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Presbiterio vs Fernandez

Facts:

1) ESPERIDION Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the value of the properties under litigation.
2.)Presbitero was ordered by the lower court to pay Nava to settle his debts. 3) Nava's counsel
still tried to settle this case with Presbitero, out of court. But to no avail. 4) Thereafter, the
sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to the plantation and adhered to the
Ma-ao Mill District and registered in the name of Presbitero as the original plantation owner. 5)
The sheriff was not able to present for registration thererof to the Registry of Deeds. 6) The
court then ordered Presbitero to segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava from the
mass of properties belonging to the defendant within a period to expire on August 1960. 7)
Bottomline, Presbitero did not meet his obligations, and the auction sale was scheduled. 8)
Presbitero died after. 9) RICARDO Presbitero, the estate administrator, then petitioned that the
sheriff desist in holding the auction sale on the ground that the levy on the sugar quotas was
invalid because the notice thereof was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.

Issue:

W/N the sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties.

Held:

1) They are real properties. 2) Legal bases: a) The Sugar Limitation Law xxx attaching to the land
xxx (p 631) b) RA 1825 xxx to be an improvement attaching to the land xxx (p 631) c) EO # 873
"plantation" xxx to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar. 3) Under the express
provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to the land, and cannot have
independent existence away from a plantation. 4) Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance
with law, xxx the levy amount to no levy at all

US vs Carlos

FACTS:

Mr Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court issued
warrant for arrest. Mr. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what he did
failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny applied only to
tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited away.

Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in jail.
Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy cant be stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal
thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance affirmed the decision. The
case reached the supreme court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not larceny can be committed against an intangible such as electricity

HELD:

Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership of electrical current was
secured by

Art 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.

Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can be stolen. However, the true test of
what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or
incorporeal, but whether is is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a
valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of science. Mr. Carlos
secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used jumper cables to
appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

Pio Modesto et al Carlos Urbina et al

FACTS:

This case originates from a complaint of recovery of possession filed by respondent Urbina against
thepetitioners Modesto, with the RTC of Pasig sometime in 1983.Urbina in his complaint alleged
that he was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Lower Bicutan,Taguig.According to Urbina, the
Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to occupy aportion of his
property.Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of said lot. However, before
the partiescould finalize the sale, the Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began
claiming ownership over the lot.The Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful owner of
the lands because it was stillgovernment property, being part of the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the land subject of the controversy, is indeed, government property, hence,
cannotbe privately owned.2. Whether or not petitioner have a better right of possession since they
were in actual, adverse, public,and continuous possession of the property.

HELD:

1. Yes. The SC upheld the factual findings of the Land Management Bureau (LMB), the
administrativeagency tasked with assisting the DENR in the management and disposition of
alienable an disposable lands ofthe public domain when it invalidated the claim of respondent of
possessory rights over said property since it

was not yet alienable and disposable lands prior to then President Cory Aquinos public declaration
of P

.D. No.172 reclassifying it to be alienable and disposable lands on October 16, 1987.2. Yes. The
Court resolved the issue by applying the legal provisions covering the subject property whichwas
P.D. No. 172 implementing guidelines M.O. No. 119 where one of the qualifications to ownership is
that onemust have constructed a house in the proclaimed area for disposition on or prior to January
6, 1986 andactually residing therein.As reported by the special investigator and other land
inspectors, it was the Modestos who were theactual occupants of the area unlike Urbina who never
occupied the land and instead has been residing inMakati City

Halili vs CA

Facts:

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real

properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow private respondent Helen

Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom

are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim,

assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in

and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.

Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation Guzman then sold the

parcel of land to Catanaig, who is one of respondents in this case. Petitioners, who are

owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,

Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances

between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano

Cataniag and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption

under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA

denied the appeal of the Halilis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the land is null and void.

Ruling:

No, because the prohibition in the constitution has already been served. Article

XII, Section 7 provides that Non- Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or

to lands of the public domain, In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private

lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. While it

is true that the transfer of Helen of his right to her son who is an American citizen

contradicts the prohibition set forth in the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the

subsequent sale of the land to Catanig, a Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent

that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or

transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the

title of the transferee is rendered valid.

The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus

[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as

construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations lands for future

generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by

making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by

naturalization.

Petition was denied.

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