Cases:

US vs Tambunting 41 Phil 364

Berkenkotter vs Cu Unjieng 61 Phil 663
Philippine Refining Co. vs Jarque 61 Phil 229
Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor 6 SCRA 197
Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo 61 SCRA 709
Prudential Bank vs Panis 153 SCRA 390
Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals114 SCRA 273
Benguet Corp. vs CBAA 218 SCRA 271
Tumalad vs Vicencio et al 41 SCRA 143
Serg's Products vs PCI Leasing 338 SCRA 499

Case Digests:
US vs Tambunting 41 Phil 364

Facts:
Manuel Tambunting and his wife were occupants of the upper floor of a house that had previously been
installed by the Manila Gas Corporation with apparatus for the delivery of gas.

It was found out that gas was being used, without the knowledge and consent of the gas company, for cooking
in the quarters occupied by the defendants.

Issue:
whether gas can be the subject to larceny.
(Larceny: The unauthorized taking and removal of the Personal Property of another by an individual who
intends to permanently deprive the owner of it.)

Held: Yes.
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being
feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to
place. Likewise water which is confined in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by wires are subjects of
larceny. (Quoted from "Larceny," at page 34, Vol. 17, of Ruling Case Law)

****************************
Berkenkotter vs Cu Unjieng 61 Phil 663

Berkenkotter - plaintiff-appellant
CU UNJIENG E HIJOS - defendants-appellees.

Facts:
The Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central, obtained from the defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos,
a loan secured two parcels and land "with all its buildings, improvements, etc. and whatever forms part or is
necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill ... now existing or that may in the future exist is said lots."

Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., bought additional machinery
and equipment. Plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, was asked by the company president, B.A. Green, to advance the
necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment. Plaintiff was promised to get
reimbursement when an additional loan from the mortgagees is obtained. Green failed to obtain said loan.

Appellant's Contention:
Installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar central was not permanent in
character ... in case Green should fail to obtain an additional loan said machinery and equipment would
become security for the company's debt to him.

Issue:
Whether or not the additional machinery and equipment is considered an improvement subject to the mortgage
executed in favor of Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc. by Cu Unjieng e Hijos.
Held:
Yes.
The installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central converted them into real property by
reason of their purpose. As essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central
would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. Inasmuch as the
central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar
industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent.

Case Cited: Bischoff vs. Pomar and Compania General de Tabacos (cited with approval in the case of Cea vs.
Villanueva)

(1) in a mortgage of real estate, the improvements on the same are included; therefore, all objects permanently
attached to a mortgaged building or land, although they may have been placed there after the mortgage was
constituted, are also included.

(2) when it was stated in the mortgage that the improvements, buildings, and machinery that existed thereon
were also comprehended, it is indispensable that the exclusion thereof be stipulated between the contracting
parties.

***********************************
Philippine Refining Co. vs Jarque 61 Phil 229

Facts:
The Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels
Pandan and Zaragoza. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the
motorship Zaragoza.

Thereafter, a petition was filed with the CFI of Cebu praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent
debtor, said petition was granted and an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent was executed in favor
of Jose Corominas.

Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained such
an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered until within thirty days prior to the commencement of
insolvency proceedings against Jarque while the fourth mortgage was entered in the chattel mortgage registry
within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.

Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages and sustained the special
defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.

Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law.
(Chattel: Moveable items of property which are neither land nor permanently attached to land or a building,
either directly or vicariously through attachment to real property.)

Held:
Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Since the term "personal property" includes
vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

A mortgage on a vessel is in the nature a chattel mortgage. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of
a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a
vessel to be noted n the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting
the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.

An affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith is required (Sec. 5 of the CM Law).
The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. A chattel
mortgage of a vessel lacking an affidavit of good faith, is unenforceable against third persons.

Note:
If the mortgage is constituted over a vehicle, it must also be made with the LTO (if a private vehicle) or LTFRB
(if its a public vehicle.) If its a ship, its made with the MARINA.

********************
Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor
6 SCRA 197
MINDANAO BUS COMPANY - petitioner
CITY ASSESSOR, et al - respondents

Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in a public utility business, solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes
by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a main office and branch offices. To be found
in their offices are machinery and equipment, which were assessed by the City Assessor as real properties.

The Court of Tax Appeals held that the petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is liable to the payment of the realty
tax on its maintenance and repair equipment.
Petitioner appealed the assessment, contending that said equipment are not realty.

On the other hand, respondents contend that said equipments, though movable, are immobilized by
destination, citing Art. 415 (5):

Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works.

Issue:
Whether or not the equipment may be deemed immovable within the meaning of Art. 415 of the NCC.

Held:
No.
Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of law must first be essential and principal elements of
an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the
industrial purpose for which it was established.

The tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle
municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are
merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its
service. Even without such tools and equipment, its business may be carried on as when if its rolling
equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.

Aside from the element of essentiality Art. 415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land. In the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or
service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as
demanded by the law.

Hence, the equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and
petitioner's business is not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land, so said equipment may not
be considered real estate.

************************
Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo 61 SCRA 709

Davao Sawmill - plaintiff-appellant

Castillo et al - defendants-appellees

Facts:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the government. The land upon which
the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building
which housed the machinery used by it. Some machines placed in the building are mounted on foundations of
cement.

Part of the lease agreement between Davao Sawmill (lessee), and the lessor was a stipulation in which after
the lease all buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership of the lessor, which would not include
machineries and accessories.

Issue:
whether or not the sawmill machineries is classified as real property (immovable).

Held:
No. The machinery must be classified as personal property.

The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the understanding
that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor on the expiration of
the lease agreement.

The lessee also treated the machinery as personal property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of
third persons. As consequence of the judgment rendered in favor of the Davao Light and Power Co. against
Davao Sawmill, the machineries in question were levied upon by the sheriff as personalty (as opposed to a
realty) pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being registered.

Furthermore, machineries only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner. (Citing US SC decision in Valdes vs. Central Altagracia)

*****************
Prudential Bank vs Panis 153 SCRA 390

Facts:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan with Prudential Bank. To further secure said loan, the spouses executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over the residential building, with a right to occupy the lot. The Real Estate Mortgage
also included information about the Sales Patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building
stood. The spouses obtained a second loan, which was secured by another Real Estate Mortgage over the
same properties. The Sec. of Agriculture issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the lot which was then
mortgaged to the bank in favor of the Macales.

The spouses defaulted on both loans. Thus, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed, and sold in a public
auction.

(Miscellaneous Sales Patent: RA 730 is an act permitting sale without public auction of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain for residential purpose. The application to purchase the land is called the
Miscellaneous Sales Application and the corresponding patent is called the Miscellaneous Sales Patent.)

The RTC held that the Real Estate Mortgage was null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to
another.

Held:
Yes.
The inclusion of "building" distinct and separate from the land In the enumeration of properties under
Article 415 of the NCC can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property.

A building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would
be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with
separately and apart from the land. Furthermore, the fact that the spouses executed the Real Estate Mortgage
over the building before executing the second Real Estate Mortgage over the land proved that the spouses
intended for the building to be an immovable separate and distinct from the land on which it is built.

****************
Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals
114 SCRA 273

Facts:
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas
stations located on leased land.The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the
owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of
the lease.

The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as
taxable realty. But The city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject machinery and equipment installed by Caltex in its gas stations should be
considered realty.

Held:
Yes.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty. The equipment and machinery as appurtenances to the
gas station building or shed owned by Caltex and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas
station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached and fixed
permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within
the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.

(appurtenance: an object that is used with or for something)

********************
Benguet Corp. vs CBAA 218 SCRA 271

Facts:
In 1985, the Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the petitioner's tailings dam as taxable improvements.

Petitioner contended that the the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a separate and independent
property because it does not constitute an "assessable improvement" on the mine because it is an integral part
of the mine.

To supporty its contention, petitioner cited the following cases:

(1) Municipality of Cotabato v. Santos
dikes and gates constructed in connection with a fishpond operation as integral parts of the fishpond.
(2) Bislig Bay Lumber Co. v. Provincial
Government of Surigao the realty tax was not imposed on a road constructed by the timber concessionaire
because the government had the right to use the road to promote its varied activities.
(3) Kendrick v. Twin Lakes Reservoir Co. (American Case)
A reservoir dam went with and formed part of the reservoir
(4) Ontario Silver Mining Co. v. Hixon (Canada)
Involved drain tunnels constructed when mining operations were expanded... it was held that "whatever value
they have is connected with and in fact is an integral part of the mine itself."

On the other hand, Solicitor General's argues that the dam is an assessable improvement because it enhances
the value and utility of the mine.

Issue: Whether or not the tailings dam in question is an "improvement" upon the land within the meaning of the
Real Property Tax Code.

Held:
Yes.
The court ruled that the subject dam falls within the definition of an "improvement" because it is permanent in
character and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's mine. The immovable nature of the dam
defines its character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under
Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.

**************
Tumalad vs Vicencio et al 41 SCRA 143

Tumalad - plaintiffs-appellees
Vicencio et al - defendants-appellants.

Facts:
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house,
which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan, payable
in one year with an interest of 12% pa.

When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. The house was
sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for
ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.
Defendants-appellants, questioned the legality of the chattel mortgage. They maintained the nullity of the
chattel mortgage based on two grounds:
(a) that, their signatures on the chattel mortgage were obtained through fraud, deceit, or trickery; and
(b) that the subject matter of the mortgage is a house of strong materials, and, being an immovable, it can only
be the subject of a real estate mortgage and not a chattel mortgage.

Issue: Whether or not the property in question can be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage.

Held:
Yes.
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property
such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature
would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on
statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him from
subsequently claiming otherwise.

In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property,
yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that
defendant conveys or intends to treat the house as chattel, so that they should not now be allowed to
make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which
defendats-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and although this can not in itself alone
determine the status of the property, it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation
that the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty.

Furthermore, unlike the cases of Lopez vs. Orosa and Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery, wherein third
persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants themselves, as debtors-
mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel
therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having treated the subject house as personalty.

********************
Serg's Products vs PCI Leasing 338 SCRA 499

Facts:

PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the seizure of
machinery, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in favor of PCI.

Machinery of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective order. It asserts
that the machinery were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage.

Issue: Whether or not the machinery purchased and imported by SERGS became real property by virtue of
immobilization.

Held:
The machinery in question have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and
principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature.

Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that
a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise.

Note:
*After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or
movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject
of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.

*Writ of Replevin: an action or a writ issued to recover an item of personal property wrongfully taken; a legal
remedy in which a court requires a defendant to return specific goods to the plaintiff at the beginning of the
action.

Summary:
US vs Tambunting
Under Art. 416 (3) of the NCC, forces of nature which are brought under the control of science such as gas,
electricity, water, etc. are considered to be (personal) property. Therefore, these can be the subjest of larceny
(or theft).

Berkenkotter vs Cu Unjieng
Machinery and equipment deemed as essential and principal elements of an industry or work is classified as
immovable under Art. 415 (5) of the NCC.

Philippine Refining Co. vs Jarque

Vessels (as well as land vehicles) are considered personal property under the civil law. A mortgage on a vessel
is in the nature a chattel mortgage.

Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor

For movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of law, (1) it must be absolutely essential to the
business (industry or work); amd (2) it must be in the place where said business id carried on.

Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo

Machineries only becomes immobilized when placed in a building by the owner of the property or building, but
not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right over the property,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

Prudential Bank vs Panis

A valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The
inclusion of "building" distinct and separate from the land In the enumeration of properties under Article
415 (1) of the NCC can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property.

Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty moreso when the fixtures are necessary to the operation
of the industry or work and have been attached and fixed (or embedded) permanently to the site where the
business is carried on.
Art. 415 (3) and (5) of the NCC applies.

Benguet Corp. vs CBAA

an "improvement" on a property is permanent in character and enhances both the value and utility of said
property. Its immovable nature efines its character as real property.

Tumalad vs Vicencio
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property
such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature
would be real property.
Principle of estoppel: by declaring his house as chattel, the owner is etopped from subsequently claiming
otherwise.

Serg's Products vs PCI Leasing

After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or
movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject
of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants
to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to
extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation,
the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to
occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary
period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary
period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a
contract of lease.

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries
in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and
not for the benefit of the public.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires
payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the
police power of the state.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT,

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that
the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends
that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company
to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems,
through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

32 Phil. 580 (1915)

In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual question
one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax in question and the other
relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the
ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter aspect as correlated to the police power of the State.

Facts:
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in
billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon
complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise
a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not
deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons. Defendant Collector
of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German
Consuls, the defendant decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is
otherwise a nuisance.

Issue:
1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the Government?

Held:
The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are
offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a
new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may
be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and
convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such
territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Equal Protection)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years
old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and
directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from
the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of
police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general
welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common
knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial
distinction from taxicabs of other places.

ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance

City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore
been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the
plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on
passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations
will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed
nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as nuisances under any
and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them.
The former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the
facts which is a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone,
and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control
such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry,
beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the
property of the plaintiff.

LEONOR FARRALES, assisted by her husband, EMILIO FARRALES vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, THE CHIEF OF POLICE,
THE MARKET SUPERINTENDENT AND THE CITY TREASURER
G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972.
Appeal from the decision of the CFI Baguio

Makalintal, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building
where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was
ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff
built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit from any city
official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her
that she present proper permit. Upon failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for
injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance;
(2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.

RULING: Judgment Affirmed.

(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in
question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at the end of
the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.

(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in
only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a
real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that
the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that
the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioners petition for
injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.