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ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was
among others, that the right to file a separate action in this procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court to exempt
AVAILABLE REMEDIES case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they
of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005 appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint vindicate,i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed caused by private respondents for which no civil liability had
SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, within the prescriptive period. been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to
MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO file a separate civil action.
FERRER, Petitioners, The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal
vs. ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. In their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the
and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, averments in the complaint make out a cause of action
represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
President/Chairman, Respondent. file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years
DECISION dismissed on the ground of prescription.5 should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
TINGA, J.:
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated March 1, for dismissal of the complaint as summons was served be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages
2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court of through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that the
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, without mentioning her designation or position. subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article
respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation
denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the
dismissal of their complaint to recover civil indemnity for the again that the complaint is not based on quasi delictbut on criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case
death and physical injuries of their kin. the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which was made.
prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.6 The trial court denied petitioners motion for Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the
The following facts are matters of record. reconsideration reiterating that petitioners cause of action Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as petitioners
was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more Moreover, they point out several other procedural lapses
(Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting than four (4) years after the vehicular accident. 7 As regards allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of
to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in the improper service of summons, the trial court certification against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be original or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial
Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite dismissed on this ground. court; and non-indication of the full names and addresses of
Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and petitioners in the petition.
three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the choice or Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14, 2002, while
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and mode of appeal.8 The appellate court also denied petitioners private respondents filed a Rejoinder12 dated October 14,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if the 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of
two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is still We grant the petition.
separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was not the permissible remedy as appeal was available to
made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person
promulgated on December 17, 1998.2 brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 13 Such civil
of certiorari in lieu of appeal.9 liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for caused and indemnification of consequential
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the damages.14 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the
Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising from the criminal action, subject to three notable
file a separate civil action. 3 They cited therein the judgment criminal liability of private respondents. Petitioners insist that exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the
convicting Sibayan. the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex right to recover damages from the accused; second, when
delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court the offended party reserves his right to have the civil
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it damages determined in a separate action in order to take full
of improper service of summons, prescription and laches, insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is control and direction of the prosecution of his cause;
and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had andthird, when the injured party actually exercises the right
sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a
view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
officers.4 finality of the judgment of conviction.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to
amended in 1988, which governed the institution of the the time of the accident. enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states: A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa
therein are consistent with petitioners claim that the action aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to
prior to the criminal action. complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the party has the choice between an action to enforce civil convicting the employee.
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the and an action for quasi delictunder the Civil Code. Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed
same act or omission of the accused. the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations
The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss17 and
said civil actions separately waives the others. the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, motion for reconsideration 18 of the order of dismissal,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractualor from crime.
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, andculpa This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
reservation. the injured party is granted a right to file an action actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of
independent and distinct from the criminal action under multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice Article 33 of the Civil Code.15 Either of these liabilities may same act or omission of the offender.19 However, since the
for the same act or omission of the accused. be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under stale action for damages based on quasi delictshould be
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability damages twice for the same act or omission of the to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only
against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or defendant and the similar proscription against double recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as recovery under the Rules above-quoted. delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the against double recovery for obvious reasons.
judgment except in an award for actual damages. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this
case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial court
is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding remaining avenue opened for them by their instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing reservation, i.e.,the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be
thereof in court for trial. is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the promote their fundamental objective of securing substantial
civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action justice.20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file
had been expressly reserved. indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final
a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by
Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is
trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16 was our duty to prevent such an injustice.21
any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability. decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La
Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING
imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and
made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively
their reservation to file a separate civil action made in the
action. The driver was convicted which conviction was dismissing the present action and denying petitioners motion
criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court
against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman.
action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be
Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they
dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO
seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from
instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the ORDERED.
crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the
accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently,
allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on the RULES GOVERNING RESERVATION
same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was based
subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court
on quasi delictand should have been brought within four (4)
dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI- The Court's Ruling However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil
ECCI), petitioner, liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
vs. On the first issue, Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme Court arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached changed.
RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of
VILLEGAS, respondents. Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994 11 by Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the
PARDO, J.: extending the requirement to all initiatory pleadings filed in offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action
all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
The Case Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI prior to the criminal action.17
Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the Respondent Villegas' failure to attach a certificate of non-
annulment of the order1 of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis forum shopping in her complaint did not violate Circular No. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the
Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration 28-91, because at the time of filing, the requirement applied independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus reversing the only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and
previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214. of Appeals.12 Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the
inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
March 29, 1994, three days before April 1, 1994, the date of This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles
The Facts effectivity of the circular.13 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which may be
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes prosecuted separately even without a reservation."18
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury
information for estafa2 against Carmen Mandawe for alleged produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the
of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the "Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, crime which injury is sought to be compensated through independently. In the cases provided in Articles
for deposit with the teller of petitioner. indemnity which is civil in nature.14 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, liable."15 This is the law governing the recovery of civil independently of the criminal action and shall
Branch 20, a complaint3 against Carmen Mandawe and liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, case, however, may the offended party recover
preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. and indemnification of consequential damages.16 damages twice for the same act or omission
In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on charged in the criminal action."
the following grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused
case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and (2) arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
that the complaint failed to contain a certification against case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the pertaining to independent civil actions which became
forum shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. criminal action or is separately instituted. effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
28-91.4
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
order5 dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On January 21, provides that: There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.19
1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 6 of the
order. "(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from for damages on account of the fraud committed against
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an the offense charged shall be deemed instituted respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may
order7 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration, with the criminal action unless the offended party proceed independently even if there was no reservation as
thereby recalling the dismissal of the case. waives the civil action, reserves the right to to its filing.
institute it separately or institutes the civil action
Hence, this petition.8 prior to the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied] The Fallo
The Issues Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court
AFFIRMS the order dated February 21, 1997.20
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff's failure to "After the criminal action has been
attach a certification against forum shopping in the complaint commenced, the separate civil action arising No costs. SO ORDERED.
is a ground to dismiss the case; 9 and, (2) whether the civil therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
case could proceed independently of the criminal case for has been entered in the criminal action." G.R. No. 160286. July 30, 2004
estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action. [Emphasis supplied]
SPOUSES FRANCISCO M. HERNANDEZ and ANICETA held liable because as employers they exercised due care in b) P25,000.00 for hospitalization and medical expenses they
ABEL-HERNANDEZ and JUAN the selection and supervision of their employee. incurred for the treatment of their son, Fred Panopio.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
LORENZO DOLOR and MARGARITA DOLOR, During the trial of the case, it was established that the 4) To Fred Panopio:
FRED PANOPIO, JOSEPH SANDOVAL, RENE drivers of the two vehicles were duly licensed to drive and
CASTILLO, SPOUSES FRANCISCO that the road where the collision occurred was asphalted and a) P25,000.00 for the loss of his
VALMOCINA and VIRGINIA VALMOCINA, in fairly good condition.[6] The owner-type jeep was travelling right leg;
SPOUSES VICTOR PANOPIO and MARTINA uphill while the passenger jeepney was going downhill. It b) P10,000.00 as moral damages.
PANOPIO, and HON. COURT OF was further established that the owner-type jeep was 5) To Joseph Sandoval:
APPEALS, respondents. moderately moving and had just passed a road bend when
DECISION its passengers, private respondents Joseph Sandoval and
a) P4,000.00 for medical treatment.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Rene Castillo, saw the passenger jeepney at a distance of
three meters away. The passenger jeepney was traveling
The defendants are further directed to pay the costs of this
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules fast when it bumped the owner type jeep. [7] Moreover, the
proceedings.
of Court seeking the reversal of the decision [1] of the Court of evidence presented by respondents before the trial court
Appeals, dated April 29, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60357, showed that petitioner Juan Gonzales obtained his
professional drivers license only on September 24, 1986, or SO ORDERED.[9]
which affirmed with modification the amount of damages
awarded in the November 24, 1997 decision [2] of the three months before the accident. Prior to this, he was
holder of a student drivers permit issued on April 10, 1986.[8] Petitioners appealed[10] the decision to the Court of
Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch IV.
Appeals, which affirmed the same with modifications as to
On November 24, 1997, the trial court rendered a the amount of damages, actual expenses and attorneys fees
The undisputed facts are as follows: decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of awarded to the private respondents. The decretal portion of
which states: the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
At about 3:00 p.m. of December 19, 1986, Lorenzo
Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr. was driving an owner-type jeepney Premises duly considered and the plaintiffs having WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
with plate no. DEB 804 owned by her mother, Margarita, satisfactorily convincingly and credibly presented evidence appealed decision is AFFIRMED. However, the award for
towards Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing the road at clearly satisfying the requirements of preponderance of damages, actual expenses and attorneys fees shall be
Barangay Anilao East, Mabini, Batangas, his vehicle collided evidence to sustain the complaint, this Court hereby MODIFIED as follows:
with a passenger jeepney bearing plate no. DEG 648, driven declares judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
by petitioner Juan Gonzales and owned by his co-petitioner defendants. Defendants-spouses Francisco Hernandez and 1) To spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita Dolor:
Francisco Hernandez, which was travelling towards Aniceta Abel Hernandez and Juan Gonzales are therefore
Batangas City. directed to pay jointly and severally, the following: a) P50,000.00 civil indemnity for their son Lorenzo Menard
Dolor, Jr.;
Boyet Dolor and his passenger, Oscar Valmocina, died 1) To spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita Dolor: b) P58,703.00 as actual and
as a result of the collision. Fred Panopio, Rene Castillo and necessary funeral expenses;
Joseph Sandoval, who were also on board the owner-type a) P50,000.00 for the death of their son, Lorenzo Menard c) P25,000,00 as temperate
jeep, which was totally wrecked, suffered physical Boyet Dolor, Jr.; damages;
injuries. The collision also damaged the passenger jeepney b) P142,000.00 as actual and d) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
of Francisco Hernandez and caused physical injuries to its necessary funeral expenses; e) P20,000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses and
passengers, namely, Virgie Cadavida, Fiscal Artemio Reyes c) P50,000.00 reasonable value of attorneys fees.
and Francisca Corona.[3] the totally wrecked owner-type jeep
with plate no. DEB 804 Phil 85; 2) To Spouses Francisco Valmocina and Virginia Valmocina:
Consequently, respondents commenced an action[4] for d) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court e) P20,000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses and a) P50,000.00 civil indemnity for
of Batangas City, alleging that driver Juan Gonzales was attorneys fees. the death of their son, Oscar Valmocina;
guilty of negligence and lack of care and that the Hernandez
b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
spouses were guilty of negligence in the selection and
2) To spouses Francisco Valmocina and Virginia Valmocina: c) P10,000.00 as temperate
supervision of their employees.[5]
damages;
Petitioners countered that the proximate cause of the a) P50,000.00 for the death of their d) P10,000.00 as reasonable
death and injuries sustained by the passengers of both son, Oscar Balmocina (sic); litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet Dolor, the driver of b) P20,000.00 as moral damages; 3) To Spouses Victor Panopio and Martina Panopio:
the owner-type jeepney, who was driving in a zigzagging c) P18,400.00 for funeral expenses;
manner under the influence of alcohol. Petitioners also d) P10,000.00 for litigation a) P10,352.59 as actual hospitalization and medical
alleged that Gonzales was not the driver-employee of the expenses and attorneys fees. expenses;
Hernandez spouses as the former only leased the 3) To spouses Victor Panopio and Martina Panopio: b) P5,000.00 as temperate damages.
passenger jeepney on a daily basis. The Hernandez
spouses further claimed that even if an employer-employee a) P10,450.00 for the cost of the artificial leg and crutches 4) To Fred Panopio:
relationship is found to exist between them, they cannot be being used by their son Fred Panopio;
a) P50,000.00 as moral damages. ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is tortfeasors is solidary.[12] Verily, under Article 2180 of the Civil
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but Code, an employer may be held solidarily liable for the
5) To Joseph Sandoval: also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. negligent act of his employee.[13]
a) P3,000.00 as temperate damages. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the The solidary liability of employers with their employees
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the for quasi-delicts having been established, the next question
minor children who live in their company. is whether Julian Gonzales is an employee of the Hernandez
SO ORDERED.[11]
spouses. An affirmative answer will put to rest any issue on
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or the solidary liability of the Hernandez spouses for the acts of
Hence the present petition raising the following issues:
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live Julian Gonzales. The Hernandez spouses maintained that
1. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct when it in their company. Julian Gonzales is not their employee since their relationship
pronounced the Hernandez spouses as solidarily liable with relative to the use of the jeepney is that of a lessor and a
Juan Gonzales, although it is of record that they were not in lessee. They argue that Julian Gonzales pays them a daily
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
the passenger jeepney driven by latter when the accident rental of P150.00 for the use of the jeepney. [14] In essence,
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
occurred; petitioners are practicing the boundary system of jeepney
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
operation albeit disguised as a lease agreement between
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
them for the use of the jeepney.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding
temperate damages to private respondents namely the Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by We hold that an employer-employee relationship exists
Spouses Dolor, Spouses Valmocina and Spouses Panopio their employees and household helpers acting within between the Hernandez spouses and Julian Gonzales.
and to Joseph Sandoval, although the grant of temperate the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
damages is not provided for in decision of the court a quo; former are not engaged in any business or industry. Indeed to exempt from liability the owner of a public
vehicle who operates it under the boundary system on the
3. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in increasing The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to abet
the award of moral damages to respondents, Spouses Dolor, a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused flagrant violations of the Public Service Law, but also to
Spouses Valmocina and Fred Panopio; by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be irresponsible drivers reckless because the measure of their
4. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the applicable. earnings depends largely upon the number of trips they
grant of attorneys fees to Spouses Dolor and to Spouses make and, hence, the speed at which they drive; and
Valmocina although the lower court did not specify the fact Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and irresponsible because most if not all of them are in no
and the law on which it is based. trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and position to pay the damages they might cause.[15]
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
Petitioners contend that the absence of the Hernandez custody. Anent the award of temperate damages to the private
spouses inside the passenger jeepney at the time of the respondents, we hold that the appellate court committed no
collision militates against holding them solidarily liable with reversible error in awarding the same to the respondents.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
their co-petitioner, Juan Gonzales, invoking Article 2184 of the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all Temperate or moderate damages are damages which
the Civil Code, which provides: the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent are more than nominal but less than compensatory which
damage. (Underscoring supplied) may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
On the other hand, Article 2176 provides nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[16] Temperate
vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a damages are awarded for those cases where, from the
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the offered, although the court is convinced that there has been
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
next preceding two months. such loss. A judge should be empowered to calculate
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a moderate damages in such cases, rather than the plaintiff
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this should suffer, without redress, from the defendants wrongful
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Chapter. act.[17] The assessment of temperate damages is left to the
article 2180 are applicable.
sound discretion of the court provided that such an award is
While the above provisions of law do not expressly reasonable under the circumstances.[18]
The Hernandez spouses argues that since they were provide for solidary liability, the same can be inferred from
not inside the jeepney at the time of the collision, the the wordings of the first paragraph of Article 2180 which We have gone through the records of this case and we
provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which does not states that the obligation imposed by article 2176 is find that, indeed, respondents suffered losses which cannot
provide for solidary liability between employers and demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but be quantified in monetary terms. These losses came in the
employees, should be applied. also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. form of the damage sustained by the owner type jeep of the
Dolor spouses; the internment and burial of Oscar
We are not persuaded. Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with Article Valmocina; the hospitalization of Joseph Sandoval on
2194 of the same Code, which categorically states that the account of the injuries he sustained from the collision and
Article 2180 provides: responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the artificial leg and crutches that respondent Fred Panopio
quasi-delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint had to use because of the amputation of his right leg.
Further, we find that the amount of temperate damages left to speculation and conjecture (Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case
awarded to the respondents were reasonable under the SCRA 337; Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The
circumstances. Appeals, 173 SCRA 619). accusatory portion reads:
As to the amount of moral damages which was In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis That sometime in December
awarded to respondents, a review of the records of this case for sustaining the award for attorneys fees and to adjudge its 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
shows that there exists no cogent reason to overturn the payment by petitioner. x x x. the said accused, did then and there
action of the appellate court on this aspect. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Company, or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply
Under Article 2206, the spouse, legitimate and
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that: on account or for value Landbank Check
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996
may demand moral damages for mental anguish for the
In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970, payable to cash in the amount
death of the deceased. The reason for the grant of moral
January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57], the Court had occasion to of P336,000.00 said accused well
damages has been explained, thus:
state that [t]he reason for the award of attorneys fees must knowing that at the time of issue
. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, be stated in the text of the courts decision, otherwise, if it is she/he/they did not have sufficient funds
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the in or credit with the drawee bank for
therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering same must be disallowed on appeal. x x x.[24] payment of such check in full upon its
inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the presentment, which check when
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed presented for payment within ninety (90)
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the days from the date thereof was
wealth or means of the offender.[19] MODIFICATION that the grant of attorneys fees is DELETED subsequently dishonored by the drawee
for lack of basis. bank for Account Closed and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan
enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are
the amount of the check or to make
awarded to allow the former to obtain means, diversion or
arrangement for full payment of the
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
same within five (5) banking days after
he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and
HEIRS OF EDUARDO G.R. No. 157547 receiving said notice.
must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.[20]
SIMON,
Truly, the pain of the sudden loss of ones offspring, Petitioners, Present: CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
especially of a son who was in the prime of his youth, and
who holds so much promise waiting to be fulfilled is indeed a BRION, Acting Chairperson,**
wellspring of intense pain which no parent should be made BERSAMIN, More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000,
to suffer. While it is true that there can be no exact or -versus - ABAD,*** respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC
uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the VILLARAMA, JR., and in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal
measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise SERENO, JJ. amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a
mathematical calculation,[21] we hold that the Court of writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No.
Appeals award of moral damages of P100,000.00 each to Promulgated: 915-00).[2] He alleged in his complaint the following:
the Spouses Dolor and Spouses Valmocina for the death of ELVIN* CHAN AND THE
their respective sons, Boyet Dolor and Oscar Valmocina, is COURT OF APPEALS, February 23, 2011 xxx
in full accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[22] Respondent. 2. Sometime in December 1996
defendant employing fraud, deceit, and
With respect to the award of attorneys fees to x------------------------------------------------------------------------------- misrepresentation encashed a check
respondents, no sufficient basis was established for the ----------x dated December 26, 1996 in the amount
grant thereof. of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring
DECISION the latter that the check is duly funded
It is well settled that attorneys fees should not be and that he had an existing account with
awarded in the absence of stipulation except under the BERSAMIN, J.: the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox
instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As copy of the said check is hereto
we have held in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v. There is no independent civil action to recover the attached as Annex A;
Court of Appeals:[23] civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 3. However, when said check
Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorneys fees to be 22 (BP 22). was presented for payment the same
awarded by a court when its claimant is compelled to litigate was dishonored on the ground that the
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest Antecedents account of the defendant with the Land
by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from Bank of the Philippines has been closed
whom it is sought. While judicial discretion is here extant, an On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor contrary to his representation that he
award thereof demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila has an existing account with the said
equitable justification. The matter cannot and should not be (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon
bank and that the said check was duly was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff 1. The sole ground upon which
funded and will be honored when attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.[4] defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiffs
presented for payment; complaint is the alleged pendency of
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion another action between the same
4. Demands had been made to to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment parties for the same cause, contending
the defendant for him to make good the bond for damages,[5] pertinently averring: among others that the pendency of
payment of the value of the check, xerox Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled
copy of the letter of demand is hereto xxx People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo
attached as Annex B, but despite such On the ground of litis pendentia, Simon renders this case dismissable;
demand defendant refused and that is, as a consequence of the
continues to refuse to comply with pendency of another action between the 2. The defendant further
plaintiffs valid demand; instant parties for the same cause contends that under Section 1, Rule 111
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing
5. Due to the unlawful failure of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled People of of the criminal action, the civil action for
the defendant to comply with the the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon, recovery of civil liability arising from the
plaintiffs valid demands, plaintiff has docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. offense charged is impliedly instituted
been compelled to retain the services of 275381-CR, the instant action is with the criminal action which the
counsel for which he agreed to pay as dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule plaintiff does not contest; however, it is
reasonable attorneys fees the amount 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx the submission of the plaintiff that an
ofP50,000.00 plus additional amount xxx implied reservation of the right to file a
of P2,000.00 per appearance. While the instant case is civil in civil action has already been made, first,
nature and character as by the fact that the information for
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF contradistinguished from the said violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No.
PRAYER Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the 2753841 does not at all make any
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, allegation of damages suffered by the
Branch X (10), the basis of the instant plaintiff nor is there any claim for
6. The defendant as previously civil action is the herein plaintiffs criminal recovery of damages; on top of this the
alleged has been guilty of fraud in complaint against defendant arising plaintiff as private complainant in the
contracting the obligation upon which from a charge of violation of Batas criminal case, during the presentation of
this action is brought and that there is Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the prosecution evidence was not
no sufficient security for the claims the alleged dishonor in plaintiffs hands represented at all by a private
sought in this action which fraud consist upon presentment for payment with prosecutor such that no evidence has
in the misrepresentation by the drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. been adduced by the prosecution on
defendant that he has an existing 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the criminal case to prove damages; all
account and sufficient funds to cover the the amount of P336,000- drawn of these we respectfully submit
check when in fact his account was allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant demonstrate an effective implied
already closed at the time he issued a who is the accused in said case, a reservation of the right of the plaintiff to
check; photocopy of the Criminal information file a separate civil action for damages;
filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of
7. That the plaintiff has a Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto 3. The defendant relies on
sufficient cause of action and this action attached and made integral part hereof Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of
is one which falls under Section 1, sub- as Annex 1. the Revised Rules of Court which
paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised mandates that after a criminal action
Rules of Court of the Philippines and the It is our understanding of the law has been commenced the civil action
amount due the plaintiff is as much as and the rules, that, when a criminal cannot be instituted until final judgment
the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the action is instituted, the civil action for has been rendered in the criminal
writ of preliminary attachment; recovery of civil liability arising from the action; however, the defendant
offense charged is impliedly instituted overlooks and conveniently failed to
8. That the plaintiff is willing and with the criminal action, unless the consider that under Section 2, Rule 111
able to post a bond conditioned upon offended party expressly waives the civil which provides as follows:
the payment of damages should it be action or reserves his right to institute it
finally found out that the plaintiff is not separately xxx. In the cases provided
entitled to the issuance of a writ of for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
preliminary attachment.[3] and 2177 of the Civil Code
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed of the Philippines, an
Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge independent civil action
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, stating: entirely separate and
in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by case since the liability of the defendant in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was
the injured party during the are imposed and the rights of the no private prosecutor during the
pendency of criminal case plaintiff are created by the negotiable presentation of prosecution evidence is
provided the right is instruments law, even without any unmeritorious. It is basic that when a
reserved as required in the reservation at all this instant action may complaint or criminal Information is filed,
preceding section. Such still be prosecuted; even without any allegation of damages
civil action shall proceed and the intention to prove and claim
independently of the 7. Having this shown, the merits them, the offended party has the right to
criminal prosecution, and of plaintiffs complaint the application for prove and claim for them, unless a
shall require only a damages against the bond is totally waiver or reservation is made or unless
preponderance of without any legal support and perforce in the meantime, the offended party has
evidence. should be dismissed outright.[6] instituted a separate civil action. xxx The
over-all import of the said provision
In as much as the case is one that falls conveys that the waiver which includes
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of On October 23, 2000, the MeTC indemnity under the Revised Penal
the Philippines as it is based on fraud, in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with Code, and damages arising under
this action therefore may be prosecuted application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code
independently of the criminal action; damages,[7] dismissing the complaint of Chan because: must be both clear and express. And
this must be logically so as the
4. In fact we would even venture xxx primordial objective of the Rule is to
to state that even without any After study of the arguments of prevent the offended party from
reservation at all of the right to file a the parties, the court resolves to GRANT recovering damages twice for the same
separate civil action still the plaintiff is the Motion to Dismiss and the act or omission of the accused.
authorized to file this instant case application to charge plaintiffs bond for
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an damages. Indeed, the evidence discloses
obligation which the defendant owes to that the plaintiff did not waive or made a
the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable For litis pendentia to be a reservation as to his right to pursue the
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case ground for the dismissal of an action, civil branch of the criminal case for
sued the defendant to enforce his the following requisites must concur: (a) violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff identity of parties or at least such as to defendant herein. To the considered
as payee of the check. Assuming the represent the same interest in both view of this court, the filing of the instant
allegation of the defendant of the actions; (b) identity of rights asserted complaint for sum of money is indeed
alleged circumstances relative to the and relief prayed for, the relief being legally barred. The right to institute a
issuance of the check, still when he founded on the same acts; and (c) the separate civil action shall be made
delivered the check payable to bearer to identity in the two (2) cases should be before the prosecution starts to present
that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was such that the judgment, which may be its evidence and under circumstances
payable to cash, the same may be rendered in one would, regardless of affording the offended party a
negotiated by delivery by who ever was which party is successful, amount to res reasonable opportunity to make such
the bearer of the check and such judicata in the other. xxx reservation. xxx
negotiation was valid and effective
against the drawer; A close perusal of the herein Even assuming the correctness
complaint denominated as Sum of of the plaintiffs submission that the
5. Indeed, assuming as true the Money and the criminal case for herein case for sum of money is one
allegations of the defendant regarding violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily based on fraud and hence falling under
the circumstances relative to the show that the parties are not only Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior
issuance of the check it would be identical but also the cause of action reservation is required by the Rules, to
entirely impossible for the plaintiff to being asserted, which is the recovery of wit:
have been aware that such check was the value of Landbank Check No.
intended only for a definite person and 0007280 in the amount of P336,000.00. In the cases provided
was not negotiable considering that the In both civil and criminal cases, the for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
said check was payable to bearer and rights asserted and relief prayed for, the and 2177 of the Civil Code
was not even crossed; reliefs being founded on the same facts, of the Philippines, an
are identical. independent civil action
6. We contend that what cannot entirely separate and
be prosecuted separate and apart from Plaintiffs claim that there is an distinct from the criminal
the criminal case without a reservation effective implied waiver of his right to action, may be brought by
is a civil action arising from the criminal pursue this civil case owing to the fact the injured party during the
offense charged. However, in this instant that there was no allegation of damages pendency of criminal case
provided the right is civil action, the Motion for
reserved as required in the Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of (a) When a criminal
preceding section. Such merit. action is instituted,
civil action shall proceed the civil action for
independently of the SO ORDERED. the recovery of civil
criminal prosecution, and liability arising from
shall require only a On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) the offense charged
preponderance of in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint, shall be deemed
evidence. disposing:[9] instituted with the
criminal action
xxx WHEREFORE, finding no error unless the offended
WHEREFORE, premises in the appealed decision, the same is party waives the
considered, the court resolves to: hereby AFFIRMED in toto. civil action,
reserves the right to
1. Dismiss the instant SO ORDERED. institute it
complaint on the ground separately or
of litis pendentia; On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the institute the civil
Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review,[10] challenging action prior to the
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground criminal action.
Attachment issued by this of litis pendentia.
court on August 14, 2000; Rule 111, Section 2 further
In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan states:
3. Charge the plaintiffs bond was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged
the amount of P336,000.00 civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter After the criminal
in favor of the defendant for embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the action has been
the damages sustained by dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis commenced, the
the latter by virtue of the pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules separate civil action
implementation of the writ of Civil Procedure was warranted. arising therefrom
of attachment; cannot be instituted
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its until final judgment
4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of assailed decision,[12] overturning the RTC, viz: has been entered in
this Court to RESTORE the criminal action.
with utmost dispatch to the xxx
defendants physical As a general rule, an offense However, with respect to civil
possession the vehicle causes two (2) classes of injuries. The actions for recovery of civil liability under
seized from him on August first is the social injury produced by the Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
16, 2000; and criminal act which is sought to be Code arising from the same act or
repaired through the imposition of the omission, the rule has been changed.
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay corresponding penalty, and the second
the defendant the sum is the personal injury caused to the In DMPI Employees Credit
of P5,000.00 by way of victim of the crime which injury is sought Association vs. Velez, the Supreme
attorneys fees. to be compensated through indemnity Court pronounced that only the civil
which is also civil in nature. Thus, every liability arising from the offense charged
SO ORDERED. person criminally liable for a felony is is deemed instituted with the criminal
also civilly liable. action unless the offended party waives
Chans motion for reconsideration was denied the civil action, reserves his right to
on December 20, 2000,[8] viz: The offended party may prove institute it separately, or institutes the
the civil liability of an accused arising civil action prior to the criminal action.
Considering that the plaintiffs from the commission of the offense in Speaking through Justice Pardo, the
arguments appear to be a mere the criminal case since the civil action is Supreme Court held:
repetition of his previous submissions, either deemed instituted with the
and which submissions this court have criminal action or is separately There is no more
already passed upon; and taking into instituted. need for a reservation
account the inapplicability of the ratio of the right to file the
decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo Rule 111, Section 1 of the independent civil
case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, action under Articles
that case, the plaintiff therein expressly which became effective on December 1, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
made a reservation to file a separate 2000, provides that: the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The effective on December WHEREFORE, the petition is
reservation and waiver 1, 2000 are applicable hereby GRANTED. The Decision
referred to refers only to this case. dated July 13, 2001 rendered by
to the civil action for the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
the recovery of the Procedural laws Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of
civil liability arising may be given the complaint filed by petitioner is
from the offense retroactive effect to hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
charged. This does actions pending and The case is hereby REMANDED to the
not include recovery of undetermined at the trial court for further proceedings.
civil liability under time of their passage.
Articles 32, 33, 34, There are no vested SO ORDERED.
and 2176 of the Civil rights in the rules of
Code of procedure. xxx On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simons motion
the Philippines arising for reconsideration.[13]
from the same act or Thus, Civil Case
omission which may No. CV-94-124, an Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit
be prosecuted independent civil that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the
separately without a action for damages on assessment that the civil case was an independent civil
reservation. account of the fraud action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code;
committed against that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees
Rule 111, Section 3 reads: respondent Villegas Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez[14] stretched the meaning
under Article 33 of the and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2
Sec. 3. Civil Code, may of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case
When civil action proceed independently was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding
may proceed even if there was no the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
independently. In reservation as to its Criminal Procedure.[15]
the cases filing. In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for
provided in review should be denied because the petitioners used the
Articles 32, 33, It must be pointed that the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based
34, and 2176 of abovecited case is similar with the on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the
the Civil Code of instant suit. The complaint was also appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did
the Philippines, brought on allegation of fraud under not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.
the independent Article 33 of the Civil Code and
civil action may committed by the respondent in the Issue
be brought by the issuance of the check which later
offended party. It bounced. It was filed before the trial The lone issue is whether or not Chans civil action to recover
shall proceed court, despite the pendency of the the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00)
independently of criminal case for violation of BP 22 was an independent civil action.
the criminal against the respondent. While it may be
action and shall true that the changes in the Revised Ruling
require only a Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining
preponderance of to independent civil action became The petition is meritorious.
evidence. In no effective on December 1, 2000, the
case, however, same may be given retroactive A
may the offended application and may be made to apply to Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
party recover the case at bench, since procedural Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
damages twice rules may be given retroactive
for the same act application. There are no vested rights The Supreme Court has settled the issue of
or omission in the rules of procedure. whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil
charged in the liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:
criminal action.
xxx
The changes in In view of the ruling on the first Article 20 of the New Civil Code
the Revised Rules on assigned error, it is therefore an error to provides:
Criminal Procedure adjudge damages in favor of the
pertaining to petitioner. Every person who, contrary
independent civil to law, wilfully or negligently
actions which became causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for action is instituted, the civil action for the complaint or information also seeks to
the same. recovery of civil liability arising from the recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
offense charged shall be deemed temperate or exemplary damages, the
Regardless, therefore, of whether or instituted with the criminal action unless offended party shall pay the filing fees
not a special law so provides, the offended party waives the civil based on the amounts alleged therein. If
indemnification of the offended party action, reserves the right to institute it the amounts are not so alleged but any
may be had on account of the separately or institutes the civil action of these damages are subsequently
damage, loss or injury directly prior to the criminal action. awarded by the court, the filing fees
suffered as a consequence of the based on the amount awarded shall
wrongful act of another. The indemnity The reservation of the right to constitute a first lien on the judgment.
which a person is sentenced to pay institute separately the civil action shall
forms an integral part of the penalty be made before the prosecution starts Where the civil action has been
imposed by law for the commission of presenting its evidence and under filed separately and trial thereof has not
a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, circumstances affording the offended yet commenced, it may be consolidated
22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director party a reasonable opportunity to make with the criminal action upon application
of Prisons, 84 Phil 692).Every crime such reservation. with the court trying the latter case. If
gives rise to a penal or criminal action the application is granted, the trial of
for the punishment of the guilty party, When the offended party seeks both actions shall proceed in
and also to civil action for the to enforce civil liability against the accordance with section 2 of the Rule
restitution of the thing, repair of the accused by way of moral, nominal, governing consolidation of the civil and
damage, and indemnification for the temperate, or exemplary damages criminal actions.
losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 without specifying the amount thereof in
Phil 265). the complaint or information, the filing Section 3. When civil action may
xxx fees therefor shall constitute a first lien proceed independently. In the cases
Civil liability to the offended party on the judgment awarding such provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
cannot thus be denied. The payee of damages. of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
the check is entitled to receive the independent civil action may be brought
payment of money for which the Where the amount of damages, by the offended party. It shall proceed
worthless check was issued. Having other than actual, is specified in the independently of the criminal action and
been caused the damage, she is complaint or information, the shall require only a preponderance of
entitled to recompense. corresponding filing fees shall be paid evidence. In no case, however, may the
by the offended party upon the filing offended party recover damages twice
Surely, it could not have been the thereof in court. for the same act or omission charged in
intendment of the framers of Batas the criminal action.
Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the Except as otherwise provided in
offended private party defrauded and these Rules, no filing fees shall be
empty-handed by excluding the civil required for actual damages. The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court,
liability of the offender, giving her only even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
the remedy, which in many cases No counterclaim, cross-claim or No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It
results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to third-party complaint may be filed by the is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
file a separate civil suit. To do so may accused in the criminal case, but any laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
leave the offended party unable to cause of action which could have been adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
recover even the face value of the the subject thereof may be litigated in a The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right
check due her, thereby unjustly separate civil action. (1a) may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. [19] Any new
enriching the errant drawer at the rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the
expense of the payee. The protection (b) The criminal action for time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
which the law seeks to provide would, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, [20] except
therefore, be brought to naught. shall be deemed to include the that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply
xxx corresponding civil action. No if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to
reservation to file such civil action convict than what is required at the time of the commission
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the separately shall be allowed.[18] of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Upon filing of the aforesaid joint Constitution.[21]
Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly criminal and civil actions, the offended Moreover, the application of the rule would not be
provides: party shall pay in full the filing fees precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right,
based on the amount of the check because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court
Section 1. Institution of criminal involved, which shall be considered as Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal the actual damages claimed. Where the
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states: 4. This Circular shall be alleged but any of these
published in two (2) newspapers of damages are subsequently
Any provision of law or Rules of general circulation and shall take effect awarded by the court, the
Court to the contrary notwithstanding, on November 1, 1997. filing fees based on the
the following rules and guidelines shall amount awarded shall
henceforth be observed in the filing and constitute a first lien on the
prosecution of all criminal cases under The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply judgment.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v.
penalizes the making or drawing and Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,[23] thus: Where the civil action
issuance of a check without funds or has been filed separately
credit: and trial thereof has not yet
xxx commenced, it may be
1. The criminal action for We agree with the ruling of the consolidated with the
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal action upon
shall be deemed to necessarily criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, application with the court
include the corresponding civil the civil action for the recovery of the trying the latter case. If the
action, and no reservation to file amount of the checks was also impliedly application is granted, the
such civil action separately shall be instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 trial of both actions shall
allowed or recognized.[22] of the 2000 Rules on Criminal proceed in accordance with
Procedure. Under the present revised section 2 of this Rule
2. Upon the filing of the Rules, the criminal action for violation of governing consolidation of
aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the the civil and criminal
the offended party shall pay in full the corresponding civil action. The actions.
filing fees based upon the amount of the reservation to file a separate civil action
check involved which shall be is no longer needed. The Rules provide: The foregoing rule was adopted
considered as the actual damages from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It
claimed, in accordance with the Section 1. Institution specifically states that the criminal
schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and of criminal and civil actions. action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of deemed to include the corresponding
Court as last amended by Administrative (a) xxx civil action. It also requires the
Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, complainant to pay in full the filing fees
1994. Where the offended party further (b) The criminal based on the amount of the check
seeks to enforce against the accused action for violation of Batas involved. Generally, no filing fees are
civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be required for criminal cases, but because
nominal, temperate or exemplary deemed to include the of the inclusion of the civil action in
damages, he shall pay the corresponding civil action. complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the
corresponding filing fees therefor based No reservation to file such Rules require the payment of docket
on the amounts thereof as alleged either civil action separately shall fees upon the filing of the complaint.
in the complaint or information. If not so be allowed. This rule was enacted to help declog
alleged but any of these damages are court dockets which are filled with
subsequently awarded by the court, the Upon filing of the B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually
amount of such fees shall constitute a aforesaid joint criminal and use the courts as collectors.
first lien on the judgment. civil actions, the offended Because ordinarily no filing fee is
party shall pay in full the charged in criminal cases for actual
filing fees based on the damages, the payee uses the
3. Where the civil action has amount of the check intimidating effect of a criminal
heretofore been filed separately and trial involved, which shall be charge to collect his credit gratis and
thereof has not yet commenced, it may considered as the actual sometimes, upon being paid, the trial
be consolidated with the criminal action damages claimed. Where court is not even informed thereof.
upon application with the court trying the the complaint or information The inclusion of the civil action in the
latter case. If the application is granted, also seeks to recover criminal case is expected to
the trial of both actions shall proceed in liquidated, moral, nominal, significantly lower the number of
accordance with the pertinent procedure temperate or exemplary cases filed before the courts for
outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 damages, the offended collection based on dishonored
governing the proceedings in the actions party shall pay additional checks. It is also expected to
as thus consolidated. filing fees based on the expedite the disposition of these
amounts alleged therein. If cases. Instead of instituting two
the amounts are not so separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
shall be filed and tried. It should be Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted vs.
stressed that the policy laid down by provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA
the Rules is to discourage the the allegations of fraud and deceit. MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
separate filing of the civil action. The IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
Rules even prohibit the reservation of B DECISION
a separate civil action, which means Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action PUNO, C.J.:
that one can no longer file a separate on the ground of litis pendentia
civil case after the criminal complaint On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas
is filed in court. The only instance Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
when separate proceedings are in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the
allowed is when the civil action is bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in
filed ahead of the criminal case. in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia? Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida
Even then, the Rules encourage the Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the
consolidation of the civil and criminal For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a commission of rape.
cases. We have previously observed bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites
that a separate civil action for the is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1)
purpose of recovering the amount of at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus
the dishonored checks would only (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC 4 on
prove to be costly, burdensome and prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No.
time-consuming for both parties and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the 013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at
would further delay the final judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of 1:00 a.m.
disposition of the case. This which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of The Information5 in each case reads as follows:
Where petitioners rights may be fully the existence of the third becomes nil.[28]
adjudicated in the proceedings CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6
before the trial court, resort to a A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal
separate action to recover civil Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 oclock [sic]
liability is clearly unwarranted. In of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within
view of this special rule governing civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber
31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
court will not apply to the case at bar. the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter,
[24]
Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will,
worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave
The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].
Association v. Velez[25] to give due course to the civil action facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered CONTRARY TO LAW.
275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata;
a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the claim.
Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995, 8 at about 1:00 oclock [sic]
result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC
dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
violation of BP 22,[26] the procedures for the recovery of the in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are the ground of litis pendentia through its decision
accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of
different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay Citydid
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a not err in affirming the MeTC.
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who
separate civil action, or may institute an independent action
was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari,
[27]
asDMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision
violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We CONTRARY TO LAW.
to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City. The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida,
the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra. Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent. SO ORDERED. as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City.
On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1,
of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the
house with Ida and Tampus9 who were both drinking beer at
that time. They forced her to drink beer 10 and after 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY
consuming three and one-half (3 ) glasses of beer, she the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. 23 He denied forcing BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in
became intoxicated and very sleepy.11 While ABC was lying ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced
on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting have sexual intercourse with ABC.24 Appellant Ida also to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to "remedyo"12 or have testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion
sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the Temporal.
instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having following day.25 She said that she always brought her
sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to
Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she instance when she left her daughter alone in the indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00
woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to Tampus
thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her to have sexual intercourse with ABC.27 With costs against the accused.
panties and short pants were stained with blood which was
coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He SO ORDERED. 34
from work the following morning, she kept on crying but testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters
appellant Ida ignored her.15 between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 1995 28 and that Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of
his actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 2000 35and
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this
was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at Court.36 Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt
the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave
threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial
assault to anyone.17 He then forcibly removed her panties. cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the courts decision with modification. It appreciated the
ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again signature appearing on the logbook really belonged to mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found
threatened to kill her if she shouted. 18 He undressed himself, Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the handwriting that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of
spread ABCs legs, put saliva on his right hand and he used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2, 1995 is intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical
applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995. 29 It report and the testimony of the attending physician, Idas
ABCs vagina and made a push and pull movement. 19 After was also revealed that the house of Tampus is just 500 schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the
consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-
told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of
her.20 leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.30 her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court
of Appeals states:
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the
sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification, 32 which merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
her.21 ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond
enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape
9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum,
Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical paranoid type. to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report. 22 Dr. maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages
Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and
revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) oclock principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case exemplary damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand
position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1) No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an pesos (Php 25,000.00).37
oclock position on ABCs hymen. accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court
appreciated in Idas favor the mitigating circumstance of We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power
accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having carnal without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of
knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. 33 The ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal
and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states, viz.: accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we
her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the
Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is
she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond
wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal
sexual intercourse with her, against her will. principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an
Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the accomplice in the same criminal case.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned
at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to the cases. The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said findings
unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or drink beer by both accused; (2) The conversation between Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and the two accused when accused Tampus requested accused 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following
result of the case.38 The rule finds an even more stringent to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused requisites must be proved in order that a person can be
application where the said findings are sustained by the Tampus and the complainant were the only persons left in considered an accomplice:
Court of Appeals.39 the house when Ida Montesclaros went to work after
acceding to the request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of pants, the pain and blood in complainants vagina and the design of the principal by direct participation, he
complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to pain in her head, groin and buttocks; (5) The threat made by concurs with the latter in his purpose;
her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4,
the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been 1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about the (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense
established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape, incident of rape that immediately ensued. These
implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an circumstances form a chain that points to accused (c) there must be a relation between the acts done
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal knowledge by the principal and those attributed to the person
trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was impelled to of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. 43 charged as accomplice.48
seek justice for the defilement of her person. Testimonies of
child-victims are normally given full credit.40 After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the
court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she
had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1, 1995. an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or agreed to Tampus request for him to have sexual
The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the intercourse with ABC. Idas acts show that she had
direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of
asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement intercourse with ABC did not prove their conspiracy. 44 Hence, Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her
was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in daughter.1avvphi1
established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. the commission of the crime by previous acts but her
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty.
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from principal. She is liable as an accomplice."45 Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.41 In cases like the one nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped. She usually drink beer?
at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC
transpired before and after the victim lost consciousness in alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed A No, sir.
order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.42 appellant Idas appeal as it also gave credence to the
testimony of ABC.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it
The trial court correctly determined, thus: was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that following assignment of errors:
A Yes, sir.
accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC]
on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article I
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink
335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is,
beer?
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
unconscious. THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE
A Yes, sir.
CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
xxxx PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon
of April 1, 1995?
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus
defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against II
the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
[on] two occasions. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA
MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE xxxx
xxxx CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.46 drink beer?
not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the
aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is A Yes, sir.
the Court has taken note of the following circumstances: (1) liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
The drinking session where the complainant was forced to
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you xxxx of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual
not complain that you had not been used to intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer,
drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with
let you drink beer at that time? you, you were quite sure that it was you who was Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express
being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse with her
A No, sir. to your mother in the Visayan dialect that "gusto daughter.
siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to intercourse with you? It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of
drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"? cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable
A Yes, sir, but I dont know the meaning of to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke. "remedyo". liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The
evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
at that time? "remedyo"? because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to
drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother. A Not yet, sir.52 intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could
have consummated the act even without Idas consent.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any xxxx
refusal to her at that time? The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to
of the word "remedyo"? drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might
if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave
maltreat me.
her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so
A Yes, sir53
that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink
beer, was she already threatening to maltreat you xxxx
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an
if you would not drink that beer?
Accomplice
Q And when your mother came back from work at
A Not yet. about 7:00 oclock [sic] in the morning of April 2,
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their
1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as
Q And how were you able to conclude that she you suspected that something serious or bad had
would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without
might maltreat you if you would not drink that beer happened to you in the previous day?
depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to
that she proposed for you to drink?
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
A Because she already knew, sir.
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for
had a wooden stick prepared. Q How did you know that she already knew?
schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she A Because I heard her telling Omeng, 54 "After you expert opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at
was offering the glass of beer to you? have sexual intercourse with her, leave her the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment.
immediately!"55 On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor
A Yes, sir.50 Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
xxxx
xxxx Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis,
Q Considering that you never knew what is the as you said, is provisional, would you say that the
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and meaning of the word, "remedyo", when your patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or
Bartolome went out of the house and you mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did reason?
overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your you not confront your mother, did you not tell her
mother that he would have sexual intercourse with that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what A Not totally.
you which you term in the Visayan dialect you had agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he
"remedyo", Bartolome would want to have a would do something to my genitals?
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
"remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment
did you allegedly hear this statement, while you A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
were drinking beer or after you had finished laughing.56
drinking beer?
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an
A When I was already lying on the floor of the accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
A There could be.
room we were renting.51 ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida
and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.
the principals in the commission of the crime of Costas testified thus:
rape for having given her daughter to be sexually xxxx
abused by her co-accused, allegedly convinced by Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular
her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense of The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
Now, if she was then under treatment, Doctor, judgment? is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, circumstances:
would you say, Doctor, that having taken this A I think, so.
diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
time, after January 12, 1995, she must have acted Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
with discernment? has, while in that stage, the patient lost contact relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
with reality? degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental victim;
illness even with the treatment, and even without A Yes, that is possible.
any medication, it may be what we called xxxx
spontaneous, really it will get back. Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of
argument, the alleged accusation against her is Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic] true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you of the offender to the victim, either as the victims parent,
tell the Honorable Court as a mother, who would ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
A I think because it might be back, the treatment allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
should be yearly. still in her sound mind or proper mental sane [sic]? spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the
information and proved during the trial in order for them to
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the
much concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some Revised Penal Code.61
deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, material things, if not, it is because of her
she is unconscious of her act, she or he may be judgment. In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged
exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, and established, her relationship with the accused as the
Doctor, in your personal opinion for the purpose of Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information,
this proceedings she may be acting with daughter allegedly to be rubbished by another and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted
discernment and with certain degree of person, then there must be something wrong? by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special
intelligence? qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the
A There must be something wrong and it came up penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her from scizpphrania. Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following
own daughter to somebody, I think there is a the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be
motive, she wants to gain financial or material A It is the judgment, in the case of the construed as applicable to actions pending and
things from the daughter if no material gain, then schizophrenic.59 undetermined at the time of their passage, 62 every
perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
opinion.57 circumstances attending the commission of the crime for
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be
considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the them to be considered in the imposition of the
xxxx exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the penalty.63 Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal
testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother of
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a
distinguish the right or wrong? [sic] of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted
basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act
impaired to discern between right or wrong. incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Idas No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law
Q In the case of this particular accused, what exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death
would you say at the state of her ailment? the consciousness of her acts. penalty.
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
Honor, I think, although the mother alleged that the is the mother of ABCwho was 13 years old at the time of
sickness could be more than one year duration, it the incidentcould have been considered as a special The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered
is in acute stage because she was allegedly qualifying circumstance which would have increased the Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the
destroying everything in the house according to imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal
the mother, so she was in acute stage.58 Revised Penal Code, viz.: Case No. 013324-L."64 The Court of Appeals, however, did
not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded
moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and
proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil accessories within their respective class, they shall also be separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato,
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in and Garalde, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for
rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto
such finding without need of further proof, because it is provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in made solidarily liable with the principal for half of the actual
injuries entitling the victim to such award.65 solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held
for those of the other persons liable."72 solidarily liable with the principal for half of the exemplary
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.
rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil As courts are given a free hand in determining the
indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing with In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and
damages. 66 However, Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has this matter have been grossly inconsistent. severally liable with the principal for only half of the amount
been extinguished by reason of his death before the final of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes
judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the
Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which remains v. Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v. Irinea,77People v. offended party. When the liability in solidum has been
for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue. Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v. enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by
Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People v. del whom payment has been made shall have a right of action
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for Rosario,82People v. Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and People v. against the other persons liable for the amount of their
which each accused is liable when they have different Tamayo,85 the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay respective shares.95 As against each other, whoever made
degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share
consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,86 the accomplice that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment
committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment is made
commission of the crime and though all the persons who imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made
took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the the other half. In People v. Toring, 87 the principal, accomplice the payment to the victim could demand payment of the part
liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the
accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or the entire amount of the civil indemnity. principal paid the victim the entire amount of the civil
accessory. indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity. This principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the
depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the makes the accomplice who had less participation in the total amount of civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable
commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal
Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the paid for the half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with,
the principal in a consummated felony. 68 The accomplice is crime was not taken into account in the apportionment of the he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the
only given the penalty next lower in degree than that amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the principle accomplice. Thus, the principal would have become
prescribed by the law for the crime committed 69 and an behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of
accessory is given the penalty lower by two for felonies, i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the civil indemnity and damages, while the accomplice would
degrees.70 However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is the degree of participation of the accused in the crime have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the penalty of committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just
imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to cooperated in the execution of the offense but whose In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v.
indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused participation is not indispensable to the commission of the Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal was ordered to
by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity as pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity.
and damages. the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for
the execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the
accused. Although, unlike criminal liabilityin which the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal responsibility accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the
Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding is individual and not collective, and each of the participants accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases
penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessory should be liable only for the acts actually committed by cited above where the principal and accomplice were held
the share of each accused in the civil liability is not him.88 The proportion of this individual liability must be solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or
specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the graduated not only according to the nature of the crime half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the
discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent with
indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are degree and nature of participation of the individual offender. Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which
respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the require that the courts should determine the amount for
basis of the allotment. In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. which the principals, accomplices and accessories must
Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v. Bato,93 and respond to and upon specifying this amount, the principals
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f People v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the
there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their
courts shall determine the amount for which each must adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their quota.
respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the held solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity ex delicto If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its respective
respective liability of the principals, accomplices and but was made to pay the moral damages of P50,000.00 quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other
classes, which shall be enforced first against the property of on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation
the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and the determination of the amount of respective liabilities to the of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus,
lastly, against that of the accessories.101 discretion of the courts.107 The courts have the competence should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the
to determine the exact participation of the principal, civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil
more than double the amount that the accomplice is liable relative to the other classes because they are able to directly indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00
for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of
was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily to observe the witnesses. damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is
liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which
liable in solidum among themselves for the other half of the We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for
indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is
answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral
(1/8) of the entire amount of civil indemnity, which is commission of the crime. The person with greater damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal,
P750.00. participation in the commission of the crime should have a Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of
greater share in the civil liability than those who played a Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in extinguished by reason of his death before the final
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages
P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because
should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each Tampus share of the civil liability has been extinguished.
were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this
case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily liable against every accessory. Care should also be taken in decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his
for such amount. considering the number of principals versus that of share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since
accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four Tampus civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas
In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also
one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity, while indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows
the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4). assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the the principal. Tampus obligation to pay P66,666.67 his
principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though quota of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for
In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment
damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory
P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary
P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every person is liability of Ida is also extinguished.
civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater
the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that
P500,000.00. (2/3) share of the principalsor P4,000.00is still divided exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court
among all the four principals, and thus every principal is of Appeals.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by liable for only P1,000.00.
which the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and damages In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the
among the principal, accomplice and accessory is In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was
determined. Though the responsibility to decide the solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the committed with one or more aggravating
respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous circumstances.109 Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive"
courts, this does not mean that this amount can be decided apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to not take into account the difference in the nature and degree serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a
grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation include rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
caprice. her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus outrageous conduct.110 Exemplary damages may be
to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It are alleged in the information and proved during the trial. 111
moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should
the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance
according to the degree of their liability, respective but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of the
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of
Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion should provide for a quota amount for every class for which the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the
that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in all cases members of such class are solidarily liable within their presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify
in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of
among two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the
because there are different degrees of culpability of not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, Information.112 The minority of the rape victim and her
offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.lavvphi1 relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the
capabilities.106 On this note, he states in his commentaries information and proved during the trial in order to be
[6]
appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels was not invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim
circumstance.113 While the information in the instant case penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak
alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she to him herself as there were no other guests in the
no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship could vouch for him for which she replied: of course. [8] Mr. immediate vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already
between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. [31] When Mr.
award of exemplary damages is not warranted. basket of fruits which was the latters present for the Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
celebrant.[9] At the penthouse, they first had their picture approached him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin
Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR- party of Dr. Filart.[10] After a couple of hours, when the buffet na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na
HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, kayo.[32] She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes
beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to began screaming and making a big scene, and even
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.[11] In a threatened to dump food on her.[33]
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other
maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before
Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the
amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
[34]
sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to
the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he
and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of thus adding to his shame and humiliation. [14] Not long after, was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse
exemplary damages is DELETED. SO ORDERED. while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, but to Altitude 49.[35] When they reached the penthouse, she
a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly
VI. SPECIAL TORTS of the hotel.[15] Like a common criminal, he was escorted out dressed and was not invited.[36] All the while, she thought that
of the party by the policeman.[16] Claiming damages, Mr. Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One bar talking to Col. Batung.[37] Then there was a commotion
A. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. [38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.
[39]
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.[17] She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to
think that she invited him.[40]
B. DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to
leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the
C. NEGLECT OF DUTY painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the complaint,[41] giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
[18]
One of her functions included organizing the birthday party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes
D. ABUSE OF RIGHTS assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.
[19]
The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, uninvited:
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005 Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY invitations accordingly.[20] The guest list was limited to
not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He
LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and
assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a
BISAYA, respondent. some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of
party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are
DECISION those invited.[21] At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: at the bar counter ordering a drink.[22] Mindful of Mr.
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no
Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim
recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel approached Mr. Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as
Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court
Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. [23] Mr.
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr.
party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to
reversing the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the
Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution [4] of the another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she
party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby
Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida
Lim must therefore fail.[42]
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.
[25]
Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to
The cause of action before the trial court was one for leave the party as he was not invited.[26] Mr. Reyes, however, On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
damages brought under the human relations provisions of lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. [27] When Ms. Lim testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the Batung whom she later approached.[28] Believing that In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling
evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim him that he should not finish his food and to leave the place
the lobby of Hotel Nikko, [5] he was spotted by his friend of requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is
several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees
should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent
the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts
Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or to use its latent power to review such findings of facts.
good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal II. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as
right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of
to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs. HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND law.[51] One of the exceptions to this general rule, however,
[43] SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are
SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT contrary to those of the trial court.[52] The lower court ruled
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly.
presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first III. liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr.
and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private: Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts
been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in BISAYA
private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant The consequential question then is: Which version is
only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. IV. credible?
Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she
who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more
Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING credible the lower courts findings of fact.
humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable. THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE
WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
... We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,
V. [53]
for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former Manager, a
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE
predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of uninvited (by the celebrant)[54] and who could not just
DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY
one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many,
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil being an actor. While he was already spotted by the
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable
simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would
for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the most hush-
asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in
a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the
309 SCRA 603).[44] The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To
assents is not esteemed in law as injury [47]) refers to self- unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel inflicted injury[48] or to the consent to injury [49] which precludes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the
Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends
to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral negligent in doing so.[50] As formulated by petitioners, the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos however, this doctrine does not find application to the case rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory
(P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a
Thousand Pesos (P10,000).[45] On motion for of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
decision as the argument raised in the motion had been to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to ridicule and shame. close. Close enough for him to kiss:
be reconsidered.[46]
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to approached you while you were at the buffet table?
Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant How close was she when she approached you?
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of
I. A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was
solidarily liable with her. that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado certain standards which must be observed not only in the exemplary damages[72] especially for the reason stated by
dito, bumaba ka na lang. exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
duties.[61] These standards are the following: act with justice,
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt
voice? [62]
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or because of the latters lowly station in life. This has to be
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be
... established. Social equality is not sought by the legal
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [63] When provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55] Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to example or correction for public good and to avert further
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be
damages arising from a violation of law[64] which does not
to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and imposed upon appellees.[73]
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask
shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from
Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that
business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the
are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the
she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long
indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board
observing that Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of
the request for the latter to leave the party was made such which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL
that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to public policy; and (3) it is done with intentto injure.[66] Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
be heard by him only and there could have been no intention humanitarian organizations of the Philippines. [74] During his
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, [67] and direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he
on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs that is, the act complained of must be intentional.[68] had income[75] and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the
reaction to the request that must have made the other
guests aware of what transpired between them. . . other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim.
Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no against him. These two people did not know each other cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
need for the police to take him out.[56] personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done
that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to
presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen. bear alone.
Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - [69]
The lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by
[57]
of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby
leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims
employee.[58] act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first
verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 180764
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as gave rise to a cause of action predicated upon mere Petitioner,
the principle of abuse of rights,[59] is not a panacea for all rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls Present:
human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states: not only protection of human dignity but respect of such Carpio, J., Chairperson,
dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. - versus - Brion,
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive Del Castillo,
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts Abad, and
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Perez, JJ.
Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment EMMA M. ROSQUETA,
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad Respondent. Promulgated:
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in faith.
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is January 19, 2010
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither
responsible.[60] The object of this article, therefore, is to set can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for
x displayed at the Bureaus main gate included Valeras picture
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- but not Rosquetas. Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted
------ x on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when
On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy
DECISION a complaint[5] for damages before the RTC of Quezon City Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position
ABAD, J.: against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the
alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.
This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed
abuse of right committed by a superior public officer in that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the
preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government
being officially recognized for it. her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction
her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially
The Facts and the Case exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent
costs of suit. Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta),
formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection But the RTC dismissed[6] respondent Rosquetas That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction
and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained
Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His
January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal- damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she before the Bureaus centennial anniversary. withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the
enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against duties of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v.
her will on orders of her superior.[1] But the CA reversed the RTCs decision, [7] holding Spouses Gutierrez,[13] a partys refusal to abide by a court
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful,
appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosquetas preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.
position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages
petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against from him.[8] Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed
petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted,
Valera with the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) of Manila in Civil salaries and leaves, and denied her official recognition as rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did
Case 01-101539.On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial not have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on
temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered account of petitioner Villanuevas treatment of her. The
the Finance Secretary[3] from implementing Valeras Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damage suit is an independent action.
appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages
the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.[4] and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation The CA correctly awarded moral damages to
expenses. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Villanueva filed this petition for review oncertiorari under when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause
Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Rule 45. of the plaintiffs anguish [14] in the cases specified in Article
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 2219[15] of the Civil Code.[16]
the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the implementation of The Issue Presented
the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues and
and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it. The key issue presented in this case is whether or friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account
not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in of the speculation over her employment status. [17] She had to
On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the endure being referred to as a squatter in her workplace. She
injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo had to face inquiries from family and friends about her
petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of exclusion from the Bureaus centennial anniversary
40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts
functions of the Deputy Commissioner. Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer. and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva
abided in good faith by the courts order in her favor. Clearly,
During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial The Courts Ruling she is entitled to moral damages.
anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama
magazine edition featured all the customs deputy Under the abuse of right principle found in Article The Court, however, finds the award
commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir 19 of the Civil Code,[9] a person must, in the exercise of his of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine
program, authorized by the Bureaus Steering Committee legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro,[18] moral
headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the
occasion, had a space where Rosquetas picture was another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 [10] and defendants grief and suffering. Moral damages should
supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was 21[11] of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
under litigation. Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.[12] gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.
4) Development Bank of the Philippines should be assigned Development Bank of the Philippines were ordered to be
The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages no less than 67% of the total subscribed and outstanding transferred to the national government. In turn, the
by way of example or correction for the public good but, in voting shares of the company. The percentage of shares management and facilitation of these assets were delegated
line with the same reasoning, reduces it assigned should be maintained at all times, and the to Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to Presidential
to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of assignment was to subsist as long as the assignee, Proclamation No. 50. In 1999, Republic Act No. 8758 was
attorneys fees and litigation expenses but reduces it Development Bank of the Philippines, deemed it necessary signed into law, and it provided that the corporate term of
to P50,000.00. during the existence of the loan.3 Asset Privatization Trust would end on December 31, 2000.
The same law empowered the President of the Philippines to
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition According to petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Ruperto V. determine which office would facilitate the management of
and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated Tankeh approached him sometime in 1980.4 Ruperto assets held by Asset Privatization Trust. Thus, on December
April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in informed petitioner that he was operating a new shipping line 6, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed
that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay business. Petitioner claimed that respondent, who is also Executive Order No. 323, creating the Privatization
respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of P200,000.00 in petitioners younger brother, had told him that petitioner Management Office. Its present function is to identify
moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, would be given one thousand (1,000) shares to be a director disposable assets, monitor the progress of privatization
and P50,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. of the business. The shares were worth P1,000,000.00.5 activities, and approve the sale or divestment of assets with
SO ORDERED. respect to price and buyer.13
On May 12, 1981, petitioner signed the Assignment of
Shares of Stock with Voting Rights. 6 Petitioner then signed On January 29, 1987, the M/V Sterling Ace was sold in
G.R. No. 171428 November 11, 2013 the May 12, 1981 promissory note in December 1981. He Singapore for $350,000.00 by Development Bank of the
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner, was the last to sign this note as far as the other signatories Philippines legal counsel Atty. Prospero N. Nograles. When
vs. were concerned.7 The loan was approved by respondent petitioner came to know of the sale, he wrote respondent
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, STERLING Development Bank of the Philippines on March 18, 1981. Development Bank of the Philippines to express that the final
SHIPPING LINES, INC., RUPERTO V. TANKEH, VICENTE The vessel was acquired on September 29, 1981 for $5.3 price was inadequate, and therefore, the transaction was
ARENAS, and ASSET PRIVATIZATION million.8 On December 3, 1981, respondent corporation irregular. At this time, petitioner was still bound as a debtor
TRUST, Respondents. Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. through respondent Ruperto V. because of the promissory note dated May 12, 1981, which
DECISION Tankeh executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of petitioner signed in December of 1981. The promissory note
LEONEN, J.: Development Bank of the Philippines. The deed stated that subsisted despite Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.s assignment
the assignor, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.: of all future earnings of the mortgaged M/V Sterling Ace to
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the Development Bank of the Philippines. The loan also
assailed October 25, 2005 Decision and the February 9, x x x does hereby transfer and assign in favor of the continued to bind petitioner despite Sterling Shipping Lines,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 be reversed, and ASSIGNEE (DBP), its successors and assigns, future Inc.s cash equity contribution of P13,663,200.00 which was
that the January 4, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court earnings of the mortgaged M/V "Sterling Ace," including used to cover part of the acquisition cost of the vessel, pre-
of Manila Branch 32 be affirmed. Petitioner prays that this proceeds of charter and shipping contracts, it being operating expenses, and initial working capital.14
Court grant his claims for moral damages and attorneys understood that this assignment shall continue to subsist for
fees, as proven by the evidence. as long as the ASSIGNORS obligation with the herein Petitioner filed several Complaints15 against respondents,
ASSIGNEE remains unpaid.9 praying that the promissory note be declared null and void
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling and that he be absolved from any liability from the mortgage
Shipping Lines, Inc. It was incorporated on April 23, 1979 to On June 16, 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent of the vessel and the note in question.
operate ocean-going vessels engaged primarily in foreign Ruperto V. Tankeh saying that he was severing all ties and
trade.2 Ruperto V. Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan from terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, In the Complaints, petitioner alleged that respondent
public respondent Development Bank of the Philippines for Inc.10 He required that its board of directors pass a resolution Ruperto V. Tankeh, together with Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. and
the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel named the releasing him from all liabilities, particularly the loan contract Jose Maria Vargas, had exercised deceit and fraud in
M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, Development Bank with Development Bank of the Philippines. In addition, causing petitioner to bind himself jointly and severally to pay
of the Philippines required that the following conditions be petitioner asked that the private respondents notify respondent Development Bank of the Philippines the amount
met: Development Bank of the Philippines that he had severed of the mortgage loan.16 Although he had been made a
his ties with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.11 stockholder and director of the respondent corporation
1) A first mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., petitioner alleged that he had
by then had been renamed the M/V Sterling Ace; The accounts of respondent Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. in never invested any amount in the corporation and that he
the Development Bank of the Philippines were transferred to had never been an actual member of the board of
2) Ruperto V. Tankeh, petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, public respondent Asset Privatization Trust on June 30, directors.17 He alleged that all the money he had supposedly
Jose Marie Vargas, as well as respondents Sterling Shipping 1986.12 invested was provided by respondent Ruperto V.
Lines, Inc. and Vicente Arenas should become liable jointly Tankeh.18 He claimed that he only attended one meeting of
and severally for the amount of the loan; Presently, respondent Asset Privatization Trust is known as the board. In that meeting, he was introduced to two
the Privatization and Management Office. Asset Privatization directors representing Development Bank of the Philippines,
3) The future earnings of the mortgaged vessel, including Trust was a government agency created through Presidential namely, Mr. Jesus Macalinag and Mr. Gil Corpus. Other than
proceeds of Charter and Shipping Contracts, should be Proclamation No. 50, issued in 1986. Through Administrative that, he had never been notified of another meeting of the
assigned to Development Bank of the Philippines; and Order No. 14, issued by former President Corazon Aquino board of directors.
dated February 3, 1987, assets including loans in favor of
Petitioner further claimed that he had been excluded affixing his signature to the loan agreement, he was liable for of P1 Million with all the perks and privileges of
deliberately from participating in the affairs of the corporation the obligation. According to Development Bank of the being stockholder and director of SSLI, a new
and had never been compensated by Sterling Shipping Philippines, he was in pari delicto and could not be international shipping line;
Lines, Inc. as a director and stockholder.19According to discharged from his obligation. Furthermore, petitioner had
petitioner, when Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was organized, no cause of action against Development Bank of the 2. That plaintiff will be part of the administration
respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh had promised him that he Philippines since this was a case between family members, and operation of the business, so with his son who
would become part of the administration staff and oversee and earnest efforts toward compromise should have been is with the law firm Romulo Ozaeta Law Offices;
company operations. Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh had complied with in accordance with Article 222 of the Civil
also promised petitioner that the latters son would be given Code of the Philippines.30 3. But this was merely the come-on or appetizer
a position in the company.20 However, after being designated for the Real McCoy or the primordial end of
as vice president, petitioner had not been made an officer Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh stated that petitioner had congregating the incorporators proposed - - that
and had been alienated from taking part in the respondent voluntarily signed the promissory note in favor of he sign the promissory note (Exhibit "C"), the
corporation.21 Development Bank of the Philippines and with full knowledge mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"), and deed of
of the consequences. Respondent Tankeh also alleged that assignment so SSLI could get the US $3.5 M loan
Petitioner also alleged that respondent Development Bank of he did not employ any fraud or deceit to secure petitioners from DBP to partially finance the importation of
the Philippines had been inexcusably negligent in the involvement in the company, and petitioner had been fully vessel M.V. "Golden Lilac" renamed M.V. "Sterling
performance of its duties.22 He alleged that Development aware of company operations. Also, all that petitioner had to ACE";
Bank of the Philippines must have been fully aware of do to avoid liability had been to sell his shareholdings in the
Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.s financial situation. Petitioner company.31 4. True it is, plaintiff was made a stockholder and
claimed that Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was controlled by director and Vice-President in 1979 but he was
the Development Bank of the Philippines because 67% of Respondent Asset Privatization Trust raised that petitioner never notified of any meeting of the Board except
voting shares had been assigned to the latter. 23 Furthermore, had no cause of action against them since Asset only once, and only to be introduced to the two (2)
the mortgage contracts had mandated that Sterling Shipping Privatization Trust had been mandated under Proclamation directors representing no less than 67% of the
Lines, Inc. "shall furnish the DBP with copies of the minutes No. 50 to take title to and provisionally manage and dispose total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of
of each meeting of the Board of Directors within one week the assets identified for privatization or deposition within the the company. Thereafter, he was excluded from
after the meeting. Sterling Shipping Lines Inc. shall likewise shortest possible period. Development Bank of the any board meeting, shorn of his powers and duties
furnish DBP its annual audited financial statements and Philippines had transferred and conveyed all its rights, titles, as director or Vice-President, and was altogether
other information or data that may be needed by DBP as its and interests in favor of the national government in deliberately demeaned as an outsider.
accommodations [sic] with DBP are outstanding."24Petitioner accordance with Administrative Order No. 14. In line with
further alleged that the Development Bank of the Philippines that, Asset Privatization Trust was constituted as trustee of 5. What kind of a company is SSLI who treated
had allowed "highly questionable acts"25 to take place, the assets transferred to the national government to effect one of their incorporators, one of their Directors
including the gross undervaluing of the M/V Sterling privatization of these assets, including respondent Sterling and their paper Vice-President in 1979 by
Aces.26 Petitioner alleged that one day after Development Shipping Lines, Inc.32 Respondent Asset Privatization Trust preventing him access to corporate books, to
Bank of the Philippines Atty. Nograles sold the vessel, the also filed a compulsory counterclaim against petitioner and corporate earnings, or losses, and to any
ship was re-sold by its buyer for double the amount that the its co-respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., Ruperto V. compensation or remuneration whatsoever?
ship had been bought.27 Tankeh, and Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. for the amount Whose President and Treasurer did not submit the
of P264,386,713.84. required SEC yearly report? Who did not remit to
As for respondent Vicente L. Arenas, Jr., petitioner alleged DBP the proceeds on charter mortgage contracts
that since Arenas had been the treasurer of Sterling Respondent Arenas did not file an Answer to any of the on M/V Sterling Ace?
Shipping Lines, Inc. and later on had served as its vice Complaints of petitioner but filed a Motion to Dismiss that the
president, he was also responsible for the financial situation Regional Trial Court denied. Respondent Asset Privatization 6. The M/V Sterling Ace was already in the Davao
of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. Trust filed a Cross Claim against Arenas. In his Answer 33 to Port when it was then diverted to Singapore to be
Asset Privatization Trusts Cross Claim, Arenas claimed that disposed on negotiated sale, and not by public
Lastly, in the Amended Complaint dated April 16, 1991, he had been released from any further obligation to bidding contrary to COA Circular No. 86-264 and
petitioner impleaded respondent Asset Privatization Trust for Development Bank of the Philippines and its successor without COAs approval. Sterling Ace was
being the agent and assignee of the M/V Sterling Ace. Asset Privatization Trust because an extension had been seaworthy but was sold as scrap in Singapore. No
granted by the Development Bank of the Philippines to the foreclosure with public bidding was made in
In their Answers28 to the Complaints, respondents raised the debtors of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and/or Ruperto V. contravention of the Promissory Note to recover
following defenses against petitioner: Respondent Tankeh, which had been secured without Arenas consent. any deficiency should DBP seeks [sic] to recover it
Development Bank of the Philippines categorically denied on the outstanding mortgage loan. Moreover the
receiving any amount from Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.s The trial proceeded with the petitioner serving as a sole sale was done after the account and asset (nay,
future earnings and from the proceeds of the shipping witness for his case. In a January 4, 1996 Decision, 34 the now only a liability) were transferred to APT. No
contracts. It maintained that equity contributions could not be Regional Trial Court ruled: approval of SSLI Board of Directors to the
deducted from the outstanding loan obligation that stood negotiated sale was given.
at P245.86 million as of December 31, 1986. Development Here, we find
Bank of the Philippines also maintained that it is immaterial 7. Plaintiffs letter to his brother President, Ruperto
to the case whether the petitioner is a "real stockholder" or 1. Plaintiff being promised by his younger brother, V. Tankeh, dated June 15, 1983 (Exhibit "D") his
merely a "pseudo-stockholder" of the corporation. 29 By Ruperto V. Tankeh, 1,000 shares with par value letter thru his lawyer to DBP (Exhibit "J") and
another letter to it (Exhibit "K") show no estoppel Plaintiff also pleads annulment on ground of equity. Article WHEREFORE, this Court, finding and declaring the
on his part as he consistently and continuously 19, NCC, provides him the way as it requires every person, Promissory Note (Exhibit "C") and the Mortgage Contract
assailed the several injurious acts of defendants in the exercise of his rights and performance of his duties, to (Exhibit "A") null and void insofar as plaintiff DR.
while assailing the Promissory Note itself x x x act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH is concerned, hereby ANNULS
(Citations omitted) applying the maxim: and good faith (Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Phils., G.R. L- and VOIDS those documents as to plaintiff, and it is hereby
Rencintiatio non praesumitur. By this Dr. Tankeh 7817, October 31, 1956). Not to release him from the clutch further ordered that he be released from any obligation or
never waived the right to question the Promissory of the Promissory Note when he was never made a part of liability arising therefrom.
Note contract terms. He did not ratify, by the operation of the SSLI, when he was not notified of the
concurring acts, express or tacit, after the reasons Board Meetings, when the corporation nary remitted All the defendants counterclaims and cross-claims and
had surfaced entitling him to render the contract earnings of M/V Sterling Ace from charter or shipping plaintiffs and defendants prayer for damages are hereby
voidable, defendants acts in implementing or not contracts to DBP, when the SSLI did not comply with the denied and dismissed, without prejudice.
the conditions of the mortgage, the promissory deed of assignment and mortgage contract, and when the
note, the deed of assignment, the lack of audit and vessel was sold in Singapore (he, learning of the sale only SO ORDERED.36
accounting, and the negotiated sale of MV Sterling from the newspapers) in contravention of the Promissory
Ace. He did not ratify defendants [sic] defective Note, and which he questioned, will be an injustice, Respondents Ruperto V. Tankeh, Asset Privatization Trust,
acts (Art. 1396, New Civil Code (NCC). inequitable, and even iniquitous to plaintiff. SSLI and the and Arenas immediately filed their respective Notices of
private defendants did not observe honesty and good faith to Appeal with the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner filed a
The foregoing and the following essays, supported by one of their incorporators and directors. As to DBP, the Court Motion for Reconsideration with regard to the denial of his
evidence, the fraud committed by plaintiffs brother before cannot put demerits on what plaintiffs memorandum has prayer for damages. After this Motion had been denied, he
the several documents were signed (SEC documents, pointed out: then filed his own Notice of Appeal.
Promissory Note, Mortgage (MC) Contract, assignment
(DA)), namely: While defendant DBP did not exercise the caution and In a Decision37 promulgated on October 25, 2005, the Third
prudence in the discharge of their functions to protect its Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
1. Ruperto V. Tankeh approaches his brother interest as expected of them and worst, allowed the findings. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner had no
Alejandro to tell the latter of his new shipping perpetuation of the illegal acts committed in contrast to the cause of action against public respondent Asset Privatization
business. The project was good business proposal virtues they publicly profess, namely: "palabra de honor, Trust. This was based on the Court of Appeals assessment
[sic]. delicadeza, katapatan, kaayusan, pagkamasinop at of the case records and its findings that Asset Privatization
kagalingan" Where is the vision banking they have for our Trust did not commit any act violative of the right of petitioner
2. Ruperto tells Alejandro hes giving him shares country? or constituting a breach of Asset Privatization Trusts
worth P1 Million and hes going to be a Director. obligations to petitioner. The Court of Appeals found that
Had DBP listened to a cry in the wilderness that of the petitioners claim for damages against Asset Privatization
3. He tells his brother that he will be part of the voice of the doctor the doctor would not have allowed the Trust was based merely on his own self-serving
companys Administration and Operations and his officers and board members to defraud DBP and he would allegations.38
eldest son will be in it, too. demand of them to hew and align themselves to the deed of
assignment. As to the finding of fraud, the Court of Appeals held that:
4. Ruperto tells his brother they need a ship, they
need to buy one for the business, and they Prescinding from the above, plaintiffs consent to be with xxxx
therefore need a loan, and they could secure a SSLI was vitiated by fraud. The fact that defendant Ruperto
loan from DBP with the vessel brought to have a Tankeh has not questioned his liability to DBP or that Jose In all the complaints from the original through the first,
first mortgage with DBP but anyway the other two Maria Vargas has been declared in default do not detract second and third amendments, the plaintiff imputes fraud
directors and comptroller will be from DBP with a from the fact that there was attendant fraud and that there only to defendant Ruperto, to wit:
67% SSLI shares voting rights. was continuing fraud insofar as plaintiff is concerned.
4. That on May 12, 1981, due to the deceit and fraud
Without these insidious, devastating and alluring words, Ipinaglaban lang ni Doctor ang karapatan niya. Kung wala exercised by Ruperto V. Tankeh, plaintiff, together with
without the machinations used by defendant Ruperto V. siyang sense of righteous indignation and fairness, tatahimik Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. and Jose Maria Vargas signed a
Tankeh upon the doctor, without the inducement and na lang siya, sira naman ang pinangangalagaan niyang promissory note in favor of the defendant, DBP, wherein
promise of ownership of shares and the exercise of pangalan, honor and family prestige [sic] (Emphasis plaintiff bound himself to jointly and severally pay the DBP
administrative and operating functions, and the partial provided).35 the amount of the mortgage loan. This document insofar as
financing by one of the best financial institutions, the DBP, plaintiff is concerned is a simulated document considering
plaintiff would not have agreed to join his brother; and the xxxx that plaintiff was never a real stockholder of Sterling
safeguarding of the Banks interest by its nominated two (2) Shipping Lines, Inc. (Emphasis provided)
directors in the Board added to his agreeing to the new All of the defendants counterclaims and cross-claims x x x
shipping business. His consent was vitiated by the fraud including plaintiffs and the other defendants prayer for More allegations of deceit were added in the Second
before the several contracts were consummated. damages are not, for the moment, sourced and proven by Amended Complaint, but they are also attributed against
substantial evidence, and must perforce be denied and Ruperto:
This alone convenes [sic] this Court to annul the Promissory dismissed.
Note as it relates to plaintiff himself.
6. That THE DECEIT OF DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. lines business and the promise of a free 1,000-share and In this Petition, Alejandro V. Tankeh stated that the Court of
TANKEH IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT when the Sterling directorship in the corporation do not amount to insidious Appeals seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in
Shipping Lines, Inc. was organized in 1980, Ruperto V. words or machinations. In any case, the shipping business acting and deciding as if the evidence stated in the Decision
Tankeh promised plaintiff that he would be a part of the was indeed established, with the plaintiff himself as one of of the Regional Trial Court did not exist. He averred that the
administration staff so that he could oversee the operation of the incorporators and stockholders with a share of 4,000, ruling of lack of cause of action had no leg to stand on, and
the company. He was also promised that his son, a lawyer, worth P4,000,000.00 of whichP1,000,000.00 was reportedly the Court of Appeals had unreasonably, whimsically, and
would be given a position in the company. None of these paid up. As such, he signed the Articles of Incorporation and capriciously ignored the ample evidence on record proving
promsies [sic] was complied with. In fact he was not even the corporations By-Laws which were registered with the the fraud and deceit perpetrated on the petitioner by the
allowed to find out the data about the income and expenses Securities and Exchange Commission in April 1979. It was respondent. He stated that the appellate court failed to
of the company. not until May 12, 1981 that he signed the questioned appreciate the findings of fact of the lower court, which are
promissory note. From his own declaration at the witness generally binding on appellate courts. He also maintained
7. THAT THE DECEIT OF RUPERTO V. TANKEH IS ALSO stand, the plaintiff signed the promissory note voluntarily. No that he is entitled to damages and attorney's fees due to the
SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS INVITED TO pressure, force or intimidation was made to bear upon him. deceit and machinations committed by the respondent.
ATTEND THE BOARD MEETING OF THE STERLING In fact, according to him, only a messenger brought the
SHIPPING LINES INC. ONLY ONCE, WHICH WAS FOR paper to him for signature. The promised shares of stock In his Memorandum, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh averred
THE SOLE PURPOSE OF INTRODUCING HIM TO THE were given and recorded in the plaintiffs name. He was that petitioner had chosen the wrong remedy. He ought to
TWO DIRECTORS OF THE DBP IN THE BOARD OF THE made a director and Vice-President of SSLI. Apparently, only have filed a special civil action of certiorari and not a Petition
STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., NAMELY, MR. JESUS the promise that his son would be given a position in the for Review. Petitioner raised questions of fact, and not
MACALINAG AND MR. GIL CORPUS. THEREAFTER HE company remained unfulfilled. However, the same should questions of law, and this required the review or evaluation
WAS NEVER INVITED AGAIN. PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER have been threshed out between the plaintiff and his brother, of evidence. However, this is not the function of this Court,
COMPENSATED BY THE STERLING SHIPPING LINES, defendant Ruperto, and its non-fulfillment did not amount to as it is not a trier of facts. He also contended that petitioner
INC. FOR HIS BEING A SO-CALLED DIRECTOR AND fraud or deceit, but was only an unfulfilled promise. had voluntarily entered into the loan agreement and the
STOCKHOLDER. position with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and that he did not
It should be pointed out that the plaintiff is a doctor of fraudulently induce the petitioner to enter into the contract.
xxxx medicine and a seasoned businessman. It cannot be said
that he did not understand the import of the documents he Respondents Development Bank of the Philippines and
8-A THAT A WEEK AFTER SENDING THE ABOVE LETTER signed. Certainly he knew what he was signing. He should Asset Privatization Trust also contended that petitioner's
PLAINTIFF MADE EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A have known that being an officer of SSLI, his signing of the mode of appeal had been wrong, and he had actually sought
COMPROMISE BETWEEN HIM AND HIS BROTHER promissory note together with the other officers of the a special civil action of certiorari. This alone merited its
RUPERTO V. TANKEH, WHICH EFFORTS WERE corporation was expected, as the other officers also did. It dismissal.
SPURNED BY RUPERTO V. TANKEH, AND ALSO AFTER cannot therefore be said that the promissory note was
THE NEWS OF THE SALE OF THE STERLING ACE WAS simulated. The same is a contract validly entered into, which The main issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
PUBLISHED AT THE NEWSPAPER, PLAINTIFF TRIED ALL the parties are obliged to comply with.40(Citations omitted) erred in finding that respondent Rupert V. Tankeh did not
EFFORTS TO CONTACT RUPERTO V. TANKEH FOR THE commit fraud against the petitioner.
PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT SOME COMPROMISE, BUT The Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of any
DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. TANKEH AVOIDED ALL competent proof, Ruperto V. Tankeh did not commit any The Petition is partly granted.
CONTACTS WITH THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL HE WAS fraud. Petitioner Alejandro V. Tankeh was unable to prove by
FORCED TO SEEK LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM HIS a preponderance of evidence that fraud or deceit had been Before disposing of the main issue in this case, this Court
LAWYER. employed by Ruperto to make him sign the promissory note. needs to address a procedural issue raised by respondents.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that: Collectively, respondents argue that the Petition is actually
In the absence of any allegations of fraud and/or deceit one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 43 and
against the other defendants, namely, the DBP, Vicente Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. 44 Thus,
Arenas, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., and the Asset convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not petitioners failure to show that there was neither appeal nor
Privatization Trust, the plaintiffs evidence thereon should even being adequate. Contentions must be proved by any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited the
only be against Ruperto, since a plaintiff is bound to prove competent evidence and reliance must be had on the dismissal of the Complaint.
only the allegations of his complaint. In any case, no strength of the partys evidence and not upon the weakness
evidence of fraud or deceit was ever presented against of the opponents defense. The plaintiff clearly failed to Contrary to respondents imputation, the remedy
defendants DBP, Arenas, SSLI and APT. discharge such burden.41 (Citations omitted) contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a Rule 45
Petition for Review. In Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank,45 this
As to the evidence against Ruperto, the same consists only With that, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Court made the distinction between a Rule 45 Petition for
of the testimony of the plaintiff. None of his documentary judgment and ordered that plaintiffs Complaint be Review on Certiorari and a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari:
evidence would prove that Ruperto was guilty of fraud or dismissed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
deceit in causing him to sign the subject promissory note.39 dated October 25, 2005 that was denied in a Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
Resolution42promulgated on February 9, 2006. jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.1wphi1 In Pure Foods
xxxx Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
Hence, this Petition was filed. rule in this light: When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
Analyzing closely the foregoing statements, we find no error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
evidence of fraud or deceit. The mention of a new shipping jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed x x
x. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may x x x fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of the obligation. The effects of dolo causante are the nullity of
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter the contract and the indemnification of damages, and dolo
through the original civil action of certiorari. into a contract which, without them, he would not have incidente also obliges the person employing it to pay
agreed to. damages.51
xxxx
This is followed by the articles which provide legal examples In Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it and illustrations of fraud. Corporation, et al.,52 this Court elaborated on the distinction
has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally between dolo causante and dolo incidente:
beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential Fraud refers to all kinds of deception -- whether through
judgment, appeal is the remedy. relations, constitutes fraud. (n) insidious machination, manipulation, concealment or
misrepresentation -- that would lead an ordinarily prudent
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other person into error after taking the circumstances into account.
construed as errors of judgment of the Court of Appeals. party had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in In contracts, a fraud known as dolo causante or causal fraud
These errors pertain to the petitioners allegation that the themselves fraudulent. (n) is basically a deception used by one party prior to or
appellate court failed to uphold the findings of facts of the simultaneous with the contract, in order to secure the
lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify consent of the other. Needless to say, the deceit employed
Court of Appeals exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this fraud, unless made by an expert and the other party has must be serious. In contradistinction, only some particular or
Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process relied on the former's special knowledge. (n) accident of the obligation is referred to by incidental fraud or
where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the dolo incidente, or that which is not serious in character and
Court of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45. Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not without which the other party would have entered into the
vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created contract anyway.53
Contrary to respondents arguments, the allegations of substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n)
petitioner that the Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse Under Article 1344, the fraud must be serious to annul or
of discretion"46 did not ipso facto render the intended remedy Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not avoid a contract and render it voidable. This fraud or
that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.47 fraudulent but may constitute error. (n) deception must be so material that had it not been present,
the defrauded party would not have entered into the
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil The distinction between fraud as a ground for rendering a contract. In the recent case of Spouses Carmen S. Tongson
action of certiorari, this Court has the discretion to treat a contract voidable or as basis for an award of damages is and Jose C. Tongson, et al., v. Emergency Pawnshop Bula,
Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for provided in Article 1344: Inc.,54 this Court provided some examples of what
Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed constituted dolo causante or causal fraud:
within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there be serious and should not have been employed by both Some of the instances where this Court found the existence
is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the contracting parties. of causal fraud include: (1) when the seller, who had no
rules.48 When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no intention to part with her property, was "tricked into believing"
need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule that what she signed were papers pertinent to her
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay
65. application for the reconstitution of her burned certificate of
damages. (1270)
title, not a deed of sale; (2) when the signature of the
In this case, petitioner filed his Petition within the authorized corporate officer was forged; or (3) when the
There are two types of fraud contemplated in the
reglementary period of filing a Petition for Review. 49 His seller was seriously ill, and died a week after signing the
performance of contracts: dolo incidente or incidental fraud
Petition assigns errors of judgment and appreciation of facts deed of sale raising doubts on whether the seller could have
and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to render a
and law on the part of the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he
contract voidable.
Petition was designated as one that sought the remedy of signed or of the consequences of his act.55 (Citations
certiorari, this Court may exercise its discretion to treat it as omitted)
In Geraldez v. Court of Appeals,50 this Court held that:
a Petition for Review in the interest of substantial justice.
However, Article 1344 also provides that if fraud is incidental,
This fraud or dolo which is present or employed at the time it follows that this type of fraud is not serious enough so as
We now proceed to the substantive issue, that of petitioners of birth or perfection of a contract may either be dolo to render the original contract voidable.
imputation of fraud on the part of respondents. We are causante or dolo incidente. The first, or causal fraud referred
required by the circumstances of this case to review our to in Article 1338, are those deceptions or
doctrines of fraud that are alleged to be present in A classic example of dolo incidente is Woodhouse v.
misrepresentations of a serious character employed by one
contractual relations. Halili.56 In this case, the plaintiff Charles Woodhouse entered
party and without which the other party would not have
into a written agreement with the defendant Fortunato Halili
entered into the contract. Dolo incidente, or incidental fraud
Types of Fraud in Contracts to organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of
which is referred to in Article 1344, are those which are not
soft drinks. However, the partnership did not come into
serious in character and without which the other party would
Fraud is defined in Article 1338 of the Civil Code as: fruition, and the plaintiff filed a Complaint in order to execute
still have entered into the contract. Dolo causante
the partnership. The defendant filed a Counterclaim, alleging
determines or is the essential cause of the consent, while
that the plaintiff had defrauded him because the latter was
dolo incidente refers only to some particular or accident of
not actually the owner of the franchise of a soft drink bottling
operation. Thus, defendant sought the nullification of the misrepresentation that the former had the exclusive Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable,
contract to enter into the partnership. This Court concluded franchise to soft drink bottling operations. it should be serious and should not have been employed by
that: both contracting parties.
To summarize, if there is fraud in the performance of the
x x x from all the foregoing x x x plaintiff did actually contract, then this fraud will give rise to damages. If the fraud To quote Tolentino again, the "misrepresentation constituting
represent to defendant that he was the holder of the did not compel the imputing party to give his or her consent, the fraud must be established by full, clear, and convincing
exclusive franchise. The defendant was made to believe, it may not serve as the basis to annul the contract, which evidence, and not merely by a preponderance thereof. The
and he actually believed, that plaintiff had the exclusive exhibits dolo causante. However, the party alleging the deceit must be serious. The fraud is serious when it is
franchise. x x x The record abounds with circumstances existence of fraud may prove the existence of dolo incidente. sufficient to impress, or to lead an ordinarily prudent person
indicative that the fact that the principal consideration, the into error; that which cannot deceive a prudent person
main cause that induced defendant to enter into the This may make the party against whom fraud is alleged cannot be a ground for nullity. The circumstances of each
partnership agreement with plaintiff, was the ability of plaintiff liable for damages. case should be considered, taking into account the personal
to get the exclusive franchise to bottle and distribute for the conditions of the victim."61
defendant or for the partnership. x x x The defendant was, Quantum of Evidence to Prove the Existence of Fraud and
therefore, led to the belief that plaintiff had the exclusive the Liability of the Parties Thus, to annul a contract on the basis of dolo causante, the
franchise, but that the same was to be secured for or following must happen: First, the deceit must be serious or
transferred to the partnership. The plaintiff no longer had the The Civil Code, however, does not mandate the quantum of sufficient to impress and lead an ordinarily prudent person to
exclusive franchise, or the option thereto, at the time the evidence required to prove actionable fraud, either for error. If the allegedly fraudulent actions do not deceive a
contract was perfected. But while he had already lost his purposes of annulling a contract (dolo causante) or prudent person, given the circumstances, the deceit here
option thereto (when the contract was entered into), the rendering a party liable for damages (dolo incidente). The cannot be considered sufficient basis to nullify the contract.
principal obligation that he assumed or undertook was to definition of fraud is different from the quantum of evidence In order for the deceit to be considered serious, it is
secure said franchise for the partnership, as the bottler and needed to prove the existence of fraud. Article 1338 provides necessary and essential to obtain the consent of the party
distributor for the Mission Dry Corporation. We declare, the legal definition of fraud. Articles 1339 to 1343 constitute imputing fraud. To determine whether a person may be
therefore, that if he was guilty of a false representation, this the behavior and actions that, when in conformity with the sufficiently deceived, the personal conditions and other
was not the causal consideration, or the principal legal provision, may constitute fraud. factual circumstances need to be considered.
inducement, that led plaintiff to enter into the partnership
agreement. Jurisprudence has shown that in order to constitute fraud Second, the standard of proof required is clear and
that provides basis to annul contracts, it must fulfill two convincing evidence. This standard of proof is derived from
But, on the other hand, this supposed ownership of an conditions. First, the fraud must be dolo causante or it must American common law. It is less than proof beyond
exclusive franchise was actually the consideration or price be fraud in obtaining the consent of the party. Second, this reasonable doubt (for criminal cases) but greater than
plaintiff gave in exchange for the share of 30 percent granted fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In preponderance of evidence (for civil cases). The degree of
him in the net profits of the partnership business. Defendant Viloria v. Continental Airlines,58 this Court held that: believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case. Civil
agreed to give plaintiff 30 per cent share in the net profits cases only require a preponderance of evidence to meet the
because he was transferring his exclusive franchise to the Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, required burden of proof. However, when fraud is alleged in
partnership. x x x. through insidious words or machinations of one of the an ordinary civil case involving contractual relations, an
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a entirely different standard of proof needs to be satisfied. The
Plaintiff had never been a bottler or a chemist; he never had contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. imputation of fraud in a civil case requires the presentation of
experience in the production or distribution of beverages. As In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not
a matter of fact, when the bottling plant being built, all that he (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente), suffice to sustain the existence of fraud. The burden of
suggested was about the toilet facilities for the laborers. inducement to the making of the contract. In Samson v. evidence rests on the part of the plaintiff or the party alleging
Court of Appeals, causal fraud was defined as "a deception fraud. The quantum of evidence is such that fraud must be
We conclude from the above that while the representation employed by one party prior to or simultaneous to the clearly and convincingly shown.
that plaintiff had the exclusive franchise did not vitiate contract in order to secure the consent of the other." Also,
defendant's consent to the contract, it was used by plaintiff to fraud must be serious and its existence must be established The Determination of the Existence of Fraud in the Present
get from defendant a share of 30 per cent of the net profits; by clear and convincing evidence. (Citations omitted)59 Case
in other words, by pretending that he had the exclusive
franchise and promising to transfer it to defendant, he In Viloria, this Court cited Sierra v. Court of Appeals 60 stating We now determine the application of these doctrines
obtained the consent of the latter to give him (plaintiff) a big that mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice in regarding fraud to ascertain the liability, if any, of the
slice in the net profits. This is the dolo incidente defined in proving fraud. respondents.
article 1270 of the Spanish Civil Code, because it was used
to get the other party's consent to a big share in the profits, Fraud must also be discounted, for according to the Civil Neither law nor jurisprudence distinguishes whether it is dolo
an incidental matter in the agreement.57 Code: incidente or dolo causante that must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. It stands to reason that both dolo
Thus, this Court held that the original agreement may not be Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or incidente and dolo causante must be proven by clear and
declared null and void. This Court also said that the plaintiff machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is convincing evidence. The only question is whether this fraud,
had been entitled to damages because of the refusal of the induced to enter into a contract which without them, he when proven, may be the basis for making a contract
defendant to enter into the partnership. However, the plaintiff would not have agreed to. voidable (dolo causante), or for awarding damages (dolo
was also held liable for damages to the defendant for the incidente), or both.
Hence, there is a need to examine all the circumstances tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they the defendant DBP, wherein plaintiff bound himself
thoroughly and to assess the personal circumstances of the shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in to jointly and severally pay the DBP the amount of
party alleging fraud. This may require a review of the case the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be the mortgage loan. This document insofar as
facts and the evidence on record. necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to plaintiff is concerned is a simulated document
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at considering that plaintiff was never a real
In general, this Court is not a trier of facts. It makes its any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not stockholder of the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
rulings based on applicable law and on standing effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
jurisprudence. The findings of the Court of Appeals are objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 3. That although plaintiffs name appears in the
generally binding on this Court provided that these are issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the records of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. as one of
supported by the evidence on record. In the recent case of pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the its incorporators, the truth is that he had never
Medina v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court held that: presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of invested any amount in said corporation and that
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may he had never been an actual member of said
It is axiomatic that a question of fact is not appropriate for a grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. corporation. All the money supposedly invested by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule (5a) him were put by defendant Ruperto V. Tankeh.
provides that the parties may raise only questions of law, Thus, all the shares of stock under his name in
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, In this case, the commission of fraud was an issue that had fact belongs to Ruperto V. Tankeh. Plaintiff was
we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the been tried with the implied consent of the respondents, invited to attend the board meeting of the Sterling
evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals particularly Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., Asset Privatization Shipping Lines, Inc. only once, which was for the
below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings Trust, Development Bank of the Philippines, and Arenas. sole purpose of introducing him to the two
of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on Hence, although there is a lack of a categorical allegation in directors of the DBP, namely, Mr. Jesus Macalinag
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the the pleading, the courts may still be allowed to ascertain and Mr. Gil Corpus. Thereafter he was never
case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: fraud. invited again. Plaintiff was never compensated by
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. for his being a so-
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the The records will show why and how the petitioner agreed to called director and stockholder. It is clear therefore
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or enter into the contract with respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh: that the DBP knew all along that plaintiff was not a
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; true stockholder of the company.
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of ATTY. VELAYO: How did you get involved in the business of
facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Sterling Shipping Lines, Incorporated" [sic] 4. That THE DECEIT OF DEFENDANT RUPERTO
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the V. TANKEH IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the DR. TANKEH: Sometime in the year 1980, I was approached when the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the by Ruperto Tankeh mentioning to me that he is operating a organized in 1980, Ruperto V. Tankeh promised
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the new shipping lines business and he is giving me free one plaintiff that he would be a part of the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific thousand shares (1,000) to be a director of this new administration staff so that he could oversee the
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set business which is worth one million pesos (P1,000,000.00.), operation of the company. He was also promised
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and that his son, a lawyer, would be given a position in
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) ATTY. VELAYO: Are you related to Ruperto V. Tankeh? the company. None of these promises was
When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are complied with. In fact, he was not even allowed to
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and DR. TANKEH: Yes, sir. He is my younger brother. find out the data about the income and expenses
contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis of the company.
provided)63 ATTY. VELAYO: Did you accept the offer?
5. THAT THE DECEIT OF RUPERTO V. TANKEH
The trial court and the Court of Appeals had appreciated the IS ALSO SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT
DR. TANKEH: I accepted the offer based on his promise to
facts of this case differently. PLAINTIFF WAS INVITED TO ATTEND THE
me that I will be made a part of the administration staff so
BOARD MEETING OF THE STERLING
that I can oversee the operation of the business plus my son,
The Court of Appeals was not correct in saying that SHIPPING LINES, INC. ONLY ONCE, WHICH
the eldest one who is already a graduate lawyer with a
petitioner could only raise fraud as a ground to annul his WAS FOR THE SOLE PUPOSE OF
couple of years of experience in the law firm of Romulo
participation in the contract as against respondent Rupert V. INTRODUCING HIM TO THE TWO DIRECTORS
Ozaeta Law Offices (TSN, April 28, 1988, pp. 10-11.).65
Tankeh, since the petitioner did not make any categorical OF THE DBP IN THE BOARD OF THE
allegation that respondents Development Bank of the STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., NAMELY,
The Second Amended Complaint of petitioner is substantially
Philippines, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., and Asset MR. JESUS MACALINAG AND MR. GIL
reproduced below to ascertain the claim:
Privatization Trust had acted fraudulently. Admittedly, it was CORPUS. THEREAFTER HE WAS NEVER
only in the Petition before this Court that the petitioner had INVITED AGAIN. PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER
xxxx COMPENSATED BY THE STERLING SHIPPING
made the allegation of a "well-orchestrated fraud" 64 by the
respondents. However, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of LINES, INC. FOR HIS BEING A SO-CALLED
Civil Procedure provides that: 2. That on May 12, 1981, due to the deceit and DIRECTOR AND STOCKHOLDER.
fraud exercised by Ruperto V. Tankeh, plaintiff,
together with Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. and Jose 6. That in 1983, upon realizing that he was only
Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
Maria Vargas, signed a promissory note in favor of being made a tool to realize the purposes of
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are
Ruperto V. Tankeh, plaintiff officially informed the 8. The complaint states no cause of action as evidentiary weight to strengthen petitioners claim of fraud. If
company by means of a letter dated June 15, against herein answering defendant; anything, it only strengthens the position that petitioners
1983 addressed to the company that he has consent was not obtained through insidious words or
severed his connection with the company, and 9. The Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was a deceitful machinations.
demanded among others, that the company board legitimate company organized in accordance with
of directors pass a resolution releasing him from the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with the Article 1340 of the Civil Code recognizes the reality of some
any liabilities especially with reference to the loan plaintiff as one of the incorporators; exaggerations in trade which negates fraud. It reads:
mortgage contract with the DBP and to notify the
DBP of his severance from the Sterling Shipping 10. Plaintiff as one of the incorporators and Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other
Lines, Inc. directors of the board was fully aware of the by- party had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in
laws of the company and if he attended the board themselves fraudulent.
8-A. THAT A WEEK AFTER SENDING THE meeting only once as alleged, the reason thereof
ABOVE LETTER, PLAINTIFF MADE EARNEST was known only to him; Given the standing and stature of the petitioner, he was in a
EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE position to ascertain more information about the contract.
BETWEEN HIM AND HIS BROTHER RUPERTO 11. The Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. being a
V. TANKEH, WHICH EFFORTS WERE SPURNED corporation acting through its board of directors, Songco v. Sellner70 serves as one of the key guidelines in
BY RUPERTO V. TANKEH, AND ALSO AFTER herein answering defendant could not have ascertaining whether a party is guilty of fraud in obtaining the
THE NEWS OF THE SALE OF THE "STERLING promised plaintiff that he would be a part of the consent of the party claiming that fraud existed. The plaintiff
ACE" WAS PUBLISHED AT THE NEWSPAPER administration staff; Lamberto Songco sought to recover earnings from a
[sic], PLAINTIFF TRIED ALL EFFORTS TO promissory note that defendant George Sellner had made
CONTACT RUPERTO V. TANKEH FOR THE 12. As member of the board, plaintiff had all the out to him for payment of Songcos sugar cane production.
PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT SOME access to the data and records of the company; Sellner claimed that he had refused to pay because Songco
COMPROMISE, BUT DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. further, as alleged in the complaint, plaintiff has a had promised that the crop would yield 3,000 piculs of sugar,
TANKEH AVOIDED ALL CONTACTS [sic] WITH son who is a lawyer who could have advised him; when in fact, only 2,017 piculs of sugar had been produced.
THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL HE WAS FORCED TO This Court held that Sellner would still be liable to pay the
SEEK LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM HIS 13. Assuming plaintiff wrote a letter to the promissory note, as follows:
LAWYER.66 company to sever his connection with the
company, he should have been aware that all he Notwithstanding the fact that Songco's statement as to the
In his Answer, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh stated that: had to do was sell all his holdings in the company; probable output of his crop was disingenuous and uncandid,
we nevertheless think that Sellner was bound and that he
COMES NOW defendant RUPERTO V. TANKEH, through 14. Herein answering defendant came to know must pay the price stipulated. The representation in question
the undersigned counsel, and to the Honorable Court, most only of plaintiffs alleged predicament when he can only be considered matter of opinion as the cane was
respectfully alleges: received the summons and copy of the complaint; still standing in the field, and the quantity of the sugar it
x x x.67 would produce could not be known with certainty until it
xxxx should be harvested and milled. Undoubtedly Songco had
An assessment of the allegations in the pleadings and the better experience and better information on which to form an
3. That paragraph 4 is admitted that herein findings of fact of both the trial court and appellate court opinion on this question than Sellner. Nevertheless the latter
answering defendant together with the plaintiff based on the evidence on record led to the conclusion that could judge with his own eyes as to the character of the
signed the promissory note in favor of DBP but there had been no dolo causante committed against the cane, and it is shown that he measured the fields and
specifically denied that the same was done petitioner by Ruperto V. Tankeh. ascertained that they contained 96 1/2 hectares.
through deceit and fraud of herein answering
defendant the truth being that plaintiff signed said The petitioner had given his consent to become a xxxx
promissory note voluntarily and with full shareholder of the company without contributing a single
knowledge of the consequences thereof; it is peso to pay for the shares of stock given to him by Ruperto The law allows considerable latitude to seller's statements,
further denied that said document is a simulated V. Tankeh. This fact was admitted by both petitioner and or dealer's talk; and experience teaches that it is exceedingly
document as plaintiff was never a real stockholder respondent in their respective pleadings submitted to the risky to accept it at its face value. The refusal of the seller to
of the company, the truth being those alleged in lower court. warrant his estimate should have admonished the purchaser
the special and affirmative defenses; that that estimate was put forth as a mere opinion; and we
In his Amended Complaint,68 the petitioner admitted that "he will not now hold the seller to a liability equal to that which
4. That paragraphs 5,6,7,8 and 8-A are specifically had never invested any amount in said corporation and that would have been created by a warranty, if one had been
denied specially the imputation of deceit and fraud he had never been an actual member of said corporation. All given.
against herein answering defendant, the truth the money supposedly invested by him were put up by
being those alleged in the special and affirmative defendant Ruperto V. Tankeh." 69 This fact alone should have xxxx
defenses; already alerted petitioner to the gravity of the obligation that
he would be undertaking as a member of the board of It is not every false representation relating to the subject
xxxx directors and the attendant circumstances that this matter of a contract which will render it void. It must be as to
undertaking would entail. It also does not add any matters of fact substantially affecting the buyer's interest, not
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES x x x
as to matters of opinion, judgment, probability, or However, in refusing to allow petitioner to participate in the However, this Court finds there is nothing to support the
expectation. (Long vs. Woodman, 58 Me., 52; Hazard vs. management of the business, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh assertion that Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and Arenas
Irwin, 18 Pick. [Mass.], 95; Gordon vs. Parmelee, 2 Allen was liable for the commission of incidental fraud. In committed incidental fraud and must be held liable. Sterling
[Mass.], 212; Williamson vs. McFadden, 23 Fla., 143, 11 Am. Geraldez, this Court defined incidental fraud as "those which Shipping Lines, Inc. acted through its board of directors, and
St. Rep., 345.) When the purchaser undertakes to make an are not serious in character and without which the other the liability of respondent Tankeh cannot be imposed on
investigation of his own, and the seller does nothing to party would still have entered into the contract."72 Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The shipping line has a
prevent this investigation from being as full as he chooses to separate and distinct personality from its officers, and
make it, the purchaser cannot afterwards allege that the Although there was no fraud that had been undertaken to petitioners assertion that the corporation conspired with the
seller made misrepresentations. (National Cash Register Co. obtain petitioners consent, there was fraud in the respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh to defraud him is not
vs. Townsend, 137 N. C., 652, 70 L. R. A., 349; Williamson performance of the contract. The records showed that supported by the evidence and the records of the case.
vs. Holt, 147 N. C., 515.) petitioner had been unjustly excluded from participating in
the management of the affairs of the corporation. This As for Arenas, in Lim Tanhu v. Remolete, 76 this Court held
We are aware that where one party to a contract, having exclusion from the management in the affairs of Sterling that:
special or expert knowledge, takes advantage of the Shipping Lines, Inc. constituted fraud incidental to the
ignorance of another to impose upon him, the false performance of the obligation. In all instances where a common cause of action is alleged
representation may afford ground for relief, though otherwise against several defendants, some of whom answer and the
the injured party would be bound. But we do not think that This can be concluded from the following circumstances. others do not, the latter or those in default acquire a vested
the fact that Songco was an experienced farmer, while right not only to own the defense interposed in the answer of
Sellner was, as he claims, a mere novice in the business, First, respondent raised in his Answer that petitioner "could their co-defendant or co-defendants not in default but also to
brings this case within that exception.71 not have promised plaintiff that he would be a part of the expect a result of the litigation totally common with them in
administration staff"73 since petitioner had been fully aware kind and in amount whether favorable or unfavorable. The
The following facts show that petitioner was fully aware of that, as a corporation, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. acted substantive unity of the plaintiffs cause against all the
the magnitude of his undertaking: through its board of directors. Respondent admitted that defendants is carried through to its adjective phase as
petitioner had been "an incorporator and member of the ineluctably demanded by the homogeneity and indivisibility
First, petitioner was fully aware of the financial reverses that board of directors"74 and that petitioner "was fully aware of of justice itself.77
Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. had been undergoing, and he the by-laws of the company."75 It was incumbent upon
took great pains to release himself from the obligation. respondent to act in good faith and to ensure that petitioner As such, despite Arenas failure to submit his Answer to the
would not be excluded from the affairs of Sterling Shipping Complaint or his declaration of default, his liability or lack
Second, his background as a doctor, as a bank organizer, Lines, Inc. After all, respondent asserted that petitioner had thereof is concomitant with the liability attributed to his co-
and as a businessman with experience in the textile entered into the contract voluntarily and with full consent. defendants or co-respondents. However, unlike respondent
business and real estate should have apprised him of the Ruperto V. Tankehs liability, there is no action or series of
irregularity in the contract that he would be undertaking. This Second, respondent claimed that if petitioner was intent on actions that may be attributed to Arenas that may lead to an
meant that at the time petitioner gave his consent to become severing his connection with the company, all that petitioner inference that he was liable for incidental fraud. In so far as
a part of the corporation, he had been fully aware of the had to do was to sell all his holdings in the company. Clearly, the required evidence for both Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
circumstances and the risks of his participation. Intent is the respondent did not consider the fact that the sale of the and Arenas is concerned, there is no basis to justify the
determined by the acts. shares of stock alone did not free petitioner from his liability claim of incidental fraud.
to Development Bank of the Philippines or Asset
Finally, the records showed that petitioner had been fully Privatization Trust, since the latter had signed the In addition, respondents Development Bank of the
aware of the effect of his signing the promissory note. The promissory and had still been liable for the loan. A sale of Philippines and Asset Privatization Trust or Privatization and
bare assertion that he was not privy to the records cannot petitioners shares of stock would not have negated the Management Office cannot be held liable for fraud.
counteract the fact that petitioner himself had admitted that petitioners responsibility to pay for the loan. Incidental fraud cannot be attributed to the execution of their
after he had severed ties with his brother, he had written a actions, which were undertaken pursuant to their mandated
letter seeking to reach an amicable settlement with Third, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh did not rebuff functions under the law. "Absent convincing evidence to the
respondent Rupert V. Tankeh. Petitioners actions defied his petitioners claim that the latter only received news about the contrary, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
claim of a complete lack of awareness regarding the sale of the vessel M/V Sterling Ace through the media and official functions has to be upheld."78
circumstances and the contract he had been entering. not as one of the board members or directors of Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc. The Obligation to Pay Damages
The required standard of proof clear and convincing
evidence was not met. There was no dolo causante or All in all, respondent Ruperto V. Tankehs bare assertion that As such, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is liable to his older
fraud used to obtain the petitioners consent to enter into the petitioner had access to the records cannot discredit the fact brother, petitioner Alejandro, for damages. The obligation to
contract. Petitioner had the opportunity to become aware of that the petitioner had been effectively deprived of the pay damages to petitioner is based on several provisions of
the facts that attended the signing of the promissory note. opportunity to actually engage in the operations of Sterling the Civil Code.
He even admitted that he has a lawyer-son who the Shipping Lines, Inc. Petitioner had a reasonable expectation
petitioner had hoped would assist him in the administration that the same level of engagement would be present for the Article 1157 enumerates the sources of obligations.
of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The totality of the facts on duration of their working relationship. This would include an
record belies petitioners claim that fraud was used to obtain undertaking in good faith by respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
his consent to the contract given his personal circumstances to be transparent with his brother that he would not
and the applicable law. automatically be made part of the companys administration.
(1) Law; Tankeh showed an earnest effort to at least allow the xxxx
possibility of making petitioner part of the administration a
(2) Contracts; reality. The respondent was the brother of the petitioner and The person claiming moral damages must prove the
was also the primary party that compelled petitioner existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for
(3) Quasi-contracts; Alejandro Tankeh to be solidarily bound to the promissory the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that
note. Ruperto V. Tankeh should have done his best to one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish,
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and ensure that he had exerted the diligence to comply with the serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other
obligations attendant to the participation of petitioner. party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a) willfully done in bad faith or will ill motive. Mere allegations of
Second, respondent Ruperto V. Tankehs refusal to enter into besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights
This enumeration does not preclude the possibility that a an agreement or settlement with petitioner after the latters are insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. It
single action may serve as the source of several obligations discovery of the sale of the M/V Sterling Ace was an action must be shown that the proximate cause thereof was the
to pay damages in accordance with the Civil Code. Thus, the that constituted bad faith. Due to Rupertos refusal, his unlawful act or omission of the [private respondent]
liability of respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is based on the law, brother, petitioner Alejandro, became solidarily liable for an petitioners.
under Article 1344, which provides that the commission of obligation that the latter could have avoided if he had been
incidental fraud obliges the person employing it to pay given an opportunity to participate in the operations of An award of moral damages would require certain conditions
damages. Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The simple sale of all of to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether
petitioners shares would not have solved petitioners physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
problems, as it would not have negated his liability under the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or omission
In addition to this obligation as the result of the contract
terms of the promissory note. factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission
between petitioner and respondents, there was also a patent
abuse of right on the part of respondent Tankeh. This abuse of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
of right is included in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code Finally, petitioner is still bound to the creditors of Sterling sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of
which provide that: Shipping Lines, Inc., namely, public respondents damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privatization 2219 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted)82
Trust. This is an additional financial burden for petitioner.
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
Nothing in the records suggested the possibility that In this case, the four elements cited in Francisco are
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
Development Bank of the Philippines or Asset Privatization present. First, petitioner suffered an injury due to the mental
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Trust through the Privatization Management Office will not duress of being bound to such an onerous debt to
pursue or is precluded from pursuing its claim against the Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privatization
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
petitioner. Although petitioner Alejandro voluntarily signed Trust. Second, the wrongful acts of undue exclusion done by
another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
the promissory note and became a stockholder and board respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh clearly fulfilled the same
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
member, respondent should have treated him with fairness, requirement. Third, the proximate cause of his injury was the
transparency, and consideration to minimize the risk of failure of respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh to comply with his
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh abused his right to pursue incurring grave financial reverses. obligation to allow petitioner to either participate in the
undertakings in the interest of his business operations. This
business or to fulfill his fiduciary responsibilities with candor
is because of his failure to at least act in good faith and be
In Francisco v. Ferrer,81 this Court ruled that moral damages and good faith. Finally, Article 221983 of the Civil Code
transparent with petitioner regarding Sterling Shipping Lines,
may be awarded on the following bases: provides that moral damages may be awarded in case of
Inc.s daily operations.
acts and actions referred to in Article 21, which, as stated,
To recover moral damages in an action for breach of had been found to be attributed to respondent Ruperto V.
In National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Tankeh.
contract, the breach must be palpably wanton, reckless,
Sangkay,79 this Court held that:
malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
In the Appellants Brief,84 petitioner asked the Court of
When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with Appeals to demand from respondents, except from
Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on respondent Asset Privatization Trust, the amount of five
breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when
human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to million pesos (P5,000,000.00). This Court finds that the
the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross
[sic] the damage of [sic] another, a legal wrong is committed amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) is a
negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of
and the wrongdoer is held responsible.80 sufficient amount of moral damages.
his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of
breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in
The damage, loss, and injury done to petitioner are shown physical injuries. In addition to moral damages, this Court may also impose
by the following circumstances. the payment of exemplary damages.1wphi1 Exemplary
Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contracts damages are discussed in Article 2229 of the Civil Code, as
First, petitioner was informed by Development Bank of the where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. follows:
Philippines that it would still pursue his liability for the
payment of the promissory note. This would not have ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed,
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
happened if petitioner had allowed himself to be fully by way of example or correction of the public good, in
negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
apprised of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.s financial straits addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known
and if he felt that he could still participate in the companys damages.
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes
operations. There is no evidence that respondent Ruperto V.
of the nature of fraud.
Exemplary damages are further discussed in Articles 2233 hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) is sufficient for this When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess
and 2234, particularly regarding the pre-requisites of purpose. employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of
ascertaining moral damages and the fact that it is the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded
discretionary upon this Court to award them or not: In sum, this Court must act in the best interests of all future payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even
litigants by establishing and applying clearly defined searched her wallet to check how much money she had,
ART. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a standards and guidelines to ascertain the existence of fraud. followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they home.10
should be adjudicated. WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals as to the assailed Decision On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages in so far as the finding of fraud is SUSTAINED with the letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the
need not be proven, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled MODIFICATION that respondent RUPERTO V. TANKEH be incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of FIVE concern the office and the same took place while respondent
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) and the was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was
damages should be awarded x x x amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in
(P200,000.00) by way of exemplary damages. SO Robinsons, but the latter again refused to receive
The purpose of exemplary damages is to serve as a ORDERED. it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource
deterrent to future and subsequent parties from the Department (HRD) of Robinsons was furnished said letter
commission of a similar offense. The case of People v. G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013 and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes
Rante85 citing People v. Dalisay86 held that: CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card.
YBAEZ, Petitioners, Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary vs. said damaging letter.13 With the above experience,
or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent. respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety,
to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue DECISION sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or PERALTA, J.: apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and
a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary of the ; Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution 2 dated (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybaez.
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), expenses.16
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed
reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, petitioner Michelle Ybaez (Ybaez). admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment. They
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon)
or gross fraudthat intensifies the injury. The terms punitive The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo)
or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those follows: who did it manually. They explained that there was
species of damages that may be awarded against a person miscommunication between the employees at that time
to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo
these damages are intended in good measure to deter the Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ,"
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second which the former believed to mean that the item has already
future.87 floor of Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in Cebu been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed
City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter,
To justify an award for exemplary damages, the wrongful act then decided to purchase the black jeans he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications
must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of worth P2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier as to whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead,
damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6 however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested
wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. 88In this that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo,
case, this Court finds that respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where
acted in a fraudulent manner through the finding of dolo Robinsons and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she they talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it
incidente due to his failure to act in a manner consistent with was heading next, a Guess employee approached and appeared in their conversation that respondent could not
propriety, good morals, and prudence. informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, recall whom she gave the payment. 20 They emphasized that
however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it
Since exemplary damages ensure that future litigants or the receipt issued in her favor. 7 She then suggested that they was the latter who was arrogant in answering their
parties are enjoined from acting in a similarly malevolent talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the questions.21As counterclaim, petitioners and the other
manner, it is incumbent upon this Court to impose the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary
damages in such a way that will serve as a categorical Guess employees as agreed upon.8 damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.22
warning and will show that wanton actions will be dealt with
in a similar manner. This Court finds that the amount of two
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
both the complaint and counterclaim of the parties. From the Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the demand letter sent to respondents employer. In view of honesty and good faith."x x x32The elements of abuse of
petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith Hawayon and Villagonzalos good faith, however, they were rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no exonerated from liability.28 which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess prejudicing or injuring another.33
employees, the court held that when they demanded Ybaez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid
payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right decision, but the same was denied in the assailed November In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a
under the honest belief that no payment was made. The 14, 2006 CA Resolution. miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer
RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to
the confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a
because it was respondent herself who put herself in that review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cash count and discovered that the amount which is
situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the based on the following grounds: equivalent to the price of the black jeans was missing. They,
letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
it against the Guess employees, because they merely asked I. such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify
for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. from respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect
In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN from her if she did not. However, the question now is
faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went
award of damages.23 PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.
RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, SIMILAR INJURY. Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the
the dispositive portion of which reads: Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or
II. duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. 34 Good faith
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of
in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybaez FEES.30 abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay advantage of another.35Malice or bad faith, on the other
plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiones jointly and solidarily hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
The petition is without merit.
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36
(P50,000.00) and attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty
Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking
the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code
respondent whether she paid or not. The Guess employees
on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul
SO ORDERED.24 were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office.
when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they
The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour
insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by
purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment
were in good faith when they confronted respondent inside both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural
which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance
the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting
of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to
CA, however, found preponderance of evidence showing on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that
verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if
that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to respondent was in possession of the item purchased from
they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the
respondents employer. It found respondents possession of the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued
exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in
both the official receipt and the subject black jeans as by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment
the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty
evidence of payment.25Contrary to the findings of the RTC, was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim
causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the
the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacifics should have been proven by substantial evidence in the
Civil Code. The Courts pronouncement in Carpio v.
director was sent to respondents employer not merely to ask proper forum.
Valmonte31 is noteworthy:
for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but
to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such It is evident from the circumstances of the case that
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a
that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that petitioners went overboard and tried to force respondent to
wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to
was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to
obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
respondents employer who was not privy to the transaction. respondents employer not only informing it of the incident
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of
This is especially true in this case since the purported letter but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed
contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations respondent.1wphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent
good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for
payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners are "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also
human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the
guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral accused respondent that she was not completely being
principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article
damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner California Clothing honest when she was asked about the circumstances of
19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in
Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration
noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x of moral damages and attorney s fees. Moral damages may of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a
be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or stipulation:
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical
gave out a blank expression and told me, "I cant remember." suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched "4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall
Then I asked her how much money she gave, she reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation be for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa
answered, "P2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 41 Moral
such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the
asked her if how much change and if she received change defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente
from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp.
After asking these simple questions, I am very certain that gravity of the wrong done.42 They are awarded not to enrich 468-469)
she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means,
invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water
she vehemently refused saying that shes in a hurry and very moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
busy.37 ofP50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8)
reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to attorney s fees in the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a
pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately and proper. certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was
took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months
shop to evade payment. These accusations were made WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma.
despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March
release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs.
showing that respondent had the intention to evade CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce
payment. Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was not Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5,
in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013 2001, p. 31).
by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
time looking for her when they realized the supposed non- vs. On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills
payment. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through
CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS. explain who authorized the cutting of the water line
demand letter to respondents employer, petitioners intended DECISION (Records, p. 160).
not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed PERALTA, J.:
amount but to tarnish respondents reputation in the eyes of On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
her employer. To malign respondent without substantial Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter
evidence and despite the latters possession of enough Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the
evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and (CA), dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, (Records, p. 161).
good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38 respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision
affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision 3 of Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, her husband] filed [a] complaint for damages [against
purpose for which it was established and must not be Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez]
excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. (Records, pp. 2-6).
obviously abused their rights.
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: only restored and reconnected when the [trial] court issued a
provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40 writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14,
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
latter for the same. one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905. xxxx
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties,
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473, defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due
damage. Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting
[respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and
the water supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to duty to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY
plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD. There Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied for its FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE
was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL
disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for payment [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8 CODE.
was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice.
Neither did they observe honesty. As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to 7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
give a notice of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES
V. Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]."9 PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO
present ownership of the house. For doing the act because OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL
Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of the Motions for Reconsideration, but these were denied by the RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003. THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them. EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY
She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari AND GOOD FAITH.
four (4) years ago and not hers. She should have been very with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802.
careful. x x x5 However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that 7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution 10 issued AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
thus: by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS
a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28,
rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and 2004. At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez,
Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following who were petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her
sums: Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in
with the following Assignment of Errors: the instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages; parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part
INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee. AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE respondents. There is no basis to do so, considering that, in
JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2,
Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set
swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR THE up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim
was because they were influenced by defendant Joyce LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is
Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE already barred from doing so in the present petition.
liable. PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION
DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's
SO ORDERED.6 THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court was
REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the
EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS. Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed
present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by
Decision disposing as follows:
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless,
COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR reiterating the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision with the RTC and the CA.
WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST
is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the awarded
damages is reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral and PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY noticed that the main issues raised by petitioner are factual
toP25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the
THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
SO ORDERED.7 received with respect and considered binding by the
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR
NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH which is present in this instant petition. 13 This is especially
true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the This provision of law sets standards which must be observed exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
CA as in this case.14 in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the performance standards set forth in the said provision and results in
of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily and observe honesty and good faith. which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
show that the instant petition lacks merit. provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a Civil Code would be proper.
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply, because rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
she had no participation in the actual disconnection. for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
However, she admitted in the present petition that it was she remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article
who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Court said: circumstances of each case. x x x18
Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was
COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
water supply, it cannot be denied that it was through the is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of
instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water observed for the rightful relationship between human beings having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
supply was disconnected in the first place. and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the
require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the
their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as reason to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; golden threads through society, to the end that law may that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
there must be no intention to harm another. 15 Otherwise, approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
liability for damages to the injured party will attach. 16 In the dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages
present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x. based on the provisions of Article 2219, 19 in connection with
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
respondent spouses water supply without warning or xxxx
informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that
request for disconnection was based on the advise of This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary
the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then standards are the following: to act with justice; to give incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant
she should have advised respondent spouses before or everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award
immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount
telling them that her request was simply to force them to rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set granted, considering that respondent spouses were deprived
comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and
Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may such deprivation would have continued were it not for the
the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a relief granted by the RTC.
without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
Spouses Pastorfides water supply despite payment of their the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the the Civil Code provides, among others, that such fees may
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith. wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty proper. and demandable claim.
and good faith.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit: another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003,
the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED. SO
xxxx not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156448 February 23, 2011 Andrada, Sr., involving a hard-top jeep; and (d) the certificate On December 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals (CA)
SPS. MOISES and CLEMENCIA ANDRADA, Petitioners, of registration of the Hino truck in the name of Moises promulgated its decision, as follows:2
vs. Andrada as well as the registration of the chattel mortgage
PILHINO SALES CORPORATION, represented by its with the Registry of Deeds of General Santos City. The WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED
Branch Manager, JOJO S. SAET, Respondent. action was docketed as Civil Case No. 21,898-93. with the modification that the sale of the Hino truck by
DECISION defendant Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of defendant-appellant
BERSAMIN, J.: Of the Andradas who were defendants in Civil Case No. Moises Andrada is declared valid, subject to the rights of BA
21,898-93, only Moises Andrada and his wife filed their Finance as mortgagee and highest bidder.
An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 responsive pleading. Later on, Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife
shall raise only questions of law. Thus, the herein petition for and Pilhino submitted a compromise agreement dated SO ORDERED.
review must fail for raising a question essentially of fact. August 20, 1993. They submitted a second compromise
agreement dated March 4, 1994 because the first was found Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada are now before the
to be defective and incomplete. The RTC thereafter rendered Court via petition for review on certiorari to pose the
Antecedents a partial judgment on March 21, 1994 based on the second following issues: 3
compromise agreement. After that, further proceedings were
On December 28, 1990, respondent Pilhino Sales taken in Civil Case No. 21,898-93 only with respect to 1. Whether or not Pilhino should be held liable for
Corporation (Pilhino) sued Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife, Moises Andrada and his wife, and BA Finance. the damages the petitioners sustained from
Maxima, in the Regional Trial Court in Davao City (RTC) to Pilhinos levy on execution upon the Hino truck
recover the principal sum of P240,863.00, plus interest and Moises Andrada and his wife averred as defenses that they under Civil Case No. 20,489-90; and
incidental charges (Civil Case No. 20,489-90). Upon had already acquired the Hino truck from Jose Andrada, Jr.
Pilhinos application, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary free from any lien or encumbrance prior to its seizure by the 2. Whether or not Pilhino was guilty of bad faith
attachment, which came to be implemented against a Hino sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case when it proceeded with the levy on execution upon
truck and a Fuso truck both owned by Jose Andrada, Jr. No. 20,489-90; that their acquisition had been made in good the Hino truck owned by Moises Andrada.
However, the levies on attachment were lifted after Jose filed faith, considering that at the time of the sale the preliminary
a counter-attachment bond. attachment had already been lifted; and that Pilhinos Ruling
recourse was to proceed against the counter-attachment
In due course, the RTC rendered a decision against Jose bond. We find no merit in the petition for review.
Andrada, Jr. and his wife. Pilhino opted to enforce the writ of
execution against the properties of the Andradas instead of For its part, BA Finance claimed lack of knowledge of the The petitioners assail the decision promulgated by the CA to
claiming against the counter-attachment bond considering truth of the material allegations of the complaint of Pilhino; the extent that it denied their claim for the damages they had
that the premium on the bond had not been paid. As a result, and insisted that the Hino truck had been validly mortgaged sought by way of counterclaim. They anchored their claim on
the sheriff seized the Hino truck and sold it at the ensuing to it by Moises Andrada, the lawful owner, to secure his own Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides that "any person
public auction, with Pilhino as the highest bidder. However, valid obligation. who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhinos name due that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
to its having been already registered in the name of On March 25, 1998, the RTC, citing the compromise shall compensate the latter for damage."
petitioner Moises Andrada. It appears that the Hino truck had agreement between Pilhino and Jose Andrada, Jr. that had
been meanwhile sold by Jose Andrada, Jr. to Moises settled all the claims of Pilhino against Jose Andrada, Jr., Article 21 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 19 of
Andrada, which sale was unknown to Pilhino, and that and the good faith of Pilhino and BA Finance in filing their the Civil Code, is part of the cause of action known in this
Moises had mortgaged the truck to BA Finance Corporation respective actions, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. jurisdiction as "abuse of rights." The elements of abuse of
(BA Finance) to secure his own obligation. 21,898-93,1 disposing: rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
BA Finance sued Moises Andrada for his failure to pay the WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing this case another.4
loan (Civil Case No. 5117). After a decision was rendered in insofar as the spouses Moises Andrada and Clemencia
the action in favor of BA Finance, a writ of execution issued, Andrada, Jose Andrada, Sr. and BA Finance Corporation, In its assailed decision, the CA found that Pilhino had acted
by which the sheriff levied upon and seized the Hino truck now accordingly BA Savings Bank, including the in good faith in bringing Civil Case No. 21,898-93 to annul
while it was in the possession of Pilhino and sold it at public counterclaims. the deed of sale involving the Hino truck executed by Jose
auction, with BA Finance as the highest bidder.
Andrada, Jr. in favor of Moises Andrada, considering that
SO ORDERED. Pilhino had "believed that the sale in favor of defendants-
Consequently, Pilhino instituted this action in the RTC in appellants [had been] resorted to so that Jose Andrada
Davao City against Spouses Jose Andrada, Jr. and Maxima Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada appealed the [might] evade his obligations."5 The CA concluded that no
Andrada, Spouses Moises Andrada and Clemencia Andrada, decision rendered on March 25, 1998 to the extent that the remedy was available for any damages that the petitioners
Jose Andrada, Sr., BA Finance, Land Transportation Office RTC thereby: (a) dismissed their counterclaim; (b) declared sustained from the filing of Civil Case No. 21,898-93 against
(in Surallah, South Cotabato), and the Registrar of Deeds of that the deed of sale of the Hino truck between Jose them because "the law affords no remedy for such damages
General Santos City to annul the following: (a) the deed of Andrada, Jr. and Moises Andrada had been simulated; and resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
sale between Jose Andrada, Jr. and Moises Andrada; (b) the (c) approved the compromise agreement between Pilhino or wrong."6
chattel mortgage involving the Hino truck between Moises and Spouses Jose Andrada, Jr. and Maxima Andrada.
Andrada and BA Finance; (c) the deed of conveyance
executed by Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of his father, Jose
Worthy to note is that the CAs finding and conclusion rested (h) When the findings are conclusions without because of the policy that no premium should be placed on
on the RTCs own persuasion that the sale of the Hino truck citation of specific evidence on which they are the right to litigate.171avvphi1
to Moises Andrada had been simulated.7 based;
Herein, the element of bad faith on the part of Pilhino in
Yet, the petitioners still insist in this appeal that both lower (i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well commencing and prosecuting Civil Case No. 21,898-93,
courts erred in their conclusion on the absence of bad faith as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not which was necessary to predicate the lawful grant of
on the part of Pilhino. disputed by the respondent; attorneys fees based on Article 2208 (4) of the Civil Code,
was not established. Accordingly, the petitioners demand for
We cannot side with the petitioners. Their insistence, which (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the attorneys fees must fail.
represents their disagreement with the CAs declaration that supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
the second and third elements of abuse of rights, supra, by the evidence on record; or WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari
were not established, requires the consideration and review for its lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the Court of
of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed, for an (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain Appeals. SO ORDERED.
appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
factual issues. In the exercise of its power of review, the properly considered, would justify a different G.R. No. 174269 May 8, 2009
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake conclusion. POLO S. PANTALEON, Petitioner,
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the vs.
contending parties during the trial. Perforce, the findings of However, the circumstances of this case do not warrant AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL,
fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. This reversing or modifying the findings of the CA, which are INC., Respondent.
restriction of the review to questions of law has been consistent with the established facts. Verily, the petitioners DECISION
institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, did not prove the concurrence of the elements of abuse of TINGA, J.:
viz: rights.
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife Julialinda,
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party The petitioners further seek attorneys fees based on Article daughter Anna Regina and son Adrian Roberto, joined an
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order 2208 (4) of the Civil Code, which provides that "in the escorted tour of Western Europe organized by Trafalgar
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October of 1991. The tour group
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, arrived in Amsterdam in the afternoon of 25 October 1991,
by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for except xxx (4) in cases of clearly unfounded civil action or the second to the last day of the tour. As the group had
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of proceeding against the plaintiff xxx." arrived late in the city, they failed to engage in any sight-
law which must be distinctly set forth. (1a, 2a)8 seeing. Instead, it was agreed upon that they would start
The petitioners are not entitled to attorneys fees. early the next day to see the entire city before ending the
It is true that the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions tour.
from the restriction. Among the recognized exceptions are It is well accepted in this jurisdiction that no premium should
the following, to wit:9 be placed on the right to litigate and that not every winning The following day, the last day of the tour, the group arrived
party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorneys at the Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam around 10
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on fees.10 Indeed, before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, minutes before 9:00 a.m. The group had agreed that the visit
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; such fees could not be recovered in the absence of a to Coster should end by 9:30 a.m. to allow enough time to
stipulation.11 It was only with the advent of the new Civil take in a guided city tour of Amsterdam. The group was
(b) When the inference made is manifestly Code that the right to collect attorneys fees in the instances ushered into Coster shortly before 9:00 a.m., and listened to
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; mentioned in Article 2208 was recognized,12and such fees a lecture on the art of diamond polishing that lasted for
are now included in the concept of actual damages. 13 One around ten minutes.1 Afterwards, the group was led to the
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion; such instance is where the defendant is guilty of gross and stores showroom to allow them to select items for purchase.
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly Mrs. Pantaleon had already planned to purchase even
(d) When the judgment is based on a valid, just and demandable claim.14This is a corollary of the before the tour began a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut, and
misapprehension of facts; general principle expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code she found a diamond close enough in approximation that
that everyone must, in the performance of his duties, she decided to buy.2 Mrs. Pantaleon also selected for
observe honesty and good faith and the rule embodied in purchase a pendant and a chain,3 all of which totaled U.S.
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
Article 1170 that anyone guilty of fraud (bad faith) in the $13,826.00.
(f) When in making its findings the CA went performance of his obligation shall be liable for damages.
To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
But, as noted by the Court in Morales v. Court of American Express credit card together with his passport to
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
Appeals,15 the award of attorneys fees is the exception the Coster sales clerk. This occurred at around 9:15 a.m., or
and the appellee;
rather than the rule. The power of a court to award attorneys 15 minutes before the tour group was slated to depart from
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, the store. The sales clerk took the cards imprint, and asked
(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those
legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to Pantaleon to sign the charge slip. The charge purchase was
by the trial court;
speculation and conjecture.16 The general rule is that then referred electronically to respondents Amsterdam office
attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part of damages at 9:20 a.m.
Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon that his embarrassment he and his family thereby suffered" for [respondent] at the time does not favorably support his ability
AmexCard had not yet been approved. His son, who had respondents refusal to provide credit authorization for the to pay for such purchase."17
already boarded the tour bus, soon returned to Coster and aforementioned purchases.8 In response, respondent sent a
informed the other members of the Pantaleon family that the letter dated 24 March 1992,9 stating among others that the On the premise that there was an obligation on the part of
entire tour group was waiting for them. As it was already delay in authorizing the purchase from Coster was respondent "to approve or disapprove with dispatch the
9:40 a.m., and he was already worried about further attributable to the circumstance that the charged purchase of charge purchase," petitioner argues that the failure to timely
inconveniencing the tour group, Pantaleon asked the store US $13,826.00 "was out of the usual charge purchase approve or disapprove the purchase constituted mora
clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager though asked pattern established."10 Since respondent refused to accede solvendi on the part of respondent in the performance of its
plaintiff to wait a few more minutes. After 15 minutes, the to Pantaleons demand for an apology, the aggrieved obligation. For its part, respondent characterizes the
store manager informed Pantaleon that respondent had cardholder instituted an action for damages with the depiction by petitioner of its obligation to him as "to approve
demanded bank references. Pantaleon supplied the names Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch purchases instantaneously or in a matter of seconds."
of his depositary banks, then instructed his daughter to 145.11 Pantaleon prayed that he be awarded P2,000,000.00,
return to the bus and apologize to the tour group for the as moral damages; P500,000.00, as exemplary Petitioner correctly cites that under mora solvendi, the three
delay. damages; P100,000.00, as attorneys fees; and P50,000.00 requisites for a finding of default are that the obligation is
as litigation expenses.12 demandable and liquidated; the debtor delays performance;
At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45 minutes after Pantaleon and the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the
had presented his AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the tour On 5 August 1996, the Makati City RTC rendered a debtors performance.18 Petitioner asserts that the Court of
group was supposed to have left the store, Coster decided to decision13 in favor of Pantaleon, awarding him P500,000.00 Appeals had wrongly applied the principle of mora
release the items even without respondents approval of the as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of the obligee
purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned to the bus. It is damages, P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P85,233.01 in accepting the performance of the obligation by the obligor.
alleged that their offers of apology were met by their as expenses of litigation. Respondent filed a Notice of The requisites of mora accipiendi are: an offer of
tourmates with stony silence.4 The tour groups visible Appeal, while Pantaleon moved for partial reconsideration, performance by the debtor who has the required capacity;
irritation was aggravated when the tour guide announced praying that the trial court award the increased amount of the offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should
that the city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to moral and exemplary damages he had prayed for. 14The RTC be performed; and the creditor refuses the performance
lack of remaining time, as they had to catch a 3:00 p.m. ferry denied Pantaleons motion for partial reconsideration, and without just cause.19 The error of the appellate court, argues
at Calais, Belgium to London.5 Mrs. Pantaleon ended up thereafter gave due course to respondents Notice of petitioner, is in relying on the invocation by respondent of
weeping, while her husband had to take a tranquilizer to Appeal.15 "just cause" for the delay, since while just cause is
calm his nerves. determinative of mora accipiendi, it is not so with the case of
On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a mora solvendi.
It later emerged that Pantaleons purchase was first decision16 reversing the award of damages in favor of
transmitted for approval to respondents Amsterdam office at Pantaleon, holding that respondent had not breached its We can see the possible source of confusion as to which
9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time, then referred to respondents obligations to petitioner. Hence, this petition. type of mora to appreciate. Generally, the relationship
Manila office at 9:33 a.m, then finally approved at 10:19 between a credit card provider and its card holders is that of
a.m., Amsterdam time.6 The Approval Code was transmitted The key question is whether respondent, in connection with creditor-debtor,20 with the card company as the creditor
to respondents Amsterdam office at 10:38 a.m., several the aforementioned transactions, had committed a breach of extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as debtor
minutes after petitioner had already left Coster, and 78 its obligations to Pantaleon. In addition, Pantaleon submits is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship already
minutes from the time the purchases were electronically that even assuming that respondent had not been in breach takes exception to the general rule that as between a bank
transmitted by the jewelry store to respondents Amsterdam of its obligations, it still remained liable for damages under and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while
office. Article 21 of the Civil Code. the depositor is considered as the creditor. 21 Petitioner is
asking us, not baselessly, to again shift perspectives and
After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family The RTC had concluded, based on the testimonial again see the credit card company as the debtor/obligor,
proceeded to the United States before returning to Manila on representations of Pantaleon and respondents credit insofar as it has the obligation to the customer as
12 November 1992. While in the United States, Pantaleon authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, that the normal approval time creditor/obligee to act promptly on its purchases on credit.
continued to use his AmEx card, several times without for purchases was "a matter of seconds." Based on that
hassle or delay, but with two other incidents similar to the standard, respondent had been in clear delay with respect to Ultimately, petitioners perspective appears more sensible
Amsterdam brouhaha. On 30 October 1991, Pantaleon the three subject transactions. As it appears, the Court of than if we were to still regard respondent as the creditor in
purchased golf equipment amounting to US $1,475.00 using Appeals conceded that there had been delay on the part of the context of this cause of action. If there was delay on the
his AmEx card, but he cancelled his credit card purchase respondent in approving the purchases. However, it made part of respondent in its normal role as creditor to the
and borrowed money instead from a friend, after more than two critical conclusions in favor of respondent. First, the cardholder, such delay would not have been in the
30 minutes had transpired without the purchase having been appellate court ruled that the delay was not attended by bad acceptance of the performance of the debtors obligation
approved. On 3 November 1991, Pantaleon used the card to faith, malice, or gross negligence. Second, it ruled that (i.e., the repayment of the debt), but it would be delay in the
purchase childrens shoes worth $87.00 at a store in Boston, respondent "had exercised diligent efforts to effect the extension of the credit in the first place. Such delay would
and it took 20 minutes before this transaction was approved approval" of the purchases, which were "not in accordance not fall under mora accipiendi, which contemplates that the
by respondent. with the charge pattern" petitioner had established for obligation of the debtor, such as the actual purchases on
himself, as exemplified by the fact that at Coster, he was credit, has already been constituted. Herein, the
On 4 March 1992, after coming back to Manila, Pantaleon "making his very first single charge purchase of US$13,826," establishment of the debt itself (purchases on credit of the
sent a letter7 through counsel to the respondent, demanding and "the record of [petitioner]s past spending with jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it remained pending
an apology for the "inconvenience, humiliation and
the approval or consent of the respondent credit card Amsterdam which reads: "US$13,826. Cardmember buying rejection of his card yet spared the shame of being held
company. jewels. ID seen. Advise how long will this take?" They were accountable by newly-made friends for making them miss
sent at 01:33, 01:37, 01:40, 01:45, 01:52 and 02:08, all times the chance to tour the city of Amsterdam.
Still, in order for us to appreciate that respondent was in Phoenix. Manila Amexco could be unaware of the need for
mora solvendi, we will have to first recognize that there was speed in resolving the charge purchase referred to it, yet it We do not wish do dispute that respondent has the right, if
indeed an obligation on the part of respondent to act on sat on its hand, unconcerned. not the obligation, to verify whether the credit it is extending
petitioners purchases with "timely dispatch," or for the upon on a particular purchase was indeed contracted by the
purposes of this case, within a period significantly less than xxx cardholder, and that the cardholder is within his means to
the one hour it apparently took before the purchase at make such transaction. The culpable failure of respondent
Coster was finally approved. To repeat, the Credit Authorization System (CAS) record on herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioners
the Amsterdam transaction shows how Amexco Netherlands purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the
The findings of the trial court, to our mind, amply established viewed the delay as unusually frustrating. In sequence same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that
that the tardiness on the part of respondent in acting on expressed in Phoenix time from 01:20 when the charge respondents credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis
petitioners purchase at Coster did constitute culpable delay purchased was referred for authorization, defendants own on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why
on its part in complying with its obligation to act promptly on record shows: respondent could not have promptly informed petitioner the
its customers purchase request, whether such action be reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the
favorable or unfavorable. We quote the trial court, thus: 01:22 the authorization is referred to Manila same could take some time. In that way, petitioner would
Amexco have had informed basis on whether or not to pursue the
As to the first issue, both parties have testified that normal transaction at Coster, given the attending circumstances.
approval time for purchases was a matter of seconds. 01:32 Netherlands gives information that the Instead, petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling in the
identification of the cardmember has been chilly autumn winds in a foreign land and soon forced to
Plaintiff testified that his personal experience with the use of presented and he is buying jewelries worth US confront the wrath of foreign folk.
the card was that except for the three charge purchases $13,826.
subject of this case, approvals of his charge purchases were Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract where
always obtained in a matter of seconds. 01:33 Netherlands asks "How long will this the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and the
take?" court should find that under the circumstances, such
Defendants credit authorizer Edgardo Jaurique likewise damages are due. The findings of the trial court are ample in
testified: 02:08 Netherlands is still asking "How long will establishing the bad faith and unjustified neglect of
this take?" respondent, attributable in particular to the "dilly-dallying" of
Q. You also testified that on normal occasions, respondents Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo
the normal approval time for charges would be 3 Jaurique.23 Wrote the trial court:
The Court is convinced that defendants delay constitute[s]
to 4 seconds? breach of its contractual obligation to act on his use of the
card abroad "with special handling."22 (Citations omitted) While it is true that the Cardmembership Agreement, which
A. Yes, Maam. defendant prepared, is silent as to the amount of time it
should take defendant to grant authorization for a charge
xxx
purchase, defendant acknowledged that the normal time for
Both parties likewise presented evidence that the processing
approval should only be three to four seconds. Specially so
and approval of plaintiffs charge purchase at the Coster Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card
with cards used abroad which requires "special handling",
Diamond House was way beyond the normal approval time purchases are approved "within seconds," there really is no
meaning with priority. Otherwise, the object of credit or
of a "matter of seconds". strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long
charge cards would be lost; it would be so inconvenient to
must it take for a credit card company to approve or
use that buyers and consumers would be better off carrying
Plaintiff testified that he presented his AmexCard to the sales disapprove a customers purchase, much less one
bundles of currency or travellers checks, which can be
clerk at Coster, at 9:15 a.m. and by the time he had to leave specifically contracted upon by the parties. Yet this is one of
delivered and accepted quickly. Such right was not accorded
the store at 10:05 a.m., no approval had yet been received. those instances when "youd know it when youd see it," and
to plaintiff in the instances complained off for reasons known
In fact, the Credit Authorization System (CAS) record of one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently
only to defendant at that time. This, to the Courts mind,
defendant at Phoenix Amex shows that defendants unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a
amounts to a wanton and deliberate refusal to comply with
Amsterdam office received the request to approve plaintiffs credit card purchase. It is long enough time for the customer
its contractual obligations, or at least abuse of its rights,
charge purchase at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time or 01:20, to walk to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw money over the
under the contract.24
Phoenix time, and that the defendant relayed its approval to counter, and return to the store.
Coster at 10:38 a.m., Amsterdam time, or 2:38, Phoenix
xxx
time, or a total time lapse of one hour and [18] minutes. And Notably, petitioner frames the obligation of respondent as "to
even then, the approval was conditional as it directed in approve or disapprove" the purchase "in timely dispatch,"
computerese [sic] "Positive Identification of Card holder The delay committed by defendant was clearly attended by
and not "to approve the purchase instantaneously or within
necessary further charges require bank information due to unjustified neglect and bad faith, since it alleges to have
seconds." Certainly, had respondent disapproved petitioners
high exposure. By Jack Manila." consumed more than one hour to simply go over plaintiffs
purchase "within seconds" or within a timely manner, this
past credit history with defendant, his payment record and
particular action would have never seen the light of day.
his credit and bank references, when all such data are
The delay in the processing is apparent to be undue as Petitioner and his family would have returned to the bus
already stored and readily available from its computer. This
shown from the frantic successive queries of Amexco without delay internally humiliated perhaps over the
Court also takes note of the fact that there is nothing in
plaintiffs billing history that would warrant the imprudent E. ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES On October 30, 1995, Gonzales and his wife obtained a loan
suspension of action by defendant in processing the for PhP 500,000. Subsequently, on December 26, 1995 and
purchase. Defendants witness Jaurique admits: January 3, 1999, the spouses Panlilio and Gonzales
A. ELEMENTS
obtained two additional loans from PCIB in the amounts of
Q. But did you discover that he did not have any PhP 1,000,000 and PhP 300,000, respectively. These three
outstanding account? B. EXAMPLES loans amounting to PhP 1,800,000 were covered by three
promissory notes.4 To secure the loans, a real estate
A. Nothing in arrears at that time. mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land covered by Transfer
1. BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38012 was executed by
Q. You were well aware of this fact on this very Gonzales and the spouses Panlilio. Notably, the promissory
date? 2. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION notes specified, among others, the solidary liability of
Gonzales and the spouses Panlilio for the payment of the
A. Yes, sir. loans. However, it was the spouses Panlilio who received the
3. PUBLIC HUMILIATION loan proceeds of PhP 1,800,000.
Mr. Jaurique further testified that there were no
"delinquencies" in plaintiffs account.25 4. UNJUST DISMISSAL The monthly interest dues of the loans were paid by the
spouses Panlilio through the automatic debiting of their
account with PCIB. But the spouses Panlilio, from the month
It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is G.R. No. 180257 February 23, 2011 of July 1998, defaulted in the payment of the periodic
entitled to damages is not simply because respondent EUSEBIO GONZALES, Petitioner, interest dues from their PCIB account which apparently was
incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability vs. not maintained with enough deposits. PCIB allegedly called
lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL BANK, the attention of Gonzales regarding the July 1998 defaults
Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are EDNA OCAMPO, and ROBERTO NOCEDA,Respondents. and the subsequent accumulating periodic interest dues
remunerative.26 Moral damages do not avail to soothe the DECISION which were left still left unpaid.
plaints of the simply impatient, so this decision should not be VELASCO, JR., J.:
cause for relief for those who time the length of their credit The Case
card transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual In the meantime, Gonzales issued a check dated September
attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster that 30, 1998 in favor of Rene Unson (Unson) for PhP 250,000
This is an appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari
there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by drawn against the credit line (COHLA). However, on October
under Rule 45 from the Decision 1 dated October 22, 2007 of
petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his 13, 1998, upon presentment for payment by Unson of said
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74466, which
several traveling companions gave rise to the moral shock, check, it was dishonored by PCIB due to the termination by
denied petitioners appeal from the December 10, 2001
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and PCIB of the credit line under COHLA on October 7, 1998 for
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 99-1324 of the Regional Trial
social humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as concluded the unpaid periodic interest dues from the loans of Gonzales
Court (RTC), Branch 138 in Makati City. The RTC found
by the RTC.27Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and and the spouses Panlilio. PCIB likewise froze the FCD
justification for respondents dishonor of petitioners check
should not give rise to a general entitlement for damages account of Gonzales.
and found petitioner solidarily liable with the spouses Jose
under a more mundane set of facts. and Jocelyn Panlilio (spouses Panlilio) for the three
promissory notes they executed in favor of respondent Consequently, Gonzales had a falling out with Unson due to
We sustain the amount of moral damages awarded to Philippine Commercial and International Bank (PCIB). the dishonor of the check. They had a heated argument in
petitioner by the RTC. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the premises of the Philippine Columbian Association (PCA)
determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of where they are both members, which caused great
moral damages, since each case must be governed by its embarrassment and humiliation to Gonzales. Thereafter, on
The Facts
own peculiar facts, however, it must be commensurate to the November 5, 1998, Unson sent a demand letter 5 to
loss or injury suffered.28 Petitioners original prayer Gonzales for the PhP 250,000. And on December 3, 1998,
Petitioner Eusebio Gonzales (Gonzales) was a client of
for P5,000,000.00 for moral damages is excessive under the the counsel of Unson sent a second demand letter 6 to
PCIB for a good 15 years before he filed the instant case.
circumstances, and the amount awarded by the trial court Gonzales with the threat of legal action. With his FCD
His account with PCIB was handled by respondent Edna
of P500,000.00 in moral damages more seemly.1avvphi1 account that PCIB froze, Gonzales was forced to source out
Ocampo (Ocampo) until she was replaced by respondent and pay the PhP 250,000 he owed to Unson in cash.
Roberto Noceda (Noceda).
Likewise, we deem exemplary damages available under the
circumstances, and the amount of P300,000.00 appropriate. On January 28, 1999, Gonzales, through counsel, wrote
In October 1992, PCIB granted a credit line to Gonzales
There is similarly no cause though to disturb the determined PCIB insisting that the check he issued had been fully
through the execution of a Credit-On-Hand Loan
award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P85,233.01 as funded, and demanded the return of the proceeds of his
Agreement3 (COHLA), in which the aggregate amount of the
expenses of litigation. FCD as well as damages for the unjust dishonor of the
accounts of Gonzales with PCIB served as collateral for and check.7 PCIB replied on March 22, 1999 and stood its
his availment limit under the credit line. Gonzales drew from ground in freezing Gonzales accounts due to the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed said credit line through the issuance of check. At the outstanding dues of the loans.8 On May 26, 1999, Gonzales
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET institution of the instant case, Gonzales had a Foreign reiterated his demand, reminding PCIB that it knew well that
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Currency Deposit (FCD) of USD 8,715.72 with PCIB. the actual borrowers were the spouses Panlilio and he never
Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-1665 is hereby
benefited from the proceeds of the loans, which were
REINSTATED. Costs against respondent. SO ORDERED.
serviced by the PCIB account of the spouses Panlilio.9
PCIBs refusal to heed his demands compelled Gonzales to fault nor negligence on the part of PCIB in dishonoring the A close perusal of the records shows that the courts a
file the instant case for damages with the RTC, on account check issued by Gonzales in favor of Unson, ratiocinating quo correctly found Gonzales solidarily liable with the
of the alleged unjust dishonor of the check issued in favor of that PCIB was merely exercising its rights under the spouses Panlilio for the three promissory notes.
Unson. contractual stipulations in the COHLA brought about by the
outstanding past dues of the REM loan and interests for The promissory notes covering the PhP 1,800,000 loan
The Ruling of the RTC which Gonzales was solidarily liable with the spouses show the following:
Panlilio to pay under the promissory notes.
After due trial, on December 10, 2001, the RTC rendered a (1) Promissory Note BD-090-1766-95,13 dated
Decision in favor of PCIB. The decretal portion reads: Thus, we have this petition. October 30, 1995, for PhP 500,000 was signed by
Gonzales and his wife, Jessica Gonzales;
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows The Issues
(2) Promissory Note BD-090-2122-95,14 dated
(a) on the first issue, plaintiff is liable to pay Gonzales, as before the CA, raises again the following December 26, 1995, for PhP 1,000,000 was
defendant Bank as principal under the promissory assignment of errors: signed by Gonzales and the spouses Panlilio; and
notes, Exhibits A, B and C;
I - IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE LIABILITY (3) Promissory Note BD-090-011-96,15 dated
(b) on the second issue, the Court finds that there ARISING FROM PROMISSORY NOTES January 3, 1996, for PhP 300,000 was signed by
is justification on part of the defendant Bank to (EXHIBITS "A", "B" AND "C", PETITIONER; Gonzales and the spouses Panlilio.
dishonor the check, Exhibit H; EXHIBITS "1", "2" AND "3", RESPONDENT)
PERTAINED TO BORROWER JOSE MA. Clearly, Gonzales is liable for the loans covered by the
(c) on the third issue, plaintiff and defendants are PANLILIO AND NOT TO APPELLANT AS above promissory notes. First, Gonzales admitted that he is
not entitled to damages from each other. RECOGNIZED AND ACKNOWLEDGE[D] BY an accommodation party which PCIB did not dispute. In his
RESPONDENT PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & testimony, Gonzales admitted that he merely accommodated
No pronouncement as to costs. INDUSTRIAL BANK (RESPONDENT BANK). the spouses Panlilio at the suggestion of Ocampo, who was
then handling his accounts, in order to facilitate the fast
SO ORDERED.10 II - IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS release of the loan. Gonzales testified:
WERE NOT AT FAULT NOR GUILTY OF GROSS
The RTC found Gonzales solidarily liable with the spouses NEGLIGENCE IN DISHONORING PETITIONERS ATTY. DE JESUS:
Panlilio on the three promissory notes relative to the CHECK DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1998 IN THE
outstanding REM loan. The trial court found no fault in the AMOUNT OF P250,000.00 FOR THE REASON Now in this case you filed against the bank you mentioned
termination by PCIB of the COHLA with Gonzales and in "ACCOUNT CLOSED", INSTEAD OF MERELY there was a loan also applied for by the Panlilios in the sum
freezing the latters accounts to answer for the past due PhP "REFER TO DRAWER" GIVEN THE FACT THAT of P1.8 Million Pesos. Will you please tell this Court how this
1,800,000 loan. The trial court ruled that the dishonor of the EVEN AFTER DISHONOR, RESPONDENT came about?
check issued by Gonzales in favor of Unson was proper SIGNED A CERTIFICATION DATED 7
considering that the credit line under the COHLA had already DECEMBER 1998 THAT CREDIT ON HAND GONZALES:
been terminated or revoked before the presentment of the (COH) LOAN AGREEMENT WAS STILL VALID
check. WITH A COLLATERAL OF FOREIGN CURRENCY Mr. Panlilio requested his account officer . . . . at that time it
DEPOSIT (FCD) OF [USD] 48,715.72. is a P42.0 Million loan and if he secures another P1.8 Million
Aggrieved, Gonzales appealed the RTC Decision before the loan the release will be longer because it has to pass to XO.
CA. III - IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST
RESPONDENTS DESPITE PRESENTATION OF Q: After that what happened?
CLEAR PROOF TO SUPPORT ACTION FOR
The Ruling of the CA
DAMAGES.12 A: So as per suggestion since Mr. Panlilio is a good friend of
On September 26, 2007, the appellate court rendered its mine and we co-owned the property I agreed initially to use
The Courts Ruling my name so that the loan can be utilized immediately by Mr.
Decision dismissing Gonzales appeal and affirming in
toto the RTC Decision. The fallo reads: Panlilio.
The core issues can be summarized, as follows: first,
whether Gonzales is liable for the three promissory notes Q: Who is actually the borrower of this P1.8 Million Pesos?
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision, dated
covering the PhP 1,800,000 loan he made with the spouses
December 10, 2001, in Civil Case No. 99-1324 is hereby
Panlilio where a REM over a parcel of land covered by TCT
AFFIRMED in toto. A: Well, in paper me and Mr. Panlilio.
No. 38012 was constituted as security; and second, whether
PCIB properly dishonored the check of Gonzales drawn
SO ORDERED.11 Q: Who received the proceeds of said loan?
against the COHLA he had with the bank.
In dismissing Gonzales appeal, the CA, first, confirmed the A: Mr. Panlilio.
The petition is partly meritorious.
RTCs findings that Gonzales was indeed solidarily liable
with the spouses Panlilio for the three promissory notes
First Issue: Solidarily Liability on Promissory Notes
executed for the REM loan; second, it likewise found neither
Q: Do you have any proof that it was Mr. Panlilio who Third, as an accommodation party, Gonzales is solidarily promissory notes which indubitably stipulated solidary
actually received the proceeds of this P1.8 Million Pesos liable with the spouses Panlilio for the loans. In Ang v. liability for all the borrowers. Moreover, the three promissory
loan? Associated Bank,19 quoting the definition of an notes serve as the contract between the parties. Contracts
accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable have the force of law between the parties and must be
A: A check was deposited in the account of Mr. Panlilio.16 Instruments Law, the Court cited that an accommodation complied with in good faith.23
party is a person "who has signed the instrument as maker,
xxxx drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value Second Issue: Improper Dishonor of Check
therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some
Q: By the way upon whose suggestion was the loan of Mr. other person."20 The Court further explained: Having ruled that Gonzales is solidarily liable for the three
Panlilio also placed under your name initially? promissory notes, We shall now touch upon the question of
[A]n accommodation party is one who meets all the three whether it was proper for PCIB to dishonor the check issued
A: Well it was actually suggested by the account officer at requisites, viz: (1) he must be a party to the instrument, by Gonzales against the credit line under the COHLA.
that time Edna Ocampo. signing as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser; (2) he must
not receive value therefor; and (3) he must sign for the We answer in the negative.
Q: How about this Mr. Rodolfo Noceda? purpose of lending his name or credit to some other person.
An accommodation party lends his name to enable the As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
accommodated party to obtain credit or to raise money; he of Court is limited to review of errors of law. 24 The factual
A: As you look at the authorization aspect of the loan Mr.
receives no part of the consideration for the instrument but findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Noceda is the boss of Edna so he has been familiar with my
assumes liability to the other party/ies thereto. The appellate court, are generally binding on us unless there was
account ever since its inception.
accommodation party is liable on the instrument to a holder a misapprehension of facts or when the inference drawn
for value even though the holder, at the time of taking the from the facts was manifestly mistaken.25 The instant case
Q: So these two officers Ocampo and Noceda knew that this
instrument, knew him or her to be merely an accommodation falls within the exception.
was actually the account of Mr. Panlilio and not your
party, as if the contract was not for accommodation.
account?
The courts a quo found and held that there was a proper
As petitioner acknowledged it to be, the relation between an dishonor of the PhP 250,000 check issued by Gonzales
A: Yes, sir. In fact even if there is a change of account officer
accommodation party and the accommodated party is one of against the credit line, because the credit line was already
they are always informing me that the account will be
principal and suretythe accommodation party being the closed prior to the presentment of the check by Unson; and
debited to Mr. Panlilios account.17
surety. As such, he is deemed an original promisor and the closing of the credit line was likewise proper pursuant to
debtor from the beginning; he is considered in law as the the stipulations in the promissory notes on the banks right to
Moreover, the first note for PhP 500,000 was signed by same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged
Gonzales and his wife as borrowers, while the two set off or apply all moneys of the debtor in PCIBs hand and
touching the obligation of the latter since their liabilities are the stipulations in the COHLA on the PCIBs right to
subsequent notes showed the spouses Panlilio sign as interwoven as to be inseparable. Although a contract of
borrowers with Gonzales. It is, thus, evident that Gonzales terminate the credit line on grounds of default by Gonzales.
suretyship is in essence accessory or collateral to a valid
signed, as borrower, the promissory notes covering the PhP principal obligation, the suretys liability to the creditor
1,800,000 loan despite not receiving any of the proceeds. Gonzales argues otherwise, pointing out that he was not
is immediate, primary and absolute; he informed about the default of the spouses Panlilio and that
is directly and equally bound with the principal. As an the September 21, 1998 account statement of the credit line
Second, the records of PCIB indeed bear out, and was equivalent of a regular party to the undertaking, a surety
admitted by Noceda, that the PhP 1,800,000 loan proceeds shows a balance of PhP 270,000 which was likewise borne
becomes liable to the debt and duty of the principal obligor out by the December 7, 1998 PCIBs certification that he has
went to the spouses Panlilio, thus: even without possessing a direct or personal interest in the USD 8,715.72 in his FCD account which is more than
obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom.21 sufficient collateral to guarantee the PhP 250,000 check,
ATTY. DE JESUS: [on Cross-Examination]
dated September 30, 1998, he issued against the credit line.
Thus, the knowledge, acquiescence, or even demand by
Is it not a fact that as far as the records of the bank [are] Ocampo for an accommodation by Gonzales in order to A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the courts a
concerned the proceeds of the 1.8 million loan was received extend the credit or loan of PhP 1,800,000 to the spouses quo committed reversible error in not finding negligence by
by Mr. Panlilio? Panlilio does not exonerate Gonzales from liability on the PCIB in the dishonor of the PhP 250,000 check.
three promissory notes.
NOCEDA:
First. There was no proper notice to Gonzales of the default
Fourth, the solidary liability of Gonzales is clearly stipulated and delinquency of the PhP 1,800,000 loan. It must be borne
Yes sir.18 in the promissory notes which uniformly begin, "For value in mind that while solidarily liable with the spouses Panlilio
received, the undersigned (the "BORROWER") jointly and on the PhP 1,800,000 loan covered by the three promissory
The fact that the loans were undertaken by Gonzales when severally promise to pay x x x." Solidary liability cannot be notes, Gonzales is only an accommodation party and as
he signed as borrower or co-borrower for the benefit of the presumed but must be established by law or such only lent his name and credit to the spouses Panlilio.
spouses Panlilioas shown by the fact that the proceeds contract.22 Article 1207 of the Civil Code pertinently states While not exonerating his solidary liability, Gonzales has a
went to the spouses Panlilio who were servicing or paying that "there is solidary liability only when the obligation right to be properly apprised of the default or delinquency of
the monthly duesis beside the point. For signing as expressly so states, or when the obligation requires the loan precisely because he is a co-signatory of the
borrower and co-borrower on the promissory notes with the solidarity." This is true in the instant case where Gonzales, promissory notes and of his solidary liability.
proceeds of the loans going to the spouses Panlilio, as accommodation party, is immediately, equally, and
Gonzales has extended an accommodation to said spouses. absolutely bound with the spouses Panlilio on the
We note that it is indeed understandable for Gonzales to Q: Did you inform him that if he did not update the interest It is the bank which computes these periodic interests and
push the spouses Panlilio to pay the outstanding dues of the he would not be able to withdraw his money? such dues must be put into writing and formally served to
PhP 1,800,000 loan, since he was only an accommodation Gonzales if he were asked to pay them, more so when the
party and was not personally interested in the loan. Thus, a A: Yes sir, we will be forced to hold on to any assets that he payments by the spouses Panlilio were charged through the
meeting was set by Gonzales with the spouses Panlilio and has with us so thats why we suggested just to update the account of the spouses Panlilio where the interest dues were
the PCIB officers, Noceda and Ocampo, in the spouses interest because at the end of everything, he would be able simply debited. Such arrangement did not cover Gonzales
Panlilios jewelry shop in SM Megamall on October 5, 1998. to withdraw more funds than the interest that the money he bank account with PCIB, since he is only an accommodation
Unfortunately, the meeting did not push through due to the would be needed to update the interest.27 party who has no personal interest in the PhP 1,800,000
heavy traffic Noceda and Ocampo encountered. loan. Without a clear and determinate demand through a
From the foregoing testimonies, between the denial of formal written notice for the exact periodic interest dues for
Such knowledge of the default by Gonzales was, however, Gonzales and the assertion by PCIB that Gonzales was the loans, Gonzales cannot be expected to pay for them.
not enough to properly apprise Gonzales about the default properly apprised, we find for Gonzales. We find the
and the outstanding dues. Verily, it is not enough to be testimonies of the former PCIB employees to be self-serving In business, more so for banks, the amounts demanded from
merely informed to pay over a hundred thousand without and tenuous at best, for there was no proper written notice the debtor or borrower have to be definite, clear, and without
being formally apprised of the exact aggregate amount and given by the bank. The record is bereft of any document ambiguity. It is not sufficient simply to be informed that one
the corresponding dues pertaining to specific loans and the showing that, indeed, Gonzales was formally informed by must pay over a hundred thousand aggregate outstanding
dates they became due. PCIB about the past due periodic interests. interest dues without clear and certain figures. Thus, We find
PCIB negligent in not properly informing Gonzales, who is an
Gonzales testified that he was not duly notified about the PCIB is well aware and did not dispute the fact that accommodation party, about the default and the exact
outstanding interest dues of the loan: Gonzales is an accommodation party. It also acted in outstanding periodic interest dues. Without being properly
accordance with such fact by releasing the proceeds of the apprised, Gonzales was not given the opportunity to properly
ATTY. DE JESUS: loan to the spouses Panlilio and likewise only informed the act on them.
spouses Panlilio of the interest dues. The spouses Panlilio,
Now when Mr. Panlilios was encountering problems with the through their account28 with PCIB, were paying the periodic It was only through a letter 30 sent by PCIB dated October 2,
bank did the defendant bank [advise] you of any problem interest dues and were the ones periodically informed by the 1998 but incongruously showing the delinquencies of the
with the same account? bank of the debiting of the amounts for the periodic interest PhP 1,800,000 loan at a much later date, i.e., as of October
payments. Gonzales never paid any of the periodic interest 31, 1998, when Gonzales was formally apprised by PCIB. In
GONZALES: dues. PCIBs Noceda admitted as much in his cross- it, the interest due was PhP 106,1616.71 and penalties for
examination: the unpaid interest due of PhP 64,766.66, or a total
They never [advised] me in writing. aggregate due of PhP 171,383.37. But it is not certain and
ATTY. DE JESUS: [on Cross-Examination] the records do not show when the letter was sent and when
Gonzales received it. What is clear is that such letter was
Q: How did you come to know that there was a problem?
And there was no instance that Mr. Gonzales ever made belatedly sent by PCIB and received by Gonzales after the
even interest for this loan, is it not, its always Mr. Panlilio fact that the latters FCD was already frozen, his credit line
A: When my check bounced sir.26
who was paying the interest for this loan? under the COHLA was terminated or suspended, and his
PhP 250,000 check in favor of Unson was dishonored.
On the other hand, the PCIB contends otherwise, as
Corazon Nepomuceno testified: NOCEDA:
And way much later, or on May 4, 1999, was a demand letter
Yes sir.29 from the counsel of PCIB sent to Gonzales demanding
ATTY. PADILLA: payment of the PhP 1,800,000 loan. Obviously, these formal
written notices sent to Gonzales were too late in the day for
Can you tell this Honorable Court what is it that you told Mr. Indeed, no evidence was presented tending to show that
Gonzales to act properly on the delinquency and he already
Gonzales when you spoke to him at the celphone? Gonzales was periodically sent notices or notified of the
suffered the humiliation and embarrassment from the
various periodic interest dues covering the three promissory
dishonor of his check drawn against the credit line.
NEPOMUCENO: notes. Neither do the records show that Gonzales was
aware of amounts for the periodic interests and the payment
for them. Such were serviced by the spouses Panlilio. To reiterate, a written notice on the default and deficiency of
I just told him to update the interest so that we would not the PhP 1,800,000 loan covered by the three promissory
have to cancel the COH Line and he could withdraw the notes was required to apprise Gonzales, an accommodation
money that was in the deposit because technically, if an Thus, PCIB ought to have notified Gonzales about the status
party. PCIB is obliged to formally inform and apprise
account is past due we are not allowed to let the client of the default or delinquency of the interest dues that were
Gonzales of the defaults and the outstanding obligations,
withdraw funds because they are allowed to offset funds so, not paid starting July 1998. And such notification must be
more so when PCIB was invoking the solidary liability of
just to help him get his money, just to update the interest so formal or in written form considering that the outstanding
Gonzales. This PCIB failed to do.
that we could allow him to withdraw. periodic interests became due at various dates, i.e., on July
8, 17, and 28, 1998, and the various amounts have to be
certain so that Gonzales is not only properly apprised but is Second. PCIB was grossly negligent in not giving prior
Q: Withdraw what? notice to Gonzales about its course of action to suspend,
given the opportunity to pay them being solidarily liable for
the loans covered by the promissory notes. terminate, or revoke the credit line, thereby violating the
A: His money on the COH, whatever deposit he has with us. clear stipulation in the COHLA.
The COHLA, in its effectivity clause, clearly provides: NEPOMUCENO: The foregoing testimonies of PCIB officers clearly show that
not only did PCIB fail to give prior notice to Gonzales about
4. EFFECTIVITY The COH shall be effective for a period It was recommended by the account officer and I supported the Offering Ticket for the process of termination,
of one (1) year commencing from the receipt by the CLIENT it. suspension, or revocation of the credit line under the
of the COH checkbook issued by the BANK, subject to COHLA, but PCIB likewise failed to inform Gonzales of the
automatic renewals for same periods unless terminated by Q: And you approved it? fact that his credit line has been terminated. Thus, we find
the BANK upon prior notice served on PCIB grossly negligent in the termination, revocation, or
CLIENT.31 (Emphasis ours.) A: Yes sir. suspension of the credit line under the COHLA. While PCIB
invokes its right on the so-called "cross default provisions," it
It is undisputed that the bank unilaterally revoked, Q: Did you inform Mr. Gonzales that you have already may not with impunity ignore the rights of Gonzales under
suspended, and terminated the COHLA without giving cancelled his credit on hand facility? the COHLA.
Gonzales prior notice as required by the above stipulation in
the COHLA. Noceda testified on cross-examination on the A: As far as I know, it is the account officer who will inform Indeed, the business of banking is impressed with public
Offering Ticket32 recommending the termination of the credit him. interest and great reliance is made on the banks sworn
line, thus: profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving
irreproachable service. Like a common carrier whose
Q: But you have no record that he was informed?
ATTY. DE JESUS: [on Cross-Examination] business is imbued with public interest, a bank should
exercise extraordinary diligence to negate its liability to the
A: I dont recall and we have to look at the folder to
This Exhibit 8, you have not furnished at anytime a copy to depositors.35 In this instance, PCIB is sorely remiss in the
determine if they were informed.
the plaintiff Mr. Gonzales is it not? diligence required in treating with its client, Gonzales. It may
not wantonly exercise its rights without respecting and
Q: If you will notice, this letter . . . what do you call this letter honoring the rights of its clients.
NOCEDA: of yours?
No sir but verbally it was relayed to him. Art. 19 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that "[e]very
A: That is our letter advising them or reminding them of their person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
unpaid interest and that if he is able to update his interest he performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
Q: But you have no proof that Mr. Gonzales came to know can extend the promissory note or restructure the due, and observe honesty and good faith." This is the basis
about this Exhibit 8? outstanding. of the principle of abuse of right which, in turn, is based upon
the maxim suum jus summa injuria (the abuse of right is the
A: It was relayed to him verbally. Q: Now, I call your attention madam witness, there is nothing greatest possible wrong).36
in this letter to the clients advising them or Mr. Gonzales that
Q: But there is no written proof? his credit on hand facility was already cancelled? In order for Art. 19 to be actionable, the following elements
must be present: "(1) the existence of a legal right or duty,
A: No sir. A: I dont know if there are other letters aside from this. (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another."37 We find that such
Q: And it is only now that you claim that it was verbally Q: So in this letter there is nothing to inform or to make Mr. elements are present in the instant case. The effectivity
relayed to him, its only now when you testified in Court? Eusebio aware that his credit on hand facility was already clause of the COHLA is crystal clear that termination of the
cancelled? COH should be done only upon prior notice served on the
A: Before . . . CLIENT. This is the legal duty of PCIBto inform Gonzales
A: No actually he can understand it from the last sentence. of the termination. However, as shown by the above
Q: To whom did you relay this information? "If you will be able to update your outstanding interest, we testimonies, PCIB failed to give prior notice to Gonzales.
can apply the extention of your promissory note" so in other
A: It was during the time that we were going to Megamall, it words we are saying that if you dont, you cannot extend the Malice or bad faith is at the core of Art. 19. Malice or bad
was relayed by Liza that he has to pay his obligations or else promissory note. faith "implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
it will adversely affect the status of the account.33 wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity." 38 In
Q: You will notice that the subject matter of this October 2, the instant case, PCIB was able to send a letter advising
On the other hand, the testimony of Corazon Nepomuceno 1998 letter is only the loan of 1.8 million is it not, as you can Gonzales of the unpaid interest on the loans 39 but failed to
shows: see from the letter? Okay? mention anything about the termination of the COHLA. More
significantly, no letter was ever sent to him about the
ATTY. DE JESUS: [on Cross-Examination] A: Ah . . . termination of the COHLA. The failure to give prior notice on
the part of PCIB is already prima facie evidence of bad
Now we go to the other credit facility which is the credit on Q: Okay. There is nothing there that will show that that also faith.40 Therefore, it is abundantly clear that this case falls
hand extended solely of course to Mr. Eusebio Gonzales refers to the credit on hand facility which was being utilized squarely within the purview of the principle of abuse of rights
who is the plaintiff here, Mr. Panlilio is not included in this by Mr. Gonzales is it not? as embodied in Art. 19.
credit on hand facility. Did I gather from you as per your
Exhibit 7 as of October 2, 1998 you were the one who A: But I dont know if there are other letters that are not Third. There is no dispute on the right of PCIB to suspend,
recommended the cancellation of this credit on hand facility? presented to me now.34 terminate, or revoke the COHLA under the "cross default
provisions" of both the promissory notes and the COHLA.
However, these cross default provisions do not confer Fourth. We find the testimony43 of Ocampo incredible on the against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its
absolute unilateral right to PCIB, as they are qualified by the point that the principal borrower of the PhP 1,800,000 loan part.45
other stipulations in the contracts or specific circumstances, covered by the three promissory notes is Gonzales for which
like in the instant case of an accommodation party. the bank officers had special instructions to grant and that it In the instant case, Gonzales suffered from the negligence
was through the instructions of Gonzales that the payment of and bad faith of PCIB. From the testimonies of Gonzales
The promissory notes uniformly provide: the periodic interest dues were debited from the account of witnesses, particularly those of Dominador Santos 46 and
the spouses Panlilio. Freddy Gomez,47 the embarrassment and humiliation
The lender is hereby authorized, at its option and Gonzales has to endure not only before his former close
without notice, to set off or apply to the payment of this For one, while the first promissory note dated October 30, friend Unson but more from the members and families of his
Note any and all moneys which may be in its hands on 1995 indeed shows Gonzales as the principal borrower, the friends and associates in the PCA, which he continues to
deposit or otherwise belonging to the Borrower. The other promissory notes dated December 26, 1995 and experience considering the confrontation he had with Unson
Borrower irrevocably appoint/s the Lender, effective upon the January 3, 1996 evidently show that it was Jose Panlilio who and the consequent loss of standing and credibility among
nonpayment of this Note on demand/at maturity or upon the was the principal borrower with Gonzales as co-borrower. them from the fact of the apparent bouncing check he
happening of any of the events of default, but without any For another, Ocampo cannot feign ignorance on the issued. Credit is very important to businessmen and its loss
obligation on the Lenders part should it choose not to arrangement of the payments by the spouses Panlilio or impairment needs to be recognized and compensated.48
perform this mandate, as the attorney-in-fact of the through the debiting of their bank account. It is incredulous
Borrower, to sell and dispose of any property of the that the payment arrangement is merely at the behest of The termination of the COHLA by PCIB without prior notice
Borrower, which may be in the Lenders possession by Gonzales and at a mere verbal directive to do so. The fact and the subsequent dishonor of the check issued by
public or private sale, and to apply the proceeds thereof to that the spouses Panlilio not only received the proceeds of Gonzales constitute acts of contra bonus mores. Art. 21 of
the payment of this Note; the Borrower, however, shall the loan but were servicing the periodic interest dues the Civil Code refers to such acts when it says, "Any person
remain liable for any deficiency.41 (Emphasis ours.) reinforces the fact that Gonzales was only an who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
accommodation party. is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
The above provisos are indeed qualified with the specific compensate the latter for damage."
circumstance of an accommodation party who, as such, has Thus, due to PCIBs negligence in not giving Gonzalesan
not been servicing the payment of the dues of the loans, and accommodation partyproper notice relative to the Accordingly, this Court finds that such acts warrant the
must first be properly apprised in writing of the outstanding delinquencies in the PhP 1,800,000 loan covered by the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
dues in order to answer for his solidary obligation. three promissory notes, the unjust termination, revocation, or damages.1avvphi1Nominal damages "are recoverable
suspension of the credit line under the COHLA from PCIBs where a legal right is technically violated and must be
The same is true for the COHLA, which in its default clause gross negligence in not honoring its obligation to give prior vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual
provides: notice to Gonzales about such termination and in not present loss of any kind x x x." 49 We further explained the
informing Gonzales of the fact of such termination, treating nature of nominal damages in Almeda v. Cario:
16. DEFAULT The CLIENT shall be considered in default Gonzales account as closed and dishonoring his PhP
under the COH if any of the following events shall occur: 250,000 check, was certainly a reckless act by PCIB. This x x x Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification
resulted in the actual injury of PhP 250,000 to Gonzales for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right.
1. x x x whose FCD account was frozen and had to look elsewhere Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only and
for money to pay Unson. not in fact. When granted by the courts, they are not treated
2. Violation of the terms and conditions of this as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply a recognition
Agreement or any contract of the CLIENT with the With banks, the degree of diligence required is more than of the existence of a technical injury. A violation of the
BANK or any bank, persons, corporations or that of a good father of the family considering that the plaintiffs right, even if only technical, is sufficient to support
entities for the payment of borrowed money, or any business of banking is imbued with public interest due to the an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as there
other event of default in such contracts.42 nature of their function. The law imposes on banks a high is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an
degree of obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors award of nominal damages is proper.50 (Emphasis Ours.)
with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
The above pertinent default clause must be read in
nature of banking.44 Had Gonzales been properly notified of In the present case, Gonzales had the right to be informed of
conjunction with the effectivity clause (No. 4 of the COHLA,
the delinquencies of the PhP 1,800,000 loan and the the accrued interest and most especially, for the suspension
quoted above), which expressly provides for the right of
process of terminating his credit line under the COHLA, he of his COHLA. For failure to do so, the bank is liable to pay
client to prior notice. The rationale is simple: in cases where
could have acted accordingly and the dishonor of the check nominal damages. The amount of such damages is
the bank has the right to terminate, revoke, or suspend the
would have been avoided. addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into
credit line, the client must be notified of such intent in order
for the latter to act accordinglywhether to correct any account the relevant circumstances.51 In this case, the Court
ground giving rise to the right of the bank to terminate the Third Issue: Award of Damages finds that the grant of PhP 50,000 as nominal damages is
credit line and to dishonor any check issued or to act in proper.
accord with such termination, i.e., not to issue any check The banking system has become an indispensable institution
drawn from the credit line or to replace any checks that had in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic Moreover, as We held in MERALCO v. CA, 52 failure to give
been issued. This, the bankwith gross negligencefailed life of every civilized societybanks have attained a prior notice when required, such as in the instant case,
to accord Gonzales, a valued client for more than 15 years. ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to constitutes a breach of contract and is a clear violation of Art.
regard them with respect and even gratitude and most of all, 21 of the Code. In cases such as this, Art. 2219 of the Code
confidence, and it is for this reason, banks should guard provides that moral damages may be recovered in acts
referred to in its Art. 21. Further, Art. 2220 of the Code
provides that "[w]illful injury to property may be a legal No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. lease contract, petitioner presented in court a certification
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no
that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. F. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT RELATIONS record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had
The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the been entered into their files. Petitioner added that he only
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." Similarly, "every G.R. No. 119107 March 18, 2005 learned of the alleged lease contract when he was informed
person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes JOSE V. LAGON, Petitioner, that private respondent was collecting rent from the tenants
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the vs. of the building.
same."53Evidently, Gonzales is entitled to recover moral HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V.
damages. LAPUZ, respondents. Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be
DECISION unwarranted, petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed for
Even in the absence of malice or bad faith, a depositor still CORONA, J.: the payment of actual and moral damages.
has the right to recover reasonable moral damages, if the
depositor suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the On July 29, 1986, the court a quo found for private
embarrassment, and humiliation.54 Although incapable of estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court, 1 two respondent (plaintiff below):
pecuniary estimation, moral damages are certainly parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few
recoverable if they are the proximate result of the months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in
defendants wrongful act or omission. The factual filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner favor of the plaintiff:
antecedents bolstered by undisputed testimonies likewise before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
show the mental anguish and anxiety Gonzales had to In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, 1. Declaring the "Contract of Lease" executed by
endure with the threat of Unson to file a suit. Gonzales had claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mangelen Guiabar in favor of the
to pay Unson PhP 250,000, while his FCD account in PCIB Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of plaintiff on November 6, 1974 (Exh. "A" and "A-1")
was frozen, prompting Gonzales to demand from PCIB and land (the "property") in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao over Lot No. 6395, Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73.
to file the instant suit. beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for Lot No. 6399. 3ls-73, and Lot no.9777-A. CSD-11-
private respondent to put up commercial buildings which 000076-D (Lot No. 3-A. 40124), all situated along
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be Ledesma St., Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which
the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo anteit paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private document was notarized by Atty. Benjamin S.
must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the Fajardo, Sr. and entered into his notarial register
be proportional to the wrong committed. 55Thus, an award of lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but as Doc. No. 619. Page No. 24. Book No. II. Series
PhP 50,000 is reasonable moral damages for the unjust since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to of 1974, to be authentic and genuine and as such
dishonor of the PhP 250,000 which was the proximate cause be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed. valid and binding for a period of ten (10) years
of the consequent humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, and specified thereon from November 1, 1974 up to
mental anguish suffered by Gonzales from his loss of When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started October 31, 1984;
credibility among his friends, colleagues and peers. remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her
estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop 2. Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the
Furthermore, the initial carelessness of the banks omission collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he commercial buildings found on the aforesaid lots
in not properly informing Gonzales of the outstanding constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing and he is entitled to their possession and the
interest duesaggravated by its gross neglect in omitting to himself as the new owner of the property, had been collection (of rentals) of the said commercial
give prior notice as stipulated under the COHLA and in not collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint buildings within the period covered by this
giving actual notice of the termination of the credit line against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of "Contract of Lease" in his favor;
justifies the grant of exemplary damages of PhP 10,000. Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating
Such an award is imposed by way of example or correction his leasehold rights over it. 3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
for the public good. following:
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he
Finally, an award for attorneys fees is likewise called for induced the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, a) Rentals of the commercial buildings
from PCIBs negligence which compelled Gonzales to litigate contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay on the lots covered by the "Contract of
to protect his interest. In accordance with Art. 2208(1) of the off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied Lease" in favor of the plaintiff for the
Code, attorneys fees may be recovered when exemplary interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there period from October 1, 1978 up to
damages are awarded. We find that the amount of PhP was no lease contract covering the property when he October 31, 1984, including accrued
50,000 as attorneys fees is reasonable. purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry interests in the total amount of Five
revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. Hundred Six Thousand Eight Hundred
WHEREFORE, this petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos
Accordingly, the CA Decision dated October 22, 2007 in CA- Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he (P506, 850.56), the same to continue to
G.R. CV No. 74466 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. went to Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly bear interest at the legal rate of 12% per
The Philippine Commercial and International Bank (now notarized the lease contract between private respondent and annum until the whole amount is fully
Banco De Oro) is ORDERED to pay Eusebio Gonzales PhP Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the paid by the defendant to the plaintiff;
50,000 as nominal damages, PhP 50,000 as moral lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that
damages, PhP 10,000 as exemplary damages, and PhP Atty. Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal
50,000 as attorneys fees. but these were all unsigned. To refute the existence of a
b) Moral damages in the amount of One (P700.00) every end of the month for the entire 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred
Million Sixty Two Thousand Five period of seventy three (73) months. This portion in holding that petitioner is liable for interference of
Hundred Pesos (P1,062,500.00); of the judgment should be considered as a mere contractual relation under Article 1314 of the New
alternative should the defendant fail to pay the Civil Code;
c) Actual or compensatory damages in amount of Five Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six
the amount of Three Hundred Twelve Centavos (P506,805.56) hereinabove specified; 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P312, holding that private respondent is precluded from
500.00); 5. Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the recovering, if at all, because of laches;
defendant for lack of merit;
d) Exemplary or corrective damages in 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
the amount of One Hundred Eighty 6. With costs against the defendant.2 holding petitioner liable for actual damages and
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos attorney's fees, and;
(P187,500.00) Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.3 In
a decision dated January 31, 1995,4 the appellate court 4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
e) Temperate or moderate damages in modified the assailed judgment of the trial court as follows: dismissing petitioner's counterclaims.6
the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); a) The award for moral damages, compensatory Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person
damages, exemplary damages, temperate or who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
f) Nominal damages in the amount of moderate damages, and nominal damages as well damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized
Sixty Two Thousand Five Hundred as expenses of litigation in the amount in that provision is known as interference with contractual
Pesos (P62,500.00); of P62,500.00 and interests under paragraph 3- relations.7 The interference is penalized because it violates
a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) are the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the
g) Attorney's fees in the amount of One deleted; benefits that should result therefrom.8
Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P125,000.00); b) The award for attorney's fees is reduced The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of
to P30,000.00; the subject property, during the supposed existence of
h) Expenses of litigation in the amount private respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina
of Sixty Two Thousand Five Hundred c) Paragraphs 1,2,5 and 6 are AFFIRMED; Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner
Pesos (P62,500.00); should be held liable for damages.
d) Additionally, the defendant is hereby ordered to
i) Interest on the moral damages, actual pay to the plaintiff by way of actual damages the The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of
or compensatory damages temperate or sum ofP178,425.00 representing the amount of Appeals,9 laid down the elements of tortuous interference
moderate damages, nominal damages, rentals he collected from the period of October with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract;
attorney's fees and expenses of 1978 to August 1983, and minus the amount (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
litigation in the amounts as specified of P42,700.00 representing rentals due the of the contract and (c) interference of the third person
hereinabove from May 24, 1982 up to defendant computed at P700.00 per month for the without legal justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner
June 27, 1986, in the total amount of period from August 1978 to August 1983, with So Ping Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of
Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos interest thereon at the rate until the same is fully his grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without
(P900,000.00); all of which will continue paid; the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The
to bear interests at a legal rate of 12% corporation, prevented from using the premises for its
per annum until the whole amounts are e) Paragraph 4 is deleted.5 business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous interference.
fully paid by the defendants to the
plaintiffs; Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract
of any lease contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and must be duly established. To prove this, private respondent
4. For failure of the defendant to deposit with this private respondent. On the other hand, private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease
Court all the rentals he had collected from the insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not to know renewal.10 While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the
thirteen (13) tenants or occupants of the about the contract since the latter was aware that he was notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution
commercial buildings in question, the plaintiff is collecting rentals from the tenants of the building. While the and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless,
hereby restored to the possession of his appellate court disbelieved the contentions of both parties, it after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioner's counsel and
commercial buildings for a period of seventy-three nevertheless held that, for petitioner to become liable for after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the
(73) months which is the equivalent of the total damages, he must have known of the lease contract and notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court
period for which he was prevented from collecting must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent
the rentals from the tenants or occupants of his bought the subject parcels of land. and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease
commercial buildings from October 1, 1978 up to contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear,
October 31, 1984, and for this purpose a Writ of Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
Preliminary Injunction is hereby issued, but the reasons why the Court should rule in his favor: continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave
plaintiff is likewise ordered to pay to the defendant rise to its execution and delivery.11
the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there purpose of furthering a personal financial interest, but when it has been stipulated upon or under the instances
be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it: provided therein.26 Likewise, being in the concept of actual
exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an damages, the award for attorney's fees must have clear,
essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering factual and legal bases27 which, in this case, do not exist.
interference.12 A defendant in such a case cannot be made with the business relations of another exists where
liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of. 13 While the actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such Regarding the dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim for
it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must justification does not exist where the actor's motive actual and moral damages, the appellate court affirmed the
nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some assailed order of the trial court because it found no basis to
reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the authorities believe that it is not necessary that the grant the amount of damages prayed for by petitioner. We
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the interferer's interest outweigh that of the party find no reason to reverse the trial court and the Court of
contract.14 whose rights are invaded, and that an individual Appeals. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction
acts under an economic interest that is substantial, of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must
the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease self-protection. Moreover, justification for certainty.28 Petitioner was unable to prove that he suffered
contract. protecting one's financial position should not be loss or injury, hence, his claim for actual damages must fail.
made to depend on a comparison of his economic Moreover, petitioner's prayer for moral damages was not
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention interest in the subject matter with that of the warranted as moral damages should result from the wrongful
of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own personal others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct act of a person. The worries and anxieties suffered by a
investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious lies in a proper business interest rather than in party hailed to court litigation are not compensable.29
circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe wrongful motives.20
deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it
property. An examination of the entire property's title bore no The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at necessary to delve into the issue of laches.
indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. bar. In our view, petitioner's purchase of the subject property
Even the registry of property had no record of the same.15 was merely an advancement of his financial or economic WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO
contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make Cuddy,21 the Court declared that a person is not a malicious ORDERED.
him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business
third element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will G. OTHERS
petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable
justification or excuse for his action 16 or when his conduct for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith G.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003
was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for involved. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA
tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR.,petitioners,
malice17 or must have been driven by purely impious reasons In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to vs.
to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present, ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
cannot be justified.18 petitioner cannot be made to answer for private respondent's ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA,
losses. ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents.
private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage BELLOSILLO, J.:
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word "induce" without injury. "Injury" is the legal invasion of a legal right
refers to situations where a person causes another to while "damage" is the hurt, loss or harm which results from I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or the injury.22 In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of to the death to make it possible for you to continue
intimidation.19 The records show that the decision of the heirs Appeals,,23 the Court turned down the claim for damages of writing it.
of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was a cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled by Voltaire
completely of their own volition and that petitioner did petitioner corporation after several defaults in payment. We
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private held there that there can be damage without injury where the
respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In VOLTAIRE'S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the
his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent that instance, the consequences must be borne by the basic liberties to free speech and free press liberties that
was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai injured person alone since the law affords no remedy for belong as well, if not more, to those who question, who do
Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice damages resulting from an act which does not amount to not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we all
or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the legal injury or wrong.24 Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct strive to achieve for ourselves and our posterity can better
property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was complained of precludes recovery of damages.25 be reached by a free exchange of ideas, where the best test
never established. of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
With respect to the attorney's fees awarded by the appellate the competition of the free market not just the ideas we
In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference court to private respondent, we rule that it cannot be desire, but including those thoughts we despise.1
can be justified at all if the interferer acts for the sole recovered under the circumstances. According to Article
2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be awarded only
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a alleged libelous article refers to the larger the press, under the Bill of Rights.12 Thus, in Newsweek, Inc.
local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of the v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 we dismissed a complaint
organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. libel could not readily identify the personalities of for libel against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground that private
LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an respondents failed to state a cause of action since they
GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, individual Muslim member to prove that the made no allegation in the complaint that anything contained
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence in the article complained of specifically referred to any of
damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of presented in this case failed to convince this court them. Private respondents, incorporated associations of
the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have
PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. applied to the herein plaintiffs.3 8,500 members and several individual members, filed a
AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an class action suit for damages in behalf of all sugarcane
article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily planters in Negros Occidental. The complaint filed in the
On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the
tabloid. The article reads: Court of First Instance of Bacolod City alleged that
decision of the trial court. It opined that it was "clear from the
Newsweek, Inc., committed libel against them by the
disputed article that the defamation was directed to all
publication of the article "Island of Fear" in its weekly
"ALAM BA NINYO? adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred
newsmagazine allegedly depicting Negros Province as a
and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This
place dominated by wealthy landowners and sugar planters
libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid
appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? sugarcane workers but also brutalized and killed them with
beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit"
impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article showed
and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE
a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella
presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to
bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and
put the sugarcane planters in a bad light, expose them to
pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila protect the interests of all Muslims.4
public ridicule, discredit and humiliation in the Philippines
ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at and abroad, and make them the objects of hatred, contempt
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang
Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in
pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag
the appellate court (a) on the existence of the elements of general. We ratiocinated
nilang 'Ramadan'."
libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit,
and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages,
x x x where the defamation is alleged to have
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
been directed at a group or class, it is essential
insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the embracing as to apply to every individual in that
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the
offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each
feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as
through false and malicious statements. 5 It is that which individual in the class or group can prove that the
a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy,
tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, defamatory statement specifically pointed to him,
good morals and human relations; that on account of these
good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory so that he can bring the action separately, if need
libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.6 It is the publication of be x x x x The case at bar is not a class suit. It is
Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every
anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of not a case where one or more may sue for the
Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
another or tends to bring him into disrepute. 7 Defamation is benefit of all, or where the representation of class
an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the interest affected by the judgment or decree is
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to indispensable to make each member of the class
JR., in their defense, contended that the article did not have, of the plaintiff.8 an actual party. We have here a case where each
mention respondents as the object of the article and of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article reputation in the community. They do not have a
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are
was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was common or general interest in the subject matter
not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of
published without malice nor intention to cause damage, of the controversy.
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
prejudice or injury to Muslims.2
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a
basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person
On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint allegation for special damages.9 The fact that the language who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the
holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article itself.10 respondents have no individual causes of action; hence,
were not specifically identified they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private
respondents must have a cause of action in common with
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be the class to which they belong to in order for the case to
It must be noted that the persons allegedly interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. prosper.
defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not identified Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a
with specificity. The subject article was directed at particular member of a class, no member of such class has a
the Muslims without mentioning or identifying the right of action11 without at all impairing the equally An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal,
herein plaintiffs x x x. It is thus apparent that the demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of separate and distinct in the community. Each Muslim, as part
of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five action for tortious libel involving large groups, and provides a The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided
(5) million people, belongs to a different trade and succinct illustration: into different sects: Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian,
profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence of
political and religious view some may be conservative, which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple may be
There are groupings which may be finite enough
others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, a corner house in the fringes of the countryside. As with the
so that a description of the body is a description of
even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to Christian religion, so it is with other religions that represent
the members. Here the problem is merely one of
strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the the nation's culturally diverse people and minister to each
evaluation. Is the description of the member
"infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual one's spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided
implicit in the description of the body, or is there a
Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to into smaller groups with varying agenda, from the prayerful
possibility that a description of the body may
an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in conservative to the passionately radical. These divisions in
consist of a variety of persons, those included
character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not the Muslim population may still be too large and ambiguous
within the charge, and those excluded from it?
have a single common reputation that will give them a to provide a reasonable inference to any personality who can
common or general interest in the subject matter of the bring a case in an action for libel.
controversy. A general charge that the lawyers in the city are
shysters would obviously not be a charge that all
The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly
of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the
In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company,14 the expressed by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the course of
lawyers in a local point in a great city, such as
United States Court of Appeals held that one guiding the deliberations in this case. We extensively reproduce
Times Square in New York City, were shysters
principle of group libel is that defamation of a large group hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating discussion on
would obviously not include all of the lawyers who
does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an group libel
practiced in that district; but a statement that all of
individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the
the lawyers who practiced in a particular building
defamatory matter.
in that district were shysters would be a specific Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and
charge, so that any lawyer having an office within slander the one being, in general, written, while
The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American that building could sue. the other in general is oral. In either form,
case,15 a person had allegedly committed libel against all defamation is an invasion of the interest in
persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there reputation and good name. This is a "relational
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous
could be no libel against an extensive community in common interest" since it involves the opinion others in the
statement is considered to have no application to anyone in
law. In an English case, where libel consisted of allegations community may have, or tend to have of the
particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not
of immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the Court considered plaintiff.
only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff
that if the libel were on the whole Roman Catholic Church
does not establish any personal reference to himself. 20 At
generally, then the defendant must be absolved. 16 With
present, modern societal groups are both numerous and The law of defamation protects the interest in
regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious
complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as reputation the interest in acquiring, retaining
groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action
the size of these groups increases, the chances for and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's
at the behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the
members of such groups to recover damages on tortious character and conduct warrant. The mere fact that
individual, will lie.
libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two the plaintiff's feelings and sensibilities have been
(2) important public policies: first, where the group referred offended is not enough to create a cause of action
In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader for defamation. Defamation requires that
numbering more than 600 million, were defamed by the would take the statements as so literally applying to each something be communicated to a third person that
airing of a national television broadcast of a film depicting individual member; and second, the limitation on liability may affect the opinion others may have of the
the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess accused of would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and plaintiff. The unprivileged communication must be
adultery, and alleging that such film was "insulting and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound shown of a statement that would tend to hurt
defamatory" to the Islamic religion. 17 The United States compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests plaintiff's reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing in
District Court of the Northern District of California concluded involved in libel cases.21 the community.
that the plaintiffs' prayer for $20 Billion in damages arising
from "an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule, discredit
In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to Although the gist of an action for defamation is an
and abuse followers of Islam throughout the world, Arabs
readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly injury to reputation, the focus of a defamation
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" bordered on the
defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement
"frivolous," ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate
indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, itself and its predictable effect upon third persons.
an actionable claim for defamation. The California Court
Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word A statement is ordinarily considered defamatory if
stressed that the aim of the law on defamation was to
"Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a it "tend[s] to expose one to public hatred, shame,
protect individuals; a group may be sufficiently large that a
religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule,
statement concerning it could not defame individual group
Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgracex x x."
members.18
political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory
which describes only a general segment of the Philippine statement as one that "tends to so harm the
Philip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose reputation of another as to lower him in the
the Law of Libel,"19 discusses the inappropriateness of any construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible estimation of the community or to deter third
for any representative identification. persons from associating or dealing with him."
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is individual damages could be presumed, and groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such
necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of where the class referred to was so numerous that broadside defamation has been lacking.
his prima faciecase that the defendant (1) great vexation and oppression might grow out of
published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be
There have been numerous attempts by individual
of and concerning the plaintiff. maintained. This rule has been applied to
members to seek redress in the courts for libel on
defamatory publications concerning groups or
these groups, but very few have succeeded
classes of persons engaged in a particular
The rule in libel is that the action must be brought because it felt that the groups are too large and
business, profession or employment, directed at
by the person against whom the defamatory poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff
associations or groups of association officials, and
charge has been made. In the American was singled out for personal attack x x x x
to those directed at miscellaneous groups or
jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for (citations omitted).
classes of persons.
damages suffered by reason of defamation of
another person, even though the plaintiff suffers
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by
some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation Distinguishing a small group which if defamed
petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor
cases, it is necessary that the publication be "of entitles all its members to sue from a large group
refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the
and concerning the plaintiff." Even when a which if defamed entitles no one to sue is
subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can
publication may be clearly defamatory as to not always so simple. Some authorities have
scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure
somebody, if the words have no personal noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group
pointedly resulting in damages.
application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable generally has twenty five (25) or fewer members.
by him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel However, there is usually no articulated limit on
because no one's reputation has been injured x x size. Suits have been permitted by members of A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the
xx fairly large groups when some distinguishing present case is an intentional tortious act causing mental
characteristic of the individual or group increases distress and not an action for libel. That opinion
the likelihood that the statement could be invokes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire22 where the U.S.
In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an
interpreted to apply individually. For example, a Supreme Court held that words heaping extreme profanity,
alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that
single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have
the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom
University football team was permitted to sue no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection;
the statement was made. This principle is of vital
when a writer accused the entire team of taking and Beauharnais v. Illinois23 where it was also ruled that hate
importance in cases where a group or class is
amphetamines to "hop up" its performance; the speech which denigrates a group of persons identified by
defamed since, usually, the larger the collective,
individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant position their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and
the more difficult it is for an individual member to
on the team and had played in all but two of the the law may validly prohibit such speech on the same
show that he was the person at whom the
team's games. ground as defamation of an individual.
defamation was directed.
A prime consideration, therefore, is the public We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the
If the defamatory statements were directed at a
perception of the size of the group and whether a immediately preceding paragraph. Primarily, an "emotional
small, restricted group of persons, they applied to
statement will be interpreted to refer to every distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil
any member of the group, and an individual
member. The more organized and cohesive a action filed by an individual24 to assuage the injuries to his
member could maintain an action for defamation.
group, the easier it is to tar all its members with emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
When the defamatory language was used toward
the same brush and the more likely a court will character. It has no application in the instant case since no
a small group or class, including every member, it
permit a suit from an individual even if the group particular individual was identified in the disputed article
has been held that the defamatory language
includes more than twenty five (25) members. At of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article,
referred to each member so that each could
some point, however, increasing size may be seen assuming there was any, falls under the principle
maintain an action. This small group or class may
to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting of relational harm which includes harm to social
be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses,
injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as
professions or employments, a restricted
lawsuit. distinguished from the principle of reactive harm which
subdivision of a particular class, a society, a
includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form
football team, a family, small groups of union
of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint,
officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of x x x x There are many other groupings of men
respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
a particular company. than those that are contained within the foregoing
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their
group classifications. There are all the religions of
activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in
the world, there are all the political and ideological
In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly other non-Muslim communities in the country.25It is thus
beliefs; there are the many colors of the human
in respect to a large class or group of persons, beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application
race. Group defamation has been a fertile and
and there is nothing that points, or by proper of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation,
dangerous weapon of attack on various racial,
colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept
religious and political minorities. Some states,
particular member of the class or group, no of emotional distress properly belongs.
therefore, have passed statutes to prevent
member has a right of action for libel or slander.
concerted efforts to harass minority groups in the
Where the defamatory matter had no special,
United States by making it a crime to circulate Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to
personal application and was so general that no
insidious rumors against racial and religious recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the
plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant the act described. The jury, however, awarded $200,000 in unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must
was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) damages on a separate count of "intentional infliction of be left through which irascible tempers may blow
The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a emotional distress," a cause of action that did not require a off relatively harmless steam.
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the false statement of fact to be made. The United States
plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental Supreme Court in a unanimous decision overturned the jury
Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to
distress was extreme and severe.26 verdict of the Virginia Court and held that Reverend Falwell
adopt a rule of recovery for emotional harm that would "open
may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional
up a wide vista of litigation in the field of bad manners," an
distress. It was argued that the material might be deemed
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so area in which a "toughening of the mental hide" was thought
outrageous and may have been intended to cause severe
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go to be a more appropriate remedy.36 Perhaps of greater
emotional distress, but these circumstances were not
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded concern were the questions of causation, proof, and the
sufficient to overcome the free speech rights guaranteed
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The ability to accurately assess damages for emotional harm,
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally each of which continues to concern courts today.37
Simply stated, an intentional tort causing emotional distress
to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff. 27 Generally,
must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free
conduct will be found to be actionable where the recitation of
speech. In this connection, the doctrines
the facts to an average member of the community would
in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her
by subsequent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler
to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or her reaction.28 It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by
times in the history of free expression the Supreme Court
the U.S. High Court as a "public figure," he was anindividual
appeared to espouse a theory, known as the Two-Class
particularly singled out or identified in the parody appearing
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental Theory, that treated certain types of expression as taboo
on Hustler magazine. Also, the emotional distress allegedly
reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the First
suffered by Reverend Falwell involved a reactive interest
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, Amendment. The most celebrated statement of this view was
an emotional response to the parody which supposedly
mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and expressed in Chaplinsky:
injured his psychological well-being.
chagrin.29 "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions,
refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
mental condition which may be generally recognized and Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional
of which have never been thought to raise any
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
depression, or phobia.30 The plaintiff is required to show, reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional no evidence on record that points to that result.
insulting or "fighting" words those which by their
distress so severe that no reasonable person could be
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element
Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.31
infliction of emotional distress in this manner34 observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove slight social value as a step to truth that any
There is virtually unanimous agreement that such
more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
ordinary defendants are not liable for mere insult,
anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, outweighed by the social interest in order and
indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the
threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. morality.
case is lacking in other circumstances of
In determining whether the tort of outrage had been
aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek. Our
committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to
manners, and with them our law, have not yet Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First
be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough
progressed to the point where we are able to Amendment principles have passed it by. American courts no
language, and to occasional acts and words that are
afford a remedy in the form of tort damages for all longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed
definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the
intended mental disturbance. Liability of course merely because it is "lewd," "profane," "insulting" or
actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as
cannot be extended to every trivial indignity x x x x otherwise vulgar or offensive.38 Cohen v. California39 is
insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.32
The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and illustrative: Paul Robert Cohen wore a jacket bearing the
required to be hardened to a certain amount of words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse in April
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell33 illustrates the test case of a rough language, and to acts that are definitely 1968, which caused his eventual arrest. Cohen was
civil action for damages on intentional infliction of emotional inconsiderate and unkind x x x The plaintiff cannot convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting any
distress. A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring recover merely because of hurt feelings. person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive
the American fundamentalist preacher and evangelist conduct." The U.S. Supreme Court conceded that Cohen's
Reverend Jerry Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state expletive contained in his jacket was "vulgar," but it
Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this
having an incestuous, sexual liaison with his mother in an concluded that his speech was nonetheless protected by the
succinct observation, viz:35
outhouse. Falwell sued Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt right to free speech. It was neither considered an
for damages. The United States District Court for the "incitement" to illegal action nor "obscenity." It did not
Western District of Virginia ruled that the parody was not There is no occasion for the law to intervene in constitute insulting or "fighting" words for it had not been
libelous, because no reasonable reader would have every case where someone's feelings are hurt. directed at a person who was likely to retaliate or at
understood it as a factual assertion that Falwell engaged in There must still be freedom to express an someone who could not avoid the message. In other words,
no one was present in the Los Angeles courthouse who Supreme Court, holding that the advocacy of illegal action damages would appear to have been adequately established
would have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personal becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to by respondents."
insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence against inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
him. incite or produce such action.45 Except in unusual
In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where
instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of
misinformation about another individual's religion is as
lawlessness as long as such speech is not translated into
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly commonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it
action.
defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket. The conviction would be more appropriate to respect the fair criticism of
could only be justified by California's desire to exercise the religious principles, including those which may be
broad power in preserving the cleanliness of discourse in the The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be outrageously appalling, immensely erroneous, or those
public sphere, which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to overemphasized. Prof. Smolla affirmed that couched as fairly informative comments. The greater danger
grant to the State, holding that no objective distinctions can "Brandenburgmust be understood as in our society is the possibility that it may encourage the
be made between vulgar and nonvulgar speech, and that the overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether
emotive elements of speech are just as essential in the treating group libel under the same First Amendment Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This
exercise of this right as the purely cognitive. As Mr. Justice standards as individual libel."46 It may well be considered as would unnecessarily make the civil courts a battleground to
Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another one of the lynchpins of the modern doctrine of free speech, assert their spiritual ideas, and advance their respective
man's lyric x x x words are often chosen as much for their which seeks to give special protection to politically relevant religious agenda.
emotive as their cognitive force." 40 With Cohen, the U.S. speech.
Supreme Court finally laid the Constitutional foundation for
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to
judicial protection of provocative and potentially offensive
In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be determine which is proper religious conduct or belief; neither
speech.
cured by the filing of a class suit. As correctly pointed out by does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast
Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In asunder, for the validity of religious beliefs or values are
Amendment protection. Only one small piece of the Two- determining the question of fair and adequate representation outside the sphere of the judiciary. Such matters are better
Class Theory in Chaplinsky survives U.S. courts continue of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether left for the religious authorities to address what is rightfully
to treat "obscene" speech as not within the protection of the the interest of the named party is coextensive with the within their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts must be
First Amendment at all. With respect to the "fighting words" interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters if only to
doctrine, while it remains alive it was modified by the current of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rights under
rigorous clear and present danger test. 41 Thus, in Cohen the of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of modern jurisprudence where "[a]ll ideas are treated equal in
U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was the named party to speak for the rest of the class.47 the eyes of the First Amendment even those ideas that
no showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional
Draft" had threatened to provoke imminent violence; and that principles."52 Under the right to free speech, "there is no such
The rules require that courts must make sure that the
protecting the sensibilities of onlookers was not sufficiently thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
persons intervening should be sufficiently numerous to fully
compelling interest to restrain Cohen's speech. seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
protect the interests of all concerned. In the present
judges and juries but on the competition of other
controversy, Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc.,
ideas."53 Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate court
Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims
decision would surely create a chilling effect on the
suffered the same fate as Chaplinsky. Indeed, in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well.
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of
whenBeauharnais was decided in 1952, the Two-Class Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of
expression, and of the press.
Theory was still flourishing. While concededly the U.S. High numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they
Tribunal did not formally abandon Beauharnais, the seminal been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with
shifts in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence substantially those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
undercut Beauharnais and seriously undermined what is left there can be a safe guaranty that those absent will be Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 August 1998 is
of its vitality as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt a adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the RTC-
crushing impact on Beauharnais and rendered it almost its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing."48 Br. 4, Manila, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, is
certainly a dead letter case law are Brandenburg v. REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
Ohio,42 and, again, Cohen v. California.43 These decisions costs. SO ORDERED.
Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "moral
recognize a much narrower set of permissible grounds for
damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to
restricting speech than did Beauharnais.44
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the Separate Opinions
damages and its causal connection with the acts complained VITUG, J ., concurring:
In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux of,49 and so it must be, as moral damages although
Klan was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to
The innate right of a person to an unimpaired reputation and
Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and propriety of impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and
good name is no less a constitutional imperative than that
crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism actual damages suffered.50 Exemplary damages, on the
which protects his life, liberty or property. Thus, the law
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reforms; other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to
imposes upon him who attacks another's reputation, by
and for voluntarily assembling with a group formed to teach establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
slanderous words or libelous publication, a liability to make
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Appellant compensatory damages.51 Unfortunately, neither of the
compensation for the injury done and the damages
challenged the statute and was sustained by the U.S. requirements to sustain an award for either of these
sustained.1
Private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Defined in simple terms, vexation is an act of annoyance or action16 without at all impairing the equally demanding right
Philippines, Inc., a federation of more than 70 Muslim irritation that causes distress or agitation. 2 Early American of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under
religious organizations in the country, and the other named cases have refused all remedy for mental injury, such as one the bill of rights.17
respondents all claim, with understandable indignation, that caused by vexation, because of the difficulty of proof or of
they have been defamed by an item published by petitioners measurement of damages.3 In comparatively recent times,
If an article, for instance, states that "judges in the
in Bulgar, a tabloid, circulated in the Metro Manila area. The however, the infliction of mental distress as a basis for an
Philippines are corrupt," such a general condemnation
article reads: independent tort action has been recognized. It is said that
cannot reasonably be interpreted to be pointing to each
"one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
judge or to a certain judge in the Philippines. Thus, no
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
"ALAM BA NINYO? particular magistrate can claim to have been disgraced or to
subject to liability for such emotional
have sustained an impaired reputation because of that
distress."4 Nevertheless, it has also been often held that
article. If, on the other hand, the article proclaims that
"Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa petty insult or indignity lacks, from its very nature, any
"judges in Metro Manila are corrupt," such statement of
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? convincing assurance that the asserted emotional or mental
derogatory conduct now refers to a relatively narrow group
distress is genuine, or that if genuine it is
that might yet warrant its looking into in an appropriate suit.
serious.5 Accordingly, it is generally declared that there can
"Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong And if the article accuses the "Justices of the Supreme
be no recovery for insults, 6 indignities or threats7 which are
bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila Court" of corruption, then there is a specific derogatory
considered to amount to nothing more than mere
pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila statement about a definite number of no more than fifteen
annoyances or hurt feelings.8 At all events, it would be
ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at persons.
essential to prove that personal damage is directly suffered
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang by the plaintiff on account of the wrongful act of the
pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag defendant. Jurisprudence would appear to suggest that in cases
nilang 'Ramadan'."
permitting recovery, the group generally has 25 or fewer
members.18 When statements concern groups with larger
A kindred concept, albeit of greater degree of perversity,
Private respondents, for themselves and in behalf of all composition, the individual members of that group would be
defamation, broadly defined, is an attack on the reputation of
Muslims, filed the complaint before the trial court against hardput to show that the statements are "of and concerning
another, the unprivileged publication of false statements
petitioners, alleging that the published article was them."19 Although no precise limits can be set as to the size
which naturally and proximately result in injury to another. 9 It
defamatory and an insult to respondents. The trial court of a group or class that would be sufficiently small,
is that which tends to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals increasing size, at some point, would be seen to dilute the
or confidence in which a person is held, or to excite adverse,
reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered harm to individuals and any resulting injury would fall
derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
petitioners to pay damages to private respondents. beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit. 20 This principle is
him.10 Defamation is an invasion of a "relational interest"
said to embrace two important public policies: 1) where the
since it involves the opinion which others in the community
group referred to is large, the courts presume that no
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before the Court to assail the may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. 11 The Revised
reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally
findings of the Court of Appeals on the existence of the Penal Code, although not the primary governing law in this
applying to each individual member; and 2) the limitation on
elements of libel, the right of respondents to institute the instance, provides an instructive definition of libel as being a
liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and
class suit, and the liability of petitioners for moral damages, form of defamation expressed in writing, print, pictures, or
expression, as well as of press, effecting a sound
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. signs,12 to wit: "A libel is a public and malicious imputation of
compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests
a crime, or vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
involved in libel cases.21
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
The present controversy stems from a civil action for the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
damages and not from a criminal complaint. The Civil Code person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."13 Thus, no recovery was allowed where the remarks
recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either complained of had been made about correspondence
pursuant to Article 26, paragraph (4), to the effect that schools, one school suing;22 or where there was imputation
although it may not constitute a criminal offense, "vexing or While arguably, the article subject of the complaint could be
of criminality to a union, one member suing; 23 or where an
humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly characterized as vexatious or defamatory and as imparting
attack was made on Catholic clergymen, one clergyman
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other an erroneous interpretation of a Muslim practice that tends to
suing.24
personal condition," can give rise to a cause of action for ridicule the Islamic faith, it is, however, impersonal on its
damages, or consonantly with Article 33 which provides that face, its language not being directed at any particular person
in case of defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely but to a large segment of society. In order that defamatory In Newsweek, Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,25 this
separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought words can be actionable in court, it is essential that they are Court dismissed a class suit for scurrilous remarks filed by
by the injured party. Both civil actions are based on tort personal to the party maligned, an ascertained or four incorporated associations of sugar planters in Negros
liability under common law and require the plaintiff to ascertainable individual.14 It is only then that plaintiff's Occidental in behalf of all sugar planters in that province,
establish that he has suffered personal damage or injury as emotions and/or reputation can be said to have been injured; against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground, among other things,
a direct consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct. In thus, the plaintiff, to recover, must show that he or she is the that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently ascribed to in the
fine, it must be shown that the act complained of is vexatious person to whom the statements are directed.15 Declarations article published by the defendant. And so also it was in an
or defamatory of, and as it pertains to, the claimant, thereby made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to older case,26 where the Court ratiocinated that an article
humiliating or besmirching the latter's dignity and honor. advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent directed at a class or group of persons in broad language
circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular would not be actionable by individuals composing the class
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of or group unless the statements were sweeping but, even
then, it would be highly probable, said the Court, that no 'Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or Private respondents insist that this case is principally about
action could lie "where the body is composed of so large a negligently causes damage to another, shall tortious conduct under Article 26 of the Civil Code. Unlike the
number of persons that common sense would tell those to indemnify the latter for the same.' [Art. 20] action in Article 30 of the Civil Code which must arise from a
whom the publication was made that there was room for "criminal offense," the action under Article 26 "may not
persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and constitute a criminal offense." Article 26, adopted from
'Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and American jurisprudence, covers several kinds of intentional
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part." torts. Paragraph 4 of Article 26, which refers to acts
good customs or public policy shall compensate
humiliating another for his religious beliefs, is embraced in
the latter for the damage.' [Art. 21]
the tort known as intentional infliction of mental or emotional
In the present case, the subject article relates to the entire
distress. This case must be decided on the issue of whether
Muslim population and not just to the Islamic Da'wah Council
'Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, there was such tortious conduct, and not whether there was
of the Philippines or to any of the individual respondents.
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbor and defamation that satisfied the elements of the crime of libel.
There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or
other persons. The following and similar acts,
any of its members, or to any of the individual complainants.
though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for II. The Tortious Act in Question
shall produce a cause of action for damages,
social censure pointedly resulting in damages. Islamic
prevention and other relief:
Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., itself, much like any
The newspaper article in question published by petitioners
other artificial being or juridical entity, having existence only
states as follows:
in legal contemplation, would be devoid of any such real (1) Prying into the privacy of another's
feeling or emotion as ordinarily these terms are residence;
understood,27 and it cannot have that kind of reputation that "ALAM BA NINYO?
an individual has that could allow it to sue for damages
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the
based on impinged personal reputation.28
private life or family relation of another; Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to SET sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay.
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be
ASIDE the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay
alienated from his friends;
REINSTATING thereby the order of dismissal rendered by magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila
the Regional Trial Court. kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin
account of his religious belief, lowly lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang
station in life, place of birth, physical 'Ramadan'."
Dissenting Opinion defect, or other personal condition.' [Art.
26]
Private respondents claim that the newspaper article, which
CARPIO, J ., dissenting: asserts that Muslims worship the pig as their god, was
It is on account of the foregoing provisions of our published with intent to humiliate and disparage Muslims and
Civil Code that plaintiffs brought to the court 'a cast insult on Islam as a religion in this country. The
I dissent not because the newspaper article in question is
quo' a civil case for damages on account of a publication is not only grossly false, but is also the complete
libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional tortious act
published article at the editorial section of the opposite of what Muslims hold dear in their religion.
causing mental distress to those whom private respondent
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines; Inc. represents. defendant newspaper x x x."1
The trial court found that the newspaper article clearly
Petitioners acknowledge that private respondents' principal imputes a disgraceful act on Muslims. However, the trial
1. Nature of Action: Not a Libel but a Tort Case
cause of action is based on tortious conduct when court ruled that the article was not libelous because the
petitioners state in their Petition that "[p]laintiffs rely heavily article did not identify or name the plaintiffs. Declared the
Private respondents filed this class suit under Articles 19, 20, on Article 26 of the Civil Code particularly par. 4 thereof." trial court:
21 and 26 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, private Petitioners, however, assert that the newspaper article in
respondents stated their case as follows: question has not caused mental anguish, wounded feelings,
"There is no doubt that the subject article contains
moral shock, social humiliation or similar injury to private
an imputation of a discreditable 4 act when it
respondents.2
"Statement of Case portrayed the Muslims to be worshipping the pig
as their god. Likewise, there is no doubt that the
Clearly, the instant case is not about libel which requires the subject article was published, the newspaper
The Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
identification of the plaintiff in the libelous statement. If this 'Bulgar' containing the same having been
were a libel case under Article 30 3 of the Civil Code, which circulated in Metro Manila and in other parts of the
'Every person must, in the exercise of his rights authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability country.
and in the performance of his duties, act with arising from a criminal offense, I would agree that the instant
justice, give everyone his due and observe case could not prosper for want of identification of the private
honesty and good faith.' [Art. 19] respondents as the libeled persons. But private respondents
do not anchor their action on Article 30 of the Civil Code.
The defendants did not dispute these facts x x x "The present laws, criminal or civil, do not Place of birth, of physical defect and other
However, x x x identity of the person is not adequately cope with interferences and vexations personal conditions are too often the pretext of
present. mentioned in Article 26. humiliation cast upon other persons. Such
tampering with human personality, even though
the penal laws are not violated, should be the
It must be noted that the persons allegedly The privacy of one's home is an inviolable right.
cause of civil action.
defamed, the herein plaintiffs were not identified Yet the laws in force do not squarely and
with specificity. The subject article was directed at effectively protect this right.
the Muslims without mentioning or identifying the The article under study denounces "similar acts"
herein plaintiffs. x x x x." which could readily be named, for they occur with
The acts referred to in No. 2 are multifarious, and
unpleasant frequency."6 (Emphasis supplied)
yet many of them are not within the purview of the
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondents law in force. Alienation of the affection of another's
assailed the trial court for "deciding the case as a libel case wife or husband, unless it constituted adultery or The intent of the Code Commission is quite clear: Article 26
rather than a case for damages for violation of Articles 19, concubinage, is not condemned by the law, much specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of
20, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code." The Court of Appeals as it may shock society. There are numerous being criminal offenses. Article 24 itself expressly refers to
reversed the decision of the trial court not on the basis of acts, short of criminal unfaithfulness, whereby the tortious conduct which "may not constitute criminal
Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26, but on the ground that the husband or the wife breaks the marital vows, thus offenses." The purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in
newspaper article was libelous. Thus, the Court of Appeals causing untold moral suffering to the other spouse. the law where a person who suffers injury because of a
held: Why should not these acts be the subject matter of wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any
a civil action for damages? In American law, they redress. Under Article 26, the person responsible for such
are. act becomes liable for "damages, prevention and other
"It is clear from the disputed article that the
relief." In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family
defamation was directed at all adherents of the
and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate cases
Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and Again, there is meddling of so-called friends who
of damnum absque injuria in human relations.
idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. poison the mind of one or more members of the
This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the family against the other members. In this manner
plaintiffs-appellants who are Muslims sharing the many a happy family is broken up or estranged. Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as
same religious beliefs." Why should not the law try to stop this by creating criminal offenses do not apply in determining responsibility
a civil action for damages? for tortious conduct under Article 26. Where the tortious act
humiliating another because of his religious beliefs is
Thus, both the trial and appellate courts found the
published in a newspaper, the elements of the crime of libel
newspaper article in question insulting and humiliating to Of the same nature is that class of acts specified
need not be satisfied before the aggrieved person can
Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to in No. 3: intriguing to cause another to be
recover damages under Article 26. In intentional tort under
believers of Islam. This is a finding of fact that the Court is alienated from his friends.
Article 26, the offensive statements may not even be
duty bound to respect.5 This finding of fact establishes that
published or broadcasted but merely hurled privately at the
petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an
No less serious are the acts mentioned in No. 4: offended party.
intentional wrongful act humiliating persons because of
vexing, or humiliating another on account of his
their religious beliefs. Like the trial and appellate courts, we
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
find the newspaper article in question dripping with extreme In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of
physical defect or other personal condition. The
profanity, grossly offensive and manifestly outrageous, and the tort is not the injury to plaintiff's reputation, but the harm
penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation
devoid of any social value. The article evidently incites to plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In libel, the gist of
are glaringly inadequate.
religious hatred, discrimination and hostility against Muslims. the action is the injury to plaintiff's reputation. Reputation is
the community's opinion of what a person is. 7 In intentional
Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to infliction of mental distress, the opinion of the community is
Private respondents have certainly suffered humiliation and
heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by immaterial to the existence of the action although the court
mental distress because of their religious beliefs. The only
reason of the latter's religion. can consider it in awarding damages. What is material is the
question is whether the wrongful act committed by
disturbance on the-mental or emotional state of the plaintiff
petitioners, which does not constitute the crime of libel, is a
who is entitled to peace of mind. The offensive act or
case of damnum absque injuria or an actionable tort under Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with statement need not identify specifically the plaintiff as the
paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code. contempt because of the latter's lowly station in object of the humiliation. What is important is that the plaintiff
life. To a certain extent this is inevitable, from the actually suffers mental or emotional distress because he saw
nature of the social make-up, but there ought to
III. Why Article 26 of the Civil Code was Enacted the act or read the statement and it alludes to an identifiable
be a limit somewhere, even when the penal laws group to which he clearly belongs.
against defamation and unjust vexation are not
The Code Commission explained the inclusion of Article 26 transgressed. In a democracy, such a limit must be
in the Civil Code in this wise: established. The courts will recognize it in each If one of the petitioners, without specifically naming private
case. Social equality is not sought by the legal respondents, hurled the same statement in private
provision under consideration, but due regard for separately to each of the private respondents, the act would
decency and propriety. be actionable under Article 26 because it would cause
mental distress to each private respondent. The fact that the
statement was made publicly in fact makes matters worse Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 13 to which the are contrary to public policy and providing for an
because the mental or emotional distress caused on private Philippines is a signatory. This is clear from the following appropriate sanction in case of violation. x x x ."15
respondents would even be aggravated by the publicity. This exchange in the deliberations of the Constitutional
merely illustrates that the requirements of libel have no Commission:
The Covenant, being an international treaty to which the
application in intentional torts under Article 26 where the
Philippines is a signatory, is part of the country's municipal
impression of the public is immaterial while the impact on the
"MR. GARCIA: But it does not mean that we will law.16 The Covenant carries great weight in the interpretation
mind or emotion of the offended party is all-important. That is
refer to each and every specific article therein, but of the scope and meaning of the term "human rights" as
why in American jurisprudence the tort of intentional infliction
only to those that pertain to the civil and politically used in the Constitution. Unquestionably, the framers of the
of mental or emotional distress is completely separate and
related, as we understand it in this Commission on Constitution intentionally referred to the civil and political
distinct8 from the twin torts of libel and slander.9
Human Rights. rights embraced in the Covenant in describing the term
"human rights." The Constitution even mandates the
The majority opinion, however, cites the U.S. Supreme Court independent Commission on Human Rights to monitor the
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, I am not
decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell10 as authority that a compliance of the Philippine Government, which includes the
clear as to the distinction between social and civil
person "may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional judiciary, with its treaty obligations under the Covenant.
rights.
distress arising from a publication unless the publication
contained a false statement of fact that was made with
Paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code makes civilly liable
actual malice, that is, with a knowledge of falsity or reckless MR. GARCIA: There are two international
any person who humiliates another because of his religious
disregard for the truth." The majority opinion's reliance covenants: the International Covenant (on) Civil
beliefs. This is just a soft prohibition of advocacy of religious
on Hustler is misplaced. The doctrine in Hustler applies only and Political Rights and the International Covenant
hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence, the act
to public figures, and the U.S. Supreme Court found that on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
the Covenant seeks to curb and which the Philippine
"respondent Falwell is a 'public figure' for purposes of First second covenant contains all the different rights
Government has undertaken to declare unlawful. Other
Amendment law." The U.S. Supreme Court held the rights of labor to organize, the right to
countries that signed the Covenant have criminalized the
in Hustler that education, housing, shelter, etcetera.
acts prohibited under the Covenant. Since our ratification of
the Covenant in 1986, the Philippines has not enacted any
"We conclude that public figures and public MR. GUINGONA: So we are just limiting at the special legislation to enforce the provisions of the Covenant,
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional moment the sense of the committee to those the on the ground that existing laws are adequate to meet the
infliction of emotional distress by reason of Gentleman has specified. requirements of the Covenant. There is no other law, except
publication such as the one here at issue without paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code, that can provide a
'a showing in addition that the publication contains sanction against intentional conduct, falling short of a
MR. GARCIA: Yes, to civil and political rights.
a false statement of fact which was made with criminal act, advocating religious hatred that incites hostility
'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the between Muslims and Christians in this country.
statement was false or with reckless disregard as MR. GUINGONA: Thank you."14 (Emphasis
to whether or not it was true. x x x." (Emphasis supplied) If we are to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations
supplied)
under the Covenant, as the Constitution expressly mandates
Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and the Philippine Government, we must give redress under
Evidently, Hustler allows recovery for intentional infliction of Political Rights provides that "[a]ny advocacy of x x Article 26 to the outrageous profanity suffered by private
emotional distress if the aggrieved party is a private person xreligious hatred that constitutes incitement to respondents. Our Constitution adopts the generally accepted
and not a public figure even if there is no showing that the discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by principles of international law as part of the law of the
false statement was made with actual malice. In the instant law." The Human Rights Committee created under the land. Pacta sunt servanda every treaty in force binds the
case, private respondents are not public figures or public Covenant, in its 1983 Nineteenth Session, reported to parties who must comply with the treaty in good faith 17 is
officials but ordinary private individuals represented by member states that: one such principle. Thus, if we refuse to apply Article 26 to
private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the the instant case, then we admit that we have no law to
Philippines, Inc. enforce the Covenant. In effect, we admit non-compliance
"1. x x x In view of the nature of article 20, States with the Covenant.
parties are obliged to adopt the necessary
IV. Constitutional Guarantee of 'Full Respect for Human legislative measures prohibiting the actions
Rights' referred to therein. However, the reports have The Supreme Court of Canada, in interpreting Canada's
shown that in some States such actions are obligation under the Covenant, explained in R. v. Keegstra:18
neither prohibited by law nor are appropriate
The 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State values the
efforts intended or made to prohibit them. Further,
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect "C.E.R.D. (Convention on the Elimination of All
many reports failed to give sufficient information
for human rights."11 The Constitution created a Commission Forms of Racial Discrimination) and I.C.C.P.R.
concerning the relevant national legislation and
on Human Rights with the function, among others, to (International Covenant on Civil and Political
practice.
"[M]onitor the Philippine Government's compliance with Rights) demonstrate that the prohibition of hate
international treaty obligations on human rights."12 The promoting expression is considered to be not only
framers of the Constitution made it clear that the term 2. x x x For article 20 to become fully effective compatible with a signatory nation's guarantee of
"human rights" as used in the Constitution referred to the there ought to be a law making it clear that human rights, but is as well an obligatory aspect of
civil and political rights embodied in the International propaganda and advocacy as described therein this guarantee. Decisions under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472
and Fundamental Freedoms are also of aid in of such slight social value as a step to truth that U.S. 749 (1985) that this Court has 'long
illustrating the tenor of the international any benefit that may be derived from them is recognized that not all speech is of equal First
community's approach to hate propaganda and clearly outweighed by the social interest in order Amendment importance.' x x x ." [other citations
free expression. This is not to deny that finding the and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse omitted] x x x."
correct balance between prohibiting hate is not in any proper sense communication of
propaganda and ensuring freedom of expression information or opinion safeguarded by the
Indeed, while democratic societies maintain a deep
has been a source of debate internationally Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
(see, e.g., Nathan Lerner, The U.N. Convention on would raise no question under that instrument."
should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, this free
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial (Emphasis supplied)
debate has never been meant to include libelous, obscene
Discrimination (1980), at pp. 43-54). But despite
or profane utterances against private individuals. 22 Clearly,
debate Canada, along with other members of the
Chaplinsky expressly includes profane utterances as the newspaper article in question, dripping with extreme
international community, has indicated a
belonging to the narrowly limited classes of speech that profanity, does not enjoy the protection of the constitutional
commitment to prohibiting hate propaganda, and
arenot constitutionally protected. Profane utterances, like guarantee of freedom of speech.
in my opinion this court must have regard to that
asserting that Muslims worship the pig as their God, have no
commitment in investigating the nature of the
social value meriting constitutional protection. Black's Law
government objective behind s. 319(2) of the VI. Court's Duty and Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights
Dictionary (6th Ed.) defines the words "profane" and
Criminal Code. That the international community
"profanity" as follows:
has collectively acted to condemn hate
The 1987 Constitution has conferred on the Court the power
propaganda, and to oblige State Parties to
to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
C.E.R.D. and I.C.C.P.R. to prohibit such "Profane. Irreverence toward God or holy things.
enforcement of constitutional rights." This is an innovation in
expression, thus emphasizes the importance of Writing, speaking, or acting, in manifest or implied
the 1987 Constitution to insure, in the words of former Chief
the objective behind s. 319(2) and the principles of contempt of sacred things. Town of Torrington v.
Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, one of the framers of the
equality and the inherent dignity of all persons that Taylor, 59 Wyo. 109, 137 P.2d 621, 624; Duncan v.
Constitution, that "the protection and enforcement of these
infuse both international human rights and the U.S., C.C.A. Or., 48 F.2d 128, 133. That which has
constitutional rights is something that the courts have to
Charter." not been consecrated."
consider in the exercise of their judicial power. 23 This
provision stresses that constitutional rights, whether found in
As a signatory to the Covenant, the Philippines is, like, "Profanity. Irreverence towards sacred things; the Bill of Rights or in other provisions of the Constitution like
Canada, obligated under international law and the 1987 particularly, an irreverent and blasphemous use of in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, are "not
Constitution to protect the inherent dignity and human rights the name of God. Vulgar, irreverent, or coarse merely declaratory but are also enforceable."24
of all its citizens. language. It is a federal offense to utter an
obscene, indecent, or profane language on radio.
One such right, the enforcement and protection of which is
18 U.S.C.A. 1464. See also Obscenity."
V. Freedom of Expression and Profane Utterances expressly guaranteed by the State under the Constitution, is
the right to "full respect for human rights." The trial and
The majority opinion states that the doctrine appellate courts have found that private respondents'
The blatant profanity contained in the newspaper article in
in Chaplinsky "had largely been superseded by subsequent religious beliefs and practices have been twisted, ridiculed
question is not the speech that is protected by the
First Amendment doctrines." The majority opinion then cites and vilified by petitioners. This is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Words
the 1971 case of Cohen v. California 20 as an "illustrative" human rights of private respondents under the Constitution
that heap extreme profanity, intended merely to incite
case that "American courts no longer accept the view that and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and do not
speech may be proscribed merely because it is 'lewd,' It now becomes the duty of the Court, as the guardian of the
enjoy constitutional protection. As explained by the United
'profane,' 'insulting' or otherwise vulgar or offensive." fundamental rights of the people, to exercise its power to
States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Chaplinsky v.
However, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,21 a 1988 case which protect and enforce the constitutional rights of private
New Hampshire:19
the majority opinion also cites, clearly explains the state of respondents.
American law on this matter, thus:
"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and
The Court, pursuant to its rule making power, can require
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well
"Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment that in actions like the instant case, the plaintiffs must bring a
understood that the right of free speech is not
principles, like other principles, are subject to class suit. This will avoid multiplicity of suits considering the
absolute at all times and under all
limitations. We recognized in Pacifica numerous potential plaintiffs all over the country. A judgment
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
Foundation that speech that is 'vulgar, offensive, in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class,
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and shocking' is 'not entitled to absolute is binding under the res judicataprinciple on all members of
and punishment of which has never been thought
constitutional protection under all circumstances.' the class whether or not they were before the court. 25 This
to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, we held that that rule will address the fear that cases will swamp the courts all
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
a State could lawfully punish an individual for the over the country if profanities against religious groups are
and the insulting or 'fighting' words those which
use of insulting 'fighting words' those which by made actionable under Article 26.
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
immediate breach of the peace.' These limitations
well observed that such utterances are no
are but recognition of the observation in Dun &
VII. The Special Circumstance of Muslim Secession in the clear and present danger test of the U.S. Supreme Court, between constitutions born to different
South stating that it did not address the psychological trauma hate countries in different ages and in very
propaganda causes and the subtle and incremental way different circumstances. . .'
hate propaganda works. The Canadian Supreme Court
Limitations on freedom of expression have always been
found the U.S. Supreme Court's Beauharnais decision more
rooted on special circumstances confronting a society in its Canada and the United States are not alike in
reflective of Canadian values rather than later U.S. decisions
historical development. In the 1950s, faced with rising racial every way, nor have the documents entrenching
that weakened Beauharnais. The Canadian Supreme Court
tension in American society, the U.S Supreme Court ruled human rights in our two countries arisen in the
handed down Keegstra at a time when Canada was
in Beauharnais v. Illinois26 that hate speech which denigrates same context. It is only common sense to
becoming a multi-racial society following the influx of
a group of persons defined by their religion, race or ethnic recognize that, just as similarities will justify
immigrants of different color, ethnic origin and religion. The
origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit borrowing from the American experience,
following passages in Keegstra are instructive:
such speech on the same ground as defamation of an differences may require that Canada's
individual. This was the only time that the U.S. Supreme constitutional vision depart from that endorsed in
Court upheld group libel, and since then, there has been a "A myriad of sources both judicial and academic the United States." (Other citations omitted)
consistent retreat from this doctrine as blacks and other offer reviews of First Amendment jurisprudence
ethnic groups became more assimilated into the mainstream as it pertains to hate propaganda. Central to most
xxx xxx xxx
of American society. Beauharnais expressly acknowledged discussions is the 1952 case of Beauharnais v.
that race riots and massive immigration of unassimilated Illinois, where the Supreme Court of the United
ethnic groups justified the legislature in "punishing x x x States upheld as constitutional a criminal statute First, it is not entirely clear that Beauharnais must
libels directed at designated collectives and flagrantly forbidding certain types of group defamation. conflict with existing First Amendment doctrine.
disseminated." Though never overruled, Beauharnais appears to Credible arguments have been made that later
have been weakened by later pronouncements of Supreme Court cases do not necessarily erode its
the Supreme Court (see, e.g., Garrison v. legitimacy (see, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, "Racial
The majority opinion states also that Beauharnais has been
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Ashton v. Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First
superseded by Brandenburg v. Ohio."27 The majority opinion
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); New York Times Amendment" (1985), 17 Colum. Human Rights L.
explains that Brandenburg, a 1969 decision, ruled that
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 1964); Brandenburg Rev. 11). Indeed, there exists a growing body of
"advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); and Cohen v. academic writing in the United States which
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). The trend reflected evinces a stronger focus upon the way in which
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
in many of these pronouncements is to protect hate propaganda can undermine the very values
While Beauharnais has been apparently weakened by
offensive, public invective as long as the speaker which free speech is said to protect. This body of
subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, it was not
has not knowingly lied and there exists no clear writing is receptive to the idea that, were the issue
overturned in Brandenburg which did not even cite or
and present danger of violence or insurrection. addressed from this new perspective, First
mention Beauharnais. What Brandenburgoverturned
Amendment doctrine might be able to
was Whitney v. California,28 thus
accommodate statutes prohibiting hate
xxx xxx xxx
propaganda (see, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Words
"Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
which, by its own words and as applied, purports The question that concerns us in this appeal is Epithets, and Name-Calling" (1982), 17 Harv.
to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of not, of course, what the law is or should be in the C.R.-C.L. Law Rev. 133; Irving Horowitz, "Skokie,
criminal punishment, assembly with others merely United States. But it is important to be explicit as the ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic
to advocate the described type of action. Such a to the reasons why or why not American Theory" (1979), 43 Law & Contemp. Prob. 328;
statute falls within the condemnation of the First jurisprudence may be useful in the s. 1 analysis of Lasson, op. cit., at pp. 2030; Mari Matsuda,
and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. In the United "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be States, a collection of fundamental rights has been the Victim's Story," (1989), 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320,
supported, and that decision is therefore constitutionally protected for over 200 years. The at p. 2348; "Doe v. University of Michigan: First
overruled." (Emphasis supplied) resulting practical and theoretical experience is Amendment Racist and Sexist Expression on
immense, and should not be overlooked by Campus Court Strikes Down University Limits
Canadian courts. On the other hand, we must on Hate Speech" (1990), 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1397)."
In any event, Brandenburg involved the constitutionality of a
examine American constitutional law with a critical
criminal statute which sought to punish the mere advocacy
eye, and in this respect La Forest J. has noted
of violence as a means to accomplish industrial or political In deciding Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court also
in R. v. Rahey, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 588 at 639:
reform. This is distinctly different from the instant case, which relied on Canada's treaty obligations under the United
involves profane utterances that have long been recognized Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
as devoid of social value and outside the purview of 'While it is natural and even desirable for which requires signatory states to prohibit any "advocacy of
constitutionally protected speech.29 Canadian courts to refer to American x x x religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
constitutional jurisprudence in seeking discrimination, hostility or violence." During the negotiations
to elucidate the meaning of Charter of the Covenant, the United States objected to this provision
In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court, in R. v.
guarantees that have counterparts in the on free speech grounds. When it finally ratified the
Keegstra,30 upheld a law criminalizing hate speech toward
United States Constitution, they should Covenant, the United States made a reservation rejecting
any section of the public distinguished by color, race, religion
be wary of drawing too ready a parallel this provision insofar as it conflicts with U.S. constitutional
or ethnic origin. The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the
protections.31 The Covenant opened for ratification on The instant case does not even call for a re-examination of and enforce constitutional rights. Applying Article 26 will help
December 19, 1966 and entered into force on March 23, the clear and present danger test which we have adopted in bind the wounds that mindless profanities inflict on religious
1976. The Philippines ratified the Covenant in 1986 without this jurisdiction in determining the constitutionality of minorities in violation of their human rights.
any reservation, just like Canada. The 1987 Constitution of legislation that impinges on civil liberties. 33 Even under the
the Philippines even created a Commission on Human clear and present danger test, profane utterances are not
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the
Rights to "[M]onitor the Philippine Government's compliance constitutionally protected at least with respect to profanities
award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000.00 moral
with international treaty obligations on human rights." directed against private individuals. The special
damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and P10,000.00
Obviously, Canada and the Philippines are alike in their circumstance involving the Muslim secessionist movement in
attorney's fees to respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the
obligations under the Covenant, but the United States is the South should make us more sensitive to the grievances
Philippines, Inc. based on paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil
differently situated.32 of our Muslim brothers who continue to have faith in the rule
Code.
of law in this country.
In our country, there has been a long festering and bloody
Dissenting Opinion
Muslim secessionist movement in the South, fueled not only Since the peace of mind of private respondents has been
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:
by poverty but also by the palpable feeling among Muslims violated by the publication of the profane article in question,
that the Christian majority is not treating Muslims fairly. Article 26 of the Civil Code mandates that the tortious
Private respondents in the instant case, despite the conduct "shall produce a cause of action for damages, I vote to affirm the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
outrageous profanity hurled at them by petitioners, chose not prevention and other relief." Article 2219 of the same Code with certain modifications.
to join their secessionist brethren in the armed struggle but provides that "[M]oral damages may be recovered in x x x
instead decided to petition our courts for legal redress of actions referred to in Articles 21, 26 x x x ." Private
For a proper perspective of the issues involved in the
their grievance. They could have easily retaliated by flinging respondents are entitled to moral damages because, as duly
present petition, it must be emphasized that the portion of
their own blasphemous invectives against the Christian established by the testimonies of prominent
the subject article which alludes to the Muslims as not eating
religion. They did not, realizing perhaps that answering Muslims,34 private respondents suffered emotional distress
pork because it is dirty is not the bone of contention of
profanity with more profanity would mean answering hatred which was evidently the proximate result of the petitioners'
respondents, because admittedly, the Muslims may eat pork
with more hatred, further dividing rather than unifying the wrongful publication of the article in question.35
if driven by necessity, as expressed in the Quran, to wit:
Filipino nation.
VII. Conclusion
"Allah has forbidden you only what dies of itself
Just last November of 2002, a Christian newspaper in
and blood and the flesh of swine and that over
Nigeria where the Miss World contest was being held opined
Almost thirty years ago, I had occasion to write about Article which any other (name) than (that of) Allah has
that the Prophet Mohammed would have approved of the
26 in this wise: been invoked. Then, whoever is driven by
beauty contest. The newspaper stated: "What would
necessity, not desiring, nor exceeding the limit, no
Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would have probably
sin is upon him."1
chosen a wife from one of them." These words provoked "At the time Article 26 was lifted by the Code
bloody rioting in Nigeria among Muslims who felt insulted by Commission from American jurisprudence, many
the article. Hundreds died in the religious riots. Yet the of the rights embodied therein were not yet widely The focal point of private respondents' claim for damages is
offensive article in the Nigerian newspaper pales in accepted by American courts, and in fact even the insult heaped upon them because of the malicious
comparison to the utterly profane newspaper article in the now at least one, the right to privacy, is still publication that the Muslims worship the pig as their God
instant case. struggling to gain recognition in some states. which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims
While we have been quick to leapfrog American that there is only one God they call Allah, and, that the
state decisions in recognizing such rights, we greatest sin in Islam is to worship things or persons other
Indeed, private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the
have, however, been painfully slow in galvanizing than Allah.2
Philippines, a federation of more than 70 Muslim religious
the same in actual cases. To date Article 26 stands
organizations in the Philippines, deserves commendation for
almost as a mere decorative provision in our
bringing this case before our courts for a peaceful and legal Petitioners are liable for damages both under Articles 33 and
statutes; but it may be harnessed fruitfully
resolution of the issue. Private respondents have placed 26(4) of the Civil Code. The instances that can be brought
anytime."36
their trust and faith in our courts, knowing and insisting that under Article 26 may also be subject to an action for
they are entitled to a just remedy under paragraph 4, Article defamation under Article 33. In such a case, the action
26 of the Civil Code. It is time to breathe life to this long Now is the time to apply this provision of law since the brought under Article 26 is an alternative remedy, and the
dormant provision of the Civil Code, to give even just instant case falls clearly within paragraph 4 of Article 26. plaintiff can proceed upon either theory, or both, although he
a token redress to religious minorities who suffer mental and Applying Article 26 will not undermine freedom of speech can have but one recovery for a single instance of publicity. 3
emotional distress from mindless profanity committed by since the profane publication in question belongs to the class
irresponsible persons belonging to the religious majority. In of speech that clearly does not enjoy constitutional
the process we will contribute in avoiding a further cleavage Article 33 of the Civil Code provides:
protection. Applying Article 26 demonstrates good faith
in the fabric of our nation, and demonstrate to our Muslim compliance with our treaty obligations under the International
brothers that their grievances can be redressed under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Applying Article 26 "Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and
rule of law. implements the constitutional policy that the "State values physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
respect for human rights." Applying Article 26 constitutes action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
compliance by the Court of its constitutional duty to protect civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a him to public hatred, contempt, or disgrace. 9 The imputation The alleged defamatory statement should be construed not
preponderance of evidence." (Emphasis supplied) must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class of only as to the expression used but also with respect to the
society whose standard of opinion the court can whole scope and apparent object of the writer.17
recognize.10 It is not sufficient, standing alone, that the
Necessarily, Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code comes
language is unpleasant and annoys or irks plaintiff, and
into play. In the present civil case, it is necessary that Want of intention to vilify does not render an objectionable
subjects him to jests or banter, so as to affect his feelings.11
respondents are able to establish by preponderance of publication any the less a libel and a publication is not
evidence the following elements of defamation: excused by the publisher's ignorance that it contains libelous
In the present case, it is evident that the subject article matter.18 The state of mind of the person who publishes a
attributes a discreditable or dishonorable act or condition to libel is immaterial in determining liability. The law looks at the
"1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or
all Muslims in general, a derision of the religious beliefs of tendency and consequences of the publication rather than
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
the Muslims and of the objectives of respondent Council to the motive or intention of the writer or publisher. 19 It does not
omission, condition, status, or circumstance.
herald the truth about Islam, in particular. The portion of the signify what the motive of the person publishing the libel
assailed article which declares that the Muslims worship the was, or whether he intended it to have a libelous meaning or
"2. That the imputation must be made publicly. pigs as God is obnoxiously contrary to the basic belief of the not.20 The defendant may not have intended to injure the
Muslims. plaintiff's reputation at all and he may have published the
words by mistake or inadvertence, 21 or in jest, or without
"3. That it must be malicious. intending to refer, or knowing that he was referring, to the
Thus, the article is not only an imputation of irreligious
plaintiff, or any existing person, or again he may have been
conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the
"4. That the imputation must be directed at a actuated by the best motives in publishing the words, but
religious beliefs of Muslims. It has been held that
natural or juridical person, or one who is dead. such facts will usually afford the defendant no defense,
scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel; it is
though they may be urged in mitigation of damages.22
enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be held of
"5. That the imputation must tend to cause the the plaintiff, or to make him contemptible or ridiculous; 12 or
dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person that the imputation tends to cause dishonor, discredit or Tested with the foregoing principles of law, there is no doubt
defamed."4 contempt of the offended party.13 that the article in question is defamatory under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. If the imputation is defamatory, 23 the Court
has held that malice is presumed and the burden of
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a Petitioners' stance that the article "Alam Ba Ninyo?" is but an
overcoming the presumption of malice by mere
person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice expression of belief or opinion does not justify said
preponderance of evidence rested on the petitioners.
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, publication. It cannot be considered as a mere information
status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit being disseminated. Petitioners' defense that the article itself
or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the was merely a contribution of a reader, or that the writer was A careful examination of the records of the case does not
memory of one who is dead.5 soliciting opinion from the readers, does not hold water, reveal any cogent reason that would set aside the
since the article did not in any way refer to such presumption of malice. In fact, there is convincing evidence
circumstance. Verily, the article, read as a whole with the that the publication of the assailed article was malicious, as
As a general rule, words, written or printed, are libelous per other paragraphs, calls the attention of the readers to a more extensively discussed in the latter portion of herein
se if they tend to expose a person to public hatred, statement of fact, not fiction, and that the writer speaks with opinion.
contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an evil authority on the subject matter. Bulgar in fact prides itself as
opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and being the "Pahayagan Ng Katotohanan".
deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society, regardless Furthermore, there is no showing that the instant case falls
of whether they actually produce such results.6Otherwise under any of the exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the
stated; words published are libelous if they discredit plaintiff Significantly, liability for libel does not depend on the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
in the minds of any considerable and respectable class in intention of the defamer, but on the fact of the
the community, taking into consideration the emotions, defamation.14In matters of libel, the question is not what the
"Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. Every
prejudices, and intolerance of mankind.7 It has been held writer of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
that it is not necessary that the published statements make the words he has used.15 The meaning of the writer is quite
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
all or even a majority of those who read them think any less immaterial. The question is, not what the writer meant, but
and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
of the person defamed, but it is enough if a noticeable part of what he conveyed to those who heard or read.16
except in the following cases:
those who do read the statements are made to hate,
despise, scorn or be contemptuous of the person concerning In other words, it is not the intention of the speaker or writer,
whom the false statements are published.8 "1. A private communication made by any person
or the understanding of the plaintiff or of any particular
to another in the performance of any legal, moral
hearer or reader, by which the actionable quality of the
or social duty; and
Thus, in order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words words is to be determined. It is the meaning that the words in
must be of such a nature that the court can presume as a fact conveyed, rather than the effect which the language
matter of law that they will tend to disgrace and degrade the complained of was fairly calculated to produce and would "2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
person or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or naturally produce on the minds of persons of reasonable without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
cause him to be shunned and avoided; in other words, they understanding, discretion, and candor, taking into legislative or other official proceedings which are
must reflect on his integrity, his character, and his good consideration accompanying explanations and surrounding not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
name and standing in the community, and tend to expose circumstances which were known to the hearer or reader. report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or
of any other act performed by public officers in the action which is the damage suffered by them caused by the reason for refusing relief if a sound principle of law can be
exercise of their functions." insult inflicted on their basic religious tenets. found which governs, or which by analogy ought to
govern.33 The fact that a case is novel does not operate to
defeat recovery, if it can be brought within the general rules
Consequently, there is no compelling reason to disregard the All premises considered, petitioners are indeed liable for
of law applicable to torts. 34 Neither is the fact that a tort
findings of the Court of Appeals that no evidence was damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
action does not fit into a nicely defined or established
presented to overcome said presumption of malice.
"cubbyhole" of the law has been said not to warrant, in itself,
Significantly, the respondents brought to the attention of the the denial of relief to one who is injured. 35 Thus, to ignore the
On the matter of publication, there is no dispute that the Court of Appeals the failure of the trial court to appreciate application of the proper provision of law in the instant case
same is present, as the subject article was admittedly Article 26(4) of the Civil Code, but the appellate court simply would be an abdication of the judiciary's primordial objective,
published in the newspaper "Bulgar" which was circulated in delved exclusively on the applicability of libel and the which is, the just resolution of disputes.
Metro Manila and in other parts of the country. existence of its elements.
Article 26 is an integral part of the Chapter in the Civil Code
It must be emphasized that not only did both the trial court Ordinarily, the Court may only pass upon errors on human relations, "designed to indicate certain norms that
and the appellate court find that the subject article was assigned.27 However, this rule is not without exceptions. The spring from the fountain of good conscience. These guides
published, they also held that the subject article contains an Court has ruled that an appellate court is accorded a broad for human conduct should run as golden threads through
imputation of a discreditable act when it portrayed the discretionary power to consider errors not assigned, society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal,
Muslims to be worshipping the pig as their god. involving, among others, (1) matters not assigned as errors which is the sway and dominance of justice." 36 Article 26,
on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving which enhances and preserves human dignity and
at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to personality, provides:
But the trial court and the appellate court differed as to the
serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
presence of the element of the identity of the persons
piecemeal justice; (2) matters not specifically assigned as
defamed. While the trial court held that the libelous article "Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters
does not identify the personalities of the persons defamed personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which
and therefore respondents had no cause of action, the Court neighbors and other persons. The following and
the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
of Appeals ruled that the Muslims were the defamed persons similar acts, though they may not constitute a
and (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
and respondent IDCP has the requisite personality to sue for criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
which the determination of a question properly assigned, is
damages. The appellate court is right. for damages, prevention and other relief.
dependent.28 Evidently, all three exceptions apply to the
present case.
Specific identity of the person defamed means that the third "(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
person who read or learned about the libelous article must residence;
Necessarily, the Court has to dwell on the applicability of
know that it referred to the plaintiff. 24 In order to maintain a
Article 26 (4) of the Civil Code in support of respondents'
libel suit, it is essential that the victim is identifiable although
claim for damages. "(2) Meddling with or disturbing the
it is not necessary that he be named; it is likewise not
private life or family relations of another;
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at Before proceeding any further, a distinction must first be
least a third person could identify him as the object of the made between a cause of action based on libel or "(3) Intriguing to cause another to be
libelous publication.25 defamation, whether in a criminal or civil case, and one alienated from his friends;
based on Article 26. In libel, the gravamen of the claim is
reputational harm; whereas, under Article 26, it can be the
It cannot be refuted that the obvious victims in the article in "(4) Vexing or humiliating another on
embarrassment, emotional harm or mental distress caused
question are specifically identified the Muslims. The account of his religious beliefs, lowly
upon a person.29 In libel cases, its four (4) constitutive
principle laid down in Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate station in life, place of birth, physical
elements, to wit: (a) defamatory imputation; (b) malice; (c)
Appellate Court,26 that "where the defamation is alleged to defect, or other personal condition."
publication; and (d) identifiability of the victim,30 must be
have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that (Emphasis supplied)
established, by mere preponderance of evidence in a civil
the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
case which herein petitioners have done in the present case.
apply to every individual in that class or group, or sufficiently
Said elements, however, are not essential in a cause of The raison d'tre for the foregoing statutory provision, as
specific so that each individual in that class or group can
action based on tort under Article 26, wherein one is liable stated by the Code Commission in its Report, is worth
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to
for personal injury, whether administered intentionally, setting forth verbatim:
him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be,"
wantonly or by negligence.31 Personal injury herein refers not
obviously applies to the present case. Certainly, the
only to reputation but also encompasses character, conduct,
defamatory imputation contained in the subject article is a "The sacredness of human personality is a
manner, and habits of a person.32
sweeping statement affecting a common or general interest concomitant of every plan for human amelioration.
of all Muslims, that is, their religious belief in Allah as the one The touchstone of every system of laws, of the
and only God. The publication was directed against all American Tort Law, on the basis of which, Philippine Tort culture and civilization of every country, is how far
Muslims without exceptions and it is not necessary to name Law was patterned, has recognized that if the plaintiff is it dignifies man. If in legislation, inadequate regard
each one of them as they could only have one cause of shown to have suffered a wrong, the mere paucity of cases is observed for human life and safety; if the laws
or absence of any precedent does not constitute sufficient do not sufficiently forestall human suffering, or do
not try effectively to curb those factors or while they are also eating slaughtered chicken, other persons." The freedom of speech does not require a
influences that wound the noblest sentiments; if cow and carabao and other non-prohibited journalist to guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes
the statutes insufficiently protect persons from animals. So to the Muslims this is an insult, not but it does prohibit publishing or circulating statements in
being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human only to the Muslims in Mindanao but to the whole reckless disregard without any bona fide effort to ascertain
personality is not properly exalted then the laws Muslim community. This is a blasphemy to the the truth thereof.48
are indeed defective. Sad to say, such is to some Muslims.
"degree the present state of legislation in the
By causing the assailed article to be published in reckless
Philippines. To remedy this grave fault in the laws
"Q As a Muslim, Professor Sayedy, how do disregard of the truth thereof, petitioners publisher MVRS,
is one of the principal aims of the Project of Civil
you feel about this article? Editor-in-Chief Mars C. Laconsay, Assistant Editor and writer
Code. Instances will now be specified.
Myla C. Aguja (Myla Tabora) exhibited utter irresponsibility
and acted contrary to the Code of Ethics adopted by the
"A I feel insulted and I feel that the beliefs of
"The present laws, criminal and civil, do not journalism profession in the Philippines, for which they
the Muslims are over abused by the publisher and
adequately cope with the interferences and deserve condemnation. The assailed article has falsely
it is a defamation and desecration on the religion
vexations mentioned in Article 26."37 (Emphasis portrayed all Muslims as worshippers of pig or swine and
of the Islam.
supplied) thus, perverted their religious beliefs and demeaned the
Muslims as a segment of human society. It belittled the
"Q What is the concept of God insofar as the Muslims by inverting the relative importance of their religious
Thus, Article 26 provides aggrieved individuals with a legal
religion of Islam is concerned? beliefs and practice, thereby disgracing the ideals and
remedy against violations of human personality, even though
aspirations of the Muslim people. Such amounts to a
such do not amount to violations of penal laws. Social
violation of their personal dignity and peace of mind, which
equality is not sought, but simply due regard for decency and "A The concept of God is that God is the only are the very rights affirmed by Article 26.
propriety.38 God, He was not begotten and He is to be
worshipped and no other to be worshipped aside
from him, He has no beginning and has no end, Petitioner Binegas should be absolved from liability. It is not
Among the rights covered by Article 26 are: (a) personal
He is the creator of all creatures and He should be refuted that the principal function of petitioner Binegas, Jr.,
dignity, (b) personal security; (c) family relations, (d) social
honored by all creatures."44 as Circulation Manager of Bulgar, was to supervise the
intercourse, (e) privacy and (f) peace of mind.39 However, it
delivery and the distribution of the paper, monitor the
has been held that the violations mentioned in the Article 26
accounts of the agents and schedule the circulation
are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not Clearly therefrom, the assailed article is vexatious and personnel. It is likewise unrebutted that petitioner Binegas,
preclude other similar acts.40 Thus, disturbing or offensive humiliating to Muslims as they adore only one God, they call Jr. was never consulted on what articles are to be published;
utterances, such as threats, false statements, or insulting, Allah. Muslims are called Muslims because they sincerely that he had no authority to decide whether or not a certain
humiliating, scandalous, or abusive language,41 may give believe in the Quran and the Hadith (the Saying and the publication of Bulgar shall be circulated; and that his only
rise to an action in tort where such language causes mental Conduct of the Prophet). It cannot be over-stressed that duty was to distribute the issue after its printing. 49 As such,
or emotional disturbance, as in this case, or bodily injury or Muslims do not eat pork because it is forbidden in the Quran his duty being ministerial in character, petitioner Binegas, Jr.,
illness resulting therefrom.42 for being unclean not because they hold pigs as sacred and should have been exonerated from liability.
worship them; and that to the Muslims, the greatest sin in
Islam is to worship persons or things other than Allah.45
Paragraph 4 of Article 26 which makes one liable for vexing
Now, do plaintiffs-respondents IDCP and its officers have the
or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs
requisite personality to institute the suit? The answer is in
finds proper application in the case at bar. The Code Petitioner Myla C. Aguja, who testified as Myla Tabora, the affirmative. Respondents IDCP and its officers have the
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that religious admitted in open court that she: wrote the subject article; requisite personality to institute the suit inasmuch as the
freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy and was a graduate of "Mass Com"; based the said article on her action is properly a class suit.
disrepute upon another by reason of the latter's religion.43 interpretation of what she recalled she had read in Reader's
Digest while she was still in high school; and did not verify if
what she recalled was true46 . Such shocking irresponsible The concept of a "true" class suit has been elucidated upon
In support of respondents' claim for damages, Professor
attitude on her part who at that time was an Assistant Editor in Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of
Abdul Rafih Sayedy, Dean of the Institute of Islamic Affairs of
of Bulgar is utterly malicious, in the same degree as the Doa Paz,50 thus:
the University of the Philippines, testified in this wise:
failure of the rest of the petitioners (except Binegas, Jr.) 47 to
verify the truthfulness of the subject article, for which they
"What makes a situation a proper case for a class
"WITNESS: should be held liable for damages.
suit is the circumstance that there is only one right
or cause of action pertaining or belonging in
"A: First, I understood that this tabloid is the The freedom of expression and the right of speech and of common to many persons, not separately or
voice of katotohanan but regarding this article it is the press are, to be sure, among the most zealously severally to distinct individuals.
not 'katotohanan'. To the Muslim it is a blasphemy. protected rights in the Constitution. But the constitutional
It is an abuse and desecration and belief of the right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to
'The 'true' class action, which is the
Muslims and the Muslims are commanded by God broadcast lies or half-truths nor may it be used to insult
invention of equity, is one which involves
to worship no other than Him. So how could the others, for such would be contrary to the plain mandate of
the enforcement of a right which is joint,
publisher publish that the Muslims are worshipping the Civil Code for each person "to respect the dignity,
common, or secondary or derivative. x x
pigs, that Muslims in his mind do not eat animals personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
(It) is a suit wherein, but for the class numerous, except a determinate number, is not by the assailed article are multitudinous, and therefore, the
action device, the joinder of all only an interest in the question, but one in second element is present in the instant case.
interested parties would be essential. common in the subject matter of the suit, x x x a
community of interest growing out of the nature
With regards to the third element, that the action be
and condition of the right in dispute; for, although
'A 'true class action' as distinguished maintained by one who fairly and adequately represents the
there may not be any privity between the
from the so-called hybrid and the class, it is essential that the relief sought must be beneficial
numerous parties, there is a common title out of
spurious class action in U.S. Federal to the class members, the party must represent the entire
which the question arises, and which lies at the
Practice 'involves principles of class asserted, and be a member of the class he claims to
foundation of the proceedings x x x [here] the only
compulsory joinder, since x x (were it represent, in addition to having an interest in the controversy
matter in common among the plaintiffs, or between
not) for the numerosity of the class common with those for whom he sues.56 For adequate
them and the defendants, is an interest in the
members all should x x (be) before the representation, it is sufficient that there are persons before
question involved, which alone cannot lay a
court. Included within the true class suit the court who have the same interest as the absent persons
foundation for the joinder of parties. There is
x x (are) the shareholders' derivative suit and are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of
scarcely a suit at law, or in equity, which settles a
and a class action by or against an the question and thus give such interest effective
principle or applies a principle to a given state of
unincorporated association x x. A protection.57 It has also been held that whether the class
facts or in which a general statute is interpreted,
judgment in a true class suit, whether members are adequately represented by the named plaintiffs
that does not involve a question in which other
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is depends on the quality of representation rather than on the
parties are interested x x x."
binding under res judicata principles number of representative parties as compared with the total
upon all the members of the class, membership of the class.58 Thus, even one member of a
whether or not they were before the It has further been held that in order to maintain a class large class can provide the kind of representation for all that
court. It is the nondivisible nature of the action there must be an ascertainable class as well as a is contemplated by the class suit.59
right sued on which determines both the community of interest among the members of that class in
membership of the class and the res questions of law and fact involved. 53 The class must be
Respondent IDCP, as a religious organization, being a
judicata effect of the final determination cognizable and manageable, and must be defined at the
federation or umbrella organization of more than seventy
of the right.' outset of the action. There must be a cognizable class
(70) Muslim religious organizations in the Philippines, and its
beyond the general strains which can be conceived to create
officers who are individual respondents as well, carry the
a class of any superficially resembling parties, but it is not
"The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or requisite personality to file a case for damages in behalf of
necessary that the exact number comprising the class be
against numerous persons as a group or as an all Muslims. Unequivocally, they properly represent the
specified or that the members be identified.54
integral entity, and not as separate, distinct Muslims who are similarly situated and affected by the
individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate assailed article.
from and independent of those affecting the The first element is present in this case. The class spoken of
others." (Emphasis supplied) in the assailed article that segregates them from the other
Respondent officers of IDCP namely, Abdulrahman R.T.
members of the general populace is the Muslim people, and
Linzag, Ibrahim F. P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, and
their common interest, undoubtedly, is their religious belief in
In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul
adoring Allah as the one and only God and that the greatest
the Rules of Court requires the concurrence of three (3) Rafih Sayedy, not only testified on how the assailed article
sin is to worship persons or things other than Allah. The
essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the emotionally, as well as psychologically, affected each of
article is an outrageous misrepresentation, inflicting stark
controversy is one of common or general interest to many them, but also as to how the said article received the
insult on the religious beliefs of the Muslims.
persons; (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is condemnation and contempt of other Muslims, further
impracticable to bring them all before the court; and (3) that evidenced by the letter dated September 21, 1992 from
the action be maintained by parties who will fairly and Concerning the second element, i.e., numerosity of parties thirty-one (31) students of the Islamic University Madinah Al-
adequately represent the class. one must bear in mind that the purpose. of the rule Mukarramah, K.S.A.,60 and the seething letter of one Abdil T.
permitting class actions is to furnish a mode of obtaining a Arafat of South Cotabato province, dated September 29,
complete determination of the rights of the parties in such 1992.61
Under the first requisite, the person who sues must have an
cases, when the number is so great as to preclude
interest in the controversy, common with those for whom he
involvement by actual service. In this class of cases, one is
sues, and there must be that unity of interest between him Moreover, an officer may sue in his own behalf if the
allowed to sue for all as a matter of convenience in the
and all such other persons which would entitle them to defamation affects him as well as the corporation 62 , or
administration of justice. A class action is particularly proper
maintain the action if suit was brought by them jointly.51 where the defamation against the officer has a direct relation
in an action wherein the persons are so multitudinous as
to the corporation's trade or business and it causes injury63 .
vexatiously to prolong and probably altogether prevent a full
As to what constitutes common interest in the subject matter hearing.55
of the controversy has been explained in Sulo ng Bayan, Thus, without a shred of doubt, respondents IDCP and the
Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc.,52 thus: individual respondents, and all Muslims they represent, have
Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that Muslims in this
interest so identical that the motive and inducement to
country comprise a lot of the population, thus, it is highly
protect and preserve may be assumed to be the same in
"The interest that will allow parties to join in a bill impractical to make them all parties or bring them all before
each.64 By instituting the suit, the respondents necessarily
of complaint, or that will enable the court to the court. It is beyond contradiction that the Muslims affected
represent all Muslims.65
dispense with the presence of all the parties, when
Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious vs.
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 19 granting
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although CHOACHUY, Respondents. the application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said
incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered for DECISION Order reads:
acts and actions based on Article 26.66 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the
Individual Muslim plaintiffs-respondents, Abdulrahman R.T.
likewise compel respect for one's personality as a unique filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court
Linzag, Ibrahim F. P. Arcilla, Abdul Rashid De Guzman, and
individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference sets at P50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue
Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul
demands respect."1 against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Rafih Sayedy, as proper representatives of the class action
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove
testified on the despair, mental anguish, social humiliation
Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision 3and the the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of
and inferior feeling experienced by the Muslims as a result of
September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals their building overlooking the side of petitioners lot and to
the vexatious article.67 Thus, the award of moral damages is
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473. transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where
justified.
petitioners property can no longer be viewed within a
Factual Antecedents distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees is Servitec, facing the road.
likewise warranted and the amount is in accordance with On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria
Articles 222968 and 220869 of the Civil Code. Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue IT IS SO ORDERED.20
City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for
However, damages awarded to individual respondents issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC
should be deleted inasmuch as the instant case is Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as denied the same in its Order 22 dated February 6,
considered as a class suit and they merely acted as officers Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against 2006.23 Thus:
and members of the principal plaintiff-respondent IDCP. respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary
One last point. There should be no room for apprehension parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October
on future litigations relating to the assailed article in view of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of 2005.
the fact that the instant suit is a class suit. In a class suit, Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo
each member of the class for whose benefit the action is Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 IT IS SO ORDERED.24
brought is a party plaintiff; the persons represented are quasi and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; 7 that
parties or parties by representation. A suit brought in behalf respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for
of others in a class gives the court jurisdiction of the whole Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
subject matter, and of all the parties, such that the judgment filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
will be binding on all persons belonging to the class with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil
represented.70 Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that Ruling of the Court of Appeals
petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit
In other words, a judgment in a class action concludes upon and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the
all members of the class, whether formally joined as parties building, which is adjacent to petitioners property; 9 that the
Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of
or not. 71 The class action has preclusive effect against one court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary
Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of
who was not named representative of the class, as long as injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in
discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and
he was a member of the class which was a party to the order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained
judgment.72 on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance
the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of
cameras facing petitioners property;11 that respondents,
Thus, in the case at bar, the Muslims, who are parties the controversy is not used as a residence. 28 The CA
through their employees and without the consent of
represented by respondent IDCP and its officers, are thereby alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going
precluded from instituting separate or individual suits for building, they could not have installed video surveillance
construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate
damages against MVRS Publications, Inc., et al., as they are cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a
petitioners right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that
bound by the judgment in this class action, which separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper
respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
amounts to res judicata. parties.31 The fallo reads:
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment
In the light of all the foregoing, I am constrained In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed
is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this
to dissent from the majority opinion. that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, 16 nor
case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and
did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners
February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the
G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013 ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
SO ORDERED.32 portion of the same property constitutes a violation of of the Civil Code covers business offices
petitioners right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of
Issues the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the where the public are excluded
private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that: to the privacy of anothers residence, petitioners opine that it therefrom and only certain individuals
includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M.
I. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners are allowed to enter.
property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR provision.37 Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy
THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead against abuses that may be committed against him by other
2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE in this case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are individuals. It states:
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide
behind Aldos corporate fiction.38 They point out that if Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
II. respondents are not the real owners of the building, where privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
by the court.39 for damages, prevention and other relief:
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO Respondents Arguments (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA xxxx
OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the
FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle,
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS maintain that they had nothing to do with the installation of where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even
CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into,
ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR Aldo, the registered owner of the building, 41 as additional peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES. security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into
impleaded in this case.43 the privacy of anothers residence," however, does not mean
III. that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by
Our Ruling Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE The Petition is meritorious. Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of
BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, anothers residence." This does not mean, however, that
INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law
CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the
PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and
our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x
IV. unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
into ones private activities in such a way as to cause
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." 45 It is the Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of
WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in residence as it may extend to places where he has the right
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH matters in which the public is not necessarily to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase
2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore,
THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33 be let alone."47 covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on
violation of petitioners right to privacy, and (2) whether and protects them against the States abuse of power. In this his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
respondents are the proper parties to this suit. regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to
secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except residences.
Petitioners Arguments "in case of overriding social need and then only under the
stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the The "reasonable expectation of
privacy of their homes.48 privacy" test is used to determine
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents whether there is a violation of the right
installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners The right to privacy under Article 26(1) to privacy.
property and a revolving camera covering a significant
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to
privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, be impleaded.
test. This test determines whether a person has a without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate
expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should family.63
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no Also quite telling is the fact that respondents,
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the
norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo
individuals "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the injunctive writ. and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the building and answered all her questions regarding the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.54 the proper parties to this suit. set-up and installation of the video surveillance
cameras.64 And when respondents moved for
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed A real party defendant is one who has a reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of correlative legal obligation to redress a RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are
should not cover places where there is reasonable the defendant's act or omission which removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances,
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, had violated the legal right of the the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor former.
should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion
anothers residence or business office as it would be no Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment parties to this suit.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Preliminary Injunction, ruled that: Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the real party-in-interest. September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
application for a temporary restraining order. The operation CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET
by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6,
mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The of the defendants act or omission which had violated the City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED
camera does not only focus on respondents property or the legal right of the former."57 and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA VII. KINDRED TORTS
of the land of petitioners. reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could
not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents ELEMENTS
petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the are not the registered owners of the building does not
revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the EVIDENTIAL RULES
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of
on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed the video surveillance cameras. LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS
only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose
of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents G.R. No. 130547 October 3, 2000
secure the building and factory premises, then the camera installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, and
should revolve only towards their properties at the back. evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another minors LLOYD and KRISTINE, all surnamed REYES,
Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary represented by their mother, LEAH ALESNA
petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents REYES, petitioners,
objection of the petitioners would violate the right of installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately vs.
petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot broached his concerns but they did not seem to care,60 and SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, PALACIO, DR. MARVIE BLANES, and DR. MARLYN
a third person."55 and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before RICO,respondents.
the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has DECISION
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a already been a dispute between his family and the MENDOZA, J.:
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their
they use it as a business office or as a residence and that respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of not.5 After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to diplomate in internal medicine whose expertise is
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36551 affirming the decision of vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions returned. microbiology and infectious diseases. He is also a consultant
the Regional Trial Court, Branch IX, Cebu City which Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before at the Cebu City Medical Center and an associate professor
dismissed a complaint for damages filed by petitioners and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, of medicine at the South Western University College of
against respondents. did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a Medicine in Cebu City. He had treated over a thousand
bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous cases of typhoid patients. According to Dr. Gotiong, the
The facts are as follows: membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At patients history and positive Widal Test results ratio of 1:320
around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The would make him suspect that the patient had typhoid fever.
Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge cause of his death was "Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to As to Dr. Vacalares observation regarding the absence of
Reyes. The other petitioners, namely, Rose Nahdja, Johnny, Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever." ulceration in Jorges gastro-intestinal tract, Dr. Gotiong said
Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed Reyes, were their children. that such hyperplasia in the intestines of a typhoid victim
Five days before his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had On June 3, 1987, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial may be microscopic. He noted that since the toxic effect of
been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he Court of Cebu City a complaint6 for damages against typhoid fever may lead to meningitis, Dr. Vacalares autopsy
failed to get relief from some home medication he was respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. should have included an examination of the brain.10
taking, which consisted of analgesic, antipyretic, and Marvie Blanes, Dr. Marlyn Rico, and nurse Josephine
antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor. Pagente. On September 24, 1987, petitioners amended their The other doctor presented was Dr. Ibarra Panopio, a
complaint to implead respondent Mercy Community Clinic as member of the American Board of Pathology, examiner of
On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community additional defendant and to drop the name of Josephine the Philippine Board of Pathology from 1978 to 1991, fellow
Clinic by his wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Pagente as defendant since she was no longer connected of the Philippine Society of Pathologist, associate professor
Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on with respondent hospital. Their principal contention was that of the Cebu Institute of Medicine, and chief pathologist of the
duty, who gave Jorge a physical examination and took his Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. 7Instead, his death was due Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Hospital in Toledo City. Dr.
medical history. She noted that at the time of his admission, to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They Panopio stated that although he was partial to the use of the
Jorge was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and contended that had respondent doctors exercised due care culture test for its greater reliability in the diagnosis of
with respiratory distress.2 Typhoid fever was then prevalent and diligence, they would not have recommended and typhoid fever, the Widal Test may also be used. Like Dr.
in the locality, as the clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily concluded Gotiong, he agreed that the 1:320 ratio in Jorges case was
cases of typhoid per month.3 Suspecting that Jorge could be that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and already the maximum by which a conclusion of typhoid fever
suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient may be made. No additional information may be deduced
standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. tests on the patients compatibility with said drug. They from a higher dilution.11 He said that Dr. Vacalares autopsy
Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and charged respondent clinic and its directress, Sister Rose on Jorge was incomplete and thus inconclusive.
malarial smear were also made.4 After about an hour, the Palacio, with negligence in failing to provide adequate
medical technician submitted the results of the test from facilities and in hiring negligent doctors and nurses.8 On September 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision
which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for typhoid absolving respondents from the charges of negligence and
fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico Respondents denied the charges. During the pre-trial dismissing petitioners action for damages. The trial court
indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes. conference, the parties agreed to limit the issues on the likewise dismissed respondents counterclaim, holding that,
following: (1) whether the death of Jorge Reyes was due to in seeking damages from respondents, petitioners were
Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the or caused by the negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and impelled by the honest belief that Jorges death was due to
evening. She also took Jorges history and gave him a lack of skill or foresight on the part of defendants; (2) the latters negligence.
physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that whether respondent Mercy Community Clinic was negligent
Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted in the hiring of its employees; and (3) whether either party Petitioners brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. On
treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility was entitled to damages. The case was then heard by the July 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said trial court during which, in addition to the testimonies of the the trial court.
test was administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also parties, the testimonies of doctors as expert witnesses were
gave the patient a dose of triglobe. As she did not observe presented. Hence this petition.
any adverse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr.
Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said Petitioners offered the testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A Chief Pathologist at the Northern Mindanao Training
second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City. On January 9, 1987, Dr. I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
later just before midnight. Vacalares performed an autopsy on Jorge Reyes to COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
determine the cause of his death. However, he did not open RULED THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was the skull to examine the brain. His findings 9 showed that the LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
called as Jorges temperature rose to 41C. The patient also gastro-intestinal tract was normal and without any ulceration INSTANT CASE.
experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, or enlargement of the nodules. Dr. Vacalares testified that
nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. He also stated that he had II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered not seen a patient die of typhoid fever within five days from COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patients convulsions. the onset of the disease. MADE AN UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTION THAT
When he regained consciousness, the patient was asked by THE LEVEL OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IS LOWER
Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had For their part, respondents offered the testimonies of Dr. IN ILIGAN CITY.
suffered from chest pains in the past. Jorge replied he did Peter Gotiong and Dr. Ibarra Panopio. Dr. Gotiong is a
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements scheduled for cholecystectomy.19 In that case, the patient
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED FOR A and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, was given anesthesia prior to her operation. Noting that the
LESSER STANDARD OF CARE AND DEGREE and manifest conditions which are observable by any one patient was neurologically sound at the time of her operation,
OF DILIGENCE FOR MEDICAL PRACTICE IN may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental
ILIGAN CITY WHEN IT APPRECIATE[D] NO where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is brain damage does not normally occur in a gallblader
DOCTORS NEGLIGENCE IN THE TREATMENT permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of operation in the absence of negligence of the
OF JORGE REYES. injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice that anesthesia
where the court from its fund of common knowledge can procedures had become so common that even an ordinary
Petitioners action is for medical malpractice. This is a determine the proper standard of care. Where common person could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed
particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury the testimony of a witness who was not an expert. In this
a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours
that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving after professional medical assistance was rendered, there is
the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior
surrounding circumstances.12 In order to successfully pursue loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers
such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or required to show not only what occurred but how and why it and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic,
surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows
prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act that he had been suffering from a serious illness and
she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or or omission complained of and the injury sustained while professional medical help came too late for him.
surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action under the custody and management of the defendant without
caused injury to the patient.13 There are thus four elements need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not
involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitor is allowed immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify application
injury, and proximate causation. because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion on
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury the alleged breach by respondents of the standard of care
In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician- suffered by him. required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of
patient relationship existed between respondent doctors and the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of
Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.As held
least the same level of care that any reasonably competent in the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the in Ramos:
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a
circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, . . . . Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
actionable malpractice.14 As to this aspect of medical of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied,
malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. patients jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where
Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient was under the a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for and observation, that the consequences of professional care
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert appendicitis, among others.17 were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as care had been exercised. A distinction must be made
to causation.15 Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present case because something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the
Res Ipsa Loquitur Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure
five days and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed when he went to the hospital. Yet, he died after only ten conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
with, and that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. As hours from the time of his admission. application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which
held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals:16 involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.
This contention was rejected by the appellate court. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application any particular scientific treatment did not produce the
negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident desired result.20
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency Specific Acts of Negligence
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not We turn to the question whether petitioners have established
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the specific acts of negligence allegedly committed by
clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to person injured.18 respondent doctors.
matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of Petitioners contend that: (1) Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and
facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and the Court of Appeals. In the Ramos case, the question was erroneously relied upon the Widal test, diagnosed Jorges
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the
has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree should be made liable for the comatose condition of a patient administration of the antibiotic chloromycetin; 21 and (2) Dr.
Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the administration of the A Way back before my training. patient associated with chills, temperature - 41oC, what could
second dose of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin barely three possibly come to your mind?
hours after the first was given.22 Petitioners presented the He is thus not qualified to prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in
testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, Chief Pathologist of the her diagnosis. Both lower courts were therefore correct in A Well, when it is change in the clinical finding, you have to
Northern Mindanao Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, discarding his testimony, which is really inadmissible. think of complication.
who performed an autopsy on the body of Jorge Reyes. Dr.
Vacalares testified that, based on his findings during the In Ramos, the defendants presented the testimony of a Q And what will you consider on the complication of typhoid?
autopsy, Jorge Reyes did not die of typhoid fever but of pulmonologist to prove that brain injury was due to oxygen
shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic reaction deprivation after the patient had bronchospasms 24 triggered A One must first understand that typhoid fever is toximia.
or chloromycetin overdose. We are not persuaded. by her allergic response to a drug,25 and not due to faulty The problem is complications are caused by toxins produced
intubation by the anesthesiologist. As the issue was whether by the bacteria . . . whether you have suffered complications
First. While petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as the intubation was properly performed by an to think of -- heart toxic myocardities; then you can consider
an expert witness, we do not find him to be so as he is not a anesthesiologist, we rejected the opinion of the a toxic meningitis and other complications and perforations
specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. pulmonologist on the ground that he was not: (1) an and bleeding in the ilium.
Furthermore, although he may have had extensive anesthesiologist who could enlighten the court about
experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had anesthesia practice, procedure, and their complications; nor Q Even that 40-year old married patient who received
yet to do one on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he (2) an allergologist who could properly advance expert medication of chloromycetin of 500 milligrams intravenous,
conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also plain opinion on allergic mediated processes; nor (3) a after the skin test, and received a second dose of
from his testimony that he has treated only about three pharmacologist who could explain the pharmacologic and chloromycetin of 500 miligrams, 3 hours later, the patient
cases of typhoid fever. Thus, he testified that:23 toxic effects of the drug allegedly responsible for the developed chills . . . rise in temperature to 41 oC, and then
bronchospasms. about 40 minutes later the temperature rose to 100 oF,
ATTY. PASCUAL: cardiac rate of 150 per minute who appeared to be coherent,
Second. On the other hand, the two doctors presented by restless, nauseating, with seizures: what significance could
Q Why? Have you not testified earlier that you have never respondents clearly were experts on the subject. They you attach to these clinical changes?
seen a patient who died of typhoid fever? vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn Ricos diagnosis.
Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose specialization is A I would then think of toxemia, which was toxic meningitis
A In autopsy. But, that was when I was a resident physician infectious diseases and microbiology and an associate and probably a toxic meningitis because of the high cardiac
yet. professor at the Southwestern University College of rate.
Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that
Q But you have not performed an autopsy of a patient who he has already treated over a thousand cases of typhoid Q Even if the same patient who, after having given
died of typhoid fever? fever.26 According to him, when a case of typhoid fever is intramuscular valium, became conscious and coherent about
suspected, the Widal test is normally used,27and if the 1:320 20 minutes later, have seizure and cyanosis and rolling of
A I have not seen one. results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes had been presented eyeballs and vomitting . . . and death: what significance
to him along with the patients history, his impression would would you attach to this development?
Q And you testified that you have never seen a patient who also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. 28 As
died of typhoid fever within five days? to the treatment of the disease, he stated that chloromycetin A We are probably dealing with typhoid to meningitis.
was the drug of choice.29 He also explained that despite the
measures taken by respondent doctors and the intravenous
A I have not seen one. Q In such case, Doctor, what finding if any could you expect
administration of two doses of chloromycetin, complications on the post-mortem examination?
of the disease could not be discounted. His testimony is as
Q How many typhoid fever cases had you seen while you
follows:30
were in the general practice of medicine? A No, the finding would be more on the meninges or
covering of the brain.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
A In our case we had no widal test that time so we cannot
consider that the typhoid fever is like this and like that. And Q And in order to see those changes would it require
Q If with that count with the test of positive for 1 is to 320,
the widal test does not specify the time of the typhoid fever. opening the skull?
what treatment if any would be given?
Q The question is: how many typhoid fever cases had you A Yes.
A If those are the findings that would be presented to me,
seen in your general practice regardless of the cases now
the first thing I would consider would be typhoid fever.
you practice? As regards Dr. Vacalares finding during the autopsy that the
deceaseds gastro-intestinal tract was normal, Dr. Rico
Q And presently what are the treatments commonly used?
A I had only seen three cases. explained that, while hyperplasia31 in the payers patches or
layers of the small intestines is present in typhoid fever, the
A Drug of choice of chloramphenical. same may not always be grossly visible and a microscope
Q And that was way back in 1964?
was needed to see the texture of the cells.32
Q Doctor, if given the same patient and after you have
A Way back after my training in UP.
administered chloramphenical about 3 1/2 hours later, the Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T.
Q Clinically? Panopio who is a member of the Philippine and American
Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine Board of drug of choice for typhoid fever and that no drug has yet The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to
Pathology, and chief pathologist at the MetroCebu proven better in promoting a favorable clinical response. common carriers. The Civil Code provides:
Community Hospital, Perpetual Succor Hospital, and the "Chlorampenicol (Chloromycetin) is specifically indicated for
Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical Center. He stated that, bacterial meningitis, typhoid fever, rickettsial infections, Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
as a clinical pathologist, he recognized that the Widal test is bacteriodes infections, etc." (PIMS Annual, 1994, p. business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
used for typhoid patients, although he did not encourage its 211) The dosage likewise including the first administration of observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
use because a single test would only give a presumption five hundred milligrams (500 mg.) at around nine oclock in goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
necessitating that the test be repeated, becoming more the evening and the second dose at around 11:30 the same them, according to the circumstances of each case. . . .
conclusive at the second and third weeks of the night was still within medically acceptable limits, since the
disease.33 He corroborated Dr. Gotiongs testimony that the recommended dose of chloromycetin is one (1) gram every The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by
danger with typhoid fever is really the possible complications six (6) hours. (cf. Pediatric Drug Handbook, 1st Ed., qualified individuals.1wphi1 It is a right earned through
which could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as Philippine Pediatric Society, Committee on Therapeutics and years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license
liver and cerebral complications.34 As regards the 1:320 Toxicology, 1996). The intravenous route is likewise correct. from the state through professional board examinations.
results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes, Dr. Panopio stated (Mansser, ONick, Pharmacology and Therapeutics) Even if Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by
that no additional information could be obtained from a the test was not administered by the physician-on-duty, the the government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct
higher ratio.35 He also agreed with Dr. Gotiong that evidence introduced that it was Dra. Blanes who interpreted of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath,
hyperplasia in the payers patches may be microscopic.36 the results remain uncontroverted. (Decision, pp. 16-17) an ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors
Once more, this Court rejects any claim of professional have imposed upon themselves in recognition and
Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the negligence in this regard. acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given
average merit among all known practitioners from the best to these safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of
the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the .... doctors the observance of "extraordinary" diligence. As it is
reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon
physicians.37 Here, Dr. Marlyn Rico did not depart from the As regards anaphylactic shock, the usual way of guarding the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already
reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in against it prior to the administration of a drug, is the skin test noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the
fact observed the due care required under the of which, however, it has been observed: "Skin testing with reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians.
circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it haptenic drugs is generally not reliable. Certain drugs cause That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of
remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in nonspecific histamine release, producing a weal-and-flare Appeals called it, the reasonable "skill and competence . . .
the present case, greater accuracy through repeated testing reaction in normal individuals. Immunologic activation of that a physician in the same or similar locality . . . should
was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. mast cells requires a polyvalent allergen, so a negative skin apply."
The results of the Widal test and the patients history of fever test to a univalent haptenic drug does not rule out
with chills for five days, taken with the fact that typhoid fever anaphylactic sensitivity to that drug." (Terr, "Anaphylaxis and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the clinic had Urticaria" in Basic and Clinical Immunology, p. 349) What all decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO
been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month, were this means legally is that even if the deceased suffered from ORDERED.
sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would not yet establish
impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever. the negligence of the appellee-physicians for all that the law G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
requires of them is that they perform the standard tests and PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the perform standard procedures. The law cannot require them vs.
administration of the drug chloromycetin, the drug of choice to predict every possible reaction to all drugs administered. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
for typhoid fever. The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes The onus probandi was on the appellants to establish, x-----------------------x
was suffering from any other illness rested with the before the trial court, that the appellee-physicians ignored G.R. No. 126467 January 31, 2007
petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on this, standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children MARCELINO
preponderant evidence to support their contention is clearly medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA
absent. the competence and skills expected of general practitioners ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and
similarly situated.39 ENRIQUE AGANA, Petitioners,
Third. Petitioners contend that respondent Dr. Marvie vs.
Blanes, who took over from Dr. Rico, was negligent in Fourth. Petitioners correctly observe that the medical JUAN FUENTES, Respondent.
ordering the intravenous administration of two doses of 500 profession is one which, like the business of a common x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - x
milligrams of chloromycetin at an interval of less than three carrier, is affected with public interest. Moreover, they assert G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007
hours. Petitioners claim that Jorge Reyes died of that since the law imposes upon common carriers the duty of MIGUEL AMPIL, Petitioner,
anaphylactic shock38 or possibly from overdose as the observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the vs.
second dose should have been administered five to six goods and for the safety of the passengers, 40 physicians and NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents.
hours after the first, per instruction of Dr. Marlyn Rico. As surgeons should have the same duty toward their DECISION
held by the Court of Appeals, however: patients.41 They also contend that the Court of Appeals erred SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
when it allegedly assumed that the level of medical practice
That chloromycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best is lower in Iligan City, thereby reducing the standard of care Hospitals, having undertaken one of mankinds most
established by medical authority. Wilson, et. al., inHarrisons and degree of diligence required from physicians and important and delicate endeavors, must assume the grave
Principle of Internal Medicine, 12th ed. write that surgeons in Iligan City. responsibility of pursuing it with appropriate care. The care
chlorampenicol (which is the generic of chloromycetin) is the and service dispensed through this high trust, however
technical, complex and esoteric its character may be, must On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, for exemplary damages and the interest thereon which are
meet standards of responsibility commensurate with the went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four the liabilities of defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes only,
undertaking to preserve and protect the health, and indeed, months of consultations and laboratory examinations, as follows:
the very lives of those placed in the hospitals keeping.1 Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was
Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for review on advised to return to the Philippines.
1. As actual damages, the following amounts:
certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision 2 dated September
6, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines,
32198 affirming with modification the Decision 3 dated March a. The equivalent in Philippine Currency
still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter
17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, of the total of US$19,900.00 at the rate
found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43322 and nullifying its of P21.60-US$1.00, as reimbursement
being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house
Order dated September 21, 1993. of actual expenses incurred in the
where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
United States of America;
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the
The facts, as culled from the records, are: pains would soon vanish.
b. The sum of P4,800.00 as travel taxes
of plaintiffs and their physician daughter;
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains
City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because of intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. c. The total sum of P45,802.50,
After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign representing the cost of hospitalization
petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 at Polymedic Hospital, medical fees,
from "cancer of the sigmoid." inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A and cost of the saline solution;
recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs
which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff 4 of 2. As moral damages, the sum of P2,000,000.00;
surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus,
the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection
in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.
surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her
3. As exemplary damages, the sum of
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
P300,000.00;
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed
consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for
Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), 4. As attorneys fees, the sum of P250,000.00;
perform hysterectomy on her. owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr.
Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged
that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces 5. Legal interest on items 1 (a), (b), and (c); 2; and
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil 3 hereinabove, from date of filing of the complaint
of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for
took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. until full payment; and
concealing their acts of negligence.