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Gerrymandering Index
Gerrymandering Index
Index
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If you are voting in congressional elections this fall and you live in many parts of
the United States, the chances are good that your vote does not matter. In fact,
you may already know this and so will decline to vote. The United States has one
of the lowest voter turnout rates of any democracy in the world (54% in years of
presidential elections and under 40% in mid-term elections). Further, few districts
are competitive with only four Congressional incumbents losing to challengers in
2002, the fewest in history. 1
There are many factors contributing to these electoral ills, but Gerrymandering affects election outcomes in a number of
one of them, gerrymandering — the practice of crafting district ways:
boundaries for political gain — appears to be getting worse.
Recent battles in Texas, California, Georgia and New York have • Reduces Electoral Competition — gerrymandering creates
highlighted the increasing sophistication with which the po- larger margins of victory and enables the creation of ‘safe
litical parties carry out the practice. In Texas, after Republican seats’.
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay led a 2003 effort to ger- • Reduces Voter Turnout — as the chance of affecting the out-
rymander the previously approved 2002 districts, Democratic come of an election is diminished, the number of voters is
legislators fled to Oklahoma and New Mexico in an attempt reduced and campaigns have few incentives to increase
to prevent a legislative quorum. The Republican gerrymander turnout.
was seen as payback for the Democrats gerrymandering of • Outcomes Determined in Primaries — since many seats are
the districts after the 1990 census. The plan was approved, decided in the party primary election, only registered party
but led to a Supreme Court challenge. In its June 2006 deci- members receive a meaningful vote. This can also indirectly
sion, the Supreme Court validated the Texas redistricting. The lead to a more partisan political dialogue - if there are more
7-to-2 decision allows redrawing of districts to occur as often contests decided in the primaries, partisan stances on a
as a state chooses, so long as it does not harm minorities by range of issues will tend to dominate since party members
violating the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In New York, Republicans are effectively the only voters.
in the northern part of the state maintain a perpetual majority • Increases Incumbent Advantage — incumbents are often
in the State Senate by incorporating large prison populations both engineering the gerrymandering and are the beneficia-
located there when determining population, but with the clear ries of it.
understanding that the prison inmates will not be able to vote.
In Georgia, Republicans took control of the state government So we know gerrymandering happens and we know some
in 2004 and promptly re-drew the previous Democratic gerry- of its effects. Why would Avencia, a software development
mander in 2005. The Democrats have been accused of doing firm, research this topic? In 2005 Avencia began developing
the same in Maryland in 2002. a software service that would enable some local Philadelphia
non-profits to match their member addresses with the local
council person representing the address in order to support
political advocacy efforts. As we expanded the service beyond
3. Is the problem getting worse? Avencia develops web- Figure 1. 1812 political cartoon run in the Boston Weekly Messenger de-
based software that uses geospatial technology for crime anal- picting the salamander-like district that inspired the term gerrymandering.
Cicero
Calculating the compactness of local and federal districts re- Local Federal
vealed the following districts to be the least compact at the
local and federal levels. A look at the maps of these areas 1. Raleigh, NC – District B 1. California – District 23
quickly reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of using Compactness Value: 1.2 Compactness Value: 2.5
tion, that consideration does not fall under the category of ger-
rymandering.
gerrymandered, what does this mean for the index? Is there Compactness Value: 7.62 GI: 0.59 (Compactness: 12.15)
is less compact than the city in which it is located, while a GI: 0.25 (Compactness: 7.62) GI: 0.60 (Compactness: 8.39)
Version 2 Weaknesses
The local districts scoring the lowest on the updated Gerry- 4. Miami, FL – District 2 9. Phoenix, AZ – District 7
GI: 0.42 (Compactness: 2.51) GI: 0.69 (Compactness: 4.40)
mandering Index are shown in Table 3. From examining the
new results, it is clear that by reflecting the municipal and
state boundaries in the index score, we are seeing more lo-
cations that are likely being gerrymandered. However, at the
local level, it is likely that our index still needs some work. In
particular, Baltimore’s 10th District is clearly heavily influenced
by its border with the Chesapeake Bay. Though non-contiguity 5. Baltimore, MD - District 10 10. El Paso, TX – District 2
is often a sign of gerrymandering, in this case it is a result of GI: 0.46 (Compactness: 4.79) GI: 0.70 (Compactness: 11.90
potential gerrymandering, but that the particulars of each case Most Gerrymandered Local Districts —
should also be used as a guide. Table 4 depicts the top 10 Modified
most gerrymandered local districts after eliminating those that
remain highly influenced by municipal and natural boundaries. 1. Philadelphia, PA – District 7 6. Tampa, FL – District 7
GI: 0.25 (Compactness: 7.62) GI: 0.60 (Compactness: 8.39)
Table 5 depicts the most gerrymandered federal districts, none
of which were eliminated based on boundary considerations.
by averaging the compactness of all districts in the state and GI: 0.07 (Compactness: 2.74) GI: 0.10 (Compactness: 4.07)
2. Pennsylvania GI = .34 GI: 0.08 (Compactness: 3.45) GI: 0.11 (Compactness: 6.04)
3. Alabama GI = .36
4. Ohio GI = .44
5. Illinois GI = .47
6. New Jersey GI = .47
7. South Carolina GI = .51
8. Connecticut GI = .53
9. New Hampshire GI = .58 3. California - District 23 8. Arizona – District 2 *
10. California GI = .59 GI: 0.09 (Compactness: 2.54) GI: 0.13 (Compactness: 8.06)
These histograms represent the distribution of compact- and below the average. Only districts with compactness
ness scores for local and federal electoral districts. Com- scores more than one standard deviation below the mean
pactness scores can range from 0 to 100 with higher were used in the calculation of the Gerrymandering Index.
scores indicating more compact districts. The average
compactness score is indicated in red and the blue lines
represent scores that area one standard deviation above
Mean 27.15
Standard Deviation 14.69
Minimum 1.98
Maximum 76.08
Mean 21.64
Standard Deviation 11.22
Minimum 2.54
Maximum 72.61
While attempts to gerrymander political districts have existed ences in the compactness scores for the two sets of dis-
for almost as long as geographic representation, there has tricts, finding that congressional districts are indeed less
been concern in recent years that the widespread availability compact now than they were ten years ago. While it is be-
of desktop GIS technology as well as specialized redistricting yond the scope of this paper to determine exact reasons
tools has encouraged a more pervasive use of gerrymandering for this change, the advances in geographic technology dur-
as a technique for both of the major political parties to acquire ing the intervening years certainly provide ample support
and retain political power. When combined with detailed demo- for any lawmaker with gerrymandering on his or her mind.
graphic data about households as well as detailed databases
of party registration, campaign donations and poll attendance, This histogram compares the distributions of compactness
it has become possible to predict aggregate voter outcomes scores for federal districts during the 104th and 109th Con-
with substantial precision. These tools have enabled political gresses. The later districts are indeed less compact than the
parties to dramatically increase the efficiency of their gerry- earlier, and since we know that individual state shapes have
mandering efforts. not changed during that time, the result is highly indicative of
increased gerrymandering, potentially related to the improve-
There is no question that elections in the U.S. House of Rep- ment in geographic technologies during the intervening years.
resentatives have become less competitive in recent years Though the difference in compactness between the two dis-
with fewer seats decided by margins of less than 10%. But tributions below is not great, it is statistically significant (t-test,
do we see an increase in the amount of gerrymandering re- p<0.05). It is up to the reader to determine the real-world
flected in the geometry of the districts? In trying to answer significance of such a change.
this question, Avencia analyzed the shapes of congressional
districts from the 104th Congress (1995 — 1996) with that
of the 109th Congress (2005 -— 2006). We analyzed differ-
104th 109th
Mean 23.40 21.64
Sandard Deviation 12.62 11.22
Minimum 0.70 2.54
Maximum 72.60 72.61
Due to the variety of factors that come into play in determin- National Conference of State Legislatures
ing legislative boundaries, gerrymandering is rarely simple to Redistricting Resources
identify. Truly bizarre and convoluted shapes can result from http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/redist.htm
processes unrelated to partisan redistricting schemes. Physi- State Legislative Redistricting Sites
cal landscape features from coastlines to mountain ranges http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/statesites.htm
impact decisions on where to draw district boundaries and
unusual growth patterns create convoluted cities, rendering ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network
compact district design all but impossible. The gerrymander- http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdy_us/
ing index described in this white paper attempts to quantify
the extent to which a local or federal district may be gerryman- United States Elections Project, George Mason University
dered, based on its level of compactness and that of its city or http://elections.gmu.edu/
state. Because of the combined impacts of political boundar-
ies and physical geography, other factors may be taken into Psephos: Adam Carr’s Election Archive
consideration when looking into a particular district, such as http://psephos.adam-carr.net/
shape, contiguity and respect for political subdivisions. None-
theless, compactness measures are a reliable indicator that Daily Sonic
gerrymandering is likely and point the way to districts worthy http://www.dailysonic.com/segment1039
of higher scrutiny. http://www.dailysonic.com/gerrymander/index.php
1. Rob Ritchie, Center for Voting and Democracy (Fairvote.org) as quoted by BBC News, “Map Redrawing Angers Democrats,” October 8, 2004.
2. Grofman, Bernard and King, Gary. The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry.
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/jp.pdf