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Domalsin v. Spouses Valenciano
Domalsin v. Spouses Valenciano
SYLLABUS
DECISION
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CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Before Us is a petition for review which seeks to set aside the decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69415 dated 20 August 2002 which reversed and set aside the
decision 3 of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil
Case No. 01-CV-1582(150) dated 23 January 2002, which affirmed the decision 4 of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tuba-Sablan, Tuba, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 150
dated 20 November 2000, declaring petitioner Frisco F. Domalsin the actual possessor of
the lot in dispute and ordering, inter alia, respondent spouses Juanito and Amalia
Valenciano to vacate and deliver the physical possession thereof to the former, and its
Resolution 5 dated 20 May 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The respective allegations of the parties as contained in the complaint and answer are
substantially summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
The property subject of this action for forcible entry is a parcel of land located at
sitio Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. Respondent Frisco B. Domalsin claims to
be the lawful owner and possessor of said parcel of land since 1979 up to the
present. He declared it for taxation purposes in 1983 as (per) Tax Declaration No.
9540 issued on September 12, 1983 by the Municipal Assessor of Tuba Benguet.
He allegedly introduced improvements consisting of levelling, excavation,
riprapping of the earth and a private road to the river, fruitbearing trees and other
agricultural plants of economic value. He was in continuous, adverse possession
and in the concept of an owner for the past nineteen (19) years.
On August 1, 1998, petitioners Spouses Juanito Valenciano and Amalia
Valenciano (Sps. Valenciano, for brevity) allegedly entered the premises to
construct a building made of cement and strong materials, without the authority
and consent of respondent, by means of force and strategy, and without a
building permit from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH, for
brevity). Respondent protested and demanded that petitioners Sps. Valenciano
halt construction of said building, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, he filed
the instant case.
Petitioners Sps. Valenciano, on the other hand, claimed that the ongoing
construction was with the consent and conformity of the DPWH and in fact the
improvements found in the property were introduced by the residents thereof,
including its first residents, William and Gloria Banuca, and not by respondent.
The premises on which petitioners Sps. Valenciano are constructing their house
were leveled after the earthquake in 1990 by the Banuca spouses. Petitioners Sps.
Valenciano are just starting the construction because the permission was only
given now by Gloria Banuca. 6
On 18 August 1998, petitioner filed before the MCTC of Tuba, Benguet, a complaint for
Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Application for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order plus Damages. 7 The complaint was amended
on 27 August 1998. 8 Per Order dated 19 August 1998, a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) was issued ordering respondents to desist and cease and refrain from continuing
the construction of a house on the land in question. 9
On 27 August 1998, respondent spouses Juanito and Amalia Valenciano filed their Answer
with Opposition to the Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 1 0 On 07
September 1998, they filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint 1 1 to which petitioner
filed a Reply. 1 2
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On 15 September 1998, the MCTC issued another TRO. 1 3
The pre-trial order dated 6 November 1998 contained, among other things, petitioner's
admission that he was temporarily not operating any business in the area, and
respondents' admission regarding the issuance of Tax Declarations on the property in
dispute in petitioner's name. 1 4
Trial ensued. Petitioner presented Mariano Suyam and Tonsing Binay-an, two of his former
truck drivers from 1981 to 1985 in his business of hauling sand, gravel and other
aggregates at Riverside, Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet. DIEACH
Mariano Suyam testified that sometime in 1981, petitioner caused the construction of a
private road leading to the Bued River from Kennon Road. He added that petitioner
constructed two houses, the first was located along the road-right-of-way of Kennon Road
where respondents are now constructing their house, while the second was located below
the private road around 40 to 60 meters down from Kennon Road. He explained that the
first house was used for sleeping quarters and resting center for laborers, while petitioner
used the second one as his quarters. He said William Banuca was hired as foreman in
1983 and that the latter and his family stayed in the second house.
Tonsing Binay-an corroborated the testimony of Suyam as regards the two houses
constructed by petitioner and added that petitioner was the manager of Salamander
Enterprises and had a concession permit from the Bureau of Mines to haul gravel and
sand.
Petitioner testified that he is a lawyer-businessman formerly engaged in trucking business,
hauling sand and gravel, and operated under the name Salamander Enterprises. 1 5 He
narrated that while he was passing Kennon Road, he discovered that a portion of the Bued
River, Camp 3, Tuba Benguet, can be a potential source of supplies for his business.
Though the area was steep and deep, he scouted a place where he can construct a road
from Kennon Road to the Bued River. In the course of cleaning the area, his workers
noticed that the place had been tilled. A certain Castillo Binay-an appeared informing him
that he was the occupant of the site of the proposed private road. After agreeing on the
consideration, the former executed a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim 1 6 over the land in his
favor.
Thereafter, the Office of the Highway District Engineer of Baguio, Ministry of Public
Highways (now Department of Public Works and Highways [DPWH]) issued a permit in
favor of petitioner to extract construction materials at Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet, 1 7 which
was followed by the issuance on 1 October 1981 of Commercial Permit No. 147 by the
Office of the Mines Regional Officer, Mineral Region No. 1, Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences (Bureau of Mines). 1 8 The Commercial Permit, which was renewable every year,
was last renewed in 1987. 1 9
Based on the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by Castillo Binay-an, petitioner was
able to apply for, and was issued, a tax declaration over the land covering one hectare. Tax
Declaration No. 9540 2 0 dated 12 September 1983 was issued to petitioner describing the
land bounded on the North by Bued River, on the South by Kennon Road, on the East by
Kennon Road, and on the West by a Creek. With the revision of the fair market value and
assessed value of lands, Tax Declaration No. 94-004-00327 dated 12 November 1994 was
issued to him. 2 1 From 1983 up to 1998, petitioner has been regularly paying real property
taxes over the land.
Respondents appealed the decision to the RTC. 2 8 In affirming the decision in toto the RTC
ratiocinated:
It may be well to consider that even after plaintiff's business ceased operation, he
religiously paid the taxes due thereon.
Appellant's theory that the plaintiff-appellee abandoned the property does not sit
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well and finds no support in the record. Notice that since 1985 up to mid-1990, the
Banucas never laid claim over the property taking into consideration that they
were already residents of the place. This only goes to show that they
acknowledged and respected the prior possession of the plaintiff-appellee.
Besides, what right has Gloria to cause the leveling of the property destroying the
natural contour thereof, to presume that plaintiff-appellee abandoned it and to
invite and allow other persons to settle thereat? Absolutely none. Knowing fully
well that the plaintiff-appellee has prior possession of the property, Gloria's
actions are unjustified, to say the least. Her consummated act of leveling the
property without the knowledge of the plaintiff-appellee is viewed as a test to
determine whether or not the latter is still interested in the property. From then on
until 1998 (but before the construction), the Banucas still recognize the plaintiff's
possession. But as Gloria claims to have heard no word from the plaintiff, she
unilaterally declared that the place is now abandoned as she "invited and
allowed" the defendants to live and construct their house thereat. CIaHDc
Via a petition for review, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals made a sudden turn-around and reversed the decision under review. Its decision
dated 20 August 2002 reads in part:
[T]here is a need to clarify a few things. What is undisputed are the identity and
nature of the property subject of the action for forcible entry. The subject of the
action concerns a portion of the road-right-of-way along Kennon Road just above
the private road constructed by respondent. The problem, however, is that
petitioners Sps. Valenciano started constructing a house on the same spot where
a house belonging to respondent once stood. Both parties are now asserting that
they are entitled to the possession of said lot. But the decision of the lower court
seems to imply that respondent's right to possess the subject property stems
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from his acquisition of the one-hectare property below it. That is not the case.
We must emphasize that the subject of the deed of quitclaim and waiver of rights
of Castillo Binay-an was not the road-right-of-way but the sloping terrain below it.
This was the property acquired by the respondent to have access to the sand and
gravel on the Bued River. It did not include the road-right-of-way. As regards Gloria
Banucas's claims, the evidence show that her agreement with Jularbal involved
only the improvements near her residence down the private road and not the road-
right-of-way. Since the subject property is a road-right-of-way, it forms part of the
public dominion. It is not susceptible to private acquisition or ownership.
Prolonged occupation thereof, improvements introduced thereat or payment of
the realty taxes thereon will never ripen into ownership of said parcel of land.
Thus, what We have are two parties, neither of which can be owners, only
possessors of the subject property. Beyond these two, only the government has a
better right to the subject property which right it may exercise at any time. This
bears emphasizing because if either party has possessory rights to the subject
property, it is not predicated on ownership but only on their actual possession of
the subject property.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no doubt that respondent had prior physical possession of the subject
property. He entered and acquired possession of the subject property when he
built his house thereon. The house was destroyed during the 1990 earthquake
and respondent did not rebuild it. The mound on which it stood was later leveled
by Gloria Banuca and in 1998 petitioners Sps. Valenciano began construction
thereat. Petitioners Sps. Valenciano claim there was abandonment, but the lower
court ruled that respondent did not abandon the subject property as he continued
to pay the realty taxes thereon and objected to petitioners Sps. Valenciano's
construction. We believe, and so hold, that at this point in time, it is immaterial
whether or not there was abandonment by respondent. The fact remains that
Gloria Banuca took possession of the subject property soon after the earthquake.
She leveled the mound and the ruins of respondent's house, yet respondent
remained silent. Respondent objected only after petitioners Sps. Valenciano
started construction of the house on the subject property. Respondent cannot
now interpose an action for forcible entry against petitioners Sps. Valenciano,
which he should have filed against Gloria Banuca, petitioners Sps. Valenciano's
predecessor-in-interest. But more than a year had passed and his right to do so
lapsed. Thus, respondent's prior possession is material only as against Gloria
Banuca and only within a period of one year from the time she wrested
possession of the property from respondent. aCASEH
We view with distate Gloria Banuca's ingratitude toward her husband's former
employer. Her actions smack of the proverbial hand being offered in aid but the
person to whom it is offered would rather have the whole arm instead. This is an
instance where it is the employees who commit injustice against their employer.
Nonetheless, petitioners Sps. Valenciano should not suffer because of Gloria
Banuca's ingratitude for the former came across the property in good faith.
But respondent is also reminded that he only has himself to blame. His failure to
assert his right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time allowed
Gloria Banuca to wrest possession from him. Especially in this case where they
do not and cannot own the subject property, actual possession becomes
particularly important. 3 0
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The case was disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the decision
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of tuba-Sablan dated November 20, 2000 as
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court on January 23, 2002 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. 3 1
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution 3 2 dated 20
May 2003.
Petitioner is now before us seeking redress. He assigns the following as the errors
committed by the Court of Appeals:
I.
At the outset, it must be made clear that the property subject of this case is a portion of
the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which is located in front of a parcel of land that
petitioner bought by way of Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim from Castillo Binay-an. 3 3 The
admission 3 4 of petitioner in his Amended Complaint that respondents started
constructing a building within the Kennon Road road-right-of-way belies his claim that the
lot in question is his.
In light of this exposition, it is clear that neither the petitioner nor the respondents can own
nor possess the subject property the same being part of the public dominion. Property of
public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and other of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public. 3 5 Public use is "use that is
not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." 3 6 As the land in
controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people, there can be no
dispute that same is part of public dominion. This being the case, the parties cannot
appropriate the land for themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over
it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession. aDACcH
The next question is: Was the action filed the correct one and was it timely filed?
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. 4 3 In actions for
forcible entry, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to
acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. 4 4 To effect the ejectment
of an occupant or deforciant on the land, the complaint should embody such a statement
of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. 4 5
A look at the Amended Complaint filed by petitioner clearly shows a case for forcible entry.
Petitioner alleged therein that he has been in possession of the subject land for the last
nineteen years and that respondents, in the first week of August 1998, without his
permission and consent, entered the land by means of force, strategy and stealth and
started the construction of a building thereon; and upon being informed thereof, he
requested them to stop their construction but respondents refused to vacate the land
forcing him to file the instant case to recover possession thereof.
The Court of Appeals pronounced that petitioner cannot interpose an action for forcible
entry against respondents and that the same should have been filed against Gloria Banuca.
It added that the right to file against the latter had already lapsed because more than a
year had passed by from the time she wrestled possession of the property from the
petitioner.
We find such pronouncement to be flawed. An action of forcible entry and detainer may be
maintained only against one in possession at the commencement of the action, and not
against one who does not in fact hold the land. 4 6 Under Section 1, 4 7 Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, the action may be filed against persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
possession or any person claiming under them. Considering that respondents are the ones
in present actual possession and are depriving petitioner of the possession of the land in
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question, it is proper that they be the ones to be named defendants in the case. The fact
that Gloria Banuca was supposedly the one who first committed forcible entry when she
allegedly demolished the house of petitioner does not make her the proper party to be
sued because she is no longer in possession or control of the land in controversy.
As regards the timeliness of the filing of the case for forcible entry, we find that same was
filed within the one-year prescriptive period. We have ruled that where forcible entry was
made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the
person deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from such
dispossession when the former learned thereof. 4 8 As alleged by petitioner in the
Amended Complaint, he was deprived of his possession over the land by force, strategy
and stealth. Considering that one of the means employed was stealth because the
intrusion was done by respondents without his knowledge and consent, the one-year
period should be counted from the time he made the demand to respondents to vacate
the land upon learning of such dispossession. The record shows that upon being informed
that respondents were constructing a building in the subject land sometime in the first
week of August 1998, petitioner immediately protested and advised the former to stop;
but to no avail. The one-year period within which to file the forcible entry case had not yet
expired when the ejectment suit was filed on 18 August 1998 with the MCTC.
Despite the foregoing findings, this Court finds that the MCTC and the RTC, as well as the
Court of Appeals, to be in error when they respectively declared that petitioner and
respondents to be entitled to the possession of the land in dispute. The parties should not
be permitted to take possession of the land, much more, claim ownership thereof as said
lot is part of the public dominion. aTEScI
1. No part.
4. Id. at 190-210.
6. Id. at 110.
7. Records, pp. 10-15.
8. Id. at 1-7.
9. Id. at 19-20.
10. Id. at 22-27.
11. Id. at 28-33.
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 41-42.
14. Id. at 56-58.
15. Exh. F, records, p. 89.
35. Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927 (2003).