Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation vs. Saama Technologies
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation vs. Saama Technologies
17
18 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (the Gates Foundation) brings this action for
20 enrichment, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1114), false
21 advertising under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)), and unfair business practices under
22 the Washington Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86.010 et seq.) against Saama
24 The Gates Foundation alleges the following based upon personal knowledge with
25 respect to its own acts and the acts of its employees, and upon information and belief as to all
26 other matters. The Gates Foundations information and belief is based on the investigation of
1 the undersigned counsel, K&L Gates LLP, which included review and analysis of (i) written
2 correspondence between the parties; (ii) materials prepared by Saama and delivered to the
3 Gates Foundation; (iii) interviews with relevant Gates Foundation employees; and (iv)
4 interviews with former Saama employees (each identified herein as a Confidential Witness
5 (CW)). Counsels investigation is continuing; many of the relevant facts are known only by
6 Saama or are exclusively within its custody or control. The Gates Foundation believes that
7 substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a
1 5. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the Gates Foundations pendent
2 state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367 in that the state law claims are integrally
3 interrelated with the Gates Foundations federal claims and arise from a common nucleus of
4 operative facts, such that the administration of the Gates Foundations state law claims with
6 6. In the alternative, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action
7 under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1). There is complete diversity between the Gates Foundation and
8 Saama, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
9 7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Saama because it conducted business
10 with the Gates Foundation in Washington and traveled to Washington as part of the events or
13 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.
1 Washington state; and (4) Global Policy & Advocacy, which builds strategic relationships and
3 11. In order to maximize its positive global impact, the Gates Foundation has
4 committed to becoming increasingly transparent, and it has sought to disseminate and share
5 high-quality data with the public for the public good. The Gates Foundation embraces
6 transparency because access to information and data fosters effective collaboration and can
8 12. The Gates Foundation has also searched for opportunities to help the
9 philanthropic sector become more transparent, so that other philanthropic organizations can
11 B. Defendant
14 new class of flexible and Fluid Analytics hybrid solutions to its customers. 1 Saama
15 advertises that it can provide a business analytics solution that is specific to its customers
16 industry, business, data, domain, and time. 2 Saama was retained by the Gates Foundation
17 in August 2015. As part of this engagement, Saama traveled to and worked in Seattle,
18 Washington.
24
1
Saama Technologies, Inc. About Us, (accessed September 21, 2017 at 9:00AM),
25 https://www.saama.com/about-us/who-we-are/
26 2
Saama Technologies, Inc. Why Saama, (accessed September 21, 2017 at 9:00AM),
https://www.saama.com/the-saama-difference/why-saama/
K&L GATES LLP
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 925 FOURTH AVENUE, SUITE 2900
SEATTLE, WA 98104-1158
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF- 4 TELEPHONE: +1 206 623 7580
FACSIMILE: +1 206 623 7022
Case 2:17-cv-01450 Document 1 Filed 09/25/17 Page 5 of 23
1 15. Over the past few years, the Gates Foundation has made a significant effort to
2 disseminate data to grantees, nonprofits, and the public at largeall as part of its goal to
4 16. The Gates Foundation has also worked to make sure its own internal decisions
6 17. Saama claims that it can develop customized tools for entities desiring to use
7 business analytics to make data-based decisions. Business analytics generally refers to the
8 process of using data, statistics, and technology to explore and analyze past performance and
10 18. In August 2015, the Gates Foundation and Saama entered into a Master
12 19. The Gates Foundation engaged Saama because Saama promised that it could
13 assess the Gates Foundations analytics strategy and ultimately build a functional business
14 intelligence, data, and analytics platform for the Gates Foundation (the Platform). The
15 Gates Foundation hoped to implement this program internally and, eventually, to use it to
17 20. The MSA set forth the general terms governing the parties relationship and
18 allowed the Gates Foundation to issue work orders for different phases of the Platform project
1 23. The Parties understood that, based on Saamas recommendations, the Gates
2 Foundation would then issue work orders for Saama to create the software that would
4 24. Saama represented to the Gates Foundation that Phase 0 was a legitimate
5 assessment upon which the Gates Foundation should base its work orders. But according to
6 former Saama employees, Saama recognized internally that the assessment step was primarily
8 25. For example, according to CW1, a Big Data/Analytics Lead, a certain segment
9 of the Saamas sales force involved in setting up the scope and pricing of projects routinely
10 fails to involve the companys delivery teams to determine whether what had been
11 represented to customers can actually be delivered. CW1 describes these individuals as high-
13 26. CW1 further explained that these sales employees commit Saama to projects
14 without knowing whether they are feasible and that, as a result, a lot of bizarre situations
16 27. CW1 notes that Saamas failure to involve its delivery team during the setup
17 phase is not typical within the industry. CW1 suggested that Saamas failure to follow best
18 industry practices is the result of poor leadership. In particular, CW1 identified the former
19 Vice President of Saamas delivery team, who had no clue how to use Saamas talent or to
21 28. According to CW1, rather than hold the sales team accountable for their
22 misleading statements, Saama would use dirty tricks to blame others for the delivery
23 problems that emerge. The Saama employees assigned to these problematic projects are often
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1 29. CW1 estimated that Saama had delivery problems on roughly 20% to 25% of
2 its engagements, which CW1 attributed directly to Saamas sales (i.e., assessment and
3 recommendation) model.
4 30. At no time did Saama inform the Gates Foundation that roughly 20% to 25%
5 of its engagements result in delivery problems. Nor did Saama give any indication to the
6 Gates Foundation that it was exaggerating or misrepresenting its capabilities. Rather, Saama
7 put forward an impressive team for the assessment that seemed capable at the time of
9 31. Saama completed its Phase 0 assessment and, as anticipated, on October 28,
10 2015, gave a presentation to the Gates Foundation with a plan outlining its recommendations
13 referred to as Phase 1a, Phase 1b, Phase 2, Phase 3, and Phase 4. Saama represented that it
14 had the capability to build the recommended Platform as outlined for each phase.
15 33. Saama promised that the Platform would deliver operations and financial
16 reporting needs of the Gates Foundation, provide a blueprint for scaling and growing
17 program analytics, allow users to gain[] insights across multiple data setsincluding
18 internal (contracts, budgets, etc.) and external (population, public health, social sentiment and
19 so on), and provide sandbox, cataloging, sharing, and collaboration capabilities across
20 distributed global teams. Saama also promised that the Platform would keep data secure at
22 34. The Gates Foundations role was to provide Saama with the information, such
23 as data sheet sets and budgets, necessary to create a functioning Platform, which it did. The
24 Gates Foundations role was not to build the Platform or develop any of the software.
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1 C. Bait and Switch: Saama Replaces its Original Team with Developers Who
Lack Basic Knowledge and Experience.
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35. During its October 2015 presentation to the Gates Foundation, Saama
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represented that Phases 1a and 1b would be completed and go live by June 28, 2016. Phase
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1 would create programs for four areas: (1) Financial systems; (2) Investments; (3) Budget;
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and (4) Domain data.
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36. Following the presentation, and before development work began, Saama
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replaced its original team with an entirely new team of employees.
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37. The Gates Foundation was surprised that Saama would replace its original
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team, but it was assured by Saama that the new team included experienced experts and was
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capable of performing the tasks and meeting the delivery dates for Phase 1a and Phase 1b on
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time. However, this representation was false.
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38. For example, according to CW2, a Business Analyst assigned to the Gates
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Foundation Project, Saama misrepresented CW2s skills to the Gates Foundation by claiming
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CW2 was a Data Profiling Expert. CW2 alerted Saama management that they were not an
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expert in this area and, in fact, had no experience or background in the data profiling field
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whatsoever. Nevertheless, Saama continued its misrepresentation and assigned CW2 to the
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Project in this capacity.
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39. When CW2 realized this, they attempted to obtain training from Saama in Data
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Profiling. In response to CW2s request, Saama provided CW2 with nothing more than a 75-
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page document that had been prepared for a different Saama client and that contained no
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specific Data Profiling training.
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40. Later in the Project, Saama again approached CW2 and asked CW2 to
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misrepresent their experience and skills. This time, Saama attempted to represent that CW2
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was an expert in Master Data Management. Again, CW2 informed Saama management that
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they had no experience in this area and would need training.
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1 41. Saama did not correct its misrepresentations to the Gates Foundation.
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1 50. The Saama presenter then admitted that he did not have MicroStrategy on his
2 computer and further admitted that he had never personally used MicroStrategy, despite
4 51. After learning that Saamas developers did not know how to use the program,
5 or even have the program installed on their computers, the Gates Foundation insisted that
6 Saama bring in someone with relevant experience. Eventually, Saama replaced its developer
9 52. In June 2016, Saama again switched the development team working on the
11 53. On June 27, 2016, Saama told the Gates Foundation that it could not meet its
12 July delivery date. Saama then promised that the Phase 1 would be complete in August 2016.
13 54. Saama did not complete Phase 1 in August, and it again delayed the launch to
14 September 2016.
15 55. In early September 2016, Saama told the Gates Foundation that it expected the
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3 60. This version was unusable for all but a handful of Gates Foundation
4 employees, because Saama developers had been unable to create a program that kept sensitive
5 financial data, such as employee salaries, medical leave, and benefits, secure.
6 61. In addition, the Gates Foundation alerted Saama about a bug in the beta
7 software in October 2016, shortly after the beta version launched. Saama assured the Gates
8 Foundation that it could fix this bug in 48 hours. But by February 2017, the bug had still not
11 62. Throughout the project, the Gates Foundation held weekly meetings with
12 Saama project leaders regarding the status of the Platform. In these meetings, Saama
13 continued to misrepresent the nature, scope, and gravity of the issues that plagued its attempt
14 to build the Platform and the experience of its team.
15 63. The Gates Foundation also met with key members of Saama leadership to
16 address the status of the project. One Saama program manager agreed with the Gates
17 Foundation that Saama had brought in the wrong team and assured the Gates Foundation
18 that the project status would improve with a new team. It did not.
19 64. Eventually, after seeing no improvement, in September 2016, the Gates
20 Foundation escalated its concerns to the highest level of Saama leadership: Saamas Chief
21 Executive Officer, Suresh Katta. Mr. Katta apologized for Saamas repeated failures and
22 promised to correct the Platform issues by bringing in more experienced team members.
23 65. Assured by these representations from Saamas CEO, the Gates Foundation
24 continued to work with Saama and chose not to terminate its contract.
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1 66. Nevertheless, Mr. Kattas representations did not lead to improved results. In
2 late September 2016, Saama once again changed its delivery date to December 2016.
3 67. By early December, it became clear to the Gates Foundation that Saama, in
4 spite of its continued assurances, including assurances from its CEO, could not meet the
5 December date. The Gates Foundation began to search elsewhere for a development team
7 68. By January 2017, Saama yet again missed the Phase 1 delivery date.
17 71. The Gates Foundation alerted Saama that it had violated Section 12 of the
18 MSA and that, as a result, the Gates Foundation was terminating the contract for cause.
19 72. At the time the contract was terminated, approximately 90% of Saamas
20 software code was nonfunctional or unusable. Saamas product was so full of material
21 defects that it had to be scrapped entirely.
22 73. The Gates Foundation hired a third party, North Highland Company, to build
23 the recommended Platform. To date, the Gates Foundation has had to pay North Highland
24 Company and other third-party contractors roughly $710,000 to address and remedy Saamas
25 failures. Unlike Saama, North Highland Company was able to build a functional product and
26 did so swiftly.
1 74. In addition, the Gates Foundations own personnel have spent roughly
3 75. The Gates Foundation paid Saama approximately $2.8 million. This money
4 was paid after Saama misrepresented its capabilities. In exchange for the $2.8 million, the
5 Gates Foundation received a non-functional product that could not even keep basic sensitive
6 data secure.
26 3
See Saama Technologies, Inc. Why Saama, (accessed September 21, 2017 at 9:00 AM),
https://www.saama.com/the-saama-difference/why-saama/ama; see also Saama Technologies,
K&L GATES LLP
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 925 FOURTH AVENUE, SUITE 2900
SEATTLE, WA 98104-1158
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF- 13 TELEPHONE: +1 206 623 7580
FACSIMILE: +1 206 623 7022
Case 2:17-cv-01450 Document 1 Filed 09/25/17 Page 14 of 23
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Inc. About Us, (accessed September 21, 2017 at 9:00 AM), https://www.saama.com/about-
26 us/who-we-are/
1 81. Saama has also allowed its investors to use the Gates Foundations name and
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12 82. Saamas use of the Gates Foundations name and mark not only violates the
14 terminated the MSA for cause after Saama charged it millions but failed to deliver anything of
15 value. In using the Gates Foundations name, Saama is misrepresenting its relationship with
18 Count I
Breach of Contract
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83. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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84. Saama and the Gates Foundation entered into a binding contract in August
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2015. Both parties had an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract and to obtain
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legal advice prior to its execution.
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25
4
See Carrkick Capital Partners, Saama Announces Fluid Analytics for Life Sciences,
26 (September 21, 2017 at 9:10AM), http://carrickcapitalpartners.com/saama-announces-fluid-
analytics-for-life-sciences-orchestration-stack-for-fastest-impact/
K&L GATES LLP
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 925 FOURTH AVENUE, SUITE 2900
SEATTLE, WA 98104-1158
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF- 15 TELEPHONE: +1 206 623 7580
FACSIMILE: +1 206 623 7022
Case 2:17-cv-01450 Document 1 Filed 09/25/17 Page 16 of 23
1 85. The Gates Foundation performed each and every contractual obligation
2 required of it.
3 86. Saama failed to perform its obligations in a good and workmanlike manner
5 87. Saama failed to perform its services in a manner consistent with industry
7 88. Saama failed to provide a product free from material defects in workmanship
9 89. Saama did not obtain the Gates Foundations permission before using its name
10 or marks in Saamas advertisements, press releases, and publications, as required by the MSA.
12 90. As a result of Saamas breaches, the Gates Foundation has suffered substantial
13 losses. The Gates Foundation gave Saama approximately $2.8 million and received nothing of
14 value in return.
15 91. The Gates Foundation has spent approximately $710,000 hiring third parties to
16 perform Saamas obligations. In addition, the Gates Foundation has lost at least $925,000 in
18 92. The Gates Foundation is entitled to an injunction that prohibits Saama from
19 using the Gates Foundation name and mark in Saama publications or on the websites of
22 to be proven at trial.
23 Count II
Fraud
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94. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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1 95. Saama misrepresented its employees skills and experience to secure and keep
2 the Gates Foundation as a customer. Saama made these misrepresentations with the intent to
3 secure more work orders and to prevent the Gates Foundation from terminating the parties
4 contract.
5 96. For example, Saama falsely represented that its employees were experts in
6 areas where they had no training or experience. These misrepresentations were material.
7 97. Saama knew that these representations were false. Employees told Saama that
8 these representations were false. Saama failed to correct these false representations or inform
10 98. Saama intended for the Gates Foundation to act on these misrepresentations by
11 keeping Saama as a contractor. Saama wanted the Gates Foundation to believe that Saamas
12 employees had experience and expertise to deliver the project when in fact they did not.
13 99. The Gates Foundation rightfully relied on Saamas statements regarding its
14 employees skillset and experience. Relying on these false and misleading statements, the
15 Gates Foundation decided to continue its relationship with Saama for a year and a half.
16 100. At the time of reliance, the Gates Foundation did not know that Saamas
20 Count III
Negligent Misrepresentation
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102. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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103. Saama supplied the Gates Foundation with information that was false in order
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to prompt the Gates Foundation to issue it work orders. This false information includes, but is
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not limited to, (1) incorrect information about employee skills; (2) incorrect information
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1 regarding the scope and timeline of the project; and (3) incorrect information regarding the
3 104. Saama knew or should have known that the information it had supplied to the
4 Gates Foundation was going to be used by the Gates Foundation to assess whether it should
8 provided by Saama.
11 Count IV
Professional Negligence
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108. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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109. A companysuch as Saamathat undertakes to render services in the practice
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of a profession is always required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally held by
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members of that profession in good standing.
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110. A technology-based business consulting firm, such as Saama, has the duty to
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possess and exercise ordinary care and diligence in the application of its professional
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knowledge.
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111. A professional relationship existed between the Gates Foundation and Saama.
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112. Saama, a professional, negligently performed the services described in and
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related to the MSA.
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113. Saamas negligence proximately caused significant damages to the Gates
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Foundation, in an amount that will be proven at trial.
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1 Count V
Unjust Enrichment
2
114. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
3
115. Should the Court find that the contract between Saama and the Gates
4
Foundation is void or unenforceable for any reason, the Gates Foundation has an equitable
5
claim against Saama to recover restitution for unjust enrichment.
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116. The Gates Foundation paid Saama approximately $2.8 million. The Gates
7
Foundation provided this money expecting a working Platform that could be used to share
8
secure data. Saama failed to provide the Platform.
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117. Saama has been unjustly enriched at the Gates Foundations expense and
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should be required to return the Gates Foundations money.
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Count VI
12
Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
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118. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
14
119. The MSA required Saama to perform its services in a good and workmanlike
15
manner consistent with industry standards. The MSA also required Saama to produce a
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product that was free from material defects in workmanship and fit for its intended uses.
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120. The MSA did not provide precise instructions for the creation of the Platform.
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Saama thus had an implied duty to perform its obligations in a reasonable way that would
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allow both parties to obtain the fruit of the MSA.
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121. To the extent that Saama actually performed its obligations, the manner in
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which it did so was cursory, negligent, and otherwise insufficient, such that Saama violated
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the duty implied in every contract to perform in good faith and allow both parties to realize
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the benefit of their respective bargains.
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122. As a result of Saamas breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
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dealing, the Gates Foundation suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
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1 Count VII
Trademark Infringement Under the Lanham Act - 15 U.S.C. 1114
2
123. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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124. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is a protected trade name and
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trademark owned by the Gates Foundation.
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125. Saama wrongfully used Foundations protected trademark without the Gates
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Foundations permission, in order to promote, market, or sell Saamas products and services.
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This wrongful and unauthorized use of the Gates Foundations mark constitutes trademark
8
infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1114.
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126. Saamas wrongful use was an intentional and willful infringement of the Gates
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Foundations marks. The intentional and willful infringement of the Gates Foundations
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marks has caused and will continue to cause damage to the Gates Foundation, in an amount to
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be proven at trial.
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127. The intentional and willful infringement of the Gates Foundations marks is
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causing irreparable harm to the Gates Foundation, for which there is no adequate remedy at
15
law.
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128. The Gates Foundation is entitled to recover damages, and to recover its costs,
17
in an amount to be proven at trial. The Gates Foundation is also entitled to injunctive relief
18
against Saama.
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129. The Gates Foundation is further entitled to recover statutory damages, treble
20
damages, and attorneys fees.
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Count VIII
22
False Advertisement Under the Lanham Act - 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)
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130. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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1 131. Saama has used the Gates Foundations name in commerce, such as on its
2 website, in a manner that misrepresents the relationship between Saama and the Gates
3 Foundation.
4 132. Saamas use of the Gates Foundations name deceives persons into believing
5 that there is an affiliation, connection, association, or sponsorship between Saama and the
6 Gates Foundation.
7 133. Saamas unauthorized use of the Gates Foundations name deceives third
8 persons into believing that the Gates Foundation approves of Saamas goods, services, and
9 commercial activateswhen in fact the Gates Foundation has condemned Saamas work.
10 134. The Gates Foundation falls within the zone of interests protected by section
12 135. Saamas statements have directly and proximately caused injury to the Gates
15 Foundation for violation of 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) of the Lanham Act. The Gates Foundation is
16 entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. The Gates Foundation is also entitled
19 Count IX
Unfair Business Practices - RCW 19.86.010 et seq.
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138. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference.
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139. Saama has an established pattern or practice of promising to provide services it
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cannot or will not deliver. Approximately 20% to 25% of its engagements result in delivery
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problems.
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140. Saama routinely makes false promises regarding the scope, budget and
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timeline of its services in order to deceive consumers into contracting with Saama. This
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1 routine deception constitutes unfair business practices under the Washington Consumer
3 141. In an effort to further deceive consumers, Saama has misused the Gates
4 Foundations name to promote, market, or sell Saamas products and services. The use of the
5 Gates Foundations name constitutes an unfair business practices under the Washington
7 142. Saamas deceptions, including but not limited to its routine deception during
8 the assessment phase and the misuse of the Gates Foundations marks, constitute an unfair
9 or deceptive practice occurring in trade or commerce that impacts the public interest and has
11 143. Saamas unfair business practices have caused and will continue to cause
12 damage to the Gates Foundation, and they are causing irreparable harm for which there is no
14 144. Saamas actions violate RCW 19.86.010 et seq., entitling the Gates Foundation
15 to injunctive relief and recovery of its actual damages. The Gates Foundation is also entitled
1 as well as all others in active concert or participation with Saama (e.g., its investors), from
2 using the Gates Foundation name or marks in association with Saamas services; and
3 (g) Such other and additional relief to the Gates Foundation as may be just and
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