Mirasol Vs CA
Mirasol Vs CA
The rule
itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just
128448; 1 Feb 2001] actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The
review.
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise
it.
of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing
before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge.
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
the very lis mota of the case.
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099.
from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle February 21,1995)
their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed
to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the vs.
mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their Ponente: QUIASON
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said
FACTS:
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases
National Government. against respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision
suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of
performance, and damages against PNB. execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code
(LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed stay
of execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
Issues: 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary
injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been
issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the
parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial ISSUE:
Court.
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are Order No. 18.
unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. Stay of execution applied.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an appeal shall not
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. As worded, there is
room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
Regional Trial Courts.
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy
enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To
deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to
petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. The
the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was issued by the Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such
cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal
separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned?
Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned,
Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review
Revised Penal Code, as amended. due course and must dismiss the same. If the intent of
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of
Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner later filed a Petition for Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a
Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ reversed petition for review despite its being out rightly dismissible,
and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or
Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to where the crime the accused is being charged with has
already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has
nugatory.