not aware of any accidental bumping or spraying of salt; and that if
something did happen she did not know. Dickinson concluded that he was not getting
all of the information regarding what happened on Heather’s ride-along with the
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Appellant on October 4, 2009. (Testimony of Dickinson and Appointing Authority
Exhibit 1)
46. On October 6, 2009, Dickinson submitted his report to Captain Michael McCabe
explaining the details of his investigation into the damage to cruiser #7. (Testimony
47. Sergeant Dickinson was a good witness and I credit his testimony. His answers were
responsive to the questions posed to him and he had a good recollection of events,
when they occurred and what was said during the various conversations referenced
above. Further, he appears to have no ulterior motive for testifying against the
Appellant, whom he described as a hard working officer who has done an outstanding
48. On October 6, 2009, after reviewing Dickinson’s report, McCabe questioned two of
the three officers that used cruiser #7 from the period of October 3, 2009 and October
McCabe)
49. Both LaValley and Valliere told McCabe that they had not damaged cruiser #7.
(Testimonty of McCabe)
50. At approximately 3:00 P.M. on October 6, 2009, McCabe visited the Tekoa Country
Club to speak with Heather regarding the damage to the cruiser. (McCabe Testimony
51. Heather told McCabe that she did not remember hitting anything but that she could
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52. After making these statements to McCabe, Heather called her mother and sought her
advice. After talking with her mother, Heather called Dickinson and told him that,
while she was in cruiser #7, the Appellant drove said cruiser into the salt barn on
Union Street and drove the car pretty fast and then stepped on the brakes thereby
making the cruiser spin out on the salt and hitting or tapping a salt pile. (Testimony of
53. Heather also told Dickinson about the Appellant’s phone call to her the day before.
(Testimony of Dickinson)
54. After Heather divulged this information to Dickinson, Dickinson (per McCabe’s
55. Heather testified that if the Appellant had not influenced her otherwise that she would
have initially divulged what she knew regarding the damage to cruiser #7. (Testimony
of Heather)
56. On or about October 15, 2009, McCabe met with the Appellant, in the presence of the
Appellant’s counsel at the time. According to McCabe, he asked the Appellant the
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57. McCabe then told the Appellant that this was not the conclusion that he (McCabe)
had drawn after looking at the damage to the vehicle and talking to Heather.
(Testimony of McCabe)
58. McCabe then asked the Appellant to describe his driving activities on the night in
question. The Appellant responded by saying that he ran radar and that there was
59. McCabe then asked the Appellant if he did any “spins” or erratic driving in the salt
barn or the storage location that night. When the Appellant “basically didn’t answer
the question”, [McCabe] pointed out that Heather said he had been doing
“doughnuts” in the salt barn that night. McCabe then asked the Appellant if that
could have possibly caused the damage and the Appellant said, “no”. (Testimony of
McCabe)
60. During the same discussion, the Appellant initially told McCabe that he never called
Heather. Several minutes later, the Appellant contradicted himself and said that he
61. On or about October 15, 2009, McCabe prepared a report which he submitted to
Police Chief John Camerota indicating his [McCabe’s] findings that the Appellant
had violated numerous provisions of the Westfield Police Rules and Regulations,
including but not limited to, Rule 5.2 Truthfulness and Rule 2.3 Conduct
#3).
62. McCabe stated that he believed that the Appellant knew that his driving actions
caused the damage to cruiser #7 and that the Appellant never disclosed his driving
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actions to Dickinson despite the fact he was asked on three (3) separate occasions.
(Appointing Authority Exhibit #3). McCabe also stated his belief that the Appellant’s
conduct of calling Heather and asking her not to say anything to Dickinson about the
Appellant’s driving of the car on the night in question was particularly egregious
given that the Appellant had charge of the Explorer group and is supposed to be a role
model for explorers. (Testimony of McCabe and Appointing Authority Exhibit #3)
63. Captain McCabe was also a good witness and I credit his testimony. He has over
twenty-five (25) years of experience with the Westfield Police Department and has
was able to provide detailed answers that rang true to me. Although he stated during
result of prior charges against the Appellant (none of which were sustained), I do not
believe that it influenced his investigation of this matter and/or his conclusions.
64. After reviewing reports from Dickinson and McCabe, Camerota believed that a
charge of untruthfulness existed, and that the charge was beyond his level of
65. As a result, Camerota sent written notice to the Appellant dated October 27, 2009
stating that a hearing was scheduled for November 9, 2009 before the Appointing
Camerota and determine any discipline. 3 Enclosed with said written notice was a
3
The Appellant filed an appeal alleging that the Appointing Authority failed to comply with G.L. c. 31,
§42. Such appeal was dismissed by vote of this Commission on January 7, 2010.
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66. The Appointing Authority conducted a disciplinary hearing on November 9, 2009 and
the Appellant was present with legal counsel. (Appointing Authority Exhibit 9)
67. Camerota informed the Appointing Authority of his opinion [Camerota’s] that the
Appellant’s lack of truthfulness during the course of the police investigation into the
damage of cruiser #7, together with the fact that the Appellant called Heather to
instruct and/or influence her not to divulge what she knew as how said cruiser was
68. On November 12, 2009, the Police Commission sent its decision to the Appellant
“The reasons for this decision to terminate your employment are your violations
of:
This Commission has found that you were not truthful during the course of a
police investigation regarding damage to police cruiser 7 that occurred on
October 4, 2009 and that you engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer
when you contacted the female 18 year old police explorer (who was riding with
you on that date) and requested, instructed, and/or otherwise influenced her
not to cooperate with or divulge information to the officers investigating
the damage to said police cruiser.” (Exhibit 10)
69. The Appellant filed a timely appeal of the Appointing Authority’s decision to the
CONCLUSION
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concerned shall be returned to his position without loss of compensation or other
rights; provided, however, if the employee by a preponderance of evidence,
establishes that said action was based upon harmful error in the application of the
appointing authority’s procedure, an error of law, or upon any factor or conduct
on the part of the employee not reasonably related to the fitness of the employee
to perform in his position, said action shall not be sustained, and the person shall
be returned to his position without loss of compensation or other rights. The
commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority.”
credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind; guided by common sense and
by correct rules of law." Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359
Mass. 211, 214 (1971); Cambridge v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 300, 304,
rev.den., 426 Mass. 1102, (1997); Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262
Mass. 477, 482 (1928). The Commission determines justification for discipline by
inquiring, "whether the employee has been guilty of substantial misconduct which
adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service." School
Comm. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 488, rev.den., 426 Mass. 1104
(1997); Murray v. Second Dist. Ct., 389 Mass. 508, 514 (1983)
satisfied "if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in
its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal
notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there." Tucker v. Pearlstein, 334 Mass.
making its de novo findings of fact . . . the commission does not act without regard to the
previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was
reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the
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circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority
made its decision’”, which may include an adverse inference against a complainant who
fails to testify at the hearing before the appointing authority. Falmouth v. Civil Service
Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006). See Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331,
Under Section 43, the Commission is required “to conduct a de novo hearing for the
purpose of finding the facts anew.” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814,
823 (2006) and cases cited. The role of the Commission is to determine "whether the
appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable
justification for the action taken by the appointing authority." Cambridge v. Civil Service
Comm’n, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 300, 304, rev.den., 426 Mass. 1102, (1997). See also
Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728, rev.den., 440 Mass. 1108, 799
N.E.2d 594 (2003); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 411, rev.den.
(2000); McIsaac v. Civil Service Comm’n, 38 Mass App.Ct. 473, 477 (1995); Town of
By a preponderance of the evidence, the Appointing Authority has shown that it had
reasonable justification for disciplining the Appellant for untruthfulness and conduct
unbecoming a police officer. I base this conclusion largely on the credible testimony of
the City’s witnesses, including Heather, the 17-year old police “explorer”. It is the
function of the hearing officer to determine the credibility of the testimony presented
before him. See Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 401
Mass. 526, 529 (1988); Doherty v. Retirement Bd. Of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 141
(1997). See also Covell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 439 Mass. 766, 787 (2003); (In cases
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where live witnesses giving different versions do testify at an agency hearing, a decision
was not present at the hearing); Connor v. Connor, 77 A. 2d. 697 (1951) (the opportunity
credibility).
The Appellant, the father of six (6) children, is a war veteran who has served our
country with distinction. For that, he has this Commissioner’s admiration and gratitude.
That distinguished military service, however, and his commendations for bravery as a
member of the Westfield Police Department, do not exempt him from the professional
On the evening of Sunday, October 4, 2009, the Appellant had arranged for Heather, a
17-year old member of the high school “Explorer” program, to join him on a “ride-a-
long”. The Appellant was justifiably proud of his efforts to rebuild the local Explorer
program. Over a period of several months, he had recruited additional student members,
bolstered the group’s fundraising and re-instituted meetings and other activities such as
ride-a-longs.
Most of the October 4th ride-along was routine and uneventful, including two (2)
traffic stops at which the Appellant gave verbal warnings to motorists. On two (2)
different occasions that night, however, the Appellant inexplicably engaged in reckless
behavior, by driving his cruiser into a salt barn and performing “spins” or “doughnuts”.
reckless behavior, however, was not the basis of the Appellant’s termination. In fact,
there is little doubt that his behavior in the salt barn that night, alone, likely would have
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resulted in nothing more than a relatively minor disciplinary action against him. The
basis for termination was the Appellant’s subsequent untruthful statements regarding
what occurred on the night of October 4th (untruthfulness) and his attempt to discourage
the 17-year old Explorer from providing accurate information to police investigators
On the second charge, even the Appellant acknowledges that he contacted Heather
while she was at school after he learned that questions were being raised about what
occurred on the night of October 4th. He acknowledges telling Heather during that
conversation, “ … you don’t have to tell him that I did – that I went into the barn and
spun around with you in the cruiser. You don’t have to offer him – you know, don’t tell
him that.” Even if I were to accept the Appellant’s version of this conversation, which I
do not, his admitted statements constitute conduct unbecoming an officer. That the
Appellant, a 45-year old police officer, who was in charge of the Explorer program,
advised a 17-year old high school student to withhold information during a police
In regard to the charge of untruthfulness, the Appellant maintains that since he was not
aware that the cruiser was damaged or whether he actually caused the damage, that his
statements denying any responsibility for such damage were truthful. Unfortunately for
the Appellant, his untruthfulness pervaded the entire investigation, and was not strictly
limited to his answer to the question of whether or not he damaged the cruiser.
Even after the Appellant was aware that questions were being raised regarding what
occurred on October 4th, the Appellant, during a second phone call with Sergeant
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Dickinson, told Dickinson that nothing happened and that he simply performed traffic
The Appellant was subsequently asked a series of open-ended questions about the
night of October 4th by Captain McCabe, including: 1) Are there any circumstances that
you can think of that would cause the damage to car 7; and 2) Could any of your driving
activities have led to the damage to Car 7? Each time, the Appellant stated “no” and
failed to mention that he performed “spins” and “doughnuts” in the salt barn (which he
Even after being told that Heather had provided a conflicting story, the Appellant,
when asked to describe his driving activities on the night in question by Captain McCabe,
stated that “nothing out of the ordinary” occurred that night. (Finding 58)
During the same discussion, the Appellant initially told McCabe that he never called
Heather. Several minutes later, the Appellant contradicted himself and said that he
untruthful during a police investigation. An appointing authority is well within its rights
to take disciplinary action when a police officer has “a demonstrated willingness to fudge
the truth in exigent circumstances” because “[p]olice work frequently calls upon officers
to speak the truth when doing so might put into question a search or embarrass a fellow
officer.” See Falmouth at. 796, 801; citing Cambridge, supra at 303.
The Commission has recognized that a police officer must be truthful at all times and
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termination. LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998), citing Bryson v. United
States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969). The Commission has stated that “it is well settled that police
officers voluntarily undertake to adhere to a higher standard of conduct than that imposed
there “is a strong public policy against employing police officers who are untruthful.”
Royston v., 19 MCSR 124, 128 (2006). Therefore, “a police officer that has lost his
credibility can no longer effectively perform the duties of the position.” Pearson v.
Whitman, 16 MCSR 46, 50 (2003). As a result, the Commission has often upheld a
Having determined that it was appropriate to discipline the Appellant, the Commission
must determine if the City was justified in the level of discipline imposed, which, in this
treatment of similarly situated individuals’ [both within and across different appointing
authorities]” as well as the “underlying purpose of the civil service system ‘to guard
decisions.’ ” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006) and cases
cited. Even if there are past instances where other employees received more lenient
sanctions for similar misconduct, however, the Commission is not charged with a duty to
4
See Royston v. Billerica, 19 MCSR at 128-29 (upholding discharge of police officer who “knowingly lied to the Chief during a
departmental investigation to cover up” his own misconduct); Garrett v. Haverhill, 18 MCSR at 385-86 (reasonable justification for
discharge of police officer who repeatedly presented false testimony during departmental investigation of officer’s misconduct);
Meaney v. Woburn, 18 MCSR 129, 133-35 (discharge upheld for police officer based, in part, on officer’s consistent dishonesty and
“selective memory” during departmental investigation of officer’s misconduct); Pearson v. Whitman, 16 MCSR at 49-50 (appointing
authority’s discharge of police officer who had “a problem with telling the truth” upheld); Eisenbeiser v. West Springfield, 7 MCSR
99, 104 (discharge upheld based, in part, on officer’s dishonesty as his misconduct was ongoing, intentional and showed no signs of
improvement).
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fine-tune employees’ suspensions to ensure perfect uniformity. See Boston Police Dep’t
“The ‘power accorded the commission to modify penalties must not be confused with
the power to impose penalties ab initio, which is a power accorded the appointing
authority.’” Falmouth v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 800 (2004) quoting
Police Comm’r v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 594, 600 (1996). Unless the
Commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the appointing
authority or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way, the commission is
not free to “substitute its judgment” for that of the appointing authority, and “cannot
modify a penalty on the basis of essentially similar fact finding without an adequate
explanation” E.g., Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006).
I have, based on the testimony of credible witnesses and the documentary evidence
submitted, reached essentially the same findings as the City. Specifically, I have found
that the Appellant engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer and that he was untruthful
Although the Appellant has no prior disciplinary history, that does not warrant the
termination.
For all of the above reasons, the Appellant’s appeal under D1-09-406 is hereby
dismissed.
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Civil Service Commission
________________________________
Christopher C. Bowman, Chairman
___________________
Commissioner
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of the receipt of this decision. Under the
pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a
clerical or mechanical error in the decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may
have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration shall be deemed a motion for
rehearing in accordance with G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1) for the purpose of tolling the time for appeal.
Under the provisions of G.L c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by a final decision or order of the Commission
may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30)
days after receipt of such order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless
specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Commission’s order or decision.
Notice:
Thomas John Rooke, Esq. (for Appellant)
Kathleen Degnan, Esq. (for Appointing Authority)
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