Humanitarian Futures

HUMANITARIAN FUTURES
FOR MESSAGING APPS

UNDERSTANDING THE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION
Syrian refugees, landed on Lesbos in Greece, looking for a mobile signal to check their location
and notify relatives that they arrived safely.
International Committee of the Red Cross

19, avenue de la Paix
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57
E-mail: [email protected] www.icrc.org
March 2017
Front cover: I. Prickett/UNHCR

HUMANITARIAN FUTURES
FOR MESSAGING APPS
UNDERSTANDING THE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION
This report, commissioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is the product
of a collaboration between the ICRC, The Engine Room and Block Party. The content of this report
does not reflect the official opinion of the ICRC. Responsibility for the information and views
expressed in the report lies entirely with The Engine Room and Block Party.
Commissioning Editors: Jacobo Quintanilla and Philippe Stoll (ICRC).

Lead Researcher: Tom Walker (The Engine Room).
Content: Eytan Oren (Block Party), Zara Rahman (The Engine Room), Nisha
Thompson, and Carly Nyst.
Editors: Michael Wells and John Borland.
Project Manager: Waiyee Leong (ICRC).
The ICRC, The Engine Room and Block Party request due acknowledgement and quotes from this
publication to be referenced as: ICRC, The Engine Room and Block Party, Humanitarian Futures for
Messaging Apps, January 2017.
This report is available at www.icrc.org, https://theengineroom.org and http://weareblockparty.com.
The text of this work is licensed under the Creative Commons

Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this
license, visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/.
The images are not covered by this license and may not be reproduced without the copyright
holder's permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................ 5
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 9
1. THE GLOBAL MESSAGING-APP MARKET.................................................. 15

The rise of messaging apps.................................................................................................................16
Emerging trends: Broadcast Lists, encryption and chatbots...................................................18
Access to messaging apps: Affordability, connectivity, gender and age............................21
2. HOW ARE PEOPLE USING MESSAGING APPS IN SITUATIONS

OF CRISIS OR ARMED CONFLICT?.............................................................. 31
Overview: Variation and fragmentation.........................................................................................32
Which apps are people using?...........................................................................................................34
How are people using messaging apps in humanitarian crises?...........................................37
What are people in crisis situations using messaging apps for?............................................38
What dont we know?............................................................................................................................41
3. HOW ARE HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

USING MESSAGING APPS?......................................................................... 45
How organizations are using messaging apps.............................................................................46
Why are organizations adopting messaging apps?....................................................................46
How are apps being incorporated into organizations work?.................................................51
Potential applications............................................................................................................................54
Using one platform to send messages from multiple messaging apps..............................54
4. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN USING MESSAGING APPS

IN HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS............................................................... 59
Working with messaging app providers: Challenges and risks..............................................60
Threats to messaging app users security and privacy..............................................................61
Consent.......................................................................................................................................................65
Messaging app features related to privacy and security .........................................................67
Operational considerations ................................................................................................................71
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................. 75
General principles...................................................................................................................................76
Privacy, security and data protection..........................................................................................77
Implementation................................................................................................................................78
Collaboration with local media and other partners................................................................78
Practical considerations..................................................................................................................79
ANNEX
WHAT KIND OF MESSAGING APPS ARE AVAILABLE,
AND WHAT ARE THE KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM?........................... 81
Operational considerations.................................................................................................................83
Registration........................................................................................................................................83
Connecting with users.....................................................................................................................83
Encryption..........................................................................................................................................87
Other functionalities........................................................................................................................89
Data protection.................................................................................................................................89
3
P. Yazdi/ICRC
A Somali woman using her phone at a

camp for internally displaced people in
Beletweyne, Somalia.
Executive summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Messaging apps are the fastest growing digital communication phenomenon ever.
Messaging apps like WhatsApp, Snapchat, Viber, WeChat, Telegram and LINE are becoming
the primary mode of communication for hundreds of millions of people around the world,
including people affected by natural disasters or caught up in armed conflicts.
Already, more than 2.5 billion people around the world use messaging apps1 a figure that
is expected to grow to 3.6 billion by 2018.2 As of November 2016, more than one billion
people nearly one in seven people on Earth were reportedly using WhatsApp.
As smartphone ownership and messaging-app usage continues to rise, it is clear that

messaging apps are here to stay. However, humanitarian organizations have so far only
conducted limited research into where and how messaging apps could help improve their
work. Using messaging apps also introduces critically important questions about security,
data protection and privacy, and creates technical challenges for information management
and data analytics.
These unresolved questions are hampering discussions in humanitarian organizations

about the practical uses of messaging apps as an operational tool, both for two-way
communication with local communities, and for internal coordination, information-sharing
and management.
Humanitarian organizations need to better understand how to make use of the opportuni-
ties that messaging apps offer. To do so, they should establish strategies and standards to
determine where messaging apps might be appropriate, how to use them effectively and
how to meet the responsible data challenges they pose.
Here is an overview of the report's recommendations, which are given in full in Section 5.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Conduct detailed, locally focused research into factors affecting how crisis-affected
groups use and share information. Before adopting any new communications channel,
organizations should learn how the people they want to reach communicate and which
channels they already use and trust.3 On this basis, they can determine whether using a
messaging app is appropriate in that situation.
At a minimum, humanitarian organizations should systematically include questions

on access to and use of mobile telephony into humanitarian needs assessments.
Failing to ask such questions can lead organizations to make assumptions that signifi-
cantly limit their effectiveness and accountability to people affected by crises.
Use a range of communications channels, rather than relying on one messaging app.
Organizations should ensure that any use of messaging apps forms part of a multi-plat-
form, multi-channel communications strategy rooted in a deep understanding of the
local information ecosystem.
Plan well in advance. Put in place strategies and processes for using messaging apps well
before they are needed in a humanitarian crisis.
1 Activate, 2016 Tech and Media Outlook, 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/ActivateInc/activate-tech-and-media-

outlook-2016/2-Over_the_next_five_years.
2 Activate, The Messaging Phenomenon Has Hardly Begun, 2016: https://medium.com/the-activate-outlook/the-
messaging-phenomenon-has-hardly-begun-cdaeaf735cb2#.n4z29ppml.
3 For an example of how to approach this, see Kelly Church and Laura Walker McDonald, Announcing SIMLabs
framework for context analysis of inclusive technology in social change projects, August 2016: http://simlab.org/
resources/contextanalysis.
5
HUMANITARIAN FUTURES FOR MESSAGING APPS
Consider who messaging apps wont reach. As with any technology, messaging apps
can exacerbate inequalities associated with gender, age, literacy and experience with
technology, as well as access to energy, mobile phones and network connectivity.
Organizations should therefore conduct thorough research into factors that affect
messaging apps accessibility and usability.
Test, test and test again. Approaches that are successful in some areas will fail in others.
Organizations should build in enough flexibility to allow for iteration and adaptation in
response to feedback.
Deploying messaging apps may be the easy part - building trust with communities
is much harder. Developing strong local relationships depends on providing effective
on-the-ground support, accompanied by information that is up-to-date, timely,
actionable and trustworthy. Introducing messaging apps will have very limited impact
if organizations do not also invest in ensuring that these apps are part of a reliable,
sustainable and useful information distribution service.
PRIVACY, SECURITY AND DATA PROTECTION

Assess the risks that any messaging app introduces. Organizations should assess what
data and metadata different apps collect, and whether the collection of that data could
increase risks (and the type of risks) to individuals or groups if a particular app was used
in a given country or region.
Prioritize individuals privacy and security when choosing a messaging app.

Organizations that decide to use messaging apps should aim to select apps with
end-to-end encryption enabled by default, run by organizations that collect and retain
minimal amounts of data and which have a strong record of resisting unlawful demands
for private data from law-enforcement and other agencies.
Collect the minimum amount of data needed to conduct operations and emphasize to
users that any data they submit is never fully secure. All data collected, generated and
stored by humanitarian agencies is incredibly sensitive and should be given the strongest
possible protection.
Ensure that your organization has and complies with a data protection or responsible
data policy. This should proactively address the intersecting issues of consent, data
protection, organizations ethical obligations and privacy rights, and identify measures
to mitigate risks wherever possible.4
4 For examples of a rights-based, responsible data approach to dealing with these challenges, see: Oxfam,
Responsible Program Data Policy: http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/oxfam-responsible-
program-data-policy-575950; Electronic Cash Transfer Learning Action Network, A Data Starter Kit for
Humanitarian Field Staff: http://elan.cashlearning.org/; The Engine Room, Mdecins Sans Frontires case
study: https://www.theengineroom.org/projects/msf-responsible-data/.
6
Executive summary
IMPLEMENTATION
Consider how your organization will manage and respond to the information it
receives. Messaging apps can introduce large quantities of data from many different
sources. Without proper planning, this can overwhelm organizations, increase the risk
that organizations fail to respect users privacy, and frustrate local communities who find
that their questions and complaints are not being acknowledged or addressed.
Prepare to invest considerable time and resources in verifying and validating any
information received through messaging apps. Data can only lead to better decisions
and more effective communication if it is managed effectively, analysed accurately and
incorporated into the organizations decision-making processes.
COLLABORATION WITH PARTNERS

Work with local media to tailor messages and promote humanitarian services. Local
media have enormous potential to provide people with relevant, trustworthy and timely
information, particularly when people need such information urgently.
In urban areas, consider network connectivity as a basic urban service that needs to
be restored. Network connectivity cannot solve all problems in conflict areas or urban
settings damaged by conflicts or disasters. However, restoring connectivity can quickly
enable people to reconnect with their own communities and others (including humani-
tarian organizations), and better organize their own response.
Consider collaborating directly with messaging-app companies. Research and pilot

projects demonstrate the potential messaging apps have to support humanitarian initi-
atives. The humanitarian community should consider collectively approaching selected
messaging app companies to propose practical collaborations or partnerships.
7
M. Henley/UNHCR
At Keleti Railway Station in Budapest,

Hungary, a refugee checks his phone.
Introduction
INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian organizations recognize that if their work is to be relevant and effective, it is
vital to engage with and make themselves accountable to people affected by crises.
Over the last decade, studies have found that timely, actionable, trusted information -
provided in the right format, in the right languages and through appropriate channels - can
save lives, help people access the support they need and improve their resilience in crisis
situations. Humanitarian organizations which communicate effectively with the people
they seek to help are better able to respond to needs and are more accountable.
However, experience also suggests that humanitarian organizations need to pay more
attention to how crisis-affected communities actually find, use and share information,
and adjust their activities accordingly.5 This means building sustained, direct, trusted and
secured connections with affected communities - but it also means constantly evaluating
how the information ecosystem is changing and evolving,6 identifying which communi-
cations channels people use to share information, and understanding how they use them.
In this context, humanitarian organizations cannot ignore the growth of mobile messaging
applications (apps) - mobile-phone-based software programmes that allow people to send
text, images, audio and video to their contacts phones over an internet connection. Over
the last four years, messaging apps have become regular communication tools for people
worldwide. In some cases, messaging apps are even becoming platforms where people can
directly access services offered by other organizations, which range from receiving news
updates and booking flights to getting a mortgage and making investments.
This report argues that, in many regions, messaging apps have become so widespread that
they deserve to be considered strategically for use in humanitarian operations alongside
other communication channels and platforms.
However, there are clear gaps in humanitarian organizations understanding of the implica-
tions of introducing this new technology into crisis situations. If left unaddressed, these gaps
may prevent organizations from using apps responsibly and effectively. This report identi-
fies areas where there is a need for standards for using messaging apps in crisis situations
and suggests preliminary steps towards a responsible data approach, which can ensure that
humanitarian initiatives respect individuals rights to consent, privacy, security and ownership.
SCOPE
This report discusses the implications of adding messaging apps to the range of communi-
cations channels currently used by humanitarian organizations, which includes face-to-face
communication, print materials, SMS messaging, social media, radio and television. The
report does not include detailed discussions of the uses or functionalities of these other
channels, which have been discussed and researched extensively elsewhere (particularly
in the context of natural disasters).
5 Elizabeth Scheper, Arjuna Parakrama and Smruti Patel, Impact of the tsunami response on local and national
capacities, Tsunami Evaluation Commission, 2006: http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/capacities.aspx;
Theodora Hannides, Nicola Bailey and Dwan Kaoukji, Voices of Refugees, BBC Media Action, 2016: http://www.
bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-and-resources/research/reports/voices-of-refugees.
6 Jacobo Quintanilla, Ten lessons on communicating with communities in complex emergencies, Humanitarian
Practice Network, 23 October 2015: http://odihpn.org/blog/ten-lessons-on-communicating-with-communities-
in-complex-emergencies/.
9
The reports focus on messaging apps is not intended to imply that messaging apps are
superior to existing communications channels, or that they are a silver bullet or universal
panacea that can improve humanitarian operations in all situations. Rather, they are
presented as a potential additional channel for humanitarian organizations to consider,
on the basis of a strong understanding of local information ecosystems and any risks that
pertain in that context.
The report places a particular emphasis on messaging-app usage in areas experiencing

armed conflict or high levels of migration, but also includes an assessment of usage in
humanitarian responses to natural disasters and epidemics, other development sectors
and the media.
Although the vast majority of humanitarian responses and funding programmes focus on
environments affected by armed conflict, the implications of engaging with communities
in these settings are less well-known and documented. This is primarily due to operational
complexities that include insecurity and limited physical access to local communities;
disrupted energy, media and telecommunications infrastructures; communities limited
access to and experience with using digital communications technologies; and, crucially,
surveillance and data protection considerations.
In todays armed conflicts, the information environment is increasingly contested and

misinformation, propaganda and rumours travel more swiftly than was previously the
case. In order to identify relevant approaches for communicating in these situations,
humanitarian organizations need to understand more clearly how all these challenges
affect their operations.
METHODOLOGY
This report is based on a survey of relevant literature, interviews with staff working in
humanitarian organizations (including technology specialists, logistics officers and field
workers), representatives of messaging app companies, and organizations that focus on
providing technology for humanitarian organizations.
Interviewees were identified through the authors and advisory groups networks, and
through responses to an open call publicized on mailing lists and through social media.
In total, researchers spoke with more than 45 people working in Asia, Europe, sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East.
This report, as conceptualized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is
intended as a first step towards understanding how messaging apps are used in the human-
itarian sector, particularly in conflict situations. It also aims to clarify the opportunities and
challenges this technology presents and identify avenues for future research and action.
It is based on a small sample of interviewees and is not therefore comprehensive. We hope it

can serve as a building block for future efforts to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian
organizations and allow them to engage more effectively with the people they endeavour
to protect and assist.
10
Introduction
GLOSSARY
2G, 3G or 4G wireless network technology: the G here refers to the generation of the
underlying wireless network technology. 1G was a purely analogue network designed
to carry voice and nothing else; 2G arrived in the early 1990s and transported data via
a digital signal. 3G was launched in the early 2000s and offered significantly improved
speeds and higher traffic capacity. 4G purely carries data and offers the highest upload
and download speeds available at the time of writing.
API (application program interface): A set of functions and procedures within an oper-
ating system, application or other service that enables external applications to access
that services features or data. In some senses, this is analogous to a customer service
window at a bank; just as a customer must go through a certain process of verification
to withdraw or deposit money at the bank, an external application must follow the APIs
rules to interact with the host service.
Bot or chatbot: A piece of code that performs specific automated functions within an
app. For example, it may provide information when a user requests it (often in natural
language that makes it resemble a human operator hence chatbot), request informa-
tion from another user, or provide a means of linking to other web services.
Bulk or broadcast messaging: The capacity to send messages or other content to a large
number of people.
Feature phone: A mobile phone with the capacity to make calls and send SMS messages,
but with few other advanced capabilities. The term is used to distinguish these devices
from more advanced smartphones.
GPRS (General Packet Radio Service): a mobile data service that works on 2G mobile-
phone connections.
GPS (Global Positioning System): a satellite-based navigation system, now available in

many smartphones. GPS is a specific system operated by the US government. Several
other comparable satellite systems are in place and may be used by some devices in
some regions of the world.
Information ecosystems: complex adaptive systems that include information infrastruc-

ture, tools, media, producers, consumers, curators, and sharers. Within these systems,
different types of news and information may be received from outside then passed on
to others through word of mouth, key community members, telephone, the internet
and other media. The term broadly refers to a loose, dynamic configuration of different
sources, flows, producers, consumers, and sharers of information interacting within a
defined community or space.7
Messaging app: a mobile-phone-based software programme that allows users to send

and receive information from and to their phones over an internet connection (either via
Wi-Fi or mobile data networks).
Mesh network: originally developed for military applications, a mesh network is a

communications network, usually wireless, made up of radio nodes, consisting of mesh
clients, mesh routers and gateways. The mesh clients are often laptops, cell phones and
other wireless devices. When one node can no longer operate for some reason, the rest of
the nodes can usually still communicate with each other. In a wireless mesh network the
connection is spread over dozens or even hundreds of wireless mesh nodes that talk to
7 Tara Susman-Pea, Why Information Matters: a foundation for resilience, Internews and the Rockefeller
Foundation, 2015: www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/why-information-matters/.
11
each other to share the connection across a large area. They thus provide a decentralized
alternative to traditional networks, which rely on a small number of wired access points.
Metadata: In the context of the present report, this means data about the transmission
of information on messaging apps. This can include the date and time at which messages
or files were sent, the users location, the identity of the person to whom data was sent,
and in some cases even the phones manufacturer and operating system. Metadata can
be used to link an individual with other individuals or groups, or be combined with other
datasets to infer details about an individual; studies demonstrate that it is possible to
extrapolate information such as health conditions, gun ownership and even literacy from
mobile phone metadata.
MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service): a standard way to send messages with multi-
media content to and from mobile phones over a mobile (cellular) phone network. They
are sometimes referred to as picture or multimedia messages. MMS can deliver up to forty
seconds of video, one image, or a slideshow of multiple images and audio.
SIM card (Subscriber Identity Module): a portable memory chip used mostly in mobile
phones, which holds the personal information of the account holder including the phone
number, text messages, and other user data. When a user wants to change devices, they
can usually remove the card from one handset and insert it into another. SIM cards have
evolved over the years - their thickness has remained relatively stable (just under 1mm)
but their surface area has decreased steadily, so that there are now micro- and nano-SIMs.
Smartphone: A mobile phone offering advanced features, typically including a GPS

sensor, the ability to access the internet over mobile-phone networks and Wi-Fi connec-
tions, and the capacity to download apps from the internet.
SMS (Short Message Service): commonly referred to as text messaging, is a service

for sending short messages of up to 160 characters to mobile devices, including mobile
(cellular) phones and smartphones, digital phones and web-based applications within a
web browser.
USSD (Unstructured Supplementary Service Data): a communication technology used

to send text between a mobile phone and the service providers computers. Sometimes
referred to as Quick Codes or Feature Codes, messages are up to 182 alphanumeric
characters long, and can be used for prepaid callback services, information services and
mobile-money services.
12
Introduction
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The ICRC, the Engine Room and Block Party would like to sincerely thank all participants
in the advisory group who helped prepare this report. These participants were requested
to serve in a personal capacity, based on the depth and diversity of their experience and
expertise within their agencies and organizations. The advisory group participants included:
Jacobo Quintanilla, Massimo Marelli and Vincent Graf (ICRC)
Antoine Bertout and Jean-Martin Bauer (World Food Programme, WFP)
John Warnes (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR)
Ombretta Baggio (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IFRC)
Alexandre Sicotte-Levesque (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

UNOCHA)
The ICRC, the Engine Room and Block Party would also like to thank all those who partici-
pated in the general consultative process, including: Jeff Wishnie (Digital Impact Alliance,
DIAL), Aurelio Salas, Monique Crettol and Victorien Hanche (ICRC), Nathaniel Raymond
(Harvard Humanitarian Initiative), Mark Latonero (Data & Society), Indra de Lanerolle
(University of the Witwatersrand), participants at the Brussels Privacy Hubs Data Protection
and Humanitarian Action event series, Kareem Elbayar (United Nations Office for Project
Services, UNOPS), Tin Geber (The Engine Room), Jacob Korenblum and Michael Moszczynski
(Souktel), Sacha Robehmed (REFUNITE), Jesco Weickert (WeltHungerLife), Heather Leson
(Qatar Computing Research Institute), Sultan Haider, Sofia Fernandes, Alice Rizzo and
Thomas Seropian (Internews), Chris Habib, Amanda Maher and Shabib Al-Qubati (IMMAP),
Ciarn Duffy (Refugee Text), Ly Nguyen (IFRC), Marc van den Homburg, Rosalia Gitau
(UNOCHA) and Trushar Barot (BBC). Any errors remain the authors responsibility alone.
13
in a nutshell kurzgesagt
By 2018, 3.6 billion of people are expected

to be using messaging apps thats almost
half of the worlds population.
1. THE GLOBAL
MESSAGING-APP
MARKET
THE RISE OF MESSAGING APPS

Mobile messaging is the fastest growing digital communication phenomenon ever. Mobile
messaging has been adopted more quickly, and by more people, than virtually any other
digital communications technology before it. This section discusses the global growth of
messaging apps, and identifies key trends in their development.
Already, more than 2.5 billion people around the world use messaging apps8 a figure that
is expected to grow to 3.6 billion by 2018.9 As of February 2016, for example, 1 billion people
nearly one in seven people on Earth were reportedly using WhatsApp.
Some studies predict that smartphone subscriptions will almost double from 3.4 billion
to 6.3 billion by 2021, meaning that most adults on earth will have access to some form of
connected mobile device.10
ACTUAL MESSAGING APP USERS

WORLDWIDE, 2014-2016
Number of users
BILLION
1.07 1.4 1.61
2014 2015 2016
Note: Mobile phone users of any age who use over-the-top (OTT) messaging apps via mobile phone (browser or app) at least once per month.
Source: eMarketer, November 2015.
8 Activate, 2016 Tech and Media Outlook, 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/ActivateInc/activate-tech-and-media-

outlook-2016/2-Over_the_next_five_years.
9 Activate, The Messaging Phenomenon Has Hardly Begun, 2016: https://medium.com/the-activate-outlook/the-
messaging-phenomenon-has-hardly-begun-cdaeaf735cb2#.n4z29ppml .
10 Financial Times June 1, 2016 Daniel Thomas Smartphone use forecast to beat feature phones this year.
16
The global messaging-app market
TOP GLOBAL CHAT APPS 2016
Monthly Active Users
MILLION
WHATSAPP FACEBOOK WECHAT SKYPE VIBER SNAPCHAT LINE IMO TELEGRAM

1000 MESSENGER 800 300 250 250 218 150 100
1000
Source: Figures reported by messaging app companies as of November 2016.
Messaging apps are not just being used widely, but intensively too. Recent data suggests that
worldwide, the average user spends four hours per day using their phone, 80% of which is Messaging apps surpassed
spent on an average of just three apps (one or more of which are frequently messaging apps).11 SMS in daily message volume
in 2013, and overtook social
The global ascension of messaging apps has been swift, surpassing SMS in daily message networks in monthly active
volume by 2013 and overtaking social networks in monthly active user accounts in 2015. user accounts in 2015.
Initially, the shift to messaging apps was powered by simple economics. Billions of people
flocked to apps that allowed them to send text messages essentially as they had previ-
ously done with SMS, but at a lower (or no) cost. As smartphone ownership and Wi-Fi and
mobile-internet access has expanded, many messaging apps have evolved into multi-
media hubs offering advanced features, new ways of sharing data and heightened levels
of security.
WHAT IS A MESSAGING APP?

A messaging application (or app) is a mobile-phone-based software programme12 that
allows users to send and receive information using their phones. There are two key differ-
ences between communication through messaging apps and communication through
mobile-phone networks:
Messaging apps can transmit and receive a much wider range of data types than is
possible using SMS or even its multimedia-enabled successor, MMS. In addition to voice
11 GSMA, Global Mobile Trends, October 2016: http://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/, p. 65; Google, Mobile
app marketing insights: how consumers really find and use your apps, 2015: https://www.thinkwithgoogle.
com/articles/mobile-app-marketing-insights.html; Matthias Bhmer, Brent Hecht, Johannes Schning, Antonio
Krger and Gernot Bauer, Falling asleep with Angry Birds, Facebook and Kindle: a large scale study on mobile
application usage, Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Human Computer Interaction with Mobile
Devices and Services, Stockholm, 30 August2 September 2012; Chad Tossell, Philip Kortum, Clayton Shepard,
Ahmad Rahmati and Lin Zhong, An empirical analysis of smartphone personalisation: measurement and user
variability, Behaviour & Information Technology, Vol. 31, No. 10, pp. 995-1010, 2012.
12 Users typically need a mobile phone to access these apps, though apps such as Facebook Messenger and Slack
can be used solely through a desktop computer, without the need for a mobile phone.
17
calls and text, messaging-app users can also send and receive files, including photos,
images and (in some cases) documents;
Unlike SMS messages, which are transmitted over conventional telephone networks,
messaging apps use a Wi-Fi internet connection or a mobile data connection to transmit
and receive data, including:
audio recordings, including voice recordings that act in the same way as a voicemail
message;
data identifying their current location, based on their phones GPS sensor;
(in the case of some apps) live video calls; and
emojis (pictographic representations of emotions or specific objects).
Because messaging apps have a well-documented tendency to borrow each others best
Messaging apps have a well- ideas, they have developed more similarities than differences over time. Messaging apps
documented tendency to borrow were primarily designed to allow private communication between individuals or small
each others best ideas and have groups (unlike social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, which allow users to broad-
developed more similarities cast content to large numbers of personal contacts or followers).
than differences over time.
However, the distinctions between social networks and messaging apps are becoming
increasingly blurred, as networks such as Twitter and Instagram increasingly adopt person-
to-person chat features, and messaging apps introduce the capacity for users to broadcast
information to large groups.
When apps do allow users to communicate with large numbers of people simultaneously,
they typically use an interface format that emulates a one-to-one chat conversation rather
than the news-feed format seen in social networks such as Facebook, which allows users
to comment on or like posts.13 (For a breakdown of some key messaging app features,
see Annex).
A very short history of instant messaging

In the early 1960s, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Computation Centers experimental
Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS) allowed up to 30 people to chat electronically at the same time.
In 1980, CompuServe launched CB Simulator, the first online chat platform, to allow people to communicate
using text in real time via their home computers.
Instant messaging hit the mainstream in the late 1990s with the enormously popular AOL Instant Messenger
(AIM).
Todays messaging apps are direct descendants of these early instant-messenger programmes, but they have
been reinvented for the mobile era.
EMERGING TRENDS: BROADCAST LISTS,

ENCRYPTION AND CHATBOTS
The past year has been defined by three emerging trends within the mobile-messaging
realm: changes to support communication with large groups (broadcast or bulk messaging),
the addition of encryption and the increasing use of chatbots.
13 There are some exceptions to this. For example, the LINE messaging app offers both newsfeed and mass one-to-
one push notifications.
18
1. BROADCAST OR BULK MESSAGING

Broadcast or bulk messaging is the ability to send a single message to a large number of
users simultaneously.
In comparison with social networks such as Facebook or Twitter, broadcast messaging

through messaging apps currently represents an efficient way for organizations to reach
their target audiences. On social networks, users often miss or simply ignore messages from
organizations, as hundreds of daily posts scroll by. Algorithms designed by social network
providers also automatically decide what information users are shown, with organizations
rarely being able to access information about why more users will see some posts rather
than others.
By contrast, messaging-app users are more likely to open and read the messages they receive
(in communications circles, this is known as having a high open rate). For example, the
company that produces the LINE app claims that its users read 55.8% of the notifications that
businesses send to them.14 Experimental scientific research has produced similar findings.15
Trend summary
Although high message-reading rates (or open rates) are encouraging today, they are likely to decline in
the future. Over time, chat apps are likely to limit companies or organizations ability to send bulk notifica-
tions, both as a way to safeguard user experience and as a means of gaining new revenue themselves. This
has already started to happen in some parts of Asia, where businesses already market their services through
messaging apps more regularly than is the case in Europe or the United States.
2. ENCRYPTION
Pavel Durov, the founder of the Telegram app, was among the first to recognize that popular
messaging apps were well-suited for entertainment and casual conversation, but that none
offered security strong enough to withstand hacking attempts or unwanted surveillance.
His app launched in 2013 with the promise of end-to-end encryption. This means that the
content of a message can be viewed only by the people sending and receiving messages,
and cannot be decrypted and read by the company itself.
T. White/Illustration/REUTERS
The extent to which messaging app companies open up the technical details of their encryption varies
considerably.
14 James Cook, Japanese Messaging App LINE Is Blowing Up, And These Stats Prove It, Business Insider, 2015:
http://www.businessinsider.com/interview-with-jeanie-han-from-line-2015-3.
15 Natalie (Talia) Jomini Stroud, Cynthia Peacock and Alex Curry, Mobile News Notifications, October 2016: https://
engagingnewsproject.org/research/mobile-news-notifications/; Alireza Sahami Shirazi, Niels Henze, Tilman
Dingler, Martin Pielot, Dominik Weber and Albrecht Schmidt, Large-scale assessment of mobile notifications,
March 2014, Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 3055-3064: http://
dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2556288.2557189.
19
Telegram was an immediate viral hit, especially in countries with a heightened fear of
surveillance, and by early 2016 counted more than 100 million monthly active users.16
Telegrams mainstream success has since inspired other popular messaging apps to jump
on the encryption bandwagon. Viber introduced end-to-end encryption in April 2016, and
other platforms such as WeChat and KakaoTalk have been publicly criticized after revela-
tions of potential collaboration with governments in response to requests for user data.
Snapchat, which casual observers may assume is secure due to its disappearing messages,
currently offers no end-to-end encryption.
Although a range of app companies now state that they have end-to-end encryption,
they provide widely varying levels of information about the way in which this encryption
is implemented.
Signal, an app developed by the non-profit organization Open Whisper Systems, was one of
the first messaging apps to combine end-to-end encryption and openly auditable encryp-
tion protocols (that is, with technical details open to security professionals who may be
able to discover and remedy flaws). Moxie Marlinspike, the encryption expert who founded
Open Whisper Systems, subsequently worked with WhatsApp to implement the same type
of encryption as used on Signal.
In mid-2016, this was rolled out by default to every WhatsApp user on any device. This
development represented the most important step towards normalizing encryption as a
standard for messaging apps, reaching more than one billion users in one stroke.
The same year, Facebook Messenger followed suit and implemented end-to-end encryp-
tion using the same protocol (albeit only as an opt-in feature).17 However, it is not possible
for external security professionals to view and verify the way that the protocol has been
implemented in either WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger. Apple also states that all the
messages sent using its iMessage service are encrypted end-to-end, and has been steadfast
in defending this stance, even against heavy pressure from governments. (See Annex for a
breakdown of key apps features and encryption protocols.)
Trend summary
Other top messaging apps are likely to introduce end-to-end encryption features in the near future. However,
there will be considerable variation in the extent to which companies open up the technical details of their
encryption, with some publicly publishing their code for inspection and validation by digital security experts,
and others expecting users to accept their public statements on trust.
3. CHATBOTS
Chatbots or bots, like instant-messaging services, have existed for decades,18 but are now
finding new life due to the rise of smartphones, artificial intelligence and advances in natu-
ral-language processing.
The complexity and degree of artificial intelligence in the bots currently available through
messaging apps ranges fairly widely. However, rather than engaging in free-form conver-
sation, most bots perform simple functions such as prompting users to press suggested
response buttons, or replying to users questions with short pieces of information. These
basic bots are relatively inexpensive to deploy and have no mind of their own that could
take conversations into unpredictable places.
16 Telegram, 100,000,000 Monthly Active Users, 23 February 2016: https://telegram.org/blog/100-million.

17 Andy Greenberg, Meet Moxie Marlinspike, the Anarchist Bringing Encryption to All of Us, Wired, 31 July 2016:
https://www.wired.com/2016/07/meet-moxie-marlinspike-anarchist-bringing-encryption-us/.
18 Early chatbots include ELIZA, developed by Joseph Weizenbaum at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
between 1964 and 1966, as well as Kenneth Colbys PARRY, designed in 1972 to emulate a paranoid
schizophrenic.
20
As of November 2016, the messaging apps Facebook Messenger, Telegram, Skype, WeChat,
LINE, Kik and Slack all supported bot technology, thus enabling users to chat with fictional
characters, US supermarket chains and government entities. Bots have also been employed
to obtain news updates, help learn languages or even register to vote in the US.19
To date, the only chatbot that has risen to the level of a cultural phenomenon has been
Microsofts Xiaoice. This bot has been deployed in several Chinese social-media platforms
and messaging services including WeChat. Microsoft claims that over 40 million people20
have installed the bot, with users interacting with it an average of 60 times per month.21 In
a 2015 New York Times feature on Xiaoice, users described the bot as a friend that could
remember personal stories shared with it and reference these in future interactions.22
Ironically, Microsofts Tay Xiaoices sister product for the US market, which was programmed
to learn from its interactions with users became a public-relations disaster after a group
of online pranksters trained it to make offensive and racist comments. With the Tay experi-
ence in mind, many businesses and organizations are unlikely to opt for high-intelligence
chatbots until the technology is perfected.23
Trend summary
Despite mixed reviews for the first generation of messaging-app bots, which users often described as glitchy
or limited in their ability to understand users intent, other major messaging apps are expected to support
similar technology by the end of 2016. For the foreseeable future, the landscape is likely to be dominated
by simple, functional bots that stick reliably to a pre-defined script.
ACCESS TO MESSAGING APPS: AFFORDABILITY,

CONNECTIVITY, GENDER AND AGE
AFFORDABILITY
Most messaging apps are only usable on smartphones, although some basic feature
phones can access mobile data through a GPRS24 connection and are sold with versions of
WhatsApp and Facebook pre-installed.
Smartphones are typically more expensive than feature phones (with prices usually starting
at around 100 US dollars), although lower-priced smartphones are becoming increasingly
available around the world.25 The use of messaging apps is still associated with a clear
upfront cost for the user, thereby limiting the number of people who can access them.
19 Drew Olanoff, Go Chat With Miss Piggy On Facebook Messenger, 7 December 2015: https://techcrunch.
com/2015/12/07/go-chat-with-miss-piggy-on-facebook-messenger/; John Brandon, Whole Foods just launched
a Messenger chatbot for finding recipes with emojis, 16 July 2016: http://venturebeat.com/2016/07/12/whole-
foods-just-launched-a-messenger-chatbot-for-finding-recipes-with-emojis/; Jessica Davies, One month in: What
CNN has learned from Facebook Messenger bots, 31 May 2016: http://digiday.com/publishers/one-month-cnn-
learned-facebook-messenger-bots/; Pavithra Mohan, This Chatbot Will Register You To Vote By Text, So Now You
Have No Excuse, Fast Company, 2016: https://www.fastcompany.com/3063969/mind-and-machine/this-chatbot-
will-register-you-to-vote-by-text-so-now-you-have-no-excuse.
20 Matt Weinberger, Microsoft Taught A Computer To Make Chit Chat, and Now 40 Million People Love It,
Business Insider, 2016: http://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-research-peter-lee-xiaoice-tay-2016-8.
21 Bing, Meet XiaoIce, Cortanas Little Sister, 5 September 2015: https://blogs.bing.com/search/2014/09/05/meet-
xiaoice-cortanas-little-sister/.
22 John Markoff and Paul Mozur, For Sympathetic Ear, More Chinese Turn To Smartphone Program, The New York
Times, 4 August 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/science/for-sympathetic-ear-more-chinese-turn-to-
smartphone-program.html.
23 Ted Livingstone, Bots are Better Without Conversation, Medium, 2016: https://medium.com/@tedlivingston/
bots-are-better-without-conversation-fcf9e7634fc4#.ve27kpf5e.
24 General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is a mobile data service that works on 2G mobile-phone connections.
25 See Mary Meekers reports, which include information on smartphone pricing worldwide: http://www.cnet.com/
news/mary-meeker-sees-messaging-taking-over-mobile/#!; Sibusiso Tshabalala, Africas smartphone market is
on the rise as affordable handsets spur growth, 13 July 2015: http://qz.com/451844/africas-smartphone-market-
is-on-the-rise-as-affordable-handsets-spur-growth/.
21
Rates of smartphone adoption are growing rapidly in all countries, with penetration
rates currently standing at roughly one-third of adults in developing markets and 68% in
advanced economies.26 Smartphone penetration rates are expected to rise considerably
faster than incomes in many developing countries, reaching 60% to 70% in some countries
by 2020.27
NUMBER OF SMARTPHONE USERS GLOBALLY

(CURRENT AND PROJECTED), 2014-2020
Number of users
BILLION
1.57 1.86 2.1 2.32 2.53 2.71 2.87
ACTUAL NUMBERS PROJECTED NUMBERS

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Note: Individuals of any age who own at least one smartphone and use smartphones at least once per month.
Source: eMarketer, April 2016.
However, access to smartphones varies significantly depending on geography. Pew

Research reports that as of spring 2015, 43% of adults worldwide owned smartphones.
However, those numbers varied greatly from country to country, reaching rates as high as
88% in South Korea, and as low as 4% in Ethiopia and Uganda.28
In every country, higher levels of education and income are reliably associated with a signif-
icantly increased likelihood of smartphone ownership. As mentioned above, the number of
smartphone subscriptions is expected almost to double by 2021.29
26 See: https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/ for up-to-date figures.

27 GSMA, Global Mobile Trends, October 2016: http://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/, p. 21.
28 Jacob Poushter, Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues To Climb In Emerging Economies,
Pew Research Center, 2016: http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-and-internet-usage-
continues-to-climb-in-emerging-economies/.
29 Financial Times, 1 June 2016, Smartphone use forecast to beat feature phones this year.
22
SMARTPHONES ARE MORE COMMON

IN THE U.S., EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Smartphone Cellphone but NOT smartphone No cellphone
PERCENTAGE
7
EUROPE 34
60
9
19 5
U.S. 72
MIDDLE EAST 36
57
13
21 19
AFRICA ASIA AND PACIFIC 37
47
56
17
LATIN AMERICA 43
37
Note: Percentages based on total sample. Russia and Ukraine not included in Europe median.
Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey, Pew Research Center.
UNHCR research indicates that refugees are around 50% less likely to own a smartphone
than the global population as a whole, and that 29% of refugee households have no
phone at all.30
Anecdotally, interviewees working in East Africa and the Middle East said they had seen
increasing rates of smartphone ownership among refugees and other low-income groups.31
As factors behind this trend, many cited the falling cost of phones that use the Android
operating system as opposed to Apples iOS and the availability of inexpensive second-
or third-hand smartphones.
Other studies have found that smartphones outnumber feature phones by two to one
in some refugee camps in the Middle East,32 and that refugees also frequently share
phones.33 This ratio may continue to rise in some areas. A recent UNHCR survey of almost
2,000refugees in Lebanon found that the proportion of respondents with access to a
mobile phone had risen to 92%, up from 54% when the same population had lived in Syria.
The proportion with access to the internet had risen to 75% from 10%.34
30 UNHCR, Connecting Refugees: How Internet and Mobile Connectivity can Improve Refugee Wellbeing and Transform
Humanitarian Action, 2016: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/connectivity-for-refugees.html. UNHCR, Connecting
Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/connectivity-for-refugees.html.
31 Ben Mason and Dennis Buchman, ICT4Refugees: A report on the emerging landscape of digital responses to the refugee
crisis, 2016: https://regasus.de/online/datastore?epk=74D5roYc&file=image_8_en; Sacha Robehmed, Getting online
in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, 6 May 2016: https://refunite.org/getting-online-in-the-kurdistan-region-of-iraq/.
32 REACH and UNHCR, Mass Communications Assessment in Azraq Camp (December 2015), April 2016: http://data2.
unhcr.org/en/documents/details/43703.
33 Linda Leung, Phoning home, Forced Migration Review, 38, October 2011: http://www.fmreview.org/technology/
leung.html.
34 Matthew Saltmarsh, Facebook group helps Syrian refugees navigate life in Lebanon, 13 July 2016: http://www.unhcr.
org/en-us/news/latest/2016/7/577e16064/facebook-group-helps-syrian-refugees-navigate-life-lebanon.html.
23
However, this trend is not uniform. In particular, refugees living in urban areas are signifi-
cantly more likely than those in rural areas to be using smartphones. According to the most
recent UNHCR overview, 68% of refugee households in urban locations had an internet-ca-
pable mobile phone in 2015, compared to just 22% of those in rural areas.35
The cost of data packages enabling mobile phones to access the internet is another
restricting factor. For example, research by FireChat indicates that around one-third of
smartphone users in Manila, Mumbai and Mexico City have periods every month where
they cannot use messaging apps because they have spent all their mobile data allowance.36
However, the cost of mobile data has been forecast to fall worldwide in the coming years.37
Anecdotal evidence suggests some groups such as Syrian refugees often regard paying for
data as a top priority, and that individuals find the overall cost of sending messages using
a smartphone with a data plan to be lower than that of sending large numbers of SMS
messages, even with a lower-cost feature phone.
Additionally, some organizations provide free Wi-Fi internet hotspots in sites with high
numbers of refugees, or offer reduced-price data packages.38
CONNECTIVITY
Because messaging apps rely on transmitting data over mobile-data connections or
Some organizations are actively
Wi-Fi networks, they will not work in areas lacking these types of connectivity. Many such
working to increase internet
areas also lack reliable electricity. The most recent data indicates that as of October 2016,
provision in sites such as refugee
mobile-internet penetration rates in sub-Saharan Africa had reached 26%, as compared to
camps, but coverage, connection
34% in the Middle East and North Africa and 39% in developing countries in Asia.39
speeds and reliability vary
UNHCR research found that 90% of refugees living in urban areas could access 3G networks
dramatically between locations.
in 2015 a share similar to that within the global urban population as a whole. However,
only 17% of refugees in rural areas could access 3G networks, while 20% of rural refugees
had no mobile-phone coverage at all.40
Some organizations are actively working to increase internet provision in sites such as
refugee camps, but coverage, connection speeds and reliability vary dramatically between
locations.41
35 UNHCR, Connecting Refugees, 2016: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/connectivity-for-refugees.html.

36 Unpublished FireChat research, February 2016, based on a sample of 200 smartphone users in Mumbai, 200 in
Mexico City and 200 in Manila.
38 Sacha Robehmed, Getting online in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, 6 May 2016: https://refunite.org/getting-
online-in-the-kurdistan-region-of-iraq/; Sacha Robehmed, Syrians with smartphones, 11 February 2016: https://
refunite.org/syrians-with-smartphones-where-does-refunite-fit-in/.
39 GSMA, Global Mobile Trends, October 2016: http://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/.
41 Alyssa Cogan, How technology is affecting the refugee crisis, 9 June 2016: https://www.mercycorps.org/
articles/afghanistan-iraq-syria/how-technology-affecting-refugee-crisis; Jacobo Quintanilla, Ten lessons on
communicating with communities in complex emergencies, 23 October 2015: http://odihpn.org/blog/ten-
lessons-on-communicating-with-communities-in-complex-emergencies; http://www.mercycorps.org/articles/
syria/how-technology-affecting-refugee-crisis; Ben Mason and Dennis Buchman, ICT4Refugees, 2016: https://
regasus.de/online/datastore?epk=74D5roYc&file=image_8_en.
24
ICRC
Burundian refugees line up behind an ICRC staff member for the free phone-charging service in the
Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda.
Finally, the presence of network coverage alone is not enough to ensure that people
actually go online. Recent research suggests that 35% of the worlds population lives in an
area with 3G or 4G network coverage but has never used the mobile internet, due to limited
digital literacy, affordability concerns, or a lack of awareness and relevant local content.42
Anecdotal evidence supports these findings, with this reports interviewees frequently The presence of network
noting that many people in conflict-affected areas either lack access to or do not use inter- coverage alone is not enough to
net-enabled smartphones. Crucially, all these services require strong and fundamentally ensure that people actually go
intact energy and communications infrastructure a particular challenge in situations online. Limited digital literacy,
affected by armed conflict, where energy, telecommunications and media infrastructure affordability concerns, lack of
is often severely disrupted or deliberately targeted by parties to the conflict.43 In some awareness and relevant local
countries affected by conflict, the authorities cite security concerns to limit access to content are key factors.
communications networks at certain periods of time.
GENDER
Men report smartphone ownership at markedly higher rates than women in many coun-
tries, as indicated in the chart below. Men report smartphone ownership
at markedly higher rates than
Interviewees working in crisis-affected areas reinforced this point, with some emphasizing women in many countries,
that this divide is even wider among vulnerable groups in such areas. particularly in crisis-affected areas.
Others reported that even in situations in which women own or have access to phones,
male members of their household often restrict or control their phone usage.

43 See, for example, in Afghanistan: Mohammad Humayon Zahid, Cell phone towers destroyed in Farah, Pajhwok
News, 6 May 2013: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/05/06/cell-phone-towers-destroyed-farah.
25
GENDER DIVIDE IN MANY NATIONS

ONSMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP
Smartphone owners: Women Men
PERCENTAGE
63% 41%
CANADA 72% RUSSIA 48%
65% 24%
UK 72%
UKRAINE 30%
66%
SPAIN 75%
6%
9% PAKISTAN 15%
28% BURKINA FASO 18%
MEXICO 44% 13%
INDIA 21%
31%
65% VIETNAM 39%
21%
VENEZUELA 72%
NIGERIA 34%
20%
KENYA 32%
21%
8%
PERU 29%
TANZANIA 14%
Note: Percentages based on total sample. Only statistically significant differences shown.
Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey, Pew Research Center.
Several studies confirm that this can significantly limit the extent to which women partic-
ipate in technology-based communication initiatives, highlighting the importance of
including alternative communication mechanisms that may be easier and safer for women
to access.44
44 See, for example, Social Impact Lab Foundation, INTRAC and World Vision UK, Low-cost mobile-enabled feedback
mechanisms for solicited and unsolicited feedback, 2016: http://cdn.worldvision.org.uk/files/3514/6056/3545/
SIMLab1.pdf.
26
AGE
As may be expected, there is a significant generational divide in smartphone ownership:
people aged 1828 often purchase smartphones at rates several times higher than those
of older consumers. In Ukraine, for example, 56% of 18- to 34-year-olds have smartphones
compared to 13% of those over 35. In the Palestinian Territories, 73% of 18- to 34-year-olds
and 39% of adults over 35 own smartphones.45
Research from October 2016 also indicates that globally, 18- to 34-year-olds now use
messaging apps with greater frequency than they do SMS or voice calls a trend that is Globally, 18- to 34-year-olds
reversed among those over 35.46 now use messaging apps
with greater frequency than
Information regarding the age of people affected by conflict or displacement is limited, they do SMS or voice calls.
though some of the studies and anecdotal evidence provided by interviewees for this report
indicate that older, low-income people are much less likely than their younger, wealthier
peers to own and use smartphones.47
46 GSMA, Global Mobile Trends, October 2016: http://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/.
47 REACH and UNHCR, Mass Communications Assessment in Azraq Camp (December 2015), April 2016:
http://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/43703.
27
Syrian refugee Riyad, 42, shows Viber voice A Syrian refugee boy, 14, shows WhatsApp
messages sent to a relative in Turkey, after voice messages sent to his father in Germany,
crossing the sea in a dinghy from Turkey after crossing the sea in a dinghy from Turkey
to the island of Lesbos, Greece. to the island of Lesbos, Greece
(October 3, 2015). (October 3, 2015).
All photos on this page: M. Muheisen/AP/Keystone
Syrian refugee Lailav Khalil, 15, shows a A Syrian refugee woman, 20, shows
selfie on her phone, after crossing the sea in Facebook Messenger exchanges with her
a dinghy from Turkey to the island of Lesbos, fiance, after crossing the sea in a dinghy
Greece (October 3, 2015). from Turkey to the island of Lesbos,
Greece (October 3, 2015).
28
A migrant shows a selfie of himself and Syrian refugee Firas Alhadi, 35, shows
friends somewhere in the Balkans, after WhatsApp messages to and from his wife
he spent the night in a shelter near Graz, in Syria, after crossing the sea in a dinghy
Austria (September22, 2015). from Turkey to the island of Lesbos,
Greece (October 2, 2015).
All photos on this page: M. Muheisen/AP/Keystone
Iraqi refugee Khubyb Luai, 29, shows A Syrian refugee shows his phone, after
his phone with a picture of himself crossing the sea in a dinghy from Turkey
and his family, after crossing the sea to the island of Lesbos, Greece
in a dinghy from Turkey to the island (October 2, 2015).
of Lesbos, Greece (October 3, 2015).
29
K. Abdullah/REUTERS
A woman uses her mobile phone to take

photos in Yemen's capital Sana'a,
14 July2015.
2. HOW ARE PEOPLE
USING MESSAGING
APPS IN SITUATIONS
OF CRISIS OR ARMED
CONFLICT?
OVERVIEW: VARIATION AND FRAGMENTATION

This section sets out some of the available evidence regarding the ways messaging apps are
used by refugees, migrants, internally displaced people (IDPs) and other groups of people
affected by armed conflict.
Very little high-quality, disaggregated data is available regarding which apps people
are using and how they are being used. Some data is available on smartphone and
messaging app usage in areas affected by conflict or violence. However, there is limited
data specifically on usage by refugees, with disaggregated data broken down by age or
gender being particularly rare. This seems to indicate that questions on access to and use
of mobile telephony are not systematically included in humanitarian needs assessments.
Even minor changes between regions appear to significantly influence the type
of apps used and the extent of their usage. While a small number of apps are used
worldwide (if to varying extents), many apps are popular only in a small number of
countries due to localized factors including cost, security considerations and the availa-
bility of specific functionalities such as security features.48 Variability in app usage is also
evident when comparing groups of IDPs and refugees; for example, one interviewee
working in Iraq noted that the range of internet connectivity options (and thereby app
usage patterns) differed significantly between refugee and IDP camps that were only
30minutes drive apart.49
App usage patterns can change dramatically over short periods of time. This factor is
exacerbated by the speed at which apps are developing and adding new features. Even
apps that are widely used in certain countries can be overtaken rapidly by competitors,
particularly if the original market leader becomes perceived as being insecure or subject
to surveillance by the authorities. Telegram and Signal, for example, regularly report rises
in downloads in specific countries in response to fears of increased government surveil-
lance.50 In the Middle East, for example, several interviewees described seeing one app
replace a previously popular competitor within the space of a year.
In order to engage with local communities effectively, detailed and regular research
aimed at understanding the local information ecosystem is crucial. This includes
systematically incorporating questions on access to and use of mobile telephony into
humanitarian needs assessments. This was repeatedly emphasized by this reports inter-
viewees, as well as in evaluations of past humanitarian initiatives. Focus groups, user
testing and surveys can help guide decisions on how people in a particular situation are
likely to respond to the use of a particular communications channel.51
For all these reasons, this report does not make broad generalizations about app usage in
conflict or violent situations. Organizations should conduct a thorough context analysis
of usage patterns, market environments and community factors before deciding to use
any messaging app. SIMLab provide a framework for conducting such context analysis in
projects that include technology, which discusses these issues in more detail.52
48 Trushar Barot and Eytan Oren, Guide to Chat Apps, Tow Center, 2015: http://towcenter.org/research/guide-to-chat-apps/.
49 Sacha Robehmed, Getting online in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, 6 May 2016: https://refunite.org/getting-
online-in-the-kurdistan-region-of-iraq/.
50 See, for example, Dominique St John, South Koreans boycott messaging app Kakao Talk en masse for Telegram,
8 October 2014: http://www.dw.com/en/south-koreans-boycott-messaging-app-kakao-talk-en-masse-for-
telegram/a-17981983; Joshua Kopstein, Signal Downloads Spiked After Election Results, 12 November 2016:
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/signal-downloads-spiked-after-election-results.
51 Humanitarian Technologies Project, 2015: http://humanitariantechnologies.net/lessons-from-haiyan/; Jacobo
Quintanilla, Ten lessons on communicating with communities in complex emergencies, 23 October 2015:
http://odihpn.org/blog/ten-lessons-on-communicating-with-communities-in-complex-emergencies; UNICEF,
Wat bother u d most abt Ebola: the design of UReport Liberia, 2014: http://www.unicefstories.org/2014/10/29/
wat-bother-u-d-most-abt-ebola-the-design-of-u-report-liberia/.
52 Kelly Church and Laura Walker McDonald, Announcing: SIMLabs framework for context analysis of inclusive
technology in social change projects, August 2016: http://simlab.org/resources/contextanalysis.
32
How are people using messaging apps in situations of crisis or armed conflict?
Certain apps boast gigantic user bases, but tend to dominate a fairly limited set of countries
or continents. Others, like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, are truly global and have It would be a mistake to assume
a genuine population of users in almost every market. That said, it would be a mistake to that the messaging app market
assume that the market will consolidate and there will be an eventual winner. will consolidate and there will
be an eventual winner. On the
On the contrary, there is ample evidence that a number of messaging apps can coexist and contrary, there is ample evidence
succeed in part because individual users often use multiple messaging platforms to talk that a number of messaging
to different people or to share different types of content.53 apps can coexist and succeed.
In 2014 and 2015, most major apps raced to outmanoeuvre competitors and conquer new
markets, but several have recently retreated to defend core geographic strongholds.
WeChat, for example, has a 93% penetration rate within Chinas major cities, but has strug-
gled to make inroads in North America.54 Its parent company Tencent has since curtailed
attempts to expand in the US market directly, opting instead to invest in messaging apps
like Kik that are popular with North American teenagers.
LINE continues to dominate in Japan, Thailand, Taiwan and Indonesia, and has had notable
successes in countries such as Spain, but has failed to dethrone popular messaging apps
in North America.
Viber is also building on successes in key markets including Russia, Ukraine and Australia,
while pulling back somewhat on other expansion efforts.
Snapchat is arguably emerging as a truly global force and could join the ranks of ubiquitous
messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger.
Relative newcomer imo has also reached the top ranks of app-download charts in countries
such as Yemen, Liberia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Iran.
Data on usage patterns in countries affected by armed conflict is limited. However, the table
below sets out available information on smartphone and app usage in several key countries
affected (or recently affected) by armed conflicts or situations of violence:
53 Madeline E. Smith, Theyre blowing up my phone: Group Messaging Practices Among Adolescents; Siu-Tsen
Shen, 2016, People and their smartphones mapping mobile interaction in the modern connected world,
Engineering Computations, Vol. 33 Iss 6 pp. 1642 - 1658: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/EC-06-2015-0153.
54 eMarketer, In China, WeChat Is Widely Used, 1 December 2015: http://www.emarketer.com/Article/China-
WeChat-Widely-Used/1013285.
33
Country Top three messaging Smartphone Other popular Share of Social media users
apps55 penetration rate messaging apps55 mobile users that are on WhatsApp
who access
social media
on their phone
Yemen WhatsApp, imo, Not available WeChat, Telegram, 5% 92%

Messenger Snapchat, LINE, Tango,
Viber
Ukraine Viber, Skype, WhatsApp 27% Messenger, Telegram, 27% n/a

LINE
Syria WhatsApp 23% Not available Not available 98%
Iraq Messenger, Viber, 17% Telegram, imo, Truecaller 26% 77%

WhatsApp
Afghanistan Not available56 Not available Not available 5% Not available
Palestinian Not available57 57% Not available 32% 47%

Territories
Chad Not available Not available Not available 1% Not available
Niger Messenger, imo, Viber Not available Skype, Snapchat 1% Not available
South Sudan Not available 26% Not available 1% Not available
Somalia Not available Not available Not available 4% Not available
555657
Sources: Pew Research Center58, GSMA59, We Are Social60, TNS Arab Social Media Report61.
The following section summarizes findings from available research on the use of messaging
apps in situations of armed conflict or among refugees and migrants.
WHICH APPS ARE PEOPLE USING?

Most publicly available evidence on messaging-app usage in conflict-affected areas focuses
on defined groups operating in specific regions, typically with small sample sizes. Such
information frequently takes the form of blogs by organizations and short articles in the
media, as well as academic studies and information needs assessments by humanitarian
organizations.
55 Based on recent iOS and Android top free apps charts, as reported by App Annie and iOSAppStats.com.
56 Other research indicates that Facebook Messenger and Viber are the most popular apps among some user
groups: http://dai-global-digital.com/consumer-insights-afghanistan-how-young-women-are-using-tech.html.
57 According to research focused on specific user groups, Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp are the most popular
apps in some scenarios: http://dai-global-digital.com/consumer-insights-palestine-e-governance-readiness.html.
59 GSMA, The Mobile Economy - Arab States, 2015: http://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/.
60 We Are Social, 2016 Digital Yearbook, 26 January 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/wearesocialsg/2016-digital-
yearbook.
61 http://www.dmc.ae/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ArabSocialMediaReport-2015.pdf.
34
J. Quintanilla/ICRC
A Honduran migrant in Tapachula, Mexico, calls relatives in the U.S. via WhatsApp, 17 December, 2016.
Most evidence to date has been focused on the Middle East, and particularly on Syrian
refugees. There is a notable lack of research on refugees and IDPs in all other regions.
In the Middle East, media reports and interviewees have regularly suggested that the most
popular apps were Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and Viber,62 with anecdotal evidence
and personal observations suggesting that other apps are significantly more popular in
other regions.
Some reports have suggested that refugees use different apps for specific purposes: using
Viber to talk to their family while engaging with local authorities on WhatsApp.63
62 Alyssa Cogan, How technology is affecting the refugee crisis, 9 June 2016: https://www.mercycorps.org/
articles/afghanistan-iraq-syria/how-technology-affecting-refugee-crisis; Katie Drew, The European Refugee
crisis: 10 Communications with Communities challenges, 6 January 2016: http://innovation.unhcr.org/the-
european-refugee-crisis-10-communications-with-communities-challenges/; Naline Malla, Ayla Jean Yackley,
Marton Dunai and Aleksandar Vasovic, For many refugees, journey to Europe begins on Facebook, 2 September
2015: http://www.ekathimerini.com/201112/article/ekathimerini/community/for-many-refugees-journey-to-
europe-begins-on-facebook; Bassam Sebti, 4 smartphone tools Syrian refugees use to arrive in Europe safely,
17 February 2016: http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/4-smartphone-tools-Syrian-refugees-use-to-arrive-in-
Europe-safely; Bram Frouws et al, Getting to Europe the WhatsApp Way, Danish Refugee Council, 2016: http://
www.regionalmms.org/index.php/10-briefing.
63 Syrene Assir, Syrians use Facebook to plan, document journey to Europe, 19 August 2015: https://www.yahoo.
com/news/syrians-facebook-plan-document-journey-europe-074314678.html?ref=gs.
35
The table below summarizes a selection of the available findings related to people in situ-
ations of conflict or mass migration:
Location Sample Summary of findings
Multiple refugee sites Survey responses from 95 UNHCRstaff Around 85% of staff respondents said refugees at the site where they worked used Facebook
in the Middle East members representing 44countries, Messenger at least once a week. With regard to other apps, 60% said refugees used WhatsApp
2016 at least once a week, and a respective 55% and 50% citing use of Skype and Viber, again at
least once per week.64
Refugees in Zaatari 234 people in the Zaatari refugee A total of 86% of young people owned mobile handsets, while 83% owned SIM cards. Even
camp, Jordan camp aged 1545, 47% female, with with these reasonably high levels of SIM-card ownership, 79% of young people also said they
surveys carried out in January 2015 borrowed SIM cards from friends and family. Unsurprisingly, mobile phones were the most
popular medium for accessing the internet.
In the camp, over half of the youth population reported accessing the internet one or more
times per day. In terms of communications services, WhatsApp was the messaging app most
frequently used for communication with people in Jordan and Syria. However, mobile voice calls
were used more frequently overall for communicating within Jordan itself.65
Refugees in transit 107 refugees from various countries Respondents were more connected than anticipated 90% indicated they used the internet to
camps in Macedonia in Tabanovce transit camp,66 contact friends and family; with Viber and WhatsApp cited as the most frequently used tools.
48% female, interviewed March Respondents over 55 had a slightly lower than average use of Viber and WhatsApp.
April2016
Face-to-face communication was overwhelmingly the preferred choice of communication with

UNHCR. Limited numbers of respondents referenced social media or [messaging apps].67
Syrian refugees More than 100 people, 26% female, Most Syrian refugees reported having a cell phone. Only 14% of interviewees did not have
in camps and urban interviewed in 2013 access to a mobile phone. 40% of those who have access to a cell phone own a smartphone.
areas in Lebanon
While not all had the capability to make immediate calls, many reported paying for data in
order to use applications such as WhatsApp. Reliance on word of mouth as a primary source of
information for most refugees has extended to significant reliance on mobile phone and SMS
(WhatsApp for those with enabled phones who can afford data bundles) as the main channels
of information flow both inside Lebanon and cross-border.68
Refugees in Greece 108 people, 50% female interviewed [Refugees] use of these smartphones is overwhelmingly focused on social messaging apps:
Turkey and Jordan in 201569 above all Facebook and WhatsApp, with small numbers additionally using others including
Viber, Telegram, Line and WeChat. WhatsApp messages are sent one-to-one and in groups, but
as far as we saw these groups did not extend beyond a persons circle of acquaintances. Our
impression was that Facebook too was being used above all as a messaging service.70
Women in Afghan- 50 women aged 1830, interviewed More than 75% of respondents own smartphones, and for a plurality (41%), mobile 3G is the
istan in 2016 only source of internet access. 73% are active on social networks, and Facebook by far was
the most popular social-networking platform (used by 73% of those active on social networks).
Viber is the most common messaging app, preferred by about 47% of respondents.71
People living in the 81 people, 32% female, interviewed Every respondent owns at least one mobile phone (two in five own multiple phones). The
Palestinian Territories in 2016 overwhelming majority own smartphones, which they identify as their primary gateway to the
internet. 95% use Facebook regularly and 85% use WhatsApp (which is used more than text).72
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

65 Carleen Maitland and Ying Xu, A Social Informatics Analysis of Refugee Mobile Phone Use: A Case Study of
Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp, TPRC 43: The 43rd Research Conference on Communication, Information and
Internet Policy Paper, 31 March 2015: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588300.
66 Breakdown: 48% from Afghanistan, 42% Syria, 9% Iraq, 1% Iran.
67 UNHCR, Information and Communication Needs Assessment, March 2016 - Tabanovce, 2016: https://data.unhcr.
org/mediterranean/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Org%5B%5D=75.
68 Janine di Giovanni et al, Lost: Syrian Refugees and the Information Gap, Internews, 2013: https://internews.org/
research-publications/lost-syrian-refugees-and-information-gap.
69 Detailed breakdown: 35 in Greece, 40% female; 23 in Jordan, 30% female; 50 in Turkey, 90% female.
70 Ben Mason and Dennis Buchman, ICT4Refugees: A report on the emerging landscape of digital responses to the
refugee crisis, 2016: https://regasus.de/online/datastore?epk=74D5roYc&file=image_8_en.
71 Anand Varghese, Digital Insights Afghanistan: How Young Women are Using Tech, 18 February 2016: https://
dai-global-digital.com/consumer-insights-afghanistan-how-young-women-are-using-tech.html.
72 Karim Bin-Humam, Digital Insights Palestine: E-Governance Readiness, 22 June 2016: https://dai-global-digital.
com/consumer-insights-palestine-e-governance-readiness.html.
36
HOW ARE PEOPLE USING MESSAGING APPS

IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES?
There is little verified, disaggregated data about messaging-app usage patterns among
people in crisis situations. Most data come from people on the move. Many interviewees
emphasized that refugees and IDPs preferred to communicate with humanitarian organiza-
tions in face-to-face interactions, noting that this was often seen as the best way of getting
trustworthy information.73
Interviewees who had used messaging apps to communicate with people in humanitarian
situations noted that they were used in a more conversational way than was true of SMS use
- a finding backed up by scientific studies of user behaviour in Europe and North America.74
Thus, rather than attempting to summarize content into a single SMS message, individuals
tend to send multiple messages to communicate a single point, write longer messages and
generally view interactions as more fluid and longer-lasting.
Experimental research indicates that users expect faster response times when using apps,
particularly because many apps show a user when another person has read their message.75 In Arabic-speaking situations,
a range of interviewees described
In Arabic-speaking situations, a range of interviewees described usage as much more vocal usage as much more vocal and
and voice-driven than in Europe or the United States. They also noted that voice messages voice-driven than in Europe or
were particularly common, which could be because voice messages avoid the need for the the United States, and suggested
user to be fully literate, and are faster and easier than typing Arabic or Latin letters.76 that this gave those with limited
literacy skills (often older
Several interviewees also said that messaging apps had given some users with limited people) a way to interact with
literacy skills (often older people) a way to interact with humanitarian organizations, noting humanitarian organizations.
that they had seen users in Turkey and Syria recording and sending voice messages because
they did not have to type them.
Using WhatsApp to register refugees for a cash-transfer programme

A humanitarian organization collecting numerical information from refugees as part of a cash-transfer
programme began asking beneficiaries to send photographs of the relevant form over WhatsApp, rather
than requiring them to accurately type or read out the number over the phone. The beneficiaries found this
easy to do and it became part of the organizations regular process, with the data from the photograph being
manually entered into the database.
The organization found that this was more reliable than previous methods, but noted that it was also a
time-consuming process. Staff members said they were actively looking for ways to collect data using
messaging apps in such a way that the information could be added automatically into their database.
73 Corinne Gray, Is your app the best way to help refugees? Improving the collaboration between humanitarian
actors and the tech industry, 14 October 2016: http://innovation.unhcr.org/app-best-way-help-refugees-
improving-collaboration-humanitarian-actors-tech-industry/.
74 Karen Church and Ricardo Oliveira, Whats up with WhatsApp? Comparing Mobile Instant Messaging Behaviors
with Traditional SMS, MobileHCI, 2013, August 2730, 2013: https://doi.org/10.1145/2531602.2531679;
Kenton P. OHara, Michael Massimi, Richard Harper, Simon Rubens, and Jessica Morris, Everyday dwelling with
WhatsApp, 2014, Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work & social
computing, 1131-1143: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2531602.2531679.
75 Martin Pielot, Rodrigo de Oliveira, Haewoon Kwak, Nuria Oliver, Didnt You See My Message? Predicting
Attentiveness to Mobile Instant Messages, Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, pp. 3319-3328: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2556973.
76 Interviews; Timo Luege, The WhatsApp response, 22 August 2016: http://sm4good.com/2016/08/22/
whatsappresponse/.; Ben Mason and Dennis Buchman, ICT4Refugees, 2016: https://regasus.de/online/
datastore?epk=74D5roYc&file=image_8_en; Comments on Techfugees Slack group: https://techfugees.slack.
com/archives/general/p1458825187000058.
37
WHAT ARE PEOPLE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS USING

MESSAGING APPS FOR?
The tasks that messaging apps are used to perform are also likely to differ significantly
depending on the situation - existing research has tended to focus on the Middle East, and
its findings should not be applied to other geographic areas.
Refugees and migrants in transit

Research by the Danish Refugee Council has identified a typology of usages of digital
communications technologies by people migrating to Europe.77 These include:
finding data on the intended country of destination (including legal information);78
initiating contact with smugglers or brokers;
getting updated information on migration routes, particularly attempting to verify

rumours; and
accessing safety and rescue services while in transit.

GreekReporter.com
Screenshots of the messages, location and pictures that 30-year old Syrian lawyer Mahmoud Alkuder
sent to the Greek Coast Guard in October 2015 to alert them to his position when the vessel that he and
some 60 other people were on ran out of fuel. The boat was rescued by the Coast Guard and towed to
the nearby island of Lesbos.
77 Bram Frouws, Melissa Phillips, Ashraf Hassan and Mirjam Twigt, Getting to Europe the WhatsApp Way: The use of
ICT in contemporary mixed migration flows to Europe, Danish Refugee Council, 2016: http://www.regionalmms.
org/index.php/10-briefing.
78 John Warnes, Update: 10 CwC challenges in the new face of the European Refugee crisis: http://innovation.
unhcr.org/update-10-cwc-challenges-new-face-european-refugee-crisis/.
38
Messaging apps were described as being most frequently used to contact others (primarily
existing friends and family) to share information about their situation or verify information Messaging apps were most
that they had found elsewhere. frequently used to contact friends
and family, share information about
Research on smartphone usage among refugees in transit to Europe has suggested that their situation or verify information.
rather than viewing smartphones as a way of accessing the internet, refugees prefer to see
phones as phones, primarily using them to stay in touch with people they know.79
Some anecdotal evidence indicates that refugees also use apps to communicate with
people that they do not know - ranging from investigative journalists keen to gain infor-
mation about refugees living conditions, smugglers or organizations that could directly
respond to their needs such as rescue services and humanitarian organizations.80 However,
there is little detailed information available about the nature of these interactions.
Communications with the diaspora

In some regions, messaging apps seem to play a crucial role in making connections between In many cases, members of the
diaspora members and individuals in their home country.81 Sacha Robehmed of REFUNITE, a diaspora are now directly involved
non-profit organization with a platform that helps refugees and IDPs search for and recon- in sharing and disseminating
nect with their families using their mobile phone, stated: Syrian refugee populations are so information about routes and
connected that most dont need a service like REFUNITE - they are already in contact with conditions in other countries.
relatives dispersed globally, using WhatsApp, imo, Viber and Facebook.
C. Yaxley/UNHCR
Internet caf at the Nakivale refugee settlement, six hours' drive west of Kampala, capital of Uganda.
In many cases, members of the diaspora are now directly involved in sharing and dissem-
inating information about routes and conditions in other countries.82 Some refugees and
former refugees actively participate as members of information networks for others who are
79 Aviva Rutkin, Phoning in refugee aid, New Scientist, 16 April 2016: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0262407916306595; Janine di Giovanni et al, Lost: Syrian Refugees and the Information Gap, Internews,
2013: https://internews.org/research-publications/lost-syrian-refugees-and-information-gap; REACH and
UNHCR, Mass Communications Assessment in Azraq Camp (December 2015), April 2016: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/
documents/details/43703; Ben Fox Rubin and Richard Nieva, Seeking shelter, 3 August 2016: https://www.cnet.
com/special-reports/road-trip-greece-refugee-crisis/.
80 Claire Reilly, WhatsApp messages from a prison island, thousands of miles away, 18 August 2016: https://www.
cnet.com/news/whatsapp-messages-from-detention-a-thousand-miles-away-refugee-crisis/; Lina Srivastava,
The if and when of technology for the global refugee crisis, 20 June 2016: http://civichall.org/civicist/the-if-and-
when-of-technology-for-the-global-refugee-crisis/.
81 Jodi Kantor and Catrin Einhorn, What Does It Mean to Help One Family?, 8 September 2016: https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/22/world/americas/canada-refugees-syria.html?_r=0.
82 See, for example, Nicholas Shmindle, Ten Borders, New Yorker, 26 October 2015: http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/10/26/ten-borders.
39
in transit between locations, sharing up-to-date information about sea conditions, border
crossings and rescue organizations contact details.83
Epidemics
Research by BBC Media Action found that during the Ebola crisis, people appreciated using
messaging apps to hear people like them voice their concerns, as well as to access accurate
information and ask questions about their situation.
Separate BBC Media Action research found that many people set up small, private WhatsApp
groups where they shared quotes from press releases and news briefings, updates on aid
facilities throughout the country, and reports on incidents, and asked questions about their
own situation.84
T. Barot/Twitter
In October 2014 the BBC launched an Ebola public health information service on WhatsApp to help
people get the latest public health information to combat the spread of Ebola in the region.
83 Theodora Hannides, Nicola Bailey and Dwan Kaoukji, Voices of Refugees, BBC Media Action, 2016: http://www.
bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-and-resources/research/reports/voices-of-refugees.
84 BBC Trending, #BBCtrending: Talking privately about Ebola, 11 October 2014: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
blogs-trending-29574923.
40
But people have also shown a willingness to share personal information about their own
experiences. During the 2014 Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone, more than 12,000 people signed During the 2014 Ebola crisis in
up for WhatsApp groups organized by BBC Media Action which allowed them to send Sierra Leone, more than 12,000
comments, questions and programming requests.85 people signed up for WhatsApp
groups organized by BBC Media
An evaluation of the project also found that people were keen to share their experiences Action that allowed them to
publicly, suggesting that this activity may meet refugees psychosocial need to express send comments, questions
themselves.86 and programming requests.
Natural disasters
In the immediate aftermath of natural disasters, people use messaging apps for three
purposes: to contact friends and family, access accurate information about the situation In the immediate aftermath of
and express their most urgent needs.87 natural disasters, people use
messaging apps for three purposes:
For example, the LINE app was created after the 2011 Japanese earthquake by employees to contact friends and family,
of a company who wanted to communicate with family members while phone networks access accurate information
were unavailable. The BBC has also used Viber to distribute verified information about relief about the situation and express
efforts and public safety in Nepal (although low literacy levels and connectivity gaps limited their most urgent needs.
its usage outside the capital, Kathmandu).88
It is also important to note that any attempt by organizations to use messaging apps
for humanitarian purposes could be appropriated in unexpected, unplanned ways. For
example, in the Philippines, radio stations that used Frontline SMS, an SMS messaging
platform, to receive feedback on their humanitarian programmes found that the service
was mainly used for song requests and dedications to friends and family members.89
Turkey: When WhatsApp unexpectedly becomes 50% of your hotline interaction

As part of a cash-card programme for Syrian refugees being implemented in Gaziantep (Turkey), German
private aid organization Welthungerhilfe set up a hotline service to provide support to users. At no time did
the group advertise that it would be using WhatsApp. However, soon after establishing the hotline number,
people started spontaneously contacting the group using the messaging app rather than by making conven-
tional phone calls.
About 50% of the contact the organization receives is now through WhatsApp. Staff members note that they
are often contacted this way by elderly people who have difficulties typing (or are illiterate), and who prefer
to send voice messages instead of text.
WHAT DONT WE KNOW?

This brief overview highlights a series of knowledge gaps that humanitarian organizations
and researchers should aim to address in order to make an informed decision on whether it
is appropriate to adopt a messaging app in a particular context, and how it can be respon-
sibly and effectively done.
85 BBC Media Action, Humanitarian Broadcasting in Emergencies: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings, 2015:
http://www.cdacnetwork.org/tools-and-resources/i/20151006113456-dir49.
86 BBC Ebola, What do you miss about life before Ebola?, 23 January 2015: https://medium.com/@bbcebola/what-
do-you-miss-about-life-before-ebola-9fa92d26fd89#.np9188hzh.
87 Imogen Wall, Citizen Initiatives in Haiti. Forced Migration Review, 38, October 2011: http://www.fmreview.org/
technology/wall.html.
88 Digital News Asia, BBC Nepali earthquake lifeline public chat channel on Viber, 6 May 2015: https://www.
digitalnewsasia.com/digital-economy/bbc-nepali-earthquake-lifeline-public-chat-channel-on-viber; Online
Khabar, In terms of popularity, Nepali Viber users make it to top 10 in the world, 24 June 2016: http://english.
onlinekhabar.com/2016/06/24/380043.
89 See the Humanitarian Technologies Project: http://humanitariantechnologies.net/publications/.
41
There is a lack of empirical data in many countries worldwide on smartphone and messaging
app usage by refugees, IDPs and other groups or persons in crisis situations, particularly (but
not exclusively) in sub-Saharan Africa.
More work is needed to understand levels of access to these apps, how frequently they
are used in comparison to other communication channels, and what they are used for. Any
such research should also pay particular attention to inequalities in access, with a focus on
gender, age, socio-economic background and experience with technology. A good starting
point will be for humanitarian organizations to systematically include questions on access
to and use of mobile telephony in humanitarian needs assessments.
There is also limited research on whether people use apps differently when they interact
The fact that people in some with humanitarian organizations. As UNHCRs Emergency Lab Manager Katie Drew points
situations are using messaging out, the fact that people in some situations are using messaging apps to contact their
apps to contact their friends friends and family does not mean that they will necessarily want to use the same apps to
and family does not mean that interact with humanitarian agencies.90
they will necessarily want to
use the same apps to interact Research on social media- and SMS-based initiatives to collect feedback in the Philippines
with humanitarian agencies. following Typhoon Haiyan found that people were more likely to share views with their
peers than aid agencies.
Separate research suggests that refugees typically prioritize information about how to
get work over information about how to get aid.91 Qualitative and ethnographic research
methods may produce particular insights in this area.92 More research is needed to investi-
gate how people interact with messaging apps, whether they are appropriate in particular
situations and what kind of information such apps are best suited to distribute.
90 Katie Drew, The European Refugee crisis: 10 Communications with Communities challenges, 6 January 2016:
http://innovation.unhcr.org/the-european-refugee-crisis-10-communications-with-communities-challenges/.
91 Humanitarian Technologies Project, 2015: http://humanitariantechnologies.net/lessons-from-haiyan/; Janine
di Giovanni et al, Lost: Syrian Refugees and the Information Gap, Internews, 2013. https://internews.org/research-
publications/lost-syrian-refugees-and-information-gap.
92 Jonathan Ong, Appealing to Agencies in Only 140 Characters? Towards More Compassionate Communication
Architectures in Community Engagement, 2015: http://cooperation.epfl.ch/files/content/sites/cooperation/files/
Tech4Dev%202016/1277-Ong-SE01-HUM_FullPaper.pdf.
42
in a nutshell kurzgesagt
Humanitarian organizations need to

develop responsible, effective ways to use
messaging apps in order to meet peoples
needs.
3. HOW ARE
HUMANITARIAN
ORGANIZATIONS
USING MESSAGING
APPS?
This section describes humanitarian organizations current approaches to using messaging

apps, as well as the challenges they see and benefits they expect as they make decisions
about which apps to use. It is based on desk research and interviews with staff members
and technical personnel who work for humanitarian organizations.
HOW ORGANIZATIONS ARE USING

MESSAGING APPS
Most humanitarian organizations contacted for this research said they were not using
messaging apps in any formalized, official way. When asked why, most indicated that
smartphone ownership rates among the people they worked with were too low to justify
the use of messaging apps and mentioned SMS-based programmes as their primary
method of communication.
For example, representatives of one large international non-governmental organiza-

tion (INGO) operating in a conflict-affected area stated that they had considered using
messaging apps, but had instead decided to continue with SMS-based methods after
extensive surveys of affected people indicated that the vast majority lacked access to the
internet or internet-enabled smartphones.
Another interviewee working in East Africa said: I do believe smartphone access is pretty
limited within most refugee communities in Africa, and an SMS solution ... is simpler and
more accessible to far more [people]. Similar views were expressed by interviewees working
in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Middle East.
Where messaging apps were being used, organizations had often adopted them in an ad hoc
way - with an organization realizing that its staff or affected people were already using an app
and then looking for ways to utilize it effectively. In these cases, organizations often lacked
defined procedures and protocols for using apps and did not always demonstrate that they
had considered whether additional steps were needed to ensure that data was collected and
managed responsibly. Section 4 below looks at these questions in greater detail.
However, there were signs of growing interest among interviewees in developing

longer-term plans to incorporate messaging apps into their overall communications and
operational strategies.
A small number of interviewees said they were considering introducing messaging apps
into their work in 2016, while technical service providers said they were experiencing
increased interest in the topic from a range of humanitarian organizations.
WHY ARE ORGANIZATIONS ADOPTING

MESSAGING APPS?
Staff at humanitarian organizations interviewed for this report said they were considering
incorporating messaging apps (in addition to existing communications methods such as
SMS, voice calls or radio) for the following reasons:
Target audiences (staff or affected people) are already using messaging apps.
Interviewees typically said the app they were considering for use was already being widely
used by the people they aimed to reach, or that people were already spontaneously
contacting them using that app. As one interviewee, describing the situation in Iraq, put it:
Any number you put out there, you can expect that strangers will use it to try
to connect via WhatsApp and Viber. It has happened to me and it happens
to pretty much everyone here. People just assume that you can be reached
that way and they do not hesitate to try - at all hours of the day and night.
46
How are humanitarian organizations using messaging apps?
For example, Yotam Polizer of the Israeli non-governmental, non-political aid organization
IsraAID said that the organization uses LINE in Japan and KakaoTalk in Korea, because
thats what people use, while the American Red Cross delegation in Vietnam uses Zalo,
an app popular in that country, to share information among volunteers.
Separately, there have been increasingly widespread suggestions that refugees are
comparatively less likely to download new, bespoke apps to communicate with humani-
tarian agencies, particularly given the recent proliferation of such new apps.93
Messaging apps can help reduce communications costs. This is true both for the
humanitarian organizations themselves (which otherwise have to pay fees for SMS or
interactive voice response (IVR) services), and for the refugees or other target populations
(who would otherwise send SMS messages or make conventional phone calls). A number
of interviewees said that some organizations were starting to find the costs of SMS-based
initiatives prohibitive, with long-term trends looking particularly difficult to sustain.
M. Henley/UNHCR
Syrian refugee making a phone call after disembarking from a Hungarian bus that brought her to the
border.
Messaging apps offer a reliable way of maintaining contact with people (whether
staff or refugees) in transit. Apps make it easier to communicate across borders without
increasing costs, while mitigating problems raised by the fact that refugees frequently
change SIM cards or use multiple SIM cards for different purposes.94 Some interviewees
also said that using messaging apps to contact staff members for the purposes of internal
coordination was easier than using email.
93 For some examples of this viewpoint, see: Corinne Gray, Is your app the best way to help refugees? Improving
the collaboration between humanitarian actors and the tech industry, 14 October 2016: http://innovation.
unhcr.org/app-best-way-help-refugees-improving-collaboration-humanitarian-actors-tech-industry; Ben Mason,
The Refugee Tech Crisis, 29 March 2016: https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_refugee_tech_crisis; Lina
Srivastava, The if and when of technology for the global refugee crisis, 20 June 2016: http://civichall.org/civicist/
the-if-and-when-of-technology-for-the-global-refugee-crisis/; Krithika Varagur, Refugees Dont Need Your Apps,
July 2016: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2016/06/30/refugees-dont-need-your-a_n_10757006.html.
94 Linda Leung, Phoning home, Forced Migration Review, 38, October 2011: http://www.fmreview.org/technology/
leung.html.
47
WhatsApp improves staff communication, speeds refugee-support efforts

IsraAID (see above) uses a WhatsApp group for staff communications in each of the 19 countries in which it
works. IsraAIDs Yotam Polizer said the organization chose WhatsApp because it allows staff to send informa-
tion quickly, uses relatively small amounts of data, and allows staff from different parts of the organization
(from coordinators to nurses) to share information about their work. Our main form of communication is
still email. But most people have to read it in their office and dont have time to read it in a crisis, Polizer said.
In Lesbos (Greece), IsraAID also created WhatsApp groups that included volunteers working to support
refugees. First responders seeking to meet refugees arriving on Lesbos additionally formed ad hoc WhatsApp
groups that included numerous support organizations.
Groups were either organized by area (the south beach) or according to the humanitarian cluster system
(with one group for each cluster). Members of each group used WhatsApps location function to share their
location every time a boat landed, thus making it easier for others to plan how to get to the location, as the
apps location-sharing feature allows users to connect directly to Google Maps route-planning function.
The groups naturally developed a structured process for sharing information and reporting incidents,
without any explicit instructions being given. However, participants said this could have developed more
quickly with some guidance. It took two to three months for everyone to get to this point of coordination.
If the crisis were to start again, I would push for it from day one, Polizer said and suggested that a manual
setting out processes for internal communication could be a helpful step towards this.
Messaging apps enable communication with people in environments where other

communications methods are unavailable. This is particularly true of apps that work
well over low-bandwidth internet connections. This capability can be useful in a wide
range of circumstances, including when infrastructure has been damaged by conflict or
a natural disaster.
Interviewees cited situations such as that in post-earthquake Nepal, where messaging

apps remained operational when other communications networks were unavailable.95
Mesh-network technologies such as Open Gardens FireChat app and its MeshKit software
module offer further potential to connect phones when internet and telephone networks
are unavailable, by using smartphones in-built Wi-Fi and radio transmitters. The usefulness
of mesh technology is currently limited by the fact that a significant proportion of people in
a given area need to have downloaded and enabled it for the network to function (FireChat
suggest that this is around 5% of the total number of smartphone users in any urban area).
However, it has been already used in the aftermath of a small number of natural disasters
- for example, FireChat has stated that 23,000 people in Chennai downloaded the app in a
five-day period in 2015 following flooding in the area.96
95 As Natalie Miller from the BBCs User-Generated Content Hub described the situation in Nepal: Phone lines were
down in the affected areas and we can be waiting a long time for an email to be received and answered, whereas
WhatsApp is quick and allows people to share their views, pictures, and videos with us all via the same channel
- See Trushar Barot and Eytan Oren, Guide to Chat Apps, Tow Center, 2015: http://towcenter.org/research/guide-
to-chat-apps/; Yotam Polizer, WhatsApp in Nepal - How one little app saves lives, Times of Israel, 15 September
2014: http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/whatsapp-in-nepal-how-one-little-app-saves-lives/.
96 http://www.opengarden.com/meshkit.html; Indian Express Tech Desk, #ChennaiRains: With networks down,
people turn to FireChat again, Indian Express, 3 December 2015: http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/
social/chennairains-with-networks-down-people-turn-to-firechat-again/. FireChat also state that in 2015, 26,000
people signed up for the service in Mexico in advance of hurricane Patricia.
48
Messaging apps can increase the speed of communications. Several interviewees

said that messaging apps allowed them to communicate more quickly than had been
possible using SMS, particularly when conventional phone network capacity was limited
or overloaded during crisis situations. One interviewee described an occasion when SMS
messages designed to be sent in quick succession as part of a situational-analysis initi-
ative during a crisis response were ultimately transmitted with 60- to 90-second delays
between each message. This frustrated users and reduced the amount of information
submitted, the interviewee said.
To a limited extent, messaging apps can improve digital-communications security

as compared with existing methods of communication. Very few interviewees cited
security and privacy considerations as a major reason underlying their decisions to
consider using a messaging app. However, several noted that despite the security limi-
tations currently associated with messaging apps, information transmitted via SMS or
conventional phone calls over telephone networks was likely to be even easier for adver-
saries to access. They cited the potential benefits of end-to-end encryption of message
content, the inherent insecurity of the mobile-phone network infrastructure, and the
fact that the message content of all SMS messages could be accessed by mobile-network
operators, and thus potentially governments if pressure was brought to bear.97
Messaging apps help organizations gather information from hard-to-reach areas.

Humanitarian organizations working in conflict-affected situations often find it difficult to
conduct face-to-face meetings with individuals in remote areas, due to security concerns,
official restrictions or the difficulty of travel. Several interviewees said that messaging apps
can facilitate communication with people whose voices might otherwise not be heard.
WhatsApp offers remote-reporting capabilities in dangerous conflict areas

A UN agency working in a conflict-affected area has been using WhatsApp to collect information about the
situation since early 2016.
To carry out this process, a single staff member sets up a number on WhatsApp and uses it to communicate
directly with people in the area. Individual contacts are added by going through trusted networks of people.
The staff member asks the people contacted short questions about their situation and then enters the data
manually into spreadsheets.
The agency subsequently cross-checks the information with data from other sources and includes it directly
in reports.
The agency said that using the app allowed it to obtain information it would otherwise have been unable
to access, as the risks of making randomized phone calls were too great, and some individuals in remote
locations who were unable to access phone networks were able to send information online.
Most importantly, this method allowed the agency staff member to build up a relationship of trust with the
individuals contacted, which in turn helped to speed up data entry over time as these contacts learned more
about the process. Agency staffers described the process as quite manageable and suggested that it was
not overly labour-intensive, as they were speaking to only a small number of people.
97 For a more detailed overview of these risks, see Frontline SMS, User Guide on Data Integrity: http://www.
frontlinesms.com/impact-of-frontline/guides-tools-and-case-studies/.
49
Features unique to messaging apps can provide additional information that speeds
up data collection or increases efficiency. Interviewees cited the ability of many apps
to send the location of a users phone using its inbuilt geolocation system as a useful
feature for security teams seeking to locate a particular staff member.98 The ability to
send comparatively long messages can also help overcome challenges imposed by the
character limit on SMS messages.
Messaging apps can improve inter-office coordination. Some interviewees said the
various apps ability to distribute text, voice messages, documents and other files among
small groups had made it easier and faster to coordinate activities between organization
offices. This can be particularly important in crisis situations, when communication is
time-sensitive.
WhatsApp bridges gaps between far-flung offices in Indonesia

Markas Pusat from the Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI), the Indonesian Red Cross Society, uses WhatsApp to
help coordinate activities between the organizations headquarters and branch offices, both in normal and
emergency or conflict situations.
Each branch office creates its own group, which is then linked with the organizations headquarters, espe-
cially the Health and Communications Division. Staff members share documents, location information,
photos and audio within the group, and also make calls using the app. They report that it makes communi-
cations run well and fast.
98 Timo Luege, The WhatsApp response, 22 August 2016: http://sm4good.com/2016/08/22/whatsappresponse/.
50
HOW ARE APPS BEING INCORPORATED

INTO ORGANIZATIONS WORK?
Humanitarian organizations are currently experimenting with messaging apps for two main
purposes: to communicate with people affected by crisis or conflict, and to coordinate tasks
and actions internally. Within each of these categories, the apps are used for a variety of
specific purposes.
COMMUNICATING WITH COMMUNITIES

As organizations seek to work and communicate with people in crisis- or conflict-affected
areas, messaging apps are currently being used in the following ways:
As a hotline. Since June 2015, the ICRCs Yemen delegation has used WhatsApp as a
dedicated hotline to enable people to report incidents or request assistance. As reports
are received, the communications department manually clusters the most frequently
recurring and relevant messages into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and shares this
information with the appropriate department within the delegation. The most urgent
messages (such as security incidents or requests for lifesaving assistance) are immediately
shared with relevant departments by phone and/or email.
J. Quintanilla/ICRC
The ICRC in Yemen uses WhatsApp to disseminate information about its activities and messages to
increase awareness of health epidemics, the protection of humanitarian personnel and other topics.
In collaboration with local media. BBC Media Action used WhatsApp as part of a
broader public-health information programme to disseminate information about Ebola.
The organization set up a communications hotline through the app for around 19,000
subscribers across West Africa, pushing out messages in collaboration with various UN
agencies, and also created content that responded directly to questions from users.
Versions of the service were also offered in various local languages.
To broadcast information to groups of various sizes. The Yuva Community Centre in

Gaziantep, Turkey, uses Telegram and WhatsApp, as well as SMS, to send refugees infor-
mation about the services provided by the centre. Tolga Gle, Yuvas communications
51
coordinator, said that the organization had found Telegram to be better suited to broad-
casting one-way information to comparatively large groups (of around 4050 people),
while WhatsApp was easier to use for two-way communication with smaller groups.
SMS, by contrast, was used for communication with all beneficiaries (a population of
1,000 people or more).99
To support existing discussions in parallel with existing communication channels.

Since it was set up in 2014, the Facebook group I am a Syrian in Lebanon100 has gained
almost 35,000 members. It currently receives over 200 questions daily on topics ranging
from methods of reporting child abuse to means of accessing services provided by
UNHCR and its partners. Its popularity and the increasing difficulty of keeping up with
the flow of information led its creator, Oum Nidal, to create a weekly compilation news-
letter, sent out on Saturdays, which summarizes and collates comments, questions and
replies on a specific issue, such as child labour. UNHCR used the data from the group to
inform the analysis made by its Communication with Communities programme and also
publicized the group itself through channels including WhatsApp and Facebook.101
INTERNAL COORDINATION
Messaging apps have also proven invaluable in overcoming challenges of communication
and coordination within organizations themselves. To this end, organizations are currently
using apps in the following ways:
To share information about tasks or problems and provide updates. Interviewees in

many countries ranging from Greece to Nepal have used messaging apps to share infor-
mation about tasks, discuss potential activities, make requests and monitor progress. A
range of apps were mentioned by interviewees, with WhatsApp by far the most common.
These organizations typically used the apps location-sharing function, exchanged photos,
and shared information rapidly among large numbers of staff through the group-discus-
sion feature.102 Although no interviewees mentioned it in relation to humanitarian work,
Slack, a software application designed to facilitate communication within organizations
and which works on smartphones and desktop computers, is becoming increasingly
popular in other sectors.103
For internal coordination within a humanitarian organization. A number of organ-

izations have found that messaging apps enable staff members in remote locations,
working in the field or simply in different offices, to coordinate activities more efficiently
than is possible simply with email or voice calls. The apps ability to use Wi-Fi or mobile
phone-network connections make it easier for staff members to stay in touch even when
internet or electricity infrastructures are unreliable.
99 Ben Mason and Dennis Buchman, ICT4Refugees: A report on the emerging landscape of digital responses to the
refugee crisis, 2016: https://regasus.de/online/datastore?epk=74D5roYc&file=image_8_en.
100
https://www.facebook.com/groups/172406933094432.
101 UNHCR, Facebook group helps Syrian refugees navigate life in Lebanon, 2015: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
news/latest/2016/7/577e16064/facebook-group-helps-syrian-refugees-navigate-life-lebanon.html.
102 Timo Luege, The WhatsApp response, 22 August 2016: http://sm4good.com/2016/08/22/whatsappresponse/;
Deepak Malik, Emergency response in the WhatsApp era!, 2 March 2016: https://blogs.worldbank.org/
endpovertyinsouthasia/emergency-response-WhatsApp-era; Yotam Polizer, WhatsApp in Nepal How one little
app saves lives, Times of Israel: http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/whatsapp-in-nepal-how-one-little-app-saves-lives/.
103 Josh Constine, Slacks growth is insane, with daily user count up 3.5X in a year, Techcrunch, 2016: https://
techcrunch.com/2016/04/01/rocketship-emoji/.
52
WhatsApp proves more reliable than email for coordination in East Africa
An organization working directly with refugees in East Africa uses WhatsApp to share information about
logistical tasks among groups of staff members, both for teams in the field and for middle managers in the
groups offices. One staff member said: Weve never really had an official set-up or plan to use the app. All
supervisors have a work-issued office phone and had already downloaded the app without prompting, as
it is extremely useful to keep in communication with our staff regardless of their location, which changes
from week to week.
The organization uses WhatsApp exclusively for internal coordination, and does not share information about
the people they assist. Staff find the app useful because it allows people working in remote areas to share
information when email access is unavailable.
As the staff member put it: Previously, staff in far-off regions might not see email for days if internet access
was not reliable. Having WhatsApp ensures important messages can be seen more quickly and acted on.
To share security information. One interviewee described messaging apps as the most
convenient means of staying in contact with a security team in an area affected by armed
conflict, with conventional landline phones, satellite phones and radio serving as parallel
means of communication. Digital security was rarely referenced in this context as a reason
for using apps, and it was notable that interviewees generally did not believe that the
information sent using messaging apps was more secure than that sent by SMS or other
methods. There have been suggestions that using mobile phones to communicate may
be useful in areas where possession of a satellite phone or radio can draw negative atten-
tion towards the person using it.104
Processes described included direct one-to-one contact with an organizations security

contact person, sending broadcast messages to all members of a group of staff, and
sharing information using a tree model, in which each person who receives a message
is responsible for passing it on to others. Interviewees did not describe providing addi-
tional training or guidelines on how to use messaging apps specifically although several
mentioned that this would be useful.
To share information about progress or individual successes. As one humanitarian worker

noted, describing experiences in Greece: When something worked be it the successful
move to a new and better camp, or something small like additional drinking-water taps
my colleagues invariably took photos and shared one or two with the WhatsApp Group.105
A number of interviewees indicated that sharing positive news in this way helped boost
staff morale.
104 Athalie Mayo, SMS Technology and Bulk SMS Delivery Systems: Their Role in Security Management for the
Humanitarian Community, in Raquel Vazquez Llorente and Imogen Wall (eds.) Communications technology and
humanitarian delivery: challenges and opportunities for security risk management, 2014, European Interagency
Security Forum (EISF): https://www.eisf.eu/library/communications-technology-and-security-risk-management/.
105 Timo Luege, The WhatsApp response, 22 August 2016: http://sm4good.com/2016/08/22/whatsappresponse/.
53
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
The following section highlights several potential applications of messaging apps, although
researchers are not aware of instances where these features have been used in humani-
tarian operations.
USING ONE PLATFORM TO SEND MESSAGES FROM MULTIPLE

MESSAGING APPS
Most messaging apps use a relatively similar process for sending messages to large
groups of people. This means it is becoming increasingly possible to use a central third-
party platform to communicate with people on different channels, including one or more
messaging apps as well as SMS.
For example, Twilio, a third-party company that has provided bulk SMS software tools
to a broad range of organizations, is now expanding into messaging-app marketing. Its
messaging toolbox106 aims to integrate SMS and messaging-app functions in order to
identify users across various communications channels, thus ensuring people are not
bombarded with the same message on multiple services.
Other organizations are offering or developing similar systems for use in the development
and humanitarian sectors.107 However, there is still more work to be done, and third-party
companies are constantly scrambling to keep up with changes to messaging-app products.
ANALYTICS
Interviewees who had worked with messaging apps regularly noted that analysing and
processing the data they received was time-consuming and difficult.
At present, most apps provide fairly limited capabilities to access and analyse data on users
interactions with an app. However, as messaging apps take on a larger role in private-sector
marketing and communications strategies, app developers may place increasing emphasis
on providing analytics tools.
LINE currently offers a dashboard providing real-time information on the number of

followers and the performance of specific posts, while Viber sends bi-weekly reports with
metrics on subscribers and visitors to Public Chats and Telegram offers details on a posts
reach (how many users have read or interacted with the content).
A number of third-party companies now provide in-depth analytics on user interaction with
bots, which are increasingly being used as a mechanism for bulk messaging through chat apps.
BOTS
All communication with communities must be accompanied by on-the-ground, face-to-
face communication and direct assistance.108 It is important to stress that any attempt to
introduce automated processes such as bots risks increasing the perception of distance
between a humanitarian organization and the people it works with. That said, interviewees
cited several situations in which they felt bots might be appropriate, for instance:
106
https://www.twilio.com/messaging.
107 Souktel (http://souktel.org) has built custom systems that allow organizations working in international
development to send messages to groups of people through either SMS, Viber or WhatsApp; and InSTEDD
(http://instedd.org/) is working with the World Food Programme to develop a bot that works on Telegram (see
World Food Programme mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping project, Introducing our chatbot, 21 July
2016: http://mvam.org/2016/07/21/introducing-our-chatbot/).
108 Rose Foran, The refugee crisis will not be hacked, 29 July 2016: http://news.trust.org/item/20160729132618-0oczq/.
54
Allowing the collection of structured survey data, including media such as photos. Several
interviewees suggested that bots could potentially increase the accuracy of survey data
by introducing questions that can only be answered by selecting one of several predeter-
mined responses or using artificial intelligence to automatically recognize and highlight
common data entry errors.
Providing a user with tailored answers to questions, by using the bot to ask a set of ques-
tions and retrieve from a database information that is relevant to the users needs.
UNICEF launches chatbot to survey young people on issues that affect them
In April 2016 at F8, Facebooks annual developer conference, UNICEF launched a chatbot that integrates with
U-Report, a service running in 28 countries worldwide that allows young people to answer polls and report
on a broad range of development issues in their communities.109
U-Report, which uses the open source software platform RapidPro, was built to receive information primarily
through SMS. Although it will continue to do so, Blair Palmer, Lab Lead at UNICEF Innovation, said that they
had decided to add messaging apps as another communication channel because they recognized that as
people have more access to the internet, people want to use the thing [messaging apps] that they already
use. Palmer also added that UNICEF sees adopting messaging apps as a way of reducing messaging costs,
noting that SMS is expensive in a lot of places.
The bot is integrated with Facebook Messenger and Telegram, and UNICEF worked directly with a team from
Messenger to implement the integration. It asks young people a weekly series of questions about issues that
affect them, including education, sexual and reproductive health, access to health services and their legal
rights. UNICEF separately noted that Messenger has enabled them - and their partners who run the platform-
to connect a wide range of countries.
Users answers are recorded in a database, analysed in real-time and shared in aggregated form on public
websites and with decision-makers. When UNICEF and the U-Report partners receive unsolicited messages
on a specific issue from members known as U-Reporters, UNICEFs partner organizations can log in and
respond using a separate piece of software (CasePro) that recognizes keywords relating to those partners
areas of expertise. For example, in Uganda UNICEFs partner, the HIV/AIDS organization Mildmay, will respond
to messages received asking questions about HIV/AIDS.110
109 110
Messaging apps themselves are a relatively new technology, but messaging app bots are
even newer. As such, humanitarian organizations should conduct extensive research to
identify implications and potential risks in a particular situation before adopting them.
Interviewees highlighted the importance of clearly explaining to a user that they were inter-
acting with a bot rather than a human, suggesting that this was communicated using an
automated system that required users to select one of a set of options. However, organiza-
tions will need to balance this against the need to provide engaging content using locally
relevant slang or dialects and encouraging the user to continue using the bot.
To provide accurate, up-to-date information, a bot also needs to be able to retrieve informa-
tion from a database or content management system. Because many humanitarian situations
change rapidly, it can be challenging for humanitarian organizations to keep information
about a particular situation up-to-date at all times, which would require significant invest-
ment in time and resources. In crisis situations, it may also be unclear in advance what kind of
information will be needed, or what can be organized and structured effectively in advance.
109 See details on various U-Report implementations here: http://www.unicefstories.org/tag/ureport/.

110 Facebook, Building Bots for Messenger Tips from the Experts: UNICEF, Messenger Blog: https://
messengerblog.com/bots/building-bots-for-messenger-tips-from-the-experts-unicef/.
55
However, content that is changed less frequently may be easier to manage. For example, a
bot created by the non-profit design organization Refugee Text, which allows users to ask
and receive information about asylum requirements in several European countries, retrieves
content from a database of relevant legal advice that is updated on a monthly basis by legal
advisers from humanitarian organizations.111
To take another example, the WhatsGerman app provides German language lessons
targeted at refugees currently based in Germany.112 The World Food Programmes mobile
Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM) project is currently testing a chatbot that works
on Telegram (and will be implemented on other platforms) to collect information about
food security; many of the lessons it has learned regarding using bots with refugees have
been published on the projects blog.113 114 115
South Africa: Using bots to support maternal health

In July 2016, the Praekelt Foundation, an African
non-profit organization, launched a bot as part of
MomConnect, a programme conducted jointly with
South Africas National Department of Health. It provides
pregnant women and new mothers with personalized
information and support according to their stage of
pregnancy, time until delivery or childs age.114
Praekelt General Manager Debbie Rogers stated that her

group had started investigating messaging apps due
Praekelt Foundation
to the high cost of SMS message fees, because they felt

that chatbots offer a more engaging way of delivering
content and because she and her colleagues felt that
in a few years SMS is going to become a fairly obsolete
service in some of the areas where were working.
Praekelt.org also runs similar maternal and child health programmes in Nigeria and Uganda and said that
they intend to introduce messaging apps in those countries for similar reasons.
The MomConnect bot works with Facebook Messenger, WeChat and Telegram. Praekelt believes that
the Messenger version is showing the most promise due to Facebooks high penetration rates in South
Africa. When a woman registers as pregnant at a clinic, she gives her phone number and is signed up to
the service, which primarily works over SMS and USSD. Users who are identified as being able to use the
Facebook Messenger service (those who have mobile data access on their phones) are then sent a link to the
MomConnect Facebook page, where they can sign up to the bot.115 The bot asks the user a predefined set of
questions (similar to those in a conventional survey), recognizes their responses and provides replies from a
database of relevant information that is used as part of the MomConnect service.
In the longer term, Praekelt plan to include the ability for users to access the MomConnect helpdesk via the
Messenger bot. This helpdesk is currently operated by trained midwives, who respond to users who cannot
find the information they get from the stage-based service (allowing users to submit information in a free
text input field); this is only currently available to SMS users.
111
http://refugeetext.org/. Refugee Text currently works with SMS and is being integrated with Facebook
Messenger, Telegram and Viber. A demo of the Facebook Messenger app is available at: www.m.me/
refugeetext.
112 WhatsGerman: http://www.whatsgerman.de/whats_app_sprachkurs_eng.html.
113 World Food Programme mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping project, Chatbot: back to the drawing
board, 13 September 2016: http://mvam.org/2016/09/13/chatbot-back-to-the-drawing-board/; http://mvam.
org/2016/07/21/introducing-our-chatbot/.
114 Praekelt, Curing Pilot-itis for mHealth, 19 July 2016: http://blog.praekeltfoundation.org/post/147639334452/
curing-pilot-itis-for-mhealth.
115 MomConnect Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/MomConnect-PMTCT-1554302084863313/.
56
Third-party companies such as ChatFuel offer free, self-service platforms enabling bots to
be created for specific purposes and deployed to Facebook Messenger and Telegram.116
Other companies such as ChatSuite, Massively and Sequel offer a greater degree of custom-
ization and complexity, while also charging monthly fees for product maintenance and the
distribution of messages to users.117 Developers such as Imperson, Msg.ai and Pandorabots
also aim to help organizations with larger budgets to build bots with a higher degree of
artificial intelligence and the ability to carry on a convincingly human conversation.118
Furthermore, third-party bot platforms have been helping private sector organizations
syndicate their bots and track user-interaction statistics across multiple messaging apps. Bots pose important questions
Many third-party bot companies price their services based on the number of messages sent about the way in which
to users, i.e. the more notifications you send, the more you are likely to pay. humanitarian agencies engage
with people. If a bot is unable
Finally, bots pose important questions about the way in which humanitarian agencies to understand or answer
engage with people. Any efficiency gains that bots may offer need to be matched by a users questions, it may simply
the humanitarian organizations capacity to provide on-the-ground, practical support to increase levels of frustration and
complement any communication. decrease trust in the humanitarian
organization as a whole.
However, if a bot is unable to understand or answer a users questions, it may simply
increase levels of frustration and decrease trust in the humanitarian organization as a whole.
Interviewees involved in developing bots repeatedly emphasised the importance of

human-centred design processes that devote substantial time to understanding users
needs, responsible data concerns (see Section 4 below) and ways of relating to bots and
apps more generally.
116
https://chatfuel.com/.
117
http://chatsuite.net/; http://www.massively.ai/; https://www.onsequel.com/.
118
http://imperson.com/; http://msg.ai/; http://pandorabots.com/.
57
M. Brecciaroli/ICRC
An ICRC staff member uses a WhatsApp

group to communicate with colleagues,
Yangon, Myanmar.
4. CONSIDERATIONS
WHEN USING
MESSAGING APPS
IN HUMANITARIAN
SITUATIONS
As the 2014 report Humanitarianism in the Age of Cyber-warfare: Towards the Principled and
Secure Use of Information in Humanitarian Emergencies recommends, humanitarian organ-
izations should support ethical innovation, ensuring that projects using new or untested
systems are held to a higher standard of oversight and codes of conduct are regularly
updated and enforced.119
Systems for using messaging apps are currently both new and largely untested, and human-
Systems for using messaging itarian organizations currently have no agreed codes of conduct, standards or ethical
apps are currently both new and frameworks for deploying them. Organizations need to address this doctrine gap in order
largely untested, and humanitarian to use messaging apps responsibly.120
organizations currently have no
agreed codes of conduct, standards When a humanitarian organization communicates or exchanges information with local
or ethical frameworks for deploying communities, it also has a responsibility to ensure that this generates no harm for those
them. Organizations need to people. The technical characteristics of messaging apps, and the way in which they share
address this doctrine gap in order and process data, introduce new risks to users security and privacy.
to use messaging apps responsibly.
This section describes a set of issues for organizations to consider when assessing whether
messaging apps can be used responsibly and effectively in a given situation.
WORKING WITH MESSAGING APP PROVIDERS:

CHALLENGES AND RISKS
Humanitarian organizations interviewed for this report said that they were attracted to using
messaging apps because it would allow them to communicate with people using channels
that those people already knew and used on a daily basis. Perhaps as a result, many inter-
viewees said that they decided which apps to use on the basis of popularity - assessing
which were most widely used in that context and then working out how to use them.
However, this approach may encourage organizations to adopt apps whose features do not
comply with established good practice for security, introduce uncertainties into existing
workflows, or run counter to existing data protection policies or laws.
Messaging apps also develop and change features fast, and there is no guarantee that a
feature offered by an app will be available indefinitely. Similarly, companies policies and
statements about data usage, security and privacy may be revised later, as highlighted by
WhatsApps August 2016 announcement that it would share users phone numbers and
times of usage with Facebook, despite previous statements to the contrary.121 In most cases,
companies are unlikely to consult users (including humanitarian organizations) or provide
advance notification about such changes. Several interviewees described instances where
an app that they were using to communicate with groups of people altered or removed
features at short notice, forcing the organization to dramatically change its strategy.
Consequently, organizations may be unable to view the technical details of the under-
lying code, and therefore unable to make a comprehensive assessment of how changes
affect users security or privacy. Organizations that use third-party providers to manage
or process information should also consider these risks and make adequate provisions to
mitigate them.
119 UNOCHA, Humanitarianism in the Age of Cyber-warfare:Towards the Principled and Secure Use of Information
in Humanitarian Emergencies, OCHA Policy and Studies Series, October 2014: http://www.unocha.org/
node/107049.
120 Nathaniel A. Raymond and Casey S. Harrity, Addressing the doctrine gap: professionalising the use of
Information Communication Technologies in humanitarian action, April 2016: http://odihpn.org/magazine/
addressing-the-doctrine-gap-professionalising-the-use-of-information-communication-technologies-in-
humanitarian-action/.
121 BBC, WhatsApp users to receive adverts, 25 August 2016: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37184651;
Sean McDonald, WhatsApp, Trust, & Trusts, 27 August 2016: https://medium.com/@McDapper/whatsapp-
trust-trusts-980ec18d71b2#.cs9pv6hxp.
60
CONSIDERATIONS WHEN USING MESSAGING APPS IN HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS
THREATS TO MESSAGING APP USERS SECURITY

AND PRIVACY
Adopting messaging apps introduces a range of additional challenges for humanitarian
organizations. This is partly because the companies behind most major apps process and Most major messaging app
store data using proprietary, opaque systems that external organizations cannot inde- companies process and store
pendently scrutinize. data using proprietary, opaque
systems that external organizations
This section discusses key areas where more work is needed to establish standards and cannot independently scrutinize.
assess threats associated with messaging apps.
Messaging apps also introduce risks for security, data protection and privacy. in a nutshell kurzgesagt
TYPES OF DATA TO CONSIDER

There is continuing discussion over how information can best be shared among humani-
tarian organizations while protecting individuals privacy and security. Here, it is important
to consider three main types of data:
Personally identifiable information (PII) is data that allows an individual to be identified.

It can include information such as an individuals name, age, email address, telephone
number or identification number. The use of personal data is also covered by a range of
international agreements. The parameters of what constitutes personally identifiable data
are continually expanding, as technological advancements make it easier to derive an
individuals identity using disparate pieces of information from the wide range of datasets
that are now accessible (also known as the mosaic effect).
Community identifiable information (CII) is data that can be used to identify a commu-
nity or distinct group, whether geographic, ethnic, religious, economic or political.122
While this may be helpful for organizations directing their support towards particular
groups, it can also help other people or organizations who may wish to target a particular
group for political or other reasons.
Metadata, in the present context, is data about the transmission of information on

messaging apps. This can include the date and time at which messages or files were
sent, the users location, the identity of the person to whom data was sent, and in some
122 As defined in UNOCHA, Humanitarianism in the Age of Cyber-warfare: http://www.unocha.org/node/107049, p.6.
61
cases even the phones manufacturer and operating system.123 (Note that even where
messaging apps use end-to-end encryption for message content, metadata itself is not
encrypted in the same way).124 Metadata can be used to link an individual with other indi-
viduals or groups, or be combined with other datasets to infer details about an individual;
studies demonstrate that it is possible to extrapolate information such as health condi-
tions, gun ownership and even literacy from mobile phone metadata.125
Moreover, governments or security forces may use metadata to identify and follow indi-
viduals or groups: as a former director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put
it in 2014, We kill people based on metadata.126 In some countries, app companies are
required to store metadata for longer time periods than for other forms of content.
POTENTIAL THREATS
Data protection and privacy concerns will arise in every area of a humanitarian organizations
work, but humanitarian organizations should consider particular risks when considering
whether to deploy a messaging app. Of these, the primary concern is the prospect that
unintended third parties access data collected by humanitarian organizations, for purposes
that run counter to the neutral, impartial and independent nature of humanitarian work.
These groups could include:
Entities in refugees countries of origin, who wish to identify groups or individuals for
political reasons.
Entities with interests in migration or security policy, who wish to understand and
predict migration flows.
Governments hosting refugees or IDPs who wish to identify groups or individuals.
Hostile parties who wish to target or discriminate against some groups of people and
the humanitarian organizations supporting them.
Business concerns who wish to profile the behaviour of particular groups, which can
lead to discrimination.127
In its 2015 Resolution on Privacy and International Humanitarian Action, the International
Conference of Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners acknowledged concerns in this
regard:
Humanitarian organizations not benefiting from Privileges and Immunities

may come under pressure to provide data collected for humanitarian purposes
to authorities wishing to use such data for other purposes (for example control of
migration flows and the fight against terrorism). The risk of misuse of data may
have a serious impact on data protection rights of displaced persons and can be
a detriment to their safety, as well as to humanitarian action more generally.128
123 For an example of the information that can be gathered about an individual using metadata, see Kai Biermann,
Betrayed by our own data, 20 March 2011, Die Zeit: http://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitz-data-retention.
124 Annex contains detailed breakdowns of metadata collected by a selection of major messaging apps, including
information about who users have spoken to at specific times and places.
125 Pl Sundsy, Can mobile usage predict illiteracy in a developing country?, Telenor Group Research, June 2016:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.01337v1.pdf; Jonathan Mayer, Patrick Mutchler, and John C. Mitchell, Evaluating the
privacy properties of telephone metadata, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, vol. 113 no. 20, pages 55365541: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1508081113; Yves-Alexandre de
Montjoye, Alex Sandy Pentland, Laura Radaelli, and Vivek K. Singh, Unique in the Shopping Mall: Reidentifying
credit card data, Science, vol. 347, no. 6221, 2015, pages 536-539: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1256297.
126 David Cole, We Kill People Based on Metadata, New York Review of Books, 10 May 2014: http://www.nybooks.
com/daily/2014/05/10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/.
127 Maria Xynou and Chris Walker, Why we still recommend Signal over WhatsApp, 23 May 2016, https://
securityinabox.org/en/blog/23-05-2016/why-we-still-recommend-signal-over-whatsapp.
128 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Adopted Resolutions, 2015:
https://icdppc.org/document-archive/adopted-resolutions/.
62
Considerations when using messaging apps in humanitarian situations
WHAT KIND OF DATA DO MESSAGING APPS COLLECT OR STORE?

Message content: Although some major messaging app companies state that their apps
offer end-to-end encryption, meaning that they are unable to decrypt or read the contents
of messages, other widely-used apps such as imo and Facebook Messenger store all
message content on their servers.
Note that some apps offering end-to-end encryption include it only as an opt-in feature
(notably Telegram, LINE and Facebook Messenger). This requires users to be aware of the
need to manually enable this feature in their settings, increasing the risk that message
content may unwittingly be sent unencrypted. Communication with most bots or bulk
messaging features on messaging apps is not end-to-end encrypted.
User information: When users sign up for an app, they are asked to submit information
about themselves (ranging from a phone number, in the case of most apps, to full names
and email addresses in the case of apps such as WeChat and Facebook Messenger).
Mandatory SIM card registration is enforced in many countries worldwide. In these coun-
tries, an apps requirement to submit a phone number may in effect prevent individuals
from using messaging apps anonymously. In parts of Latin America, users may also be
required to register their handset number.129 During sign-up many apps automatically
access a users contacts list to find other contacts who already have the app. In some cases,
apps may store this data separately. WhatsApp, for example, confirmed in June 2016 that
it stores contact list information.130 Details of any messaging groups to which the user
belongs may also be stored. Information about a users network of contacts could be used
as evidence against them.
Metadata: Apps collect varying quantities of metadata (see examples in the box below),
including sites and information accessed from within the app. Many app companies state
that this data is retained on their servers, but rarely explain the length of time that data
is retained, or if and how metadata is encrypted. This is the case even among apps which
claim to have implemented end-to-end encryption. Although some messaging applications
on personal computers offer to hide users metadata using Tor hidden services (software
that enables anonymous browsing),131 this is not an option on the major messaging apps
currently available. Instead, the most privacy-conscious apps currently available simply aim
to collect as little metadata as possible.
Messaging apps - user and metadata collection compared132

imo: A users account creation data, profile information, posted content, contacts, device information, logs
of messages, aggregated online activities, location, and chat history.133
Snapchat: A users Snapchat username, email address, phone number, Snapchat account creation date,
timestamp and Internet Protocol (IP) address of account logins and logouts, and logs of previous messages
sent and received.
Signal: A users phone number, the time they signed up, and the last time they connected to Signals server
(with the precision of this time limited to the day, rather than the hour, minute and second.135
132 133 134
129 GSMA, Mandatory registration of prepaid SIM cards: Addressing challenges through best practice, April 2016:
www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Mandatory-SIM-Registration.pdf.
130 Micah Lee, Battle of the secure messaging apps: How Signal beats WhatsApp, The Intercept, 22 June 2016:
https://theintercept.com/2016/06/22/battle-of-the-secure-messaging-apps-how-signal-beats-whatsapp/.
131 All the following options use Tor hidden services (software that is designed to allow anonymous
communication): Guardian Project, What is Orbot?: https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/; Security in a
Box, Guide to Orbot: https://securityinabox.org/en/guide/orbot/android; Tor Project, Tor Messenger Beta:
Chat over Tor, Easily, 29 October 2015: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-messenger-beta-chat-over-tor-
easily; Joseph Cox, Ricochet, the Messenger That Beats Metadata, Passes Security Audit, 17 February 2016:
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/ricochet-encrypted-messenger-tackles-metadata-problem-head-on.
132 Based on publicly available information from the apps terms of service at the time of writing.
133 Aggregated online activities is likely to denote external internet sites accessed from within the app.
134 Signal, Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data, Eastern District of Virginia, 4 October 2016: https://
whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/.
63
Data shared with third-party providers: Messaging app companies frequently state that
they share users personal data with other companies which provide services to enable the
app to operate. However, they rarely state which companies they work with, what services
they provide, what data they have access to, or how that data is processed and stored (see
Annex for details).
One interviewee reported starting a project with a third-party provider to send content over
a messaging app, but later terminated the agreement after the provider could not produce
a privacy policy or explain how they stored data securely.
Evidence that a user has installed an app on their phone: By accessing an individuals
physical device or viewing metadata shared by an internet service provider, authorities may
find physical evidence that a user has installed a particular messaging app. This could also
potentially be accessed through other means: for example, users must associate an email
address with their smartphone to download an app, creating a potentially traceable link
between the app and other online activity.
HOW COULD OTHER PARTIES ACCESS DATA SHARED

ON MESSAGING APPS?
Other parties may be able to access data transmitted through messaging apps in a number
of ways, including:
A messaging app company (or a third-party provider that accesses app users personal
information) discloses message content or metadata stored on its servers, in response
to a disclosure request from an authority in the jurisdiction where that data is stored.
Another party gains unlawful or covert access to message content or metadata stored
on a messaging app companys servers (through hacking), or accesses that information
while it is travelling between the two parties (known as a man-in-the-middle attack). For
example, tests by the University of Torontos Citizen Lab in late 2013 indicated that the
messaging app LINE was not encrypting content sent over 3G connections despite the
fact that content sent over Wi-Fi was encrypted and pointed to speculation that LINE may
have done so intentionally to allow the authorities to access message content.135
Parties access messaging app content through other covert methods. These include
accessing the SMS login codes sent to users when they sign up for an app by redirecting
traffic on conventional mobile phone networks, or inducing users to install malware
(short for malicious software) onto their phone which enables others to remotely gain
access to that phone or data stored on it. To limit the risk of the former type of attack,
security experts generally advocate enabling two-factor authentication in the apps
settings (see Annex for details on where this feature is available).136 It may also be possible
for parties to manipulate individuals into disclosing information through social engi-
neering, often by impersonating a person or organization that the individual trusts.
An individual is forced to hand over their physical device. End-to-end encryption

only encrypts data while it is in transit, not on the users device. If a party gains physical
access to a phone or computer with access to a users messaging app account (such
as by compelling the user to unlock it), they may be able to access message content,
contacts as well as details of apps that are installed on the device. This could potentially
135 3G networks are encrypted by default, but only at the level of the network provider, meaning that internet
service providers (ISPs) and telecommunications companies can decrypt information sent over them.
Citizen Lab, Asia Chats: Analyzing Information Controls and Privacy in Asian Messaging Applications, November
2013: https://citizenlab.org/2013/11/asia-chats-analyzing-information-controls-privacy-asian-messaging-
applications/; Jon Russell, Thailands Government Claims It Can Monitor The Countrys 30M Line Users:
https://techcrunch.com/2014/12/23/thailand-line-monitoring-claim/.
136 Two Factor Auth provides a list of websites and whether or not they support 2FA: https://twofactorauth.org.
64
compromise others privacy and security. In some countries, the authorities consider
merely installing apps such as WhatsApp as an indicator of subversive behaviour.137
Governments are reported to have made efforts to unlock access phones in several
countries. Signal, Telegram and SnapChat all offer self-destructing messages, which
are only visible on the sender and recipients phones for a limited time before being
automatically deleted. Viber, Signal, LINE and Telegram allow users to set a password
that must be submitted in order to view message contents. Note that screenshots of
a recipients conversation can also be collected and shared, irrespective of whether
end-to-end encryption is enabled.
A messaging app company allows a government to directly access content or data

transmitted over the app by building a secret feature into its code (known as a
backdoor). Other companies have publicly stated that that they have refused requests
from government agencies to create backdoors,138 while many major app companies have
publicly stated that they will not include backdoors in their apps code.139
CONSENT
Communicating with communities in humanitarian situations always involves negotiating
a range of complex questions, including the following:
Do individuals need to give a humanitarian organization permission to add their details

to a group or channel?
How can an individual opt out of receiving the content? Is this made clear to them at
the outset?
How can people be made aware of who PII or other information is shared with?
If requests for support that fall outside the humanitarian organizations mandate are shared
with another humanitarian agency, are there clear data-sharing protocols to cover this?
How do people know how long their data will be kept, and for what purposes?
How can all these issues be communicated in a way that is easy to understand, including
for people with limited experience of technology?
Working with messaging apps adds an additional layer of complexity to all these issues.
To maintain fully informed consent,
Some of the data entered into most messaging apps is retained and stored by third parties humanitarian organizations will
(messaging app companies), which in turn share some of that data with other parties - need to constantly monitor changes
whether service providers that enable an app to function, or parent companies (as with in messaging app companies terms
Facebook and WhatsApp). and conditions and communicate
any changes to the people
To maintain fully informed consent, humanitarian organizations will need to constantly they are seeking to support.
monitor changes in messaging app companies terms and conditions, and communicate
any changes to the people they are seeking to support.
137 Maria Xynou and Chris Walker, Why we still recommend Signal over WhatsApp, 23 May 2016: https://
securityinabox.org/en/blog/23-05-2016/why-we-still-recommend-signal-over-whatsapp.
138 Jon Russell, Tim Cook Says Apple Wont Create Universal iPhone Backdoor For FBI, 17 February 2016: https://
techcrunch.com/2016/02/17/tim-cook-apple-wont-create-backdoor-to-unlock-san-bernardino-attackers-
iphone/; Max Eddy, What Its Like When The FBI Asks You To Backdoor Your Software, 8 January 2014: http://
securitywatch.pcmag.com/security/319544-what-it-s-like-when-the-fbi-asks-you-to-backdoor-your-software.
139 Amnesty International, For your eyes only: ranking 11 technology companies on encryption and human
rights, 17 October 2016: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/POL40/4985/2016/en/.
65
Humanitarian organizations may also be unable to confidently state that users can destroy
or remove data that they have already submitted because this could entail multiple negoti-
ations with multiple parties (not all of whom are transparent about what data they hold). In
these circumstances, organizations seeking to use messaging apps should aim to minimize
the amount of information that is submitted to them.
Academic research focused on the US has also found that users of messaging apps are
usually unaware of the privacy implications of installing and sharing data on messaging
apps.140 Interviewees frequently said that people regularly provided them with more
information over messaging apps than their organization had requested, including names,
addresses and contact details. This has also been an issue for news media, as Trushar Barot,
(Mobile Editor, BBC World Service) explained:
There have been some examples where people have sent us content []
and have said Im happy for you to use my name, but we said were not
going to or wed anonymize it by just using the first name because we felt
that was important, even if they were fine with it. We overrode the safety
considerations they may have themselves and made our own judgement.141
However, this varied from situation to situation: several interviewees noted that in conflict-
Humanitarian organizations need affected areas, refugees and IDPs were often cautious about surveillance and careful about
to conduct detailed research what data they disclosed. For example, Refugee Texts Ciarn Duffy said that individuals
into what data is necessary for were only prepared to submit data about their country of origin after the organization
their operations, and what risks explained exactly why it was necessary to answer their questions about asylum regulations.
collecting it might entail.
Again, this highlights the need for humanitarian organizations to conduct detailed research
into what data is necessary for their operations, and what risks collecting it might entail.
Interviewees regularly said that they were looking for clear ways to explain to users how
their data would be used, with some expressing particular concerns over potential uses of
data for other purposes by organizations such as Facebook.
More work is needed to identify common approaches for communicating this information
in an easily comprehensible way. Organizations may also have an opportunity to promote
practices among users that help to reduce the amount of data an app collects, such as
altering the apps default settings or communicating clearly what kinds of information
should not be shared on the app.142
140 Patrick Gage Kelley, Sunny Consolvo, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Jaeyeon Jung, Norman Sadeh and David Wetherall,
A Conundrum of Permissions: Installing Applications on an Android Smartphone, Financial Cryptography and
Data Security, Vol. 7398, pp 68-79: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2F978-3-642-34638-5_6.
141 Alastair Reid, How newsrooms can use chat apps and private networks for newsgathering, 15 November 2015:
https://firstdraftnews.com/how-newsrooms-can-use-chat-apps-and-private-networks-for-newsgathering/.
142 See, for example, the grugq, Operational WhatsApp, 15 April 2016: https://medium.com/@thegrugq/
operational-whatsapp-on-ios-ce9a4231a034#.rsft0ye56; or Security in a Box, Guide to Signal, 23 May 2016:
https://securityinabox.org/en/guide/signal/android.
66
Responsible data considerations when using WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger to collect data
Ahead of South Africas municipal elections in August 2016, the non-profit Africas Voices Foundation part-
nered with Livity Africa to evaluate the impact of Voting is Power, a campaign to encourage young people
to vote and highlight issues that mattered to them.143
To do so, they used online surveys of young people (conducted via email and through WhatsApp and
Facebook Messenger) and posts published on social media. WhatsApp and Messenger were selected as
channels because of their popularity with young people (476 people were engaged through Facebook
Messenger and 46 through WhatsApp).
Africas Voices Foundation felt that their use of WhatsApp groups encouraged conversations that would
yield particularly useful feedback. Impact and Communications Officer Rainbow Wilcox said: the data that
can be gathered [through WhatsApp] is rich, authentic, and provides insights into socio-cultural beliefs and
behaviours.
However, Africas Voices had concerns about privacy when using both Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp.
We sought informed consent and stored the data securely, but we cannot control how the data will be used
in these platforms, Lopes said. It was problematic because we asked for personal information such as voting
and demographics. We have decided not to embark on a [similar] project again if the privacy risks are not
well understood before it starts.
MESSAGING APP FEATURES RELATED

TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY 143
The following are relevant features to look for when choosing a messaging app to exchange
information in humanitarian crises:
1. Anonymity permitted/no requirement for authenticated identity

Enabling users to communicate anonymously via a messaging app enhances their privacy,
whereas requiring the use of real names, email addresses and authenticated identities
increases the risk that individuals will be monitored or targeted. The less information a
user is required to provide in order to use an app, the less information about them other
parties may be able to access. Because most apps require a users account to be linked to
a telephone number, users anonymity could be enhanced by creating an account using a
SIM card that is then disposed of.
2. No retention of message content

User privacy is better served when the contents of messages are delivered to a users device
and deleted from the app companys servers after they are read. Apps such as Telegram,
WhatsApp, Viber and Signal state that they delete message content from their servers
immediately after the intended recipient has accessed it. However, humanitarian organ-
izations should be aware that they may not be able to independently verify these claims.
Companies such as Skype and Facebook Messenger retain message content on their servers
after the user has read the message, without stating a maximum time limit after which they
will delete the data.
3. End-to-end encryption
End-to-end encryption restricts the ability of third parties to intercept communications
between humanitarian organizations and their beneficiaries in a way that allows the
message contents to be viewed. Even if a company does retain content data, it will be in
encrypted form and thus not legible to the company or to any third party seeking access
143 Africas Voices, Case Study: Livity South Africa: http://www.africasvoices.org/case-studies/livity-south-africa/.
67
to it. Encryption thus restricts the type and amount of legible data that messaging-app
companies can be compelled to disclose. Ideally, it should be deployed by default in both
one-to-one and group chats.
Some encryption protocols are considered by security experts to be stronger than others:
for example, Telegram has been criticized for developing its own protocol rather than
using the existing Signal protocol, which experts generally regard as among the strongest
currently available.
At the time of writing the Electronic Frontier Foundation was updating its Secure Messaging
Scorecard, which assesses levels of security offered by specific apps. The Scorecard and
media sources should be monitored for updates.144
4. User ownership of data

It is essential that messaging-app users be regarded as the lawful owners of their personally
identifiable data as well as the contents of their messages. This prevents messaging-app
companies from using such data for commercial or other initiatives without the explicit
consent of the user. This issue is addressed by national law in some countries, and the topic
may also be included in the messaging apps terms-of-service agreements.
5. No or minimal retention of metadata

The less metadata messaging apps retain on their servers, the less data they can be
compelled to disclose to governments or sell to commercial interests. Messaging apps such
as Signal and Telegram claim not to retain any metadata on their users, though Telegrams
claim has been contested145, whereas most major apps under consideration state that they
collect contact numbers, logs of activity on the app and location information (see Annex
for details).
6. Messaging-app code is open source

When the code which underpins a messaging app is open source, the app can be inde-
pendently scrutinized to verify that it has no vulnerabilities to security threats or hidden
surveillance functions such as backdoors.146 Ideally, an app will publish its entire codebase
openly. Messaging apps such Signal and Wire are entirely open source, while apps such as
Telegram and Threema publish only part of their code.147
7. The app company rigorously vets disclosure requests from law

enforcement
It is critical that the company producing the messaging app rigorously vets and responds
in a restrained manner to law-enforcement requests for user data. Ideally, they will provide
information on their own behaviour in this regard, publishing regularly updated trans-
parency reports that provide details about what requests they have received from which
jurisdictions, and what types of information they have provided.
At the time of writing, Microsoft148 and Facebook149 publish regular transparency reports
that detail how many requests they receive and how much data they hand over to law-en-
forcement agencies, while Open Whisper Systems (the company behind Signal) provides
more detailed descriptions of the requests they receive.150
144 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Secure Messaging Scorecard: https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-

scorecard. See Annex for basic details on the encryption protocols used by the various messaging apps.
145 Jeremy Seth Davis, Telegram metadata allows for stalking anyone, 30 July 2015: http://www.scmagazine.
com/telegram-metadata-allows-for-stalking-anyone/article/456484/.
146 See, for example, Darren Pauli, Trust it: Results of Signals first formal crypto analysis are in, 8 November
2016: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/11/08/trust_it_results_of_signals_first_formal_crypto_analysis_are_
in/?mt=1478607335044.
147
https://wire.com/; https://threema.ch/en/; For more on this topic, see Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Wickr:
Can the Snapchat for Grown-Ups Save You From Spies?, 4 March 2013: http://mashable.com/2013/03/04/
wickr/#3EwYsDKZ5kqh.
148 Microsoft Transparency Hub: https://www.microsoft.com/about/csr/transparencyhub/.
149 Facebook, Government Requests to Facebook: https://govtrequests.facebook.com/about/.
150 Open Whisper Systems, Big Brother: https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother.
68
8. No sharing of personally identifiable information or community

identifiable information with third parties
Although messaging apps will need to share some data with third parties (typically
information playing a technical role in data processing) to facilitate the delivery of their
services, it is critical that companies do not share personally identifiable or community
identifiable data and only share data that has been minimally de-identified when this is
strictly necessary. Organizations should choose a messaging app that does not share any
data with third parties other than that which is strictly necessary for the technical opera-
tion of the service - and seek to confirm this explicitly with companies before proceeding.
9. Companies not domiciled in a country with broad surveillance powers

A final critical feature of a privacy-protecting messaging app is that data collected by the app
is stored in a country where the government does not have broad surveillance powers or a
record of regularly flouting legal restraints on surveillance.151 Note that a company may also
store the data that it collects in a data centre outside the country in which it is domiciled.
The table below provides a brief overview of the extent to which a subset of the most
popular messaging apps claim to embody the privacy-friendly features listed above.152 It
is based on publicly available statements and the apps terms of service (TOS) documents,
and has not been independently verified. Annex contains more details on the information
in these categories.
151 Useful sources for further research include: https://www.digcit.org/; https://privacyinternational.org/global-

advocacy; https://advox.globalvoices.org/; and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks.
152 The inclusion of specific messaging apps in this list does not imply an endorsement of these apps, or suggest
that they are the only apps suitable for use in humanitarian situations. They are included here because publicly
available usage data indicates that they are the most frequently used in countries in which the ICRC works. See
Annex for more details.
69
PRIVACY-FRIENDLY FEATURES OF MESSAGING APPS
WhatsApp Viber Signal Telegram LINE Facebook Snapchat FireChat Skype imo WeChat
Messenger
Does the app ask the user to submit their real name to use the service?
NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES
Is message content retained by the app company after a message has been delivered?
NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES Partially*
Does the app offer claim to offer end-to-end encryption for group chats?**
YES by default YES by default YES by default YES opt-in YES opt-in NO NO YES by default NO NO NO
Does the app claim to offer end-to-end encryption for one-to-one chats?
YES by default YES by default YES by default YES opt-in YES by default YES opt-in NO YES by default NO NO NO
Does the user have ownership rights over data they submit using the app?***
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Does the app retain metadata collected while the app is used?
YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Is the apps code open source?
NO NO YES Partially**** NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Does the company publish reports on requests from law enforcement for user data?
YES NO YES NO NO YES YES Unknown YES Unknown Unknown
Does the app share data with any third parties?
YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Where is the app company domiciled?
US Israel US Germany Japan US US US US US China
HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF RISK.

* Shared message content is retained.
** Note: this report has not independently audited the implementation of end-to-end encryption. The Electronic Frontier Foundations Secure Messaging Scorecard (currently
under revision) aims to provide a more detailed assessment of these claims: https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard.
*** This row is based on statements in the apps terms of service. Some apps, such as Facebook Messenger, state that user data may be analysed or shared with others for
advertising purposes.
**** Telegrams code for its clients (such as its Android and iOS apps) is open source, but its server-side code is not. Telegram states that it may publish this code openly in
future, but has not provided a more detailed timeline.
70
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON MESSAGING APP USAGE

Content transmitted on messaging apps is increasingly becoming subject to government
controls or censorship, limiting the extent to which individuals can communicate freely and Content transmitted on messaging
openly (including with humanitarian organizations). apps is increasingly becoming
subject to government controls or
Freedom Houses Freedom on the Net 2016 report indicates that in 2016, messaging apps censorship, limiting the extent to
became the communications tools most routinely targeted by governments in the 65 coun- which individuals can communicate
tries they assessed.153 freely and openly, including with
humanitarian organizations.
BLOCKING OF APPS OR MOBILE INTERNET

Governments across the world have demonstrated that they are prepared to ban specific
apps or shut down mobile-internet connections154. If a humanitarian organization relies Governments across the world
on a specific app, it will be exposed to the risk that that app could become unusable at a have demonstrated that they
crucial point during a crisis. are prepared to ban specific
apps or shut down mobile-
internet connections.
MANAGING AND ANALYSING DATA
Some interviewees indicated that processing the data collected through messaging apps
was a challenge. Greater numbers of people can now collect and share larger volumes of Processing the data collected
data with organizations, but this means the organizations need to ensure they have the through messaging apps can
capacity to deal with it. be challenging. Organizations
need to ensure they have the
Interviewees frequently described difficulties in creating a workflow to manage and analyse capacity to deal with this data,
the information received. Several noted that the systems used by messaging apps were not and to integrate it within existing
interoperable with existing information management systems or databases; three inter- information management systems.
viewees described manually transcribing individual messages into spreadsheets to allow
them to analyse data in a way that would allow for effective decision-making.
For example, when working with WhatsApp, Africas Voices Foundation (AVF) had to extract
data in an unstructured format, with staff then linking users answers to the questions AVF
had initially asked using a set of heuristic rules. Claudia Abreu Lopes, Head of Research and
Innovation, noted: We had to do exhaustive manual checks and creative data wrangling to
be confident about the quality of the dataset [on users views].
Because interactions over messaging apps may be more conversational in tone (see Section
3), interviewees noted that humanitarian organizations may also receive information that is
in a different format to what has been requested. For example, the spontaneous nature of
the WhatsApp group set up by Africas Voices Foundation meant that people also responded
with other information, such as questions about the organization, or photos of polling
stations, to which staff responded on an ad hoc basis where possible.
153 Sanja Kelly, Mai Truong, Adrian Shahbaz and Madeline Earp, Freedom on the Net 2016: Silencing the Messenger -
Messaging apps under pressure, November 2016: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2016.
154 Recent reports have identified 81 short-term internet shutdowns in 19 different countries over the last year
- see Darrell M. West, Internet shutdowns cost countries $2.4 billion last year, 6 October 2016: https://www.
brookings.edu/research/internet-shutdowns-cost-countries-2-4-billion-last-year/; Thomas Carothers, Closing
Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire, Carnegie Endowment, 2014: http://carnegieendowment.
org/2014/02/20/closing-space-democracy-and-human-rights-support-under-fire-pub-54503.
71
Although this may be achievable in smaller groups (Africas Voices WhatsApp group
contained 56 users), it entails a significant investment in staff time. As Rainbow Wilcox of
Africas Voices cautioned: It can be difficult to curate conversations - they can take on a
life of their own. From the outset, organizations which allow spontaneous conversations
through apps should prepare to manage users expectations about the level of response that
they can provide. In cases where organizations used messaging apps for internal communi-
cation, interviewees often said that it was crucial to give at least one person in each group
responsibility for moderating conversations, to ensure that they remained focused.
Verifying data
Interviewees also described challenges with regard to verifying information received
Verifying content is already an issue through messaging apps. While this is an issue in many online channels,155 verifying content
in many online channels; using from messaging apps is made more challenging by the speed at which information can be
information from messaging apps sent, as well as by message volume and the range of data types that can be sent.
is made even more challenging by
the speed at which information News media and human rights bodies have attempted to respond to these challenges
can be sent, by the volumes through collaboration and efforts to produce resources and guidance. Some of these
of messages and the range of resources may also be useful to humanitarian organizations.156 Nonetheless, verification
data types that can be sent. requires substantial time and effort, and as a result is likely to become a core activity for any
humanitarian organization that chooses to adopt messaging apps.
Rumours and misinformation can spread rapidly on messaging apps, in part because infor-
mation is usually shared in closed groups that are based on peer-to-peer trust.157 This poses
a challenge to humanitarian organizations. However, there is increasing recognition that
monitoring rumours and misinformation can help organizations direct their efforts more
effectively. For example, Internews Anahi Ayala suggests that it could help to predict trends
such as the displacement of large numbers of people in response to rumours or threats,
and increase understanding of popular perceptions of humanitarian agencies activities.
Some humanitarian organizations invest time and effort in debunking rumours.158

For example, during the Ebola crisis in Liberia, the Health Communication Capacity
Collaborative initiative created a weekly newsletter to debunk rumours collected from
sources including radio stations and health workers, and then trained journalists on how
to respond to these claims.159
Messaging apps are another potential channel that may need to be monitored in these
circumstances. However, if humanitarian organizations distribute information collected
through messaging apps without also ensuring that they have the capacity to validate and
verify it, they could risk losing the trust of the communities they work with. In conflict-af-
fected areas, this is an ever-present risk.160
In some cases, messaging apps introduce specific technical challenges for verification
efforts. As one interviewee put it, describing the situation in a conflict-affected area: The
way that sources favour transferring information is often through [messaging apps] that by
default strip out some of the [metadata] thats helpful for verification, and obviously that
complicates things substantially. For example, while not collecting geolocation data with
155 The Engine Room, Verification of social media: The case of UNHCR on Twitter: https://responsibledata.io/
reflection-stories/social-media-verification/.
156 See, for example, Craig Silverman (ed.), The Verification Handbook, European Journalism Centre: http://
verificationhandbook.com/; Various authors, DatNav: New Guide to navigate and integrate digital data in human
rights research, Amnesty International, The Engine Room and Benetech, 2016: https://www.theengineroom.
org/datnav-digital-data-in-human-rights-research/; First Draft News Partner Network: https://firstdraftnews.
com/partners-network/.
157 Anahi Ayala, The Dichotomy of Technology in Conflict: Beauty and the Beast, in Raquel Vazquez Llorente and
Imogen Wall (eds.) Communications technology and humanitarian delivery: challenges and opportunities
for security risk management, 2014, European Interagency Security Forum (EISF): https://www.eisf.eu/library/
communications-technology-and-security-risk-management/.
158 See Internews News that Moves project: https://newsthatmoves.org/.
159 Beatrice M. Spadacini, Tracking Rumors to Contain Disease: The Case of DeySay in Liberias Ebola Outbreak,
22September 2016: https://blog.usaid.gov/2016/09/tracking-rumors-to-contain-disease-the-case-of-deysay-
in-liberias-ebola-outbreak/.
160 Jacobo Quintanilla, Ten lessons on communicating with communities in complex emergencies, 23 October
2015: http://odihpn.org/blog/ten-lessons-on-communicating-with-communities-in-complex-emergencies.
72
incident reports may help protect users privacy, it may also make those reports consider-
ably more difficult for organizations to verify.161
Organizations will have to balance the imperatives of protecting individuals privacy and
collecting data that is accurate and actionable, on the basis of an assessment of the risks
that apply in that context.
Bias in data collected through messaging apps

Relying on data gathered solely through one app risks introducing statistical bias into
analyses of a particular issue. Differences in individuals access to the internet or to mobile Differences in individuals access
phones could affect the way that different populations are represented, with conclusions to the internet or to mobile phones
based on this skewed data potentially reinforcing inequalities. could affect the way that different
populations are represented,
This phenomenon could also exacerbate blind spots: for example, incident reports collected with conclusions based on
through messaging-app data might give the impression that violence was concentrated in a this skewed data potentially
particular part of a country, without taking account of network outages or limited internet reinforcing inequalities.
access in other parts of the country.
Decisions taken during the design of interactions with messaging apps can also exacerbate
biases - for example, by failing to account for the fact that in some situations, women may
not be able to access or submit data over a messaging app without the approval of a man in
their household. For this reason, some interviewees described deliberate decisions to avoid
messaging apps, instead using bespoke apps that included elements such as a requirement
to sign in every time they used the service.
A comprehensive breakdown of similar challenges and processes for mitigating them is

beyond the scope of this report; for an introduction, see the Human Rights Data Analysis
Groups outline of the key elements that can lead to inaccuracies when using data (including
data collected in conflict-affected environments).162
161 Timo Luege, Lessons Learned: Social Media Monitoring during Humanitarian Crises, Assessment Capacities
Project, 2015: http://www.alnap.org/resource/21232.
162 Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Core Concepts: https://hrdag.org/coreconcepts/.
73
A. Zavallis/UNHCR
A group of Syrian refugees takes a selfie

moments after crossing the Aegean sea
from Turkey in an inflatable plastic boat.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
Messaging apps are becoming the primary mode of communication for many people
Messaging apps are likely to around the world, including many members of communities facing humanitarian crises.
continue to pose responsible data As such, these apps deserve to be considered along with other communications channels
challenges related to privacy, data by humanitarian organizations. Given rising rates of smartphone ownership and messag-
protection, digital security and ing-app usage, it is abundantly clear that messaging apps are here to stay.
consent as companies add new
features and more people begin Messaging apps will not be appropriate in every humanitarian situation. As with any
to use them. The onus will be on technology, they can exacerbate inequalities associated with gender, age, literacy and
humanitarian organizations to experience with technology, as well as access to energy, mobile phones and network
take active steps to recognize their connectivity. Humanitarian organizations should therefore consider who messaging apps
duty of care towards the people do not reach. Nonetheless, in some situations they offer a way of contacting individuals who
they seek to protect and assist. might otherwise be impossible to reach, and a means of sharing information that would
otherwise be inaccessible.
Messaging apps are a new, rapidly evolving technology. More work is needed in order
to understand their potential effects, and establish community standards for using them
effectively and responsibly. Humanitarian organizations must ask questions such as if and
how data transmitted by the apps can be responsibly retained or analysed; what consent
procedures are both appropriate and practical; and how to assess threats that arise from
use of the apps.
Fundamentally, it is crucial that humanitarian organizations start from a clear understanding

of the local information ecosystem in order to know, specifically, why a messaging app may
be useful in that particular context and why information exchanged through a messaging
app may be a safe and effective way of collecting or sharing that information.163
Messaging apps are likely to continue to pose responsible data challenges related to
privacy, data protection, digital security and consent as they add new features and more
people start to use them.164 The onus will be on humanitarian organizations to take active
steps to recognize their duty of care towards the people they seek to protect and assist.
They must also ensure that the approaches they adopt when using and engaging with
messaging apps respect users rights to consent, privacy, security and ownership.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Research for this project has shown that some organizations already deem the benefits
associated with messaging apps to outweigh the potential concerns. Those organizations,
and others considering whether to integrate these apps into their own communications
strategies, should keep the following recommendations in mind:
Invest the time and effort needed to understand the local information ecosystem.
Before adopting any new technology, organizations should learn how the people they
want to reach communicate and which channels they use and trust. The way in which
people communicate may also vary significantly across different environments and
cultures; moreover, there may be changes in peoples information needs and the channels
they have access to over time. Organizations should consult with local communities regu-
larly and take time to learn from them before making any project design decisions local
residents are the true communication experts.
At a minimum, humanitarian organizations need to systematically include questions

on access to and use of mobile telephony into humanitarian needs assessments.
Historically, humanitarian organizations have asked affected people what they need, but
163 Nathaniel A. Raymond and Casey S. Harrity, Addressing the doctrine gap: professionalising the use of
Information Communication Technologies in humanitarian action, April 2016: http://odihpn.org/magazine/
addressing-the-doctrine-gap-professionalising-the-use-of-information-communication-technologies-in-
humanitarian-action/.
164 For more information and resources, see the Responsible Data Forum, a collaborative effort to develop useful
tools and strategies for dealing with the ethical, security and privacy challenges that includes an active mailing
list of practitioners discussing these questions: https://responsibledata.io.
76
Recommendations
rarely what they need and want to know, how they access information, and what channels
they use and trust. Although this is starting to change, failing to ask such questions can
result in assumptions that can significantly limit organizations effectiveness and overall
accountability to people affected by crises.
Use a range of communications channels rather than relying exclusively on a messaging

app. Organizations should ensure that messaging apps are part of a multi-platform,
multi-channel communications strategy rooted in a deep understanding of the local
information ecosystem. Efforts should be made to craft this strategy to enable vulnerable
groups to access information in ways appropriate to their skills or resources, ensuring
that individuals are not discriminated against as a result of their gender, age or abilities.
Remember that technology is only the start - building trust with the community is
hard. When it comes to messaging apps and other communication platforms, simply
deploying and learning how to use the technology itself can be the easy part. It is much
more difficult to build a relationship of trust that translates into a strong relationship
with local communities. People will judge humanitarian organizations on the basis of the
quality of their engagement, as well as their ability to listen, deliver what is needed and
(when necessary) change the way they operate.
Dont let the technology distract from the need for appropriate local content.
Technology and connectivity alone are not enough to produce beneficial change in
peoples lives. Humanitarian organizations using messaging apps will have very limited
impact if they dont also invest in providing timely, actionable and useful content tailored
for people locally. Moreover, managing and analysing the data received through the apps
is necessary to ensure that the information provided by target communities genuinely
helps to guide an organizations future activities.
Establish feedback mechanisms with all key stakeholders. Humanitarian organizations

should build in flexibility to allow for corrections following feedback from respondents
to improve the use of messaging apps; they should also prioritize higher levels of local
content and relevance. Suggestions from users on how the app can best serve their needs
should be built into implementation on an ongoing and iterative basis.
Plan well in advance: as far as possible, put in place strategies and processes for using
messaging apps well before they are actually needed in a humanitarian situation. This
might mean building up systems for managing data or developing policies and training
field staff in how to implement these policies.
PRIVACY, SECURITY AND DATA PROTECTION
Prioritize the privacy rights of respondents when choosing a messaging app.

Organizations should investigate the privacy risks associated with using messaging
apps to communicate with vulnerable individuals and communities, and should take
all possible steps to mitigate those risks. This includes choosing messaging apps with
end-to-end encryption enabled by default, run by companies which collect and retain
minimal amounts of data, and which have a strong record of resisting unlawful demands
for private data from law-enforcement and other agencies.
Collect as little data as needed to conduct essential operations (both message content
and message metadata), and emphasize to users that any data they submit remains
insecure. Even apps that include end-to-end encryption collect other data about their
users that could expose individuals to risks in some contexts. Organizations should
conduct a risk assessment to gain a better understanding of what data is being collected,
and what the worst-case scenarios could be as a result. As a general principle, organiza-
tions should encourage individuals to remember that any information submitted over a
communications network may be viewed by an adversary at some point in the future.
77
Ensure that your organization has and complies with a data protection or responsible
data policy. All data collected, generated and stored by humanitarian agencies is incred-
ibly sensitive and should be given the strongest possible protection. As organizations
adopt new technologies and adjust their working practices accordingly, taking a broader
look at the challenges this brings through establishing a Responsible Data Policy may also
help to proactively address the related issues of consent, data protection, ethical obliga-
tions and privacy rights. On the data protection front, the ICRC and UNHCR are examples
of organizations which are currently in the process of shoring up their data-protection
policies and systems and can provide guidance to smaller organizations wishing to do the
same. Organizations like Oxfam165, Mercy Corps166 and Mdecins Sans Frontires167 have
all taken a rights-based, Responsible Data approach to dealing with these challenges.
IMPLEMENTATION
Test, test and test again. Interviewees repeatedly emphasized that approaches which
are effective in some regions will fail in others. One organization described commu-
nications initiatives which had been launched with usage assumptions taken from a
Western context, but without any of the funding needed to adapt the initiatives when
they proved inappropriate for the intended local situation. Organizations should thus
conduct thorough research into key factors that affect accessibility and the use of the app
among local people before introducing it. Following the launch, organizations should
use analytics tools to monitor usage patterns, support local dialects wherever possible,
consider ways to promote usage among women and older people, and factor in the
needs of those who may be inexperienced with these tools.
In urban areas, consider network connectivity as a basic urban service that needs to
be restored. Network connectivity certainly cannot solve all problems in conflict areas or
urban settings damaged by conflicts or disasters. When first responders help to restore
connectivity, this can enable people to reconnect with community members, diaspora
groups, their government, the media and humanitarian organizations. Moreover, this can
allow local communities to start organizing their own responses to a crisis in a faster and
better way. The specifics of re-establishing or providing connectivity and sufficient electric
power to charge mobile phones will inevitably differ between situations, but mobile-net-
work operators and the private sector will almost inevitably play an important role.168
COLLABORATION WITH LOCAL MEDIA AND OTHER PARTNERS
Work with local media to promote humanitarian services and tailor messages through
and beyond messaging apps. Local media have enormous potential to provide people
with relevant, trusted and timely information, particularly when people need such
information most urgently. Moreover, media organizations can demand accountability
from local governments and humanitarian organizations. Representatives of initiatives
seeking to communicate with communities in crisis situations have reported that people
165 Oxfam, Responsible Program Data Policy: http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/oxfam-

responsible-program-data-policy-575950.
166 Electronic Cash Transfer Learning Action Network, A Data Starter Kit for Humanitarian Field Staff: http://elan.
cashlearning.org/.
167 The Engine Room, Mdecins Sans Frontires case study: https://www.theengineroom.org/projects/msf-
responsible-data/.
168 Following two years of industry consultation, the GSM Association (GSMA, a trade association representing
mobile-network operators around the world) launched the Humanitarian Connectivity Charter in March 2015
to support mobile-network operators in improving network preparedness and resilience. The Charter consists
of a set of shared principles adopted by key players in the mobile industry to support improved access to
communication and information for those affected by crisis, with the aim of reducing loss of life and positively
contributing to humanitarian responses. The Charter is supported by the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the UN Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), the IFRC and the ICRC:
www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/disaster-response/humanitarian-connectivity-charter.
78
Recommendations
become frustrated when communication efforts fail to provide locally relevant, action-
able information.169
Organizations should thus consider collaborating with local media to promote their
humanitarian services, including through the publication of relevant messaging-app
numbers.170
Additionally and crucially local media can help organizations tailor their messaging
to be more effective and establish two-way communication and dialogue through partic-
ipating in interactive programming (not just facilitating the broadcasting of messages),
while also providing links to existing on-the-ground networks that may be able to provide
in-person support.171
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Develop a workflow and an information-management system. Consider carefully how

the information gathered through a messaging app will be used to inform operational
decision-making. More data does not necessarily lead to better decisions. Messaging apps
can introduce large quantities of new information and data from many different sources.
Without proper planning, this could overwhelm organizations, increase the risk that organ-
izations fail to respect users privacy,172 and frustrate members of local communities who
may not find their questions, feedback or complaints addressed. Third-party providers
offering applications which can access an apps features and data may be able to assist with
data analysis or management, but introduce a further set of risks around data protection
and users privacy that organizations should consider carefully before proceeding.
Consider how the organization will verify and validate information received. The speed
of peer-to-peer information exchange exacerbates the danger of spreading misinforma-
tion. However, information verification requires time and resources, and can end up being
a core function for any humanitarian organization choosing to utilize messaging apps.
Organizations will thus need to offset the time spent in verifying information against the
potential benefits associated with rapid communication or, indeed, invest more resources
in verification than initially planned.
Consider collaborating directly with messaging-app companies. As more research

findings and pilot projects demonstrate the potential of messaging apps to support
humanitarian initiatives, the humanitarian community should consider approaching
selected messaging-app companies to propose practical collaborations or partnerships.
It is important to bear in mind that for-profit companies who develop messaging apps
may have different priorities to those of humanitarian organizations. These need to be
discussed and clearly communicated at the outset to develop strong working relation-
ships. If humanitarian organizations seek to work collectively, rather than individually
and separately, direct collaboration with the app developers could be of greater benefit
to all the parties.
169 BBC Media Action, Humanitarian Broadcasting in Emergencies: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings, 2015: www.
cdacnetwork.org/tools-and-resources/i/20151006113456-dir49.
170 See Internews, Reporting on Humanitarian Crises: A Manual for Trainers & Journalists and an Introduction for
Humanitarian Workers, 2014: http://www.internews.org/research-publications/reporting-humanitarian-crises-
manual-trainers-journalists-and-introduction, and BBC Media Action iLearn website, containing resources
related to Lifeline programming, 2016, or its special broadcasting for audiences in emergencies. Among
those resources, there is a Guide with tips for aid workers on working with media to save lives: https://www.
bbcmediaactionilearn.com/course/view.php?id=187.
171 Rose Foran, The refugee crisis will not be hacked, 29 July 2016: http://news.trust.org/item/20160729132618-
0oczq/.
172 For an excellent overview of roles and strategies to mitigate this (in the context of SMS campaigns, see
Frontline SMSs section on Human Participation in their User Guide on Data Integrity, p.51: http://www.
frontlinesms.com/impact-of-frontline/guides-tools-and-case-studies/.
79
G. Makkas/Panos
Ramia Sabbagh from Aleppo, Syria, checks

her phone at the disused freight platform
of Idomeni railway station, Greece.
ANNEX
WHAT KIND OF
MESSAGING APPS
ARE AVAILABLE,
AND WHAT ARE
THE KEY DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THEM?
This annex examines features offered by ten messaging apps: Facebook Messenger, imo,
LINE, Skype, Snapchat, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp, Signal and FireChat.
Selection of apps
The inclusion of specific messaging apps in this list does not imply an endorsement of
these apps or suggest that they are the only apps suitable for use in humanitarian situa-
tions. Rather, they were included because publicly available usage data indicates that they
are the most frequently used in countries where the International Committee of the Red
Crosss most important operations were underway at the time of writing: Afghanistan, Iraq,
the Lake Chad region, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.
Two others (Signal and FireChat) were included because they offer specific features of
interest to the ICRC that were not available elsewhere. Various other messaging apps also
offer similar features,173 but are not included here for reasons of time and space.
The information in this annex is based on information that was publicly available at the
time of writing. Wherever possible, it was shared with app companies for comment before
publication.
The list here does not attempt to rank apps against each other or recommend specific apps
as appropriate in all situations. An organization should decide which app is appropriate on
the basis of a practical assessment of its needs, and (if possible) in conversation with the
app company itself.174
N.B. It is important that humanitarian organizations understand that messaging apps evolve
rapidly. Please note that the information contained in the tables below was accurate at the time
of writing, but some apps' key functionalities and other features may have changed since then.
173 For example, see Wire (https://wire.com), KakaoTalk (http://www.kakao.com/talk), YikYak (http://yikyak.com),
Zalo (http://zalo.me) and Threema (https://threema.ch).
174 Sean McDonald, Ranking the 6 Problems with ICT4D Product Rankings, 6 October 2016: http://www.ictworks.
org/2016/10/06/ranking-6-problems-with-ict4d-product-rankings/.
82
ANNEX
Key functionalities
Voice calls Voice Photo Bots Location Video File sharing Video calls
messages messages sharing messages
WhatsApp YES YES YES NO YES YES Up to 160 MB NO
Viber YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
Signal YES YES YES NO YES NO NO NO
Telegram NO YES YES YES YES YES files of up to 1.5 GB NO
LINE YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Facebook YES YES YES YES YES YES Through YES

an integration
Messenger
with Dropbox
Snapchat YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
FireChat NO YES YES NO YES YES Yes (limits NO

unknown)
Skype YES YES YES YES NO YES 300MB size limit YES
imo YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
WeChat YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
REGISTRATION
All apps require users to download and install them from an online store. To use these
stores, users must have an email address registered either with Google (for phones using
the Android operating system) or Apple (for phones using iOS).
CONNECTING WITH USERS

All apps discussed in this report require both participants in an exchange or conversation to
have downloaded and installed the same app. For most of these apps, the phone number
serves as the users identifier. Most apps then automatically add contacts using the mobile-
phone numbers stored in the users phone book.
Many apps, including WeChat, LINE, Viber, Facebook Messenger, Skype, imo, Snapchat and
FireChat, also allow users to set up an account with a username (which can be a pseu-
donym) that others can then add as a contact. WhatsApp and Signal are exceptions to this
and require use of the account holders phone number. By contrast, Skype and Facebook
Messenger do not require a phone number to participate (though they do encourage users
to provide a phone number in the setup process). WeChat is starting to offer multi-platform
accounts without reference to a phone number.
83
SENDING MESSAGES TO LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE

Apps typically allow a user to communicate with large numbers of people in two ways:
By setting up a group based on users phone numbers. This method either uses existing
contacts from the group creators phone book, or numbers that are submitted directly
by potential group members.
In most cases, numbers need to be added manually, with the user then consenting to be
added to the group. WhatsApp and Signal only allow groups to be created in this way.
Most apps place limits on the number of participants in a group, with upper bounds
ranging from 20 to 500 (see table below). WhatsApp currently has a maximum group
size of 256 members; many interviewees described setting up multiple groups to get
around this restriction.
By setting up a channel, account or page that users actively subscribe to. In this case,
there is no need to use phone-book contacts or a phone number. Users cannot be added
by the humanitarian organization itself - they have to actively initiate the connection.
This is possible through various methods. For example, they can visit a specific URL, scan
a quick response (QR) code with their phone, or respond to an invite via email, SMS or
the app itself. App services offering this capability include WhatsApps Broadcast Lists,
Telegrams Channels and Vibers Public Chats; Snapchat only allows broadcast or bulk
communication (through its Stories feature) to be initiated in this way. In most cases,
conversations with bots require a user to initiate an interaction (for example, by sending
a message to the bots account).
Viber, Telegram, WeChat, FireChat, LINE and imo all allow groups to be set up using either
of these methods.
84
ANNEX
Operational features for connecting with groups
Requirements for Method of adding contact Communication with large numbers of people Maximum Alternative
users communicating number in group platforms for
using the app non-mobile use
available?
WhatsApp
All users must have the Add users phone number to The Broadcast List feature can be used to contact a large 256 for both groups Windows 8 and
app installed. A user the mobile phones address group of people without letting them see who else has been and broadcast lists up, OS X 10.9 and
must enter a code (sent book. If the contact has contacted. Replies to Broadcast List messages will only be higher, or a browser
to their phone number by WhatsApp installed, they will received by the list administrator. To receive a message from app for browsers
SMS) when signing up. appear in the contacts tab in a Broadcast List, the list owner must have the sender's phone such as Chrome.
the app (if not, they will be number saved in their address book.
invited to download the app).
Group chats can be used where individuals wish to permit
other group members to see information that they have
submitted. This requires an invitation to the group chat by a
group administrator (users phone numbers must be in the
group admins contacts.)
Viber
All users have to create Add a phone number to the Public chats allows users to set up a group chat with up to 200 Windows 10 and
an account and have mobile phones address book 200 people; the message content of that group is public for Windows phone,
the app installed. A user or through the app, it is also any Viber user to see. OSX, Linux
must enter a code (sent possible to add people by
to their phone number by having them scan a QR code
SMS) when signing up. that the app generates.
Signal
Signal can be used to In order to add contacts to Signal can be used as both an online messaging app and an No limit for secure Google Chrome app,
send SMS messages Signal you have to add the SMS app, so there are two ways to have group chats. group chat, Linux, Mac OS X,
to any phone number. contact to the mobile phones 10users for non- Chromium
Using Signal as an SMS app you can have a group chat
For end-to-end address book. For SMS secure group chat.
with up to 10 users: these users dont have to be in the
encrypted messages, all messages just input phone
mobile phones address book and can be added manually.
participants must have number to the message
It is also possible to send bulk messages using Signal SMS
the Signal app installed. screen and send a text.
by selecting all the users in the phone book and sending a
A user must enter a
message. This chat will not be encrypted and SMS fees apply.
code (sent to their phone
number by SMS) when Using Signal as an online messaging app, group chats can
signing up. include an unlimited number of members. Everyone in the
group must have the latest version of Signal and be in the
mobile phones address book.
Telegram
All users have to create It is possible to add contacts In group chats, an administrator creates the group but any Groups - 200 Windows, OS X,
an account and have to Telegram from the mobile group member can add others by sending invite links or and Linux
Supergroups -
the app installed. A user phones address book or searching for usernames.
5000
must enter a code (sent searching for the Telegram
In supergroups, an administrator can contact groups of up
to their phone number by user name. Channels - No limit
to 5,000 people and send updates to the whole group: these
SMS) when signing up.
groups can also be public so anyone can view the whole chat
and join. Any group can be converted into a supergroup. A
message that is deleted by a user will be deleted from the
whole group.
Users can also subscribe to a channel to receive notifications.
All notifications are public. Users can join by clicking a
shareable URL or by subscribing to the group.
85
available?
LINE
All users have to create It is possible to add people Line manages group chats with up to 500 people. They have 500 for groups, no Windows, IOS, iPad,
an account and have to Line by adding a number also created another app just for broadcasting messages. limit for Line@ Chrome browser
the app installed. Users to the mobile phone book, Line@ was created for businesses to broadcast to Line users version.
are asked to create search by Line user ID, scan who friend their account. You can chat or update a timeline,
a username, and can a QR code, or two users post documents etc. for people who have friended the
create an account using can shake their phones account. There is no limit on the Line@ account.
their Facebook account simultaneously.
or a phone number.
Facebook Messenger
All users must have To start a group chat you can The Facebook Messenger Platform is integrated into Group chats - Version that works
the app installed and go to the group chat tab in the Messenger, and allows developers to create bots to unclear. Bots - . within browsers.
a Facebook account. app, create a new group, and communicate with an unlimited number of people.
It is not necessary to add people from your friends
be friends with the list or contacts to the group.
contact if the users You need to have a Facebook
mobile number is set to account and be in the
be searchable in the app. contacts of the group admin.
In some regions (and only
on Android devices), it is
possible to use the app
to send SMS messages.
Snapchat
All users have to create It is possible to add contacts It is possible to use Snap to send stories, etc. to multiple No limit No
an account and have from the mobile phones people, but they have to be in the contact list and be
the app installed. A user address book, as well as a individually selected. There doesnt appear to be a limit on
must enter a code (sent nearby function which finds the number of people that can be selected. It is also possible
to their phone number by people near the user and adds to send stories to an unlimited number of followers. There is
SMS) when signing up. them as a contact. apparently no group chat function, only private one-to-one
chat. The Discover option for broadcasting involves using a
channel to contact subscribers; it is a paid service.
FireChat
In order to use FireChat It is possible to add people by In FireChat, it is possible to have public chats that are on a No limit No
for messaging, all users sending an individualized invite broadcast channel; anyone with the app can join and the
have to install the app. link to share via any sharing group can include thousands of people; you send messages
app, email, or SMS. Once by creating an invite link.
clicked, the user is added to
the group.
Skype
In order to use Skype all It is possible to add contacts Bots can be created that users can subscribe to, allowing N/A Browser, Windows,
users must have a Skype by searching for Skype them to receive messages from them. There is a business OS X, Linux, IPad,
ID and the app installed. usernames, email addresses broadcast feature designed for communicating about Android Tablets,
or phone numbers. meetings: all recipients must be on a list of attendees. Kindle, PC tablets,
Xbox One, Apple
and Android watch,
Skype for TV
86
ANNEX
available?
imo
All users have to create It is possible to add a contact imo offers group chats and a broadcast message feature. No stated limit Windows desktop,
an account and have from the mobile phone book Broadcast feature allows the user to send messages to all OS X
the app installed. A user or by searching for their imo their contacts.
must enter a code (sent username.
to their phone number by
SMS) when signing up.
WeChat
All parties need to have It is possible to find WeChat WeChat offers group chats that include an announcement 500 OSX, Windows,
the app installed. Users users in the mobile phone feature that sends a notification for a message to all browser
are asked to submit book, adding people close members of a group: only the administrator of the group
their full name, country/ by with the WeChat nearby can use this feature. The broadcast feature can send a
region, phone number feature, adding their number mass message to all a users contacts in WeChat.
and a password. A user manually, mass adding
must enter a code (sent contacts with the friend
to their phone number by radar feature. Users can
SMS) when signing up. also send messages to a
virtual space where people
can see and add users by
liking the message.
ENCRYPTION
Viber, Signal and WhatsApp all include end-to-end encryption that is turned on by default
in one-to-one and group chats. End-to-end encryption is not enabled on WhatsApps
Broadcast Lists or Telegrams Channels. Facebook Messenger includes end-to-end encryp-
tion through its Secret Chats function, although users must actively opt in to be able to
access this feature. LINE uses end-to-end encryption for one-to-one chats by default, though
users must actively turn on encryption for group chats. Snapchat, Skype and WeChat do
not currently provide any form of end-to-end encryption. Although imo has stated that its
service is encrypted, it provides no further information that this report was able to verify.
Different apps use different encryption protocols. For example, Signal, WhatsApp and
Facebook Messenger all use Open Whisper Systems Signal protocol, an open standard
that many cryptography specialists consider to be strong and well-designed. Telegram
and Viber have developed their own protocols: Telegram uses the MTProto protocol, while
Viber uses a protocol built from scratch that its developers describe as being similar to the
Signal protocol. LINE uses the ECDH protocol.175 Several apps, including LINE and Facebook
Messenger, do not extend end-to-end encryption to their desktop platforms by default.
175 The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol, like a number of other encryption protocols, is based
on a public-private key system. Users public keys are widely distributed, while private keys are not shared.
Messages are encrypted using the intended recipients public key, but can only be decrypted and read using
the paired private key. A message can be authenticated by referencing the senders public key.
87
Encryption features
End-to-end encryption available? Details of encryption Other security features
Self- Optional Two-factor

destructing passcode authentication
messages? protection
for message
content?
WhatsApp End-to-end encryption is available by default Open Whisper Systems Signal protocol. No176
in one-to-one and group chats. All users must
have the most recent version of the app in
order for encryption to work.
Viber End-to-end encryption is available by default Encryption protocol developed by Viber. . Yes
in one-to-one chats and group chats. End-to-
end encryption is not available for Windows
Phone 8 users.
Signal End-to-end encryption is available by default Open Whisper Systems' Signal protocol. Yes Yes
for one-to-one and group chats for all users
who have the most recent version of the app
installed.
Telegram End-to-end encryption is available for Encryption protocol developed from scratch Yes Yes Yes
one-to-one and group chats to all users by Telegram known as the MTproto protocol.
with the updated Telegram app, and who opt
in to using Secret chats. Note that end-to-
end encryption does not currently apply
to conversations with bots or channels.
LINE End-to-end encryption is available by default Encryption protocol developed by Line using Yes
for one-to-one conversations and as an the ECDH protocol.
opt-in feature for group chats; all users must
have the most recent version of the app
in order for encryption to work.
Facebook End-to-end encryption is not available by Open Whisper Systems' Signal protocol. Yes
Messenger default, but only available for the secret
conversations feature.
Snapchat No end-to-end encryption available. No end-to-end encryption Yes Yes
FireChat End-to-end encryption is available for FireChat states that it uses state-of-the-art
one-to-one communication. Encryption elliptic curve cryptography comparable to the
is also offered for offline peer-to-peer Signal protocol, which works offline over the
private messages. mesh network.
Skype No No end-to-end encryption.
imo No, there is no information on the website or No encryption information available.

in imo's Privacy Policy that indicates whether
end-to-end encryption is available or not.
WeChat No No end-to-end encryption
176
176 At the time of writing, WhatsApps beta version included two-factor authentication: https://www.whatsapp.
com/faq/en/general/26000021
88
ANNEX
OTHER FUNCTIONALITIES
Apps allow different types of media to be shared in the context of a chat conversation. All
apps except FireChat and Snapchat offer a desktop computer version of their software, thus
making it easier to send messages and share files between a conventional computer and
a mobile phone. These desktop versions are usually linked directly to the mobile app via a
phone number and use either a QR code or the submission of a short numeric code sent
via SMS to confirm the users identity.
DATA PROTECTION
App companies' jurisdictions and approaches towards data-sharing
Privacy policy/ Company owner Location of Terms of Service- Does the app share information with third parties?
legal usage policy company Company
URL jurisdiction
WhatsApp
https://www. Facebook US California The Terms of Service and Privacy Policies state that WhatsApp shares data
whatsapp.com/ with third parties. The data they share includes anonymous user usage
legal/ data, referring / exit pages and URLs, platform types, asset views, number
of clicks, etc. to understand the usage patterns for certain content, services,
advertisements, promotions, and/or functionality on the WhatsApp site. In
mid-2016, WhatsApp announced that they would start sharing users' phone
numbers and time of usage data with Facebook.
Viber
http://www.viber. Viber Media Israel New York State The Terms of Service states that Viber shares some data with third parties for
com/en/terms technical needs, analytics or analysis of services, but does not specify what data.
Signal
https:// Open Whisper US US No.

whispersystems. Systems
org/signal/privacy/
Telegram
https://telegram. Telegram Germany Stated that servers The Terms of Service and Privacy Policies does not mention Telegram sharing
org/privacy Messenger LLP are kept in different data with third parties or outside servers being used.
jurisdictions
LINE
https://terms.line. Line Corporation / Japan Japan The Terms of Service state that Line does provide information to third-party
me/line_rules/ Naver Corporation partners and service providers, but do not specify what data is shared.
Facebook Mes-
senger
https://www. Facebook US California The Data Policy states that Facebook Messenger uses third parties for
facebook.com/ technical infrastructure and analysis of services, but does not specify what
privacy/explanation data is shared.
Snapchat
https://www. Snap Inc. US California The Privacy Policy states that Snapchat shares data with third parties for
snapchat.com/ services, including sellers that provide goods through Snapchat, and business
privacy partners that provide services and functionality. It does not specify what data
is shared.
89
Privacy policy/ Company owner Location of TOS - Company Does the app share information with third parties?
legal usage policy company jurisdiction
URL
FireChat
https://www. Open Garden US California The Privacy Policy states that FireChat shares information with third-party
snapchat.com/ vendors who provide services in connection with the app, i.e. vendors who
privacy send emails on behalf of FireChat. It does not specify what data is shared.
Skype
https://www.skype. Microsoft US Washington The Data Policy states that Skype shares personal data with third parties
com/en/legal/ who provide services for them (i.e. vendors that provide customer service
support or assist in protecting and securing systems) which may need access
to personal data to function. It does not specify what kind of personal data is
shared.
imo
https://imo.im/ PageBites Inc. US California The Terms of Service state that imo shares data with third parties, but does
policies/terms_of_ not specify what data is shared.
service
WeChat
https://www. Tencent China Hong Kong The Privacy Policy states that WeChat shares personal information with third
wechat.com/en/ parties. It does not specify what personal data is shared.
privacy_policy.html
90
ANNEX
Metadata and content collected by app companies
App name What user data and metadata does the app How long does the app company retain Does message content remain on the app
collect and retain? metadata? companys servers?
WhatsApp Phone number, mobile device information, log No maximum retention period stated. Content is kept on WhatsApps servers until it
file information, IP address, browser language, is read; if the message is not read, it is deleted
referring/exit pages, URLs, platform type, after 30 days. WhatsApp says it doesn't store
number of clicks, domain names, landing pages, messages on its servers and can't recover them
pages viewed, amount of time spent on pages, for you.
info of when a message is sent or received, if
you update or request status information, time
and date stamps, mobile phone numbers the
messages were sent from and to.
Viber Phone numbers and names from your address Personal data is kept for "as long as needed", Viber claims not to store content from messages
book on their servers, IP address, location, call which means that it will be retained until an once the message has been read. If a message
detail records, numbers of messages and calls account is deactivated or the app is uninstalled. is not read within two weeks, Viber says that the
made by users, typical destinations, call lengths, message will be deleted from their servers.
network type.
Signal Signal states that it does not keep any user data Signal states they do not keep any data and No
or metadata beyond the users phone number, can't access any information.
the date that the user signed up for the service
and the last time that the app communicated
with the Signal server.
Telegram Telegram claims only to keep phone numbers Telegram claims to delete all information when Telegram claims not to keep message
and names of contacts, but no metadata on the account is deactivated, and if the account information on their servers, only personal
usage. There is a way to access the "last seen" is not active for six months. When a message is information needed for basic app functioning.
data for each user in your contacts. deleted, it is deleted from their servers.
LINE Line states that it retains user data that includes: Line may retain personal information even after According to Line's Privacy Policy User
operating system type, IP address, and browser the account is closed if retention is reasonably generated content is considered "optional"
information including type and language necessary; in order to comply with applicable data that Line collects. It does not state in the
settings, device identifier, advertising identifier laws, regulations or legal obligations; to provide policy how long the messages are stored in their
or mobile application identifier, telephone and complete customer support service; to servers and when/if they delete them. The app
number. The user can also submit information resolve disputes between or with LINE users; or will keep metadata and personal data for basic
to them including: email address, location, to detect and deter unauthorized or fraudulent functioning. They also offer "Keep" a storage
contacts, payment information, and information use of or abuse of the Service. solution for content to be stored on Line servers,
from integrated websites. but they say that they only keep it for 30 days.
Facebook Facebook states that it retains user data that According to the Facebook Data Policy they store Facebook does not store the messages from
Messenger includes: phone number, message content, data for as long as they need to, they will keep the secret conversations features, for all
device information (operating system, location, data for law enforcement regulations for 90 days other conversations they store the message
connection information), network information information and metadata for as long as they
and information about payments. need.
Snapchat Snapchat username, Email address, Phone The Law enforcement document states that Once the message is read Snapchat deletes it.
number, Snapchat account creation date, Time different information has different retention If the message is not acknowledged it stays on
stamp and IP address of account logins and policies. their servers then is deleted after an expiration
logouts, logs of previous messages sent and period (not specified how long), metadata is
Account information when creating the
received kept. If the content is shared on public features
account is retained and when changed the
such as Live, Local, or any other crowd-sourced
old information is overwritten. If there is a law
service, we may retain the content indefinitely.
enforcement request then information will be
kept.
Logs of account activity are also kept until the
user deletes the account.
91
App name What metadata does the app collect and How long does the app retain data? Does message content remain onthe apps
retain? servers?
FireChat Contacts, when you use the app, logs of activity, Terms of Service states FireChat will retain data FireChat keeps messages, metadata and user
third-party apps, websites visited, photo as long as they have to. information for as long as they need.
information, location, cellular network location,
Wi-Fi networks, bluetooth services, browser
services,
Skype Name and contact data. Credentials. No official retention policy is listed in its privacy Microsoft's Privacy Policy indicates that Skype
Demographic data. Payment data. Usage data. policy. keeps message content. The company does not
Product use data. Device data. Error reports and specify a maximum retention time.
performance data. Support Data. Interests and
favourites. Contacts and relationships. Location
data. Content. Subject line and body of an email,
text or other content of an instant message,
audio and video recording of a video message,
and audio recording and transcript of a voice
message you receive or a text message you
dictate.
imo Account creation data, profile info, posted No official data retention policy is listed in its According to imo's Terms of Service they keep
content, contacts, device information, logs, privacy policy. "anonymous and aggregated data" as well
online activities aggregated, location, chat as metadata. The company does not specify a
history maximum retention time.
WeChat Name, phone number, email, address, credit WeChat keeps data for law enforcement WeChat states that it keeps content from group
card, profile info, contact list, biometrics, purposes. Personal information is kept for as and public messages as well as metadata, but
location data, log data, date, time, and posts long as the account is active. not private chat messages.
you make.
92
MISSION
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an
impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively
humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims
of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide
them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering
by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal
humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin
of the Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement. It directs and coordinates the international
activities conducted by the Movement in armed conflicts and other
situations of violence.
4299/002 03.2017

Humanitarian Futures

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Humanitarian Futures

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

HUMANITARIAN FUTURES

FOR MESSAGING APPS

International Committee of the Red Cross

Front cover: I. Prickett/UNHCR

Commissioning Editors: Jacobo Quintanilla and Philippe Stoll (ICRC).

This report is available at www.icrc.org, https://theengineroom.org and http://weareblockparty.com.

The text of this work is licensed under the Creative Commons

1. THE GLOBAL MESSAGING-APP MARKET.................................................. 15

2. HOW ARE PEOPLE USING MESSAGING APPS IN SITUATIONS

3. HOW ARE HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

4. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN USING MESSAGING APPS

A Somali woman using her phone at a

As smartphone ownership and messaging-app usage continues to rise, it is clear that

These unresolved questions are hampering discussions in humanitarian organizations

At a minimum, humanitarian organizations should systematically include questions

1 Activate, 2016 Tech and Media Outlook, 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/ActivateInc/activate-tech-and-media-

PRIVACY, SECURITY AND DATA PROTECTION

Prioritize individuals privacy and security when choosing a messaging app.

COLLABORATION WITH PARTNERS

Consider collaborating directly with messaging-app companies. Research and pilot

At Keleti Railway Station in Budapest,

The report places a particular emphasis on messaging-app usage in areas experiencing

In todays armed conflicts, the information environment is increasingly contested and

It is based on a small sample of interviewees and is not therefore comprehensive. We hope it

GPS (Global Positioning System): a satellite-based navigation system, now available in

Information ecosystems: complex adaptive systems that include information infrastruc-

Messaging app: a mobile-phone-based software programme that allows users to send

Mesh network: originally developed for military applications, a mesh network is a

Smartphone: A mobile phone offering advanced features, typically including a GPS

SMS (Short Message Service): commonly referred to as text messaging, is a service

USSD (Unstructured Supplementary Service Data): a communication technology used

Jacobo Quintanilla, Massimo Marelli and Vincent Graf (ICRC)

Antoine Bertout and Jean-Martin Bauer (World Food Programme, WFP)

John Warnes (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR)

Alexandre Sicotte-Levesque (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

By 2018, 3.6 billion of people are expected

THE RISE OF MESSAGING APPS

ACTUAL MESSAGING APP USERS

1.07 1.4 1.61

2014 2015 2016

8 Activate, 2016 Tech and Media Outlook, 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/ActivateInc/activate-tech-and-media-

TOP GLOBAL CHAT APPS 2016

Monthly Active Users

WHATSAPP FACEBOOK WECHAT SKYPE VIBER SNAPCHAT LINE IMO TELEGRAM

Source: Figures reported by messaging app companies as of November 2016.

WHAT IS A MESSAGING APP?

A very short history of instant messaging

EMERGING TRENDS: BROADCAST LISTS,

1. BROADCAST OR BULK MESSAGING

In comparison with social networks such as Facebook or Twitter, broadcast messaging

16 Telegram, 100,000,000 Monthly Active Users, 23 February 2016: https://telegram.org/blog/100-million.

ACCESS TO MESSAGING APPS: AFFORDABILITY,

NUMBER OF SMARTPHONE USERS GLOBALLY

1.57 1.86 2.1 2.32 2.53 2.71 2.87

ACTUAL NUMBERS PROJECTED NUMBERS

However, access to smartphones varies significantly depending on geography. Pew

26 See: https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/ for up-to-date figures.

SMARTPHONES ARE MORE COMMON

35 UNHCR, Connecting Refugees, 2016: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/connectivity-for-refugees.html.

42 GSMA, Global Mobile Trends, October 2016: http://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/, p. 38.

GENDER DIVIDE IN MANY NATIONS

Smartphone owners: Women Men

All photos on this page: M. Muheisen/AP/Keystone

All photos on this page: M. Muheisen/AP/Keystone

1 Activate, 2016 Tech and Media Outlook, 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/ActivateInc/activate-tech-and-media-

8 Activate, 2016 Tech and Media Outlook, 2016: http://www.slideshare.net/ActivateInc/activate-tech-and-media-

16 Telegram, 100,000,000 Monthly Active Users, 23 February 2016: https://telegram.org/blog/100-million.

26 See: https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/ for up-to-date figures.

35 UNHCR, Connecting Refugees, 2016: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/connectivity-for-refugees.html.

42 GSMA, Global Mobile Trends, October 2016: http://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/, p. 38.

64 UNHCR, Connecting Refugees, 2016: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/connectivity-for-refugees.html.

98 Timo Luege, The WhatsApp response, 22 August 2016: http://sm4good.com/2016/08/22/whatsappresponse/.

109 See details on various U-Report implementations here: http://www.unicefstories.org/tag/ureport/.