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Property Digests Articles 484 501
Property Digests Articles 484 501
ARTICLE 484 (CO-OWNERSHIP) Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as
the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation
1. G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon
respondent. completion of payment, the title to the
condominium unit was issued in the name of
FACTS: The trial court declared the marriage petitioner.
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered In light of these facts, we give more credence to
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired
property. during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly,
under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property
Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of The Family Code provides:
Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Article 147. When a man and a woman who are
Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
ownership of Suite 204 in the name of respondent, with each other as husband and wife without the
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
14735, being respondents exclusive property, wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
acquired prior to his marriage. equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be
Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of governed by the rules on co-ownership.
this Order of the subject properties, namely the
Ground Floor Front (Fridays Club), Ground Floor In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC acquired while they lived together shall be
Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the presumed to have been obtained by their joint
same shall be shared by the parties in common, in efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
proportion to one-half each or share and share them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
alike, after deducting all expenses for Income party who did not participate in the acquisition by
Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal the other party of any property shall be deemed to
License fees, clearances, etc. Accordingly, have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if
petitioner is hereby directed to deliver to the formers efforts consisted in the care and
respondent the following: a) the balance of his maintenance of their family and of the household.
share of the monthly rentals from February 1998 to
May 1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
monthly rentals of the aforesaid properties from inter vivos of his or her share in the property
June 1998 up to this date. Thereafter, the parties acquired during cohabitation and owned in
shall own and enjoy their respective share of the common, without the consent of the other, until
monthly rentals derived from the properties after the termination of their cohabitation.
adjudicated to them.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
LCG Condominium and the support of the children. common children. In case of default of or waiver by
Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on any or all of the common children or their
installment basis at the time when petitioner and descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
respondent were living exclusively with each other the respective surviving descendants.
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are
apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family legally capacitated and not barred by any
Code. impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of Suite 204 of LCG This provision creates a co-ownership with respect
Condominium and how the properties acquired by to the properties they acquire during their
petitioner and respondent should be partitioned. cohabitation.
RULING: YES. It appears from the facts, as found by Under this property regime, property acquired by
the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of both spouses through their work and industry shall
long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
and moved in with respondent in the latters Any property acquired during the union is prima
residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit facie presumed to have been obtained through
and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
December 3, 1983. The couple got married on the acquisition of the property shall still be
March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at said partys "efforts consisted in the care and
LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to maintenance of the family household."
Page 1 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)conveying 113.34 square
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33 square
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the deeds of sale particularly described the portion
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All conveyed to each son in metes and bounds.
these elements are present in the case at bar. It has Petitioners contend that since the property was
not been shown that petitioner and respondent already three distinct parcels of land, there was no
suffered any impediment to marry each other. They longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence,
lived exclusively with each other as husband and Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption
wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si.
his residence and were later united in marriage.
Their marriage, however, was found to be void After trial on the merits, the court ruled for
under Article 36 of the Family Code because of petitioners:
respondents psychological incapacity to comply
with essential marital obligations. "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is
hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs."
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium, was purchased on installment basis Court of Appeals issued the decision reversing the
on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and decision of the trial court and ruling for private
respondent were already living together. Hence, it respondents.
should be considered as common property of
petitioner and respondent. ISSUE: Whether Or Not private respondents are co-
owners who are legally entitled to redeem the lot
In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common
property of petitioner and respondent and the RULING: NO. The trial court found that the disputed
property regime of the parties should be divided in land was not part of an undivided estate. It held
accordance with the law on co-ownership. that the three deeds of absolute sale technically
described the portion sold to each son. The portions
2. G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000 belonging to the three sons were separately
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's
SI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. Jose's
ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, testimony that the land was undivided was
and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo contradicted by his wife when she said they had
Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents. been receiving rent from the property specifically
allotted to Jose.
FACTS: The 340 square meters of land, the property
in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry
of Severo Armada, Sr. During the lifetime of the of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and
spouses, the property was transferred to their issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT 134594 in
children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 134595 under
issued TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si;
as follows : "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married and (3) TCT 134596 owned by Jose Armada,
to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; married to Remedios Almanzor. All these are on
JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, record. However, the Court of Appeals' decision
113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, contradicted the trial court's findings.
Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos."4Annotated also
in the title is the total cancellation of said title "... by The lot in question had already been partitioned
virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales
dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all
V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which
ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the documents purports to have been registered with
property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September
married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007
issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion
24751. conveyed and transferred to the three sons was
definitely described and segregated and with the
Spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, corresponding technical description (sic). In short,
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale this is what we call extrajudicial partition.
and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against
herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons
Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada has been declared for taxation purposes with the
brokered the sale. Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21,
1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants
October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with the consent of Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was
her husband executed three separate deeds of concretely determined and identifiable. The fact
Page 2 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, there is co- (a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land
ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines
thing or right belongs to different persons. There is Sur, presently covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983)
no co-ownership when the different portions owned in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared
by different people are already concretely under TD No. 18856 and assessed at
determined and separately identifiable, even if not 17,240.00;
yet technically described. This situation makes
inapplicable the provision on the right of (b) A parcel of residential land situated at San
redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, declared under TD
follows: No. 19639 with an assessed value of 6,240.00;
and
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within (c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo,
thirty days from the notice in writing by the Nabua, Camarines Sur, declared under TD No.
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case 35122 and assessed at 6,780.00.
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an That all the above named parcels of land are
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written actually owned in common by the children of the
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. late spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that Ocampo although the land denominated as parcel
of adjoining owners." (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the
name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose by her as a property owned in common by all of
Armada was well informed of the impending sale of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to
Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated partition said properties but defendants Fidela
February 22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and
"Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can unreasonably refuse to do so and moved by a
sell your share of Leveriza." common purpose, both of them mortgaged to the
PNB the land denominated as parcel (a) of the
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not complaint to secure the payment of a 110,000.00
entitled to written notice. A written notice is a loan, the proceeds of which were x x x exclusively
formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners to the benefit of said defendants only
have actual notice of the sale to enable them to
exercise their right of redemption within the limited In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be
period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had rendered ordering the partition of the properties
actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or described in paragraph 9 of the complaint;
afterwards, a written notice of a fact already ordering defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
known to them, would be superfluous. The statute Ocampo, to release or otherwise cancel any and
does not demand what is unnecessary. all encumbrances on TCT No. RT-4389(983) which
they had caused to be annotated thereon,
3. G.R. No. 150707 April 14, 2004 particularly, the mortgage in favor of the PNB.
APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by
MARIANO O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. Counsel for plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit
QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, Supplemental Complaint. The Supplemental
FELIX OCAMPO JR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-
OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR., Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30
VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA September 1987, TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name
OCAMPO, ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering the lot
JOHNNY OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA described as parcel (a) in paragraph 9 of the
DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA original complaint was cancelled and, in lieu
OCAMPO, LUIS OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O. thereof, TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant
FORTUNO,petitioners, vs. FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant
FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, Vicente Barrito, on the strength of an alleged Deed
VICENTE BARRITO, NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by
OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents. defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their favor.
Page 3 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner
issuance of a certificate of title does not foreclose to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
the possibility that the real property may be under attribute. Whether established by law or by
co-ownership with persons not named therein. But agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing
given the circumstances of this case, the claim of held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature
co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to stand on. so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the
Again, we stress, Belen clearly traced the source of benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any
her sole ownership of the property in question and act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
thereby foreclosed the unproven and
unsubstantiated allegation of co-ownership thereof. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as the properties in co-ownership is to create an
evidence the Tax Declaration35 indicating that she, express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the
as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every
property, all to the exclusion of petitioners. co-owner is a trustee for the others.
4. G.R. No. 152766 June 20, 2003 Before the partition of a land or thing held in
LILIA SANCHEZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, common, no individual or co-owner can claim title
HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-
RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
TERIA, Respondents. proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
FACTS: Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her undivided interest in the property the right to freely
parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He
263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez may validly lease his undivided interest to a third
married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married party independently of the other co-owners. But he
to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific
Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to or determinate part of the thing owned in common
Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. On 20 because his right over the thing is represented by a
February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. quota or ideal portion without any physical
289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia adjudication.
Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed
to have been executed on 23 June 1995by all six (6) Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of
co-owners in her favor. Petitioner claimed that she the property, the metes and bounds of petitioners
did not affix her signature on the document and lot has not been designated. As she was not a party
subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the
an action for recovery of possession of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court effected to protect her right to her definite share
(MeTC). and determine the boundaries of her property.
Such partition must be done without prejudice to
The MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as
private respondent declaring that the sale was buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the
other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on 5. G.R. No. 122904. April 15, 2005
account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute ADORACION E. CRUZ, THELMA DEBBIE E. CRUZ,
Sale having been established as a forgery. GERRY E. CRUZ and NERISSA CRUZ-
TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional OF APPEALS, SUMMIT FINANCING CORP., VICTOR S.
Trial Court of Caloocan City. The RTC of Caloocan STA. ANA, MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, RAMON G.
City, the trial court affirmed the decision of the MANALASTAS, and VICENTE TORRES, respondents.
MeTC.
FACTS: Petitioner Adoracion Cruz is the mother of
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is valid given that one her co-petitioners Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and
of the co-owners did not consent thereto. Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, as well as Arnel Cruz, who was
one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 49466.
RULING: YES. The characteristics of co-ownership Petitioners filed said case on February 11, 1983
are: against Arnel Cruz and herein private respondents
(a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, Summit Financing Corporation (Summit), Victor S.
(b) unity of or material indivision, which means that Sta. Ana and Maximo C. Contreras, the last two in
there is a single object which is not materially their capacities as deputy sheriff and ex-officio
divided, and which is the element which binds the sheriff of Rizal, respectively, and Ramon G.
subjects, and, Manalastas in his capacity as Acting Register of
(c) the recognition of ideal shares, which Deeds of Rizal. The Complaint[4] alleged that
determines the rights and obligations of the co- petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a
owners. parcel of land situated in Taytay, Rizal. Yet the
property, which was then covered by Transfer
Page 5 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 495225, was registered belong.[14]Every act which is intended to put an end
only in the name of Arnel Cruz. According to to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
petitioners, the property was among the properties devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
they and Arnel Cruz inherited upon the death of should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
Delfin Cruz, husband of Adoracion Cruz. compromise, or any other transaction.
Petitioners and Arnel Cruz executed a Deed of In the deed, the shares of petitioners and Arnel
Partial Partition,] distributing to each of them their Cruzs in the mass of co-owned properties were
shares consisting of several lots previously held by concretely determined and distributed to each of
them in common. Among the properties them. In particular, to Arnel Cruz was assigned the
adjudicated to defendant Cruz was the parcel of disputed property. There is nothing from the words
land covered at the time by TCT No. 495225. It is the of said deed which expressly or impliedly stated
subject of this case. Subsequently, the same parties that petitioners and Arnel Cruz intended to remain
to the Deed of Partial Partition agreed in writing to as co-owners with respect to the disputed property
share equally in the proceeds of the sale of the or to any of the properties for that matter. It is well-
properties although they had been subdivided and settled in both law and jurisprudence, that
individually titled in the names of the former co- contracts are the law between the contracting
owners pursuant to the Deed of Partial Partition. This parties and should be fulfilled, if their terms are clear
arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum of and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of
Agreement[6] executed on August 23, 1977 or a day the contracting parties.
after the partition.
To be considered a co-owner, one must have a
Petitioner Thelma Cruz discovered that TCT No. spiritual part of a thing which is not physically
495225 had already been cancelled by TCT No. divided, or each of them is an owner of the whole,
514477 which was issued on October 18, 1982 in the and over the whole he exercises the right of
name of Summit. Upon further investigation, dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
petitioners learned that Arnel Cruz had executed portion which is truly abstract.[18] In Dela Cruz v.
a Special Power of Attorney[7] on May 16, 1980 in Cruz, et al.,[19] this Court denied the prayer for legal
favor of one Nelson Tamayo, husband of petitioner redemption of plaintiff-appellant therein because
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, authorizing him to obtain a the portions of appellant-plaintiff and of the
loan in the amount of One Hundred Four Thousand defendant spouses are concretely determined and
Pesos (P104,000.00) from respondent Summit, to be identifiable, for to the former belongs the northern
secured by a real estate mortgage on the subject half, and to the latter belongs the remaining
parcel of land. Since the loan had remained southern half, of the land.
outstanding on maturity, Summit instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and at the As the absolute owner thereof then, Arnel Cruz had
foreclosure sale it was declared the highest bidder. the right to enjoy and dispose of the property,[22] as
Consequently, Sheriff Sta. Ana issued a Certificate well as the right to constitute a real estate
of Sale[9] to respondent Summit, which more than a mortgage over the same without securing the
year later consolidated its ownership of the consent of petitioners.
foreclosed property.
6. G.R. No. 161136 November 16, 2006
In their complaint before the RTC, petitioners WILFREDO T. VAGILIDAD and LOLITA A.
asserted that they co-owned the properties with VAGILIDAD, Petitioners, vs. GABINO VAGILIDAD, Jr.
Arnel Cruz, as evidenced by the Memorandum of and DOROTHY VAGILIDAD, Respondents.
Agreement. Hence, they argued that the mortgage
was void since they did not consent to it. FACTS: A parcel of land, Lot No. 1253 was owned by
Zoilo. Sometime in 1931, ZOILO died. Subsequently,
The trial court declared in favor of plaintiff and on May 12, 1986, Loreto Labiao, son of ZOILO, sold
against defendants. to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253,
measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by LORETO.
decision. The appellate court stressed that
the Memorandum of Agreement does not contain In view of the death of ZOILO, his children, LORETO,
any proscription against the mortgage of the Efren Labiao and Priscilla Espanueva executed an
subject property although it provides that the Extrajudicial x x x Settlement of Estate dated
parties thereto are entitled to share in the proceeds January 20, 1987, adjudicating the entire Lot No.
of the sale of the properties covered by it. 1253, covering 4,280 square meters, to LORETO. On
January 29, 1987, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
ISSUE: Whether or not the real estate mortgage on the No. T-16693 was issued in favor of LORETO, EFREN
property then covered by TCT No. 495225 is valid. and PRISCILLA, but on even date, TCT No. T-16693
was cancelled and TCT No. T-16694, covering the
RULING: YES. Co-ownership is terminated upon said property, was issued in the name of LORETO
judicial or extra-judicial partition of the properties alone.
owned in common. Partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held GABINO JR. paid real estate taxes on the land he
in common among those to whom it may bought from LORETO as per Tax Declaration No.
Page 6 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue of the
1253-B. GABINO JR. thereafter sold the same lot to sale on May 12, 1986 were the same rights as the
Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale vendor LORETO had as co-owner, in an ideal share
dated December 7, 1989. On even date, Deed of equivalent to the consideration given under their
Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the opt- transaction.
described property was also executed by LORETO
in favor of WILFREDO. The aforementioned deeds, LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No.
which were both executed on December 7, 1989. 1253 to GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO
purportedly sold to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989
Spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad, as the same portion of the lot, he was no longer the
plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of owner of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on the principle that
Document, Reconveyance and Damages, with the "no one can give what he does not have," LORETO
Regional Trial Court of Antique, against spouses could not have validly sold to WILFREDO on
WILFREDO and Lolita Vagilidad. The plaintiffs December 7, 1989 what he no longer had. As
claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the
1253-B which was sold to him by LORETO in 1986. sale made by LORETO in favor of WILFREDO is void
They alleged that [GABINO JR.] is a nephew of as LORETO did not have the right to transfer the
defendant WILFREDO. They likewise raised that ownership of the subject property at the time of
when GABINO SR. died, defendant WILFREDO sale.
requested GABINO JR. to transfer the ownership of
Lot No. 1253-B in defendant WILFREDOs name for The mere fact that LORETO sold a definite portion of
loaning purposes with the agreement that the land the co-owned lot by metes and bounds before
will be returned when the plaintiffs need the same. partition does not, per se, render the sale a nullity.
They added that, pursuant to the mentioned We held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the
agreement, plaintiff GABINO JR., without the fact that an agreement purported to sell a
knowledge and consent of his spouse, DOROTHY, concrete portion of a co-owned property does not
executed the Deed of Sale dated December 7, render the sale void, for it is well-established that the
1989 in favor of defendant WILFREDO receiving binding force of a contract must be recognized as
nothing as payment therefor. far as it is legally possible to do so.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners WILFREDO In the case at bar, the contract of sale between
and LOLITA and held that LORETO did not validly LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be
convey Lot No. 1253-B to GABINO, JR. on May 12, legally recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had
1986 since at that time, the heirs of ZOILO had not an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square
partitioned Lot No. 1253.5 It ruled that LORETO could meter property or some 1,426 square meters but
only sell at that time his aliquot share in the sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO, JR. We
inheritance. He could not have sold a divided part have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his
thereof designated by metes and bounds. aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only
his share but not those of the other co-owners who
GABINO, JR. and DOROTHY filed an appeal with the did not consent to the sale. Be that as it may, the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and
set aside the decision of the court a quo. interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20,
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Loreto and 1987. They declared that they have previously
Gabino jr. over lot no. 1253-B is void on the ground received their respective shares from the other
that Loreto had no right to dispose an aliquot part estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION.
of the yet undived property of Zoilo.
The rights of GABINO, JR. as owner over Lot No.
RULING: NO. Co-ownership is the right of common 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not
dominion which two or more persons have in a effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO in
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Nor
divided. Before the partition of the property held in were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon
common, no individual or co-owner can claim title the issuance of the title to the subject property in
to any definite portion thereof. All that the co- the name of WILFREDO. Registration of property is
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or not a means of acquiring ownership. Its alleged
proportionate share in the entire property. incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by
WILFREDO because certificates of title cannot be
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be
May 12, 1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, used as a shield for the commission of fraud.
even before the partition of the property on
January 19, 1987, to transfer in whole or in part his 7. G.R. No. 154486 December 1, 2010
undivided interest in the lot even without the FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR., Petitioner, vs. ANTONIETA
consent of his co-heirs. This right is absolute in JARANTILLA, BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE,
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a substituted by CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE, DOROTEO
co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share JARANTILLA and TOMAS JARANTILLA, Respondents.
and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and substitute another person for its enjoyment.
Page 7 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
FACTS: The spouses Andres Jarantilla and Felisa supposedly rolled back into the business as
Jaleco were survived by eight children: Federico, additional investments in her behalf. Antonieta
Delfin, Benjamin, Conchita, Rosita, Pacita, Rafael further claimed co-ownership of certain
and Antonieta. Petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr. is properties(the subject real properties) in the name
the grandchild of the late Jarantilla spouses by their of the defendants since the only way the
son Federico Jarantilla, Sr. and his wife Leda defendants could have purchased these properties
Jamili. Petitioner also has two other brothers: were through the partnership as they had no other
Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla. source of income.
Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst RTC: During the course of the trial at the RTC,
themselves the real properties of their deceased petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr., who was one of
parents.7With the exception of the real property the original defendants, entered into a compromise
adjudicated to Pacita Jarantilla, the heirs also agreementwith Antonieta Jarantilla wherein he
agreed to allot the produce of the said real supported Antonietas claims and asserted that he
properties for the years 1947-1949 for the studies of too was entitled to six percent (6%) of the supposed
Rafael and Antonieta Jarantilla. partnership in the same manner as Antonieta was.
He prayed for a favorable judgment.The RTC, in an
In the same year, the spouses Rosita Jarantilla and Order1approved the Joint Motion to Approve
Vivencio Deocampo entered into an agreement Compromise Agreementand on December 18,
with the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and 1992, decided in favor of Antonieta.
Conchita Jarantilla to provide mutual assistance to
each other by way of financial support to any CA: Both the petitioner and the respondents
commercial and agricultural activity on a joint appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals. The
business arrangement. This business relationship petitioner claimed that the RTC "erred in not
proved to be successful as they were able to rendering a complete judgment and ordering the
establish a manufacturing and trading business, partition of the co-ownership and giving to [him] six
acquire real properties, and construct buildings, per centum (6%) of the properties."Court of Appeals
among other things. rendered the challenged decision setting aside the
RTCs decision.
The spouses Buenaventura and Conchita
Remotigue executed a document wherein they ISSUE:Whether or not the partnership subject of the
acknowledged that while registered only in Acknowledgement of Participating Capital funded
Buenaventura Remotigues name, they were not the subject real properties.
the only owners of the capital of the businesses
Manila Athletic Supply (712 Raon Street, Manila), RULING:NO.Persons who contribute property or
Remotigue Trading (Calle Real, Iloilo City) and funds for a common enterprise and agree to share
Remotigue Trading (Cotabato City). In this same the gross returns of that enterprise in proportion to
"Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," they their contribution, but who severally retain the title
stated the participating capital of their co-owners to their respective contribution, are not thereby
as of the year 1952, with Antonieta Jarantillas rendered partners. They have no common stock or
stated as eight thousand pesos (8,000.00) and capital, and no community of interest as principal
Federico Jarantilla, Jr.s as five thousand pesos proprietors in the business itself which the proceeds
(5,000.00). derived.
The present case stems from the amended In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there
complaintdated April 22, 1987 filed by Antonieta must be: (a) An intent to form the same; (b)
Jarantilla against Buenaventura Remotigue, generally participating in both profits and losses; (c)
Cynthia Remotigue, Federico Jarantilla, Jr., Doroteo and such a community of interest, as far as third
Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla, for the accounting persons are concerned as enables each party to
of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its make contract, manage the business, and dispose
partition and the delivery of her share of the whole property. x x x.
corresponding to eight percent (8%), and for
damages. The common ownership of property does not itself
create a partnership between the owners, though
Antonieta claimed that in 1946, she had entered they may use it for the purpose of making gains;
into an agreement with Conchita and and they may, without becoming partners, agree
Buenaventura Remotigue, Rafael Jarantilla, and among themselves as to the management, and use
Rosita and Vivencio Deocampo to engage in of such property and the application of the
business. Antonieta alleged that the initial proceeds therefrom.
contribution of property and money came from the
heirs inheritance, and her subsequent annual Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two
investment of seven thousand five hundred pesos essential elements in a contract of partnership: (a)
(7,500.00) as additional capital came from the an agreement to contribute money, property or
proceeds of her farm. Antonieta also alleged that industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide
from 1946-1969, she had helped in the the profits among the contracting parties. The first
management of the business they co-owned element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar,
without receiving any salary. Her salary was for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have
Page 8 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
agreed to, and did, contribute money and property 8. G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006
to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows down PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G.
to their intent in acting as they did. It is not denied DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
that all the parties in this case have agreed to Second Division, Respondents.
contribute capital to a common fund to be able to
later on share its profits. They have admitted this FACTS:Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was
fact, agreed to its veracity, and even submitted survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
one common documentary evidence to prove their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
such partnership - the Acknowledgement of respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the
Participating Capital. properties he left was a parcel of land with a
It is clear that a partner is entitled only to his share residential house and a pre-school building built
as agreed upon, or in the absence of any such thereon. Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally
stipulations, then to his share in proportion to his advised private respondent of their intention to
contribution to the partnership. The petitioner partition the subject property and terminate the co-
himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the ownership. Private respondent refused to partition
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
However, petitioner fails to realize that this instituted an action for partition before the Regional
document specifically enumerated the businesses Trial Court of Quezon City.
covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply,
Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trial court ordered the partition of the subject
Trading in Cotabato City. Since there was a clear property. Private respondent filed a motion for
agreement that the capital the partners reconsideration which was denied by the trial
contributed went to the three businesses, then there court, hence he appealed before the Court of
is no reason to deviate from such agreement and Appeals, which denied the same. However, upon a
go beyond the stipulations in the document. motion for reconsideration filed by private
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in limiting respondent, the appellate court partially
petitioners share to the assets of the businesses reconsidered the Decision.
enumerated in the Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint for partition filed by
The petitioner has failed to prove that there exists a petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It
trust over the subject real properties. Aside from his held that the family home should continue despite
bare allegations, he has failed to show that the the death of one or both spouses as long as there is
respondents used the partnerships money to a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
purchase the said properties. Even assuming partition the property unless the court found
arguendo that some partnership income was used compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
to acquire these properties, the petitioner should
have successfully shown that these funds came ISSUE:Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the
from his share in the partnership profits. After all, by minor son of private respondent, can be
his own admission, and as stated in the considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, he Family Code in order to prohibit the partitioned of
owned a mere 6% equity in the partnership. their family home.
In essence, the petitioner is claiming his 6% share in RULING:NO. The family home is deemed constituted
the subject real properties, by relying on his own from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
self-serving testimony and the equally biased From the time of its constitution and so long as any
testimony of Antonieta Jarantilla. Petitioner has not of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
presented evidence, other than these family home continues to be such and is exempt
unsubstantiated testimonies, to prove that the from execution, forced sale or attachment except
respondents did not have the means to fund their as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
other businesses and real properties without the value allowed by law.
partnerships income. On the other hand, the
respondents have not only, by testimonial The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the
evidence, proven their case against the petitioner, family home either by the owner thereof or by "any
but have also presented sufficient documentary of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is
evidence to substantiate their claims, allegations "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as
and defenses. They presented preponderant proof opposed to something merely possible, or to
on how they acquired and funded such properties something which is presumptive or constructive.
in addition to tax receipts and tax declarations. It Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the
has been held that "while tax declarations and owner of the house specifically. Rather, the
realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries"
ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code,
ownership when accompanied by possession for a which may include the in-laws where the family
period sufficient for prescription." Moreover, it is a home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife.
rule in this jurisdiction that testimonial evidence But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers.
cannot prevail over documentary evidence. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the
Code.
Page 9 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must Due to the petitioners needing her portion that was
be actually living in the family home to avail of the then occupied by the respondent, she demanded
benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands,
Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to
respondent and grandson of the decedent file against him on a complaint for ejectment and
Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death Cebu City.
of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second
requisite. LOWER COURT: The MTCC rendered its decision in
favor of the petitioner, ruling that the deeds of sale
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino executed by Eliseo in favor of the respondent did
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his not have the effect of conveying the disputed
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are property to him inasmuch as at the time of the sale,
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal the parcel of land left by their father, which
support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario included the disputed property, had not yet been
IVs parents, especially his father, herein private partitioned, rendering Eliseo a mere co-owner of
respondent who is the head of his immediate the undivided estate who had no right to dispose of
family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal a definite portion thereof.
Page 10 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
CA: CA promulgated its decision, affirming the That defendant, before he acquired the land
decision of the RTC, and dismissing the case for from Eliseo Quijano was informed by the latter
ejectment, but on the ground that the respondent that the portion sold to him was his share
was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the already; that they have orally partitioned the
right of possession over the disputed property. whole lot before defendant acquired the
portion from him.
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent was either a co-
owner with the right of possession over the disputed His knowledge of Eliseos co-ownership with his co-
property. heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition
notwithstanding, the respondent still did not
RULING:YES. The disputed property originally formed exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo
part of the estate of the late Bibiano Quijano, and made it appear to the respondent that the partition
passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his had already been completed and finalized, the co-
death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was heirs had not taken possession yet oftheir respective
owned in common by the heirs, subject to the shares to signify that they had ratified their
payment of the debts of the deceased. agreement, if any. For sure, the respondent was no
stranger to the Quijanos, because he himself had
In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the petitioner
belong to different persons, with each of them herself.
holding the property pro indivisoand exercising her
rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may In that sense, it would have been easy for him to
use and enjoy the property with no other limitation ascertain whether the representation of Eliseo to
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co- him was true. As it turned out, there had been no
owners. The underlying rationale is that until a prior oral agreement among the heirs to partition
division is actually made, the respective share of the estate; otherwise, Eliseo would have questioned
each cannot be determined, and every co-owner the deed of extrajudicial partition because it did
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint not conform to what they had supposedly agreed
ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to upon. Had the respondent been vigilant in
his use and enjoyment of it. Even if an heirs right in protecting his interest, he could have availed
the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully himself of the rights reserved to him by law,
settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, particularly the right to take an active part in the
Article 49325 of the Civil Codegives the heir the right partition and to object to the partition if he wanted
to exercise acts of ownership. to. It was only on September 30, 1992, or two years
and five months from the time of the first sale
Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property transaction, and a year and two months from the
to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a time of the second sale transaction, that the co-
co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only heirs executed the deed of extrajudicial partition.
that portion that would beallotted to him upon the Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to
termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not participate in or toobject to the partition of the
vest ownership of the disputed property in the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever
respondent but transferred only the sellers pro was ultimately agreed upon by the Quijanos.
indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as
the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until ARTICLE 487
it is partitioned. As Eliseos successor-in-interest or
assignee, the respondent was vested with the right 1. G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003.
under Article 497 of the Civil Codeto take part in MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
the partition of the estate and to challenge the APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO,
partition undertaken without his consent.27 Article represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda
497 states: Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-
owners may take part in the division of the thing FACTS: ABEJO instituted an action for recovery of
owned in common and object to its being effected possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his
without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn complaint, ABEJO alleged that:
any partition already executed, unless there has 1. He is the owner of the undivided portion of a
been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding property used as a fishpond (FISHPOND) situated in
a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without Meycauayan, Bulacan;
prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to 2. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611
maintain its validity. square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of
79,220 square meters;
Page 11 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
3. That DE GUIA continues to possess and use the cannot implement any decision in the latter case
FISHPOND without any contract and without paying without first a partition.
rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice.
4. That DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and ISSUE: Whether an action for recovery of possession
possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated and turn-over of the undivided portion of a
demands to do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract common property is proper before partition.
over the FISHPOND had expired.
ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to HELD: No. Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there
vacate the area as well as pay damages. is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, alleged that: A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an
1. The complaint does not state a cause of action owner of the whole, and over the whole he
and has prescribed; exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
2. That the FISHPOND was originally owned by same time the owner of a portion which is truly
Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-
Lejano as her only heir; ownership when the different portions owned by
3. That ABEJO is not the owner of the entire different people are already concretely
FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who determined and separately identifiable, even if not
authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. yet technically described.
He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the undivided Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one
portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
ownership over an undivided half portion of the This article covers all kinds of actions for the
FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an
damages and reimbursement for the improvements action under Article 487 not only against a third
he introduced as a builder in good faith. person, but also against another co-owner who
takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
RTC rendered a decision in favor of ABEJO and ownership of the property. In the latter case,
ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain
GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff
ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the
the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to property because as co-owner he has a right of
present evidence of the judicial or extra-judicial possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any
partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the material or determinate part of the property.
specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner
is vital in an action to recover possession of real In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso
property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, we
pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover
ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of a material or determinate part of a common
ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. property prior to partition:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, property owned in common is actually partitioned,
ABEJO as co-owner has the right to possess the all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract
FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the quota or proportionate share in the entire property.
benefits from the FISHPOND effective immediately. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete,
Until there is a partition, and while there is no specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co- common because until division is effected his right
ownership shall govern the rights of the parties. over the thing is represented only by an ideal
portion.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts
decision. The Court of Appeals debunked DE GUIAs As such, the only effect of an action brought by a
claim that partition and not recovery of possession co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain
was the proper remedy under the circumstances. recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant
The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIAs cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the
failure to respect ABEJOs right over his undivided property because as a co-owner he has a right to
share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any
recovery of possession. According to the Court of material or determinate part of the property. Thus,
Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical the courts a quo erred when they ordered the
aspect of the decision just like accounting when delivery of one-half of the building in favor of
necessary. private respondent.
DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive
definite portion from the property owned in possession of the entire FISHPOND since July 1974.
common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJOs claim of
that ABEJO should have filed an action for partition ownership over the undivided portion of the
instead of recovery of possession since the court FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized
ABEJOs undivided share by offering to settle the
Page 12 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
case for P300,000 and to vacate the property. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per year
During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the
asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and reasonable compensation for the use and
exclusive ownership over the entire FISHPOND. occupation of the leased property, considering the
circumstances at that time.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-
ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal
shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, ARTICLE 488
they have the same right in a qualitative sense as
co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are 1. G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951
owners of the whole and over the whole, they ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO
exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.,
the same time individual owners of a portion, which defendants-appellees.
is truly abstract because until there is partition, such
portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As FACTS:In 1941 the sisters Angela Tuason and Nieves
co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason
the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until Jr., held a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila in
they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion.
segregating their respective portions.
Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and common property, but failing in this, she offered to
DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was offered
proper recourse. An action to demand partition is for sale to her siblings but both declined to buy it.
imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co- The offer was later made to their mother but the she
owner may demand at any time the partition of the also declined to buy. Finally, the share of Nieves
common property unless a co-owner has was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc. The three co-
repudiated the co-ownership under certain owners agreed to have the whole parcel
conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has subdivided into small lots and then sold, the
repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions proceeds of the sale to be later divided among
set by law. them. This agreement is embodied in a document
(Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of Agreement".
To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an
action for recovery of possession against a co- Before, during and after the execution of the
owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire contract, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as
co-owned property. However, the only effect of the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of Angela Tuason
such action is recognition of the co-ownership. The and Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a
courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning member of the Board of Director of the third co-
of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra- owner, Araneta, Inc.
judicial partition is necessary to effect physical
division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11
GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of
for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from reference we are reproducing them below:
the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary (9) This contract shall remain in full force and
consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall effect during all the time that it may be
exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND
the entire FISHPOND. PART to fully sell the said property in small
and subdivided lots and to fully collect the
Is the order to pay damages in the form of rent purchase prices due thereon; it being
premature before partition?No. understood and agreed that said lots may
be rented while there are no purchasers
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited thereof;
by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co- (11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART
owner cannot devote common property to his (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. power and authority to sign for and in
behalf of all the said co-owners of said
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease property all contracts of sale and deeds of
the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs sale of the lots into which this property might
lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the be subdivided; the powers herein vested to
entire FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may, under
GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without its own responsibility and risk, delegate any
paying rent would prejudice ABEJOs right to receive of its powers under this contract to any of its
rent, which would have accrued to his share in the officers, employees or to third persons;
FISHPOND had it been leased to others. Since (15) No co-owner of the property subject-
ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or
FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should dispose of his ownership, interest or
pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and participation therein without first giving
use of ABEJOs portion beginning from that date. preference to the other co-owners to
Page 13 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
FACTS: On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum of
Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff P2,500.00.
a fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares
situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a The appellate court furthermore correctly held that
bigger parcel of land. The lessors are co-owners in the consent or concurrence of Felisa Vda. de
equal shares of the leased property. Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was
not an essential condition to the validity and
According to the contract of lease, the term of the effectivity of the agreement of cancellation of the
lease was for five years from January 24, 1956 at a lease (Exhibit A) as between Arsenio and
rental of P5,000 a year. respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim,
holding that "(S)ince then specific provision in Exhibit
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. A supporting defendant's claim, we are not
prepared to supply such condition unless the same
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee can be deduced from other evidence or unless the
and defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by plaintiff
lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as
of lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exhibit a party thereto."
A) was signed by them.
ISSUE: Whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond
"Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows: owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas
"2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could validly
kabuluhan namin and nasabing kasulatan at lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent
nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni Atienza) independently of his co-owner, and in
Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay case his co-owner also leased his other half interest
isauli kay GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o to the same third party, whether Arsenio could
kabuuang halagang P5,000.00 na paunang cancel his own lease agreement with said third
naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing kasulatan; na party?
ang nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa
sa amin sa o bago dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956. RULING: The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as
without merit and affirms the judgment of the
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest
Defendant did not pay the P2,500.00 which under as co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the
the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A, he fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third
should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand party, respondent Atienza, independently of his co-
for payment was made by plaintiff's counsel on owner (although said co-owner had also leased his
January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the present other undivided one-half interest to the same third
action." party) and could likewise by mutual agreement
independently cancel his lease agreement with
On the conflicting contentions between the parties said third party. Said predecessor-in-interest (and
as to who between them would attend to securing petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs)
the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to
(widow of Tomas de Castro) to the agreement of refund the advance rental paid to him by the
cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza, lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke
the appellate court found that "the testimony of the the non-cancellation of the co-owner's lease to
defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.). . . supports the elude such liability.
contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the
defendant Arsenio who was interested and The appellate court correctly resolved the issue
undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own declaration thus: "Our view of the contract of lease Exhibit 1 is
that "I agreed to sign this document (referring to the that each of the Castro brothers, leased his
cancellation) because of my desire to cancel our undivided one-half interest in the fishpond they
original agreement" and that his purpose in owned in common to the plaintiff.
obtaining the cancellation of said lease agreement
with plaintiff Atienza was "(B)ecause I had the Could one of them have validly leased his interest
intention of having said fishpond leased to other without the other co-owner leasing his own?
persons and I cannot lease it to third parties unless I
can see in the signature of Felisa Vda. de Castro." The answer to this is given by appellant in his own
brief when he said that it would result in a
The appellate court thus held in effect that as partnership between the lessee and the owner of
Arsenio "was the one interested in cancelling the the other undivided half. If the lease could be
lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most entered into partially by one of the co-owners,
probably undertook to obtain the signature of Mrs. insofar as his interest is concerned, then the lease,
Castro [widow and successor-in-interest of his Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as
brother Tomas]" and that he could not invoke his between plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, we
own failure to obtain such signature to elude his conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda.
own undertaking and liability to refund respondent de Castro is not essential for the cancellation of the
(plaintiff) his share of the rental paid in advance by lease of defendant's one-half undivided share in
the fishpond to plaintiff."
Page 15 of 65
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Page 16 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or possession of the portion of the lot in question. On
redemption shall not be exercised except within appeal, the RTC affirmed thedecision of the MCTC.
thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case Catapang filed a petition for review with the Court
may be. The deed of safe shall not be recorded in of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs decision and
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals held that
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. case because respondents entry into the property,
considering the consent given by co-owner Norma
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet Maligaya, cannot becharacterized as one made
to commence when private respondent Rosales through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a
sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 cause ofaction for forcible entry. Thus, the case
March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale went to the Supreme Court.
from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City,
or when the case was initiatedbefore the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the consent given by one of the co-
owners is sufficient to warrant thedismissal of a
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court complaint for forcible entry.
has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still HELD: No, Co-owners cannot devote common
entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner property to his or her exclusive use to theprejudice
in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, of the co-ownership. In this case, the act of Norma
its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and Maligaya is tantamount todevoting the property to
status. her exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil
Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the
Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
Court,relied upon by petitioner in contending that owned in common. The Court ruled that it would
actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a necessarily follow that none of the co-owners can,
written notice of sale. without the consent of the other co-owners, validly
gives consent to the making of an alteration by
All given, we find no error in the appellate court's another person, such as Catapang in this case, in
finding that private respondents are entitled to the the thin gowned in common.
redemption of the subject property.
In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states
ARTICLE 491 each co-owner may use the thingowned in
common provided he does so in accordance with
1. G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008 the purpose for which it isintended and in such a
LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M. way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership
CATAPANG, respondent. or preventthe other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. The Court ruled that, to
Co-owners cannot devote common property to his giveconsent to a third person to construct a house
or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co- on the co-owned property would be toinjure the
ownership. interest of the co-ownership and would prevent
other co-owners from usingthe property in
FACTS: Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma accordance with their rights.
Maligaya are the co-owners of aparcel of land
covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at In this case, the consent of only one co-owner will
Barangay MahabangLudlod, Taal, Batangas. not warrant the dismissal ofthe complaint for
Sometime in 1992, Teofila Catapang, with the forcible entry filed against the respondent
consent of NormaMaligaya as one of the Catapang. The consentgiven by Norma Maligaya
aforementioned co-owners, built a house on a lot in the absence of the consent of her other co-
adjacent to thesubject parcel of land. The house owners did notgrant Catapang any right to enter
built by Catapang intruded on a portion of the co- and even build upon the co-owned
owned property. property.According to the Supreme Court, the
respondent Catapangs act of getting only the
In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma
and made several demandsfor Catapang to Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay inthe
demolish and vacate the part of the structure constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
encroaching upon theirproperty. However, strategy which she utilized in orderto enter into the
Catapang refused and disregarded the demands co-owned property.
of Cruz.
As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible entry against The petition was GRANTED.
Catapang before the MCTCof Taal, Batangas. The
MCTC decided in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent 2. See Manuel de Guia vs. CA and Abejo case
of only oneof the co-owners is not sufficient to justify digest
defendants construction of the house and
3. G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006
Page 17 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner, vs. EMETERIO M. ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition
ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, should be dismissed.
Respondents.
ARTICLE 493
FACTS: A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in
the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of 1. G.R. No. 191090 October 13, 2014
(petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who Petitioner, vs. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO and ELY B.
is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then FLESTADO, Respondents.
adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to
himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of FACTS: Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe
his father to occupy the property provided that were husband and wife. They have two children,
they vacate when asked. Time came when he Juan Irenea. Juan is married to Leonarda and they
demanded that they vacate and when they have six children. Irenea on the other hand is
refused he filed an ejectment suit against them. married to Santiago Samson and they have two
children, respondents Herminia Samson-Bico and
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) Merlita Samson-Flestado.
and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming
that the said lot was registered in their parents Apolonio owned a 29,748 sq.m. parcel of land in
name and they had been living in the said house Binangonan, Rizal that was later inherited by his 2
and lot since birth. The only reason why the said children. Upon their death, the heirs of Juan and
house and lot was transferred in Dominadors name Irenea became co-owners.
was when their parents were in need of money for
renovating their house, their parents were not In April of 2002, the heirs of Juan (Ballesteros),
qualified to obtain a loan and since Dominador without the consent of respondents, the heirs of
was the only one who had a college education, Irenea executed in favor of petitioner Extra-ordinary
they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Development Corp (EDC) a Deed of Absolute Sale
Dominador. covering the subject property for P2,974,800.00. Prior
to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that that the property had been the subject of a
Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the estate contract to sell between the heirs of Juan and EDC.
are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC
And since Dominador was survived by his wife, informing it of the existence of co-ownership over
Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share the subject property. EDC wrote back that it will
in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to look into the matter and asked respondents to
turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also further establish the basis of their claims.
granted the motion of execution which was
opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed
who claim that they have a share in the lot. of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial
Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding the subject property in its name. This prompted
that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of
thus he cannot eject them from the property via Contract and conveyance of property with
unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar. damages. In defense, EDC alleged that it is a buyer
in good faith and for value of the subject property
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of
the ejectment suit. Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio. On the
other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that
HELD: NO. The theory of succession invoked by respondents were aware of and were parties to the
Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The
Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received
upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co- their share in the down payment made by EDC but
owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed they were both unpaid of the balance on the cost
on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making of the land.
them co-owners as well.
RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents. The decision
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file stated that respondents and the heirs of Juan are
the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co- co-owners of the subject property; that at the time
owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to
that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o sell the one-half share of the heirs of Irenea and thus
necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs the sale is null and void; that the sale did not bind
because it is presumed to be instituted for the the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the
benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale when the
plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that one-half
of the property sold is owned by respondents; and
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it
his benefit alone and his repudiation of the knew that respondents were co-owners of the
Page 18 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
The execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took
of Absolute Sale over the subject property which possession of the land and built a house thereon. A
they do not exclusively own but is admittedly few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio
co-owned by them together with the respondents, Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as
was valid only to the extent of the formers security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr.
undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no
title or interest to transfer the other one-half portion On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of
which pertains to the respondents without the Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and
latters consent. It is an established principle that no Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose
one can give what one does not have (nemo dat Regalado, Sr.
quod non habet.) Accordingly, one can sell only
what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad
buyer can acquire no more than what the seller Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage
can transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDCs debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot
rights over the subject property originated from 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn,
sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said corporation executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in
merely stepped into the shoes of its sellers and favor of Soledads heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo,
cannot have a better right than what its sellers Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On
have. same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed
Page 19 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, in part even without the consent of the other co-
the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion owners. Salomes right to sell part of her undivided
Quiachon. interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share
reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
18047. However, title was transferred later to Jose and substitute another person in its enjoymen. Since
Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property Salomes clear intention was to sell merely part of
into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid
in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C- objection can be made against it and the sale can
6. be given effect to the full extent.
Petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo We are not unaware of the principle that a co-
brought this complaint for "repartition, resurvey and owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular
reconveyance" against the heirs of the now portion of a co-owned property prior to partition
deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed among all the co-owners. However, this should not
that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters signify that the vendee does not acquire anything
located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously at all in case a physically segregated area of the
included in the name of Regalado. Petitioners co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-
alleged that they occupied the disputed area as owner/vendors undivided interest could properly
residential dwelling ever since they purchased the be the object of the contract of sale between the
property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a
also declared the land for taxation purposes and sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-
paid the corresponding taxes. owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the
complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate
her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not abstract share in the property held in common.
validly sell an undivided part thereof by meters and
bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162
their title. as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her
favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose
judgment. Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that
time, the ideal shares held by the three co-
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by a co-owner of a owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of
physical portion of an undivided property held in the undivided property less the aliquot share
common is valid. previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the
principle that "no one can give what he does not
HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Salome purportedly have," Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not
transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a
by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in
not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that
evident under Article 493 of the Civil Code and even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. In Lopez vs. the sale will affect only his own share but not those
Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al.: of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
The fact that the agreement in question sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
purported to sell a concrete portion of the undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
hacienda does not render the sale void, for one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-
it is a well-established principle that the owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-
binding force of a contract must be owner of the property.
recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-
quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which
no force as I do it, it shall have as much Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly
force as it can have.) convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner
and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can 1951. The logical effect on the second disposition is
be no doubt that the transaction entered into by to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as
Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights
its entirety since the object of the sale did not even are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the No. 14566 in Regalados name.
co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale
executed between the parties expressly stipulated Be that as it may, we find that the area subject
that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be matter of this petition had already been effectively
taken from Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said segregated from the mother lot even before title
lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted
Page 20 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners CUISON, MANSUETO CUISON, BONIFACIA CUISON,
bought and took possession of the property in 1951 BASILIO CUISON, MOISES CUISON, AND FLORENCIO
until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. CUISON, Respondents.
14566. Additionally, the intervening years between
the date of petitioners purchase of the property A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner
and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant without the express authority of the others is
complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no unenforceable against the latter, but valid and
instance during this time did respondents or enforceable against the seller.
Regalado, for that matter, question petitioners right FACTS: Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of
over the land in dispute. Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale(Deed) covering
Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo,
In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor
Appeals,we had occasion to hold that where the of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu
allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a International Airport Authority (MCIAA). MCIAA
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the rejmained in material, continuous, uninterrupted
same for a period too long to be ignored, the and adverse possession of the subject lot through
possessor is in a better condition or right than said the CAA, later renamed the Bureau of Air
transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). Such Transportation (BAT), and is presently known as the
undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial Air Transportation Office (ATO). The subject lot was
partition of the co-owner property which entitles the transferred and conveyed to MCIAA by virtue of
possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Republic Act No. 6958.
Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the
disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial
possession thereof for a total of 49 years up to the reconstitution of the original certificate of title
present. covering the subject lot. Consequently, OCT No.
RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was
The lower courts reliance on the doctrine that mere reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the
possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a respondents' predecessors-in-interest, the
registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, Cuisons. The respondents' ownership of the subject
considering that petitioners were deprived of their lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They
dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and asserted that they had not sold their shares in the
with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. In subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell
this case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.
the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot
and could not, therefore, have validly registered The failure of the respondents to surrender the
the same in his name alone because he was aware owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA
of petitioners possession of the subject portion as to sue them for the cancellation of title in the
well as the sale between Salome and Soledad. RTC,alleging in its complaint that the certificate of
title conferred no right in favor of the respondents
Records show that the particular area subject of this because the lot had already been sold to the
case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband Government in 1957; and that by virtue of the
to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May 1, 1947 or one Deed, the respondents came under the legal
year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor obligation to surrender the certificate of title.
of the latter. Regalado never questioned the
ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for The RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it
the P400.00 debt and he must have at least known pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot
that Soledad bought the subject portion from No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22
Salome since he could not have reasonably share of Julian.
accepted the lot as security for the mortgage debt
if such were not the case. By accepting the said On appeal, the CA affirmed the orders of the RTC.
portion of Lot 162 as security for the mortgage
obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized MCIAA insists that the respondents were fully aware
Soledads ownership of this definite portion of Lot of the transaction with Julian from the time of the
162. consummation of the sale in 1957, as well as of its
continuous possession thereof; that what was
Consequently, respondents are estopped from conveyed by Julian to its predecessor-in-interest,
asserting that they own the subject land in view of the CAA, was the entirety of Lot No. 4539, consisting
the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage of 12,012 square meters, not just his share of 1/22 of
executed between Regalado and petitioners the whole lot; that the respondents were guilty of
predecessor-in-interest. inexplicable inaction as to the sale, which
manifested their implied ratification of the
3. G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016 supposedly unauthorized act of Julian of selling the
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY subject lot in 1957; that although the respondents
[MCIAA], Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF GAVINA IJORDAN, were still minors at the time of the execution of the
NAMELY, JULIAN CUISON, FRANCISCA CUISON, sale, their ratification of Julian's act became
DAMASTNA CUISON, PASTOR CUISON, ANGELINA evident from the fact that they had not impugned
Page 21 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
the sale upon reaching the age of majority; that the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition
they asserted their claim only after knowing of the of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and
phenomenal rise in the value of the lot in the area the transferee gets only what would correspond to
despite their silence for more than 30 years; and his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
that they did not assert ownership for a long period, common.
and did not exercise physical and constructive
possession by paying the taxes or declaring the MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar
property for taxation purposes. the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of
Respondents aver that they were not aware of the their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance.
sale of the subject lot in 1957 because the sale was The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who
not registered, and because the subject lot was not were parties to the contract and their privies or
occupied by MCIAA or its lessee; that they became successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents
aware of the claim of MCIAA only when its could not be held to ratify the contract that was
representative tried to intervene during the declared to be null and void with respect to their
reconstitution of the certificate of title in 1980; and share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily,
that one of the co-owners of the property, Moises the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse
Cuison, had been vigilant in preventing the effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject
occupation of the subject lot by other persons. lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot validly 4. Esguerra vs. Court of Appeals, 19310. February
conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner. 3, 1997
Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire Esguerra filed a complaint with the then Court of
property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, TagaytayCity to
respondents for lack of their consent and authority recover said truck and for damages. Esguerra
in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect alleged, among others, that due to his failure to
as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of pay the installments due, the agents of GAMI, Jose
the CivilCode provides that no person could Tino and Samuel Dore, representing themselves as
contract in the name of another without being deputy sheriffs and with use of force, threats and
authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a intimidation, seized the cargo truck in question from
right to represent him; the contract entered into in his driver, Carlito Padua, while unloading gravel
the name of another by one who has no authority and sand in Pasay City; and that despite repeated
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond demands, GAMI refused and failed to return the
his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, same. GAMI, et al. filed their answer with a
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose counterclaim, alleging as affirmative defense that
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the plaintiff gave his consent to the taking of the
the other contracting party. But the conveyance by truck by the agents of the corporation on condition
Julian through the Deed had full force and effect that he be allowed to recover its possession upon
with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire payment of his back accounts.
property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of
its being a voluntary disposition of property on his Issue: Whether or not GAMI is liable for damages in
part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid: taking the truck
x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not Held: The taking of Esguerras truck without
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to proceeding to sell the same at public auction
Page 22 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
appropriating the same in payment of Esguerras 1) No. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property
indebtedness is not lawful. However, the as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
respondent appellate court did not err in holding those of the other co-owners who did not consent
that while the mortgagee can take possession of to the sale. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the
the chattel, such taking did not amount to the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers
foreclosure of the mortgage. Otherwise stated, the share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only that
taking of Esguerras truck without proceeding to the which corresponds to his grantors share in the
sale of the same at public auction, but instead, property owned in common.
appropriating the same in payment of Esguerras
indebtedness, is not lawful. As clearly stated in the 2)No. In the light of the foregoing, petitioners
chattel mortgage contract, the express purpose of defense of prescription against an action for
the taking of the mortgaged property is to sell the partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article
same and/ or foreclose the mortgage constituted 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall be obliged
thereon either judicially or extrajudicially and to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
thereby, liquidate the indebtedness in accordance demand at anytime the partition of the thing
with law. owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned. In Budlong vs. Bondoc, this Court has
A stipulation in a contract of sale regarding interpreted said provision of law to mean that the
automatic appropriation amounts to pactum action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be
commissorium, and is therefore null and void. More barred by prescription.
than that, even if such automatic appropriation of
the cargo truck in question can be inferred from or 6. Ancog v. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 676)
be contemplated under the aforesaid mortgage
contract, such stipulation would be pactum Facts: The land, with improvements thereon, was
commissorium which is expressly prohibited by formerly the conjugal property of spouses Gregorio
Article 2088 of the Civil Code and therefore, null Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio died,
and void. The three remedies of the vendor in case leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario, and
the vendee defaults under Art. 1484 are alternative children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and
and cannot be exercised simultaneously or Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad
cumulatively by the vendor creditor. Having opted Yap as his heirs. Thereafter, Rosario obtained loans
to foreclose the chattel mortgage, respondent from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage
GAMI can no longer cancel the sale. The three on the disputed land, which was annotated on its
remedies of the vendor in case the vendee OCT.
defaults, in a contract of sale of personal property
the price of which is payable in installment under When Rosario applied again for a loan, offering the
Article 1484 of the Civil Code, are alternative and land as security, the banks lawyer, Atty. Serna,
cannot be exercised simultaneously or cumulatively suggested that she submit an extrajudicial
by the vendor-creditor. In Cruz vs. Filipinas settlement covering the disputed land as a means
Investment and Finance Corporation (23 SCRA 791, of facilitating the approval of her application. The
[1968]), the Supreme Court construing Article 1484 suggestion was accepted. The extrajudicial
of the Civil Code, held: Should the vendee or settlement, which was prepared by Atty. Serna, was
purchaser of a personal property default in the signed by the heirs, with the exception of Gregorio,
payment of two or more of the agreed installments, Jr., then only a minor. After the document was
the vendor or seller has the option to avail of any notarized, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was
one of these three. issued. Upon the execution of a real estate
mortgage on the land, the loan was approved by
5. G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999 the bank. Rosario exercised rights of ownership over
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF the land. She brought an ejectment suit against
APPEALS Jovitas husband and son to evict them from the
ground floor of the house built on the land for failure
Facts: Private Respondents De Castro filed an to pay rent.
action for partition over a parcel of land which was
sold, without their knowledge, by their brother Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario had
Mariano in favor of Petitioner Tomas Claudio offered the land for sale. She informed her younger
Memorial College. It is the contention of the private brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed an action for
respondent De Castros that Mariano was only able partition. As Caridad was unwilling to join in the
to sell his undivided share on the lot in question but action for partition against their mother, she was
not the other co-owners equivalent to four-fifths impleaded as a defendant. Petitioners alleged that
(4/5) of the property. Mariano, on the other hand, the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and
raises the defense of prescription/laches. therefore void. They claimed that in signing the
instrument, they did not really intend to convey their
Issues: 1) Did the sale by Mariano effectively interests in the property to their mother, but only to
include the entire land? enable her to obtain the loan on the security of the
2) Was the action for partition filed by the siblings of land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees
Mariano barred by prescription? and for household repairs.
Held: Issues:
Page 23 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner. conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto in the
Thus, the mere fact that respondent was not co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may be
impleaded as a party in Civil Case No. CEB-22825 is considered adverse to strangers may not be
not in itself indicative of extrinsic fraud. If a seller/co- considered adverse in so far as co-owners are
owner is not treated as an indispensable party, how concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner,
much more is a third person who merely alleged his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from the
that his lots are affected thereby? Truly, the property, the erection of buildings and fences and
exclusion of respondent (or other alleged planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land
subdivision lot owners who are equally affected) taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership,
from the legal redemption case does not entitle him if it is not borne out by clear and convincing
to the right to ask for the annulment of the evidence that he exercised such acts of possession
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules, because he which unequivocally constituted an ouster or
does not even have any legal standing to deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
participate or intervene therein. WHEREFORE
premises considered, the instant Petition is Thus, in order that a co-owners possession may be
GRANTED. deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the other
co-owners, the following elements must concur:
8. AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004 repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or the other co-owners;
FACTS:Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
owned a piece of land. After the death of Emilia, known to the cestui que trust or the other co-
Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When owners; and
Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should convincing.
manage and administer the said property. After
Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed Tested against these guidelines, the respondents
an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he failed to present competent evidence that the acts
falsely stated that he was the only heir of Leocadio. of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiate the existing
co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio
It turned out that while Sixto were still alive, he sold a Medrano. Respondents reliance on the tax
portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is
another portion to Maria Bacong, Maria Bacong unworthy of credit since we have held on several
later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. occasions that tax declarations by themselves do
Petitioners, all heirs of Leocadio who were affected not conclusively prove title to land. Further,
by the sale demanded reconveyance of the respondents failed to show that the Affidavit
portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole
Resultantly, petitioners filed a suit against them owner of the subject property was known or made
seeking the nullity of the documents and partition known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
thereof. The vendees contended that they
acquired the property under the valid deed of sale 9. PNB VS. JOSE GARCIA ET. AL.
and petitioners cause of action was barred by
laches and prescription. Tiburcio also contended Facts: Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent
that he is an innocent purchaser for value. of his children executed SPAs authorizing spouses
Garcia to convey a property covered with TCT No.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid sale T-44422 to secure a loan from PNB by way of
between Sixto Medrano and the three purchases mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate
considering the fact that it was made without the Mortgage in favor of PNB which were inscribed in
consent of the co-owners. the title.
HELD: Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the
sale by a co-owner of the whole property as his will said amendment against spouses Garcia and PNB
affect only his own share but not those of the other alleging that the property was conjugal, being
co-owners who did not consent to the sale). The acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya
provision clearly provides that the sale or other and they became owners pro indivisio upon the
disposition affects only the sellers share, and the death of Ligaya on 1987.
transferee gets only what corresponds to his
grantors share in the partition of the property PNB contends that the subject property was
owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property in the as a widower.
by one co-owner without the consent of the other
co-owner is not null and void; only the rights of the During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and
co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
buyer a co-owner of the property. authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during
the pretrial of the case.
It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed
by Sixto in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid
Page 25 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal complaint impleading the bank as additional party
or was acquired during marriage or thereafter. defendant. The court issued an order rejecting the
amended complaint of the petitioners.
Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with
Article 160 applies. All properties acquired during Likewise, the court dismissed the complaint and
marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in held that pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code, a
the name of one spouse does not destroy the co-owner is not invalidated by the absence of the
presumption that it is conjugal. What is material is consent of the co-owners. Hence, the sale by
the time when the property was acquired. Esperanza of the property was valid; the excess
from her undivided share should be taken from the
The conjugal partnership was converted into an undivided shares of Criseta and Antonio, who
implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of expressly agreed to and benefited from the sale.
Ligaya thus governed by Article 493 of Civil Code. The CA likewise held that the sale was valid and
The effect of the mortgage with respect to the co- binding insofar as Esperanza's undivided share of
owners shall be limited to the portion which may be the property was concerned. It affirmed the RTC
allotted to him in the division upon the termination ruling that the lack of consent of the co-owners did
of the co-ownership. Thus, Jose Sr. cannot not nullify the sale.
mortgage the entire property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale
10. MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. CA and JOSE was valid. - Deed of Absolute Sale was merely
B. ABEJO (see previous case digest) relatively simulated, it remains valid and
enforceable.
11. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES BALITE VS. LIM
HELD: Validity of the Sale We have before us an
FACTS: Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite were example of a simulated contract. Article 1345 of the
the owners of a parcel of land. When Aurelio died Civil Code provides that the simulation of a
intestate, his wife Esperanza and their children contract may either be absolute or relative. In
inherited the subject property and became co- absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract
owners thereof. Esperanza became ill and was in but without any substance, because the parties
dire need of money for her hospital expenses. She, have no intention to be bound by it. An absolutely
through her daughter, Criseta, offered to sell to simulated contract is void, and the parties may
Rodrigo Lim, her undivided share for the price of P1 recover from each other what they may have
mil. Esperanza and Rodrigo agreed that under the given under the contract.
Deed of Absolute Sale, it will be made to appear
that the purchase price of the property was On the other hand, if the parties state a false cause
P150,000 although the actual price agreed upon by in the contract to conceal their real agreement,
them for the property was P1mil. such a contract is relatively simulated. Here, the
parties real agreement binds them. In the present
On April 16, 1996, Esperanza executed a Deed of case, the parties intended to be bound by the
Absolute Sale in favor of Rodrigo. They also Contract, even if it did not reflect the actual
executed on the same day a Joint Affidavit under purchase price of the property. That the parties
which they declared that the real price of the intended the agreement to produce legal effect is
property was P1mil. payable to Esperanza by revealed by the letter of Esperanza Balite to
installments. Only Esperanza and two of her children respondent dated October 23, 1996 and petitioners
Antonio and Criseta knew about the said admission that there was a partial payment of
transaction. When the rest of the children knew of P320,000 made on the basis of the Deed of
the sale, they wrote to the Register of Deeds saying Absolute Sale. There was an intention to transfer the
that their mother did not inform them of the sale of ownership of over 10,000 square meters of the
a portion of the said property nor did they give property .
consent thereto. Nonetheless, Rodrigo made partial
payments to Antonio who is authorized by his Clear from the letter is the fact that the objections
mother through a Special Power of Attorney. of her children prompted Esperanza to unilaterally
Esperanza signed a letter addressed to Rodrigo withdraw from the transaction. Since the Deed of
informing the latter that her children did not agree Absolute Sale was merely relatively simulated, it
to the sale of the property to him and that she was remains valid and enforceable. All the essential
withdrawing all her commitments until the validity of requisites prescribed by law for the validity and
the sale is finally resolved. perfection of contracts are present. However, the
Then Esperanza died intestate and was survived by parties shall be bound by their real agreement for a
her children. Meanwhile, Rodrigo caused to be consideration of P1,000,000 as reflected in their
published the Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners Joint Affidavit. Deed of Sale not an Equitable
filed a complaint against Rodrigo for the annulment Mortgage For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two
of sale, quieting of title, injunction and damages. requisites must concur: one, the parties entered into
Rodrigo secured a loan from the Rizal commercial a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and,
Banking Corporation in the amount of P2mil and two, their intention was to secure an existing debt
executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the property by way of mortgage. In the present case, however,
as security thereof. On motion of the petitioners, the Contract does not merely purport to be an
they were granted leave to file an amended absolute sale. The records and the documentary
Page 26 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
evidence introduced by the parties indubitably defines it as the manifestation of the private right of
show that the Contract is, indeed, one of absolute ownership, which instead of being exercised by the
sale. There is no clear and convincing evidence owner in an exclusive manner over the things
that the parties agreed upon a mortgage of the subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners
subject property. and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is
one and the same.
Furthermore, the voluntary, written and
unconditional acceptance of contractual Co-ownership; characteristics The characteristics of
commitments negates the theory of equitable co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are
mortgage. There is nothing doubtful about the the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision,
terms of, or the circumstances surrounding, the which means that there is a single object which is
Deed of Sale that would call for the application of not materially divided, and which is the element
Article 1602. The Joint Affidavit indisputably which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of
confirmed that the transaction between the parties ideal shares, which determines the rights and
was a sale. We find no basis to conclude that the obligations of the co-owners.
purchase price of the property was grossly
inadequate. Petitioners did not present any witness Co-ownership; relationship In co-ownership, the
to testify as to the market values of real estate in the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-
subjects locale. They made their claim on the basis owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
alone of the P2,000,000 loan that respondent had Whether established by law or by agreement of the
been able to obtain from the Rizal Commercial co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
Banking Corporation. This move did not sufficiently impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-
show the alleged inadequacy of the purchase owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-
price. A mortgage is a mere security for a loan. owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to
There was no showing that the property was the the interest of his co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of
only security relied upon by the bank; or that the an agreement to preserve the properties in co-
borrowers had no credit worthiness, other than the ownership is to create an express trust among the
property offered as collateral. Co-Ownership The heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership
appellate court was correct in affirming the validity is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for
of the sale of the property insofar as the pro indiviso the others.
share of Esperanza Balite was concerned. Article
493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an FACTS: Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-
undivided interest in the property the right to freely square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The
sell and dispose of such interest. The co-owner, lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the
however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to
determinate part of the thing owned in common, Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor
because such right over the thing is represented by Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez,
an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos,
division. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the deed and Felipe Sanchez.
purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per
se render the sale void. On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under
TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent
The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995
is subject to the results of the partition upon the by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez
termination of the co-ownership. Hence, the claimed that she did not affix her signature on the
transaction between Esperanza Balite and document and subsequently refused to vacate the
respondent could be legally recognized only in lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for
respect to the formers pro indiviso share in the co- recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the
ownership. As a matter of fact, the Deed of MeTC.
Absolute Sale executed between the parties
expressly referred to the 10,000-square-meter MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the
portion of the land sold to respondent as the share sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot
of Esperanza in the conjugal property. Her clear and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of
intention was to sell merely her ideal or undivided petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed
share in it. No valid objection can be made against of Absolute Sale having been established as a
that intent. Clearly then, the sale can be given forgery.
effect to the extent of 9,751 square meters, her
ideal share in the property as found by both the trial RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed
and the appellate courts. to submit their pleadings.
12. LILIA SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for
the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
Co-ownership; nature Sanchez Roman defines co- private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4
ownership as the right of common dominion which November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate
two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who
thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa however refused to heed the Notice. On 28 April
Page 27 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
1999 private respondent started demolishing attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
petitioners house without any special permit of favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of
demolition from the court. Due to the demolition of any showing that the review sought is merely
her house which continued until 24 May 1999 frivolous and
petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
premises that used to serve as the houses toilet and prejudiced thereby.
laundry area. On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed
her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: WON Lilia Sanchez has a right to
on the ground the property.
that she was not bound by the inaction of her
counsel who failed to submit petitioners appeal RULING: Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as
memorandum. the right of common dominion which two or more
persons havein a spiritual part of a thing, not
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. as the manifestation of the private right of
CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for ownership, which instead of being exercised by the
lack of merit. owner in an exclusive manner over the
thingssubject to it, is exercised by two or more
PROCEDUARAL ISSUE: WON Certiorari under Rule 65 owners and the undivided thing or right to which it
is the proper remedy. refers is one and thesame.
RULING: As a matter of policy, the original The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality
jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or
extraordinary writs should generally be exercised material indivision, which means that there is a
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court single object which is not materially divided, and
of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals which is the element which binds the subjects, and,
or agencies the acts of which for some reason or (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which
other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. determines the rights and obligations of the co-
Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also owners.
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or
the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner
that the specific action for the procurement of the to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
writ must be presented. However, this Court must be attribute. Whether established by law or by
convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing
before it gives due course to a certiorari petition held proindiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature
under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has benefit of his coowners and he may not do any act
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve
law. the properties in co-ownership is to create an
express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every
we are giving due course to this petition as there co-owner is a trustee for the others. Before the
are matters that require immediate resolution on partition of a land or thing held in common, no
the merits to effect substantial justice. The Rules of individual or co-owner can claim title to any
Court should be liberally construed in order to definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is
promote their object of securing a just, speedy and an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in
inexpensive disposition of every action or the entire land or thing.
proceeding. The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an
the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of undivided interest in the property the right to freely
the cases before them. Liberal construction of the sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He
rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to may validly lease his undivided interest to a third
effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as much party independently of the other co-owners. But he
as possible, be decided on their merits and not on has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific
mere technicalities. or determinate part of the thing owned in common
Xxxx because his right over the thing is represented by a
quota or ideal portion without any physical
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property adjudication.
which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of
the most mandatory character and an examination Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of
and review by the appellate court of the lower the property, the metes and bounds of petitioners
courts findings of fact, the other elements that lot has not been designated. As she was not a party
should be considered are the following: (a) the to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered
existence of special or compelling circumstances, into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the
(b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely property must be respected. Partition needs to be
Page 28 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
effected to protect her right to her definite share The deed contains the statement "that by virtue
and determine the boundaries of her property. hereof, the said Andrea Budlong is hereby vested
Such partition must be done without prejudice to with full ownership and property of the lot in
the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as question." It was acknowledged before Genaro
buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute. Visarra the mayor of Tagbilaran, an ex oficio notary.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Remanded to the MeTC Two years after the execution of the donation, or on
for partition. October 27, 1936, Original Certificate of Title No.
4718 was issued for the said lot. The title shows that
ARTICLE 494 the lot is owned by the following co-owners:
Crispina Pondoc 113; Isabela Pondoc 1/3; Francisco
1. BALO vs. CA Garrote 1/6, and Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.
G.R. No. 129704 September 30, 2005
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without
Doctrine: An action for partition is at once an any descendants in 1935 and 1937, respectively.
action for declaration of co-ownership and for Francisco Garrote an alleged brother of Isabela
segregation and conveyance of a determine Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc left Bohol thirty years
portion of the properties involved. before 1966 and had never returned to that
province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc died and was
Facts: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real survived by her five children named Juan, Fabio,
Properties and Accounting with Damages, was filed Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed
by private respondent Josefina Garrido against Pondoc y Garrote
petitioners Ulpiano Balo, Lydia Balo-Lumpas,
Eugenio Balo, Ulpiano Balo, Jr., Nida Balo-Moraleta, Presumably, Andrea Budlong has been in
Nora Balo-Catano, Zaida Balo, Judith Balo- possession of the lot. She declared it for tax
Mandreza, Danilo Balo and Ronilo Balo, alleging purposes in her name. She paid the realty taxes
that she (private respondent) and petitioners are thereon from 1936 to 1966. She planted the lot to
the co-owners of undivided parcels of land located coconuts, bamboos, bananas and a mango tree.
at Mayorga, Leyte.
Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed of
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR JUDICIAL donation. The register of deeds in a letter dated
PARTITION AND ACCOUNTING HAS PRESCRIBED, April 1, 1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the
WAS WAIVED, OR WAS OTHERWISE ABANDONED owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718. He did not
comply with that request.
Held: No. It is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss
filed by the petitioners did not ipso facto establish On May 11, 1965 Andrea Budlong filed in the Court
prescription. Dismissal prior to answer is premature. of First instance of Bohol an action for the partition
An action for partition is at once an action for of the said lot. She retarded the action against
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation Francisco Garrote and the five children of Isabel
and conveyance of a determine portion of the Garrote-Pondoc Francisco was summoned by
properties involved. If the defendant asserts publication. He was declared in default.
exclusive title over the property, the action for
partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable grounds that Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches
to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the and that the registration of the lot extinguished her
court should dismiss the action, not because the rights under the deed of donation. It opined that
wrong remedy was availed of, but because no she could not ask for the partition of the lot
basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to because she does not appear as a co-owner in the
partition. If, on the other hand, the court after trial title thereof.
should find the existence of co-ownership among
the parties, the court may and should order the From that adverse decision, Andrea appealed to
partition of the properties in the same action. this Court. The trial court correctly held that the
donation is valid. Defendants-appellees' belated
2. Budlong vs. Pondoc contention on appeal that the donation is mortis
causa (they did not raise that issue in their answer or
Facts: This is an action for the partition of Lot No. in the lower court) is wrong. There is not the slightest
5447, with an area of 12,524 square meters, situated indication in the deed that the donation would
at Barrio Ubujan Tagbilaran City, Bohol, at six take effect upon the donors' death. It is indisputably
hundred pesos in 1965. an inter vivos donation.
On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and In the deed it is expressly stipulated that the
Crispina Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a ownership over the two-thirds proindiviso share of
notarial instrument their two-thirds share in the said the donors in Lot No. 5447 was transferred to the
lot in consideration of the donee's personal services donee. That notarial deed amounted to a transfer
to the donors. Andrea accepted the donation in of the ownership.
the same instrument.
Page 29 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Issue:Whether or not the done ceased to be a co-owner In conclusion, we hold that the 1934 donation
because her name does not appear in the certificate of title should be given effect. It was confirmed by plaintiff-
appellant's ion of the donated lot, her
Held: Yes. We rind the appeal to be meritorious. The improvements thereon, her enjoyment of the fruits
trial court erred in assuming that the donee ceased thereof, and her payment of the realty taxes dues
to be a co-owner thereon for the years 1936 to 1966.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 that registered land, and 3. Epitacio de Lima vs. CA
ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to
the same burdens and incidents attached by law Facts: During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot
to unregistered land", and that nothing in Act No. No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate
496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the in Cebu by sale on installments from the
laws of descent, or the rights of partition between government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving
coparceners joint tenants and other cotenants " "or as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely:
to change or affect in any other way any other Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and
rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the
unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in
provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof". the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima,
deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now
substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit
1. Registered land is subject to the same of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this
legal burdens and incidents as unregistered affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No.
land and, therefore, fake unregistered land, 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of
it is subject to attachment and execution for Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other
the payment of debts. The rights and heirs.
liabilities which are created by law and are
made applicable to unregistered land, are Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for
applicable to registered land, except as taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from
otherwise provided in Act No. 496. 1954 to 1965.
2. The rights arising from the relation of
husband and wife are applicable to On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the
registered lands. surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action
of any description established by law on for reconveyance and/or partition of property and
land and the b thereon, or the interest of the for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages
owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente
laws of descent, and (c) to the rights of Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party
partition between coparceners joint defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join
tenants, will other cotenants except as the latter in their action.
otherwise expressly provoked in Act No.
496. On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners.
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-
owner of Lot No. 5447. She became the successor- Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
in-interest of the donors, Isabela Pondoc and
Crispina Pondoc. The fact that in OCT No. 4718, On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court
which was issued subsequent to the donation, the reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the
donors appear to be the co-owners and not claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers
Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the rights and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita
of Andrea as a co-owner. and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived
their rights to the property in his favor, considering
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining
unmistakably provides that the conversion of balance of the purchase price of the lot and the
unregistered land into registered land does not realty taxes thereon
affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal
rights and liabilities applicable to unregistered land. Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
The trial court erred in applying to this case section
38 of Act No. 496 regarding review of the decree of 1) In not holding that the right of a co-
registration on the ground of fraud. This is not a case heir to demand partition of inheritance is
of fraudulent registration. Nor is this a case where imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of
the rule on laches is applicable Moreover, the prescription and laches have already
defendants waived that defense because they did been waived.
not invoke it in their answer
2) 2) In disregarding the evidence of
the petitioners.
Page 30 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
Appeals a special civil action However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a) transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner
the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take of the property. The proper action in a case like this,
cognizance of the case as the causes of actions is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the
have been decided with finality by the Supreme recovery of possession of the property owned in
Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of common from the third person, but for division or
discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the partition of the entire property if it continued to
case. remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it. 9Such partition
Court of Appeals, finding no grave abuse of should result in segregating the portion belonging to
discretion committed by the lower court, dismissed the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
the petition. Petitioner filed a timely motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of
prescription against an action for partition is a vain
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in
Held: There is no showing of grave abuse of common, insofar as his share is concerned."
discretion committed by the public respondent. As In Budlong vs. Bondoc, 10 this Court has interpreted
correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took said provision of law to mean that the action for
cognizance of the action for partition filed by the partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by
private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code
subject matter of the case. 3 Jurisdiction over the explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
determined by the allegations of the complaint impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all
or some of the claims asserted therein. 4 Acquiring 5. Arturo Trinidad vs. CA
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does
not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to Facts: On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein
reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of
land registration case mentioned by the petitioner. Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four
(4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one
the court over the subject matter is determined by of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was
the allegations of the complaint, hence the court's the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of
defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes
dismiss. 5 This has to be so, for were the principle and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal
making the sufficiency of this kind of action shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual
dependent upon the defendant in all cases. share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978,
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the
question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended
was petitioner who elevated the instant controversy that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941,
to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that
In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the
of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief parcels of land described in the complaint had
therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a been in their possession since the death of their
court, he cannot thereafter challenge that court's father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff
jurisdiction in the same case. 7 To do otherwise a share in the produce of the land.
would amount to speculating on the fortune of
litigation, which is against the policy of the Court. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the
parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940,
even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, survived by the above named children, he left four
the sale will affect only his own share but not those (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon,
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the Kalibo Aklan.
sale. 8 Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale
or other disposition affects only the seller's share pro Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to
indiviso, and the transferee gets only what be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of
the property owned in common. Since a co-owner Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at
is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the
entire property by one co-owner without the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants
Page 32 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
that the above-mentioned parcels of land be Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court
partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he committed reversible error in holding that
be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-
late father, but defendants refused. barred.
Respondent Court sustain the appeal on the 6. Consolacion Austria vs. Lichauco
ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient
evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Facts: Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco,
Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim Consuelo Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos
legitimacy has not prescribed. and Antonio Quintos, and defendant-appellant
Consolacion Austria are siblings of full blood. Jose
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone, all
as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of
the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public the defendant-appellant.
document or a private handwritten instrument, or
that he was in continuous possession of the status of The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2)
a legitimate child. parcels of land with an aggregate area of six
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad hundred sixty one (661) square meters located in
Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Palanan, Makati City. The aforesaid parcels of land
Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One have permanent improvements thereon which
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the straddle both lots, namely, a residential bungalow
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad and two (2) units, two-storey apartments, the titles
Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, of which are registered jointly in the names of the
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church parties as co-owners thereof.
and that she attended the wedding
ceremony. Hence, there was no preponderant The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the
evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes' early part of 1996, they informed defendant-
acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was appellant of their desire to have the subject
born on July 21, 1943. properties partitioned based on the percentage of
each co-owners respective share.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe.
Where one of the interested parties openly and A realtor was even engaged to prepare the
adversely occupies the property without schemes by which the subject properties could be
recognizing the co-ownership, Acquisitive physically partitioned among the co-owners.
prescription may set in. However, the defendant-appellant Austria refused
to accede to any of the schemes presented by the
Issue: Whether or not of private respondent realtor for the physical apportionment of the
(defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership subject properties between the co-owners thereof.
of the properties in question by acquisitive Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant
prescription. Austria to partition the property, and the inability of
the co-owners to mutually agree on an
Held: Private respondents have not acquired arrangement acceptable to all of them, on July 1,
ownership of the property in question by acquisitive 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against the
benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former defendant-appellant Austria and two other
repudiates the co-ownership.43 Thus, no prescription defendants namely Benedicto Quintos and Antonio
runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or Quintos for partition of the subject property.
her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Within the period for filing an answer, the
defendant-appellant Austria filed an Omnibus
It is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, Motion to Dismiss.
petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was
receiving from private respondents his share of the The lower court denied the omnibus motion to
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, dismiss of the defendant-appellant Austria, and
recognition of the co-ownership by private directed the defendants to file their answer within
respondents was beyond question. There is no the remaining period provided by the Rules.
evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the
co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over Within the prescriptive period, the defendant-
the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land appellant Austria filed a Motion for
were still in their father's name. Although private Reconsideration of the November 10, 1997 order,
respondents had possessed these parcels openly which the lower court denied in an order dated
since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the February 2, 1998.
produce of the land during the pendency of this Not satisfied, the defendant-appellant Austria filed
case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co- before the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari
ownership. and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Page 33 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
On November 9, 1998, the defendant-appellant Issue: Whether or not the trial courts decision is
Austria received a copy of the Decision dated valid in alternatively ordering the partition of the
October 30, 1998 dismissing her petition for certiorari subject property or authorizing its sale to a third
and prohibition. The defendant-appellant Austria party.
moved for the reconsideration thereof.
Held: There is no question that a co-ownership exists
Subsequently, on July 19, 2001, defendant- between petitioner and respondents. To this extent,
appellant Austria received a copy of the Resolution the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in
of the Court of Appeals dated July 9, 2001, denying line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner
her motion for reconsideration of the decision shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
denying her petition for certiorari and prohibition.
There are two stages in every action for partition.
Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then The first phase is the determination of whether a co-
filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the ownership in fact exists and a partition is
Revised Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the parties interested in the property. This phase may
Supreme Court denied the said petition for review end either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not
for non-compliance with the 1997 Rules of Civil entitled to have a partition either because a co-
Procedure for failure to pay on time docket and ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec. 3, prohibited; or (b) with a determination that a co-
Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56. ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises, and an accounting of rents and
Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the profits received by the defendant from the real
defendant-appellant Austria filed a motion for estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the
reconsideration of the resolution dated October 15, parties may, if they are able to agree, make
2001 denying her petition for review. partition among themselves by proper instruments
of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
In its resolution dated January 24, 2002, the partition so agreed upon.
Supreme Court denied with finality the petitioners
motion for reconsideration. The second phase commences when it appears
that the parties are unable to agree upon the
The lower court in its order dated July 6, 1999 partition directed by the court. In that event,
declared the defendants in default, set the partition shall be done for the parties by the court
reception of ex-parte evidence, and commissioned with the assistance of not more than three (3)
the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the ex- commissioners. This second stage may well also
parte evidence and to submit her corresponding deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
report thereon as soon as the same is concluded. its approval by the court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon,
On August 4, 1999, the defendant-appellant Austria and an award for the recovery by the party or
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents
dated July 6, 1999 with an urgent prayer to cancel and profits of the real estate in question.
plaintiffs ex parte presentation of evidence on
August 9, 1999, which was however denied by the The proceedings in this case have only reached the
lower court, for lack of merit, in an order dated first phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that
January 14, 2000. even if the order decreeing partition leaves
something more to be done by the trial court for
The plaintiffs-appellees then presented their the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the
evidence ex-parte on January 28, 2000. appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for
the determination of just compensation by the
The assailed decision was subsequently rendered appointed commissioners, the submission of their
by the lower court on February 14, 2000, finding in reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of
favor of the plaintiffs-appellees. the partition, it is considered a final order and may
be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.
A motion for new trial was thereafter filed by the
defendant-appellant Austria, which was, in an However, the trial court went astray when it also
order dated August 7, 2000, denied for lack of authorized the sale of the subject properties to a
merit. third party and the division of the proceeds thereof.
What makes this portion of the decision all the more
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of objectionable is the fact that the trial court
Appeals which dismissed her petition and affirmed conditioned the sale upon the price and terms
the trial courts decision but deleted the order that acceptable to plaintiffs (respondents herein) only,
petitioner pay reasonable rental for her use of a and adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again
portion of the disputed properties. The appellate only to plaintiffs.
court denied reconsideration.
It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on
appeal resulting in the appellate courts failure to
Page 34 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
rule on the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simply Espiritu and, in turn, she gaveJuan Cabrera the
brush this issue aside considering that its resolution is receipts issued to her by Henry Ysaac.
necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the
case.17 The rectification of the trial courts decision On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the
is accordingly in order. balance of the purchase price to Henry Ysaac.
However,at that time, Henry Ysaac was in the
7. Cabrera vs Ysaac United States. The only person in Henry Ysaacs
residence was his wife. The wife refused to accept
Facts: Unless all the co-owners have agreed to Juan Cabreras payment.
partition their property, none of them may sell a
definite portion of the land. The co-owner may only Issue: Whether or not there was a valid contract of
sell his or her proportionate interest in the co- sale between petitioner and respondent.
ownership. A contract of sale which purports to sell
a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is Held: We find that there was no contract of sale. It
null and void ab initio. was null ab initio.
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 Juan P. As defined by the Civil Code, [a] contract is a
Cabrera assails the Court of Appeals' decision meeting of minds between two persons whereby
dated June 19, 20032and resolution dated January one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
3, 2005.3 These decisions ruled that a specific something or to render some service.
performance to execute a deed of sale over a For there to be a valid contract, there must be
parcel of land is not available as a relief for Juan consent of the contracting parties, an object
Cabrera. certain which is the subject matter of the contract,
and cause of the obligation which is established.
It appears that the heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac
co-owned a 5,517-square-meter parcel of land Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates
located in Sabang, Naga City, covered by Original himself to deliver a determinate thing and to
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 506.4 One of the co- transfer its ownership to the buyer. In turn, the buyer
owners is respondent, Henry Ysaac. pays for a price certain in money or its
equivalent.77 A contract of sale is perfected at
the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to thing which is the object of the contract and upon
several lessees. Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, the price.78 The seller and buyer must agree as to
leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land the certain thing that will be subject of the sale as
beginning in 1986. well as the price in which the thing will be sold. The
thing to be sold is the object of the contract, while
On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and the price is the cause or consideration.
offered to sell the 95-square-meter piece of land to
Juan Cabrera.6 He told Henry Ysaac that the land The object of the sales contract between petitioner
was too small for his needs because there was no and respondent was a definite portion of a co-
parking space for his vehicle. owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged
sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire
In order to address Juan Cabreras concerns, Henry property was still held in common. This is evidenced
Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two by the original certificate of title, which was under
adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing the names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter
to the Borbe family and the Espiritu family. Those Ysaac, respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac,
three parcels of land have a combined area of Norma Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac,
439-square-meters. However, Henry Ysaac warned Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda
Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.85
could only proceed if the two families agree to it.
The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided
Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry interest in the coownership.
Ysaac and Juan Cabrera settled on the price of
250.00 per square meter, but Juan Cabrera stated However, this was not the object of the sale
that he could only pay in full after his retirement on between him and petitioner. The object of the sale
June 15, 1992.8 Henry Ysaac agreed but demanded was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent
for an initial payment of 1,500.00, which Juan who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease
Cabrera paid. contract to petitioner, respondent has no right to
sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate
According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed part of the thing owned in common, because his
him that the Borbe family and the Espiritu family right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal
were no longer interested in purchasing the portion without any physical adjudication.
properties they were leasing. On June 9, 1990, Juan
Cabrera paid the amount of 6,100.00.10 Henry ARTICLE 495
Ysaac issued a receipt for this amount. 3,100.00 of
the amount paid was reimbursed to Mamerta 1. Heirs of Juanita Padilla vs. Magdua
Page 35 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Facts: Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of denied the motion for reconsideration and
petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San dismissed the case on the ground of prescription
Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23
March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to
sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of
word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to
regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can
a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo set in. The RTC added that since prescription had
addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to set in to question the transfer of the land under the
find out that Ricardo had declared the land for Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could
himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was also be taken against the deed of sale executed by
then discovered that Juanita had allegedly Ricardos daughters in favor of Dominador.
executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property4 (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June Issue: whether the present action is already barred
1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The by prescription.
records do not show that the land was registered
under the Torrens system. Held: Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground of
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action for prescription. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit
recovery of ownership, possession, partition and executed in 1966 does not conform with the
damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the requirement of sufficient repudiation of co-
sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine ownership by Ricardo against his co-heirs in
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent accordance with Article 494 of the Civil Code.
Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part of
made during the lifetime of Ricardo. public records only because it was kept by the
Provincial Assessors office for real property tax
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through declaration purposes. However, such cannot be
misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his contemplated by law as a record or registration
name without the consent and knowledge of his affecting real properties. Petitioners insist that the
co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966, Affidavit is not an act of appropriation sufficient to
Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. be deemed as constructive notice to an adverse
However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima claim of ownership absent a clear showing that
separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had
Biliran and the house was leased to third parties. knowledge of the Affidavit issued by their mother in
Ricardos favor.
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of
Juanita in the Affidavit is highly questionable Respondent Dominador, on the other hand,
because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a maintains that Juanita, during her lifetime, never
written instrument stating that she would be leaving renounced her signature on the Affidavit or
behind to her children the land which she had interposed objections to Ricardos possession of the
inherited from her parents. land, which was open, absolute and in the concept
of an owner. Dominador contends that the alleged
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground written instrument dated 15 May 1978 executed by
of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value of the Juanita years before she died was only made
land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial known lately and conveys the possibility of being
Court of Tanauan, Leyte. fabricated. Dominador adds that the alleged
highly questionable signature of Juanita on the
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Affidavit was only made an issue after 35 years from
RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the
the amount of 590.00 was less than the amount case in 2001. As a buyer in good faith, Dominador
cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over invokes the defense of acquisitive prescription
the case. against petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC explained that prescription had already set
Petitioners argued that the action was not merely in since the Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966
for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and petitioners filed the present case only on 26
and damages but also for annulment of deed of October 2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No
sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions action could be taken against the deed of sale
beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well made in favor of Dominador without assailing the
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit
had already prescribed.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the
ground of prescription. After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC
incorrectly relied on the Affidavit alone in order to
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC dismiss the case without considering petitioners
reconsidered its previous stand and took evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to
cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely
Page 36 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in
the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the
of sale was not presented as evidence and neither co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had
was it shown that Ricardos daughters had any repudiated the claims of the others, and that they
authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to
In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily run.
concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal
personality to sell the property. However, in the present case, the prescriptive
period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not date petitioners received notice of Ricardos
present any proof to show that Ricardos possession repudiation of their claims to the land. Since
of the land had been open, continuous and petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership
exclusive for more than 30 years in order to establish and possession, partition and damages with the
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.10 Dominador RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years
merely assumed that Ricardo had been in had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the
possession of the land for 30 years based on the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period
Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on required by law in order to be entitled to claim
the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador
for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after
he separated from his wife sometime after 1966 and Further, Dominadors argument that prescription
moved to another place. The records do not began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit
mention, however, whether Ricardo had any was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely
intention to go back to the land or whether relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that
Ricardos family ever lived there. Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more
than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos
the land declared in his name for taxation purposes alleged possession since 1966.
from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until
2001 when the case was filed. Although a tax Further, Dominadors argument that prescription
declaration does not prove ownership, it is began to commence in 1966, after the Affidavit
evidence of claim to possession of the land. was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely
relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more
co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other
cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos
of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear alleged possession since 1966.
repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in
Article 494 of the Civil Code which states: 2. Aguilar vs. CA
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a Facts: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are
co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co- brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children
heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the
the co-ownership. fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers
purchased a house and lot in Paraaque where
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a their father could spend and enjoy his remaining
trustee, in order that a co-owners possession may years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the
be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-
co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was
that he has performed unequivocal acts of one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed
que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive that henceforth their interests in the house and lot
acts of repudiation have been made known to the should be equal, with Senen assuming the
cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the remaining mortgage obligation of the original
evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in
exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the
In the present case, all three requisites have been house together with their father.
met. After Juanitas death in 1989, petitioners
sought for the partition of their mothers land. The Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a
heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of
plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, sale would be executed and the title registered in
notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further
adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, agreed that Senen would take care of their father
Ricardos interest in the land had now become and his needs since Virgilio and his family were
adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after staying in Cebu.
repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land.
Page 37 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate
demanded from private respondent that the latter the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as
vacate the house and that the property be sold rentals2 from January 1975 up to the date of
and proceeds thereof divided among them. decision plus interest from the time the action was
filed.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to
petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January Issue: whether the trial court correctly declared
1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and respondent as in default for his failure to appear at
lot so that they could divide the proceeds between the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present his
them. evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court
correctly rendered the default judgment against
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the respondent.
proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of
two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to Held: We find merit in the petition.
respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the
rentals for the use of the house by respondent after appearance of parties at the pre-trial is
their father died. mandatory.3 A party who fails to appear at a pre-
trial conference may be non-suited or considered
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged as in default.4 In the case at bar, where private
that he had no objection to the sale as long as the respondent and counsel failed to appear at the
best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to
would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be declare respondent in default.5
divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he
was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to
property. postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial
thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre- court, which should take into account two factors in
trial on 26 April 1979. On 20 April 1979. the grant or denial of motions for postponement,
namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and
Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for (b) the merits of the case of movant.
respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial on the
ground that he would be accompanying his wife to In the instant case, the trial court found the reason
Dumaguete City where she would be a principal stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to
sponsor in a wedding. cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's
explanation that he had to go to by boat as early
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany
be without merit, the trial court denied the motion her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April
and directed that the pre-trial should continue as 1979 where she was one of the principal sponsors,
scheduled. cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify
postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial.
on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not
Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in abuse its discretion in denying the postponement
whose favor he executed a special power of for lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a
attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial
Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, would require much more than mere attendance in
declared defendant as in default and ordered a social function.
reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for
On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an postponement three (3) days before the scheduled
omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not
and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date,
denied the motion and plaintiff presented his respondent at least should have personally
evidence. appeared in order not to be declared as in default.
But, since nobody appeared for him, the order of
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default the trial court declaring him as in default and
against defendant, the trial court found him and directing the presentation of petitioner's
plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in evidence ex parte was proper.
equal shares on the basis of their written
agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial
deprived of his participation in the property by court by default, which respondent appellate court
defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the
lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the
continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay parties and the evidence presented ex parte,
partition. petitioner and respondents are co-owners of
subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at
Page 38 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
any time and the other cannot object to such petitioner as the property should have been sold
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall and the proceeds divided equally between them.
be divided equally according to their respective To this extent and from then on, respondent should
interests. be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his
family vacate.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co- 3. Lavaadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand
at any time partition of the thing owned in common Facts: The petitioner, the second wife of the late
insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse
rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the decision promulgated on November 11,
thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them with modification the decision rendered on August
who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her
to (1) when the right to partition the property is right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband
invoked by any of the co-owners but because of in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided husband acquired during the second marriage.
or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the
co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
or assigned the entire property upon proper Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices
reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,8 this at that time when he was living with his first wife,
Court upheld the order of the trial court directing herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
the holding of a public sale of the properties owned (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil
in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code. ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace
of Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and
However, being a co-owner respondent has the later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
right to use the house and lot without paying any Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the 1948.
property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
intended and in a manner not injurious to the seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal,
interest of the other co-owners.9 Each co-owner of Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana
property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
the whole property and may use and enjoy the Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After
same with no other limitation than that he shall not almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA
injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from
being that until a division is made, the respective each other in February 1966 and agreed to
share of each cannot be determined and every separation of property, to which end, they entered
co-owner exercises, together with his co- into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
participants joint ownership over the pro SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
indiviso property, in addition to his use and November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
enjoyment of the separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
same. conjugal partnership of property.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a
court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
and respondent has not refuted the allegation that Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in
he has been preventing the sale of the property by Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
his continued occupancy of the premises, justice date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
and equity demand that respondent and his family time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
vacate the property so that the sale can be SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, together as husband and wife until 1987.
respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per
month, with legal interest; from the time the trial Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law
court ordered him to vacate, for the use and firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
enjoyment of the other half of the property (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing
appertaining to petitioner. partner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY.
of the property and the trial court granted the LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the Condominium Project(condominium unit) at
right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52
Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and square meters, for 1,449,056.00, to be paid on
his family in the house prejudiced the interest of installment basis for 36months starting on April 15,
Page 39 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997.
office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY.
Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in
bearing the following names: our jurisdiction.
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna Issue: What law governed the property relations of
(46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, Soledad?
married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x Held: Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being
x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and bigamous, was void; properties acquired during
17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the their marriage were governed by the rules on co-
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. ownership
Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued
on February 7, 1992 in the following names: The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas
subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground
(38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners
but the same was still registered in common under The Court concurs with the CA.
CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the
interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
established and headed another law firm with Atty. the Civil Codeclearly states:
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
office condominium unit as their office. The said law Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, the country where they were performed, and valid
1997. there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the marriages as determined by Philippine law.
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the contracting a second or subsequent marriage
first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the before the first marriage has been legally dissolved,
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging or before the absent spouse has been declared
to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who presumptively dead by means of a judgment
established his own law firm named Renato G. De rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
la Cruz & Associates. marriage is considered void ab initio.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna
condominium unit as well as the law books, office and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
furniture and equipment became the subject of the being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC. co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the
Civil Code, viz:
The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts ruling that the 24/100 pro- Article 144. When a man and a woman live
indiviso share in the condominium unit is adjudged together as husband and wife, but they are not
to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning,
through his sole industry; that Plaintiff has no right as the property acquired by eitheror both of them
owner or under any other concept over the through their work or industry or their wages and
condominium unit, hence the entry with respect to salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be ownership.(n)
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
Eugenia Zaballero Luna"; carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
Both parties appealed to the CA. became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof
of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
Page 40 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
without sufficient and competent evidence, would 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were
warrant no relief in her favor. issued in respondents name alone.
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two
proved her actual contributions in the purchase of sons.
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of
at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By
contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the then, respondent found a new boyfriend while
loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Jambrich began to live with another woman in
Financing and Banco Filipino Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons
totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate for only two months after the break up.
contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo
of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the
of the units purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The real estate business. He also built and repaired
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich
paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of purchased an engine and some accessories for his
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" boat from petitioner, for which he became
note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make indebted to the latter for about 150,000.00. To pay
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the
Luna could not acquire the properties on his own Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for 250,000, as
due to the meagerness of the income derived from evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
his law practice. Sale/Assignment." On July 26, 1991, when petitioner
6
that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-
much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
only supported by documentary evidence but also transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
by the admission made by the defendant acquire the subject properties for a valuable
Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial consideration. This is the situation in the instant case.
capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in
. is not disputed. the acquisition of the properties. She had no
The only probable and possible reason why her income of her own at that time, nor did she have
name appeared and was included in [the any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and supported by Jambrich.
March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute
sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from
as observed by the Court, she being a scheming acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section
and exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which is
the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of
bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good the 1935 Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of
attitude shown by her to him since he could still very the 1973 Constitution. The capacity to acquire
well provide for everything she needs, he being private land is dependent on the capacity "to
earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private
observed by this Court, the acquisition of these land may be transferred only to individuals or
properties under litigation was at the time when entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
their relationship was still going smoothly and public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations
harmoniously. at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the
reversed the decision of the trial court. fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos
from acquiring or holding title to private lands,
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was except only by way of legal succession or if the
denied acquisition was made by a former natural-born
citizen.
Hence, this petition for review.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land
Issue: Having found that the true buyer of the from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been
Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
the properties in the name of respondent? conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a
Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World
Held: In the instant case, the transfer of land from Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the
Agro-Macro Development Corporation to consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a the flaw in the original transaction is considered
Filipino citizen. While the acquisition and the cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties valid. Applying United Church Board for World
under litigation were void ab initio since they were Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, the viz.:
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a
Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic)
original transaction and the title of the transferee is Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
valid. As the property in dispute is already in the [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to
hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a
would be no more public policy to be protected. foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by
The objective of the constitutional provision to keep plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured
our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. the flaw in the original transaction and the title of
the transferee is valid.
It is settled that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. It is only a means of SC AFFIRM THE RTC. The trial court upheld the sale
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the
the world at large. Certificates of title are not a cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent.
source of right. The mere possession of a title does
not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, 5. G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000
the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO
disputed properties in her name does not FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise FACTS:Spouses Fernandez filed an action for
does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title ejectment against the Tumlos. Said spouses alleged
implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
Page 42 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA,
they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE and
building since 1989, without any payment of any DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA; EUFROSINA
rent. TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs,
namely: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO,
It was agreed that Guillerma Tumlos would pay ROMULO T. ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIO-
P1,600/month while the other defendants promised HADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO
to pay P1,000/month for the rental, which was not TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO
fulfilled by the Tumlos. T. TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T. ZULUETA,
CANDIDO T. TORBELA, FLORENTINA T. TORBELA and
When the Fernandez demanded the payment from PANTALEON T. TORBELA; DOLORES TORBELA
the Tumlos of P84,000 from Toto and Gina Tumlos as TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented
unpaid rentals for 7 years and P143,600.00 from by her heirs, namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO,
Guillerma as unpaid rentals for 7 years, but said CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN; and
demand were unheeded. SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
Then they prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUE-
vacate the property in question and to pay the ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.
P30,000 in attorney's fees.
Guillerma filed an answer to the complaint, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
claiming that she is also the co-owner and co-
vendee of the apartment in question together with G.R. No. 140553
Mario Fernandez, as evidenced by a Contract to LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs.
Sell. MTC promulgated its decision in January 1997. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
Respondent.
Upon appeal to the RTC, Guillerma et al alleged
that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an FACTS:The issue is over a parcel of land inherited by
amorous relationship, and that they bought the the Torbela siblings from their parents.
property as their love nest; that they lived together
in the property with their 2 children and that They executed a deed of absolute quitclaim over
Guillerma administered the property by collecting the property in favor of Dr. Rosario. Four days after,
rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived a TCT was issued in Dr. Rosarios name covering the
her as to the annulment of his marriage. property.
RTC affirmed with the judgment of the MTC. CA Another deed of absolute quitclaim was
reversed the RTC Decision. subsequently executed twelve days after by Dr.
Rosario acknowledging that he only borrowed the
ISSUE:Whether or not that petitioner is the co-owner lot from the Torbela siblings and was already
of the apartment. returning the same. This deed was notarized but not
immediately annotated.
RULING:No. SC rejected the claim that Guillerma
and Mario were the co-owners of the disputed Dr. Rosario used the land as mortgage for a loan he
property. obtain through DBP for P70,000.00. He used the
proceeds of the loan to build a 4 storey building
Under Article 148, proof of actual contribution must which was initially used as a hospital but later
be presented to be deemed as co-owner of the converted into a commercial space. Part was
property acquired during the cohabitation. leased to PT&T and the rest to Rosario s sister who
operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant.
In this case, Guillerma failed to present any
evidence that she had made an actual Dr. Rosario fully paid the loan from DBP and the
contribution to purchase the apartment building. mortgage was cancelled and ratified by a notary
She merely anchors her claim of co-ownership on public. However, Dr. Rosario took another loan from
her cohabitation with Mario Fernandez. No other PNB. He later acquired a third loan from Banco
evidence was presented to validate such claim, Filipino and bought out the loan from PNB
except for the said affidavit/position paper. Her cancelling the mortgage with PNB. Rosario failed to
claim of having administered the property during pay their loan in Banco Filipino and the property
their cohabitation is unsubstantiated, for there is was extra judicially foreclosed.
nothing in the Article 148 of the FC provides that the
administration of the property amounts to the Meanwhile, back in 1965, the Torbela siblings sought
contribution in its acquisition. to register their ownership over the lot and to
perfect their title but couldnt because the title was
6. G.R. No. 140528 December 7, 2011 still with DBP. They showed as proof the deed of
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: absolute quitclaim presented executed by Rosario
EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and children: CLARO, himself. In 1986, they filed a civil case for recovery
MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all of ownership and possession and damages. They
surnamed TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE
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Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
tried to redeem the lot from Banco Filipino but Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title.
failed. TCT was issued to Banco Filipino. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership
The Torbelas claim they have right over the rents of thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is
the building through accession because they are different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the
the land owners. best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides,
the certificate cannot always be considered as
ISSUE(S): W/N The Express Trust created herein was conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance
effectively repudiated of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real
HELD: Yes. There was an express trust between the property may be under co-ownership with persons
Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario. not named in the certificate or that the registrant
may only be a trustee or that other parties may
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance
the title to Lot No. 356-A from their parents, the of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not
Torbela spouses, who, in turn, acquired the same the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence
from the first registered owner of Lot No. 356-A, thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not
Valeriano. be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are
Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of interchangeably used. x x x.[54] (Emphases
Absolute Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which supplied.)
they transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr.
Rosario for the consideration of P9.00. However, the Registration does not vest title; it is merely the
Torbela siblings explained that they only executed evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not
the Deed as an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario give the holder any better title than what he
could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name actually has. Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still
and use said property to secure a loan from DBP, prove herein his acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A,
the proceeds of which would be used for building a apart from his submission of TCT No. 52751 in his
hospital on Lot No. 356-A a claim supported by name.
testimonial and documentary evidence, and borne
out by the sequence of events immediately Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with
following the execution by the Torbela siblings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario
said Deed. On December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, only holds Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela
covering Lot No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr. siblings.
Rosarios name. On December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario
executed his own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of
which he expressly acknowledged that he only property, the legal title to which is vested in
borrowed Lot No. 356-A and was transferring and another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the
conveying the same back to the Torbela siblings for trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of
the consideration of P1.00. On February 21, 1965, Dr. the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may
Rosarios loan in the amount of P70,200.00, secured either be express or implied. An express trust is
by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by created by the intention of the trustor or of the
DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a hospital parties, while an implied trust comes into being by
building started on Lot No. 356-A. operation of law.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive
Among the notable evidence presented by the acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will,
Torbela siblings is the testimony of Atty. Lorenza or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an
Alcantara (Atty. Alcantara), who had no apparent intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the
personal interest in the present case. Atty. Civil Code, [n]o particular words are required for
Alcantara, when she was still a boarder at the the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
house of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr. Rosarios that a trust is clearly intended.[62] It is possible to
mother), was consulted by the Torbela siblings as create a trust without using the word trust or trustee.
regards the extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 356-A.
She also witnessed the execution of the two Deeds Conversely, the mere fact that these words are
of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings and Dr. used does not necessarily indicate an intention to
Rosario. create a trust. The question in each case is whether
the trustor manifested an intention to create the
In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as
issued in his name, to prove his purported title to Lot trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that
No. 356-A. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,[53] the relationship which he intends to create is called
the Court made a clear distinction between title a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
and the certificate of title: characteristics of the relationship which is called a
trust.
The certificate referred to is that document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer In Tamayo v. Callejo,[64] the Court recognized that
Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in
ownership which is represented by that document. the beginning, but the registered owners
Page 44 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
subsequent express acknowledgement in a public plans, Marcos promised him a 4-ha w/c he
document of a previous sale of the property to obtained in 1927.
another party, had the effect of imparting to the
aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust. The certificate was issue in 1918 and stated that
The same situation exists in this case. When Dr. Marcos and Tabifranca each owned . In 1921,
Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his Tabifranca sold the to her step daughter and
name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964, step granddaughter apparently to avoid her son
an implied trust was initially established between from a previous marriage from inheriting it.
him and the Torbela siblings under Article 1451 of
the Civil Code, which provides: Meanwhile, Tagarao learned of her uncle Claros
obtaining of the 4-ha share w/c prompted her to
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any also claim. Marcos promised to give her her share
person and he causes the legal title to be put in the but instead he sold his to the brother of his son-in-
name of another, a trust is established by law.
implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.
The RTC ordered delivery of the and annulled the
Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute sales.
Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing his
express admission that he only borrowed Lot No. Issues:
356-A from the Torbela siblings, eventually a. Whether or not the sale valid - VOID
transformed the nature of the trust to an express b. Whether or not plaintiffs entitled to relief - NO
one. The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario
stating in his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim that he Held: Void. Resurrecion not entitled.
was already returning Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela
siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained registered in Dr. Ratio:
Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario 1. Sale by Tabiifranca is fictitious. She knew she
kept possession of said property, together with the was not entitled to the land as her spouse has
improvements thereon. acquired it before their marriage. The price is
disproportionate to the value. The buyers are in no
ARTICLE 498 financial position as they are minors.
1. G.R. No. L-40064 December 4, 1934 Sale by Marcos fictitious. Buyer is in no financial
RESURRECCION TAGARAO, BUENAVENTURA position-only as retailer of tuba and fresh fish. This
TAGARAO and SERAFIN TAGARAO, plaintiffs- was alleged to be a mortgage. Interest was not
appellees, vs.MARCOS GARCIA, ET AL., defendants. paid.
MARGARITA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, DOLORES
RUFINO, and ELUETERIO RUFINO, appellants. 2. The 3-year exception under Sec. 42 of Art.
190 not yet elapsed. But Resurrecion is
DOCTRINE: Co-ownership is distinguished from already 24 and the 3-year period has
common-law concept of joint tenancy, in that in prescribed.
the latter, the rights of the co-owners are
inseperable, as if they were one; hence, one may Tagarao cites Velasquez vs. Teodoro w/c held that
not without the consent of the other, dispose of his where defendants interests are joint and
interest, and when one of them dies, the surviving inseparable, the others right is saved by the
co-owner is subrogated to the rights of the disability of another, although the former is not
deceased co-owner immediately upon the death disabled. But SC said that case is N/A because she
of the latter (by mere fact of such death) similar to can dispose of her ownership in common w/o the
what may be termed as an agreement of consent of co-owners.
survivorship.
Every co-owner is the absolute owner of his part
FACTS:Petitioners are the grandchildren of although the effect of disposal is limited to his share
defendant Garcias brother. upon partition. Any of the co-owners also has a
right to partition.
The land is a 31-ha land bought by Ventura and
Marcos Garcia (defendant). Ventura has two The statute of limitations protects the diligent and
children: Merced and Claro. Plaintiffs are the vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his right.
children of Merced.
She did nothing to protect her rights in 1915 (death
Plaintiffs parents died in 1914. This action for of mother). After this, Marcos possession was in
delivery of of the land was brought in 1928. Their concept of an owner w/c ripened after 10 years of
ages were: Resurrecion 24, Serafin 23, continued possession
Buenaventura 18.
Dispositive: Only 2/12 ordered transferred.
After the death of his brother Merced, Marcos
claimed the land in a cadastral case and alleged 2. G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990
that he purchased it in 1904 with his 2nd wife MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and
Tabifranca. To prevent Claro from frustrating his SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs.
Page 45 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Finding merit in the request, and for the purpose of
Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV, determining the applicability of Article 498 of the
SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an
Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA order dated February 4, 1981 which directed the
FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents. parties to signify whether or not they agree to the
scheme of allotting the subject properties to one of
FACTS:On March 13, 1980, Reyes et. Al. filed with the the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square
CFI a complaint for injunction and damages, meter, or whether or not they know of a third party
seeking to enjoin Socorro Marquez Vda. De who is able and willing to buy the subject properties
Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. at terms and conditions more favorable than that
Zaballero from selling to a third party their pro- offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The
indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels of order contained a series of questions addressed to
registered land located in the province of Cavite, all the parties, who were thereupon required to
with an aggregate area of about 96 hectares. submit their answers thereto.
Reyes claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing
Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential that they were willing to allot their shares in the
right to purchase these shares from private subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de
respondents for a reasonable price. Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter,
and that they did not know of any other party who
Further, Reyes at al asserts: was willing and able to purchase the subject
1. That the subject properties are incapable of properties under more favorable conditions than
physical partition; that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is
grossly excessive; However, instead of submitting their answers to the
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre- queries posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners
emptive right for an amount of not more that filed a motion for clarification as to the true identity
P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the
reasonable value of said properties; subject properties.
4. That the statutory period for exercising their
pre-emptive right was suspended upon the filing of On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge
the complaint; rejected petitioners' motion on the ground that it
was irrelevant.
On the other hand, respondents averred:
1. That the reasonable price of the subject On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an
properties is P12.50 per square meter; order denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled
2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right
lapsed upon their failure to exercise the same within to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-
the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties
of the Philippines; were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge
3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject
claim that the price of P12.50 per square meter is properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil
grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date
the plaintiffs to sell their shares to the VOLCANO of public bidding for the subject properties on April
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS 13, 1981.
CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and
good faith is beyond question, as the same was Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration
admitted by the parties herein; from the above order. Without awaiting resolution
4. That the subject properties consisting of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed
approximately 95 hectares may be physically the present petition for certiorari.
partitioned without difficulty in the manner
suggested by them to plaintiffs, and as graphically ISSUE:
represented in the subdivision plan, which will be a. Whether or not Reyes et, al has claim of a
furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel. pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' pro-indiviso shares - NO
In order to settle once and for all the controversy b. If so, whether of not the public sale of the
between the parties, private respondents filed a subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of
motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting that the New Civil Code is valid - YES
petitioners be required to formally specify which of
the two options under Article 498 of the New Civil HELD:
Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners' The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
shares in the subject properties be sold to private
respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; A. This claim is patently without basis. In this
or that the subject properties be sold to a third jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do
party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. and its not grant to any of the owners of a property held in
proceeds thereof distributed among the parties. common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-
Page 46 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the New Civil
on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. Code.
Article 1620 provides: Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase
redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners private respondents' pro-indiviso shares is null at this
or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the moment.
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. B. Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting
respondent trial judge's order for the holding of a
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the
the right of redemption, they may only do so in provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
proportion to the share they may respectively have
in the thing owned in common. It must be noted that private respondents, in their
answer with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a partition of the subject properties in the event that
co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a the petitioners refused to purchase their pro-indiviso
stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter.
redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is
invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to
are sold to a third party or stranger to the co- purchase the other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares,
ownership. private respondents' counterclaim for the partition
of the subject properties is recognized by law,
But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed specifically Article 494 of the New Civil Code which
their complaint for injunction and damages against lays down the general rule that no co-owner is
private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro- obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494
indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. reads as follows:
Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no
application to the case at bar. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention time partition of the thing owned in common,
that private respondents had acknowledged the insofar as his share is concerned.
pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their
shares at a "reasonable price". It cannot be said Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
that private respondents had agreed, without undivided for a certain period of time, not
qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to be extended by a new agreement.
purchase the shares at a price lower than the A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
selling price of private respondents. period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited
private respondents from alienating their pro- by law.
indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a co- No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
owner of a property are clearly specified in Article co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
493 of the New Civil Code, thus: he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full None of the legal exceptions under Article 494
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits applies to the case at bar.
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as
person in its enjoyment, except when personal regards the fact that the subject properties should
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation not be partitioned, and private respondents
of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners continued to manifest their desire to terminate the
shall be limited to the portion which may be co-ownership arrangement between petitioners
allotted to him in the division upon the termination and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within
of the co-ownership. his jurisdiction when he issued his order dated
February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to answer
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, certain questions for the purpose of determining
alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the whether or not the legal conditions for the
property held in common. The law merely provides applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code
that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited only were present in the case.
to the portion of the property which may be allotted Art. 498 provides that:
to him upon termination of the co-ownership and,
as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the
have the right to redeem, within a specified period, co-owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of
the shares which may have been sold to the third them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds distributed.
Page 47 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the For failure of Mario and Guillermo as plaintiffs
subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal (and therein to adduce sufficient evidence to support
Mario Batongbacal for 50.00 per square meter or for their complaint, the RTC, in a Decision dated 24
a total of 187,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement, March 1999, dismissed Civil Case No. 215-M-90 and
Reynaldo received an advance payment of ordered Reynaldo to return to the former the sum of
31,500.00 leaving a balance of 156,000.00. As shown P28,000.00 with 12% annual interest. Reynaldo failed
in the document denominated as Resibo and to convince the court a quo that the contract he
signed by Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties entered into with Mario was an equitable
agreed that the amount of 20,000.00 as part of the mortgage. It was held by the trial court, however,
advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery that the supposed Contract to Sell denominated as
of the Special Power-of-Attorney (SPA), which Resibo is unenforceable under Article 1403 of the
would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject New Civil Code because Reynaldo cannot bind his
property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings co-owners into such contract without an SPA
namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo cannot
balance thereon shall be paid in 10,000.00 monthly be compelled to deliver the subject property but
installments until the purchase price is fully settled. he was nonetheless ordered by the court to return
the amount he received as part of the contract
Page 48 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
price since no one should be allowed to unjustly loan obligation.[18] While there is no single test to
enrich himself at the expense of another. determine whether the deed of absolute sale on its
face is really a simple loan accommodation
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, brushed aside the secured by a mortgage, the Civil Code, however,
claim of equitable mortgage and held that the sale enumerates several instances when a contract is
effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit:
property is valid and enforceable. Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be
an equitable mortgage, in any of the following
According to the appellate court, no SPA is cases:
necessary for Reynaldo's disposition of his undivided (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase
share as it is limited to the portion that may be is unusually inadequate;
allotted to him upon the termination of the co- (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee
ownership. The Batongbacals could have validly or otherwise;
demanded from Reynaldo to deliver the subject (3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to
property pursuant to the Contract to Sell but such repurchase another instrument extending the
option is no longer feasible because the entire period of redemption or granting a new period is
property has already been sold to third persons to executed;
whom a new title was issued. The appellate court (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of
thus proceeded to rescind the contract and the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds
ordered Reynaldo to return the amount he himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
received as consideration thereby restoring the (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred
parties to their situation before entering into the that the real intention of the parties is that the
agreement. transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or
the performance of any other obligation.
In seeking modification of the appellate court's
decision, Mario and Guillermo pointed out that the In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or
title of the subject property has not yet been other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent
transferred to third persons, and thus, Reynaldo can or otherwise shall be considered as interest which
still be compelled to execute a deed of shall be subject to the usury laws.
conveyance over his undivided share of the entire
property. A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo
reveals the utter frailty of petitioners' position
In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the because nothing therein suggests, even remotely,
Motion for Reconsideration of Mario and Guillermo that the subject property was given to secure a
and directed Reynaldo to convey the subject monetary obligation.
property to them.
The terms of the contract set forth in no uncertain
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was terms that the instrument was executed with the
notified of the death of Reynaldo, and his heirs intention of transferring the ownership or the subject
sought to be substituted as party in this case. property to the buyer in exchange for the price.
Nowhere in the deed is it indicated that the transfer
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this was merely intended to secure a debt obligation.
Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
praying that the Court of Appeals Decision and On the contrary, the document clearly indicates
Resolution be reversed on the ground that it was the intent of Reynaldo to sell his share in the
rendered not in accordance with the applicable property. The primary consideration in determining
law and jurisprudence. the true nature of a contract is the intention of the
parties. If the words of a contract appear to
ISSUE: Whether the contract entered into by parties contravene the evident intention of the parties, the
was a Contract to Sell or an equitable mortgage latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not
only from the express terms of their agreement, but
RULING: also from the contemporaneous and subsequent
CONTRACT TO SELL acts of the parties. That the parties intended some
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although other acts or contracts apart from the express terms
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other of the agreement, was not proven by Reynaldo
requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless during the trial or by his heirs herein. Beyond their
reveals the intention of the parties to charge real bare and uncorroborated asseverations that the
property as security for a debt, and contains contract failed to express the true intention of the
nothing impossible or contrary to law. For the parties, the record is bereft of any evidence
presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two indicative that there was an equitable mortgage.
requisites must concur: (1) that the parties entered
into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2) the Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of
intention was to secure an existing debt by way of the price carry the day for the petitioners. It must be
mortgage. Consequently, the non-payment of the underscored at this point that the subject of the
debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to Contract to Sell was limited only to 1/4 pro-indiviso
foreclose the mortgage, sell the property and apply share of Reynaldo consisting an area of 3,750
the proceeds of the sale for the satisfaction of the square meter and not the entire 15,001-square
Page 49 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
meter parcel of land. As a co-owner of the subject in the property held in common is perfectly valid
property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or and binding. In fact, no authority from the other co-
mortgage his ideal share in the property held in owners is necessary for such disposition to be valid
common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law as he is afforded by the law full-ownership of his
is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells out part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
the rights of co-owners over a co-owned property, thereto. A condition set forth in a sale contract
to wit: requiring a co-owner to secure an authority from his
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full co-owners for the alienation of his share, as
ownership of his part and or the fruits and benefits seemingly indicated in this case, should be
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, considered mere surplusage and docs not, in any
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another way, affect the validity or the enforceability of the
person in its enjoyment, except when personal contract. Nor should such a condition indicate an
rights arc involved. But the effect of the alienation intention to sell the whole because the contrary
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, intention has been clearly written:
shall be limited to the portion which may be x x x Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang !.ole
allotted to him m the division upon the termination No. 1, may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa
of the co-ownership. nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan
sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulatang ito.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to
alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles the issue
property even without the consent of his co- regarding the purchase price. A contract of sale is
-owners. This right is absolute and in accordance a consensual contract, which becomes valid and
with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on
full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the the price and the object of the sale. The mere
right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and inadequacy of the price docs not affect its validity
substitute another person for its enjoyment. In other when both parties arc in a position to form an
words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from independent judgment concerning the transaction,
selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share in the unless fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative
property held m common. of a defect in consent is present. A contract may
consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated
In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on all consent and not due to the inadequacy of the
fours to the present petition, the Court upheld the price. In the case at bar, however, no evidence to
right of the co-owner to alienate his pro-indiviso prove fraud, mistake or undue influence indicative
share in the co-owned property as part of his right of vitiated consent is attendant.
of dominion. It was even pointed out that since the
previous sale is valid, the subsequent conveyance As the parties invoking equitable mortgage, the
effected by the co-owner is null and void pursuant Heirs of Reynaldo did not even come close to
to the principle that "no one can give what he does proving that the parties intended to charge the
not have," nemo dat quod non habet. property as security for a debt, leaving us with no
other choice but to uphold the stipulations in the
In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be contract. Basic is the rule that if the terms of the
compelled by the court to give their consent to the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
sale of his share in a co-owned property. In intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its
Arambula v. Nolasco, the Court intimated: stipulations shall control, we find that the Court of
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling, in
such by the Court, agree that co-owners such as modification of its original judgment, that the sale
respondents have over their part, the right of full effected by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the
and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as property is valid and enforceable.
that or individual owners which are not diminished
by the fact that the entire property is co-owned ARTICLE 501
with others. That part, which ideally belongs to
them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of 1. G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
as they please, independent of the decision of their PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO
co-owners. So we rule in this case. The respondents OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees,
cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co- vs.CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ,
owned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON
Court of First Instance of Rizal, "each party is the sole LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA
judge of what is good for him. BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION
BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
were true, i.e., that the entire propc1iy has been
sold to thirds persons, such sale could not have This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping
affected the right of Mario and Guillermo to inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition
recover the property from Reynaldo. In view of the of co-owner ship.
nature of co-ownership, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the terms in the Contract to Sell, FACTS:Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the
which limited the subject to Reynaldo's ideal share Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an
Page 50 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
area of 69,687 square meters. In December, 1931, portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order
Lorenzo Lopez died, leaving said property to his that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective
wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate
any moves to legally partition the property. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for partition of the
said property has already prescribed
on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest
son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute RULING: NO - The action for partition has not
sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two prescribed.
hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more
or less, of the undivided portion of (their) interests, The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute
rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of sale is not in issue in this case in view of the finding
the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do
consideration of the amount of P1,000. not question their due execution.13 What should
pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated
another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" portions of an undivided, co-owned property.
four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257)
square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that
favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora before the partition of a land or thing held in
Gaspar, (P1,000). Each of the said documents bear common, no individual co-owner can claim title to
the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner
Candido. has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire land or thing.
In his affidavit, Candido stated that a month prior to
the execution of the deed of sale in favor of However, the duration of the juridical condition of
Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and
of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate
them was "in a position to purchase" said property. should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years.
And, under the former article, any agreement to
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute keep a thing or property undivided should be for a
sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a
Olivares, had been paying the real property taxes definite period of in division which exceeds the
for their respectively purchased properties. They maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be
also had been in possession of their purchased void only as to the period beyond such maximum.
properties which, being planted to palay and
peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of
by dikes. the in division of a property for more than twenty
years, it would be contrary to public policy to
On November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by
brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly
them of their demands to partition the property so mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered
that they could acquire their respective titles meaningless.
thereto without resorting to court action, however,
the Lopezes did not answer said letter and the In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez
Olivares filed a complaint for partition and maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty
damages. years. We hold that when Candido and his mother
(who died before the filing of the complaint for
In their answer, the Lopezes alleged that no sale partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they
ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not validly exercised dominion over them because, by
have sold specific portions of the property; that operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased.
plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific The filing of the complaint for partition by the
portions of the properties being illegal, they could Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered
not ripen into ownership; and that they were not as subrogated to the rights of Candido over
under any obligation to lend their copy of the portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely
certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's
for the partition or settlement of the property. As otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-
special and affirmative defenses, the defendants ownership.
contended that the deeds of sale were null and
void and hence, unenforceable against them; that The action for partition has not prescribed. Although
the complaint did not state a cause of action and the complaint was filed thirteen years from the
that the cause or causes of action if any, had execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as
prescribed. contended by the defendants-appellants,
prescription might have barred its filing under the
The lower court rendered a decision declaring valid general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil
the deeds of absolute sale and ordering the Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each
defendants to allow the segregation of the sold co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
Page 51 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
the thing owned in common insofar as his share is square meters) of the same property as belonging
concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the to petitioner Concepion Roque.
conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor
and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' Concepcion claimed that preparation of the
action for partition was timely and properly filed. Subdivision Plan, was a preliminary step leading
eventually to partition of Lot No. 1549, however,
2. G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988 respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of
CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner, vs.HON. Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO ROQUE, petitioner's claim of ownership and rejected the
FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA plan to divide the land.
ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE,
respondents. Thus, Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977,
filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific
FACTS:The controversy here involves a 312 square Performance" against respondents Emesto Roque
meter parcel of land situated in San Juan, Malolos, and the heirs of Victor Roque.
Bulacan and designated as Lot No. 1549 of the
Cadastral Survey of Malolos. Concepcion Roques alleged that, as a co-owner of
Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the
The property was registered originally in the name property, that she could not be compelled to
of Januario Avendao, a bachelor who died remain in the coownership of the same.
intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.
In an Answer, respondents impugned the
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan
Januario Avendafio executed a document entitled Lubos at Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on
"Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng the ground "that the signatures appearing thereon
Hukuman." Through this instrument, extrajudicial are not the authentic signatures of the supposed
partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected among the signatories ...."
intestate heirs as follows:
It was also alleged that petitioner Concepcion
a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549,
Avendao. "occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere
b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio tolerance of the [defendants]."
Avendafio and Miguel Avendao.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, The trial court ordered the heirs of the late Victor
Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Roque namely to execute a deed of confirmation
Avendao. of the sale made by Emesto and Victor Roque in
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to favor of Concepcion Roque, over the 3/4 portion of
respondent Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. the subject property.
On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, The Intermediate Appellate Court, reversed the
Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, judgment of the trial court and dismissed both the
Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao, in petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal.
consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00,
transferred their collective and undivided three- While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition,
fourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to respondent the defendants, after denying plaintiff's assertion of
Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in co-ownership, asserted that they are the exclusive
the latter full and complete ownership of the and sole owners of the 314 portion of the parcel of
property. The transactions were embodied in two land claimed by the plaintiff.
(2) separate deeds of sale both entitled "Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Patuluyan" and both duly notarized. Upon the issue thus joined by the pleadings, it is
obvious that the case has become one of
Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at ownership of the disputed portion of the subject lot.
Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961, Emesto and
Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4) It is well settled that an action for partition will not
undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, prosper as such from the moment an alleged co-
petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same owner asserts an adverse title. The action that may
amount. be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion
reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
The property, however, remained registered in the possession
name of the decedent, Januario Avendao.
ISSUE:Whether the action for partition has already
Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on 20 September 1975 prescribed - NO
and a Subdivision Plan was drawn up by the
Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating a RULING:An action for partition-which is typically
one-fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a
property as belonging to Ernesto Roque and Victor specified property against a defendant or
Roque, and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234 defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-
Page 52 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
owners may be seen to present simultaneously ownership between petitioner and themselves nor
two principal issues. First, there is the issue of the validity of petitioner's claim of a three-fourths
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed,
property sought to be partitioned. Second, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have
assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the acquiesced in the coownership.
first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the
property is to be divided between plaintiff and 3. G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
defendant(s) i.e., what portion should go to ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL
which co-owner. VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO,
CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO
The question of prescription also needs to be FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,*
addressed in this connection. It is sometimes said CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO
that "the action for partition of the thing owned in FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO
common (actio communi dividendo or actio TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED)
familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe." SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA
IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ,
First of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque-the co- HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ;
owner seeking partition has been and is presently DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY
in open and continuous possession of a three- JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND
fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING
common. The Court notes in this respect the finding (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE)
of the trial court that petitioner, following execution AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS, vs.
of the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27 November LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,
1961, had been in "continuous occupancy of the RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA
3/4 portion of the lot ... up to the present, and VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
whereon plaintifrs house and that of her son are
erected. " Respondents do not dispute this finding FACTS:Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela
of fact, although they would claim that petitioner's Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a parcel of land in
possession is merely tolerated by them. Kalibo, Aklan covered by OCT RO-630. Leon and
Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his
Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
involved had asserted or manifested a claim of deceased.
absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of
Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co- RESPONDENTS are the heirs of ROMANA.
owners: in other words, co-ownership of the PETITIONERS are the heirs of GREGORIA.
property had continued to be recognized by all the
owners. Consequently, the action for partition could In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet property belonged to him as Romanas surviving
prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC of Kalibo a case
of the action. for partition, recovery of ownership and possession,
with damages, against Gregorias heirs. Leonardo
The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with alleged that on several occasions, he demanded
Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in the partition of the property but Gregorias heirs
December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years refused to heed his demands; that the matter
later that respondents first questioned the reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos which issued a certification to file a court action
at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16) sometime in 1980; that Gregorias heirs claimed sole
years did respondents contest petitioner's ownership of the property; that portions of the
occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera,
No. 1549. which portions must be collated and included as
part of the portion to be awarded to Gregorias
Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as heirs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared
they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of the owner of half of the subject property.
Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents
would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged In their Answer, herein petitioners claimed that
occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of Leonardo had no cause of action against them;
the land while they, upon the other hand, that they have become the sole owners of the
contented themselves with occupation of only a subject property; that they were in continuous,
fourth thereof. actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession
of the property with a just title; that they have been
This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardos
of a very substantial length of time during which claim is barred by estoppel and laches.
petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and
uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, The trial court dismissed the complaint of Leonardo
places respondents here in laches: respondents on the ground that his right right of action has long
may no longer dispute the existence of the co- prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil
Page 53 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Code. Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO- property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,
630 (24071) to be the common property of the heirs petitioners and respondents became co-owners
of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property
OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and owned in common, provided they do so in
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is accordance with the purpose for which it is
directed to issue a transfer certificate of title to the intended and in such a way as not to injure the
heirs of Gregoria. It also found that the April 4, 1943 interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other
and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be co-owners from using it according to their rights.
spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the They have the full ownership of their parts and of
property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even
property remained part of Leons estate at the time substitute another person in their enjoyment, except
of his death in 1962. Leons siblings, Romana and when personal rights are involved. Each co-owner
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in may demand at any time the partition of the thing
equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are owned in common, insofar as his share is
entitled to Romanas share as the latters concerned. Finally, no prescription shall run in favor
successors. of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had ownership.
only 30 years from Leons death in 1962 or up to
1992 within which to file the partition case. Since For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be
Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, done by a co-owner.
the same was already barred by prescription. It
held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, an Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner
action for partition and recovery of ownership and cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
possession of a parcel of land is a real action over other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of
immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In the co-ownership. In order that the title may
addition, the trial court held that for his long prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
Consequently, the property should go to Gregorias performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
heirs exclusively. amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made
The CA did not agree with the trial courts known to the other co-owners; and (3) the
pronouncement that Leonardos action for partition evidence thereof is clear and convincing."
was barred by prescription. The CA declared that
prescription began to run not from Leons death in From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that
1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which period within which Leonardo may seek partition
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and
the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner
provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a and against the other co-owners only from the time
co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co- he positively renounces the co-ownership and
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes makes known his repudiation to the other co-
the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only owners.
when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of
declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when
name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of
Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in
commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive his name, and informed the latter before the
period under Article 1141. Lupon Tagapamayapa of his 1943 purchase of
the property. These apparent acts of repudiation
ISSUE:W/N case should be dismissed on the ground were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.s act of
of prescription/laches. NO withholding Leonardos share in the fruits of the
property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself
RATIO:Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited these facts, the CA held that prescription began to
the property in equal shares. In turn, Romanas and run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in 1980
Gregorias heirs the parties herein became when it has been made sufficiently clear to him
entitled to the property upon the sisters passing. that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the and has claimed sole ownership over the property.
succession are transmitted from the moment of The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case
death. No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted
from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed
Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of under Article 1141.
the subject property.Thus, having succeeded to the
Page 54 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
What escaped the trial and appellate courts Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the
notice, however, is that while it may be argued that Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000,
Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be respectively.
characterized as a repudiation of the co-
ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of
property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage
merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to "Deed of Sale") conveying the Properties to "Roland
Antipolos daughter Teodora. Under the Family A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo"
Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for ("vendees"). However, the Deed of Sale was not
succession, exclude relations by affinity. annotated on TCT Nos.58999 and 59000. Neither
was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortgage
Art. 150. Family relations include those: loans and the receipts for loan payments issued by
1. Between husband and wife; PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricios name
2. Between parents and children; even after his death on 20 November 1973.
3. Among other ascendants and descendants;
and Simona died in 1977.On 23 June 1997, Edward,
4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an
full or half blood. action for the judicial partition of the Properties.
Edward claimed that he and the other
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co- grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-
owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he owners of the Properties by succession. Despite this,
cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co- petitioners refused to share with him the possession
ownership, which he was never part of. For this and rental income of the Properties.
reason, prescription did not run adversely against
Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and
property has not been lost. who was subsequently raised by Simona, moved to
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid intervene in the case. David Jr. filed a complaint-in-
repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo intervention impugning the validity of the Deed of
could seek partition of the property at any time. Sale and praying for the partition of the Properties
among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona.
4. G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005 The trial court allowed the intervention.
LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P.
BRAVO,[1] ROLAND P. BRAVO, JR., OFELIA BRAVO- Trial Court: The trial court upheld Mauricios sale of
QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR the Properties to the vendees. The trial court ruled
namely: GERSON U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory heirs,
CLIFF RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR, WIDMARK B. as the Properties were conveyed for valuable
NIOR, SHERRY ANNE B. NIOR, represented by LILY consideration. The trial court also noted that the
ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO as their attorney-in- Deed of Sale was duly notarized and was in
fact, and HONORABLE FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., existence for many years without question about its
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, validity. It DENIED the JUDICIAL PARTITION of the
Makati City, petitioners, vs. EDWARD P. BRAVO, properties.
represented by his attorney-in-fact FATIMA C.
BRAVO, respondent, and DAVID B. DIAZ, JR., Court of Appeals: REVERSED; the Court of Appeals
intervenor-respondent. declared the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simonas
consent. The appellate court held that the GPA
FACTS:Spouses Mauricio Bravo ("Mauricio") and executed by Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to
Simona Andaya Bravo ("Simona") owned two authorize Mauricio to sell the Properties.
parcels of land ("Properties") located along
Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. They ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
have three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN
surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo QUESTION
married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz,
Jr. ("David Jr."). Roland had six children, namely, Lily HELD:This Court finds it proper to grant the partition
Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero ("Elizabeth"), Edward of the Properties.
Bravo ("Edward"), Roland Bravo, Jr. ("Roland Jr."),
Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their Petitioners have consistently claimed that their
half-sister, Ofelia Bravo ("Ofelia"). father is one of the vendees who bought the
Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of
("GPA") on 17 June 1966 appointing Mauricio as her Sale is their father, although their brother, Roland
attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage payments.
Mauricio to "mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, Petitioners counsel, Atty. Paggao, made the same
sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my clarification before the trial court.
property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind
whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent
interest therein xxx." Mauricio subsequently Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of
mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine National Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his
Page 55 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
brothers and sisters, in his fathers portion of the FACTS:This case is about the enforcement in 1973 of
Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co- a 1920 partition of certain unregistered lands. The
owners of the Properties. following is a summary of the allegations in the
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of complaint filed in 1973 by the heirs of Catalino
the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any Jardin and Galo Jardin against the heirs of Sixto
time the partition of the common property unless a Hallasgo in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This Oriental in Civil Case No. 4234:
action for partition does not prescribe and is not The spouses Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo
subject to laches. were survived by their two children named Catalino
and Galo and by Sixto Hallasgo, apparently
OTHER ISSUES: Maura's child by her first husband.
Whether Simona validly appointed Mauricio as her In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a
attorney-in-fact to dispose the properties in private document the following properties inherited
question YES from the Jardin spouses:
(1) A residential lot in the poblacion of Jasaan, now
HELD: We hold that the Court of Appeals erred Lower Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, with an
when it declared the Deed of Sale void. In this case, assessed value of P1,000. Catalino and Galo
Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to each received as their share 495 square meters
"sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my and seven coconut trees. The remainder of the
property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind lot and seven coconut trees were allotted to
whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any Sixto.
interest therein xxx" as well as to "act as my general (2) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio
representative and agent,with full authority to buy, Campo-santo planted to 7-1/2 gantas with an
sell, negotiate and contract for me and in my assessed value of P500. An area planted to five
behalf." Taken together, these provisions constitute gantas was given to Sixto while the remainder
a clear and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the was adjudicated to Galo and Catalino.
Properties. Even if it is called a "general power of (3) A parcel of land located at Barrio Cabagtucan
attorney," the specific provisions in the GPA are planted to 2-1/2 gantas with an assessed value
sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These of P200 was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
provisions in the GPA likewise indicate that Simona (4) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio
consented to the sale of the Properties Canajawan planted to fourteen gantas was
assigned to Sixto.
Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated or (5) A parcel of land also located at Barrio
is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price No Canajawan planted to thirteen gantas with an
assessed value of P500 was assigned to Galo
HELD: We point out that the law on legitime does and Catalino.
not bar the disposition of property for valuable (6) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Sagpolon
consideration to descendants or compulsory heirs. planted to ten gantas was assigned to Galo and
In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the Catalino.
property taken from the estate. There is no (7) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in Mandagisiao planted to five gantas was
values. Donations and other dispositions by assigned to Sixto.
gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included (8) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio
in the computation of legitimes. Calabugon planted to six gantas was divided
Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a equally among the three heirs.
void contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not (9) A parcel of land located at Barrio Mingomon,
even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless Claveria, Bukidnon, plus one cow, was assigned
it signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties to Sixto in exchange for a house of strong
actually intended a donation or some other materials located at the poblacion.
contract. Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a
contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495
undue influence. In this case, respondents have not square meters in the lot at the Poblacion of Jasaan
proved any of the instances that would invalidate in exchange for Catalino's one-half share of the
the Deed of Sale. riceland in Barrio Sagpolon (No.6). Catalino
became the owner of 990 square meters of the
5. G.R. No. L-55225 September 30, 1982 poblacion lot. Galo became the sole owner of the
HEIRS OF CATALINO JARDIN, namely, RUSTICA, riceland at Sagpolon.
CEFERINA, VICTORINA, REMEDIOS, ELSIE, CIRILA,
PURIFICACION, and VIRGINIA, all surnamed JARDIN, In 1963, Sixto was allowed by Catalino's children to
and WALDERICO Z. JARDIN, as Heir of Galo Jardin, use as a garden an area of 350 square meters
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. which is a part of the 990 square meters owned by
HEIRS OF SIXTO HALLASGO, namely, PAZ, CORAZON, them. However, in 1964 Sixto fraudulently and
NERIO, and ELIODORA, all surnamed HALLASGO, without the knowledge of Catalino's children (Sixto's
defendants- appellees. nephews and nieces) included said portion in the
cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot.
Page 56 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Sixto and his children refused to reconvey the said The document of partition itself shows that it was
350-square-meter portion to Catalino's children. already implemented in 1920. Under that partition,
the land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted to
Allegedly taking advantage of the minority of the 2-1/2 gantas, the land located at Barrio Canajawan
children of Catalino and Galo, who both died after and the land located at Barrio- Sagpolon planted
the war, Sixto occupied the parcels of land to ten gantas (Nos. 3, 5 and 6) were definitely
adjudicated to Galo and Catalino in the 1920 deed adjudicated to Galo and Catalino. Sixto could not
of partition including the house of strong materials. have usurped those lands for if he did so his brothers
Sixto used those lands after the death of Galo and Galo and Catalino would have resisted the
Catalino and did not give to their heirs any share of usurpation. There was no co-ownership as to these
the harvests. lands.
It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children That the 1920 partition among the three heirs was
of Galo and Catalino came to know of the 1920 implemented is shown in the allegations of the
deed of partition which was shown to them by complaint with respect to the poblacion lot. As
Corazon Hallasgo during a confrontation in the already stated, Galo and Catalino were each
provincial commander's office at Camp Alagar given 495 square meters and seven coconut trees
when they sought to recover the said portion of 350 out of the poblacion lot. The re-mainder of the lot
square meters from the Hallasgos. and seven coconut trees were given to Sixto.
On that occasion, the children of Galo and That partition of the poblacion lot shows that the
Catalino came to know that the shares of Galo and 1920 agreement was actually enforced. There was
Catalino in that partition allegedly had been in the no co-ownership as to the Poblacion lot. If the 1920
possession of Sixto and his children "for a long time". partition was enforced as to the poblacion lot,
In spite of earnest efforts, Sixto's heirs refused to there would be no reason why it would not have
settle the case amicably with the heirs of Galo and been implemented with respect to the other lands.
Catalino.The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in
their 1973 complaint that Sixto's heirs be ordered to The only lands held in co-ownership under the 1920
reconvey to them the lands allocated to their partition were the Camposanto corn land planted
parents in the 1920 partition and the portion of 350 to 7-1/2 gantas and the Calabugon rice land
square meters in the poblacion lot appropriated by planted to six gantas (Nos. 2 and 8). But it was not
Sixto. The plaintiffs also prayed for damages. alleged with particularity when Sixto repudiated the
co-ownership as to those lands and claimed them
Defendants Hallasgo filed a motion to dismiss. as his own.
The trial court in a minute order dismissed the Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-
complaint on the ground of prescription, citing owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857. The plaintiffs ownership" and that "each co-owner may demand
appealed. They contend that their action had not at any time the partition of the thing owned in
prescribed and that its dismissal had no factual common, insofar as his share is concerned". It also
basis. provides that "no prescription shall run in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
The appellants invoke the rule that the action for heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
partition among co-heirs does not prescribe and the co-ownership."
that a co-owner's possession of the community
property is not deemed adverse to the other co- While the action for the partition of the thing owned
owners. They argue that the 1920 handwritten in common (actio communi dividendo or actio
partition signifies that Sixto recognized the existence familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe, the co-
of the co-ownership. ownership does not last forever since it may be
repudiated by a co-owner. In such a case, the
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for partition has action for partition does not lie. What may be
prescribed (YES However, the plaintiffs' action for brought by the aggrieved co-owner is an accion
the recovery of the 350-square-meter portion of the reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
Poblacion lot may be maintained) possession. That action may be barred by
prescription.
RULING:There are no allegations as to the specific
dates when Galo and Catalino died (it was merely "If the co-heir or co-owner, having possession of the
alleged that they died "after the war") and when hereditary or community property, holds the same
Sixto died; when the heirs of Galo and Catalino in his own name, that is, under claim of exclusive
became of age; the date when Sixto allegedly ownership, he may acquire the property by
usurped the lands allocated to Galo and Catalino; prescription if his possession meets all the other
what lands are in the possession of Galo and requirements of the law, and after the expiration of
Catalino's heirs and why they did not sue Sixto the prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may
during his lifetime to recover what pertained to lose their right to demand partition, and their action
them. may then be held to have prescribed." (De los
Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
Page 57 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Joaquins acquiescence for 23 years, furnish were Eustaquias great grandchildren. As such,
sufficient evidence that there was actual partition respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation
of the properties. of the oral partition over parcels III and IV, and the
partition of parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is replete
CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It also rejected with rulings that any co-owner may demand at any
petitioners argument that the action was barred by time the partition of the common property unless a
prescription and laches, explaining that prescription co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This
does not run against the heirs so long as the heirs, action for partition does not prescribe and is not
for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not subject to laches.
expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.
The CA found no repudiation on Joaquins part. It, 3. For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and
therefore, concluded that respondents action Ireneo occupied their portions of the San Jose
could not be barred by prescription or laches. property and significantly, Joaquin never disturbed
Hence, this petition. their possession. They also installed tenants in parcel
IV, and Joaquin did not prevent them from doing
ISSUES: so, nor did he assert his ownership over the same.
1. WON Joaquin acquired the properties by virtue These unerringly point to the fact that there was
of a valid sale. NO indeed an oral partition of parcels III and IV.
2. WON Respondents are co-owners of the subject
properties. YES In Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, it was held that:
3. WON the partition was valid considering that it Partition may be inferred from circumstances
was orally made by the parties. YES sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus,
4. WON an action for partition prescribes. - NO after a long possession in severalty, a deed of
partition may be presumed. It has been held that
RULING: recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of
1. The stated consideration for the sale land, improvements made thereon for a long series
are P5,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively, an of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish
amount which was so difficult to raise in the year sufficient evidence that there was an actual
1946. Respondents established that at the time of partition of land either by deed or by proceedings
the purported sale Joaquin Quimpo was not in the probate court, which had been lost and were
gainfully employed. He was studying in Manila and not recorded.
Eustaquia was the one supporting him; that when
Eustaquia died two (2) years later, Joaquin was not Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal, it was
able to continue his studies. The Quimpos failed to explained that:
override this. Except for the incredible and On general principle, independent and in spite of
unpersuasive testimony of Joaquins daughter, the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
Adelia Magsino, no other testimonial or enforced oral partition when it has been
documentary evidence was offered to prove that completely or partly performed.
Joaquin was duly employed and had the financial Regardless of whether a parol partition or
capacity to buy the subject properties in 1946. agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at
law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol
Likewise, both the trial court and the CA found that partition has actually been consummated by the
Eustaquia was 91 years old, weak and senile, at the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
time the deeds of sale were executed. In other ownership by the parties of the respective portions
words, she was already mentally incapacitated by set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol
then, and could no longer be expected to give her partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.
consent to the sale. The RTC and CA cannot, Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of
therefore, be faulted for not giving credence to the cases involving an oral partition under which the
deeds of sale in favor of Joaquin. parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
The fact that the disputed property may have been partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
declared for taxation purposes in the name of partition and in a proper case decree title in
Joaquin Quimpo does not necessarily prove accordance with the possession in severalty.
ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration
or tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of In numerous cases it has been held or stated that
ownership. The CA, therefore, correctly found this parol partitions may be sustained on the ground
proof inadequate to establish Joaquins claim of of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
absolute dominion. tenant in common as to parts of land divided by
parol partition as to which possession in severalty
2. Respondents are co-owners of the subject was taken and acts of individual ownership were
four (4) parcels of land, having inherited the same exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the
from a common ancestor Eustaquia Perfecto- agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual
Abad. Petitioners assertion that respondents failed for the purpose of concluding the right of the
to prove their relationship to the late Eustaquia parties as between each other to hold their
deserves scant consideration. Consuelo was the respective parts in severalty.
grandchild of Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo,
Helen, Marites, Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo
Page 60 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
A parol partition may also be sustained on the A year later, Don Fabian contracted a second
ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in marriage with Sofia Pendejito. They had 4 children,
and ratified the partition by taking possession in namely, Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of After the death of his first wife, but during the early
the partition. part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) an intestate
A number of cases have specifically applied the proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife.
doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a The CFI ordered the partition which covered Parcels
part performance is necessary, to take a parol F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the
partition out of the operation of the statute of whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of
frauds. It has been held that where there was a Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D.
partition in fact between tenants in common, and Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and
a part performance, a court of equity would have one-half of Parcel F-5.
regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by
the parties. During the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following
properties were acquired: Parcel F1, F2, F3, F4, F5,
The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in F6, F7, F8, S1, S2, S3 and S4. The "F" designation
sustaining the oral partition over parcels III and IV signified that the covered properties were acquired
and in invalidating the deeds of sale between during the first marriage, to distinguish them from
Eustaquia and Joaquin. those acquired during the second marriage which
are designated as "S" properties.
4. Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia,
while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin
also Joaquin Quimpo were Eustaquias great (son of Don Fabian with his first wife) filed with the
grandchildren. As such, respondents can rightfully RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with
ask for the confirmation of the oral partition over Damages against their uncle, Tirso (son of Don
parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and Fabian with his first wife), the complaint involved a
II. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that any co- portion of Parcel F-4, described in the Project of
owner may demand at any time the partition of the Partition. They alleged in their complaint, their
common property unless a co-owner has uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with the above-
repudiated the co-ownership. This action for described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of
partition does not prescribe and is not subject to the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso
laches. allotted to their father. However, their uncle refused
to surrender and deliver the same when they
8. G.R. No. 105608 April 30, 2008 demanded such delivery upon their reaching the
TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, petitioner, majority age. Tirso countered that the portion
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD TINGA, pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him;
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, REYGULA it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad
MONTEROSO-BAYAN, PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to
SR., SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to
FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, exchange her share in said property for another
HEIRS OF FABIAN MONTEROSO, JR., REYNATO parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied
MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE by her.
MONTEROSO-POSPOS, ADELITA MONTEROSO-
BERENGUEL, and HENRIETO Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and
MONTEROSO, respondents. Damages with Receivership, involving 12 parcels of
x-----------------------------------------------x land (i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4,)
G.R. No. 113199 April 30, 2008 against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD and half-siblings and/or their representatives. Tirso
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, PERFECTO L. alleged the following: (1) the aforementioned 12
CAGAMPANG, SR., REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships
FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, of the first and second marriages contracted by
RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, Don Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which purportedly
HENRIETO MONTEROSO, ADELITA MONTEROSO- judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is
BERENGUEL, and REYNATO MONTEROSO, petitioners, null and void for the reason that the project of
vs. partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of
COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO D. the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were
MONTEROSO, respondents. excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth
share or legitime over the said three parcels of land;
FACTS:Don Fabian had 4 children( namely, and (3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired
Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso) with his first during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not
wife, Soledad Doldol. On April 8, 1927, Soledad paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de
Doldol Monteroso passed away. Monteroso.
while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were Don Fabians action for partition is provided in a case where the
exclusive properties having been acquired through co-ownership of the properties sought to be
a donation from the heirs of one Benito Tinosa. They partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-
further maintained the validity of the judicial owner at which instance the remedy available to
partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but
judicata insofar as Parcels F-1 to F-5 are concerned. for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on
In particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, extinctive prescription. By invoking the benefits of
and one-half of F-5 were adjudicated to Don prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses
Fabian as his share in the conjugal partnership of are deemed to have admitted the existence of a
the first marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other half co-ownership among the heirs of Fabian Monteroso,
of Parcel F-5 were equally divided among the four Sr. over the properties forming the decedents
children of the first marriage; that during his lifetime, estate.
Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Partition not Barred by Laches nor by Acquisitive
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang; that Soledad Prescription
Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D. Monteroso, and
Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of
donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan; Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of
and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof
properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as does not per se argue against the existence of a
Parcel S-1 was acquired by her through a co-ownership. While Tirso may not have expressly
homestead patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand
possession, and Parcels S-3 and S-4 by purchase. from, and act of initiating Civil Case against, the
Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily
Sps. Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang raised the implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or
defense of acquisitive prescription against Tirso. co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the
They averred that the right to ask partition is proper Cagampang spouses through the instrumentality of
only where co-ownership is recognized. They also simulated deeds of sale covering some of the
suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a
considering that Tirso averred in his complaint that compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into
from the time of Don Fabians death in 1948, the lots the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses
in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, were holding some of the subject properties in trust
and public possession of the Cagampang spouses. and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the
Assayed against this perspective, petitioners submit extent of his legal share or legitime thereon.
that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but an
action for reconveyance which is subject to the Consequently, we are one with the trial and
rules on extinctive prescription. They assert that appellate courts that partition is the proper remedy
there being no co-ownership over the properties for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or
sold by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso- share of the inheritance from the decedent. An
Cagampang, Tirsos cause of action, had already action for partition is at once an action for
prescribed, either in 1949, i.e., 10 years after the declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
subject properties were registered in Soledad and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
Monteroso-Cagampangs name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 properties involved.
years after the cause of action accrued in 1948
(death of Don Fabian). Tirsos complaint was Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the
commenced in 1970. right to compel partition of the properties
comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a
ISSUE: 1.WON a partition can be barred by measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an
prescription. GR: IMPRESCRITIBLE; EXCEPTION: WHEN heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the
THERE IS A REPUDIATION properties comprising the intestate estate of Don
2. WON Sps. Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang Fabian at the moment of his death. Before partition
repudiated the existence of co-ownership against and eventual distribution of Don Fabians intestate
Tirso. YES; WHEN THEY REFUSED UPON DEMAND BY estate, a regime of co-ownership among the
TIRSO FOR PARTITION, SUCH CONSTITUTES A CLEAR compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate
REPUDIATION OF THE CO-OWNERSHIP IN WHICH of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION MAY SET IN. estate, Tirsos right over a share thereof is
3. WON the action for partition filed by Tirso has imprescriptible. As a matter of law, acquisitive
prescribed. -NO prescription does not apply nor set in against
compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or
RULING: legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate
Recognition of Co-ownership in Acquisitive their share. Reconveyance is not the proper
Prescription remedy available to Tirso. Be it remembered in this
regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership
The CA correctly ruled that Tirso Monterosos rights over the subject properties, but only insofar as
principal cause of action is unmistakably one for his legitime from the intestate estate of his father,
partition which by its very nature is imprescriptible Don Fabian, is concerned.
and cannot be barred by laches x x x. The only
exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an
Page 62 of 65
Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it
favor of a co-owner, "where there exists a clear belongs to the heirs of Don Fabian under Sec. 105
repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co- of CA 141, which pertinently provides:
owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and Sec. 105. If at any time the applicant or
exclusive ownership." In the instant case, however, grantee shall die before the issuance of the
no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in patent or the final grant of the land, or
against Tirso and other compulsory heirs in favor of during the life of the lease, or while the
the Cagampang spouses because effective applicant or grantee still has obligations
repudiation had not timely been made against the pending towards the Government, in
former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the accordance with this Act, he shall
repudiation which must be clear and open as to be succeeded in his rights and obligations
amount to an express disavowal of the co- with respect to the land applied for or
ownership relation happened not when the deeds granted or issued under this Act by his heirs
of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these in law, who shall be entitled to have issued
could not have amounted to a clear notice to the to them the patent or final concession if they
other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang show that they have complied with the
spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for requirements therefor, and who shall be
the partition (in 1961) and distribution of the subrogated in all his rights and obligations
intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was for the purposes of this Act.
deemed apprised of the repudiation by the
Cagampang spouses. It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the
homestead patent applicant who was subrogated
However, considering that the new Civil Code was to the rights of the original applicants, spouses
already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, by
Code applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 purchasing from the latter Parcel S-1 on May 8,
years and at the most 30 years to file the 1943. Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and
appropriate action in court. The records show that declared it for taxation purposes. The application,
Tirsos cause of action has not prescribed as he however, would be rejected because death
instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine supervened. In 1963, Pendejito filed her own
years after the considered express repudiation. homestead application for Parcel S-1. Assayed
Besides, acquisitive prescription also does not lie against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light
against Tirso even if we consider that a valid of the aforequoted Sec. 105 of CA 141, the heirs of
express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1.
the Cagampang spouses since in the presence of
evident bad faith, the required extraordinary It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for
prescription period of 30 years has not yet lapsed, meeting the requirements of law for homesteading
counted from said considered repudiation. Such Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot
would still be true even if the period is counted from be categorized as the paraphernal property of
the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent thereto, if
Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession of eventually issued, must be made in the name of the
the subject properties. compulsory heirs of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito
Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties shall be entitled, pursuant to Art. 834 of the Spanish
of Second Marriage Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over
the property equal to the corresponding share of
Tirsos acknowledgment of Pendejito and her each of Don Fabians compulsory heirs, i.e., his
childrens possession of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 eight children.
cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to
bar Tirso from pursuing his right to seek partition. 9. G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011
Under the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BAYANI S.
person desiring to exclude another from the co- SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
ownership to do the repudiating. Verily, the records
do not show that Pendejito and her children FACTS:Respondent was already married.
performed acts clearly indicating an intention to Respondent and petitioner met each other through
repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso a common friend and their relationship developed.
and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs of such Petitioner gave birth to respondents son.
intention.
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and
To be sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first respondent, together with three more incorporators,
marriage have a stake on Parcels S-2, S-3, and S-4, were able to establish a manpower services
even if these parcels of land formed part of the company. Five parcels of land were also acquired
conjugal partnership of gains of the second during the said period and were registered in
marriage. There can be no serious dispute that the petitioner and respondents names, as husband
children of the first marriage have a hereditary right and wife.
over the share of Don Fabian in the partnership
assets of the first marriage. Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour
and they decided to part ways. Both parties
agreed to divide the said properties and terminate
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Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
their business partnership by executing a Partition deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have
petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon,
and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, and an award for the recovery by the party or
while the ownership over the three other properties parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents
will go to respondent. However, when petitioner and profits of the real estate in question. x x x
wanted additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling While it is true that the complaint involved here is
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial one for partition, the same is premised on the
partition of the said properties before the RTC. existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-
Petitioner averred that she and respondent worked owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
together as business partners, acquiring real based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
properties amounting to 15,500,000.00. covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until
Respondent said that the properties were acquired and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely
out of his own personal funds without any and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect
contribution from petitioner. a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even
complaint for lack of merit. In resolving the issue on have any rightful interest over the subject
ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable properties.
weight to petitioners own admission that the
properties were acquired not from her own 2. As to whether respondents assent to the
personal funds but from the income of the initial partition agreement serves as an admission
manpower services company over which she owns against interest, in that the respondent is deemed
a 3.33% share. to have admitted the existence of co-ownership
between him and petitioner, the Court ruled in the
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed RTCs negative.
ruling.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a
ISSUES: party against his interest or unfavorable to the
1.WON the determination of the existence of co- conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent
ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action with the facts alleged by him. Admission against
of partition. YES interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of
2. WON respondents assent to the partition the Rules of Court, which provides:
agreement is deemed to be an admission the Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act,
existence of co-ownership between him and declaration or omission of a party as to a
petitioner. -NO relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.
RULING:
1. In Municipality of Bian v. Garcia the Court To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve
explained that the determination as to the matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical
existence of co-ownership is necessary in the and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily
resolution of an action for partition. Thus: made; and (d) be adverse to the admitters
interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit inadmissible.
is taken up with the determination of whether or not
a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and Partition Agreement indicates that the document
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the involves matters which necessitate prior settlement
parties interested in the property. This phase may of questions of law, basic of which is a
end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to determination as to whether the parties have the
have a partition either because a co-ownership right to freely divide among themselves the subject
does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners
may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment argument would be to allow respondent not only to
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is admit against his own interest but that of his legal
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled
and profits received by the defendant from the real co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent
estate in question is in order. x x x is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.
The second phase commences when it appears Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless
that "the parties are unable to agree upon the the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a
partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt third person with a right recognized by law.
with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also
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Property Digests (Articles 484 501)
Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to proscribed, and may be made by voluntary
the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to agreement of all the parties interested in the
amend the same to include other matters. property. This phase may end either: (a) with a
Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
contents of an agreement she intentionally refused partition either because a co-ownership does not
to sign. exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a
determination that a co-ownership does in truth
10. G.R. No. 170080 April 4, 2007 exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, Petitioner, vs. accounting of rents and profits received by the
CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, CONSUELO Q. defendant from the real estate in question is in
JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO M. order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are
QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS and TYRONE M. able to agree, make partition among themselves
QUINTOS, Respondents. by proper instruments of conveyance, and the
court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon.
FACTS: Respondents and Petitioners are co-owners The second phase commences when it appears
of two (2) parcels of land. The said parcels of land that the parties are unable to agree upon the
have permanent improvements thereon which partition directed by the court. In that event,
straddle both lots, namely, a residential bungalow partition shall be done for the parties by the court
and two (2) units, two-storey apartments, the titles with the assistance of not more than three (3)
of which are registered jointly in the names of the commissioners. This second stage may well also
parties as co-owners thereof. deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
its approval by the court after the parties have
The respondents allege that sometime in the early been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon,
part of 1996, they informed petitioner of their desire and an award for the recovery by the party or
to have the subject properties partitioned based on parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents
the percentage of each co-owners respective and profits of the real estate in question.
share.
The proceedings in this case have only reached the
A realtor was even engaged to prepare the first phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that
schemes by which the subject properties could be even if the order decreeing partition leaves
physically partitioned among the co-owners. something more to be done by the trial court for
However, the petitioner refused to accede to any the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the
of the schemes presented by the realtor for the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for
physical apportionment of the subject properties the determination of just compensation by the
between the co-owners thereof. Because of the appointed commissioners, the submission of their
refusal of the petitioner to partition the property, reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of
and the inability of the co-owners to mutually agree the partition, it is considered a final order and may
on an arrangement acceptable to all of them, on be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.
July 1, 1997, the respondents filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court against the petitioner and There is no question that a co-ownership exists
two other defendants namely Benedicto Quintos between petitioner and respondents. To this extent,
and Antonio Quintos (as unwilling co-plaintiffs) for the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in
partition of the subject property. line with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts However, the trial court went astray when it also
decision but deleted the order that petitioner pay authorized the sale of the subject properties to a
reasonable rental for her use of a portion of the third party and the division of the proceeds thereof.
disputed properties. The appellate court denied What makes this portion of the decision all the more
reconsideration. objectionable is the fact that the trial court
conditioned the sale upon the price and terms
Petitioner contended that the RTC erred in its acceptable to respondents herein only, and
decision in alternatively declaring the partition or adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only
authorizing the sale to third person. respondents.