Professional Documents
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Agrarian Law
Agrarian Law
b) Attention and Cultivation - leasehold tenant should personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land; whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased;
d) Law governing the relationship - Civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special law (RA 3844 as amended
by RA 6389). (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974)
3. An overseer of a coconut plantation was not considered a tenant (Zamoras vs. Su, Jr.,
184 SCRA 248 (1990); Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529 (1992).
4. The owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation of
law. (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 197 (1990).
6. Successor-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent are
bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land
(Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 [1992]).
7. The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work on the land
(Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons to
help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).
8. We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is divested of
his landholding and somebody else is installed to became a new landlord. (Oarde, et
al., vs. CA, et al., 780 SCRA 235 [1997]).
9. Tenancy relation was severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm household
ceased from personally working the fishpond (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA
590 (1974).
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10. Since there is no sharing arrangement between the parties, the Court held that
Matienzo is merely an overseer and not a tenant (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA
276 (1981).
11. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been
established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The tenant has a
right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom for cause as
provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 (1989).
12. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as
life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 439
(1988).
13. Security of tenure afforded the tenant-lessee is constitutional (Primero vs. CIR, 101
Phil. 675 (1957); Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967) Once a tenant,
always a tenant.
14. The Supreme Court held that only the tenant-lessee has a right to a homelot and
that members of the immediate family of the tenant are not entitled to a homelot
(Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SCRA 819 (1997).
16. The lessor who ejects his tenant without the courts authorization shall be liable for:
a) Fine or imprisonment;
b) Damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or
imprisonment for unauthorized dispossession;
c) Payment of attorneys fees incurred by the lessee; and
d) The reinstatement of the lessee.
17. The Supreme Court in upholding its constitutionality held that there is no legal basis
for declaring LOI No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and taking
of property without just compensation grounds. (Zurbano vs. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333
(1989)
18. In the case of Locsin vs. Valenzuela which was promulgated on 19 February 1991,
the Supreme Court explained the legal effect of land being place under OLT as
vesting ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent case dated 13 September
1991 Vinzons Magana vs. Estrella citing Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo which pre-dated
the Locsin case, the High Tribunal ruled that mere issuance of a certificate of land
transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee.
19. The consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not needed in the determination of just
compensation pursuant to Section 18 of RA No. 6657 (Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. CA and Pascual (G.R. No. 128557, December 29, 1999).
20. Just Compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court, that
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the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used
to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
21. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section II, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petition for determination of just
compensation has already been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only
means that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken
under the CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusive,
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings
are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For the matter, the law
may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless,
resort to courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of
the legality of administrative action (Phil. Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000).
22. The Supreme Court decided not to apply that 6% increment to the valuation because
the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARADs use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in the
valuation of the private respondents land (following the ruling in the Court of
Appeals case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No. 23168; Rollo, p. 36) (LBP vs.
CA and Jose Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)
23. The DAR must first resolve the issues raised in a protest/application before the
distribution of covered lands to farmer-beneficiaries may be effected. (Roxas & Co.,
Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17 December, 1999).
24. The CREATION and JURISDICTION of the DARAB was discussed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995). The Supreme Court held
that:
25. In Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996), complainant filed an
administrative case against the respondent Judge for taking cognizance of the
ILLEGAL DETAINER case filed by their landowner against them notwithstanding
knowledge of previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer
case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of
the complainants containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent
judge took cognizance of the illegal detainer case. Knowledge of existing agrarian
legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary
degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the
DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law.
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However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just
compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57). Jurisdiction over
said matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided
by DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA 885 (1990).
26. DARABs Jurisdiction over Agrarian Disputes was also resolved in Central Mindanao
University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86.
28. In the case of Vda. de Areiola vs. Camarines Sur Reg. Agricultural School, et al.,
110 SCRA 517 (1960), the Supreme Court explained the phrase by a third party in
Section 21 of RA 1199 (Ejectment; Violation; Jurisdiction. ---all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party - - -) The Supreme
Court held that when no tenancy relationship between the contending parties exist,
the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction, The law governing agricultural
tenancy, RA 1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises
between a landholder and a tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake
jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former, etc.
29. Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court (SACs) shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation and all criminal offenses. The Supreme held that any effort to
transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR Adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to
Section 57 of RA 6657 and therefore would be void. (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 758 SCRA 263 (1996).
30. It should be stressed that the motion in Fortich were denied on the ground that the
win-win resolution is void and has no legal effect because the decision approving the
concession has already become final and executory. This is the ratio decidendi or
reason of the decision. The statement that LGUs have authority to convert or
reclassify agricultural lands without DAR approval is merely a dictum or expression of
the individual views of the ponente or writer of the Resolution of August 19, 1997. It
does not embody the Courts determination and is not binding (Fortich, et al., vs.
Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457 (August 19, 1999).
31. Agricultural lands expropriated by LGUs pursuant to the power of eminent domain need
not be subject of DAR conversion clearance prior to change in use. (Province of
Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993)
32. Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners
landholding does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners
application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. (Roxas
vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, (December 16, 1999)
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33. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely
outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership
shall be resolved in a separate proceedings before the appropriate trial court
between the claimants thereof. (Jaime Morta, Sr., et al., vs. Jaime Occidental, et al., G.
R. No. 123417, (June 10, 1999) (Note the Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davide
Jr.,)
34. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program, covers
tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops: and (2) there must
be a system of share crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either of these
requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need
not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and
undisturbed.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of
retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2)
there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the
size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares or it could be
more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares
thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of other
agricultural lands.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised
their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under
R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a
landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously
filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the
retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is only entitled to
retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657. (Eudosia Daez and/or Her Heirs
presented by Edriano D. Daez, vs. The Hon. C.A. et. al., 325 SCRA 857).
35. Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them
in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to
decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the
Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not
with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr.
Lorayes with indirect contempt (LBP vs. Severino Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611.
(August 5, 2003)
There are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1)
though a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court
MOTU PROPRIO.
36. We hold that our decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of
appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts is a rule of procedure which
affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice
LBPs right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be
dismissed outright in mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits thereof.
It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who
already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the
issuance of said doctrine. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon, et al., G.R.
No. 143275 (March 20, 2003)(Note: Sec. 60 in relation to Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657).
37. The Supreme Court ruled that if landowners are called to sacrifice in the interest of
land reform, their acceptance of Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural
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38. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus seeking to compel respondent
GSIS to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as payment for a pre-existing
obligation (Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281).
39. It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands
involving agrarian reform although such valuation may only be considered preliminary
as the final determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. (Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
40. Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld
the constitutionality of the payment of just compensation for Presidential Decree 27
lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18. R.A. 6657. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
41. Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 granting the
Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction (administrative proceeding) to
determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction
over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the provisions of Sec. 57,
R.A. 6657 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction (judicial
proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under Republic Act No. 6657.
(Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
42. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation
has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. (Philippine Veterans
Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
43. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive"
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are
not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law
may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless,
resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322
SCRA 139).
44. In Vda. De Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-
tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA
167).
45. The findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantial
evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal. ( De Chavez vs. Zobel, 55
SCRA 26).
46. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no reason
to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6
of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above. (Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343).
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47. That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not
conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution.
Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide
for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law
is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of
public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main
objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. (Ibid.)
48. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for
such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. (Ibid.)
49. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by
law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel
action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action
only. (Ibid.)
50. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the
just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious as
the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification
of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is
not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree
today. (Ibid.)
51. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the
other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the
areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because
the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a
bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any
time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are
also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other
properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of
just compensation. (Ibid.)
52. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions. (Ibid.)
53. CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention
limits. (Ibid.)
54. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of an action. There can be no question that
at the time the complaints in CAR Cases Nos. 760-802-UP'78 and 806-810-UP'78 were
filed, the RTC of Pangasinan had no jurisdiction over them pursuant to Section 12 (a)
and (b) of P.D. No. 946 which is vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with
original exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted and obligations
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55. On 22 July 1987, the President of the Republic of the Philippines promulgated
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 providing for the mechanisms for the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131
dated 22 July 1987. Section 17 thereof provides: "SEC. 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of
the DAR.- The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA). x x x
The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial
Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal." This
provision not only repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of B.P. Blg. 129. The above-
quoted Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 was the governing law at the time the challenged
decision was promulgated. Then, too, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, substantially reiterates said Section 17 while Sections 56 and 57
provide for the designation by this Court of at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial
Court in each province to act as a special agrarian court which shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation and
the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. (Tiongson vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197).
56. The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions No. 474 and
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well settled.
More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of
Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado
Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven
hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more
than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families". (Vinzons-Magana vs. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536).
57. It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion but not the discretion
itself. The writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion but not the
discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but not specific action where
the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion. (Sharp International
Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299).
58. Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for
more than two (2) years fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Agrarian Relations. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567).
60. Presidential Decree No. 816 imposes the sanction of forfeiture where the "agricultural
lessee x x x deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or
amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years."
Petitioners cannot be said to have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They
acted in accordance with the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good
faith. Forfeiture of their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as
decreed by the CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted. (Curso
vs. CA, 128 SCRa 567).
61. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible
entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail
themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform.
Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates the above provisions of the Act
shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court. ( Central
Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).
62. The DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it
involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by
the school to be necessary for its purposes.
There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute in the implementation of the CARP.
An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial
rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture. ( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86).
63. Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 deemed repealed by Section 17
Executive Order No. 229.- The above quoted provision should be deemed to have
repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then
Courts of Agrarian Relations with the original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and
questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the
Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.
(Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609).
64. The Department of Agrarian Reform is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the
DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to
assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).
65. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts,"
which are Regional trial Courts designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within
each province-to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.
(Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176).
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66. The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold contract is an issue
which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the Regional Trial Courts to resolve. (Ibid.)
67. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the
parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
(Ibid.)
68. The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except on the
aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over which regular courts
have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885).
69. Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever between
the parties that could bring a controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has no jurisdiction. (Heirs of
the Late Herman Rey Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293).
70. The CARETAKER of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and,
hence, a tenant. (Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88).
71. The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation.
(COCOMA vs. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
72. There are no squatters in Agricultural lands. Squatters are only found in
URBAN COMMUNITIES, not in RURAL AREAS. (On Presidential Decree No. 772-
Illegal Squatting) (People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663).
73. It bears noting that the Decision, which prescribed for Rule 42 as the correct mode of
appeal from the decisions of the SAC, was promulgated by this Court only on 10
September 2002, while the Resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said case
giving it a prospective application was promulgated on 20 March 2003. Respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 July 1998 via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. Though appeal under said rule is not the proper mode of appeal,
said erroneous course of action cannot be blamed on respondent. It was of the belief
that such recourse was the appropriate manner to questioned the decisions of the SAC.
In Land Bank v. De Leon, we held:
Thus, while the rule is that the appropriate mode of appeal from the decisions of
the SAC is through petition for review under Rule 42, the same rule is inapplicable in the
instant case. The Resolution categorically stated that said ruling shall apply only to those
cases appealed after 20 March 2003 (Fernando Gabatin, et al., vs. LBP, G.R. No.
148223, November 25 2004)
74. The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determination of just
compensation absent respondent Land Banks participation. Logically, it follows that
respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of just
compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program.
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There is nothing in the Rules of Court that prohibit a party in an action before the
lower court to make an appeal merely on the ground that he is not an indispensable
party. The Rules of Court does not distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable
party or not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement is that the persons appealing
must have a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must be aggrieved
or prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved or prejudiced when
his interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the lawsuit, is injuriously affected
by the judgment, order or decree. The fact that a person is made a party to a case
before the lower court, and eventually be made liable if the judgment be against him,
necessarily entitles him to exercise his right to appeal. To prohibit such party to appeal is
nothing less than an outright violation of the rules on fair play.
75. The Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. In BPI v. Court of Appeal, 402 SCRA 449 this Court explained:
. . . . . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.
76. In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, this Court even went on to say
that without the Land Bank, there would be no amount to be established by the
government for the payment of just compensation, thus:
77. We must stress, at the outset, that the taking of private lands under the agrarian
reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a number
of cases, we have stated that in computing the just compensation for expropriating
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking not at the time of
the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration. This being do,
then in determining the value of the land for the payment of just compensation, the
time of taking should be the basis. In the instant case, since the dispute over the
valuation of the land depends on the rate of the GSP used in the equation, it
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necessarily follows that the GSP should be pegged at the time of the taking of the
properties.
In the instant case, the said taking of the properties was deemed effected on 21
October 1972, when the petitioners were deprived of ownership over their lands in
favor of qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to E.O. No. 228 and by the virtue of P.D.
No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of palay at that time was at P35. Prescinding from
the foregoing discussion, the GSP should be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP at
the time of the taking of the subject property . (Ibid)
78. Petitioners are not rendered disadvantage by the computation inasmuch as they are
entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded
annually pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply
explained by this Court:
79. Petitioners reliance on Land Bank v. Court of Appeals where we ordered Land Bank
to pay the just compensation based on the GSP at the time the PARAD rendered the
decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not well taken. In that case, PARAD, in
its decision, used the GSP at the time of payment, in determining the land value.
When the decision became final and executory, Land Bank, however, refused to pay
the landowner arguing that the PARADs valuation was null and void for want of
jurisdiction. We rules therein that the PARAD has the authority to determine the
initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform. Thus, the decision of the PARAD
was binding on Land Bank. Land Bank was estopped from questioning the land
valuation made by PARAD because it participated in the valuation proceedings and
did not appeal the said decision. Hence, Land Bank was compelled to pay the land
value based on the GSP at the time of payment. (Ibid)
80. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from
judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion
for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks
volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute
excusable negligence. (LBP vs. Hon. Elis G.C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May
16, 2005).
81. Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but
a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it,
much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The trial court
therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it
cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment. (Ibid)
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82. At any rate, in the Philippines Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, We declare
that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second
refers to judicial proceedings.
83. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not
at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President,
Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding
did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with
PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in
Paris v. Alfeche. (Ibid)
86. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by
respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case
of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a
controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies, even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in
character, as in this case. (Ibid)
87. Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows
that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the
assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as
a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory
provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and
38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA
6657, which reads:
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88. It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be received by the Supreme
Court in an appeal by certiorari. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals (which are ordinary accorded great respect) is when these are based on
speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial
evidence. (Samahan ng Magsasaka San Jose represented by Dominador
Maglalang vs. Marietta Valisno, et al., G.R. No. 158314 June 3, 2004).
89. The relevant laws governing the minors redemption in 1973 are the general Civil
Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1327 of
the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
Article 1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent is viodable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by the minors in
1973 was merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab initio, as petitions
argue.
Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered into by the
minors would require that: (1) the plaintiffs must have an interest in the contract;
and (2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the party responsible for the
defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides in part that [t]he action for the
annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of
those with whom they contracted. The action to annul the minors redemption in
1973, therefore, was one that could only have been initiated by the minors
themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved parties in whom the law itself vests the
right to file suit. This action was never initiated by the minors. We thus quote
with approval the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals:
91. On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending
on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of
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a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the
administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (DAR vs. APEX Investment and Financing Corporation; G.R. No.
149422, April 10, 2003).
92. In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrieved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests
(after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process.
Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued
forever, the landowners has to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their
petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved
their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for
petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously,
petitioner might continue to alienate respondents lots during the pendency of its
protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the
circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Ibid)
94. In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the
Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latters old address.
Petitioner explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those
notices upon respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment
and Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that
personal service could not be made, however, there is no showing that petitioner
caused the service of the notices via registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of
R.A. 6657, On this point, petitioner claimed that the notices were sent not only by
registered mail but also by personal delivery and that there was actual receipt by
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95. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands. Section 3 defines agricultural land, as land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. (Ibid)
96. In dismissing outright the petition for certiorari, the CA reasoned that since it
(petitioner LBP) was assailing the writ of execution issued by respondent Provincial
Adjudicator, then its recourse was to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:
Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, however, Rule 43 does not
apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because the same is not a final
order within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Court fairly recently
explained, a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to
carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or a judgment.
It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.
As such an order or execution is generally not appealable. (LBP vs. Hon.
Pepito Planta and Faustino Tabla, G.R. No. 152324 April 29, 2005.
97. On the other hand certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in part,
that the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination
and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be
brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice hereof. In relation to this provision, Section
16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribed that any party who does not agree with the
decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the
court for final determination of just compensation. (Ibid)
98. Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between the
period to file certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days from
receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Section 4 of
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judgment, order or
resolution). The Courts holds that Section 54 of RA No. 6657 prevails since it is
a substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or cases
pertaining to the application, implementation enforcement of interpretation of
agrarian reform laws. However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is
extendible, but such extension shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
99. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion for extension on the grounds that the petition which petitioner
intended to file is not the proper remedy. . .
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100. Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or
procedural imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and
rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding. (Paulina Diaz, et al., vs. Carlos Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345,
March 19, 2004)
101. The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of
the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation
patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations,
Section 12(g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of
Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of
emancipation patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such
cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure.
102. Only questions of law, however, can be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact by the CA are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so
if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of the DARAB, an
administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized
jurisdiction. This Court is not thus duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, subject to certain
exceptions. (Ibid)
103. Petitioner furthermore argues that the amortization payments she made to the Land
Bank in the amount of P9,825.80 should not have been forfeited in favor of
respondent. On this score, the Court finds for petitioner. While the DARAB has
jurisdiction to Order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficiary,
forfeiture should be made in favor of the government and not to the reallocatee
of the landholding. (Ibid)
104. In Monsanto v. Zerna, (G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001) it was held that for
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it
would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to it: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
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lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
In the case a bar, the element that the parties must be the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement
depends, is absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of
ownership of both parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No.
5198, by virtue of a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private
respondents assert ownership over Lots Nos. 5198-A, 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D
on the basis of an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do
the records show any juridical tie or tenurial relationship between the parties
predecessors-in-interest. The questioned lot it allegedly declared for taxation
purposes in the name of petitioners father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to
have any connection with the private respondents nor with their alleged predecessor-
in-interest, Caridad Fuentebella. (Rodolfo Arzaga, et al., vs. Salvacion Copias, et
al., G.R. No. 152404, March 28, 2003).
105. In Chico v. Court of Appeals, (348 Phil. 37 1998) also an action for recovery of
possession, the Court was confronted with the same jurisdictional issue. The
petitioner therein claimed ownership over the disputed property pursuant to a final
judgment, while the respondents asserted right to possession by virtue of an
alleged tenancy relationship with one who has no juridical connection with the
petitioners. In holding that it is the trial court and not the DARAB which has
jurisdiction over the case, the Court ruled that the absence of a juridical tie between
the parties or their predecessor-in-interest negates the existence of the element of
tenancy relationship.
106. The basic rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is that the
petitioners action does not involve an agrarian dispute, but one for recovery of
possession, which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trail Courts.
(Ibid)
108. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted
from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:
The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and
found to be necessary cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would
want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The
words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the Plain meaning rules or
verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of
a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. (Ibid) (Note: To be
exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived
therefrom, that must be actually and exclusively used for educational
purposes.)
109. In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP
beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the court to exercise
great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave
abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was
none.
110. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his theory of the
case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that courts of
justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. A
judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which
the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and
invalid The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present case, the
Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of Appeals,
which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the Spouses Velasco from the land
under RA 3844. (Henry Mon vs. CA, Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
118292, April 2, 2004).
112. Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to accomplish the
noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid and has the force of law. The
rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court
when it stated that The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the
lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on
the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular is meant to remedy the situation
where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor
against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual
obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed circular essentially sought to
accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it
has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. (Ibid)
113. The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816 and
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that
the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until
the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6,
implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease
rental after the value of the land has been determine. (Ibid)
114. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in
implementation of P.D. 27 these must not be read in isolation, but rather, in
conjunction with each other. (Private respondent, however splits hairs, so to
speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the
Circular implement P.D. 816, whereas it is expressed stated in the Circular that it
was issued in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but
rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be
made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been
determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations
to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly there is no inconsistency
between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each
other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the
agricultural property. (Ibid)
115. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has
been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court. Further, that P.D. 27 does not
suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly
emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited
case of De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and
upheld as part and parcel of the land of the land, viz: There is no doubt then, as
set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree
is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question.
That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has
spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because
of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law.
It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this
basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the
promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the
small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new
Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well
as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any
other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role
assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy
goals. (Ibid)
116. Eminent Domain; Just compensation; the determination of just compensation under
P.D. No. 27, like in section 16(d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or
conclusive unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation
of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties
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may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. The
determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in section 16 (d) of R.A.
6657 or the CARP Law is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the
succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228: x x x In the event of dispute with
the landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary,
the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land
Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its
submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No.
26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances, In the event a party questions in
court the resolution of the dispute the landowners compensation shall still be
processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust
Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5
hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court. Clearly therefrom,
unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property
by the Barrio Committee on Land production and the DAR the parties may bring the
dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a
task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. (LBP vs. CA and Lilia
Gonzales, 387 SCRA 15).
117. Republic Act No. 6657; The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the
CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27 R.A. 6657 covers all public and
private agricultural and including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229;
while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides
for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically
states: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with
respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It cannot be gainsaid,
therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way,
P.D.27.And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A 6657
shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under
P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A 6657.
118. We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that matter
is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in
his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance
in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply
because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the
mandate of the law. (Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 616) (cited in Victor G.
Valencia vs. CA, G.R. No. 122363; April 29, 2003)
119. From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee
cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under to Sec. 6 of R.A. No.
3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee,
although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless
expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the
contract of lease the occupants of the property are merely civil law subleases
whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement.
(Victor Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003).
120. Agrarian Reform ; Presidential Decree No. 27; Homesteads; Parcels of land,
though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are
covered by land reform under Presidential Decree 27. Petitioners contention is
without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation
Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all
tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a
system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or
not. The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein
does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its
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121. The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute it is premised on
the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or
will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. Clearly, the right to retain an
area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the
landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it
upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is
present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted;
thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally retain any portion
of her landholdings. (Ibid)
122. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for as long as they continue to cultivate them.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain
the original homesteads only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That
parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt
them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the
original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands
from land reform coverage. (Ibid)
123. Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land
they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest,
within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the court held
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform: It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers
as of October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion
of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged
member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however,
that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably
to the constitutional requirement. (Ibid)
124. Executive Order 228; Evidently, the law recognizes that the lands exact value,
or the just compensation to be given the landowner cannot just be assumed
it must be determined with certainly before the land titles are transferred
although Executive Order 228, provides that the total lease rentals paid for the
lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does
not sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered
as equivalent to just compensation for the land. Presidential Decree 27 and
subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights acquired by
tenant-farmers under PD 27, provides in detail the computation to be used in arriving
at the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes
that their exact value, or the just compensation to be given to the landowner,
cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainly before the land titled
are transferred. Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the
lands from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not
sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent
to just compensation for the land. The provision significantly designates the lease
rentals as advance not full payment. The determination of the exact value of the
lands cannot simply be brushed aside, as it is fundament to the determination of
whether full payment has been made. (Ibid)
125. Respondent correctly cited the case of Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
where the Court held that in computing the just compensation for expropriation
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proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking [or October 21, 1972],
the effectivity date of P.D. No. 27], not at the time of the rendition of judgment, which
should be taken into consideration. Under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, the
following formula is used to compute the land value for palay:
It should also be pointed out, however, that in the more recent case of Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, The Court categorically ruled: the seizure of
the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 but would
take effect on the payment of just compensation. Under Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657, the following factors are considered in determining just compensation, to wit:
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court deems it more equitable to
apply the ruling in the Natividad case. In said case, The Court applied the provision
of R.A. No. 6657 in computing just compensation for property expropriated under
P.D. No. 278, stating, viz.:
xxxx
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due
private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as
irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors
value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced
that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation
due private respondents in accordance with, and guided, by RA 6657
and existing jurisprudence. (Emphasis supplied).
As previously noted, the property was expropriated under the Operation Land
Transfer scheme of P.D. No. 27 way back in 1972. More than 30 years have passed and
petitioners are yet to benefit from it, while the farmer-beneficiaries have already been
harvesting its produce for the longest time. Events have rendered the applicability of P.D.
No. 27 inequitable. Thus, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 should apply in this case.
(Anacleto R. Menesis, et. al., vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, et. al., G.R. No. 156304;
October 23, 2006)
126. The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of
the DARAB Rules of Procedures, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the
LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such case, they must relate
to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have
been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation
of agrarian laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants
or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB. (Heirs of
Julian dela Cruz, et. al., vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, represented by Benedicto
V. Cruz., G.R. 162890; November 22, 2005)
127. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agricultural, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing , or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and condition of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operation and
beneficiaries, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental (G.R. 123417, 10 June 1999, 308 SCRA 167), this
Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship (4)
that the purposes of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. (ibid)
129. As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. (147 Phil.
301,304 (1971).
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patent and the
character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, it
that where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent thereof is recorded, and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land
Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled
to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In
other words upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a
certificate issued in a registration proceeding (Emphasis supplied).
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are
enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in
fact devotes Chapter IX (Chapter IX: CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER,
EMANCIPATION PATENT, AFFIDAVIT OF NON-TENANCY) on the subject of EPs.
Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as
certificate of title issued in registration proceedings. (Ibid)
130. More importantly, petitioner is not a real party-in-interest in this case. According to
Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgments in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. We stand by the ruling in Fortich v. Corona that farmer-
beneficiaries, who are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-
interest. In Fortich, the farmers who intervened in the case were mere
recommendees. We stated in said case that:
131. In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
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132. The subsequent case of Natalia Realy, Inc. v. DAR reiterated our ruling in the Luz
Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercials and
residential lands are not covered by the CARL. We stressed anew that while
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and
private agricultural lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in
Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hill Subdivision, which are arable yet
still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian
reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.
133. As general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative
redress (Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 378 Phil. 727 (1999). In the instant
case, it is beyond dispute that petitioner failed to resort to proper administrative
recourse in resisting the Notice of Coverage issued by respondent MARO.
Unsuccessful in its attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverage when it lodged its
protest with the incorrect administrative offices, petitioner resorted to a judicial
remedy. The petition for mandamus, which it filed, however, was correctly denied by
the Court of Appeals. Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are
administrative remedies available to petitioner (Gualberto Castro v. Ricardo Gloria,
415 Phil. 645 (2001) (Nicanor T. Santos Devt. Corp. vs. Hon. Sec., DAR, et al.,
G.R. No. 159654; February 28, 2006)
134. Is it settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duly, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely pressed,
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it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Erlinda C. Pefianco v. Ma. Luisa
C. Moral, 379 Phil. 468 (2000). (Ibid).
135. Petitioners filing of an answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it
now raises. As we have said time and again, the active participation of a party in a
case pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount to
a recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts or
bodys jurisdiction. (Alcantara vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land [problems,
361 SCRA 664, 669 [2001]). (Lapanday Agricultural & Devt. Corp. vs. Maximo
Estita, et al., G.R. NO. 162109, January 21, 2005).
136. Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government are
invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To quote from our decision
in Torres vs. Ventura, as reiterated in Corpus vs. Sps. Grospe. (333 SCRA 425,
436 [2000]
137. The court finds that the December 22, 1994 Order of Execution issued by the DAR
Regional Director suffers from jurisdiction and procedural defects as it directed
the relocation of petitioners without first conducting a hearing or survey to determine
the portion of the subject property excluded from the CARP.
138. Petitioners contention that the authority to issue the Order of Execution is vested
with the DARAB and not with the DAR Regional Director is likewise correct.
A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for supporting the field units and
supervising program implementation of the Department within the region. The
function of the DAR Regional Office includes [implementing] laws, policies, plans,
rules and regulations of the Department in the regional area. A similar function is
delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order No. 129-A. Thus, the
functions of the DAR Regional Director are purely administrative, that it , to put into
operation agrarian laws and fill out the details necessary for their implementation,
and not adjudicatory.
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On the other hand, when a dispute arises between parties affected by the
operation of agrarian laws, the controversy should be settled in a adversarial
proceeding before the DARAB, the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR (Section 50, R.A.
No. 6657; Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. the DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agricultural
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). A function
becomes judicial or quasi judicial in nature when the exercise thereof involves the
determination of rights and obligations of the parties. (Ibid).