1

The Reign of Terror: Re-Thinking the 9/11 Conspiracy

Copyright 2011 by Kieran Banda Wanduragala
Cover Image: The Death of Samson, by Gustave Dor

2
For my long-suffering Mom and Dad

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 INTRODUCTION

This book establishes a fact, tears up a myth that has been successfully masquerading as a fact,
and advances a perspective to guide further research.

The fact to be established: we, the public, do not at present know for sure the true culprits behind
9/11, or, for that matter, many terrorist incidents.

The myth posing as fact: why, none other than the official story of 9/11.

The perspective: a greater understanding of how and why conspiracies can and have been pulled
off to this day, and hence, a clearer view as to why 9/11 is a plausible candidate for a political
conspiracy.

The point: to dispel the prevalent knee-jerk response that there is no such thing as conspiracies,
the better to leave each file open to serious research and discussion, and, in the case of 9/11,
action.

Nonetheless, this book goes about its business rather differently from many, if not most,
treatments of the subject of conspiracy. Many conspiracy researchers focus heavily on the
evidence at hand about the incident in question; yet government secrecy, the fog of war, and the
adeptness of conspirators (when they exist) often reduce such investigations to scraps and
speculation about scraps. Sometimes these are priceless scraps and invaluable speculations, to
keen observers, but they are rarely enough to convince the uninitiated. Taking advantage of the
situation, the government and media choreograph chuckles at conspiracy theorists; the real
punch-line, not intended for public consumption, being trust us (snicker).

This book is supposed to convince the reader that there really is such a thing as conspiracy. I
freely admit in advance that I do not know the truth about the 9/11 attacks. The book does
however work its way towards an analytical judgment, a best guess, though not a certainty: that
the attacks emerged more from the dark side of the West than from a shadowy menace in the
Middle East. Yet while this book is chiefly about 9/11, it does not chiefly talk about 9/11, nor
does it primarily rely on 9/11-related evidence to make its case. Instead it ranges across
continents and centuries, from ancient Rome to present-day Syria and Lebanon, from Cold War
Italy to pre-war Japan, from Carl Schmitt to Carl Jung. Inevitably this involves a certain amount
of daring amateurism. I will not be surprised to hear of many mistakes, but also not altogether
unhappy;

These waters must be troubled, before they can exert their virtues. A man who works beyond the surface
of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet he clears the way for others, and may chance to make even
his errors subservient to the cause of truth.1

1
A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of The Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke, P. F. Collier
& Son Company, 1909 - 1914 www.bartleby.com/24/2/

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 ANTHRAX

Beginning a week after the 9/11 attacks, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several
media offices and two US Senators. Obviously, the people behind the attacks were Muslim
terrorists. After all, they were kind enough to say so in their letters!

YOU CAN NOT STOP US. WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX. YOU DIE NOW. DEATH TO
AMERICA. DEATH TO ISRAEL. ALLAH IS GREAT.2

The anthrax killed five and infected another seventeen. The attacks fed the post-9/11 terror,
seeming to confirm public fears that America was facing a vast, capable, and utterly ruthless
Middle Eastern adversary. Vice President Dick Cheney suggested that Al Qaeda was behind the
attacks.3 Senator John McCain pointed to Saddam Husseins Iraq.4

But after some months of investigation it became apparent that the anthrax strain in question
came from the US government biodefense laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland.5

The FBI scrutinized a number of people at the lab for years without prosecuting anyone. In July
2008, one of these individuals, Dr. Bruce Ivins, killed himself. The FBI declared Ivins to have
been the sole culprit and closed the case.6 The evidence was circumstantial, such as late night
laboratory work around the time of the attacks, misleading submissions to investigators, and an
email sent by Ivins before 9/11 in which he warned that Bin Laden terrorists for sure have
anthrax and sarin gas and have just decreed death to all Jews and all Americans - language
that investigators ingeniously compared with the death to America and death to Israel in the
anthrax letters.7 The centerpiece of the evidence was Ivins custody (as a senior researcher) of
the anthrax flask from which the spores used in the attacks were apparently taken. But the FBI
determined by 2005 that the anthrax came from Ivins flask, and it was not until 2007 that the
investigation began to focus on him.8

The evidence against Ivins is similar in nature to the evidence that had pointed to Dr. Steven
Hatfill, an earlier suspect at the same lab. The FBIs suspicions about Hatfill were raised by
discoveries such as a report he had written on the possibility of anthrax terrorism by mail, an
unpublished novel about a bioterror attack on Congress, and reactions by sniffer dogs at his

2
Scan available at www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/detect/daschleletter2.jpg
3
Anthrax Found in NBC News Aide, David Barstow, New York Times, October 12, 2001
www.nytimes.com/2001/10/12/national/12CND-ANTH.html
4
One Month After 9/11, McCain Said Anthrax May Have Come From Iraq, Warned Iraq Is The Second Phase,
Think Progress, August 1, 2008 http://thinkprogress.org/2008/08/01/mccain-anthrax-iraq/
5
Anthrax attack bug identical to army strain, Debora MacKenzie, New Scientist, May 9, 2002
www.newscientist.com/article/dn2265-anthrax-attack-bug-identical-to-army-strain.html
6
U.S. officials say documents tie scientist to 2001 anthrax attack, David Stout and Eric Lichtblau, New York
Times, August 7, 2008 www.nytimes.com/2008/08/07/world/americas/07iht-07anthrax.15062862.html
7
Ibid.
8
Transcript: DOJ News Conference On Bruce Ivins, NPR.org, August 8, 2008
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93415845

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home.9 The FBI placed Hatfill, like Ivins, under constant surveillance and subjected him to
intrusive investigation. But Hatfill turned around and successfully sued the government for $5.8
million for destroying his reputation; with a history of depression and other psychological
problems, Ivins succumbed.10

In public, the FBI never addressed the most obvious questions: what were the implications of
such false-flag tactics in which one party conducts an attack under the pretense of being
another party? If even an apparently amateurish false-flag could fool many for a time, what
might a more sophisticated effort accomplish? And what were possible motives around the time
of 9/11 for conducting a false-flag attack under the assumed guise of Islamic terrorism?

9
The Wrong Man, David Freed, The Atlantic, May 2010 www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/05/the-
wrong-man/8019/
10
Ibid.

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 BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION

Following some major catastrophe, the US government traditionally establishes a commission to

investigate the incident. The Kennedy assassination, Pearl Harbor, the Space Shuttle Challenger
disaster, the Iran-Contra scandal, and 9/11, all precipitated investigations by presidential
commissions. These commissions have essentially been of two types. When commission is
understood in one sense, it speaks of wide powers, investigative authority, and ultimate
responsibility. These have been the great blue ribbon commissions of American history, with
exceptional memberships of non-partisan statesmen, scientists, academics and heroes, unafraid to
take the evidence where it led them. When commission is understood in another sense, it
suggests that a story has been commissioned, and what is expected is that the already-decided
story will be asserted and defended in narrative form. These commissions are typically composed
of establishment politicians. They usually not only go for the safest answer (for them), but fail to
seriously consider any other possibility.

The Rogers Commission, set up to investigate the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, is
an outstanding example of a blue ribbon commission. Although chaired by a longtime
politician, William B. Rogers, the commissions members included respected heroes of space
flight such as Neil Armstrong and Sally Ride, test pilot Chuck Yeager, pioneering engineers and
scientists from academia and the private sector, an Air Force general with experience in rocketry,
government experts, and a prominent aviation writer.

Crucially, the commission also included Richard P. Feynman, a leading theoretical physicist and
recipient of the Nobel Prize. Feynman (described as a real pain by Rogers) adopted an
independent approach, skeptical of the answers given by NASA managers.11 In contrast to
Rogers, who took a dim view of whistleblowers, Feynman listened to the alternative voices.

The case had found its sleuth. Feynmans investigations (and tip-offs from insiders) led him to
conclude that the accident was caused by a fundamental problem with the O-rings, rubber loops
that fit between parts to form a seal at the joint.12 Questioning a NASA manager, who insisted
that the O-rings were perfectly safe, Feynman dipped an O-ring in a glass of ice water, on live
television, and demonstrated that the O-rings resiliency was compromised by cold
(unprecedented low temperatures were recorded before the launch).

The commission and NASA came around to Feynmans point of view regarding the technical
cause of the accident, but Feynman was alarmed by the commissions leniency and reluctance to
criticize systemic problems, particularly in NASA management. He pointed out that while
NASA managers claimed the shuttles chances of catastrophic failure were as low as 1 in
100,000 launches, NASA engineers and scientists generally believed the risk to be closer to 1 in
100.13 He observed that engineers and scientists had been aware of the O-ring problem, but

11
Richard Feynman Dead at 69; Leading Theoretical Physicist, James Gleick, The New York Times, February 17,
1988 www.nytimes.com/books/97/09/21/reviews/feynman-obit.html
12
Ibid.
13
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix F, Richard
Feynman, June 6, 1986 http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt

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somehow their concerns did not get through to NASA management. He described NASA
management as playing Russian roulette.14 Feynman insisted on writing a dissent, heavily
critical of NASA managements lack of understanding of basic scientific concepts - included
only after he threatened to remove his name from the main report.15

The diversity and quality of the Challenger commissions membership and the scope of its
authority ensured that many if not all of the tough questions were asked and answered. What
sort of commission was the 9/11 Commission? According to itself, the 9/11 Commission Report
aims to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11.16 This is a telling
remark. The mandate of the shuttle commission, by contrast, was to establish the probable cause
or causes of the accident.17 The latter presupposes a real investigation; the former suggests a
storytelling exercise. Indeed, whatever its investigative merits, the Report won great praise for its
literary qualities, rising to the top of bestseller lists and named a finalist in the 2004 National
Book Awards.

The commission comprised, without exception, establishment insiders. None of the

commissioners were renowned political scientists, Middle East specialists, foreign policy
analysts, counterterrorism experts, Nobel Prize-winners, out-of-the-box thinkers, or public
heroes (with the exception of war hero Senator Max Cleland, who resigned from the commission
alleging a cover-up).18 Instead, all the commissioners were politicians - five Democrats and five
Republicans. The Bush administration got away with minimal cooperation, blocking requests for
information and refusing to give testimony except under stringent conditions. The commissions
co-chairs, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, have written that they were set up to fail.19 They
were given minimal funding, very tight deadlines, and little investigative authority. They were
stonewalled by the CIA in their quest for access to suspects, witnesses, and hard data; the CIA
obstructed our investigation by denying access and destroying evidence.20 Other agencies
showed little desire to cooperate; after-action reports, accident investigation, and public
testimony by FAA and NORAD officials advanced an account of 9/11 that was untrue.21 Of
course, this bleating from Kean and Hamilton was a little rich, for it was they who had put Philip
Zelikow in charge of actually running the investigation as Executive Director;

They had hired Zelikow to run the investigation with the knowledge that he was close to many people at
the center of it that he was not likely to agree to savage Rice and his other friends and patrons in the
White House who had been in charge on September 11. They kept Zelikow in place even after they learned

14
Ibid.
15
Risk Perception and the Perceived Public, Lola Lopes, in The Social Response to Environmental Risk, Daniel
W. Bromley and Kathleen Segerson, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 70
16
The 9/11 Commission Report, Thomas H. Kean, chair, Lee H. Hamilton, vice-chair, p. xvi www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
17
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Preface, June 6, 1986
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Preface.txt
18
The White House Has Played Cover-Up, Democracy Now, March 23, 2004
www.democracynow.org/2004/3/23/the_white_house_has_played_cover
19
Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Vintage
Books, 2007 p. 14
20
Stonewalled by the C.I.A., Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The New York Times, January 2, 2008
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/02/opinion/02kean.html
21
Without Precedent, op. cit., p. 261

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 that his conflicts of interest were far graver than they knew at first: his role in the Bush transition team in
demoting Clarke, his role in drafting the preemptive war strategy for the White House, his surreptitious
phone calls to Karl Rove and his meetings with Rice.22

Nonetheless, these political, technical, and bureaucratic issues, which would be very interesting
if they occurred in the context of a real or even half-hearted investigation, are essentially
irrelevant; for it is quite plain to see that the 9/11 Commission was not an investigation at all, but
rather, a cover-up. The report does not evince the slightest sign of having contemplated the
possibility that the attacks might not have been conducted by Al Qaeda. No thought is given to
the possibility of participation by other parties or a wholesale strategem of deceit. The entire
report proceeds on the assumption that the attacks were conducted by Al Qaeda alone, and
contents itself with telling a good yarn about how it was done. It does not take Sherlock Holmes,
Nancy Drew, or even Encyclopedia Brown to see that an investigation that begins, rather than
concludes, by identifying a sole culprit, is not an investigation.

One may surmise that the 9/11 commissioners were in a difficult position. It would have been
extremely tricky, politically, to start raising questions about whether Al Qaeda was really the
culprit, when the Bush administration had already gone and invaded Afghanistan. George W.
Bush made clear his views just weeks after 9/11, when in a speech at the United Nations he
blamed Al Qaeda and demanded: Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories
concerning the attacks of September the 11th, malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away
from the terrorists themselves, away from the guilty.23 At the time, this statement passed almost
unnoticed, but in retrospect it is astonishing: after a few weeks, even before the anthrax
investigation had reached its disturbing preliminary findings, let alone time for a proper
investigation into a crime of the magnitude of 9/11, Bush is so sure of his story that any other
explanation is not to be tolerated. The political, media, and academic mainstream largely
complied with Bushs demand, treating the official story as revealed truth and serious
questioning as heresy. This meek, near-universal compliance was made darkly hilarious by the
obviousness of the 9/11 Commissions compromised nature and the commissioners own open
admissions as to the inadequacy of the investigation.

A blue ribbon investigation of 9/11 would consider not only the obvious scenario, that it was an
Al Qaeda attack, but that - like the anthrax attacks - it may have been an attack by another party
made to look like an Al Qaeda attack. Some flight manuals and Qurans in a car, some names
linked to Al Qaeda on the passenger manifests, some passports in the wreckage, and an
incriminating letter in some left-behind luggage, do not entail that Al Qaeda is the real culprit,
any more than does a letter filled with anthrax and covered in death to America and Allah is
great rants. Because, under the alternative scenario - that this was a deception operation - such
evidence could have been arranged. Or - if jihadists really did execute the attacks on the day
itself - they may well have not been the only ones involved. If these possibilities at this point
seem like airy speculation, they should not after reading subsequent chapters.

22
The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation, Philip Shenon, Hachette Book Group, 2008,
p. 405
23
Statement by H.E. Mr. George W. Bush, President, at the 56th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, November 10, 2001 www.un.org/webcast/ga/56/statements/011110usaE.htm

9
One might object that one could construct a hypothetical scenario to undermine any data-set and
any conclusion. The evidence points to Bin Laden, but UFOs could have conducted the attacks
and fiddled the data with fiendish technology from another dimension. This example reminds us
that, although we may step back from a particular set of data and question its authenticity, we
cannot intelligently step back from all data and principles. If we are trying to construct an
alternative hypothesis, while suspending our belief in the narrow 9/11-evidence data set, we need
to search elsewhere for reliable information and established principles that would contextualize
the possible false data set. Stepping back from 9/11 for a moment, what else do we know about
the world that would explain a false reading? We are looking for documented facts.

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 CLASSICAL CONSPIRACY

When a group of people get together, plot in secret, and execute a crime, that fits the most basic
definition of conspiracy. In this sense, we all agree that 9/11 was the result of a conspiracy; we
are arguing about the who, the why, and the how of the conspiracy. In popular discourse,
however, conspiracy refers to something more specific: the view in some instance that (1) the
government/mainstream story is wrong and (2) there was a calculated motive, to be understood
in a political context, rather than a base motive such as anger, revenge, or just madness. The
conspiracy viewpoint is widely ridiculed and shunned by the government, newsmedia, and
academia, despite the fact that its two basic premises are eminently plausible. Governments,
news outlets, and popular opinion have often been wrong about matters of the greatest
significance (often in concert), and ambitious political plots punctuate history from ancient times
to the present. Yet concerns of this nature are generally lumped with stories about faked moon
landings and bigfoot under the label conspiracy theory, which is widely taken as a cue to
chuckle and read no further.

Given that trust in government and media is fairly low anyway, the likely basis for the successful
ridicule of conspiracy is rather an ignorance of high politics in which calibrated acts of
violence are used by small groups of elites to achieve major objectives, plots that are difficult to
understand without an appreciation of the interests, ideologies, and clandestine methods
involved. Such plots are documented at least back to the Pharaoh Ramses III, whose wife Queen
Tiy organized a wide-ranging conspiratorial network encompassing army commanders, scribes,
sorcerers, and officials from the harem and the treasury in an attempt to assassinate her husband
and place her son on the Egyptian throne; the records of the trials conducted by the commission
established to investigate the conspiracy survive to this day.24

The Biblical account of Jesus final days is, on a political level, the story of an unfolding
conspiracy. The Gospels tell us that the chief priests and Pharisees called a meeting of the
Sanhedrin and warned, Here is this man performing many miraculous signs. If we let him go
on like this, everyone will believe in him, and then the Romans will come and take away both
our place and our nation. Then one of them, named Caiaphas, who was high priest that year,
spoke up, You know nothing at all! You do not realize that it is better for you that one man die
for the people than that the whole nation perish. ...So from that day on they plotted to take his
life.25 Judas betrayal gave the conspirators a vital inside angle, allowing them to identify and
arrest Jesus; yet they did not wish to risk the murder themselves. The plan depended on using
false evidence to manipulate the Roman governor Pontias Pilate, an archetypal imperial authority
who would ask what is truth? and crucify the innocent to please the propagandized mob.

In ancient Rome, political conspiracy rose to the level of an art, lying behind many of the
transformative events in Roman history. The reigns of countless emperors ended in assassination,
suicide-under-duress, or mysterious death. Perhaps the most important and certainly the most
famous conspiracy was the assassination of Julius Caesar on the Ides of March, 44 BC, igniting a

24
Ancient Records of Egypt: Volume IV, James Henry Breasted, University of Chicago Press, 1906, pp. 208 - 221
25
New International Version, John 11:47-53 www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John%2011&version=NIV

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series of bitter civil wars that ended in the final collapse of the Roman Republic and the
emergence of the Roman Empire.

Roman sources report that Caesars arrogance and increasingly king-like power spread hatred
among the political elite, until plots which had previously been formed separately, often by
groups of two or three, were united in a general conspiracy.26 Nicolaus of Damascus, a
contemporary commentator (and pioneering conspiracy researcher) who set out to investigate
the manner in which the assassins formed their conspiracy against Caesar and how they worked
out the whole affair, and what happened afterward when the whole state was shaken, provides
useful detail.27 He writes that At first a few men started the conspiracy, but afterwards many
took part, more than are remembered to have taken part in any earlier plot against a
commander... Different people had different reasons, all brought together by whatever pretext
they happened upon.28 Some conspired to restore the Republic, others to satisfy personal
enmity; Then those also were excited who wished to lay hands on him not to recover liberty but
to destroy the entire extant system.29

The first element in the conspirators success was maintaining secrecy; The conspirators never
met to make their plans in the open, but in secret, a few at a time in each others houses;
furthermore They all confirmed each other in their conspiracy and they furnished as surety to
one another the grievances which they held... Hence, though the number of conspirators became
so great, no one dared to give information of the fact.30 Secondly, the conspirators worked to
sabotage Caesars usual security measures; They tried to bring about, somehow, the dismissal
of his bodyguard... This actually came to pass, and made their task far easier.31 Thirdly, the
conspirators did their homework, developing a number of assassination scenarios; As was
natural, many plans were proposed and set in motion by them as they considered how and when
they should commit the awful deed.32 After studying the pros and cons of pushing Caesar off a
bridge, ambushing him in the main street, or surprising him at a gladiatorial display, they settled
on killing him on their home turf, the Senate.

Brutuss decision to lead the conspiracy, as one of those closest to Caesar, gave the conspiracy a
vital asset - only Brutus was able to persuade Caesar to disregard ominous portents and dire
warnings and to attend the Senate that day. As Caesar took his usual chair, the conspirators
pounced, and there was not one of them but struck him as he lay lifeless, to show that each of
them had had a share in the deed... A tremendous uproar arose from those who had no
knowledge of the plot and who were rushing terror-stricken from the senate house, thinking that
the same awful thing was going to happen to themselves also.33 Before long, Rome was at war.

26
The Lives of the Twelve Caesars, Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, trans. J.C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library, 1913-
1914, pp. 105-106 http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/home.html
27
Life of Augustus, Nicolaus of Damascus, trans. Clayton M. Hall, Collegiate Press, 1923, p. 29
www.archive.org/details/nicolausofdamasc00nico
28
Ibid., pp. 29-30
29
Ibid., p. 41
30
Ibid., pp. 33, 41
31
Ibid., 41
32
Ibid., 41 - 43
33
Ibid., p. 47

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If conspiracies are not an accepted part of present political reality, they are certainly a part of our
culture and history. This fact, however, is unlikely to satisfy critics of conspiracy theories. They
can respond with an important argument: with regard to various alleged modern conspiracies,
there is no evidence. Sometimes this argument is used disingenuously, coupled with a steadfast
refusal to look for evidence or to take into account evidence that may exist; by itself however it
is a fair point. There may be no evidence of conspiracy because the conspirators do a reasonably
thorough job of covering their tracks. Alternatively, there may be no evidence of conspiracy
because there is no conspiracy. Keep this objection in mind, and we will return to it later on with
a clearer understanding of the problems involved. For now, lets grant that a lack of evidence
justifies the term conspiracy theory - but by no means justifies the derision attached to the
phrase. Many major discoveries began with theories. Sometimes the evidence is staring us in the
face, but we dont see it until we know what we are looking for.

Romans were strangers neither to conspiracies nor to conspiracy theories; as Victoria Emma
Pagn has written, The need for constant vigilance against conspiracy is readily attested in Latin
literature... A sense of conspiracism emerges, but a major difference abides. In ancient Rome, at
least in the extant sources, the elite are the ones with the conspiracy theories.34 Indeed, some of
the greatest Roman historians would in our time be classed as conspiracy theorists or
sympathizers, advancing conspiratorial interpretations of major events without direct proof. The
Great Fire of Rome in 64 AD, which completely destroyed three of the citys fourteen districts
and seriously damaged seven, was a particular subject of unproven conspiratorial allegations. Of
the three major Roman sources on the Emperor Nero - Suetonius, Cassius Dio, and Tacitus - the
first two state outright that Nero deliberately plotted the fire that devastated the city, whereas the
third, though not taking a final position, hardly laughs off the notion. Present-day academics, in
contrast, tend to scoff and harrumph at the notion of conspiracy.

Suetonius writes of Nero that

When someone in a general conversation said: When I am dead, be earth consumed by fire, he rejoined
Nay, rather while I live, and his action was wholly in accord. For under cover of displeasure at the
ugliness of the old buildings and the narrow, crooked streets, he set fire to the city so openly that several
ex-consuls did not venture to lay hands on his chamberlains although they caught them on their estates with
tow and fire-brands, while some granaries near the Golden House, whose room he particularly desired,
were demolished by engines of war and then set on fire, because their walls were of stone... Viewing the
conflagration from the tower of Maecenas and exulting, as he said, in the beauty of the flames, he sang
the whole of the Sack of Ilium, in his regular stage costume. Furthermore, to gain from this calamity too
all the spoil and booty possible, while promising the removal of the debris and dead bodies free of cost he
allowed no one to approach the ruins of his own property; and from the contributions which he not only
received, but even demanded, he nearly bankrupted the provinces and exhausted the resources of
individuals.35

Cassius Dio writes that

Nero set his heart on accomplishing what had doubtless always been his desire, namely to make an end of
the whole city and realm during his lifetime. At all events, he, like others before him, used to call Priam

34
Toward a Model of Conspiracy Theory for Ancient Rome, Victoria Emma Pagn, New German Critique 103,
Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 2008
35
Twelve Caesars, op. cit., pp. 267-268

13
 wonderfully fortunate in that he had seen his country and his throne destroyed together. Accordingly he
secretly sent out men who pretended to be drunk or engaged in other kinds of mischief, and caused them at
first to set fire to one or two or even several buildings in different parts of the city, so that people were at
their wits end, not being able to find any beginning of the trouble nor to put an end to it, though they
constantly were aware of many strange sights and sounds. For there was naught to be seen but many fires,
as in a camp, and naught to be heard from the talk of the people except such exclamations as This or that is
afire, Where? How did it happen? Who kindled it? Help! In the wake of the fire, Nero began to
seize enormous amounts of money from the population, taking the conflagration as his pretext.36

Tacitus writes, with greater circumspection, of A disaster... whether accidental or treacherously

contrived by the emperor, is uncertain, as authors have given both accounts, worse, however, and
more dreadful than any which have ever happened to this city by the violence of fire.37 In any
case, all human efforts, all the lavish gifts of the emperor, and the propitiations of the gods, did
not banish the sinister belief that the conflagration was the result of an order. Consequently, to
get rid of the report, Nero fastened the guilt and inflicted the most exquisite tortures on a class
hated for their abominations, called Christians by the populace.38 In our enlightened age it is of
course inconceivable that those in power would attempt to shift the blame from themselves by
singling out and torturing members of some unpopular religion.

The Great Fire is something of an exception. Classical conspiracy - and conspiracy theory - most
commonly revolved around straightforward assassination and coups detat. In the ancient world,
killing the pharaoh, emperor, or other leading figures was the way to transform politics. The
centralized nature of power and the elitist character of political life made targeting ordinary
people as part of a conspiracy relatively senseless. Moreover, the technology of the time did not
permit a small group of conspirators easily to indulge in mass killing. This dynamic has changed
along with the development of democracy, the influence of public opinion, and the power of
modern technology. There are still many examples of the classical style of conspiracy. But as
we will shortly see, the new style of conspiracy aims to transform politics by targeting public
opinion, aiming to shape elite behavior by proxy. Such conspiracies, unlike most classical
conspiracies, must remain secret not only before but after the action is accomplished, at least for
a time.

36
Roman History: Volume VIII, Cassius Dio, trans. Earnest Cary, Harvard University Press 1925, pp. 112 - 118
37
The Annals of Imperial Rome, Publius Cornelius Tacitus, trans. Alfred John Church and William Jackson
Brodribb, The Internet Classics Archive http://classics.mit.edu/Tacitus/annals.html
38
Ibid.

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 DETECTION

How should the possibility of conspiracy be dealt with? The solution of the 9/11 Commission,
aided and abetted by politicians, journalists, and academics, is to pretend that the possibility does
not exist. This is certainly the safest and most comfortable approach in the short term, but
resolutely sticking ones head in the sand has its own longer-term danger - losing hold of reality.

The solution adopted by those motivated publicly to address the problem has typically been to
come up with theories about the possible conspiracy - earning them the title conspiracy
theorist. This mode of operation has some characteristic flaws: automatically blaming pre-
existing political enemies (mirroring the response of governments); hyperbole, believing that
everyone of significance is in on the plot (which is exactly the assumption made after Caesars
assassination by his friends and allies, who thought that the whole senate was involved and that
a large army was on hand for the purpose)39; presenting theories and possibilities as facts (of
which no lesser figures than Suetonius and Cassius Dio were guilty).

Probably the biggest mistakes, however, are practical. Conspiracy theorists very often get
bogged down in alternative theories of events rather than focusing on an alternative general
theory of the case. They pore over videotapes, eyewitness testimony, and so on from 9/11 in
search of some clue that will prove that the whole days events occurred differently than
everyone thought. Many of them are convinced that they have found evidence of controlled
demolition of the WTC towers or a cruise missile hitting the Pentagon. They are certainly right
that the 9/11 Commission did not investigate such theories, as part of its unfulfilled duty to
consider alternative hypotheses. And there is value in looking for evidence and exploring such
hypotheses up to a point.

But even if their suspicions are correct, they may be looking for conclusive evidence that does
not exist, if the conspirators were adept. Furthermore, it is quite possible for the events of 9/11 to
have transpired on the day exactly as the official story indicates - jihadist hijackers flew planes
into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, causing the former to collapse - and yet for other non-
jihadist conspirators to have instigated and facilitated the operation, in which case the beloved
theories about what really happened on 9/11 are just red herrings. If the 9/11 Commission
based its work on an assumption as to who was responsible, many conspiracy theorists base their
work on an assumption as to how the crime was pulled off. The question for those conspiracy
theorists is: are the obscure mechanics of a particular suspected conspiracy worth so much
speculation, when our mainstream institutions do not adequately account for the mere possibility
of political conspiracy? Overwhelmingly, conspiracy theorists are fighting on the wrong
battleground, a field of countless competing speculations where they rarely agree among
themselves, let alone change the minds of others.

There may be some lessons to be learned from the Kennedy assassination, after which all kinds
of theories proliferated about who shot from where. This approach was successful in generating
enough inchoate public disbelief in the official story as propounded by the Warren Commission
to force an investigation by the US House of Representatives Select Committee on
39
Life of Augustus, op. cit., p. 47

15
Assassinations. After an extensive investigation, the Select Committee concluded that the FBI
and Warren Commissions investigation into the possibility of conspiracy in the assassination
was inadequate, and that in fact President John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a
result of a conspiracy, but averred that The committee is unable to identify the other gunman
or the extent of the conspiracy.40 The conspiracy theorists got what they thought they wanted -
an admission that Oswald was not a lone gunman - but they did not succeed collectively in
advancing a compelling historical perspective to shape a national debate on conspiracy.

Then, how should one go about detecting and studying a possible conspiracy? Some useful
advice regarding detection comes from... a detective. C. Auguste Dupin, the creation of Edgar
Allan Poe, is one of the first detectives in fiction; the three short stories in which he appeared
between 1841 and 1844 provided the model for future literary sleuths, setting the pattern of the
oddball genius-detective, the comparatively dimwitted sidekick narrator, and the combination of
logical deduction with intuitive leaps.

Characteristically, Dupin enters the scene when slim evidence and methodical but sterile police
work have stumped the authorities or led them to dubious conclusions, and when the media,
whose object is rather to create a sensation - to make a point - than to further the cause of truth
have further muddied the waters.41 His story The Purloined Letter reveals how the intellect is
blinded to those considerations which are too obtrusively and too palpably self-evident.42 In
The Mystery of Marie Roget - based on a real unsolved crime in New York - Dupin (truly,
Poe) offers invaluable advice on how to proceed when the direct evidence proves unhelpful in
clarifying the case or suggesting a culprit:

In that which I now propose, we will discard the interior points of this tragedy, and concentrate our
attention upon its outskirts. Not the least usual error, in investigations such as this, is the limiting of inquiry
to the immediate, with total disregard of the collateral or circumstantial events... experience has shown, and
a true philosophy will always show, that a vast, perhaps the larger portion of truth, arises from the
seemingly irrelevant... I would divert inquiry, in the present case, from the trodden and hitherto unfruitful
ground of the event itself, to the contemporary circumstances which surround it.43

Han Fei Zi, an ancient Chinese philosopher and a member of the ruling family of the Han state,
dredged the depths of conspiracy, discussing the dangers of wicked ministers, factions of vassals
manipulating the sovereign, secret alliances, lying advisors, assassinations, and coups detat. He
lists seven tacts which the ruler ought to employ; the first is comparing and inspecting all
available different theories - which could have done wonders for the 9/11 Commission.44 If the
sovereign does not compare what he sees and hears, he will never get at the real, Han Fei
writes; If his hearing has any particular passage to come through at all, he will be deluded by

40
Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives, Louis Stokes, Chairman,
March 29, 1979, Part I www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/
41
The Mystery of Marie Roget, Edgar Allan Poe, 1842 http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/PoeMyst.html
42
The Purloined Letter, Edgar Allan Poe, 1844 http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/PoePurl.html
43
Marie Roget, op. cit.
44
The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu with Collected Commentaries, Volume I, Book 9, Chapter XXX, trans.
Wenkui Liao, Arthur Probsthain 1939
http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/hanfei.xml&style=xwomen/xsl/dyn
axml.xsl&chunk.id=d2.30&toc.depth=1&toc.id=0&doc.lang=bilingual

16
ministers.45 The fourth tact is in the same vein, listening to all sides of every story, without
which the ruler cannot distinguish between the stupid and the intelligent.46

The sixth tact, however, is most interesting: If you make inquiries by manipulating different
information, then even unknown details will come to the fore. If you know everything of
something, then all the hidden will be seen in a different light... when the knowledge of the
conditions outside the south gate became definite, conditions going on in the other three
directions were found out, too.47 A mystery can sometimes be penetrated best not by
speculation regarding the unknown, but by concrete investigation of potentially analogous and
known cases, offering sidelong glimpses of the target. This advice tallies with that of Poe.

In these pages, we will follow the advice of Poe and Han Fei that we raise our eyes from the
murky details of the events of the day itself to consider the circumstances, the moment,
analogous events, and the blindingly obvious. There is no shortage of theories; what we lack is
understanding of conspiracies - for which, to our fortune, recent history provides plenty of grist.

45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.

17
 ERGENEKON

Several hundred people in Turkey have been placed in detention since 2008 in the ongoing
Ergenekon investigation. Turkish investigators and prosecutors allege that Ergenekon is a
network of ultra-nationalist conspirators who manipulated politics through such means as false-
flag terrorist attacks and assassinations. The case is widely considered the trial of the century in
Turkey.

Although the trials are still unfolding, and the case has become mired in domestic politics, the
allegations are based on extensive evidence including witness testimony; the discovery of arms
caches; documents detailing coup strategies, assassination plans, and terrorist plots, with wet
signatures of senior officers verified by police and military forensic analysis; wiretaps; and
evidence indicating that a number of attacks previously blamed on Muslim extremists and
Kurdish rebels were in fact false-flag operations by members of the network.48 A secular,
nationalist, and militarist ideology deeply at odds with the democratically elected Islamist
government seems to have motivated the network.

The Ergenekon case emerges from a history of deep state activity in Turkey seeking to shape
policy and politics through covert pressure and plausibly deniable violence. Such activity is a
product of three interrelated phenomena: a history of military intervention in politics to uphold
the secular order, including the staging of coups detat; a long tradition of secret networks
embedded in state institutions shaping policy from behind the scenes; and, crucially, Turkeys
involvement in the Europe-wide clandestine Gladio networks of armed and trained paramilitary
cadres created under NATO auspices to resist any Soviet invasion.49 These factors were widely
understood for decades, but until the Ergenekon investigation began to turn up results, talk of
such activity was still often dismissed as conspiracy theories.

According to the Turkish indictments, Ergenekon is a clandestine organization, which has

adopted a cell type organization. It has spread to various establishments within the state covering
both civilians and official state officers... Although the magnitude of the actions already achieved
or attempted to be achieved by the network demonstrates the size of the network, the structure of
the network makes it difficult to uncover all the elements and members of the network fully.50
The network worked to infiltrate the most strategic and diversified units of the state - a goal it
attained with ease in a state culture largely sympathetic to its ideals.51 Members on trial include
senior generals, members of the special operations forces, and police chiefs. Ergenekon worked
to advance its members to key positions: the network has taken care of the appointment and
promotion affairs of its members who were working in the governmental units and recruited by
the network.52

48
Ergenekon Is Our Reality, Young Civilians and Human Rights Agenda Association, July 2010
http://ergenekonisourreality.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/ergenekonisourreality-final.pdf
49
Turkeys Deep State and the Ergenekon Conundrum, H. Akin nver, The Middle East Institute Policy Brief, No.
23, April 2009, p. 3 www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/turkey-deep-state-ergenekonconundrum.pdf
50
Summary of Indictment No 3 brought against Ergenekon terror network, p. 3
www.turkishgladio.com/files/334ergenekon_indictment3.doc
51
Ibid., p. 65
52
Ibid., p. 5

18
While members of the network often held powerful official positions, their real loyalties lay with
the network. For instance, an indictment observes in one instance that a suspects obedient and
submissive attitude towards another individual does not conform to the order and command
chain and understanding of discipline within the TSK [Turkish Armed Forces], of which he is a
member... a clear sign of a special and hierarchical network related relationship between the two
suspects.53 This meant that the diverse capabilities and access of the members in official
positions of power were at the full disposal of the network, allowing them easily to acquire any
arms, munitions and other supplies required to attain their objectives and easily to capture
many State owned top secret documents.54 Many of the higher ranking members of the
network were retired from their official military posts, allowing them to devote their full
attention to the coordination of network activity, supervising the actions of subordinate members
on the inside.

But the network was not limited to state institutions, wielding powerful connections throughout
society; members included academics, journalists, union leaders, lawyers, businessmen, and
mafia figures. This diverse mix of connections and capabilities allowed a comprehensive
political strategy to be pursued: It is further understood that the network has organized within
the top executive positions of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), manipulating such
organizations in line with the objectives of the network, that by manipulating the media, they
have built public opinion parallel to the decisions of the network.55 The organizational structure
was divided into a civilian wing of visibles, called the lobby, and a wing of invisibles,
where real power rested, consisting of political planning, mafia, intelligence, military, and
special warfare groups. Finance allegedly came in part from international drug trafficking -
claims supported by the German police.56 An archive of clandestinely-filmed sex tapes of
prominent figures was amassed for the purpose of blackmail.57 Conspiracy has come a long way
since the days of Pharaohs and Caesars.

Despite the power that such a network could wield through quiet influence alone, Ergenekons
ambitions were grander still. The network plotted false-flag terrorist provocations, which would
cause public panic, create an atmosphere of emergency, and provoke military intervention. The
mainstream military hierarchy would be forced to act, and the Ergenekon faction, thanks to its
hard-line against terrorism (which in reality it conducted) would come to dominate military and
government thinking and decision-making. Ergenekon stands accused of bombings and
assassinations of journalists, professors, priests, judges, generals, and ethnic and religious
minorities - killings mostly wrongly blamed at the time, as the network intended, on radical
Islamists. One unfulfilled plot detailed in seized documents involved a mass-casualty terror
attack in Istanbuls Taksim Square (to be blamed on Muslim extremists) in order to trigger a
chaotic environment that would eventually lead to military intervention.58 Another involved

53
Ibid., p. 99
54
Ibid., p. 118
55
Ibid., pp. 118-119
56
Coup planner Ergenekon involved in drug trafficking, Bari Altinta, Ahmet Dnmez, Todays Zaman,
January 29, 2008 www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=132731
57
The CD and DVD Weapons of Ergenekon, Ihsan Bal, trans. Salih Dogan, The Journal of Turkish Weekly,
February 2, 2009 www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3088/ergenekon-case-and-indecent-proposals.html
58
Ergenekon investigation uncovers plans for bomb attack on Taksim, Todays Zaman, July 8, 2008

19
blowing up a military museum during a visit by schoolchildren (you guessed it: to be blamed on
Muslim extremists).

One of Ergenekons specialties involved slaying non-Muslim minorities, in the guise of radical
Islamists, in order to stir fear and hatred of Islam: Bombs will be exploded at various quarters in
Adalar region, says one of the networks internal documents; Assassination will be plotted
against persons having a high profile as a fierce defender of minority rights; By placing
suspicious packages at many spots and informing the police of them, the security forces will be
kept pre-occupied; By showing AKP [Islamists] and reactionary groups as the culprit of the
actions executed, black propaganda will be carried out in terms of origin; terrorizing
propaganda will also be employed.59

Some of these operations were apparently conducted by using in house special operations units,
but another internal Ergenekon document suggests that terror groups must absolutely be kept
under control and by setting up front terror groups if necessary, the terror community must be
guided and a position must definitely be secured as part of the game set up by the powerful
intelligence services.60 Ties to terrorist organizations of all stripes were maintained, ranging
from the extreme left to the ultranationalist right, from Kurdish nationalists to violent Islamists.61
Any ideology could be exploited to generate chaos. One Ergenekon suspect infiltrated the Hizb
ut-Tahrir, a radical Islamist group, as part of Ergenekons strategy to establish false terrorist
networks and infiltrate, control and use the existing terrorist networks in line with its objectives
upon the instructions of the network.62

In early 2010 evidence of another plot, codenamed Sledgehammer, was uncovered, aiming to
stage attacks, trigger a state of emergency, and lay the groundwork for a coup. This involved
plans to bomb two Istanbul mosques during Friday prayers (to be blamed on Al Qaeda or the
PKK) and provoke Greece into shooting down a Turkish jet (failing that, the plotters would
destroy their own jet and blame it on Greece).63 Extensive documentation and audio recordings
of the plotters support the prosecution case. A number of top military brass were arrested
including four admirals and a general. The full scope of the plot, and which of its plans may
already have translated into action, remains unclear: Prosecutors are now examining whether
the al-Qaeda-backed suicide bomb attacks on two synagogues, the British Consulate General and
an HSBC bank in Istanbul in 2003 were part of the Sledgehammer plan.64 The Turkish military,
however, which sees the all-military plot as an internal affair, has pushed back against the

www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=146941
59
Operation Cage Action Plan, www.turkishgladio.com/files/64ecage.doc
60
Ergenekon: An Analysis, October 1999, p. 10 www.turkishgladio.com/files/9b1Ergenekon-Analysis.doc
61
Close relation between Hizb ut-Tahrir, Ergenekon exposed, Mutlu zay, Mustafa Turan, Todays Zaman, July
28, 2009 www.todayszaman.com/news-182248-101-close-relation-between-hizb-ut-tahrir-ergenekon-exposed.html
62
Summary of Indictment No 2 brought against Ergenekon terror network, p. 155
www.turkishgladio.com/files/8b9ErgenekonIndictment2.doc
63
Turkish police arrest 50 in move against anti-Islamist coup, Suna Erdem, The Times, February 23, 2010
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7036825.ece
64
Sledgehammer generals questioned over synagogue, British consulate, HSBC bombings, Todays Zaman,
March 1, 2010 www.todayszaman.com/news-202955-sledgehammer-generals-questioned-over-synagogue-british-
consulate-hsbc-bombings.html

20
investigation. The suspects claim that Sledgehammer was merely a war game scenario.
Prosecutors allege that war games were just a useful cover.

Conspirators in Turkey were guided by shared ideas and shared modes of operation as much as
by a centralized command - as evidenced by the emergence of plots such as Sledgehammer,
apparently with little connection to Ergenekon but sharing the same methods and objectives.
Ergenekon itself was not based around a single conspiratorial clique in a single organization, but
brought like-minded individuals across government, military, and society together in a powerful
network. The Ergenekon plots evidently aimed to shape the direction of the country on a large
scale; they would generate their political effect through the public reflex - in other words, by
relying on the predictable public response to terrorist outrages.65 But ultimately the operations
were conducted for the purpose of putting into implementation extraordinary management
methods as a result of the effect caused by fear and feeling.66 So, the attacks, through the
public reflex (fear and anger), would dialectically shift the government into emergency
operations mode, easing the implementation of the conspirators policies. Such conspirators
seem to understand the state and public opinion as parts of a machine that respond predictably
when certain buttons are pushed.

Ultimately, Ergenekon did not seek to achieve its objectives with the techniques of classical
conspiracy - assassinating enemy leaders, staging a direct coup - but by assassinating friends,
massacring civilians, and shaping public opinion, all under false pretenses, with the goal of
evoking predictable automatic responses from state institutions. The success of the plots
depended on the public never believing that respectable-looking people in influential positions
would engage in such cold-blooded killing, and on their blaming instead stereotypical bearded
fanatics. This is the new style of conspiracy.

65
Indictment No 3, op. cit., p. 4
66
Ezrinican - Erzurum Indictment, p. 6 www.turkishgladio.com/files/2dbErgenekon_Erzincan_Iddianame_ENG.doc

21
 FALSE FLAG

The term false flag emerged from a practice in naval warfare; for centuries, ships would at
times fly the flag of a different country, whether as camouflage against enemy attack or in order
to sneak up on an unsuspecting target. Most famously, pirates would sometimes fly a national
flag, before, in a terrifying last-minute transformation, running up the Jolly Roger and
commencing their attack. In the 19th century, the false-flag problem was the subject of much
debate in the fields of international law and military tactics. It was generally agreed that flying a
false flag during war was an allowable practice, but actually attacking under a false flag was
perfidy.67 In the perfidious 20th century, false flag evolved from naval tactic to political
strategy. Attacks were conducted by one party in the guise of another for all kinds of purposes: to
provide a pretext for war, to create a state of emergency, to trigger a clash between already-
mistrustful groups.

The anthrax letters and the Ergenekon plots were only some of the latest in actual and planned
false-flag incidents. The perpetrators of such attacks have included governments, individuals,
and networks. The very possibility of a false-flag attack raises difficult questions. When a
terrorist attack or assassination takes place, all appearances may suggest that the attack was the
work of some one party. But a successful false-flag attack remains unknown or ambiguous to
history. The examples in this book are efforts that were exposed, having failed in execution or as
part of a larger strategy. We do not know how many have succeeded.

World War 2 began with a false-flag attack: Operation Himmler. On August 22, 1939, as Hitler
laid his final plans for war, he announced to his generals: I shall give a propagandist reason for
starting the war - never mind whether it is plausible or not... In starting and waging a war it is not
right that matters but victory.68 German troops, dressed in Polish uniforms, would stage attacks
on German installations along the Polish border, capture border posts, broadcast fake radio
messages announcing a Polish attack on Germany, and leave behind bodies in Polish uniforms
(in fact concentration camp victims killed by lethal injection and shot for appearance). Reinhard
Heydrich, the head of the Reich Main Security Office, specified to the head of one of the teams
that actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for
German propaganda purposes.69 Here as elsewhere, proof is one thing, and proof that will
convince the media, quite another. The operations were successfully carried out on August 31;
the next morning, Germany launched its invasion of Poland, and in his war speech that day,
Hitler cited the border incidents as the justification for the assault. The plot was exposed through
the interrogation of SS agents after Germanys defeat in 1945.

In 1954, Israel arranged bombings of American and British targets in Egypt in the guise of
domestic Egyptian elements, aiming to poison relations between Cairo and the West, in what
would become known as the Lavon Affair. Israel wanted to ensure that hardliners in America
and Britain, who favored Britains remaining in control of Egypts Suez Canal, carried the day.
Israel viewed a British withdrawal from the canal as a serious threat: free of the British presence

67
International Law, Henry Wager Halleck, H. H. Bancroft & Company, 1861, pp. 402 - 404
68
Peculiar Liaisons, John S. Craig, Algora Publishing, 2005, p. 180
69
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, William S. Hein & Co.,
Vol. 4, p. 242, at The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/12-20-45.asp

22
(which served as a physical buffer protecting Israel), with its prestige enhanced, Egypt might
mount a second round against the Jewish state.70 Israeli military intelligence drew up a plan,
Operation Suzannah, To undermine Western confidence in the existing regime by generating
public insecurity and actions to bring about arrests, demonstrations, and acts of revenge, while
totally concealing the Israeli factor. The team was accordingly urged to avoid detection, so that
suspicion would fall on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists, unspecified malcontents or
local nationalists.71 It was particularly hoped that the bad blood that would result between
Cairo and London might torpedo the evacuation agreement.72 In the context of this plan, the US
Information Agency offices in Cairo and Alexandria were bombed, as well as a British-owned
theatre. However, Egyptian intelligence captured one of the Israeli agents when one of his
explosives ignited prematurely, and the espionage network was rounded up. When Israeli Prime
Minister Moshe Sharrett interrogated Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon about the operation, Lavon
denied all knowledge. Debates raged for years in Israel, behind closed doors, over exactly who
had authorized the operation, but in 2005, Israel officially honored its agents involved in the
affair for their splendid work.73 America and Britain never took Israel to task over the attacks, at
least in public, and the matter was successfully hushed up for decades.

Charles Manson led a small cult, known as the Manson Family, which thrived on the fringes of
the 1960s California counterculture. For some time, he had preached that a race war in America
between blacks and whites was imminent. Preoccupied with the occult, Manson became
convinced that the Beatles were speaking to him in esoteric code through their albums,
confirming and expanding on his prophecies. The conflict would begin with a series of brutal
murders of whites; then, all the other white people would be afraid that this would happen to
them, so out of their fear they would go into the ghetto and just start shooting black people like
crazy.74 The spiral of tit-for-tat violence would culminate in an all-out racial conflict that would
kill most of the population; Manson and his family would rule the survivors. By summer 1969,
the predicted clash of civilizations had failed to materialize - so Manson decided to trigger it
himself. I want to show Blackie how to do it, he said.75

Manson and his followers conducted two brutal massacres of wealthy and prominent whites
under the pretense of being African-American terrorists. In both instances they smeared
messages and Black Panther symbols in blood to implicate blacks. Manson also wanted to leave
more concrete evidence. The prosecutor asked one of Mansons followers: Did he tell you why
he wanted you to throw the wallet out of the window? The answer: Yes, he did. He said he
wanted a black person to pick it up and use the credit cards so that the people, the establishment
would think it was some sort of an organized [black] group that killed these people.76 The
police fortuitously cracked the case due to a breakthrough on an earlier murder, and Manson
remains behind bars to this day. However, Mansons basic concept had broader appeal:
According to the KGB archives, In 1971, at a time of great racial tension, the Soviets set off

70
Israels Secret Wars, Ian Black and Benny Morris, Grove Press, 1991, p. 109
71
Ben Gurions Spy, Shabtai Teveth, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 81
72
Israels Secret Wars, op. cit.
73
Israel Honors 9 Egyptian Spies, Reuters, March 30, 2005
74
Closing Argument, The State of California v. Charles Manson et al., delivered by Vincent Bugliosi, January 15,
1971 http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/manson/mansonsummation.html
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.

23
bombs in the Negro section of New York, and falsely claimed the acts as the work of the
Jewish Defense League, in an obvious attempt to incite mass disorders and race war.77

People once concluded that the world was flat and that the Sun and the stars revolved around the
Earth. The evidence of the senses seemed to confirm those conclusions and to make any other
theory preposterous. Figuring out the truth required both reason and research. In Book VII of
Platos Republic, Socrates asks his listeners to consider the case of a group of prisoners chained
in a cave since childhood, able to see only the wall in front of them, upon which shadows from a
fire behind them are cast by passers-by. Since all the prisoners have ever seen are the shadows,
would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?; to these
prisoners, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows.78

Socrates then asks us to imagine what would happen if a prisoner is set free and stumbles into the
outside world. At first, the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of
which in his former state he had seen the shadows; he then hears someone telling him that
what he saw before was an illusion... what will be his reply? ...Will he not fancy that the shadows
which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?79 But over time,
he will grow accustomed to the world outside the cave. Then, if he were to remember the science
the prisoners had developed of analyzing and predicting the flow of the shadows, do you think
that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them?; and if he were
to return to the cave, and participate once more in their science, would he not be ridiculous?
Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better
not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light,
let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.80

Socrates uses this argument as an analogy to suggest that the prison-house is the world of sight
and the journey to the surface is the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world.81 For a
person limited to the world of the senses, what is seen is real, and what is unseen, is unreal.
Socrates refers to such people in another of Platos dialogues as the uninitiated... the people
who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that action
or generation or anything invisible can have real existence.82 A person operating in the
intellectual realm, in contrast, understands that what is seen may be an illusion, and the truth may
be unseen.

With regard to terrorist attacks and assassinations, we too are often in the position of the
prisoners in the cave. We see only the shadows cast by the terrorists: explosions, gunshots, dead
bodies, notes and videotapes claiming responsibility. We do not have sound knowledge of what
lies behind them. Most of the institutions of our society operate according to the logic of what is
seen; some may know better, but wise confessions of ignorance make far less impact than false
professions of certainty. The strongest criticism of conspiracy theories is that there is no
77
The Sword and the Shield, Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Basic Books, 1999, pp. 238-239, cited in
Images of Terror, Philip Jenkins, Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 2003, p. 105
78
The Republic, Book VII, Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Theaetetus, Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html

24
evidence to support them and that for the official story there is evidence; but as we are starting
to see, there is an increasingly prominent style of conspiracy whose very principle of success is
not only to leave no evidence, but to leave considerable false evidence implicating another party.

Some of the more unconventional thinkers in the US defense establishment have warned of the
growing false-flag threat. Herman Kahn, a leading American nuclear strategist during the Cold
War, delivered an early public warning about the dangers of false-flag operations in his 1962
book Thinking about the Unthinkable - the same year, as we will see later, that others in the
defense establishment were devising a false-flag plot against America to justify an invasion of
Cuba. He listed intensified agent-provocateur problems and catalytic and anonymous war as
two of the ten major problems likely to arise in the near future, remarking that One thing which
restrains the behavior of respectable large nations is that they do not wish to acquire a
reputation for being blatantly aggressive. Therefore, when a nation wants to be aggressive it
usually needs an excuse to make its aggression seem defensive... If the arranged incident has
been successfully and imaginatively staged, many will applaud the punishment of the small
power which had shown itself to be so dangerously irresponsible.83 But the false-flag strategy
was not the exclusive province of major powers: the situation is so complicated that one must
construct and consider many scenarios to get a feeling for the many possibilities. However, even
without systematic exploration one can list dangerous possibilities for anonymous mischief-
making by third parties... When the possible development of suitcase bombs is considered it
becomes clear how private groups might foment a war between two nations.84

In late 2000, a book by Lt. Col. (now Major General) Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. on asymmetric
warfare, emerging from a study group chaired by Michle A. Flournoy at the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, renewed the warning. After considering the possibility of direct
asymmetric attack by another country, McKenzie noted that The issue becomes more clouded
when dealing with a bolt-from-the-blue attack at a time when identification of the attacker would
be difficult to establish. Perhaps even a third party would initiate such an attack with a view to
provoking the United States to retaliate against the presumptive guilty party - a false flag
tactic.85 Later on, discussing attacks by nonstate actors, McKenzie wrote that It is conceivable
that such an operation might be intended to have a false flag effect that would prompt the
United States to take action sought by the nonstate actor against a regional opponent.86

Yet while the possibility of false-flag attacks is not totally ignored, it is greatly understated - and
with regard to 9/11, it is decried as an outrageous conspiracy theory. The concept of false-flag
attacks is ignored because it reveals an uncertainty that is unwelcome to governments which
wish to propound, and citizens who wish to believe, a single definite story about major events.

83
Some Problems in the Near Future, from Thinking about the Unthinkable, Herman Kahn, Horizon Press, 1962,
pp. 212 - 217 www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2212
84
Ibid.
85
Revenge of the Melians, Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000, p. 24
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/mcnair62.pdf
86
Ibid., p. 53

25
 GLADIO

The origins of the Ergenekon networks are found partly in the Cold War-era Counter-Guerilla,
the Turkish branch of the Gladio networks. These paramilitary forces were created throughout
Europe under NATO auspices to continue resistance in the event of a Soviet invasion or
communist takeover. Networked cells of hard-line anticommunists, including many former
fascists, were established with the help of the CIA and MI6, arms caches were distributed, and
training in sabotage and guerilla warfare was conducted.87

Unsurprisingly, in the absence of a Soviet invasion, these networks soon turned to other
purposes. Assuming the guise of Communist terrorists, they conducted bombings, assassinations,
and kidnappings throughout Europe; The operations always aimed at spreading maximum fear
among the population.88 Gladio and its false-flag atrocities remained secret until the end of the
Cold War, repeatedly and vehemently denied by those in power, despite allegations that there
existed, in relation to unsolved terrorist attacks, a real live structure, occult and hidden, with the
capacity of giving a strategic direction to the outrages... a secret force parallel to the armed
forces, composed of civilians and military men, in an anti-Soviet capacity... a super-organization
with a network of communications, arms and explosives, and men trained to use them.89 Even
former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, before his murder in 1978 (apparently by left-wing
terrorists), warned in letters that he feared a shadow organization, alongside other secret
services of the West ... might be implicated in the destabilization of our country.90

Only in 1990, as a result of Italian parliamentary investigations into mysterious acts of terrorism
in recent decades, was the Italian government forced to disclose the existence of Gladio (the
name for the Italian networks, although often used to refer to the whole Europe-wide program).
On August 2, 1990, with evidence mounting, the Italian Senate demanded to be informed with
respect to the existence, characteristics and purpose of a parallel and occult structure which is
said to have operated within our secret service of the military with the aim to condition the
political life of the country.91 The following day, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti
confirmed Gladios existence, supported over subsequent months by disclosures throughout
Europe, including a grudging admission by NATO.

In Italy, Gladio (short sword) was linked to a strategy of tension; by spreading chaos and fear,
the conspirators aimed to spur public demands for greater security, authoritarian government,
and a crackdown against leftists. As with the Ergenekon network, the Gladio networks aimed to
trigger an emergency politics to override democratic politics: A briefing minute of June 1,
1959, reveals [Italian] Gladio was built around internal subversion. It was to play a
determining role... not only on the general policy level of warfare, but also in the politics of
emergency.92 After the 1972 Paetano bombing, blamed on the Red Brigades, it was

87
The Gladio File: did fear of communism throw West into the arms of terrorists?, Richard Norton-Taylor, The
Guardian, December 5, 1990 www.cambridgeclarion.org/press_cuttings/gladio_graun_5dec1990.html
88
NATOs Secret Armies, Daniele Ganser, Routledge, 2005, p. 2
89
Secret agents, freemasons, fascists... and a top-level campaign of political destabilization, Ed Vulliamy, The
Guardian, December 5, 1990 www.cambridgeclarion.org/press_cuttings/vinciguerra.p2.etc_graun_5dec1990.html
90
Ibid.
91
NATO, op. cit., p. 22
92
Secret agents, op. cit.

26
established that the explosives used came from Gladio arms caches. Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a
neofascist militant and the last man in a long chain of command, eventually confessed to
planting the bomb and gave early - and, at the time, widely disbelieved - testimony as to Gladios
existence.93 Vinciguerra furthermore exposed the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, which killed 17
and was initially blamed on the far left, as having been designed to be the detonator which
would have convinced the political and military authorities to declare a state of emergency.94
The 1980 Bologna train station bombing, which killed 85 people, was conducted with explosives
from a Gladio cache.95 The short sword cut deep.

There is no evidence that the bombings were directly ordered or organized by high ranking
Italian or NATO officials, but they certainly played a crucial role in covering up the real culprits
and blaming more suitable villains: Most of these state-sponsored terrorist operations, as the
subsequent cover-ups and fake trials suggest, enjoyed the encouragement and protection of
selected highly placed governmental and military officials in Europe and in the United States.96
As Vinciguerra testified, A whole mechanism came into action... that is, the Carabinieri, the
Minister of the Interior, the customs services and the military and civilian intelligence services
accepted the ideological reasoning behind the attack.97

Gladio crimes were not limited to Italy. In addition to the activities of the Turkish networks still
being unraveled today, the Greek Gladio network, the Hellenic Raiding Force, took the lead in a
1967 coup detat. In Belgium, there were disturbing signs of a Gladio link to the Brabant
Massacres, a series of 16 brutal robberies between 1983 and 1985 in which 28 people were
killed, but little was stolen (except the minds of the public); Witnesses and experts agreed that
these massacres were not the work of petty criminals, but bloody operations of elite
professionals. The robberies spread terror throughout Belgian society; Multiple deaths during
armed robberies had hitherto been extremely rare, which gave a chilling novelty to the crimes of
the so-called Killers of Brabant. The random nature of the crimes gave people a sense that they
or their families could be at risk.98 At the same time as the robberies, bombings and attacks
were conducted by the CCC and the FRAP, apparently far-left groups. It soon became apparent,
however, that both the Brabant killers and the far left groups timed their attacks to the Nazi
ritual calendar. As for the Killers, The worst of their attacks occurred on November 9, one of
the holiest days in the Nazi year... Even more surprising, though, was the investigation of
movements like FRAP and the CCC, which at least pretended to be left-wing in orientation...
Like the Killers, FRAP liked to launch its attacks on dates special to the Nazi calendar, like April
20, which is Hitlers birthday.99 Repeated judicial and parliamentary attempts to investigate the
matter were stymied by the refusal of intelligence authorities to disclose the names of Gladio
members, but Senator Roger Lallemand, who led the Belgian Gladio investigation, concluded
that the Brabant killings were a terrorism aimed at destabilizing democratic society.100

93
NATO, op. cit., p. 4
94
Strage di Piazza Fontana spunta un agente Usa, Giovanni Maria Bellu, La Repubblica, February 11, 1998
95
Bomb used at Bologna came from Nato unit, Ed Vulliamy, The Guardian, January 16, 1991
96
NATO, op. cit., p. 246
97
Ibid., p. 4
98
Images of Terror, Philip Jenkins, Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 2003, p. 107
99
Ibid.
100
Gladio: Europes best kept secret, Hugh OShaughnessy, The Observer, June 7, 1992, in NATO, op. cit., p. 147
www.cambridgeclarion.org/press_cuttings/gladio_obs_7jun1992.html

27
Strategies of destabilization or tension work by spreading the fear that is crucial for
implementing authoritarian designs; such techniques proved their utility throughout Europe.

But it was in Italy that the Gladio networks reached the pinnacle of political manipulation. The
Propaganda Due (P2) rogue Masonic lodge (operating without charter from the Italian Grand
Orient and in contravention of Italian law) played a crucial role in covering up Gladio and its
crimes. A P2 member list confiscated in a police raid

counted at least 962 members, with total membership estimated at 2,500... 52 were high-ranking officers
of the Carabinieri paramilitary police, 50 were high-ranking officers of the Italian Army, 37 were high-
ranking officers of the Finance Police, 29 were high-ranking officers of the Italian Navy, 11 were
Presidents of the police, 70 were influential and wealthy industrialists, 10 were Presidents of banks, 3 were
acting Ministers, 2 were former Ministers, 1 was the President of a political party, 38 were members of
parliament and 14 were high-ranking judges... The most prominent member was Silvio Berlusconi, who
was elected Prime Minister of Italy in May 2001, by coincidence, almost exactly 20 years after the
discovery of the P2.101

P2s power in Italian society emerged from this immense network and the information,
capabilities, and influence it could thus command. For instance, files were collected by Italian
intelligence agencies during the 1960s concerning the private lives, sexual habits, extramarital
relationships, etc. of over 157,000 people - including many prominent figures of society and
politics. These files, which were ordered destroyed, actually fell into the hands of P2 when
General Giovanni Allavena, a past head of the Italian SID, became a member, and to its
Director Licio Gelli as a very special gift gave a copy of the 157,000 secret files.102 This created
potential for blackmail on an extraordinary scale. P2 had ties to the mafia, to South American
dictatorships, and to major banking scandals such as the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano
involving the mysterious death of P2 member Roberto Calvi, Gods Banker.

P2 undergirded a shadow establishment that could be counted on to conceal Gladios terrorist

role and to interpret the atrocities in the desired manner. After the exposure of P2, the head of the
lodge, Licio Gelli, was convicted of misleading the investigation into the Bologna bombing
(amongst an array of other crimes), as were a number of other P2 members whose day jobs
were senior positions in the security services. One such effort to mislead the Bologna
investigation, of which P2 members General Pietro Musumeci and Colonel Giuseppe Belmonte
were convicted, involved planting explosives on a train, with the aim of casting suspicion on
other parties.103

Felice Casson, the Italian prosecutor who first exposed the Gladio network, remarked that
Government resolve is a decisive factor... Setting up a parliamentary commission with special
powers is considerably important in the fight against illegal organizations. If there is political
support, a parliamentary commission can conduct an in-depth investigation. But if the
government does not know what it should do, or if there is no political support, this is very
difficult to do.104 The transnational dimensions of such networks pose a particular challenge to
101
NATO, op. cit., p. 74
102
Ibid., p. 73
103
Former Top Intelligence Official Convicted, Sentenced, Associated Press, July 25, 1985
104
Gladio prosecutor Casson: Parliamentary commission with special powers a must, Ali Ihsan Aydin, Todays
Zaman, November 12, 2008 www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=158432

28
national investigations: the biggest difficulty for me was to identify the international links to
Gladio... It had contacts with the intelligence agencies of NATO member countries and many
other countries. It even had contacts in Turkey... I could not investigate its reach into other
countries. I demanded this, but it was not possible. Doors were shut tight.105

Gladio recalls the strategy suggested by Adeimantus in Platos Republic as a challenge to justice:

Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance
I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and
exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox... But I hear some one exclaiming that the
concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy... With a view to
concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric
who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I
shall make unlawful gains and not be punished.106

105
Ibid.
106
The Republic, op. cit., Book II http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html

29
 HARIRI

On Valentines Day, 2005, an explosion rocked Beirut. As Lebanese across the city watched the
pall of smoke and speculated as to the identity of the victim, rescue workers rushed to the scene.
Charred bodies, flames, and shredded armored vehicles were all that remained of the motorcade
carrying billionaire former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Cupids arrow packed a bigger-than-
usual punch.

The Hariri assassination is worth our study for several reasons.

Firstly, it is a clear example of an attack misleadingly framed as the work of Islamic extremists -
which, as the reader may be beginning to notice, is now a fairly standard element in conspiracy.
Just after the explosion, a tape surfaced in which a jihadi claimed responsibility for the attack
on the infidel Hariri in the name of an Al-Qaeda type organization. This claim was broadly
dismissed as unlikely. The UN investigation concluded that the assassination was carried out by
a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities107, which did
not match the profile of any known jihadist groups in Lebanon. Everyone from the Bush
administration (which accused Syria) to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, agreed with the UNs
conclusion that the attack had not been conducted by a small group of fundamentalists alone, but
by a sophisticated, professional operation.108

This conclusion was supported by the absence of any DNA of the individual in the tape, Ahmad
Abu Adas, at the crime scene, despite the claim of the tapes accompanying note that he was the
suicide bomber.109 Because this tape was delivered immediately after the killing, and had clearly
been prepared beforehand, it had to be viewed in a different light: a pre-planned attempt by the
real killers to throw people off the scent and frame a convenient patsy (that, or the conspirators
macabre joke).

Secondly, the UN investigations conclusion that the crime was conducted by a sophisticated and
professional organization deserves a closer look. After all, just as hijacking some planes with
boxcutters does not seem so difficult, nor does blowing up a motorcade with a truck bomb. One
of the investigations reports sheds light on this question, writing that it has become clear that
the means and methods of such a terrorist operation are more complex in their preparatory and
planning stage, and simpler in their execution. The individuals who perpetrated this crime appear
to be very professional in their approach, as they planned to a high percentage the likelihood
for success and conducted the operation with high standards of individual and collective self-
discipline.110 For instance, with regard to a number of mobile phones determined to have been
used in the monitoring of Hariri in the minutes prior to his assassination, the investigation

107
First Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Detlev Mehlis, Commissioner, October
19, 2005, p. 2 (all reports available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/49)
108
An hour with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Charlie Rose, PBS, March 27, 2006
www.charlierose.com/view/interview/484
109
Ninth Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Serge Brammertz, Commissioner,
November 2007, p. 8
110
Third Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Serge Brammertz, Commissioner,
March 14, 2006, p. 8

30
reported that an analysis of the mobile phone usage revealed a high degree of security-aware
behaviour on the part of the conspirators.111 The deed itself is simple. The difficult parts are
planning; logistics; surveillance; recruiting and training highly disciplined, organized, and
trustworthy individuals; achieving a high probability of success in a single attempt; and knowing
how to stay under the radar of security and intelligence services as well as any subsequent
investigation.

Thirdly, the high degree of professionalism exhibited by the perpetrators by no means ruled out
involvement by jihadists, particularly at the level of execution. The UN investigation established
through DNA evidence that an unidentified suicide bomber was used at the ground level of the
operation to drive the explosives-filled truck; he was presumably a jihadist, unless somehow
coerced - but not the one who claimed responsibility in the tape.112 However, this
professionalism tended to suggest that while jihadists may have been used in the operation, they
were neither the organizers nor the masterminds; one working hypothesis is that while an
extremist group may have been involved in part in committing the crime as outlined in the tape
and note, this group was actually manipulated by others for another objective not related to its
own organizational aspirations.113

How could a terrorist group be manipulated? As Philip Jenkins, a leading criminologist, explains,

terrorist movements normally organize their active members into cells... In each cell, only one superior
officer has any contact with the higher ranks of the organization, and all orders are channeled through that
person... Imagine that one of the superior officers... is somehow turned, persuaded to go over to the side of
the authorities. Thenceforward, the members of that particular cell would continue operating, though
unknown to them, all their operations would be directed by the authorities. This would allow the cell to be
used for whatever purpose the agency in question wished. If, though, ordinary cell members were arrested,
they would say, with perfect truth, that they believed they were still acting in the revolutionary cause.114

Complex and risky operations may be organized at several levels - each well insulated from the
other. Martyrdom-ready jihadis may execute the crime. Professionals may organize the crime.
And then there is the layer of the commissioners of the crime, who will presumably have done
everything in their power to insulate themselves through intermediaries and maintain plausible
deniability. As the UN investigations Brammertz report put it, there is a layer of perpetrators
between those who initially commissioned the crime and the actual perpetrators on the day of the
crime, namely those who enabled the crime to occur.115 If an operation is structured in layers of
jihadis, professionals, and commissioners, no one in the jihadi layer need know that the operation
is in fact a political conspiracy (with a professional doubling as a jihadist operative), and only
one of the professionals need know who has commissioned the crime; if things have been done
properly, even the commissioner may be a plausibly-deniable emissary of unknown allegiance.

111
Sixth Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Serge Brammertz, Commissioner,
December 12, 2006, p. 10
112
Eighth Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Serge Brammertz, Commissioner, July
2007, p. 6
113
Seventh Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, Serge Brammertz, Commissioner,
March 2007, p. 10
114
Images of Terror, op. cit., p. 93
115
Third Report, op. cit.

31
Fourthly, the Hariri case illustrates the reality of how even a well-financed, well-resourced
investigation over many years may yet succumb to political pressure and manipulation, and fail
to find enough evidence to conclusively nail the guilty party. The first report of the UN inquiry,
the Mehlis Report, unambiguously pointed to Syria as the culprit, even producing two witnesses
who claimed to have been present during discussions and plans for the attack at the highest level
of the Syrian leadership.116 There was just one problem: the witnesses were fakes.117 One appears
to have been bribed for his testimony by the Syrian regimes opponents in Lebanon; the other
appears to have been a Syrian double agent designed to discredit the investigation. Subsequent
reports by Mehlis successors Brammertz and Bellemare walked back from the Mehlis Reports
conclusions and adopted a more cautious approach.

In April 2009, as Syrias ties with the West improved, the four pro-Syrian figures in the
Lebanese security establishment who had been arrested for the crime were released. In summer
2010, rumors swirled regarding the possible indictment of members of Hezbollah on the basis of
traced telephone calls. But the discovery of a major network of Israeli spies in Lebanese
telecommunication companies raised the prospect that the data upon which indictments may be
based have been tampered with. Hezbollah, in turn, accused Israel, unveiling hacked surveillance
footage from Israeli reconnaissance drones monitoring the site of the assassination beforehand as
well as other routes regularly used by Hariri.

Who really killed Hariri? A competent assassination or attack, while it may leave plenty of
obvious false leads, may leave little direct evidence as to the real organizers or commissioners of
the crime. Particularly when suicide attackers have been used to actually conduct the attack, it
can be difficult to work backwards and prove who put them up to it. Thomas Hobbes, the
seventeenth century political philosopher, refers us to Cicero, who praised a severe Judge
amongst the Romans, for a custome he had, in Criminal causes, (when the testimony of the
witnesses was not sufficient,) to ask the Accusers, Cui Bono; that is to say, what Profit, Honor,
or other Contentment, the accused obtained, or expected by the Fact. For amongst
Praesumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the Author, as doth the BENEFIT of the
Action.118 But there were, ultimately, two ways of seeing the benefit of the assassination (if,
with the investigators, we discount jihadists, business rivals, and jilted lovers due to the
professionalism of the operation.)

Motive A centers on Syrian regime politics and its extensions into Lebanon. Syria maintained a
steady grip on its smaller neighbor through proxies, allies, and a heavy military and intelligence
presence. Hariri had feuded with the young Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, and instead
cultivated his relations with other power brokers in the Syrian regime: members of the old guard
who enriched themselves (often with Hariris help) through their long guardianship of
Lebanon. He also mounted a challenge to Assads allies in Lebanon, and seemed poised to win
parliamentary elections in May. In the months after the assassination, Hariris associates among
the Syrian old guard went down one by one: Ghazi Kanaan, the Interior Minister and longtime
Syrian viceroy in Lebanon, committed suicide (despite not being known for bouts of existential

116
First Report, op. cit., pp. 34-36
117
Syria Attacks Evidence as U.N. Case Turns More Bizarre, Michael Slackman, New York Times, December 7,
2005 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E4DF1031F934A35751C1A9639C8B63
118
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes, Cosimo Classics, 2008, p. 392-393

32
angst); Abdel Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Vice President and manager of the Lebanon file, fled
into exile.

Motive B, rather than looking at the parochial imperatives of elite politics and the Syrian-
Lebanese relationship, examines the larger consequences of the assassination. It was obvious,
due to the tensions between Syria and Hariri, that Syria would be blamed for any attempt on
Hariris life. This shaped predictable outcomes - the humiliating withdrawal of Syrian forces
from Lebanon; the dramatic heightening of tensions between Syria and the West; the collapse of
Syrias ties with Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and a major victory for Syrias
opponents in the parliamentary elections. None of these outcomes served Syrias interests.
Motive B could point to Israel and the US, which clearly wished to expel Syria from Lebanon,
bring Lebanon into their own sphere of influence, and isolate the Syrian regime. Hariris
assassination enabled the aggressive pursuit of this strategy. Motive B could likewise point to
Iran, which had a clear interest in bringing Syria into closer alliance (the logical outcome of
Syrias broken ties with most other major actors) and removing Syria from Lebanon so that
Irans proxy Hezbollah could become the dominant actor - a motive that could also implicate
Hezbollah. One could also conceive of a private network with similarly ambitious goals.

Any of these scenarios could reasonably be described as a conspiracy theory, given the lack of
solid proof, and the basing of accusation on analysis of means, motive, and opportunity.
Nonetheless, it seems likely that one of them is true.

33
 INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is supposed to provide political decision-makers with an understanding of reality to

guide action. The questions as to what is real, what we can know, and what we should do are
ultimately the province of philosophy, whose flourishing in Ancient Greece still exerts a
powerful influence over intellectual life today. This flourishing largely occurred among landed
aristocrats, or in other words, people insulated from day-to-day pressures. In contemporary
practice, however, intelligence does not usually allow the luxury of leisurely timescales and
insulation from political decision-making (such as conspiracy theorists always enjoy).
Intelligence often demands immediate analysis linked to consequential decisions. When the
public is crying out for answers and politicians are itching to take action, it can be next to
impossible for intelligence analysts to wait and see, consider all alternative hypotheses, dig for
more data, or elucidate deep ambiguities. In a crisis situation, there can be great pressure to go
for a quick and workable answer, about which, because of the political dimensions the answer
will assume, no public doubt can be entertained afterwards.

The general difficulties faced by intelligence analysts - having to base conclusions on

incomplete, ambiguous, even questionable data - are rendered particularly acute by the problem
of deception. One usually has some kind of data, but, even assuming the data points to some one
conclusion at all, could this be because there has been a successful attempt at deception? This
problem greatly exercised neoconservatives during the Cold War and through the 1990s in their
continuing clashes with the mainstream analytical tradition.

Deception is the attempt to mislead an adversarys intelligence analysis, wrote Gary Schmitt
(executive director of the Project for a New American Century and Secretary of the Committee
for the Liberation of Iraq) and Abram Shulsky (who would head the Office of Special Plans
under Donald Rumsfeld) in their 1999 book Silent Warfare, ... with the result that, having
formed a false picture of the situation, he is led to act in a way that advances ones interests
rather than his own. It is considered a form of counterintelligence because it attempts to thwart
the fundamental purpose of the adversarys intelligence operations; in addition, it often involves
counterintelligence methods, such as double agent operations.119

Successful deception requires an intimate understanding of the target; it typically employs some
method of finding out how the adversary is assessing the situation. If he is not alert enough to
have noticed the false signals, or if he has not interpreted them as the deceiver wished him to,
more can be manufactured to get his attention and lead him to the desired interpretation. If he
begins to sense anomalies in the (false) picture of the situation the deceiver has planted in his
mind, new signals can be created to explain them away.120 Deception is best practiced in the
context of the targets existing worldviews and mindset; The false view of the situation one
wishes an adversary to adopt must be determined by the action one wishes the adversary to take.
Nevertheless, the view must be plausible to the adversary; in fact, success is more likely if the
deception scenario is based on what the adversary thinks is the case anyway... Thus, it is not
accidental that most impressive deception successes involve large elements of self-deception.121

119
Silent Warfare, Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky, Brasseys, Inc., 2002, p. 117
120
Ibid., p. 120
121
Ibid., p. 121

34
The neoconservatives were convinced that mainstream intelligence analysis was blind to the
possibility of deception. A 1999 essay, also by Schmitt and Shulsky, explains why. This essay,
Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence, illuminates the differences between the
neoconservative and mainstream approaches to intelligence. Sherman Kent, a Yale history
professor, fathered the mainstream postwar CIA analytical tradition. As Schmitt and Shulsky
note, Kent saw intelligence as an extension of academic research. They single out Kents remark
that: Research is the only process which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is
capable of giving us the truth, or a closer approximation to truth, than we now enjoy... we insist,
and have insisted for generations, that truth is to be approached, if not attained through research
guided by a systematic method. In the social sciences which very largely constitute the subject
matter of strategic intelligence, there is such a method.122123

Schmitt and Shulsky accuse the Kent tradition of a general disregard of deception.124 They
argue that Kent's willingness to downplay the issue of deception meant that American
intelligence analysts were generally reluctant throughout the Cold War to believe that they could
be deceived about any critical question by the Soviet Union or other Communist states.125 They
approvingly cite the claim of Eliot Cohen (PNAC, Defense Policy Advisory Board, Committee
for the Liberation of Iraq) that The official school of intelligence writing seems to pay very little
heed to problems of deception and concealment.126 As they see it, the hard data upon which a
social scientific approach will tend to rely, may well - in the world of intelligence - be the result
of trickery. Their view of the significance of deception, they suggested, was drawn from the
approach of Leo Strauss, whose philosophy alerts one to the possibility that political life may be
closely linked to deception. Indeed, it suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the
hope, to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the
exception.127 Strauss own study of (and penchant for) esoteric writing, the idea that most
serious writers wrote so as to hide at least some of their thought from some of their readers, was
itself a hint that a positivist approach could blind one to crucial subtleties.128

The deception view of intelligence analysis had its first chance in the mid-1970s, when hawks
such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and nuclear strategist Albert Wolhstetter argued that
the CIA seriously underestimated Soviet strength. A team of experts, named Team B (headed
by Richard Pipes, and including Paul Wolfowitz) was assembled to reassess the conclusions of
the National Intelligence Estimates. These experts were handpicked from those, in their own
words, known to take a more somber view of the Soviet strategic threat than the mainstream;
unsurprisingly, Team B concluded that the National Intelligences Estimates systematically

122
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Sherman Kent, quoted in Leo Strauss and the World of
Intelligence, Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky, 1999, p. 1
123
I am indebted to David Habakkuk for his discussion of these issues at Sic Semper Tyrannis:
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/sspaper.pdf
124
Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence, p. 3.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/leo_strauss_and_the_world_of_intelligence.pdf
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid., p. 4
127
Ibid., p. 3
128
Ibid.

35
underestimated Soviet strength.129 Team Bs authors criticized the CIA for its concentration on
the so-called hard data while ignoring the soft data concerning Soviet intentions (implicitly,
intentions demanding deception).130 With this methodology, Team B arrived at conclusions that
can only be described, in hindsight, as seriously flawed, vastly overestimating future Soviet
power. The Team B report served as a major part of the intellectual and political foundation for
the US arms buildup of the late 1970s and 1980s; this was just a preview of what was to come.

In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a special Pentagon unit was set up in 2002, the
Office of Special Plans, by Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, and headed by Abram Shulsky.
The Office of Special Plans picked through the raw intelligence collected by the intelligence
community (disregarding evaluations as to the reliability of the intelligence) and assembled
dossiers of the juiciest intelligence on Iraqi WMD, links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda,
attempts to develop nuclear weapons, and so on. Lack of more conclusive proof was explained as
Saddams successful efforts at deception and concealment, and contradictory hard data
suggesting that there were no WMDs was ignored. The intelligence was then stovepiped into
the Bush White House via Vice President Dick Cheneys office - over the heads of the
intelligence community.131 The groundwork for this approach was prepared in the 1996 report
The Future of US Intelligence by Schmitt and Shulsky, who recommended bringing analysis
bureaucratically closer to policy and reconceptualizing its task by breaking down some of the
barriers between it and policy deliberations.132 The traditional insulation of analysis from
policy - safeguarding the integrity of the analysis from policy imperatives - was to be destroyed.

The neoconservatives insistence on the possibility of deception, holding the hard data in
doubt, generally resulted in analyses indulgent to their desired policies (whether intensifying a
military buildup against the Soviets or invading Iraq) that would ultimately prove to have little
grounding in reality. As long as these analyses got the policies through, they did not evince much
regret. Schmitt and Shulsky explained their motive elsewhere: truth is not the goal of
intelligence, but only a means toward victory.133 The neoconservatives have a great deal in
common with conspiracy theorists, sharing a profound skepticism of the official hard data.
Unlike most conspiracy theorists, however, who seem to desire (whether or not they approach)
the truth, the neoconservatives conspiracy theories were largely self-serving.

But were the neoconservatives on to something in their view of the mainstream analytical
tradition as blind to deception? Intelligence, after all, faces the realities of a world where false-
flag attacks can be conducted with little trace to the real culprits, where covert operations can be
conducted with plausible deniability, where even the writings of philosophers may conceal as
much as they reveal. Whether one is trying to figure out who is behind a terrorist attack or what a
countrys intentions are, there will generally be a legitimate worry that some crucial part of the

129
Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis; Soviet Strategic Objectives, an Alternative View;
Report of Team B, Team Leader, Prof. Richard Pipes, 1976, p.iii
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/nitze10.pdf
130
Ibid., p. 1
131
The Stovepipe, Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker, October 27, 2003
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/10/27/031027fa_fact
132
The Future of US Intelligence, Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky, The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence,
1996, p. x
133
Silent Warfare, Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky, Brasseys, Inc., 2002, p. 176

36
picture remains concealed, or that information that one does have is the result of deception, or
even fundamental uncertainties such as the target country itself not knowing what its own
intentions are. These are not easily proved or disproved scientific facts, which hard data could
resolve all by itself; if they were, one would not need intelligence analysis, just a copy-editor to
put the facts in some kind of readable order. The interpretation of the case will be a more
humanistic, and less strictly scientific enterprise.

Colonel W. Patrick Lang, former head of human intelligence at the DIA, has written that The
truth is that intelligence is an art best practiced by gifted eccentrics, people widely and deeply
educated, favored by nature and training with intuition beyond the average and who care more
for the truth than anything else...134 The neoconservatives falsely accused Sherman Kent of
founding an analytical tradition ignorant of this fact; but there is truth to the claim that
contemporary bureaucracies are less and less amenable to the humanistic side of intelligence:

...There are people like that in the leadership of US Intelligence. There are a few, but there once were
many more and they are fewer all the time... What are really to be found in the upper echelons of the
community are either people who early in their government service became specialized in the generalized
management of organizations (often after early substantive analytic work) or others who were staff of
some kind, (budgetary planners, lawyers, liaison staff, etc.)... Such people as the managers are easily
recognized by the directors of the agencies as very valuable to their career survival... but they are not well
suited to leading real intelligence officers to feats of brilliant analysis or imaginative collection operations
because they are always in a defensive crouch fearing that the real intelligence officers will cause
trouble for them or the boss through disagreement with the picture desired by the administration of the
day.135

The upshot is that analysis is ironed out in a layer cake system of committees at ever-higher
layers of bureaucracy... When this process is ended, what is typically produced is a stereotypical
example of the lowest common denominator, not something on which the country should hang
its hat in making decisions affecting the national fate.136

An individual brilliant mind such as Sherman Kent might not have been deceived as easily as the
neoconservatives imagined, but for a generations-removed, managerially-driven bureaucracy, the
story may be very different. Kent wrote that I do not wish to be the one who rejects all hunches
and intuitions as uniformly perilous, for there are hunches based on knowledge and
understanding which are the stuff of highest truth. What I do wish to reject is intuition based
upon nothing and which takes off from the wish.137 In this line, Kent delivers an apposite
critique both of those who would look no further than the data, and those who would take
skepticism of the data as license to see whatever they wished.

The US intelligence community may have been a ripe target for a false-flag attack at the time of
9/11, and not only because of its known obsession with the Middle East and jihadist terrorism.
Conspirators with a good understanding of their target would have known that, of the two major
schools contesting intelligence analysis, the first (mainstream, bureaucratic, and narrowly data-

134
Bureaucrats versus Artists, W. Patrick Lang, 2004, p. 9
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/artists_versus_bureaucrats....pdf
135
Ibid., p. 4
136
Ibid., p. 8
137
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Sherman Kent, Archon Books, 1965, p. 203

37
driven with an overriding tendency to play it safe) downplayed the importance of the possibility
of deception and would not look too much further than the hard data and obvious evidence,
while the second (associated with neoconservatives), despite being more attuned to problems of
deception, was inclined to disregard objective truth altogether in favor of interpretations that
would justify desired policies. They would not look a gift horse in the mouth; any
unconventional, dissenting voices would be ironed out.

38
 JESTER

The court jester, or fool, is a universal phenomenon. He crops up in every court worth its salt in
medieval and Renaissance Europe, in China, India, Japan, Russia, America and Africa.138 For
hundreds of years, their influence permeated court life, entertaining, baffling, and insulting
with their wit, puns, riddles, doggerel verse, songs, capering antics, or nonsensical babble.139

Yet, as Beatrice Otto has written, Of at least equal importance with his entertainers cap was the
jesters function as adviser and critic. This is what distinguishes him from a pure entertainer who
would juggle batons, swallow swords, or strum on a lute or a clown who would play the fool
simply to amuse people.140 Inevitably, other court functionaries cooked up the kings facts for
him before delivery; the jester delivered them raw.141 A king who attempted to govern without a
fool to break the wall of sycophants standing between him and reality risked calamity - a
conception immortalized by Shakespeare. In King Lear, the Fool tries to warn the King of his
shortsightedness in yielding his kingdom to his scheming daughters. Speaking at first in
irreverent riddles and puns, standing up to Lears angry threats, it becomes plain that he is trying
to warn the King; When thou clovest thy crown i the middle, and gavest away both parts, thou
borest thy ass on thy back oer the dirt: thou hadst little wit in thy bald crown, when thou gavest
thy golden one away.142 The Fools warnings heighten the sense of tragedy; the truth was not
unknowable, indeed it was spoken, but the King did not want to hear it; the Fool shows us that
the fault is not in our stars, but in our selves.

Of necessity, jesters are peripheral to the game of politics; as such, They have little to gain by
caution and little to lose by candor.143 Mark Edmundson writes that Shakespeares fools are
subtle teachers, reality instructors one might say, who often come close to playing the part that
Socrates, himself an inspired clown, played on the streets of Athens. They tickle, coax and cajole
their supposed betters into truth, or something akin to it.144

One of Americas most dedicated Fools is Lyndon LaRouche, probably the most unusual
character of recent American political life. He has swerved from far left to far right and back
again since his emergence in the late 1960s as the head of Marxist splinter movement. A regular
no-hope candidate for the presidency since the 1970s, his writings are a genre of their own,
characterized by an inimitable blend of insight, megalomania, conspiracy-of-all-history rants,
inside information, perennial (sometimes accurate) forecasts of doom, and obscure metaphysical
propositions. Like a Fool, his status in the mainstream social order is that of a contemptible
lunatic; his movement is passionately decried as a cult by many ex-members.145 Like a Fool, his
discourse is alternately witty, offensive, nonsensical, scandalous, perceptive, and absurd -

138
Fools are Everywhere, Beatrice K. Otto, University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 233
139
Ibid., p. 242
140
Ibid., p. 244
141
The Kings Jester: Modern Style, A.J. Nock, Harpers Monthly Magazine, quoted in Fools are Everywhere,
Otto, p. 244
142
King Lear, William Shakespeare, I.iv.152-156
143
Fools are Everywhere, op. cit., p. 245
144
Playing the Fool, Mark Edmundson, The New York Times, April 2, 2000
www.nytimes.com/books/00/04/02/bookend/bookend.html
145
See for instance discussions among former followers: http://www.factnet.org/vbforum/forumdisplay.php?f=1229

39
sometimes all at the same time. Like a Fool, his penchant for inserting himself into high-level
under-the-table dealings has meant time mixing in the most exalted circles - and time cooling his
heels in prison. A former member of the National Security Council described his network as
one of the best private intelligence services in the world.146 LaRouches true identity probably
lies somewhere beyond his self-conception as the DaVinci of statecraft and his enemies
successfully-popularized view of him as a dangerous lunatic. Yet this indigestible character,
blacklisted by the mainstream media, was one of the few to grasp and highlight the
transformative moment in 2000-2001.

Already, in December 2000, he had alerted his readers to the likelihood of crisis-management
measures:

Will the next Congress be capable of returning a vote in favor of any of the kinds of legislation which will
be needed? Or, instead, lacking the ability to make law, faced with a situation in which the President cannot
make law, because the Congress wont agree to it; no sensible laws can be passed. What happens then, is
that the tendency is to go to methods of dictatorships, sometimes called, euphemistically, crisis
management. Which means that the U.S. and other governments will create crises, create a crisis, in order
to force a crisis-management decision upon the President and other institutions... thats the great threat: a
United States which is, presumably a superpower, the Ozymandias of our time, faced with a situation where
it pretends to rule the world, but is incapable of effectively governing itself, and lashes out like a wild,
desperate beast, trying to get the world to obey, when it doesnt even know what it wants to do.147

Shortly after George W. Bushs inauguration in January 2001, with assurances of a humble
foreign policy still ringing in the ears of the public and media, LaRouche warned that The new
Bush Administration wishes to settle accounts with Iraq... As long as that remains a prevalent
Anglo-American intention, a new Middle East war, bigger than any yet seen, is more or less
inevitable under presently reigning global influences; more ominously, he suggested that

A new Middle East war of the general type and implications indicated, will occur or not, whether or not
certain specified incidents materialize. It will occur only if the combination of the Israeli government and
certain Anglo-American circles wish to have it occur. If they should wish it to occur, the incidents to
explain that occurrence, will be arranged, just as the Hitler regime concocted the incidents used as the
pretext for the invasion of Poland.148

The alarms continued at a steady pace. In February 2001, he linked the developing geopolitical
paradigm to something that had gone seriously wrong in the global financial system: Now, what
Alan Greenspan is doing, is absolute lunacy. It is not a policy; it is pure desperation... Its not
going to continue this way. Were going to get to a point soon, at which: Either you will have
Middle East wars, and similar kinds of things which distract public attention from the problem;
you will then have measures, emergency measures taken inside the United States to control the
political situation. Or, you will have a sensible solution, in which the United States decides to

146
Some Officials Find Intelligence Network Useful, John Mintz, The Washington Post, January 15, 1985
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/cult/larouche/larou1.htm
147
Presidential Election 2000: The Fall of Ozymandias, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence
Review, December 22, 2000 http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/2000/2750_lar_ozymandias.html
148
Look At What Happened in Brazil, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence Review, January 27, 2001
http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/2001/2806_brazil.html

40
abandon its present policy... We are at the end of the line.149 In March 2001: The most
dangerous thing on the scene right now... the Bush Administration is committed to a Middle East
general war. Which means that, Iran is also a target.150 In August 2001, he sounded one final
warning bell:

Dont try to understand the problem in Israel and the Middle East, from the standpoint of the Israelis, or
Arabs. Thats not where the problem lies. The Israelis are the Israelis, and the Arabs are the Arabs. But they
are not the cause of the great danger which may come out of the Middle East war... The problem is this:
call it the guns of August. Now, if you look back into the 20th century, youll recall that in August of
1914, a great world war began, a war that could be seen coming, that was planned by most of the great
powers... Then, in August of 1939, as the first of September approached, the Wehrmacht under Hitler
moved to launch World War II, which was also another geopolitical war, to destroy the possibility of
cooperation in Eurasia... the only way to prevent China, Russia, India, and so forth, from cooperating in
Eurasian economic cooperation, is to do what? Is to start a war between Islam, and the West. And how do
you trigger such a war? You trigger it by getting a religious war started in the Middle East... There are
some people in powerful positions, in the United Kingdom, and in powerful positions inside the United
States, who want that to happen.151

Unsurprisingly, this analytical backdrop led LaRouche, who was being interviewed on the radio
the morning of September 11, 2001, to proffer a very different view of those events as they
unfolded:
Somebody wants this thing to go out of control. Thats why theyre doing this. This is not an attack; this is
a provocation. Its a provocation with an intention behind it. To create a programmed reaction from the
institutions of the United States. This is not some dumb guy with a turban some place in the world, trying
to get revenge for whats going on in the Middle East. This is something different.152

First of all, the first suspicion thats going to be on this is Osama bin Laden... So, now you can blame
Osama bin Laden. At some point, you go in and kill him, and you say the problem was solved. But you
never considered who sent, who created Osama bin Laden, and who protected him, and deployed his forces
and name for these purposes. And as we saw in terrorism in Italy in the 1970s, for example, the people who
were running the so-called terrorist operations in Italy, were not really the groups that had the credit for it.
They were actually runaway NATO asset organizations at a very high level... So, in a case like this, dont
assume that the popular names that everybody knows, or that the FBI quotes and so forth, that this is the
real problem.153

The United States needs a Franklin Roosevelt, who will say we have nothing to fear as much as fear
itself... What Im afraid of from this White House is, because of its very weakness, it will tend to go into
flight-forward... Theyre going to pull out some kind of favorite horror movie and try to act that out as a
scenario.154

149
Questions and Answers from Peru, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence Review, March 16, 2001
http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/2001/2810_peru_webcast_qanda.html
150
Questions and Answers at March 31, 2001 Webcast, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence Review
http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/2001/2814_webcast_qanda.html
151
LaRouche Speaks on Surviving the Global Financial Crash, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence
Review, August 3, 2001 http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/2001/2829_webcast_opening.html
152
LaRouche Discusses the Sept. 11 Attack As It Unfolds, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., The Jack Stockwell Radio
Talk Show Program, K-Talk Radio, Salt Lake City, Utah, September 11, 2001
http://www.larouchepub.com/pr_lar/2001/010911stockwell.html
153
Ibid.
154
Ibid.

41
 I dont think this is an Islamic national operation. I think this was on the other side. I would say the
capability, and the motivation, for the intention, does not come from the Arab world. And the isolated Arab
groups, which might intend to do something like that, dont have that capability. But rather, the culprits
are people who want the United States to go to war against the Arab world, along the line of what
Brzezinski and his man Huntington talk about as the Clash of Civilizations.155

Obviously, these views should not be accepted unquestioningly. What should be equally obvious
is that the views of ostensibly more reasonable, less Foolish people should not be accepted
unquestioningly either. Perhaps Hunter S. Thompsons famous maxim is closest to the truth:
When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.156

155
Ibid.
156
Fear and Loathing at the Super Bowl, Hunter S. Thompson, Rolling Stone No. 155, February 28, 1974

42
 KNOWN AND UNKNOWN

One common test as to whether some theory about the world is a current candidate for scientific
knowledge is that of falsifiability. In other words, the theory must be possible to disprove.
There is a God, goes one widespread view. There is no scientific way of disproving this
theory; it is non-falsifiable, and is hence not a candidate for scientific knowledge. That does not
mean the idea is untrue; it is just not scientific, by this view.

Many have accused conspiracy theories of being non-falsifiable in this sense - there is no way to
disprove a conspiracy. This accusation is correct. Whatever evidence you bring against the
conspiracy theory, the conspiracy theorist can just attribute as proof of the even-more-amazing
deviousness of the conspirators. What those who make this point generally fail to realize,
however, is that official stories are in practice non-falsifiable as well. They depend on
assertions by the government, which typically are based on information and analysis that cannot
be verified on the grounds of national security. Whatever evidence you bring against the
official story, the government can assert that you are wrong on the basis of information that it is
not willing to disclose or subject to verification. With regard to 9/11, as we have seen, even the
official commission did not have the access it needed to prisoners, raw intelligence, classified
documents, videotapes, and accurate records from the Pentagon, NORAD, and the FAA, let
alone the ability to verify such information. Truly independent researchers are at a much greater
disadvantage. Official stories have a scientific status basically akin to that of conspiracy theories.

Much of the confusion, talking-past-each-other, and outright mutual rejection may be due to the
conviction on both sides that they are discussing rival falsifiable theories. Neither are anything of
the sort. If one sees through the facade of certainty that most conspiratorial and government
accounts present, it becomes clear that (when they seek the truth, rather than propagandize) they
deal with issues regarding which there is inherent uncertainty, incomplete information, and a
possibility of deception. They require intelligence analysis, a humanistic endeavor (if one wishes
to call it scientific, one must adopt a much broader view of what science is).

This analysis, however, is conducted from two very different perspectives - the perspective of
intelligence agencies, who may have access to significant evidence, but who also may have all
kinds of reasons for concealing it or privileging one interpretation over another, and the
perspective of outside researchers who do not have access to evidence. Criminologist Philip
Jenkins writes:

In many ways, terrorism poses unusual difficulties for any kind of academic analysis... When dealing with
regular forms of criminality like drugs or homicide, official agencies might well present misleading
statements, generally to gain some political advantage, but in such cases it is possible for critical academics
or journalists to reinterpret the evidence to form a more reliable picture. In the case of terrorism, we can be
far less confident.157

One of the chief problems is that:

In studying terrorist groups... we often find evidence of masquerade and subterfuge, basically, of
individuals and groups pretending to be someone other than they actually are. This kind of behavior

157
Images of Terror, op. cit., p. 6

43
 immensely complicates any attempt to attribute responsibility for particular acts, and thus to observe a track
record for any given group or nation. It also means that any understanding of terrorism must depend on the
interpretive work of official agencies or expert observers, to a degree that is not the case when dealing with
the most routine crime. Defining terrorism is in large measure a subjective process, conditioned by political
and bureaucratic interests.158

Yet we might well have reasons for believing an official story and considering it respectable
humanistic knowledge. For instance, we could imagine a case where the government had
generally proven itself to be a reliable source of information, was relatively transparent and
forthcoming, was amenable to unconventional and politically damaging conclusions, where, on
the occasions the government had been wrong, it was usually caught out before it was too late by
a skeptical media and the reality-check of academia - and where, on those occasions, there was
no evidence of manipulation or systemic problems. Surely this was once the ideal for Americas
use of intelligence. Does this scenario currently apply in matters of war and peace?

The case of Iraqi WMD proved that it does not, serving as the antidote for anyone still reluctant
to question any truth now propounded in unison by the most respected media outlets,
intelligence analysts, think-tank experts, and government figures. The WMD claims were not
just advanced by news rags and shady propagandists; they were put forward authoritatively by
institutions such as the CIA and MI6, people such as Colin Powell and Tony Blair, by
newspapers such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, by academics from the
greatest universities and fellows at the most prestigious think-tanks. The WMD stories were the
declared justification for the invasion of Iraq; without doubt, they were the crucial factor in
building domestic and international coalitions for the operation. After no WMD were found,
these once-respected sources of information just wanted us to forget the matter, as though it had
been a bad dream. Whether the problem lay in accuracy in determining the truth, or sincerity in
telling it, it is clear that we have witnessed a massive collective failure of truthfulness.

The official story of 9/11 was prepared with the same cooks in the kitchen. It emerged from the
same government and intelligence apparatuses, the same people, the same way of doing business.
It was subjected to scrutiny by the same media - which, if it was cowed in 2003, was positively
fetal after 9/11. If some combination of poor practice, political manipulation, and compliant
media yielded such flawed conclusions about Iraq, it is no idle question as to whether similar
flaws plagued conclusions regarding 9/11.

As a humanistic discipline resting on subjective interpretation, intelligence analysis, though often

immensely valuable, usually involves a greater or lesser degree of doubt. That is why an honest
government is very careful about the status it ascribes to intelligence analyses. For instance, if
the Bush administration had told the public that we believe that or Saddam Hussein may have
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the shock when none were found would have been much reduced
- as would the political potency of the claim as a reason for war. The words used by Bush,
Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Blair were quite different: we know and there is no doubt.159 The only
possible interpretations are that they were lying, or that there was something seriously wrong
with our political-intelligence system, or a fair amount of both. The same language was, and

158
Ibid., pp. 85-86
159
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Who Said What When, Counterpunch, May 29, 2003
www.counterpunch.org/wmd05292003.html

44
continues to be used with regard to 9/11. The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian
nuclear program is a different story entirely. In contrast to the 9/11 and WMD language, the
estimate scrupulously labels all its judgements as being of low confidence, moderate
confidence, or high confidence, candidly noting that even A high confidence judgment is
not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.160 Inside
the intelligence community at least, some lessons are being learned.

Conspiracy theory is the dark side of the humanistic work of intelligence analysis - the
unacknowledged possibility, the unspoken alternative, the risk present even in the high
confidence judgement. Even at the best of times, it will occasionally be right. When political
leaders lie and intelligence processes fail, conspiracy theories are a required source of insight.
Unlike intelligence analysts, there are no minimum qualifications required to be a conspiracy
theorist, so it is necessary to wade through a lot of crap. There are also systemic factors that
hamper conspiracy theorists, such as: lack of access to secret information; lack of training and
support; and a tendency to be politicized, as official intelligence analysis is sometimes politicized
in favor of the ruling party, in favor of the ruling partys most radical opponents (which will
particularly be the case if the conspiracy theorists have latched on to a truth that the
establishment parties wish to suppress). However, there are also systemic factors that allow
conspiracy theorists greater freedom in the pursuit of truth: lack of political pressure to support
policy, lack of bureaucratic group-think, and freedom to violate taboos (after violating the major
taboo of publicly theorizing conspiracy, taboos no longer instill much fear). Lack of access to
secret information can also be a blessing in disguise, if that information is unreliable.

There are many, however, who do not wish us to recognize the nature and limits of our
knowledge, which would spur us to compare and contrast different theories. Cass Sunstein, a
Harvard Law School professor appointed by President Obama to head the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, co-authored a paper in 2008 with Adrian Vermeule, another
Harvard professor, entitled Conspiracy Theories. Their primary concern is conspiracy
theories relating to terrorism, especially theories that arise from and post-date the 9/11
attacks.161 Sunstein and Vermeule define conspiracy theories as an effort to explain some event
or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who have also managed to
conceal their role.162 What an absurd notion, that!

They see conspiracy theories as presenting serious risks, and focus on government strategies to
address this threat; yet they admit that some conspiracy theories, under our definition, have
turned out to be true, reassuringly stating that our focus throughout is on false conspiracy
theories, not true ones. Our ultimate goal is to explore how public officials might undermine
such theories, and as a general rule, true accounts should not be undermined.163 And how are
true conspiracy theories to be distinguished from false ones? Might that - at a wild guess -
involve researching and theorizing conspiracies?

160
Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Council, November 2007
www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
161
Conspiracy Theories, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, 2008, p. 3
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084585
162
Ibid., p. 4
163
Ibid., p. 5

45
What is less amusing, however, is what Sunstein and Vermeule propose to do: (1) Government
might ban conspiracy theorizing. (2) Government might impose some kind of tax, financial or
otherwise, on those who disseminate such theories. (3) Government might itself engage in
counterspeech, marshaling arguments to discredit conspiracy theories. (4) Government might
formally hire credible private parties to engage in counterspeech. (5) Government might engage
in informal communication with such parties, encouraging them to help. Each instrument has a
distinctive set of potential effects, or costs and benefits, and each will have a place under
imaginable conditions [my italics]. However, our main policy idea is that government should
engage in cognitive infiltration of the groups that produce conspiracy theories...164 This
envisions a scenario whereby government agents or their allies (acting either virtually or in real
space, and either openly or anonymously) will undermine the crippled epistemology of those
who subscribe to such theories.165 It must be very troubling when the rabble stops believing
everything you tell them, and starts thinking independently. Such a scenario must be averted at
all costs; better to feed them a few harmless secrets to slake their suspicion, than to see them
engage in fundamental reflection on their epistemology, asking how do we know?. Sunstein
and Vermeule chose the phrase crippled epistemology; but are they not aware that philosophy
limps?166

Socrates would probably have had a lot of fun with those conspiracy theorists who know that
their pet theory is true, and with those official story fanatics like Sunstein and Vermeule who
know that the conventional wisdom is the only possible truth. Socrates spent his whole
philosophical life exposing the knowledge claimed by those who thought they were wise,
showing them that it was nothing of the sort. In the account of his trial presented by Plato, at
which he would eventually be sentenced to death by the many enemies he accumulated in this
quest, Socrates summed up the arguments of the prosecution as follows: Socrates is an evil-
doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes
the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.167

To refute this charge, he traced his path back to the moment when the Oracle at Delphi informed
him that there was no man wiser than he.168 Stunned and perplexed by this claim, Socrates set
out to prove the oracle wrong and find someone wiser. He examined a politician widely thought
to be very wise, but left saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that
either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is, - for he knows
nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular,
then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him.169 He interrogated other wise men, poets and
artisans, and came to the same result. Finally Socrates realized that this was precisely the
meaning of the oracle: that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the
wisdom of men is worth little or nothing, and the only reason there is no man wiser is that

164
Ibid., p. 14
165
Ibid., p. 15
166
In Praise of Philosophy, in In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, trans. John
ONeill, Northwestern University Press, 1988, p. 58.
167
Apology, Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.

46
Socrates knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing.170 Throughout the dialogues in
which he features, Socrates is consistently portrayed as saying, I dont know and insisting on
his ultimate ignorance.

The official story does not count as knowledge because the direct evidence it presents in support
of its position is, firstly, unverifiable, and secondly, largely consistent with another viable,
documented sort of scenario for which there is ample means, motive, and opportunity: the
concealed involvement of other parties, up to the level of a full-fledged false-flag attack. The
conspiracy theories do not count as knowledge either; there is circumstantial evidence and
plausible speculation, but no solid direct evidence. We do not know for sure what happened on
9/11. Hence, one might argue that Socrates would have found the official story and conspiracy
theories equally objectionable. Indeed, Socrates would probably have had his peculiar brand of
fun with those conspiracy theorists who draw conclusions with too much haste and assurance.
But while Socrates was cautious about committing too firmly to any view arrived at in his search
for knowledge, he was fiercely committed to the quest:

MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.

SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not
altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we
ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no
knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know; - that is a theme upon which I am
ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.171

Not only would Socrates have scorned the official storys claim to the status of knowledge, he
would have had no time for the typical official story fall-back position: that maybe the official
story isnt true, but we cant prove otherwise, and even if we could, what would we do about it?
Socrates profession of ignorance was not a go-back-to-sleep conclusion that we dont know the
truth and hence the truth is unimportant; the truth is important, and hence, so is our ignorance of
it. Admitting that we dont know implies that we should ask, which is exactly what conspiracy
theorists are doing.

Official story supporters, in contrast, will find Socratic ignorance inherently indigestible.
Admitting ignorance and asking questions opens up a universe of facts and possibilities they
simply do not want to contemplate. It is a problem of closed minds. That is why the official story
survives as a - admittedly still dominant - faith-based dogma, from which any dissent is
considered heresy, rather than a theory open to question. Given a choice between those who ask
questions, even if they make mistakes, and those who insist on the infallibility of their doctrine
and demand that heretics be crushed, it is clear where Socrates sympathies would have lain. The
world of conspiracy theories is where the real intellectual activity is going on. It does without
easy reliance on the information and assumptions taken for granted by the mainstream. Like any
field which is officially unrecognized, socially discouraged, and completely disorganized, it is
full of its own useless theories and bad information. What is astonishing, however, is that it is

170
Ibid.
171
Meno, Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html

47
also the scene of good research and prescient analysis, bearing witness to the fact that the
limping of philosophy is its virtue.172 Wa Allahu alam.

172
In Praise of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 62

48
 LORDS AND SUBJECTS

A subject is someone under the dominion of a sovereign lord. The sovereign grants the subjects
privileges, but may take them away. The sovereign is supposed to act in the best interests of the
subjects, but the subjects have no say as to how. Power flows from the sovereign downwards.
The subject is part of a flock, under the shepherding of the lord. As Jesus Christ was the
heavenly sovereign lord, his power on Earth was delegated to kings who ruled by divine right.

What was truly revolutionary about the American Revolution was that it put this-worldly
sovereignty - and hence responsibility - in the hands of the people. As Benjamin Franklin wrote,
In free governments the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors and sovereigns.173
The plan of the architects of American freedom was poignantly illuminated in recent spectral
analysis by the Library of Congress on one of Thomas Jeffersons early drafts of the Declaration
of Independence. Jefferson at first wrote the then-standard phrase, our fellow subjects, but then
sought quite methodically to expunge the word, to wipe it out of existence and write over it.
Many words were crossed out and replaced in the draft, but only one was obliterated. Over the
smudge, Jefferson then wrote the word citizens.174 In contrast to subjects, citizens have
inalienable rights. Citizens make decisions, shape policy, and take responsibility. Power flows
from citizens upwards. This conception of government was not based on a belief that citizens
would always make the wisest decisions, or that they would always live up to their
responsibilities, but on the principle that sovereignty was theirs by right.

This principle is problematic, however. It has become more so as the challenges of policymaking
have become more complex, and the issues at stake more grave. People who think a lot about
policy tend to become very preoccupied. From the policy perspective, problems are piling up and
have been for some time, while relatively little has been done. America did little to articulate a
new vision for the world after the end of the Cold War. It did not move decisively to lead and
reshape the world, as after World War II, nor did it define a more modest place for itself;
America drifted. The healthcare system threatens to eat up a fifth of Americas GDP, but reform
in any direction is piecemeal. Many are concerned about the prospects of environmental
catastrophe, but inaction has prevailed. Infrastructure has deteriorated, the education system has
become less competitive, and deep-rooted economic and financial problems have gone
unaddressed.

Americas separation of powers between the executive, bicameral legislative, and judicial
branches, and again between the federal and state levels; a gridlock of competing lobbies and
interest groups; a media-driven spin cycle and obsession with polls - all have tended to impede
decisive movement. Yet ultimately, the American people themselves have not mobilized in favor
of decisive action in any area. In China or other authoritarian states, in contrast, if a challenge is
identified it can be confronted head on, addressed programmatically in Five Year Plans imposed
from above by a small group of decision-makers. But ordinary people have little power to object

173
Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Jonathan Elliot (ed.), J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1863, p. 369
174
Jefferson changed subjects to citizens in Declaration of Independence, Marc Kaufman, Washington Post,
July 3, 2010 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/02/AR2010070205525.html

49
if the Plan requires their village to be bulldozed, their business to be closed, or taxes to be
doubled.

It may be that the American people are instinctively, and the architects of the American system
were deliberately, wise in resisting revolutionary change. History is replete with radical measures
that created far more misery than they resolved. But inevitably, the policy people who foresee
doom if certain problems are not addressed become ever more frustrated and disdainful of public
opinion and the political system. This divide was aggravated by the Cold War, when a small
group of people had to make serious plans and policies based around the possibility of a nuclear
war that could wipe out much of the planets population, while the rest of us tried to forget about
it. Some people do have to think about the extreme case, the unthinkable exception that sits
uncomfortably beneath daily life. Such a perspective may encourage a sense of personal
responsibility for the countrys future, perhaps even a sense that only a small elite possesses the
long-range thinking, rationality, and influence to take action; average citizens, it may be thought,
do not expend the time and brainpower required to grapple with serious issues. Perhaps
Americas constitutional order seems outmoded in the face of the burdens of global power.

These dilemmas of governance were broached at a high level in a 1975 report to the Trilateral
Commission on the crisis of democracy. The section on America, written and presented for
debate by Samuel Huntington, begins on what sounds like an optimistic note: The 1960s
witnessed a dramatic renewal of the democratic spirit in America.175 It turns out, however, that
the increased vitality of democracy in the 1960s raised questions about the governability of
democracy in the 1970s.176 Huntington observed the declining trust in authority, the increased
opposition to government policies from the media, intellectuals, and citizen groups, and the
weakening of the presidency as an institution, all at the same time as demands on government
were increasing; all of these factors inhibited strong government leadership. The danger of this
lack of governability was particularly evident in the international arena; The turning inward of
American attention and the decline in the authority of American governing institutions are
closely related, as both cause and effect, to the relative downturn in American power and
influence in world affairs.177 In particular, a government which lacks authority and which is
committed to substantial domestic programs will have little ability, short of a cataclysmic crisis,
to impose on its people the sacrifices which may be necessary to deal with foreign policy
problems and defense.178 Thus, the primary challenge to Americas government comes not
primarily from external threats, though such threats are real, nor from internal subversion from
the left or the right, although both possibilities could exist, but rather from the internal dynamics
of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society.179

What was the solution? First, Huntington noted, democracy is only one way of constituting
authority, and it is not necessarily a universally applicable one. In many situations the claims of
expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents may override the claims of democracy as a

175
The Crisis of Democracy, Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki, The Trilateral Commission,
1975, p. 59 http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/archivos_pdf/crisis_of_democracy.pdf
176
Ibid., p. 64
177
Ibid., p. 106
178
Ibid., p. 105
179
Ibid., p. 115

50
way of constituting authority.180 Secondly, the effective operation of a democratic political
system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some
individuals and groups.181 In other words, some of the problems of governance in the United
States today stem from an excess of democracy... Needed, instead, is a greater degree of
moderation in democracy.182

It was left to Ralf Dahrendorf, the English-German sociologist, to make the vital objection in the
discussion after Huntingtons presentation:

Governability presumably refers to the ability of governments to give direction to the economies,
societies, and political communities in which they govern, and to do so effectively. Could it not be argued
that one of the traditional characteristics of democracies is that we do not ask governments to give direction
to the economies, societies, and political communities, at least not to the extent to which nondemocratic
societies are doing this? Might it not be argued, therefore, that by raising the question of governability in
relation to democracies, one is in fact raising the question of whether the power of government should be
increased rather than the question of whether the power of government should be restored? Is it not
misleading to imply that governments in democracies had all those powers in the past which are now
demanded for them?183

These quandaries are still with us, and President Barack Obama succinctly summarized the issue:
You know, America - one of the great things about this country is weve got a system thats
sometimes kind of hard to change; Congress gets kind of bogged down. And part of that is
because of the way the Constitution is designed. Its served us well because it keeps us very
stable. We dont have coups and all kind of governments collapsing all the time. But the
disadvantage, sometimes, is that its hard for us to make big, bold steps.184 He then added, a
little more vaguely, the great thing about the system is that every once in a while, when we
finally hit a point where things just arent working at all, we are able to generate the political will
to get things done.185 How exactly do we generate this political will that increases the scope for
governability? Obama did not explain. But on the two occasions in the past decade in which
tectonic policy shifts actually took place - in response to 9/11 and the financial meltdown - these
shifts came in response to crisis.

As a result of the governability problem, there is a widespread attitude among political elites
that crises must be exploited for maximum policy impact. After 9/11, President George W. Bush
remarked that through my tears I see opportunity.186 Donald Rumsfeld argued that the events
provided the kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion the world;
Condoleezza Rice asked the National Security Council to think about how do you capitalize on
these opportunities? to fundamentally change... the shape of the world; the September 2002 US
National Security Strategy stated that The events of September 11, 2001, opened vast, new

180
Ibid., p. 113
181
Ibid., p. 114
182
Ibid., p. 113
183
Ibid., p. 188
184
Remarks by the President in an Online Town Hall on Healthcare, The White House, July 1, 2009
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-in-an-Online-Town-Hall-on-Health-Care-Reform/
185
Ibid.
186
Remarks by President Bush and President Megawati of Indonesia, The White House, September 19, 2001
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/president_020.asp

51
opportunities.187 Serving and retired defense officials told the Washington Post in 2006 that
Another attack could create both a justification and an opportunity that is lacking today to
retaliate against some known targets.188 Rule one, Rahm Emanuel said shortly after the
Obama administration arrived in office, Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are
opportunities to do big things.189 President Obama urged Americans to discover great
opportunity in the midst of great crisis.190 The theme of the 2009 Trilateral Commission
meeting was Seeking Opportunities in Crisis.191 It would almost be reassuring if this were the
whispered cipher of conspiracy - unfortunately, this is just how policy elites see the world.

In everyday life, it is admirable to see opportunity in crisis - to focus on the positive things that
can be done, rather than mourning the calamities. But why are crises such opportunities for
political change? In a crisis, everything moves faster. There is a sense of urgency. Normal road-
blocks fall aside - the Congress becomes more pliable, the courts more quiescent, and the media
more focused. If the very fundamentals of life such as physical security and economic well-being
are seen to be in jeopardy, much more radical change is accepted and even demanded. People are
afraid and want solutions. In short, crisis gives the executive branch and the permanent
government much more freedom for action.

Crisis management entails ramming through solutions devised by policy people with minimal
scrutiny and debate by the public and little vetting by the ordinary political process. For the
public debate, deliberation, and tradition of democracy, crisis management substitutes spasmodic
responses to stimuli, channeled and directed by the ideologies of policy elites. This is not a
crime, and from a utilitarian perspective may even seem to be the right thing to do. If politics is
the art of the possible, crisis changes the parameters of the possible. Shouldnt we seize the
moment to accomplish the most we can? But in the long view, government-by-crisis, though not
in itself a legal abrogation of democracy since the crisis is informal and publicly accepted, runs
against democracys spirit. It moves closer to redefining citizens as subjects, and movement in
that direction has a momentum of its own. Possibly, our would-be policy lords do indeed have a
special, deeper insight into the problems of the country and the world than the ordinary citizen.
For that matter, the average 18th century monarch may have been considerably better fitted by
upbringing, education, and experience for the responsibilities of government than the average
subject. Nonetheless, democracy was never about convenience.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against these developments in his famous farewell
address. One of his cautions is well known: In the councils of government, we must guard
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can

187
9/11: Possible Motives of the Bush Administration, David Ray Griffin, Global Research, December 2, 2005
www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1391
188
New Plans Foresee Fighting Terrorism Beyond War Zones, Ann Scott Tyson, The Washington Post, April 23,
2006
189
Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, Jeff Zeleny, The New York Times, November 9, 2008
190
Obama: Crisis is time of great opportunity, Associated Press, March 7, 2009
191
Seeking Opportunities in Crisis, The Trilateral Commission, Tokyo Plenary Meeting 2009
www.trilateral.org/download/doc/seeking_opportunities2.pdf

52
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our
peaceful methods and goals.192 Lesser known is his warning of the danger that public policy
could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite; as Eisenhower saw it, Crises
there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a
recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous
solution to all current difficulties.193 But we need not so much the emotional and transitory
sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without
complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle with liberty the stake.194

Once those running the state assume de facto sovereignty and its responsibilities, the next step in
the redefinition of sovereignty comes when the constitutional rule of law itself is placed into
suspension. As Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich wrote in their study of dictatorship and
autocracy,

the essence of the doctrine of sovereignty was that a determinate person or group of persons wield an
unlimited power of deciding what is in the public interest. The truth of the matter is that, as once was said
rather picturesquely by the great Sir Edward Coke, sovereignty and the common law make strange
bedfellows, by which he meant that the common-law tradition of the supremacy of the law could not be
reconciled with the new theory of the state as unlimited in fact. The genuine state concept calls for an
absolute ruler, an autocrat.195

Again, Americas journey down this road began in earnest during the Cold War. The most
blatant step was taken in the form of Continuity of Government plans designed to ensure the
governments continued operation in the event of nuclear war or other major catastrophe. The
most dramatic of these plans was developed by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld during the
1980s: The program called for setting aside the legal rules for presidential succession in some
circumstances, in favor of a secret procedure for putting in place a new President and his staff...
One of the awkward questions we faced, one participant in the planning of the program
explains, was whether to reconstitute Congress after a nuclear attack. It was decided that no, it
would be easier to operate without them.196 In short, the plan called for suspending
constitutional government. Elements of Continuity of Government plans went live for the first
time on 9/11, and a state of emergency was declared and renewed every year since.197198

The state of emergency inaugurated by 9/11 was not merely theoretical: US citizens were
detained without trial; torture was justified; Fourth Amendment protection against unwarranted
search and seizure was effectively suspended; warrantless wiretapping and domestic spying
192
Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White
House, January 17, 1961 www.eisenhower.archives.gov/All_About_Ike/Speeches/Farewell_Address.pdf
193
Ibid.
194
Ibid.
195
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Carl J. Friedrich, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Harvard University Press,
1965, p. 7
196
The Armageddon Plan, James Mann, The Atlantic Monthly, March 2004
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/03/the-armageddon-plan/2902/
197
Shadow Government Is at Work in Secret, Barton Gellman and Susan Schmidt, The Washington Post, March
1, 2002 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900891.html
198
Letter from the President on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist
Attacks, The White House, September 10, 2010 www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/10/letter-president-
continuation-national-emergency-with-respect-certain-te

53
without any suspicion of criminal activity was introduced. The Obama administration ordered
the execution of a US citizen overseas without trial.199 Cold War secrecy practices were
strengthened; Continuity of Government plans were kept secret even from Congress. The
declaration of a war on terror and its contextualization as part of a long war itself suggested
an open-ended state of emergency. As opposed to a war against a determinate, destructible
opponent, it is inherently unending - a war against a phenomenon. It is also eminently adaptable,
because the power to define who is a terrorist lies solely in the hands of those who have declared
the war. The precedents set will long outlast the cardboard villains by which they are justified.

The key word here is emergency, which describes not only the general basis of crisis
management, but also the specific legal-political form it assumes. Most notable among those
who have seen emergency as an indispensable technique to maintain governability is Carl
Schmitt, who developed his views under the Weimar Republic during the 1920s and early 1930s.
Sovereign is he who decides on the exception, he asserts.200 The German word Schmitt uses is
Ausnahmezustand, which is often translated as state of emergency, but Schmitt makes clear
that the exception is to be understood to refer to a general concept in the theory of the state, and
not merely to a construct applied to any emergency decree or state of siege.201 For those who
think in this way, the state of exception always exists, ready to be called upon - an emergency
override for the machinery of government.

It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole
question of sovereignty. The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one
spell out what may take place in such a case... The precondition as well as the content of
jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be unlimited.202 For Schmitt, an
implicit zone of exception, or state of emergency, both free of and underlying the legal order was
necessary to enable a government to act decisively at critical moments. Whoever held this power
was the de facto sovereign, an implicit power behind the explicit legal order that could violate
the laws in order to make possible their existence. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous
to the miracle in theology, a mysterious intervention from above in the ordinary workings of the
system.203 Schmitt saw the exception as a way of reconciling the tension between the theory of
democratic constitutional rule and the real-world demands of sovereignty.

Schmitts ideas took the stage with the rise of the Nazis to power in 1933. On February 27th, less
than one month after Hitlers inauguration as chancellor, the Reichstag building burned, and a
lone Dutch communist, Marinus van der Lubbe, was arrested. Hitler immediately pointed to a
communist conspiracy, and the following day convinced ailing President Paul von Hindenburg to
issue the Reichstag Fire Decree, which suspended habeas corpus and free speech, subjected
postal, telegraphic, and telephone communications to surveillance, and allowed warrantless
search and seizure. The German Communist Party was suppressed and thousands of communists
arrested, paving the way for Nazi victory in federal elections on March 5th. Schmitt praised the

199
The Presidents Power to Order the Extra-Judicial Execution of an American Citizen, Scott Horton, Harpers
Magazine, October 1, 2010 http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/10/hbc-90007665
200
Political Theology, Carl Schmitt, trans. George Schwab, University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 5
201
Ibid.
202
Ibid., pp. 6-7
203
Ibid., p. 36

54
Decree, having been a major supporter of the provision in the Weimar constitution that allowed
for the constitutions suspension in an emergency, and became known as the crown jurist of
the Third Reich. His ideas ensured that the Weimar Constitution never had to be revoked; it was
just ignored, and technically remained in effect until 1945. As Giorgio Agamben writes, the end
of the Weimar Republic clearly demonstrates that... a protected democracy is not a democracy
at all, and that the paradigm of constitutional dictatorship functions instead as a transitional
phase that leads inevitably to the establishment of a totalitarian regime.204

Agamben traces the history of the state of exception back to the wars of the French Revolution;
since then, it has gradually been freed from the wartime situation to which it was originally
bound in order to be used as an extraordinary police measure to cope with internal sedition and
disorder, thus changing from a real, or military state of siege to a fictitious, or political one. In
any case, it is important not to forget that the modern state of exception is a creation of the
democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one.205 Today, the state of exception
tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary
politics.206 Remarkably, this fundamental change has been subject to little public debate;
though this transformation of the constitutional order (which is today underway to varying
degrees in all the Western democracies) is perfectly well known to jurists and politicians, it has
remained entirely unnoticed by the citizens. At the very moment when it would like to give
lessons in democracy to different traditions and cultures, the political culture of the West does
not realize that it has entirely lost its canon.207

In a democratic republic such as the United States, there is no legitimate provision for the
suspension of the constitution. All tendencies of modern constitutional development point
toward eliminating the sovereign in this sense, writes Schmitt, But whether the extreme
exception can be banished from the world is not a juristic question. Whether one has confidence
and hope that it can be eliminated depends on philosophical, especially on philosophical-
historical or metaphysical, convictions.208 Even if there is no explicit provision for a sovereign
and emergency powers, the temptations and circumstances that create the pressure for a state of
exception remain. A crisis sufficient to paralyze or weaken normal democratic processes is
enough.

But such crisis management raises an intriguing question: might not these crises, which are so
politically effective, be deliberately created? If neither vital democracy nor sovereign autocracy
are directing a country, and no suitable crisis materializes, Schmitts analysis suggests that
individuals may take sovereign matters, the exception, into their own hands. Some historians
argue that the Nazis themselves set the fire in the Reichstag that enabled them to consolidate
their power, although that debate is far from over. But never mind possibilities: the Ergenekon
and Gladio networks pursued exactly this strategy. By conducting false-flag terrorist attacks,
they attempted to trigger a different kind of politics, a politics of emergency that would
override the normal processes of a democracy and transform the policymaking environment.

204
State of Exception, Giorgio Agamben, trans. Kevin Attell, University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 15
205
Ibid., p. 5
206
Ibid., p. 2
207
Ibid., p. 18
208
Political Theology, op. cit., p. 7

55
 MANCHURIA

In the evening of September 18, 1931, explosive charges destroyed a section of the Japanese-
owned Southern Manchuria Railroad near the Chinese city of Mukden. Japan accused Chinese
forces of sabotage. The following morning, Japanese forces began a coordinated invasion of
Manchuria, resulting in the establishment of a puppet government, and eventually, the expansion
of the war to the rest of China. These events offer a unique perspective on crisis and conspiracy.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Japan reeled from the effects of the worldwide depression.
GNP fell nearly 20% between 1929 and 1931.209 Unemployment skyrocketed. Communists,
socialists, and anarchists exploited broad social discontent. Liberal internationalists, influential in
the government, came under heavy pressure from militarists and civilian ultranationalists to
adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. Within the military, dissatisfaction at the countrys
direction was mounting; low-paid officers steeped in patriotism and bushido-style ethics
reacted against the corruption of politicians and the affluence of businessmen who financed
them.210 The armys prestige was at a low ebb, military appropriations had been cut, and
equipment and rations were poor and in short supply.211

Most importantly, there was great unhappiness at the cautious, gradual approach taken by the
government on the Asian continent and in negotiations with Western powers on naval arms
controls. Powerful factions in the army and the fleet opposed these policies. Secret societies
flourished among mid-ranking officers, majors and colonels; although concerned at first with
practical military issues and the near abroad, the grander ideas of radical civilian ideologues
began to gain ground in the officer corps. Partly as a result of contacts with civilian
ultranationalists... some of them came to contemplate the possibility of engineering a political
crisis which would end the era of party cabinets.212

The ideas that began to percolate advocated aggressive expansion, statist economic policies, a
new Japanese-led order in Asia, and even a spiritual transformation of Japanese society. Okawa
Shumei was among the most prominent of such civilian ideologues with strong military ties.
Okawa did not believe in the value of peace and viewed history in Civilizational terms, as
progress born out of conflict and war - most centrally, war between Asia and the West.213
However, expectations of such a clash of civilizations were merely one aspect of a greater
vision of a revivified Japanese civilization underpinning a new order:

It was clear to Okawa and others that the object of reconstruction was domestic politics. This goal must be
reached by any means, which, in the early 1930s, meant violence and terror. Indeed, violence was a
necessity because of its cleansing propensities... the spiritual reconstruction summoned by writers such as

209
Politics and Governance in Japan, Frank Gibney, in Governance in the Asia-Pacific, Maidment, Goldblatt, and
Mitchell (eds.), Routledge, 1998, p. 59
210
Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation, Richard Sims, Palgrave, 2001, p. 154
211
Myopic Grandeur, John E. Dreifort, Kent State University Press, 1991, p. 44
212
Japanese Political History, op. cit., p. 155
213
Sovereignty and Authenticity, Prasenjit Duara, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 98

56
 Okawa converged with plans to launch a war... If war were necessary for the spiritual awakening of Asia,
peace would bring a new order of coprosperity under Japanese leadership.214

As Okawas ideology suggests, the objectives of the militarists had both an internal and external
aspect, which played off against each other. The spiritual transformation of society and the
ascent of the military faction in politics was necessary to undergird foreign war; at the same
time, war was the surest means of effecting this social and political change. This paradoxical
equation raised a question: how could a transformative war take place, if the civilian
government, public opinion, and large parts of the military hierarchy were not presently disposed
to start one? Was there a kind of event that could both start a war as well as transform politics
and society in one blow?

The sights of the Japanese militarists and ultranationalists were set on Manchuria. In the
preceding years, Japan had amassed extensive commercial and political interests in the Chinese
province, exploiting the disarray and civil conflict in China. A major Japanese force, the
Kwantung Army, was already deployed on leased territory in Manchuria; the seizure of all of
Manchuria seemed to militarists to be the next logical step to assert Japanese leadership of Asia,
a New World Order. Beneath their high-sounding ideals, many militarists and ultranationalists
were heavily involved in Chinese opium trafficking. Not only was the opium trade a means of
personal enrichment for modestly-paid officers, it was a crucial source of off-the-books finance
for the Japanese presence in mainland Asia. In the coming years, with the seizure of Manchuria
and much of China, this trade would expand dramatically with Japanese encouragement; the
opium profits financed projects ranging from puppet governments to clandestine intelligence
networks and biological warfare/human experimentation outfits such as Unit 100.215216

A 1928 rail explosion, also near Mukden, foreshadowed the 1931 incident with which our story
began. This explosion blew up the train of the Old Marshal, Zhang Zuolin, a powerful Chinese
warlord and Japanese ally in Manchuria. Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi had been
attempting to orchestrate a diplomatic solution to safeguard Japanese interests in Manchuria,
balancing the Old Marshal in Manchuria against the Chinese Nationalist government; Tanakas
house of cards, the nonmilitary solution... had appeared near completion, but the bombing of
Marshal Zhang collapsed it at a stroke.217 The slain marshals son soon transferred his loyalty to
the Chinese nationalists, sealing the door against any but a military solution for Japan.218

The assassination was masterminded by Colonel Komoto Daisaku, a senior officer of Japans
Kwantung army, which was a den of political intrigue far from the eyes of the Tokyo
government. Komoto, an influential member of the Issekikai secret society, seems to have hoped
that the Old Marshals assassination would set off chaos in Manchuria that would necessitate a
Japanese invasion. However, the time was not yet ripe for such a move; neither the Kwantung
Army nor those sympathetic to its aims in Tokyo were prepared to act in the emergency created

214
Japanese Revolt against the West, Tetsuo Najita and H.D. Harootunian, in The Cambridge History of Japan,
Peter Duus and John Whitney Hall (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 733-734
215
An Opium Tug-of-War, Motohiro Kobayashi, in Opium Regimes, Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi
Wakabayashi (eds.), University of California Press, 2000, pp. 344 - 356
216
Factories of Death, Sheldon H. Harris, Routledge, 2002, p. 116
217
The Way of the Heavenly Sword, Leonard A. Humphreys, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 161
218
Ibid.

57
by the bombing incident.219 Prime Minister Tanaka, realizing the true nature of the incident,
began an investigation; Meanwhile, the general staff headquarters, already completely though
informally apprised of the facts, began work to bury it in darkness.220 Tanakas efforts to
reveal the conspiracy came to naught without military cooperation, and he resigned, dying a few
months later; the fact that Komotos flagrant breach of discipline and heinous criminal act went
unexposed and unpunished amounted to condonation, thereby weakening the established
leadership and encouraging new plots.221

The 1931 incident came at a more propitious moment. The crashing economy had undermined
the civilian government and increased social unrest. Conspiratorial networks among officers and
civilian ultranationalists had multiplied and amalgamated. Nonetheless, even among militarist
conspirators, there were serious differences. Geopolitically, there were divisions between those
who advocated a continental strategy that would lead to war with the Soviet Union, and those
who preferred a Pacific strategy of confrontation with the United States and Great Britain. In
terms of political strategy, some advocated seizing control in Japan before embarking on any
foreign adventures, whereas others advocated the staging of a dramatic incident in Manchuria
which would unleash national feeling and make it easy to sweep away constitutional
liberalism.222 After a coup detat planned by the Tokyo-first group fizzled in March 1931, the
way was clear for the Manchuria first group to try their hand with the support of the former.

Colonels Itagaki Seishiro and Ishiwara Kanji, both on the staff of the Kwantung Army, arranged
the bombing of the Manchuria railway at Mukden on September 18th, 1931, working through a
few trusted subordinates. The bombing caused minimal damage, but served as the pretext for
the Kwantung Army to implement its emergency plan of operations, which began with the
occupation of the city of Mukden.223 Yet Tokyo was not committed to a wider operation. Still in
the dark, the civilian government and Imperial General Headquarters approved the Kwantung
Armys defensive action, but issued orders not to widen the conflict. Even General Honjo,
commander of the Kwantung Army, was not in on the plot, though he rapidly realized what his
staff had done and agonized through the night. The moment of crisis offered great opportunity -
few knew the crisis to be manufactured - but should success be founded on such dishonor?

At this stage, the Mukden incident was, like the 1928 incident, just a provocation by a small cell
of mid-ranking radicals, supported by a flex net of like-minded individuals in Tokyo. But
General Honjo and the officers of his staff agreed to seize the opportunity provided by the
conspirators, and worked to bring allies in Japan into the plot. They sought the good offices of
Major-General Tatekawa, a sympathetic envoy from Tokyo. By 2 A.M. on the 20th, all the staff
officers had agreed that Tatekawa should be told, You have been writing about these matters of
settling the Manchurian troubles. Whether good or bad, now is the best time to carry it out -
all or nothing. It is a fait accompli.224 Honjo ordered deep thrusts into Manchuria, in violation

219
Ibid., p. 164
220
Ibid., p. 165
221
Ibid., p. 162
222
Ibid., p. 165
223
Japanese Political History, op. cit., p. 156
224
Nomonhan, Alvin D. Coox, Stanford University Press, 1985, p. 34

58
of Tokyos orders, and secured reinforcements - likewise unapproved - from the army in Korea.
Thereafter the Kwantung Army ignored every directive from the Tokyo headquarters.225

In any case, the ground in Tokyo had been prepared. Even before the Manchurian Incident, the
mass media had begun to picture China as an enemy. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the
media began to agitate for victory.226 The rapid advances of the Kwantung Army won wide
acclaim across the political spectrum; the defensive image of the conflict was reinforced by
forged Chinese documents laying out the plan for sabotage and casting it as a prelude to a
broader attack on Japan. The few opponents of the war were labeled as un-Japanese by the
government and by war supporters and became isolated from the great majority.227 The civilian
government and military hierarchy were forced to legitimize and praise the actions of the army in
Manchuria, as well as cover up the true nature of the provocation.

The most profound results of the Mukden incident transpired not in Manchuria but in Japan: the
invasion advanced the militarist faction in political life, setting the stage for repeated grasps at
power in the coming years. The incident was bracketed by attempted coups detat in March and
October 1931 by the Sakurakai secret society, followed by the assassination of the Prime
Minister in May 1932 by a military faction, another abortive plot in 1934 by officers at the
military academy, culminating in the February 26 conspiracy of 1936, killing or attempting to
kill many in the civilian leadership and briefly occupying much of Tokyo. Mukden also poisoned
Japans relations with the West and broke the forces of liberal internationalism in the
government, while triggering a major growth in military expenditure and industry that revived
the economy and set a course for further wars. At the very least, the failure of key groups to
reject the militarys policies in Manchuria allowed an escalation and extension of Japanese
military gains that was not to be taken for granted at the beginning of the Manchurian crisis. Less
tangibly, the events of 1931-1933 had a critical effect on the shape and strength of both
nationalism and militarism in Japan... generating a flood of rhetoric about the nation.228 More
ambitiously, it could be argued that Not only did the Manchurian Incident usher in the so-called
fifteen years of war (the Manchurian Incident, the China War, and the Pacific War); it also
constituted Japans open defiance of the Versailles-Washington world order and eventually led to
the conflagration of the Second World War.229

The events at Mukden were a stunning example of how a small group of unobtrusive, well-
placed, mid-ranking personnel could deliberately shift national policy and world history on vast
scale. This conspiracy was quite the opposite of the common stereotype about the grand over-
arching conspiracy; the vision and action of a miniscule vanguard dragged first the Kwantung
Army, then the military, and finally the government and the country along with them. Their plan,
like the Ergenekon and Gladio plots (except much more effective) involved a small number of
radicals with connections higher up creating a crisis that would trigger existing emergency plans,
strategic objectives, and political dispositions at successively higher levels of decision.

225
From Mukden to Pearl Harbor, Hata Ikuhiko, in Japan Examined, Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy (eds.),
University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p. 310
226
The 1930s: A Logical Outcome of Meiji Policy, Kisaka Junichiro, in Japan Examined, op. cit., p. 247
227
Ibid.
228
The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, Sandra Wilson, Routledge, 2002, p. 4
229
The 1930s, op. cit.

59
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, set up by the Allies after the end of World
War 2 to try Japanese war criminals, preferred to see a grand conspiracy. In addition to charges
against thousands of Japanese officers and politicians for crimes against humanity, 28 were
indicted for participation as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy... The object of such plan or conspiracy was that
Japan should secure the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of
the Pacific and Indian Oceans through undeclared wars of aggression.230 According to the
Tribunal, the conspiracy, spanning the years 1928 to 1945, worked to increase the influence and
control of the military and naval groups over Japanese government officials and agencies and
psychologically prepare Japanese public opinion for aggressive warfare.231 The conspiracy
involved a vigorous campaign of incitement to expansion... A large number of Societies, some
secret, was also formed both in the Army and Navy and among civilians, with similar objects.
Opposition to this policy was also crushed by assassinations of leading politicians who were not
considered sufficiently friendly to it, and by fear and threats of such assassinations.232

In their final judgement, the Tribunal took particular delight in referencing the 28 defendants
plans for a New World Order as evidence of a master conspiracy. They cited one defendants
1940 assertion that the Mukden incident might well be called the opening battle for the
construction of a new world order; and that the achievement of that order was incompatible
with any compromise with Great Britain and the United States. The China War he described as
a grand revelation of national polity... The crisis of the European War would, he said, be turned
into a golden opportunity, enabling Japan to lead the world to a new world order.233 They
turned to another leaders remark in the same year regarding the alliance with Germany and Italy
that historians of the future generations would probably refer to the Pact as the Treaty of the
New World Order, as it not only represented a racial feud between the Anglo-Saxon and the
Teuton and between the yellow and white races, but it included a positive program to overthrow
the status quo and prescribe the New World.234 A third had written that one could not fail to be
deeply stirred by the fact that the Pact had been concluded and that Japan's objective of founding
a New World Order had been made clear, but that the nation with unswerving resolution should
make preparations for the attainment of that objective without delay.235 The Tribunal also took
note of the 1933 claim by a fourth defendant that The true spirit of the Japanese race lay in
finding order amid chaos, and in realising an ideal world, a paradise in East Asia... If the zeal
which the Mukdan Incident had engendered was sustained, the new order would be achieved. A
revival of the national spirit would resolve the international difficulties which beset Japan; for
the issue of wars depended ultimately upon the spiritual power of the people.236

230
Indictment, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, p. 8 http://werle.rewi.hu-
berlin.de/tokyo.anklageschrift.pdf
231
Ibid., p. 7
232
Ibid., p. 26
233
Judgement of 4 November 1948, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, p. 114 http://werle.rewi.hu-
berlin.de/tokio.pdf
234
Ibid., p. 423
235
Ibid., p. 424
236
Ibid., p. 76

60
However, the Tribunals New World Order interpretation of Japanese history came in for
considerable criticism. French justice Henri Bernard wrote a dissent to the Tribunals judgement,
arguing that No direct proof was furnished concerning the formation among individuals known,
on a known date, at a specified point, of a plot, the object of which was to assure Japan the
domination, unaccepted by its inhabitants, of some part of the world. The only thing proved is
the existence among certain influential classes of the Japanese nation of the desire to seat at all
costs the domination of Japan upon other parts of East Asia.237 Indian justice Radhabinod Pal,
who argued that all of the accused should be found not guilty as the Tribunal amounted to
victors justice, objected to the charge of conspiracy, writing that The fact to be proved is a
conspiracy of an enormous magnitude... The materials presented relate to so many plots,
conspiracies, and sinister incidents that our minds may easily be preoccupied by a tendency to
believe in the inter-relation between these several plots and the ultimate master-plot. As I have
already observed, we cannot entertain our mind with this pleasure, which it is apt to take in
readily adapting circumstances to one another. We must avoid all eagerness to accept as real
anything that may lie in the direction of our unconscious wishes.238 Marius Jansen, a leading
historian of modern Japan, writes that The prosecution charged defendants with carrying out a
single, consistent plan of aggression that began in 1931, but neither the documentary basis nor
the nature of Japanese politics, in which the prosecutors were neophytes, supported this.239

Japans road to war was clearly paved with countless aspects of conspiratorial activity, including
false-flag operations, militaristic factionalism, assassinations, secret societies, grandiose visions
of world order, and attempted coups detat. But the Tribunal seems to have erred by weaving this
all into a legally and politically convenient but historically unsound story of a monolithic
geopolitical master plot driving two decades of Japanese history, which masked the divisions,
spontaneity, and fluidity that characterized much of this action, as well as the global factors and
internal socioeconomic changes that also influenced Japans course. Conspiracies are a fact of
politics, but the charge of conspiracy is susceptible to facile legal, political, and historical use.

237
Dissenting Judgement, Henri Bernard, quoted in Politics, Trials, and Errors, Baron Maurice Hankey, The
Lawbook Exchange, 2002, p. 87 - 88
238
Dissentient Judgement, Radhabinod Pal, Kokusho-Kankokai Inc., 1999, p. 193 www.sdh-
fact.com/CL02_1/65_S4.pdf
239
The Making of Modern Japan, Marius B. Jansen, Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 673

61
 NETWORKS

Enron in 2001, the worlds largest energy trader, with over 20,000 employees, $60 billion market
value, and $100 billion revenue, was seen as one of Americas most innovative and successful
companies. The full extent of Enrons innovative methods would be revealed later that same year
when the company filed for bankruptcy as massive liabilities concealed by highly creative
accounting methods were revealed. A number of executives were jailed on charges including
fraud, money laundering, insider trading, and conspiracy.

How can we understand this scandal? Was this an Enron conspiracy, a corporate plot from top
to bottom? Or was something different going on here? A clue lies in Enrons corporate structure,
which epitomizes a network form of organization on various dimensions.240 Enron was highly
decentralized, with a number of compartmentalized business units; externally Enron had links
with a huge number of organizations, which consisted of subsidiaries... as well as partnerships
and alliances.241 In addition, Enron was surrounded by a huge network of special purpose
entities (SPE), many of which were accounting or legal artifacts, understood only by a limited
number of people; these SPEs were used to hide Enrons losses off the books.242 Enrons
financial network was also extensive, diverse, complicated, and often dependent on inside
information based on personal relationships. The result was that information regarding the big
picture was limited to a network of crucial individuals.

An examination of the Enron conspiracy makes it clear that this was less a plot by a
corporation than the product of networks that included many top Enron executives, who reaped
huge bonuses, but crucially, extended far beyond the corporation itself. Enrons relationship with
its auditor, Arthur Anderson, was complex and lucrative, a major portion of Andersons Houston
office revenue. Arthur Anderson employees facilitated Enrons creative accountancy schemes
on the consultancy side (bringing it $27 million revenue in 2000), and then covered it up on the
audit side ($25 million), putting its stamp of approval on Enrons accounts and shredding the
documents when the company collapsed.243 Enrons financial relationships showed similar
dynamics:

while the security firms (J.P. Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and others) were trading Enrons
stocks through their brokerage divisions, their analysts were involved in evaluating the companys
performance, and their managers, sometimes having personally invested in Enron, provided consultation
advice to its executives. These multiple, often conflicting, links generated a complex web of inconsistent
relationships... What was often portrayed as a lender-borrower relationship was, indeed, a complicated link
that forced Enron to meet Wall Street expectations, on the one hand, and turned the banks into promotional
agents and propaganda mouthpieces of Enron, on the other.244

240
Managing Network Organizations in the Knowledge Economy, Hamid R. Ekbia, in Managing in the
Information Economy, Uday Apte and Uday Karmarkar (eds)., Springer Science, 2007, p. 124
241
Ibid.
242
Ibid.
243
Where Were the Gatekeepers?, Barry J. Cooper, in Ethics and Auditing, Tom Campbell and Keith Houghton
(eds.), ANU E Press, 2005, p. 167
244
Managing Network Organizations, op. cit., pp. 124 - 125

62
Furthermore, Enron had established a strong web of political influence in all branches of the
government as well as the media, mainly aimed at deregulating the energy market, spreading
millions of dollars among Republicans and Democrats in the decade before its collapse.245 That
said, while top Enron executives, outside consultants and auditors, bankers, and politicians made
out like bandits, the average Enron employee committed no crime and got nothing more out of
the affair than a pink slip.

To understand cases such as Enron, it is no longer sufficient to look at corporations as monoliths

in a void; rather, analysis must focus on the extended network that includes, among others, the
partnerships, banks, brokerage firms, auditors, and government agencies.246 It should be added
that in these other parties, too, we are not dealing with the entities as a whole, but rather,
departments and individuals within them. In a network enterprise, as sociologist Manuel Castells
writes, the actual operating unit becomes the business project, enacted by a network, rather
than individual companies or formal groupings of companies.247 Castells foresaw that as the
process of globalization progresses, organizational forms evolve from multinational enterprises
to international networks, actually bypassing the so-called transnationals that belong more to
the world of mythical representation.248 This is true for corrupt endeavors as much as legitimate
ones.

In her book Shadow Elite, Janine Wedel describes the growing influence of unaccountable,
obscure flex nets of well-placed, chameleonic players; their operations swirl in and above the
institutions for which they supposedly work state, corporate, international, or other.249 In the
past, it was possible to determine with relative ease who someone represented and what they did,
and it was reasonable to identify the actions of individuals with the organizations in which they
were embedded; today,

members of flex nets wield influence by forging coincidences of interest among an array of roles across
organizations, whose boundaries and purposes often blend. Emergent forms of governing, power, and
influence thus play out not in formal organizations or among stable elites, but in social networks that
operate within and among organizations at the nexus of official and private power. The players in this
system are less stable, less visible, and more global in reach than their forebearsWhile many activities of
flexions, and certainly their views, are public, the full array of their machinations is almost always difficult
to detect.250

After any major crime, the first question on everyones lips is usually, who did it?

Who did it? is a question that lends itself to a simple answer; it asks for a single identity, a
single motive, a single hierarchical structure of decision and execution: X did it. Whether
ones suspicions are guided more by the official line or the conspiratorial angle, one wants much
the same thing: a simple answer, a name, an address, a target.

245
Ibid., p. 138
246
Ibid., p. 121
247
The Rise of the Network Society, Manuel Castells, Blackwell Publishing, 2010, p. 177
248
Ibid., p. 208
249
Shadow Elite, Janine R. Wedel, Basic Books, 2009, p. 12
250
Ibid., p. 20

63
Yet the agile networks - of which Gladio, Ergenekon, and the Japanese militarists were merely a
foreshadowing - best placed to turn lumbering governments and corporations into marionettes,
are often invisible to the public. They are not legally incorporated, with a logo and a website; no-
one officially works for them, their members having important day jobs in all kinds of
organizations; those involved will deny the entitys existence, calling it an obnoxious conspiracy
theory; there is little on which to base news reports or academic studies; it may be almost
impossible to prove who is a member and who isnt (there doesnt even need to be a formal
membership). Only if they are sloppy will they put their plans in writing or make indiscreet
comments on the phone. Nothing less than the most determined investigation will reveal the
connections that constitute a power distinct from, but often permeating, more readily-identifiable
organizations.

Because such entities are relatively difficult to identify and characterize, it is much more
convenient to blame an eminently identifiable, monolithic, hierarchical organization. Most of us
probably remember Enron as a corrupt company rather than a company hijacked by a far more
extensive corrupt network. Governments and media outlets readily blame Al Qaeda for all kinds
of violence by unrelated or distantly-related networks precisely because Al Qaeda, as a once-real
cadre organization with declared identity, leadership, and purpose, not to mention a good line in
corny propaganda videos, is one of the few identifiable and convenient addresses for terrorist
activity. In the same manner, conspiracy theorists often blame the government, the CIA, Israel,
and so on, seeking some readily recognizable entity to hold responsible.

In contrast to the primitive myths dominating media and government discourse, counter-
terrorism specialists quickly grasped the fact that terrorism was best understood by thinking in
terms of networks. Bringing the concept of networks into play is really to ask for greater
precision in determining how things work and how things happen, a precision to be achieved by
getting away from impersonal corporate abstractions and moving towards an understanding of
individuals, their motivating interests and ideologies, their relationships, and their environment.
Whereas the hierarchical organization paradigm sees a terrorist attack as the decision of some
one well-known party and executed through the ranks, the network paradigm sees it as a more
organic phenomenon catalyzed by a spark amid a primordial soup of propitious ingredients. Yet
while counter-terrorism specialists talk of networks, they adopt in public a strangely limited view
of the concept by confining their hunt to the jihadist milieu; perhaps the most important
characteristic of social networks is the way in which they can bridge completely different
milieux, even through just a single node.

Thinking in terms of networks should encourage a critical distance from notions of monolithic
corporate entities. Not everything that is done in and around organizations is policy. Informal
networks may help to reduce or eliminate paper trails. Lengthy bureaucratic processes may be
skipped. The uncooperative boss may be circumvented by appealing to his deputy, gatekeeper, or
superior. The unconventional proposal can be presented only to those willing to participate,
rather than circulated for broad approval. Important links can be made on a purely informal,
deniable basis. A network may have many segments, connected by many different kinds of
relationship, based on ideology, business, blackmail, friendship; different segments of the
network may be very differently structured. The network may have a flexible hierarchy, or even
at a certain level be a group of equals. Its value may be more distributed among its members,

64
rendering it invulnerable to decapitation. The glue holding it together may be as powerful and
indestructible as an idea. Large bureaucracies are often risk-averse, unimaginative, and change
resistant; transformation, whether legitimate or corrupt, is often spearheaded by smaller, informal
ginger groups.

But ginger groups or flex nets are themselves perhaps too broad a level of analysis when
dealing with the most dramatic crimes. Particularly when we are looking at a very risky, very
unconventional, very complex, and potentially very high payoff project those responsible may
well be an ad-hoc network formed precisely to pull off that particular job. It is not a particular
instance of ongoing activity. Think not only of a large-scale terror attack, but of a spectacular
bank heist.

The majority of terrorist attacks and bank robberies are conducted by individuals and small
networks, require little skill, planning, and logistical support, and achieve limited results. Call
them motive-driven crimes. Someone or some little group are so intensely motivated (by
vengeance, despair, greed...) that they are willing to take the risks and cross the moral boundaries
involved in putting a bomb in a cafe or sticking up a bank teller, as the case may be. The means
are nothing special and the opportunity is available to anyone.

A step up from this, we find what might be called means-driven crimes. In this class we might
find rings of professional criminals and well-trained, well-equipped terrorists (of whatever
stripe). Their ability to pull off operations depends on specialized skills, tools, and effective
organization. Such groups have pulled off significant robberies and significant attacks. They do
so, and then they continue to do so - it is a vocation.

However, the largest and most spectacular bank robberies have tended to involve quite different
dynamics. The biggest heists in America (the $18.9 million Dunbar robbery, the $18.8 million
Loomis Fargo robbery, the $17.3 million robbery also of Loomis Fargo, all in 1997, and before
that the previous record holder, the $5 million+ 1978 Lufthansa heist) were inside jobs. In each
case someone on the inside of the security mechanisms recognized an opportunity - a flaw in the
security protocol that could be exploited. They usually assembled a network of co-conspirators to
pull off the operation - or, provided the information to someone who could. Here, the means
were nothing special, and much of the population has the motive of getting rich. These are
opportunity-driven crimes. Often those responsible do not even have prior criminal records.
Once the heist has been pulled off, no-one is planning to strike again - rather, a comfortable
retirement in a South American country is traditional.

To conclude, a simple example: Sues birthday. Sues friends are sitting together at lunch one
day. Her boyfriend Joe mentions that Sues birthday is next week. Bill suggests getting a card
and present. Sarah suggests cake too. Mort suggests it should be a surprise. Sarah collects cash
from Joe, Bill, and Mort. Sarah gives cash to Sues best friend Elise, who knows exactly what
Sue wants, to get the present, and gets the card and cake herself. Elise makes a little speech at the
party and gives Sue her present.

Who orchestrated this secret operation? Sue might think it was Elise, who gave her the present
and made the speech (or alternatively she is skeptical because Elise is usually forgetful, and

65
entertains a conspiracy theory that her always-thoughtful boyfriend Joe masterminded it all
behind the scenes). But in reality, the background to the emergence of the party was a complex
process in which a number of players were indispensable to the final outcome. The network is
not a highly structured organization. It has no formal standing. To some extent, it is just a
construct we might use to explain what happened. They did not need to incorporate as Sues
Birthday Agency. No one was the boss of the network. The network has no continuing life as
such after the event. But, for a brief time, the different informational resources (Joe and Elise),
financial resources (all), analytical resources (Bill, Sarah, and Mort), and operational resources
(Sarah and Elise) of the concerned parties all contribute to the occurrence of the event. The
network does not assume a unity of motive or purpose. The network may have resulted from a
diversity of motives: Elise is hoping for forgiveness after bickering with Sue; Joe wants to cheer
Sue up after her cat died; Sarah is just thinking about the cake. The birthday network also
illustrates how ideas can be powerful network catalysts. All Joe had to do was mention that it
was Sues birthday, and, from his point of view, the rest took care of itself.

66
 OPERATION NORTHWOODS

To many, the idea of a false-flag attack, and particularly the idea that such a maneuver could be
perpetrated against - or even perpetrated by - Americans, will remain a fringe science-fiction
scenario. A document declassified in 1998 tells a very different story.

The document, detailing the proposed Operation Northwoods, was drafted by the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1962, signed by JCS Chairman General Lyman Lemnitzer, and submitted to
Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara for approval. The document begins by stating the
operations purpose: to provide pretexts which would provide justification for US military
intervention in Cuba; the plan aims to place the United States in the apparent position of
suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to
develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the the Western hemisphere.251 The
plan was to be carefully compartmentalized, specifically recommended to be kept secret from
ordinary military commanders and allied countries. It envisioned a logical build-up of incidents
to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
create the necessary impression.252 In short, the plan outlined options for creating false-flag
provocations to prepare the American public and the world for military action against Cuba. The
alert reader may remember that Herman Kahn had warned of such a possibility that very year.

Among the options outlined:

We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba;

Conduct funerals for mock-victims;

Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation;

We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other
Florida cities and even in Washington;

We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated);

It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban

aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United
States... The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday... An
aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil
registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a
designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would
be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The
actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone... From the rendezvous point the
passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to... Eglin AFB where arrangements will have
been made to evacuate the passengers. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly

251
Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 13, 1962, pp. 1, 5
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
252
Ibid., pp. 4-5

67
 the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the
international distress frequency a MAY DAY message stating he is under attack by
Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft
which will be triggered by radio signal.253

Firstly, Northwoods demonstrates that false-flag planning is not unknown even to the highest
levels of the US defense establishment. A significant part of the government was willing to pull
off a massive fraud on the public and the world in order to start a war. These documents allow us
to ask all those who call conspiracy theories paranoid, irrational, fantastic, absurd, crazy,
radical, offensive, and so on, to the extent of being a serious risk that has to be countered
with cognitive infiltration a pointed question. If Operation Northwoods had gone through - and
considering that unlike other zany anti-Castro plans the proposal was actually signed by the head
of the Joint Chiefs and sent to the Secretary of Defense for action on a short timetable, the
possibility is not remote - would they not now be using the same epithets and strategies against
anyone who questioned the official story of the Cuban attacks? Perhaps most of these epithets
should be reserved for those who would come up with a plan like Northwoods - though naturally
some must be left over for those congenitally unable to recognize the possibility of such a false-
flag conspiracy.

Secondly - a point insufficiently noted by conspiracy theorists - the Northwoods proposal did not
call for killing Americans. The plan involved creating the illusion that large numbers of
Americans had been killed, not actually killing them. The drone aircraft deception scenario,
complete with substitute planes and fake victims under college students on vacation aliases that
could stand up to scrutiny, was enormously complicated - it would have been far easier just to
shoot down a plane full of Americans. The very people who wanted to deceive the public to start
a war, went to great lengths in their plan to avoid actually killing Americans. The harm to life
and limb proposed was to Cuban refugees and dissidents. The objective was the image, not the
reality of terror. The Northwoods plans actually support the widespread intuition that however
deep the governments flaws may be, and however much influential groups in it may be willing
to engage in massive deception for the sake of aggressive war, there is no mainstream tendency
in the US government and military hierarchy towards the mass-murder of its own people as a
matter of policy.

Thirdly, the fate of the Northwoods plan shows the inherent limitations of attempting to pull off
such a plot in a government context. The proposal went, like any other, up the bureaucratic
hierarchy, apparently getting at least as far as the addressee, Secretary of Defense MacNamara. It
was evidently rejected. Lemnitzer was denied another term as JCS chairman and transferred from
his post within months - strongly suggesting that Kennedy and MacNamara wanted nothing to do
with such a project. Despite considerable pressure and enthusiasm from many parts of the
defense, intelligence, and foreign policy establishments for military action against Cuba, the
military and political hierarchy got in the way. The plan also left a very nasty paper trail - hard to
avoid in bureaucratic policymaking.

Northwoods furthermore draws our attention to a similar plan developed the following year: a
false-flag operation against a Latin American ally, likewise to justify an invasion of Cuba. This
253
Ibid., pp. 8-10

68
sheds further light on the difficulty of orchestrating false-flag plots from within the US
government. In this case, it was noted that

Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system
in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be
made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited
only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units
for any aspect of the contrived situation.254

Organizational conspirators could not rely on the most powerful force under their command - the
US military - to support and keep secret their false-flag designs, even ones that did not involve
killing Americans. If the plans involved the mass killing of Americans, it seems likely that the
reliability of even the most highly trusted covert personnel would be in serious doubt.

The Northwoods plans were one amongst many proposals considered under the framework of
Operation Mongoose, a joint CIA - Pentagon program of covert action against Cuba. One plan
involved creating an imaginary Cuban leader to serve as a focal point for resistance directed
against Castro while allowing the US to control future selections of leaders or groups and
influence the ideologies of the resistance.255 The leaders reputation would be built over time;
Specific acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or members of his group.
Before long, all unexplained incidents and actions for which credit has not been seized by some
other exile group would automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. A declassified memo
from Brigadier General William Craig, the head of the Pentagon side of the operation, gave a list
of 12 other options to provoke, harrass, or disrupt Cuba; Option 7, Operation DIRTY
TRICK, aimed to provide irrevocable proof, should John Glenns attempt to become the first
American in space fail, that the fault lies with the Communists.256 Note: the plan was not to
kill John Glenn. Option 10, Operation BINGO, involved: (1) Simulated attack on
Guantanamo. (2) Word flashed to the President. (3) President orders counterattack...257 Probably
the best plan, however, was Option 11, Operation GOOD TIMES, which aimed to Prepare a
desired photograph, such as an obese Castro with two beauties in any situation desired,
ostensibly within a room in the Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table brimming over
with the most delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as
My ration is different.258 The photograph would then be distributed by air-drops throughout
the Cuban countryside. This, the proposal growled, should put even a Commie Dictator in the
proper perspective with the underprivileged masses.259

The Northwoods documents and related proposals show a willingness by powerful people in the
US government to deceive the public and the world in order to achieve a major political
objective. They support the thesis that the US government may have concealed, or not have gone
out of its way to uncover, fundamental truths about 9/11. They support the plausibility of the
254
Body of Secrets, James Bamford, Doubleday, 2001, p. 89
255
Future Cuban Leadership, Lt. Col. James K. Patchell, May 13, 1963, in Operation Mongoose: The Psyop
Papers, Jon Elliston (ed.), www.parascope.com/ds/articles/mongoosePSYOP.htm
256
Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass, or Disrupt Cuba, Brig. Gen. William Craig, February 2, 1962, in
Operation Mongoose, op. cit.
257
Ibid.
258
Ibid.
259
Ibid.

69
false-flag concept in relation to 9/11. They do not support the thesis that the US government and
military would have orchestrated the murder of thousands of their own people.

70
 PEARL HARBOR

2001 was an auspicious year for transformation in the West. A new administration had come to
power in Washington with radical ideas and ambitious plans, obscured by a folksy new President
and his rhetoric about humility and small government.

The new agendas were outlined in a number of documents drawn up during the preceding years
by many of those who would fill the top posts in the new Bush administration. Openly
expressing their views through think-tanks and discussion groups, these intellectuals and
policymakers had become deeply disillusioned with what they saw as the Clinton
administrations failure to seize the historical moment for American leadership after the end of
the Cold War. Some on the Democratic side of the fence were in agreement. But even after the
Bush administration took office, the new agendas were slow to translate into major change; the
new administration was as bogged down as its predecessor in the treacle of democratic politics.

These documents outlining the new agendas have been understood by many conspiracy theorists
to establish the complicity of their authors in 9/11. These allegations draw on the documents
eerie foresight, and the way in which 9/11 eased the implementation of these previously
improbable plans, to establish motive on the part of the authors. The documents certainly do
point to potential motives, but while it is not completely impossible that the conspirators decided
to tell all about their plot before its execution, this seems a trope more suited to mediocre Bond
villains rather than serious conspirators. However, these documents can be used to establish a
more modest, but more plausible proposition: namely, that (in the context of means, motive,
and opportunity to establish the plausibility of a conspiracy) there was a broad opportunity for
an ambitious 9/11 conspiracy, a situation understood by sensitive political thinkers.

There is no point in going to all the trouble and risk of organizing a conspiracy if the outcome is
basically unknowable. For a conspiracy to be plausible, and for any motive to stick, conspirators
have to have a fairly good idea of what the consequences of their actions are going to be. And for
the conspiracy to be worthwhile, those consequences have to be fairly massive. What these
documents establish is that it was clear before 9/11 exactly what America would do if confronted
with a 9/11-type event - namely, use the crisis as an opportunity to implement specified far-
reaching policy changes with impact on a global scale. As for the motive, the documents
certainly highlight many plausible motives, but far from being motives limited to the authors, or
to America, they are motives with a potentially global appeal.

One key document was the 2000 report Rebuilding Americas Defenses of the Project for the
New American Century, a think tank whose signatories included, among many other future Bush
appointees, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle. This report
outlined a number of revolutionary goals. Military expenditure was to be dramatically increased
(the report suggested the military was underfunded by up to $100 billion annually, a colossal
increase to ask for in pre-9/11 days, after years of flat budgets).260 The military was to be
transformed, with major shifts to take advantage of the revolution in military affairs, deploy

260
Rebuilding Americas Defenses, Project for the New American Century, 2000, p. 69, p. 75
www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf

71
global missile defenses, and to control the new international commons of space and
cyberspace.261 Americas presence in the Persian Gulf was to be increased; While the
unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial
American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein -
which PNAC had already declared its policy to overthrow.262263

Another such document was the 1996 paper A Clean Break by future appointees such as
Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and Meyrav Wurmser. This paper, essentially a neoconservative
manifesto for the Middle East, outlined a strategy for reshaping Israels strategic environment
(or, as the reports own practically biblical subtitle put it, a new strategy for securing the
realm). Saddam Hussein was to be removed from power, and efforts were to be made to
redefine Iraq.264 Further efforts were to be made along the lines of weakening, containing,
and even rolling back Syria, including striking Syrian military targets in Lebanon, and should
that prove insufficient, striking at select targets in Syria proper; the peace process with the
Palestinians was to be ditched, and alternatives to Arafats base of power were to be sought.265

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor and influential Democratic geostrategist,
also proposed an interventionist program, in more general terms. His 1997 book The Grand
Chessboard outlined the need for an integrated, comprehensive, and long-term geostrategy for
all of Eurasia.266 The stakes in Brzezinskis game were high. Two paths beckoned: one that ran,
through a phase of costly interventionism, towards a system of global governance, and another
that led to global anarchy.267 Worse, time was running out; America faced a narrow window
of historical opportunity.268 The real question was whether America might become the first
superpower unable or unwilling to wield its power.269 After all, A genuinely populist
democracy has never before attained international supremacy.270 This was because Democracy
is inimical to imperial mobilization.271 On the same lines: The pursuit of power and especially
the economic costs and human sacrifice that the exercise of such power often requires are not
generally congenial to democratic instincts; Brzezinskis chief concern was that America might
as a result become an impotent global power.272

Moreover, these documents demonstrated a clear awareness of the kind of scenario that would
allow their recommendations quickly to be translated into policy. The most famous line is from
the Project for the New American Century report, noting that the process of transformation,
even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and

261
Ibid., p. v
262
Ibid., p. 14
263
Letter to President Clinton on Iraq, Project for the New American Century, 1998
www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
264
A Clean Break, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1996 www.iasps.org/strat1.htm
265
Ibid.
266
The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Basic Books, 1998, p. 194
267
Ibid., p. 30
268
Ibid., p. 213
269
Ibid., p. 210
270
Ibid.
271
Ibid., p. 36
272
Ibid., p. 210

72
catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor.273 Michael Ledeen, a leading neoconservative
ideologist, noted in his 1999 book Machiavelli on Modern Leadership that we can always get
lucky. Stunning events from outside can providentially awaken the enterprise from its growing
torpor, and demonstrate the need for renewal, as the devastating Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
in 1941 effectively aroused the United States from its soothing dreams of permanent
neutrality.274 Brzezinski, too, noted the kind of scenario that would override typical democratic
constraints: the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in
conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the publics sense of domestic well-being275; as
America becomes an increasingly multicultural society, it may find it more difficult to fashion a
consensus on foreign policy issues, except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely
perceived direct external threat276; The public supported Americas engagement in World War
II largely because of the shock effect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.277

Even our Jester, Lyndon LaRouche, offered a similar analysis, from his rather different
perspective. In 2000, the Pearl Harbor effect was a recurrent theme in his writings. In a section
entitled The Role of a Great, Sudden Shock he suggested that the only hope for civilization is
a great shock, a shock which shatters confidence in what are presently still the prevailing cultural
and scientific norms of behavior among those of ages below fifty-five. In modern U.S. history,
the sudden popular reaction to news of Japans bombing of Pearl Harbor, qualifies as a shock of
the type needed today.278 At this point, LaRouche expected the shock to take the form of a
financial crash, although, as we have seen, his views would take a darker turn when the Bush
administration came to office. Elsewhere, also in 2000, he wrote: On Dec. 7, 1941, the day the
Pearl Harbor bombing occurred, the American people underwent, before my very eyes, a
fundamental transformation...We are in such a period ahead right now. In which all things that
seem secure, in terms of the power of certain bodies of opinion, of certain ideas, of certain mass-
media values, of certain entertainment values; suddenly, in a moment, a shock will be
administered...279

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, killing almost 2500 Americans and wrecking
much of the Pacific Fleet, represented, until 9/11, the most dramatic moment of sudden change in
American society. The shock of Pearl Harbor catalyzed a change from peace to war, from
isolationism to global mobilization, from inward preoccupation to national self-sacrifice. And for
many thinkers and ideologists, Pearl Harbor symbolized the kind of event that could transform
American policy and society again. The concept of a new Pearl Harbor pops up as early as
1954, in the form of loose talk on the part of General Franz Halder, chief of staff of the German
Army between 1938 and 1942, and Hans Speier, a German migr to the United States, adviser
on Germany to US intelligence and head of social science research at RAND. According to
Speier, Halder remarked that

273
Rebuilding Americas Defenses, p. 51
274
Machiavelli on Modern Leadership, Michael A. Ledeen, St. Martins Press, 1999, p. 116
275
Grand Chessboard, p. 36
276
Ibid., p. 211
277
Ibid., p. 25
278
On the Subject of Strategic Method, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive Intelligence Review, June 2, 2000
www.larouchepub.com/lar/2000/lar_strategic_method_2722.html
279
The Failure of Globalization and the Need for a New Bretton Woods, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., Executive
Intelligence Review, May 26, 2000 www.larouchepub.com/lar/2000/2721_dominican.html

73
 One cannot throw A-bombs because of a little incident. He considered this fact one of the basic dilemmas
of American foreign and military policy. Nor would the American people, in his opinion, back such
decisions... he did not think any president could simply push the button. Then he added, with a slight
smile, Unless he can do it again as it was done at Pearl Harbor. ...I said that an atomic Pearl Harbor
might not be the beginning of a war but its end. Halder replied that theoretically it might not be necessary
to invite an atomic attack upon the United States: a lesser incident might suffice as a new Pearl Harbor. It
seemed to me that we both were walking on very thin ice at this point... I made a casual remark to the effect
that one should neither overestimate the skill of politicians nor underestimate the moral scruples of
American statesmen. The subject was then dropped.280

Documentary evidence of pre-9/11 strategic thinking establishes some key facts: (1) The
response to 9/11 was entirely predictable: not only the obvious offensive against the perceived
culprits and heightened domestic security, but the implementation of very well specified
strategies. By 2001, these transformational agendas were on the shelf in the new Bush
administration. (2) The kind of event that would trigger the implementation of these strategies
and wishlists was well understood in advance - a new Pearl Harbor that would present a
massive and widely perceived external threat, overriding democratic paralysis. (3) None of this
was a secret, if you knew where to look - although it had not entered public consciousness.

A keen observer of US foreign policy elites, even from afar, could easily have put the pieces
together: if this happens, they do that. There was an immense, unique, and - to the right mind -
obvious opportunity in 2001 radically to alter the course of US policy, the mindsets of the
people, and the future of large swathes of the world. With the explosive agendas of the Bush
administration and the neoconservatives in place, potentially anyone aware of the state of play
could light the match and change the world. It should not be assumed that the ideologies and
motives of the perpetrators would have been identical with the ideologies and motives of those in
the government whose views and mindsets made a historical discontinuity possible. An
opportunity is an opportunity.

In 1170, it seemed that tensions between the King of England, Henry II, and the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Thomas Becket, over the respective powers of the crown and the church, might
finally be eased. After six years of estrangement and exile in France, Becket was received by the
King, his old friend, and returned to his post in Canterbury. But within months, the King was
informed that Becket had excommunicated more of the Kings allies. From his sickbed, the King
was heard to shout (according to legend) will no one rid me of this turbulent priest! - or,
according to a contemporary chronicler, What miserable drones and traitors have I nourished
and promoted in my household, who let their lord be treated with such shameful contempt by a
low-born cleric!281 There was nothing to indicate that the Kings shout was anything other than
a cry of fevered frustration. The King made no plans to have his friend Becket killed, but rather
sent envoys to reason with him.

Yet the Kings cry was overheard, and four knights decided to act. These four secret
conspirators seem to have acted within, or on the fringe of, an official mission sent to confront

280
From the Ashes of Disgrace, Hans Speier, University of Massachusetts Press, 1981, p. 265
281
Thomas Becket, Frank Barlow, University of California Press, 1990, p. 235

74
and restrain the archbishop.282 Arriving first, the four knights waylaid Becket in Canterbury
Cathedral and hacked him to death. By all accounts King Henry was greatly grieved at the
murder, and although even at the time few, if any, believed that Henry had given orders to
anyone for the killing, he had set in motion operations which could easily produce that result.283

282
Ibid., p. 236
283
Ibid., p. 237

75
 QAEDA

There are elements on the fringes of political Islam that feed violence across the Islamic world -
violence that targets civilians and sometimes spills over to other parts of the globe. They have
spurred xenophobia, spread fear, and shed innocent blood. The Western policy matrix has done
much to facilitate the growth of this fringe zealotry and its brutal violence. Rather than
challenging Saudi Arabia, the chief source of fundamentalist indoctrination and finance, the
Bush administration chose as enemies two countries hostile to fundamentalism, Iraq and Syria,
as well as a third country, Iran, with a religious orientation (Shii) completely at odds with Sunni
jihadis. The chaos and anger created by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
bombing of other Muslim countries, were bread and butter to extremists. Americas continuing
support for Israels dispossession of the Palestinians likewise boosted the appeal of the radical
fringe. Indeed, these moves suggested that whatever the logic of American policy in the Middle
East, eradicating jihadists was not actually an overriding priority.

Where does Al Qaeda fit in? Al Qaeda is one of many groups on the radical fringe. Al Qaeda
was composed of Bin Laden and a relatively small group of loyal followers gathered around him.
Al Qaeda was distinct from other jihadist groups, being just one organization professing the
radical Islamist ideology that flourished in many places across the world. Al Qaeda also had little
to do with the long-simmering conflicts across the Muslim world, from Algeria to Somalia to
Yemen, which were generally rooted in largely local grievances.

After 9/11, Al Qaeda became Al Qaeda, a mythical entity of superhuman power and strength.
Al Qaeda conducted attacks all across the world and were the leaders of Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism. They potentially had access to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.284285 Bin
Laden was a Saudi tycoon with $300 million in funds.286 They had tens of thousands of sleeper
agents across the world, ready to be activated.287 The world was crawling with their terrorist
masterminds. Countless mega-terror plots were busted.

Some of this was simply wrong information, such as Al Qaedas non-existent WMDs and Bin
Ladens vastly exaggerated fortune.288 But the larger part of the myth was created and sustained
through a sleight of hand exploiting the very definition of Al Qaeda. Originally designating Bin
Laden and his not-so-merry men, Al Qaeda now became a metaphor - little recognized as such
- for jihadist activity worldwide. A shooting in Iraq? Al Qaeda. A bomb in London? Al
Qaeda. An ambush in Algeria? Al Qaeda. A clan takes a village in Somalia? Al Qaeda. Soon
it seemed that any Muslim with a gun and a grievance was Al Qaeda. The Bush administration
and its allies conflated these distinct phenomena into a single monolithic threat.

284
Report predicts high probability of Al Qaeda attack, CNN.com, June 10, 2003 http://articles.cnn.com/2003-
06-10/us/alqaeda.threat_1_al-qaeda-attack-favor-spectacular-attacks-international-terrorist-groups?_s=PM:US
285
Rice: Iraq trained Al Qaeda in chemical weapons, CNN.com, September 25, 2002 http://articles.cnn.com/2002-
09-25/us/us.iraq.alqaeda_1_iraq-and-al-qaeda-chemical-weapons-saddam-hussein?_s=PM:US
286
Finances of Terror, New York Times, September 24, 2001 www.nytimes.com/2001/09/24/opinion/finances-of-
terror.html
287
Resilient Al Qaeda Resumes Plotting, Josh Meyer and Bob Drogin, Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2002
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jun/11/nation/na-qaeda11
288
The Bin Ladens, Steve Coll, Penguin, 2008, pp. 328 - 330, 451 - 457

76
The Al Qaeda myth benefited all the parties concerned. The Bush administrations War on
Terror discourse, the public justification for launching wars in the Middle East, was reinforced
by continuing Al Qaeda activity all over the world. It was particularly useful to point to Al
Qaeda in Iraq to justify that increasingly unpopular war - even though the Sunni resistance in
Iraq had only the most superficial relation to the actual Al Qaeda. Bin Laden and the remnants of
the actual, original Al Qaeda benefited by looking as though they were still relevant, despite the
fact that their real activities seemed to be confined largely to releasing tapes filled with droning
speeches. The local groups calling themselves Al Qaeda in... gained prestige and branding far
beyond their actual significance. And American allies in the countries concerned received new
backing and legitimation to take on pesky rebels, who instead of aggrieved locals were now Al
Qaeda terrorists. It was a win-win-win-win situation for everyone who mattered.

The Al Qaeda story lived on new attacks. There is little evidence that the actual Bin Laden
outfit has done anything of significance since 9/11 (if indeed they had anything to do with that),
but the activity of Al Qaeda franchises in the Middle East did much to sustain the myth. In
addition, there were a few significant attacks in the West, such as the 3/11/2004 Madrid train
bombings and the 7/7/2005 London Underground bombings, which, despite the lack of credible
evidence connecting the attacks to Al Qaeda, were linked in the public imagination thanks
largely to the media. By the time of the 2008 Mumbai attack, the media seemed to have quietly
gotten the memo that Al Qaeda is not the orchestrator of every attack.

There were also a large number of busted plots in the West that kept fear of Al Qaeda alive.
Sometimes these were real attempts by apparent imbeciles, such as the shoe bomber and the
underpants bomber; at other times, they were setups by security services thirsty for success. A
closer look at some of the Al Qaeda plots broken up in America tells the latter story:

In 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales unveiled what he called a deadly plot by seven
men to bring down the Sears Tower with explosives.289 The case was developed through two
informants, one of whom posed as an Al Qaeda organizer. The entire Al Qaeda angle was
based on this informant. There was no evidence that the alleged mastermind had met with any
real terrorist, received e-mails or wire transfers from the Middle East, possessed any al-Qaeda
literature, or had even a picture of bin Laden.290 Almost all the terrorist-related activity by the
plotters, ranging from surveillance of federal buildings to an oath of allegiance to Al Qaeda,
happened at the urging of the two informants, who reportedly earned about $120,000 from the
feds for their help.291 The alleged terrorists, members of an eccentric cult blending Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, requested from the Al Qaeda member a long list of supplies to carry
out the attack, ranging from cash to an SUV - but forgot to mention explosives.

289
Terror Plot Was in Earliest Stages, Gonzales says, John ONeil, The New York Times, June 23, 2006
www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/us/22cnd-indict.html?ex=1151208000&en=d20a074c7a5a563f&ei=5087%0A
290
FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned, Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, September 2, 2006
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html
291
Department of Pre-Crime, Eric Umansky, Mother Jones, February 29, 2008
http://motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/department-pre-crime

77
The 2007 JFK airport plot, in which four men were arrested, was announced as one of the
most chilling plots imaginable... The devastation that would be caused had this plot succeeded is
just unthinkable.292 It turned out that the group was entirely clueless. They had no money and
no explosives. They were egged on by an FBI informant believed by the men to have been sent
by Allah to be the one (in fact a convicted drug trafficker seeking to get his sentence reduced).
They planned to bomb jet fuel tanks far from terminals and aircraft, little realizing that the tanks
were unlikely to just explode; In the worst-case scenario, there might have been a fire - which
would have been contained to an unpopulated area of the airport.293

The 2009 Synagogue plot was described as a plan by extremely violent men to bomb Jewish
targets and shoot down military planes; assistant US Attorney Eric Snyder said that Its hard to
envision a more chilling plot.294 In fact, there were no bombs and no missiles, because the lead
role in the plot was played by an FBI informant, Shahed Hussain; Posing as a wealthy
Pakistani terrorist, Mr. Hussain combed mosques in the suburbs north of Manhattan for possible
extremists before enlisting the four men in the plot.295 When one of the enlistees tried to back
out, Hussein offered him $250,000 to remain committed.296

All of these cases, announced with great fanfare and terrifying seriousness, exhibit two key
characteristics. Firstly, the accused committed no actual terrorist acts and lacked the means to do
so. Secondly, an FBI informant is at the heart of the case, invariably introduced before plans for
terrorism emerge, and facilitating the plot from start to finish. As the New York Times puts it,
the government informants became central figures in the conspiracies, as their use of money,
knowledge and initiative to push attacks forward raised questions about whether the supposed
masterminds were actually in charge.297 Its hard to imagine a more chilling plot...

But in fact, penetration and manipulation of terrorist and resistance groups are well-established
practices; such strategies take advantage of the compartmentalized cell structure of terrorist
groups and the need to know principle which puts terrorist foot-soldiers in the position of not
knowing where their actions fit into the bigger picture or whose bigger picture that might be.
While such tactics are a staple even of the most conscientious counterterrorism strategy, they can
develop a logic of their own:

A classic example of successful infiltration occurred during the 1957 Battle of Algiers... The French
inserted more and more people into FLN ranks, while persuading other rebels to change sides and fight on
behalf of the government. Gradually, more and more FLN fighting units fell under the control of French
military intelligence. By the end of the battle, the French intelligence chief found himself, in effect,

292
The JFK Plot: Overstating the Case?, Amanda Ripley, TIME, June 4, 2007
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1628169,00.html
293
Ibid.
294
Secret Recordings Reveal Details of Terror Plot Accusations, Michael Wilson, The New York Times, May 21,
2009 www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/nyregion/22plot.html
295
Lawyer Tries to Discredit Informer in Synagogue Bomb-Plot Case, Kareem Fahim, The New York Times,
September 15, 2010 www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/nyregion/16plot.html
296
Informer in Synagogue Plot Is Accused of Bullying Defendant, Kareem Fahim, The New York Times,
September 21, 2010 www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/nyregion/22plot.html
297
Jury Hears Defendant Planning to Blow Up J.F.K. Airport, A.G. Sulzberger, The New York Times, July 15,
2010 www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/nyregion/16kennedy.html

78
 virtually controlling the FLN apparatus in Algiers. To maintain an appearance of authenticity, the chief
organized bombings himself, one of which destroyed his own headquarters.298

The explosives for the 2004 Madrid train bombings seem to have been supplied by Spanish
police informants.299 David Headley, a Pakistani-American and DEA informant, was convicted
of organizing the 2008 Mumbai attack in cooperation with Pakistani officers, prompting Indian
accusations that Headley was a rogue US operative.300 Faisal Shahzad, who confessed to
planning the failed Times Square bombing in 2010, was linked by US officials to the Pakistani
Taliban, but his background as the son of a Pakistani Vice Marshal who grew up around senior
military officers, and the arrest of an army major in connection with the case, raises the
possibility of a different dynamic.301302 It does not require too much imagination to see that
despite their usefulness to genuine counter-terror efforts, penetration and manipulation tactics
can also be turned to deliberately cynical use, using the terrorist networks to conduct plausibly
deniable false-flag operations.

The transformation of Al Qaeda into Al Qaeda makes such manipulation even easier. Although
the disconnect between the original Al Qaeda and the current Al Qaeda legend has been little
noticed by the public, some academics have addressed the issue by rethinking Al Qaeda as a
leaderless resistance, defined by a unifying ideology rather than a tangible organization.
Despite the merits of this view, it is misleading to use the name Al Qaeda, the name of a
particular historical organization, to refer to a phenomenon. In any case, The leaderless
resistance tactic... makes it even easier for security forces, or for rivals, to undertake their own
operations and claim them in the name of some hitherto unknown phantom cell. The possibilities
for deception and provocation become even larger.303 A structured terrorist organization, such
as Hezbollah or the IRA, can credibly claim or deny responsibility for operations. No one knows
who is really responsible for the operations of a leaderless resistance - least of all Bin Laden.

On September 16, 2001, Bin Laden stated (if we are to believe the authenticity of the
communiqu): The U.S. government has consistently blamed me for being behind every
occasion its enemies attack it. I would like to assure the world that I did not plan the recent
attacks...304 If 9/11 was Bin Ladens most spectacular achievement yet, the result of a strategic
decision taken by the Al Qaeda command and implemented through the ranks, logic suggests he
should have been prepared to take credit, declare his cause, and make his demands; in other
words, to strike while the iron was hot.

298
Ibid.
299
191 dead, thousands of victims - but the mastermind is cleared, Thomas Catan, The Times, November 1,
2007 www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2781588.ece
300
Mumbai terror suspect David Headley was rogue US secret agent, Rhys Blakely, The Times, December 17,
2009 www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6960182.ece
301
U.S. Urges Action in Pakistan After Failed Bombing, Jane Perlez, The New York Times, May 8, 2010
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/world/asia/09pstan.html
302
Pakistani Major Among 2 New Arrests in Bombing, Jane Perlez, The New York Times, May 21, 2010
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/22/world/asia/22pstan.html
303
Images of Terror, op. cit., p. 94
304
Bin Laden says he wasnt behind attacks, CNN, September 17, 2001 http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-
16/us/inv.binladen.denial_1_bin-laden-taliban-supreme-leader-mullah-mohammed-omar?_s=PM:US

79
Bin Laden would eventually take credit for the attacks, months later, (if we are to believe the
authenticity of the communiqus). But such claims establish nothing. Taking credit for a crime
or terrorist incident is significant if the claim incurs costs - if it comes before one is being hunted
and bombed for the incident. It is meaningful because the party taking credit is assuming a
burden of punishment and blame that it would not otherwise carry. It is especially meaningful if
there are no benefits expected from taking credit. Bin Laden made his eventual claims after the
US launched its massive operations against him and his associates. His prestige among jihadist
sympathizers shot up as a result of his claim of responsibility, with attendant benefits for
fundraising, recruitment, etc. A little basic cost/benefit thinking clarifies that if you are already
paying the price for a crime, you might as well claim any available benefits - calculations
entirely divorced from the question as to whether or not you actually committed the crime.

As for the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks - at least, the person who has confessed to being the
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks... How reliable is this confession? Consider the following. Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times in March 2003 alone - to cite only the known
form of torture employed - and the tendency of torture to produce false confessions is well
established.305306 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is known to have exaggerated and fabricated his
role in other attacks.307 The CIA destroyed the videotapes of Khalid Sheikh Mohammeds
interrogation.308 Finally, among jihadis who saw 9/11 as a great achievement - of whom Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed seems to be one - to be considered the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks
would be a fantastic honor. Again, if one is already being punished for a crime, one might as
well claim any prospective reward, whether or not one is actually guilty.

Does all this mean that Al Qaeda alone couldnt have orchestrated 9/11? No. They could have.
Some combination of zealous determination, governmental incompetence, and sheer luck could
have brought them success. They could have moved nineteen operatives into the United States
without setting off alarm bells; trained them sufficiently; kept them on mission when a single one
chickening-out, screwing-up, or getting caught would have blown the whole operation; handled
all of the requisite planning, surveillance, finance, and logistics; and pulled off an operation
unprecedented in history. It is sometimes said of conspiracy theories that, as Sunstein and
Vermeule write, they generally attribute extraordinary powers to certain agents - to plan, to
control others, to maintain secrets, and so forth.309 The Al Qaeda story is by this analysis a
conspiracy theory. It might be true, but in the light of all the facts, is the Al Qaeda story the most
likely explanation? Contrast the resources of such an association of disempowered malcontents
with the resources commanded by networks such as Gladio and Ergenekon: personnel,
information, analysis, expertise, contacts, weapons, influence, and finance from sources ranging
from intelligence agencies to corporations to mafias to terrorist groups - not to mention cover
from larger networks that did not participate directly in crimes but, for various reasons, helped to
conceal the true culprits and blame more convenient parties.

305
Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, The New York Times, April 19, 2009
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html
306
Torturing the Brain, Shane OMara, Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol. 13, Issue 10, September 2009
307
Why KSMs Confession Rings False, Robert Baer, TIME, March 15, 2007
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1599861,00.html
308
C.I.A. Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing Interrogations, The New York Times, December 7, 2007
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/washington/07intel.html
309
Conspiracy Theories, op. cit., p. 5

80
The jihadist fringe of Salafism, like any other collection of very-pissed-off people with a belief
that any measures are justified, poses a certain danger. However, the danger is not monolithic,
but fragmented. It is also not a danger restricted to radicals acting on their own accord; a ready
supply of martyrdom volunteers is a major resource pool for state and private actors to exploit
for a great variety of purposes.

81
 REVOLUTIONARIES

Terrorism, designating the subjective effect of the phenomenon - what we feel, terror - often
obscures the ambiguous and varied objective nature of the operations designed to stir that
emotion. The popular view is that terrorism is a tactic employed by desperate non-state actors to
create fear amongst the enemy. Such is the kind of terrorism that politicians and the media talk
about, and that counter-terrorism specialists train to fight.

This terrorism dogma emerged from the Israeli conflict with the Palestinians, particularly since
the 1970s, when Palestinian groups resorted to asymmetric guerilla tactics against their vastly
more powerful opponent. Although the Israelis were far ahead of others in thinking through the
technical security challenges posed by non-state actors, the terrorism dogma as adopted
wholesale by the West after 9/11 also includes a whole host of Israeli-perspective value
assumptions. If sometimes it seems that the only terrorists are Arabs and Muslims, it is not
because Arabs and Muslims have a monopoly on violence designed to induce fear. It is because
the presently-dominant concept of terrorism has been tailored for them, focusing on the kinds of
violence that Arabs and Muslims are presently engaged in against Israel.

For instance, terrorism is commonly defined as violence by non-state actors - excluding the
historical use of terror as an instrument of state policy, from Hiroshima to Gaza. Present-day
thinking also emphasizes brute terror tactics involving the open targeting of enemy populations,
while turning a blind eye to the more cunning uses of terror - such as provocations and false-flag
operations - which may well target ones own people or a third party in order to secure a larger
aim. Moreover, nowadays the distinction between terrorism and resistance against a tyrannical
government or occupying power is often glossed over - a distinction without which the American
war of independence could be described, unjustly, as terrorism. In short, there are some kinds of
terrorism that we do not call terrorism; there are some kinds of terrorism regarding which we
suppress knowledge and debate; and there are things we call terrorism that are not terrorism.

But one central historical aspect of terrorism is almost completely ignored in current debates.310
The origins of the concept of terrorism lie in revolutionary violence, bloodshed designed to
transform the world by force and bring a new order into being. The concept emerged in the
course of the French Revolution when, under the Reign of Terror led by Maximilien Robespierre
and the Jacobins, the revolutionary state executed tens of thousands of its own citizens. Although
differing in its practical mechanics from what is called terrorism today, the Terror employed the
same political methodology: securing goals by creating a state of fear among the populace.

Since the storming of the Bastille in 1789, the Revolutions leadership had become increasingly
radicalized in an atmosphere of foreign war, economic crisis, and domestic plots. A state of
emergency was declared in July 1792, and the King was executed in January 1793. Different
factions vied for the support of the sans-culottes, the masses of urban poor who constituted the
street power of revolution; the Jacobins, whose hard-line stances resonated with the angry mob,

310
Although, in his October 25, 2001 remarks, Attorney General John Ashcroft may have inadvertently put his
finger on it in his references as to how The wheel of history turned on September 11, as the terrorists crossed the
Rubicon, facing America with a reign of terror. justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm

82
outmaneuvered their opponents and seized power in June 1793. The Terror was directed from the
Committee for Public Safety, which quickly became the central organ of a revolutionary
dictatorship. The Jacobins declared that enemies must be prosecuted by all not as ordinary
enemies, but as rebels, brigands, and assassins - asserting a state of exception.311 Devouring
aristocrats, clergy, ill-starred revolutionaries, and countless ordinary men and women suspected
of disloyalty, the instruments of the Terror finally gobbled up Robespierre and his allies
themselves in the coup of Thermidor, after a reign of one year and one month.

The progressive, Enlightenment values held by the revolutionaries are perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the Reign of Terror. Robespierre and his fellows were intense partisans of freedom and
equality; they abolished serfdom, attacked superstition, decried tyranny, supported democracy
with universal male franchise, and proclaimed an era of respect for the rights of all. At the same
time, Robespierre ruled as a dictator under emergency powers, governed by fear, and set in
motion an inexorable state murder machine. To those who wanted the former without the latter,
Robespierre had a scornful reply: Citizens, did you want a revolution without a revolution?312

The revolutionaries aimed to renovate not only the political system, with the abolition of
absolute monarchy and aristocracy, but the society and even the individual. The new elites
sought to create a new man. Their rhetoric addressed personal virtue and vice, morality and
perversion, glory and greed, as much as purely political ideals. They embarked upon a campaign
of de-Christianization, while new religions, the Cult of Reason and the Cult of the Supreme
Being, sought to transform the spiritual life of the citizen. A new revolutionary calendar was
instituted, enlivened by new festivals and holidays; new standards of measurement were adopted;
sexual taboos were shattered; fashions and manners were radically simplified; a standardized
French language was imposed and a new vocabulary emerged; grandiose educational projects
were envisioned, teaching that not only enlightens and exercises the mind but also shapes the
heart (Robespierre even argued for placing all the countrys children in state boarding schools
in a bid to mold the next generation).313 By raising a massive peoples army, rendering the old
professional armies obsolete, the revolutionaries transformed warfare as well.

From the beginning, blood was the philosophers stone of these revolutionary changes. Getting
rid of opponents was nothing new, but in the French revolution violence was something more.
War alone can equalize us all and regenerate our souls, argued Jacques Pierre Brissot, a
Girondist leader, in 1791; it would purge [the people] of the vices of despotism.314 In the hands
of the Jacobins, this philosophy would be turned to internal violence. Terror is only justice,
prompt, severe and inflexible, Robespierre declaimed at the height of the slaughter; it is then
an emanation of virtue... Is not the lightning of heaven made to blast vice exalted? Without
terror, virtue is impotent.315 Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, Robespierres precocious ally,
remarked that The particular good one does is a palliative. One must wait for a general sickness

311
On Property Rights, Maximilien Robespierre, April 1793, in The Human Rights Reader, Micheline R. Ishay,
(ed.), Routledge, 1997, p. 160
312
Maximilien Robespierre, cited in Robespierre or the Divine Violence of Terror, Slavoj Zizek,
www.lacan.com/zizrobes.htm
313
The Cult of the Nation in France, David A. Bell, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 162
314
The French Revolution and Empire, Donald M. G. Sutherland, Blackwell, 2003, p. 219
315
On the Principles of Political Morality, Maximilien Robespierre, February 1794
www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1794robespierre.html

83
great enough for general opinion to feel the need for measures capable of doing good. That
which produces the general good is always terrible.316 On another occasion, he would suggest
that Nothing resembles virtue so much as a great crime.317 Gracchus Babeuf, who ardently
defended the Jacobins after the end of the Reign of Terror, famously demanded: May
everything return to chaos, and out of chaos may there emerge a new and regenerated world.318

The guillotine, the instrument of Terror, embodied the grand theatre and pitiless idealism of
revolution; it turned the revolution into a drama that all could understand. It was the
Enlightenment on display, punishing all equally without unnecessary suffering... This mass for
the masses offered the certainty of blood sacrifice and the promise of collective redemption...
This collective ritual in the public places of Paris made anything taking place on an indoor stage
seem pale by comparison.319 The revolutionaries, by undertaking such meticulously staged acts
of terror dramatized with the aid of new technologies and an artistic touch, would be the first of
the transformed new men; it was their ultimate form of radical simplification. A thousand
hopes and hatreds could be compressed into a single act of blood ritual, transforming
philosophes into rvolutionnaires.320 As Simon Schama writes, Bloodshed was not the
unfortunate by-product of revolution, it was the source of its energy.321

The insistence on transformation through bloody public violence recalls the formerly widespread
practice of human sacrifice. Hannah Arendt described terror as the execution of a law of
movement whose ultimate goal is... the fabrication of mankind, which eliminates individuals
for the sake of the species, sacrifices the parts for the sake of the whole.322 Yet human beings
were not the only sacrifice. The tectonic rupture of revolution was also dramatized by the utter
destruction of iconic edifices; France first found its revolutionary identity not only by storming
the Bastille but also by razing it utterly, creating in the heart of Paris a field of nature where the
towers of tradition once stood.323 Creative destruction is the motto of revolutionaries.

It is difficult to explain the Terror as a rational response to foreign or domestic threats; as Crane
Brinton observed, the government of the Terror, if originally directed against real enemies, was
in the end almost wholly directed against imaginary ones. That, indeed, is what makes it a Terror
instead of a mere government of national defense.324 Rather than being a matter of political
pragmatism, the Terror emerged from the radically transformative agendas of the revolutionaries;
their desire to create a new world and a new man necessitated extreme measures to overcome
individual and systemic resistance to change. One of those who experienced the Terror described
it as A habitual, generalized, trembling, an external trembling which affects the innermost
physical forces, the disorientation of all the moral faculties, the disintegration of all ideas, the
subversion of all the affections. It is a true disorganization of the soul... an extreme, total

316
Fire in the Minds of Men, James Billington, Transaction Publishers, 1999, pp. 65 - 66
317
On Revolution, Hannah Arendt, Viking Press, 1965, p. 87
318
Fire in the Minds of Men, op. cit., p. 75
319
Ibid., p. 47
320
Ibid., p. 25
321
Citizens, Simon Schama, Vintage Books, 1990, p. 615
322
The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt, Harcourt Brace, & World, 1966, p. 465
323
Fire in the Minds of Men, op. cit., p. 45
324
A Decade of Revolution, Crane Brinton, cited in Citizens & Cannibals, Eli Sagan, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p.
463

84
condition.325 In such a state of inner chaos, brought about by fear, resistance to external changes
collapses, and the construction of a new man within could begin.

James Billington, the Librarian of Congress, sees in the French revolution the origins of nothing
less than a new religion that would spread, grow, and evolve to shape subsequent centuries; the
violent revolutions that convulsed the twentieth century grew out of a faith generated in the
nineteenth.326 Revolutionaries are no less committed and intense than were the Christians or
Muslims of an earlier era. What is new is the belief that a perfect secular order will emerge from
the forcible overthrow of traditional authority.327 This belief was a new millenarian evolution of
ancient theology; At a deep and often subconscious level, the revolutionary faith was shaped by
the Christian faith it attempted to replace. Most revolutionaries viewed history prophetically as a
kind of unfolding morality play.328

Despite framing its appeal in the language of reason and enlightenment, this revolutionary faith
was shaped not so much by the critical rationalism of the French Enlightenment (as is generally
believed) as by the occultism and proto-romanticism of Germany. This faith was incubated in
France during the revolutionary era within a small sub-culture of literary intellectuals who were
immersed in journalism, fascinated by secret societies, and subsequently infatuated with
ideologies as a secular surrogate for religious belief.329 In the revolutionary tradition, from
France to Russia, the ideal has remained that of a small elite of the virtuous, commanding
centralized technocratic power according to their unique insight. The new reality they sought
was radically secular and stridently simple. The ideal was not the balanced complexity of the
new American federation, but the occult simplicity of its great seal: an all-seeing eye atop a
pyramid over the words Novus Ordo Seclorum.330

The revolutionary faith born in France went underground before reemerging, in recognizable
form, amongst Communists. These new revolutionaries had an even more radical and all-
encompassing vision than their predecessors. The revolution would be global, not national; it
would create a classless society; it would realign mans relation to the physical world itself.
Ultimately, consciousness itself would be transformed, a revolution of the mind for the new
man. Marx proclaimed that consciousness is something that the world must acquire, like it or
not; this reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to clarify its
consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself... Then it will transpire that the world has
long been dreaming of something that it can acquire if only it becomes conscious of it.331

Trotsky elaborated on this vision: Man will, at last, begin to harmonize himself in earnest... He
will want to master first the semi-conscious and then also the unconscious processes of his own
organism... and, within the necessary limits, will subordinate them to the control of reason and
will... The human species, the sluggish Homo sapiens, will once again enter the state of radical

325
Citizens and Cannibals, op. cit., pp. 474 - 475
326
Fire in the Minds of Men, op. cit., p. vii
327
Ibid., p. 3
328
Ibid., p. 8
329
Ibid., p. 3
330
Ibid., p. 6
331
For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing, Karl Marx, in The Marx-Engels Reader, Robert C. Tucker
(ed.), Norton, 1972, p. 10

85
reconstruction and will become in its own hands the object of the most complex methods of
artificial selection and psychological training... Man will make it his goal to master his own
emotions, to elevate his instincts to the heights of consciousness, to make them transparent.332

How was this new consciousness to be attained? Marx wrote that the alteration of men on a
mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a
revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be
overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution
succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.333 The
activity of revolution itself would work the transformation: it is men who change
circumstances... the educator must himself be educated... The coincidence of the changing of
circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood
only as revolutionary practice.334 Elsewhere, Marx argued more bluntly that there is only one
way in which the murderous death agonies of the old society and the bloody birth throes of the
new society can be shortened, simplified and concentrated, and that way is revolutionary
terror.335 Stalin, unable to resist purging the insight of its bourgeois literary excesses, scrawled
in the margins of Marxs text: Terror is the quickest way to the new society.336

For Marxs heirs, as with the French revolutionaries, the communist ideology took the place of
religion and assumed many of its features: a savior, a prophecy, an elect, a communist
paradise at the end of history, to be reached through a transformation as much mental as
material. Terror would be used as an institutional device, consciously employed to accelerate
the momentum of the revolution.337 From the Red Terror of the Russian Revolution to the Great
Terror of Stalins mass purges to the terror of Maos permanent revolution and Pol Pots Year
Zero (aping the French revolutionary calendar), transformations would be forced, working
through states of emergency; manichaean divisions between Friends and Enemies, Good and
Evil; perpetual war and mentality of war; imagined utopias; at a price of tens of millions of
innocent lives. Revolutionary terror accounts for the overwhelming majority of terrors victims.

Nazism exhibited many of the same features. Hitler, although no friend of organized religion and
apparently skeptical of the mysticism of many of his comrades, possessed powerful spiritual
beliefs, certain of guidance by the inner voice of Divine Providence. His messianic style of
leadership; the Nazis millennial aspirations; their use of symbols such as the swastika; their
metaphysical faith in the destiny of the German nation and equally metaphysical hatred of the
Jews; the religious-racial doctrines of Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg; the occult
preoccupations of Heinrich Himmler and other leading figures in the SS; all point to the
importance of a quasi-spiritual revolutionary psychology in Nazi deeds. Their vision was not just
about a New Orders world domination; it sought a mental/spiritual revolutionizing of the

332
Literature and Revolution, Leon Trotsky, cited in From Darkness to Light, Igal Halfin, University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2000, p. 78
333
The German Ideology, Karl Marx, 1845, Part 1D www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-
ideology/ch01d.htm
334
Theses on Feuerbach, Karl Marx, 1845 www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/original.htm
335
The Victory of the Counter-Revolution in Vienna, Karl Marx, Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 136, November
1848 www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/11/06.htm
336
Stalin, Edvard Radzinsky, Anchor Books, 1997, p. 155
337
On Revolution, op. cit., p. 95

86
German Volk, a transformation to a new ideology, which at the very least is as gigantic as the
transformation to Marxist thinking or the transformation from a feudal state to a democratic-
parliamentary system... a perfectly new ideas world, to construct a completely new state.338 This
was not just a social, legal, or political change, Hitler explained; Such a transformation requires
an inner conversion! A mental, a spiritual, an ethical, even a religious one... the new faith is
awakening out of the lethargy of a corrupt epoch and taking to the march.339 To this end, he
made expert use of the weapon which most readily conquers reason: terror and violence,
regarding which the psychological effect can be calculated with precision.340

Nazism, despite its revolutionary profile, is rarely described as revolutionary because the term
seems to add a ring of legitimacy to a justly reviled movement. The American War of
Independence, happily avoiding the human sacrifice of the European tradition, is called a
Revolution and placed without discomfort amongst more sinister outbursts abroad. Revolution
has a positive, cosmic connotation; the word itself originates in the inexorable course of the stars
in the sky; literally a revolving, a turning, even a restoration.341 Now, new products and ideas are
hailed as revolutionary advances. The French Revolution is remembered with nostalgia and
pride; the Russian revolution long had an army of intellectual allies in the West. But while the
grandiose ideals of revolutions are long celebrated, the innocent blood they shed is forgotten all
too quickly. Materializing lofty visions exacts a terrible price - and more than a few have been
willing to pay it. Many in the West, particularly among activist intellectuals, have thought the
sacrifice of large numbers of innocent people acceptable in the service of the right ideals.

Eric Voegelin sees such eschatological violence as the product of a realm of action that lies,
in the sentiments of the activist believers, beyond good and evil because it secures the transition
from a world of iniquity to a world of light... What in reality happens through political action and
violence is understood as an operation of transcendental Spirit. Moral judgment that is valid in
ordinary human existence obviously does not apply to the spiritual operation.342 The believers
seek a transcendental irruption in history... The inhuman, conscienceless horror of these events
results from the combination of mysticism with animal aggressiveness... On the plane of history
and politics on which the revolutions are enacted the profoundest human lusts can be satisfied...
with the positive premium of the consciousness that the worst misdeeds are measures in the
divine plan for delivering the world from evil.343 As Voegelin notes, the revolutionaries never
actually succeed in creating a heaven on earth. But that does not stop them trying.

There are many reasons that impel people to engage in mass murder, from the desperation of
those who have no other form of power to fanatics thirst for vengeance; the cold reasoning of
government, too, has led to the killing of countless innocents. Such is the logic of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki: kill 150,000 - 250,000 Japanese civilians to end the war now, rather than invade Japan
and face another year of war, hundreds of thousands more American dead, and millions of
Japanese dead. Kaiser Wilhelm II remarked, in this spirit, that My soul is torn, but everything
338
Hitler: Study of a Revolutionary?, Martyn Housden, Routledge, 2000, pp. 60 - 61
339
Hitlers Millennial Reich, David Redles, New York University Press, 2005, p. 78
340
Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler, trans. Ralph Manheim, Houghton Mifflin, 1998, pp. 40, 44
341
Fire in the Minds of Men, op. cit., pp. 17 - 18
342
History of Political Ideas: Renaissance and Reformation, Eric Voegelin, Vol. 22 of The Collected Works of Eric
Voegelin, David L. Morse and William M. Thompson (eds.), University of Missouri Press, 1998, p. 174
343
Ibid., p. 175

87
must be put to fire and sword; men, women and children and old men must be slaughtered and
not a tree or house be left standing. With these methods of terrorism, which are alone capable of
affecting a people as degenerate as the French, the war will be over in two months, whereas if I
admit considerations of humanity it will be prolonged for years.344 However, such justifications
are applied much more comfortably to foreigners than to ones own people.

Revolutionary violence, in contrast, is overwhelmingly internal to a civilization. It seeks a

revolution of the mind rather than a mere coup detat seeking new leadership. It arises from
abstract ideas, transformative visions and transcendent principles. Explanations based on
circumstances go only so far; at some point, it is necessary to ask what inner state prompted
individuals to see mass murder of their people as justified. It is easy to conceive of revolutionary
mass murderers as nihilists; but that does little to explain their motivation or appeal. The
intelligent, socially effective people who successfully organize mass murders usually do so for
what they see - and convince others - as serving a higher purpose.

Socrates suggests in Platos Republic that really successful villains, however evil, must have had
some genuine ideals; if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one
another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which
enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as
their victims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been whole villains,
and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action.345 What Plato seems to be
getting at, through Socrates tongue, is not that successful villains are in fact good, but that
their success in their evil acts is due to their persuasive commitment to an ideal that bonded them
together. Robespierre, for instance, was known as the incorruptible, which was not, to his
followers, contradictory with his involvement in mass atrocities. A mere corrupt politician has no
reason to stick his neck out so far. As we have seen, the most ruthless murderers in history, and
the most successful exploiters of terror, were idealists. Amongst revolutionaries, bloody murder
and base entanglements co-exist with, and are seen as justified by, transformative ideals.

It is impossible to understand the actions and - often fleeting - success of revolutionaries without
grasping the higher ideals which drove them. Nor can one properly comprehend revolutions
unless their untold expendable victims are kept firmly in mind. In each case their souls return
to haunt the revolution, belying its exalted ideals. While the notion of enlightened murder is
not, as revolutionary history demonstrates, an implausible conceit for murderers to hold, the rosy
image should not distract from the sordid reality; investigators must explore but not allow
themselves to be seduced. The revolutions that stand the test of centuries are those nourished by
the sacrifice not of unsuspecting innocents, but, as in 1776, of the revolutionaries themselves.

It was once fashionable to envision a monolithic, age-old conspiracy by revolutionaries to take

over the world; Winston Churchill wrote in 1920 that

From the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun
(Hungary), Rosa Luxembourg (Germany), and Emma Goldman (United States), this world-wide conspiracy
for the overthrow of civilization and for the reconstitution of society... has been steadily growing. It

344
American Power and the New Mandarins, Noam Chomsky, The New Press, 2002, pp. 168 - 169
345
The Republic, op. cit., Book I http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.2.i.html

88
 played... a definitely recognizable part in the tragedy of the French Revolution. It has been the mainspring
of every subversive movement during the Nineteenth Century; and now at last this band of extraordinary
personalities from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America have gripped the Russian
people by the hair of their heads and have become practically the undisputed masters of that enormous
empire.346

It was particularly fashionable to blame the conspiracy on the Jews, the perennial whipping boys
for the flaws the West could not acknowledge in itself (a role now filled by the Arabs). But just
as the image of Al Qaeda as a monolithic conspiratorial jihadist organization has fallen apart, so
has the idea of a monolithic revolutionary conspiracy. Both are now understood as metaphors for
part-political, part-spiritual ideologies, deeply opposed to the status quo, that inspire individuals
in different places and times to undertake the same sort of violent action, usually through more
or less ad-hoc networks.

346
Zionism versus Bolshevism, Winston S. Churchill, Illustrated Sunday Herald, February 8, 1920, cited in The
Churchill You Didnt Know, The Guardian, November 28, 2002
www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2002/nov/28/features11.g21

89
 SAMSON

A divinely inspired terrorist kills 3000 men and women by bringing down two great pillars in a
suicide operation motivated by revenge. 9/11? Or the Old Testaments Book of Judges?

When they stood him among the pillars, Samson said to the servant who held his hand, Put me where I can
feel the pillars that support the temple, so that I may lean against them. Now the temple was crowded with
men and women; all the rulers of the Philistines were there, and on the roof were about three thousand men
and women watching Samson perform. Then Samson prayed to the LORD, O Sovereign LORD,
remember me. O God, please strengthen me just once more, and let me with one blow get revenge on the
Philistines for my two eyes. Then Samson reached toward the two central pillars on which the temple
stood. Bracing himself against them, his right hand on the one and his left hand on the other, Samson said,
Let me die with the Philistines! Then he pushed with all his might, and down came the temple on the
rulers and all the people in it. Thus he killed many more when he died than while he lived.347348

The Biblical Samson is portrayed as a tragic hero rather than an avatar of evil. As Shadia Drury
has written, It may be argued that Samson was a hero because he did not act independently; he
was merely an instrument of God's will. And God wished to punish the Philistines for their
idolatry and their iniquity. But, she points out, the same argument may be applied to the 9/11
attackers; indeed, after 9/11 the leader of the Moral Majority, Jerry Falwell, and the founder of
the Christian Coalition, Pat Robertson, declared that the terrorist attack was a deserved
punishment from God for America's sins.349 While harshly condemning Middle Eastern
monsters, Falwell remarked that What we saw on Tuesday, as terrible as it is, could be
miniscule if, in fact, God continues to lift the curtain and allow the enemies of America to give
us probably what we deserve.350 Robertson voiced agreement, and the two went on to blame
abortionists, gays, feminists, the ACLU, and so on, for making God angry.351 In the wake of the
tragedy, Falwell sensed among Americans the kind of brokenness that no one could conjure,
only God could bring upon us. And, that is to me the most optimistic thing that I see today as I
look across America... this could be Gods call to revival.352

The preoccupation of many Muslim fundamentalists with the moral degeneration of the West -
and with the corrupting influence of such trends on the Islamic world - is well known. Sayyid
Qutb, the intellectual godfather of contemporary jihad, spent two years in America, and was
profoundly affected by the experience:

America, the New World, is that vast, far-flung world that occupies in the minds eye more space than it
really does on this earth. Imaginations and dreams glimmer on this world with illusion and wonder... It is
the huge factories, unequaled in all of civilization. It is the awesome, incalculable yields, the ubiquitous
institutes, laboratories, and museums. American genius in management and organization evokes wonder
and admiration. Americas bounty and prosperity evokes the dreams of the Promised Land. The beauty that
is manifested in its landscape, in the faces and physiques of its people is spellbinding. America conjures up

347
New International Version, Judges 16: 25-30 www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Judges+16&version=NIV
348
See artwork inspired by Samson over the centuries at The Death of Samson, Biblical Art on the WWW,
www.biblical-art.com/biblicalsubject.asp?id_biblicalsubject=147&pagenum=1
349
Terrorism: from Samson to Atta, Shadia Drury, Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter-Spring 2003
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_1-2_25/ai_n27666895/
350
Holy Terrors, Bruce Lincoln, University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 109 - 111
351
Ibid.
352
Ibid.

90
 pleasures that acknowledge no limit or moral restraint, dreams that are capable of taking corporeal shape in
the realm of time and space.353

But, he asks, This great America: What is its worth in the scale of human values? And what
does it add to the moral account of humanity? And, by the journeys end, what will its
contribution be? After all:
Most of the value of civilizations lay in what universal truths and worldviews they have attained. These
achievements elevate feelings, edify consciences, and add depth to mans perception of the values of all
life, and human life in particular. They increase the distance between man and animal in feelings and
behavior, through mans estimation of life and things.
...
It appears that all American ingenuity is concentrated in the field of work and production, so much so that
no ability remains to advance in the field of human values. Americas productivity is unmatched by any
other nation. It has miraculously elevated life to levels that cannot be believed. But man cannot maintain
his balance before the machine and risks becoming a machine himself. He is unable to shoulder the burden
of exhausting work and forge ahead on the path of humanity, he unleashes the animal within.
...
When humanity closes the windows to faith in religion, faith in art, and faith in spiritual values altogether,
there remains no outlet for its energy to be expended except in the realm of applied science and labor, or to
be dissipated in sensual pleasure. And this is where America has ended up after four hundred years.354

Qutb excoriated at length the simplistic, violent, and promiscuous tendencies of American
popular culture. He deplores the crude screaming of jazz and the simplistic story lines and
primitive emotions of films (making an exception for Elevated, brilliant films like Gone with
the Wind).355 He cant get into the spirit of American football: each player attempts to catch
the ball with his hands and run with it toward the goal, while the players of the opposing team
attempt to tackle him by any means necessary, whether this be a blow to his stomach, or crushing
his arms and legs with great violence and ferocity. The sight of the fans as they follow this game,
or watch boxing matches or bloody, monstrous wrestling matches... is one of animal excitement
born of their love for hardcore violence.356 In possibly the raunchiest passage ever written by an
Islamic fundamentalist, he notes how

The American girl is well acquainted with her bodys seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and
in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and
in the shapely thighs, sleek legs and she shows all this and does not hide it. She knows it lies in clothes: in
bright colors that awaken primal sensations, and in designs that reveal the temptations of the body - and in
American girls these are sometimes live, screaming temptations! Then she adds to all this the fetching
laugh, the naked looks, and the bold moves, and she does not ignore this for one moment or forget it!357

Ahem. In short, Americas fascination with materialism, sensuality, and entertainment blinded its
people to the spiritual dimensions of life, such that humanity makes the gravest of errors and
risks losing its account of morals, if it makes America its example in feelings and manners.358

353
The America I Have Seen, Sayyid Qutb, trans. Tarek Masoud and Ammar Fakeeh, in America in an Arab
Mirror, Kamal Abdel-Malek (ed.), St. Martins Press, 2000, pp. 9 - 10
354
Ibid., pp. 10, 11, 14
355
Ibid., p. 24
356
Ibid., p. 14
357
Ibid., p. 22
358
Ibid., p. 26

91
But Qutbs views are not the peculiar province of a jihadi ideologist. As we have seen, even
major Christian religious figures in America considered 9/11 a deserved punishment from God.
Perhaps as relevant as the statements of Muslim and Christian fundamentalists, however, are the
writings of foreign policy intellectuals who believed before 9/11 that there was a crucial political
dimension to moral decline. Such writings can help us to understand the ideological milieux in
which they wrote.

In his 1993 book Out of Control, Democratic geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that we
have witnessed the massive collapse, especially in the advanced parts of the world, of almost all
established values...an ethos of consumerism masquerades as a substitute for ethical
standards.359 In the place of religious values, cornucopian permissiveness is increasingly
dominating and defining both the content and the goals of individual existence. The notion of a
permissive cornucopia involves essentially a society in which the progressive decline in the
centrality of moral criteria is matched by heightened preoccupation with material and sensual
self-gratification.360

On the whole, Brzezinski writes, the values conveyed by the media repeatedly manifest what
justifiably might be called moral corruption and cultural decadence.361 He attacks popular
entertainment, and television in particular, as having gone overboard in sensationalizing reality
as novelty detached from any moral moorings and in presenting material or sexual self-
gratification as the normal, even admirable conduct.362 He observes how American movies in
recent years have also come to be dominated by brutish violence and physical and sexual
savagery.363 Americas mass culture is driven by profiteers who exploit the hunger for
vulgarity, pornography, and even barbarism.364

The consequences of this moral vacuum are not merely spiritual but - more to the point -
geopolitical: The question arises whether a global power that is not guided by a globally
relevant set of values can for long exercise that predominance...Unless there is some deliberate
effort to reestablish the centrality of some moral criteria for the exercise of self-control over
gratification as an end in itself, the phase of American preponderance may not last long, despite
the absence of any self-evident replacement.365 If America is to lead the world, The relevance
of American values to what might eventually be called a new world order thus becomes the
essential question.366 Consumerist values that, economically and ecologically, cannot be
duplicated across the planet, will not suffice. Nor will a spiritual vacuum that deprives
Americans and others throughout the world of a common bond. He concludes in his final
paragraphs:The global crisis of the spirit has to be overcome if humanity is to assert command
over its destiny.367

359
Out of Control, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Scribners, 1993, p. x
360
Ibid., p. 65
361
Ibid., p. 69
362
Ibid., p. 113
363
Ibid., p. 71
364
Ibid., p. 112
365
Ibid., p. xiii
366
Ibid., p. 101
367
Ibid., p. 230

92
Brzezinski sees a dangerous mismatch between Americas global responsibilities and its values;
although his analysis sounds like a call for radical measures (a deliberate effort to reestablish
the centrality of some moral criteria for the exercise of self-control over gratification as an end
in itself) he makes no dramatic proposals as to what is to be done. Michael Ledeen is not quite
so subtle. Ledeen, a leading neoconservative ideologue who in addition to the standard
promotion of a great revolutionary war that will transform the Middle East, insistence that
peace doesn't come from process, it comes from war, and advocacy of creative destruction,
is notable for his role in the Iran-Contra conspiracy and ties to the P2/Banco Ambrosiano milieu
in Italy; his CV is rounded out by efforts during the 1980s to paint the Soviets as masterminds of
global terrorism and an alleged role in the 2002 Niger forgeries of documents pertaining to
Iraqi uranium.368369370371372 What interest us here, however, are his views on American
corruption and decadence, and as to what should be done about them; left unchecked, the rot
spreads, corrupting the entire society. Once that happens, only violent and extremely unpleasant
methods can bring us back to virtue.373

Ledeens book Machiavelli on Leadership (1999) is a full-throated paean to the Florentines

political insight and his relevance today. Like Machiavelli, we live at a moment of profound
change in all areas of human endeavor. Just as he did, we see corruption reaching deep into
Western societies at the very moment we have soundly defeated many of our most dangerous
enemies.374 In our day, corruption of the national mission, combined with the myth that peace
is normal, produces a solvent strong enough to dissolve the strength of our armed forces and the
integrity of our political and military leaders.375 Ledeen worries that if corruption is so great
that the people are no longer outraged by the moral and political corruption of their leaders; if,
instead of demanding laws and leaders that defend virtue and advance the common good, the
people emulate the self-indulgence and indolence of the leaders, then, even if our enemies or
Fortune spare us, we are on the road to tyranny. Some fear that the seeming indifference of the
American public to the revelations about the moral and political corruption of the Clinton
administration and the President himself is evidence that the corruption has spread far and wide...
If that is the case, we will soon find ourselves in the same desperate crisis that drove Machiavelli
to call for a new dictator to set things right.376

368
The Answer to Terrorism? Revolution, Michael A. Ledeen, The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2001
www.aei.org/article/13276
369
Blind World Leadership, Michael Ledeen, The American Spectator, June 2000 www.aei.org/article/11588 In
this article, Ledeen accuses Russian intelligence agencies of planting the bombs in Moscow apartment buildings
that justified the invasion of Chechnya - a false-flag attack.
370
Well Win This War, Michael Ledeen, The American Enterprise, December 2001
371
Ledeen denies or minimizes his role in P2, Banco Ambrosiano, Iran-Contra, BCCI, etc., but see Beat the Devil,
Andrew Cockburn, The Nation, August 17, 1985, The Gospel According to Ali Agca, Alexander Cockburn, The
Nation, July 6, 1985, and Della Chiaie, George Black, The Nation, April 25, 1987, as well as UNDERWORLD a
few pages on. Also, enjoy his little joke in Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 22
372
Forging the Case for War, Philip Giraldi, The American Conservative, November 21, 2005
www.amconmag.com/article/2005/nov/21/00016/
373
Impeachment: the Machiavellian View, Michael A. Ledeen, Society, Volume 36, No. 3, March 1999, cited in
Man of the World, Jeet Heer and Dave Wagner, The Boston Globe, October 10, 2004
374
Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 16
375
Ibid., p. 67
376
Ibid., p. 133

93
Dictatorship for Ledeen is not the feared tyranny; he thinks a dictatorship might be the solution
to our problems, a guard against tyranny: Paradoxically, preserving liberty may require the rule
of a single leader - a dictator - willing to use those dreaded extraordinary measures, which few
know how, or are willing, to employ.377 In this Schmittian mindset, what is needed is a tough
leader of exceptional resolve and exemplary moral qualities within the corrupt system, one
willing to do the evil things that alone can save freedom.378 According to Ledeen, There are
several circumstances in which good leaders are likely to have to enter into evil: whenever the
very existence of the nation is threatened; when the state is first created or revolutionary change
is to be accomplished; when removing an evil tyrant; and when the society becomes corrupt and
must be restored to virtue.379 However, the entry into evil is an exceptional occurrence; Once
the dirty deed is done, you can exit. Indeed, you must exit... the evil actions must be limited to
meeting a specific crisis and must not become an integral part of the government or regime.380

Ledeen examines Machiavellis interpretation of Moses, and in particular Moses actions when,
having ascended Mount Sinai to receive the commandments, he returns to find his people
worshipping a golden calf:

Then comes the part that most people have forgotten, or never knew, but which Machiavelli knows well
and appreciates: Then Moses stood in the gate of the camp, and said: Whoso is on the Lords side, let him
come unto me. And he said unto them: Thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel: Put ye every man his
sword upon his thigh, and go to and fro from gate to gate throughout the camp, and slay every man his
brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbor. And the sons of Levi did according to
the word of Moses; and there fell of the people that day about three thousand men. Machiavelli notes,
Whoever reads the Bible sensibly will see that Moses was forced, were his laws and institutions to go
forward, to kill numberless men... Machiavelli doesnt pretend that the means used by Moses were good.
He knows that somewhere in the shards of the shattered tablets it says Thou shalt not murder. He readily
admits that the means are evil, but he insists that they are the only ones that work in such dire
circumstances... there are circumstances when only doing evil ensures the victory of a good cause.381

Machiavelli, as Ledeen sees it, is simply stating the facts: if you lead, there will be occasions
when you will have to do unpleasant, even evil, things or be destroyed.382 Not only will leaders
have to violate religious strictures to prevail against merciless enemies and competitors, or to
restore a corrupt enterprise to good health, but sometimes, you may even have to sacrifice your
own people to sustain a necessary deception.383 Ledeen is pessimistic about the state of America
in the late 1990s, but he sees Machiavelli as offering a way out: Lulled into security by the
weakness of our enemies, comforted by the wealth created by our industry, our leaders are
sliding into the mire Machiavelli knows so well and detests so intensely. He believes he knows
how to deal with it. Do we?384

377
Ibid., p. 124
378
Ibid., p. 129
379
Ibid., p. 81
380
Ibid., p. 79
381
Ibid., pp. 75 - 76
382
Ibid., p. 84
383
Ibid., p. 78.
384
Ibid., p. 105

94
Remarkably, Islamic fundamentalist perspectives on Western civilization are shared not only by
Christian fundamentalists, but by foreign policy intellectuals worried about entirely secular
matters. It would be a mistake to see a Samson in every harsh moral critic of America; most
critics, however outspoken, do not see themselves as judge, jury and executioner. The key point
is that the soil in which a Samson may grow, and the imperatives with which that perspective
might be interlinked, are not confined to the Middle East.

95
 TRANSFORMATION

The Tower is card XVI in the Tarot, a set of cards used by mystics for centuries to gain insight
into the unknown and to map the spiritual world.385 The Tower is traditionally depicted as being
struck towards the top by a bolt from the blue, the upper section beginning to collapse, and
human figures plummeting to the ground. The Russian philosopher and esotericist P. D.
Ouspensky associated the Tower with the fall of exotericism; he also linked it to the Tower of
Babel, a story told in the book of Genesis, and elaborated in countless Jewish, Christian, Islamic,
and other early sources. The gist of the story is that at one time the whole world had one
language and a common speech, and the people began to build a tower that reached to the
heavens; but when God saw this, angered by their effrontery, he said, If as one people speaking
the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for
them.386 So he confounded their languages and, according to many traditions, collapsed the
tower, destroying understanding among the peoples - perhaps the original clash of
civilizations? In Ouspenskys interpretation, the tower is a constant reminder of the Masters
teaching that the true tower must be built in ones own soul, that in the tower built by hands there
can be no mysteries, that no one can ascend to Heaven by treading stone steps. The tower should
warn the people not to believe in it. It should serve as a reminder of the inner Temple and as a
protection against the outer; it should be as a lighthouse, in a dangerous place where men have

385
See images and discussion of early depictions of the Tower, Iconology of the Tower Cards, Robert ONeill
www.tarot.com/about-tarot/library/boneill/tower
386
New International Version, Genesis 11 www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=genesis%2011&version=NIV

96
often been wrecked and where ships should not go.387 The Tower also recalls Robespierres
remark about terror, the lightning of heaven made to blast vice exalted.

According to a more contemporary take, the Tower symbolizes:

a sudden, dramatic upheaval or reversal in fortune. Usually change is gradual, giving us time to adapt, but
sometimes it is quick and explosive. This is the action of the Tower. In films, the hero sometimes slaps
someone who is groggy or babbling. Having tried everything else, he finally resorts to a sharp sting to snap
him out of it. Sudden crises are lifes way of telling you to wake up. Somethings wrong, and youre not
responding. Are you too full of pride? Expect a blow to the ego. Are you holding back your anger? Expect
the dam to burst. Are you stuck in a rut? Expect a surprise... Recognize that the disruption occurred because
it was needed. Perhaps embracing the change is too much to ask, but try to find the positive in it. In fact,
you may feel tremendous release that you have finally been forced in a new direction. You may have a
burst of insight about your situation and reach a new level of understanding about it.388

Carl Jung, the father of analytical psychology, wrote that the set of pictures in the Tarot cards
were distantly descended from the archetypes of transformation.389 They are psychological
images, symbols with which one plays, as the unconscious seems to play with its contents. They
combine in certain ways, and the different combinations correspond to the playful development
of events in the history of mankind... Those are sort of archetypal ideas, of a differentiated
nature, which mingle with the ordinary constituents of the flow of the unconscious.390 Inspired
by Jung, Tarot symbols have been employed in therapy; The therapeutic process can also be
improved by using a chaos model approach in which periods of psychic instability are
deliberately induced through stimulation of the imagination via the Tarot symbols. The Tarot
symbols are so rich that one or more are likely to produce archetypal stimulation in the clients
psyche; a drawing up from the depths (Jung)... In this way, concentration on Tarot symbols can
induce psychic bifurcation points that the therapist can then use to direct behavioral change...
Small stimuli by the therapist at such points can cause large changes in later behavior.391

The notion of the transformation of mans nature is rooted in ancient spiritual perspectives. As
James Webb has written, the idea of progressive spiritual transformation is found as the cardinal
point in all mystical texts of the Middle Ages and relates to the successive stages of the mystical
ascent toward God.392 In different guises, the idea is present in Christianity, Islam, Judiasm,
Hinduism, Buddhism, and countless other religions and belief systems throughout the world;
some have referred to it as the perennial philosophy. This viewpoint holds that there is an
ultimate transcendental reality which may be brought into awareness through inner development.
Jung approached these ideas through his investigation of alchemy; for centuries, the alchemists
sought to transform base metals into gold, but this outer work was also an allusion to the inner
spiritual transformation that it precipitated. Jung saw alchemy as the historical counterpart of

387
The Symbolism of the Tarot, P. D. Ouspensky, Donald Tyson (ed.), 1913
http://www.messagefrommasters.com/Ebooks/The-Symbolism-of-the-Tarot-Ouspensky.pdf
388
Learning the Tarot, Joan Bunning, Red Wheel, 1998, pp. 144-145
389
Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, Carl Gustav Jung, in The Archetypes and the Collective
Unconscious, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 38
390
Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930 -1934, Carl Gustav Jung, Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 923
391
Chaos and the Psychological Symbolism of the Tarot, Gerald Schueler, 1997
www.schuelers.com/chaos/chaos7.htm
392
The Occult Establishment, James Webb, Library Press, 1976, p. 17

97
my psychology of the unconscious.393 He wrote that it was only after encountering alchemy that
he understood that the unconscious is a process, and that the psyche is transformed or
developed by the relationship of the ego to the contents of the unconscious... Through the study
of these collective transformation processes and through understanding of alchemical symbolism
I arrived at the central concept of my psychology: the process of individuation.394

Individuation, in Jungs psychology, was a process of coming to terms with and integrating the
unconscious, the psychic underworld. In part, this involves coming to terms with ones personal
unconscious material acquired in the process of development, but Jung also argued that there
existed a collective unconscious, an unconscious shared by different individuals, whose
contents can be found everywhere, which is naturally not the case with the personal
contents.395 The collective unconscious contained pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which
can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic
contents.396 These archetypes patterned and organized thought, explaining, for instance, the
phenomenon that certain motifs from myths and legends repeat themselves the world over in
identical forms.397 Remaining repressed and unrecognized, the unconscious and its archetypes
wield tremendous and invisible power over conscious life, and such power can be exploited:
The energy of archetypes can be focused (through rituals and other appeals to mass emotion) to
move people to collective action.398 Our psyches are polarized between a conscious that is
rational but cut off from deeper values, and an unconscious that is repressed, festering, and
subtly powerful. It was necessary to transform consciousness through the union of opposites of
conscious and unconscious to develop freedom and true individuality.399 The idea was to
confront the conscious material with the unconscious - inevitably causing confusion, but
triggering a process of reconciliation and eventual synthesis.

All the highest achievements of virtue, as well as the blackest villainies, are individual, Jung
wrote, but mass society and culture tends to repress such individuality, favoring instead
sociality and whatever is collective in the individual.400 Facebook, anyone? The individual
elements lapse into the unconscious, where, by the law of necessity, they are transformed into
something essentially baleful, destructive, and anarchical. Socially, this evil principle shows
itself in the spectacular crimes - regicide and the like - perpetrated by certain prophetically-
inclined individuals; but in the great mass of the community it remains in the background, and
only manifests itself indirectly in the inexorable moral degeneration of society.401 Morality,
Jung argues, depends on the ability of a human being to act as a free individual, in defiance of
his society if necessary; as for the man of today, however, the greatest infamy on the part of his
group will not disturb him, so long as the majority of his fellows steadfastly believe in the

393
Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Carl Gustav Jung, Pantheon, 1973, p. 205
394
Ibid., p. 209
395
On the Psychology of the Unconscious, Carl Gustav Jung, in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, Routledge,
1999, p. 66
396
The Concept of the Collective Unconscious, Carl Gustav Jung, in Archetypes, op. cit., p. 43
397
The Personal and the Collective Unconscious, Carl Gustav Jung, in Two Essays, op. cit., p. 65
398
Man and his Symbols, Carl Gustav Jung, Marie-Louise von Franz, et. al., Doubleday, 1964, p. 79
399
The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, Carl Gustav Jung, in Two Essays, op. cit., p. 223
400
Ibid., p. 152
401
Ibid., p. 153

98
exalted morality of their social organization.402 The problem is that Modern man does not
understand how much his rationalism (which has destroyed his capacity to respond to
numinous symbols and ideas) has put him at the mercy of the psychic underworld. He has freed
himself from superstition (or so he believes), but in the process he has lost his spiritual values
to a positively dangerous degree. His moral and spiritual tradition has disintegrated, and he is
now paying the price for this break-up in a world-wide disorientation and dissociation.403

The path out of this mess was hinted at by the alchemists, for whom there was first of all an
initial state in which opposite tendencies or forces were in conflict; secondly there was the great
question of a procedure which would be capable of bringing the hostile elements and qualities,
once they were separated, back to unity again.404405 In this procedure, The initial state, named
the chaos, was not given from the start but had to be sought for as the prima materia.406 The end
state would amount to some kind of new order. The repression of one of the opposites leads
only to a prolongation and extension of the conflict, in other words, to a neurosis. The therapist
therefore confronts the opposites with one another and aims at uniting them permanently; the
dark, unpleasant, shadowy aspects once concealed must be revealed and integrated.407 The
archetypes cannot be integrated simply by rational means, but require a dialectical procedure, a
real coming to terms with them, often conducted by the patient in dialogue form, so that, without
knowing it, he puts into effect the alchemical definition of the meditatio: an inner colloquy with
ones good angel. Usually the process runs a dramatic course, with many ups and downs. It
expresses itself in, or is accompanied by, dream symbols that are related to the representations
collectives, which in the form of mythological motifs have portrayed psychic processes of
transformation since the earliest times.408 Ultimately, The division into two was necessary in
order to bring the one world out of the state of potential into reality.409

James Webb ran into many of the same problems in exploring the neglected influence of the
occult in politics and society, and in supposedly scientific or rationalist theories of man and
the universe which appear to have nothing to do with the irrational at all.410 In his exploration of
the subject, the occult amounts to rejected knowledge that repeatedly bubbles up to relevance
and plays a significant, though little perceived role in shaping history.411 He traces its influence
in places as varied as Irish and Scottish nationalism, Nazi Germany, and the 1960s
counterculture; indeed, the religious and the political, the occult and the revolutionary, run in
the same paths, employ each others language.412 The common element in these trends is a
flight from reason, a reason that has become somehow suspect in its unimaginative

402
Ibid., p. 154
403
Man and his Symbols, op. cit., p. 84
404
Mysterium Coniunctionis, Carl Gustav Jung, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953, p. xiv
405
Conspiracy theory in some ways parallels alchemy, which in its day was not a science with a reliable
methodology and a fully elaborated set of tools, techniques, and institutions to support its endeavor, but a valuable
subject of study still handicapped by conceptual, technical, and institutional limitations on its practice. Despite many
dead ends, its practice led to the development of the science of chemistry (and illuminating psychological insights).
406
Ibid.
407
Ibid., p. xv
408
Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, op. cit., pp. 40 - 41
409
Mysterium, op. cit., p. 462
410
Occult Establishment, op. cit., p. 2
411
Ibid., p. 10
412
The Occult Underground, James Webb, Open Court, 1974, p. 12

99
materialism, towards the irrational, which far from being non-rational, has its own special
logic: There is no need to argue divine intervention in history to maintain that the immaterial
and immeasurable causes, particularly of mass movements, are at least as important as material
stimuli. The imbalance in the attitude of the dedicated materialist results from his rejection of the
irrational element in humanity. However much man might like to consider himself rational,
history proliferates with examples that this is not the case. There is a forceful irrational side to
his nature which keeps breaking through.413 In Webbs account, the occult plays a similar role,
on a large scale, to that played by the unconscious in Jungs analysis of the individual psyche.

Webb shared Jungs interest in the idea of spiritual development, which has assumed great
significance in the ideological struggles of this century; for in the crisis of consciousness from
which this argument takes its starting-point the governing factor is anxiety induced by change...
because the crisis of consciousness was occasioned so greatly by the conscious or unconscious
perception of change, the ultimate possible change began to appear to many reformers the only
fruitful method of attack. This was the changing of man himself - the perfection of the human
being, so palpably imperfect and self-destructive.414

The notion of changing man and progressive spiritual transformation was originally a personal
matter, a question of how a single individual might be improved, but this same notion was later
turned, in the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries, from the private transformation aspired to by the
mystic, to the mass social transformation aspired to by revolutionaries; The esoteric idea of the
spiritual development of the individual man could be extended by social theorists to all
humanity... performing, as it were, an alchemical transmutation upon whole peoples.415

413
Ibid., p. 361
414
Occult Establishment, op. cit., pp. 15 - 16
415
Ibid., p. 18

100
 UNDERWORLD

Terrorist groups and intelligence agencies are the most visible faces of clandestine power,
thrusting above the waters into public prominence. Much more rarely does the murky
underworld clear enough to offer a brief glimpse of the tendrils in which governments and elites
across the world are ensnared. Such a moment arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the
form of investigations conducted by a number of Congressional committees. Their reports were
couched in the cautious diplomatic language of people hoping to continue their political lives,
and the most explosive allegations were played down, but the facts needed no exaggeration.

A Senate committee headed by Senator John Kerry dove into the mechanics of international
narcotics trafficking and its relationship to foreign policy and law enforcement. The Committees
report concluded that drug cartels have become a powerful supra-national political force with
economic resources of a magnitude to shape developments in Central and South America, and
throughout the Caribbean... The Columbian cartels constitute an international underworld so
extensive, so wealthy, and so powerful, that today they operate virtually unchallenged... Men like
Pablo Escobar, Jorge Ochoa, Jaime Guillot-Lara, and Carlos Lehder, formed ocean-spanning,
mafia-like organizations capable of very large and very complex undertakings.416 The cartels
have undermined some governments and taken over others in our hemisphere. They work with
revolutionaries and terrorists. They have demonstrated their power to corrupt military and
civilian institutions alike.417 There were serious concerns that US law enforcement had been
penetrated. The cartels had hired former federal agents and prosecutors, yielding access to
intelligence and tradecraft; A strong counter-intelligence capability must be developed as a
means of reversing the serious compromise of our law enforcement efforts.418

The Committee subjected the Nicaraguan Contras - right-wing rebels against the left-wing
government - to particular scrutiny, as a result of allegations that US officials had broken the law
to support the Contras, established a clandestine finance mechanism, and even become mixed up
in drug trafficking. It turned out that Lt. Col. Oliver North, operating out of the National Security
Council apparatus, had assembled a private covert action network to get around Congressional
prohibitions on support for the Contras; the Committee found that Although it might have been
unintended, this private support network, encouraged by certain officials of the U.S.
Government, served as a magnet for many individuals who exploited their activities on behalf of
the Contras as a cover for illegal gun-running and narcotics trafficking.419 It was furthermore
apparent that not only were drug cartels exploiting the clandestine infrastructure established by
North but that some officials may have turned a blind eye to these activities.420 In sum, Not
only did the actions of the North network undermine our governments war on terrorism, but
they also damaged the war on drugs.421

416
Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International
Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, December
1988, pp. 7 - 8 www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/north06.pdf
417
Ibid., p. 2
418
Ibid., p. 139
419
Ibid., p. 124
420
Ibid., p. 136
421
Ibid., p. 132

101
This nature of this private network was exposed through the investigations of other congressional
committees as well as the Tower Commission appointed by President Reagan. Their reports cast
illegal support for the Contras and ties to drug money as part of a larger conspiracy arranged by
the North network, Iran-Contra, which involved the covert sale of arms by the United States to
Iran (officially its bitter enemy). To this end, Israel transferred thousands of missiles from its
own stocks to Iran (officially its bitter enemy); Israels missile stocks were replenished by the
United States; and Iran transferred its payment to Norths network via a series of intermediaries.
This skullduggery had been justified to Reagan as being essential to free US hostages in Lebanon
through Iranian mediation; in fact, the Independent Counsel concluded, the activities of the
North network were inconsistent with the goal of releasing the hostages.422 The real purpose of
the plan was to create a hidden slush fund under the exclusive control of the conspirators.423

According to the joint Congressional report, North and his associates created what they called
the Enterprise, a private organization designed to engage in covert activities on behalf of the
United States. The Enterprise, functioning largely at Norths direction, had its own airplanes,
pilots, airfield, operatives, ship, secure communications devices, and secret Swiss bank
accounts.424 The network made $48 million during two years from arms sales to Iran and the
Contras, together with private contributions; Its income-generating capacity came almost
entirely from its access to U.S. Government resources and connections.425

Although some of the money was skimmed off in commissions by the organizers, most went
towards covert action.426 The Nicaraguan Contras were the first to benefit from diversion of
funds from the Enterprise, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, yet C.I.A. Director Casey
saw the diversion as part of a more grandiose plan to use the Enterprise as a stand-alone, off-
the-shelf, covert capacity that would act throughout the world while evading Congressional
review.427 North testified that as early as 1984 Casey wanted to establish an offshore entity
capable of conducting operations in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy that was stand-alone -
financially independent of appropriated funds and, in turn, Congressional oversight.428 The
Congressional report defines the covert action pursued by the Enterprise as an attempt by a
government to influence political behavior and events in other countries in ways that are
concealed (which is strikingly close to Sunstein and Vermeules earlier noted definition of
conspiracy theory, an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations
of powerful people, who have also managed to conceal their role.)429

The deals with Iran and the Contras were supposed to be just the beginning. A plan was
developed within the Enterprise to use DEA and Israeli contacts to fund and equip a force in

422
Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Part III: The Operational Conspiracy,
Lawrence E. Walsh, August 4, 1993, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
423
Ibid.
424
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th Congress, 1st Session,
November 13, 1987 www.archive.org/stream/reportofcongress87unit
425
Ibid., p. 331
426
Ibid.
427
Ibid., p. 8
428
Ibid., p. 332
429
Ibid., p. 375

102
Lebanon.430 Israeli counterterrorism advisor Amiram Nir proposed to use Israels share of the
profits for a set of joint covert operations in the Middle East; other plans were made to fund anti-
communist groups around the world.431 The early exposure of Iran-Contra thwarted these
ambitions; many of the principals were tried and convicted, but all were pardoned by President
George H. W. Bush. Some of those involved in the Enterprise, including Admiral John
Poindexter, John Negroponte, and Elliott Abrams, were appointed to significant positions in the
George W. Bush administration. Others, such as Michael Ledeen and Oliver North, took leading
roles outside government in selling the war on terror.

The Iran-Contra case provides a glimpse into the informal relationships, private networks, and
unorthodox methods that can be crucial in advancing a covert foreign policy. The investigators
warnings that The democratic processes... are subverted when intelligence is manipulated to
affect decisions by elected officials and the public would prove prescient.432 Iran-Contra also
illustrates how private covert infrastructure can be turned to other purposes; established with
quiet official blessing for a rational but secret foreign policy aim, the highly profitable
arrangements and unaccountable power involved can cause the network to mutate into something
quite different. The Congressional report describes the Enterprises more ambitious efforts as
ventures that began with ambitious expectations but accomplished nothing.433 Yet, the report
concludes, the fate of these ventures cannot obscure the danger of privatization of covert
operations or the fact that the participants in the Enterprise had audacious plans for covert
operations. Had the architects of the other operations been emboldened by success, and not
frustrated by failure, the Committees can only conjecture, with apprehension, what other
uncontrolled covert activities on behalf of the United States lay in store.434

Iran-Contra was just an appetizer. Senator John Kerry, along with Senator Hank Brown,
continued the investigation into drug financing, money-laundering, foreign policy, and black
money, and found that many of the leads went back to a single bank: the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International. BCCI was founded in Britain by Agha Hasan Abedi, a Pakistani
national, and underwent explosive expansion during the 1970s and 1980s to become a leading
international financial institution. Unbeknownst to most, it was also an organization that
constituted international financial crime on a massive and global scale.435 According to Kerry
and Browns report, BCCIs connections, activities, and characteristics included:

A Ponzi-scheme structure involving the use of new deposits to finance operating

expenses, resulting in the disappearance of most of the banks $23 billion stated assets.436

Capitalization by oil-rich Gulf Arab emirates, apparently as at-risk investors, in fact

guaranteed no-risk returns - an arrangement designed to encourage a false sense of
confidence in the banks probity.437

430
Ibid., p. 367
431
Ibid., p. 366 - 367
432
Ibid., p. 382
433
Ibid., p. 369
434
Ibid.
435
The BCCI Affair, Senator John Kerry and Senator Hank Brown, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd
Congress, 2nd Session, December 1992, Executive Summary www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/
436
Ibid., BCCI and Law Enforcement

103
 Manipulation of commodities and securities markets in Europe and Canada.438

Laundering of billions of dollars in drug money, from the cocaine profits of the
Columbian cartels to the heroin money of Afghanistan and Pakistan.439

Financing of the Pakistani nuclear program, often on a charitable basis, as well as

support for what would later be identified as the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology
smuggling network, involving proliferation to countries such as North Korea, Libya, and
Iran, with business relationships from Malaysia to Western Europe to Israel.440

Finance for the Abu Nidal terrorist organization through BCCI London.441

Special procurement of prostitutes, including children, for VIPs.442

Banking and money laundering for figures such as Manuel Noriega and Pablo Escobar.443

BCCI was incontestably used by key Iran/Contra figures to finance arms shipments to
Iran in connection with the secret Reagan Administration initiative.444

Managing transactions for arms dealers such as Adnan Khashoggi, Manoucher

Ghorbanifar, and Monzer al-Kassar.445

Arming and training of drug cartel death squads by Israeli intelligence operatives.446

Secret ownership of First American, the CIAs bank of choice, a takeover facilitated by
former Saudi intelligence head and longtime CIA liaison Kamal Adham.447 In order to
enter the US market, BCCI deceived regulators in collusion with nominees including the
heads of state of several foreign emirates, key political and intelligence figures from the
Middle East, and entities controlled by the most important bank and banker in the Middle
East.448 Moreover, Equally important to BCCI's successful secret acquisitions of U.S.
banks in the face of regulatory suspicion was its aggressive use of a series of prominent
Americans, beginning with Bert Lance, and continuing with former Defense Secretary
Clark Clifford, former U.S. Senator Stuart Symington, well-connected former federal
bank regulators, and former and current local, state and federal legislators... Thus, it was

437
Ibid., BCCIs Criminality
438
Ibid., Executive Summary
439
Ibid., BCCIs Criminality
440
Ibid., BCCIs Relationship with Foreign Governments, Central Banks, and International Organizations
441
Ibid., BCCIs Criminality
442
Ibid.
443
Ibid.
444
Ibid., BCCI, the CIA, and Foreign Intelligence
445
Ibid., Executive Summary
446
Ibid., BCCIs Criminality
447
Ibid., BCCI, the CIA, and Foreign Intelligence
448
Ibid., Executive Summary

104
 not merely BCCI's deceptions that permitted it to infiltrate the United States and its
banking system. Also essential were BCCI's use of political influence peddling and the
revolving door in Washington.449

Conduit of covert US and Saudi funding for Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.450 Osama bin Laden had a number of BCCI accounts.451

A relationship with retired CIA director William Casey, among other CIA officials,
credibly reported to have met with BCCI head Abedi every few months for two years.
These reports were flatly denied by the CIA, of which the Senators report notes: there
remains a wide disparity between the CIA's official account of critical relationships
between BCCI and persons associated with the CIA, and the information available from
other sources, including BCCI's own records. One is left with the choice of accepting the
official record, which requires an assessment that the other contacts between BCCI and
U.S. intelligence figures and operations are coincidental, or of assuming that the full story
of BCCI's relationship to the United States has been intentionally veiled by critical
players on both sides of that relationship.452 The report notes that former CIA officials,
including former CIA director Richard Helms and the late William Casey; former and
current foreign intelligence officials, including Kamal Adham and Abdul Raouf Khalil;
and principal foreign agents of the U.S., such as Adnan Khashoggi and Manucher
Ghorbanifar, float in and out of BCCI at critical times in its history, and participate
simultaneously in the making of key episodes in U.S. foreign policy, ranging from the
Camp David peace talks to the arming of Iran as part of the Iran/Contra affair.453

Mass bribery of world leaders and government officials in dozens of countries;

sometimes, the bribes were naked and direct quid pro quos, such as BCCI's payments to
Central Bank officials in return for Central Bank deposits in countries like Peru. In other
cases, BCCI made campaign contributions to politicians, such as it did with General Zia
in Pakistan and Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela. In still other cases, BCCI's payments
came in the guise of charitable contributions, and provided BCCI with an entree to
generate deposits from others, as in the case of President Jimmy Carter... Abroad,
important figures with extensive contact with BCCI included former British Prime
Minister James Callaghan, then United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cueller, Jamaican prime minister Edward Seaga, Antiguan prime minister Lester Byrd; a
large number of African heads of state; and many Third World central bank officials...454

Reports described a BCCI black network which served as a global intelligence

operation and a Mafia-like enforcement squad, directly tasked with drug smuggling,

449
Ibid., BCCI in the United States: Initial Entry and FGB and NBG Takeovers
450
Ibid., BCCI, the CIA, and Foreign Intelligence
451
Bin Laden linked to BCCI, CNN.com, September 26, 2001,
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/09/26/binladen/
452
The BCCI Affair, op. cit., BCCI, the CIA, and Foreign Intelligence
453
Ibid., Executive Summary
454
Ibid., BCCIs Criminality

105
 arms trades, bribery, extortion, and murder.455 The Senate committee could not confirm
or refute these allegations based on the testimony of former senior BCCI officials.

BCCI was a nexus of large-scale, high level international corruption, shady dealings, and covert
funding implicating countless intelligence agencies, political leaders, and business elites. It is no
surprise, then, that extensive efforts were made to cover up the scandal. The CIA released only
three of several hundred reports in its possession on BCCI, stonewalled congressional
investigators, and steadfastly denied its own BCCI connections despite contrary evidence. Senior
BCCI officers, key witnesses for any investigation, were held in silence by Abu Dhabi, one of
the banks major investors.456 The UK governments Sandstorm report into the BCCI affair was
and remains classified (though a heavily redacted version is available in the US). Many key
individuals died or were incapacitated before they could be questioned, including former CIA
Director William Casey, arms dealers Ben Banerjee and Cyrus Hashemi, and BCCI head Agha
Hasan Abedi. Few others talked. The Justice Department not only made critical errors in its
treatment of the BCCI case, but masked inactivity in prosecuting and investigating the bank by
advising critics that matters pertaining to BCCI were under investigation, when in fact they
were not.457 These actions were compounded by the Justice Department's attempts to hinder
other legitimate investigative efforts, and by the Justice Department's inability to admit that it
had made any of these mistakes.458 Serious investigations came at first only from less august
sources, namely the New York District Attorneys office and the US Customs Service. If these
limited investigations were able to expose all of the above, one can only wonder what more
remained to be covered up.

BCCI is important not just because it illustrates one extraordinary web of corrupt and covert
relationships, but because it is a specific instance of such networks that helps us grasp the
general type: BCCI cannot be taken as an isolated example of a rogue bank, but a case study of
the vulnerability of the world to international crime on a global scope that is beyond the current
ability of governments to control. Its multi-billion dollar collapse is merely the latest in a series
of international financial scandals that have bedeviled international banking this century. Its
techniques and its associations with government officials, intelligence agencies, and arms
traffickers, were neither new nor unique.459 When we look back at Ergenekon, Gladio/P2, and
the pre-war Japanese networks involved in conspiracies and false-flag plots, we find that all three
were involved to a greater or lesser extent in the underworld, including narcotics smuggling (all
three), transnational organized crime (all three), money laundering and financial scandals
(Ergenekon and P2), on top of the expected ties to intelligence, terrorism, and politics. High-
sounding motives and abject criminality, in these milieux, go hand in hand.

The BCCI head was one phone call away from intelligence chiefs, international terrorists,
political leaders, drug barons, dictators, arms dealers, and rogue commodity traders - all of whom
were implicated in the same web of relationships that very often could not be acknowledged

455
B.C.C.I.: The Dirtiest Bank of All, Jonathan Beaty, S.C. Gwynne, Cathy Booth, Jay Branegan, Helen Gibson,
TIME, July 29, 1991 www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973481,00.html
456
The BCCI Affair, op. cit., BCCI, the CIA, and Foreign Intelligence
457
Ibid., BCCI and Law Enforcement
458
Ibid.
459
Ibid., Introduction

106
because of their criminality, covert intelligence nature, or both. BCCI was not just a bank where
all of these people happened to put their money; it was a criminal enterprise that actively
facilitated and participated in the deeds of its clients. The potential for BCCI to act as a
matchmaker among clients is clear. The dynamics of Ive got something on you relationships
could generate all kinds of unusual network hierarchies; even the most unlikely parties could
become allies if they each knew something damning about the other. Alternatively, people could
end up being controlled by those they thought they were controlling. Such networks could easily
spin out of control.

If such a nexus were to produce a singular catastrophic result - even unintended by most of the
parties involved - all of the parties connected to the nexus would have a very strong interest in
diverting attention away from the nexus as a root cause. An investigation focusing on the nexus
would, at the very least, tear a gaping wound in the belly of international elites, exposing the guts
of covert activities, corruption, crime, and under-the-table relationships, and feeding public
demands to know the full extent of the matter (something that did not happen in the BCCI case).
For that reason, a nexus that cannot stand to see the light of day might even be a magnet for
conspiracy.

107
 VIRTUAL

For those who died, and for their friends and families, there was nothing virtual about 9/11 - just
very real pain and loss. But the drama of 9/11 unfolded in front of America and the world like no
other event in history. In this theatre, 9/11 became a virtual event, the name of an alloy of ideas
forged in the crucible of the government and the media by the flames of fear and anger. The
scope of these ideas ranged from the Middle East to military tactics to constitutional law. It is the
virtual 9/11 that allowed wars to be launched, age-old rights and laws to be abrogated, and
trillions of dollars to be spent. The hypnotic power of this virtual 9/11 was at first mysterious, for
while the deaths of 3000 people is a national tragedy, 40,000 people die violent deaths every year
in America from car accidents, and this vast toll has not encouraged Americans radically to
change their automobile-centered society, surrender long-held rights and freedoms, or spend
trillions of dollars fighting the problem.460 Around 14,000 people are murdered in America every
year, of whom two thirds are killed with guns.461 Yet Americans have stuck to their Second
Amendment rights much more fiercely than to their First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Amendment rights curtailed after 9/11.

The events, shocking the population and paralyzing the countrys democratic institutions, were
used to develop a political myth, the power of which policy elites have long understood. Philip
Zelikow, the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, explained his approach to
contemporary political history in 1999:

Contemporary is defined functionally by those critical people and events that go into forming the
publics presumptions about its immediate past. This idea of public presumption is akin to... public myth
but without the negative implication sometimes invoked by the word myth. Such presumptions are beliefs
(1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty), and (2) shared in common
within the relevant political community. The sources for such presumptions are both personal (from direct
experience) and vicarious (from books, movies, and myths)... The power of these presumptions derives
from their role in facilitating conversation, analysis, and understanding.462

Far from seeing a role for contemporary political history in challenging public presumptions,
Zelikow evidently thinks history should work within those presumptions, the better to shape
public understanding. This is all the more important for particularly searing or molding
events [which] take on transcendent importance and, therefore, retain their power...463 As
Zelikow sees it, readers are drawn to histories that help answer how the choices of individuals
in the past either affect me or instruct me.464 The role of the historian (reading between the
lines) is not to search for truth, but to make people sure learn the right lessons. After 9/11,
Zelikow wrote that this shock gave emerging trends a form, brought them into mass
consciousness, and forced upon us the task of defining a comprehensive national response.465
This statement describes to perfection the purpose of the official story.

460
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx
461
Crime in the United States 2009 - Expanded Homicide Data Table 9, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
September 2010, www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_09.html
462
Thinking About Political History, Philip Zelikow, Miller Center Report Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter 1999
463
Ibid.
464
Ibid.
465
The Transformation of National Security, Philip Zelikow, The National Interest, Spring 2003

108
This approach to truth was put more bluntly by a senior aide to President Bush (later identified
as Karl Rove) in an interview with Ron Suskind;

The aide said that guys like me were in what we call the reality-based community, which he defined as
people who believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality. I nodded and
murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. That's not the way
the world really works anymore, he continued. Were an empire now, and when we act, we create our
own reality. And while youre studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - well act again, creating
other new realities, which you can study too, and thats how things will sort out. Were historys actors...
and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.466

What we are left with, amid the rubble created by such arrogance, is a fairly sordid myth
concocted to suit the political needs of the moment. As we have begun to see, the truth about
9/11 is that we do not know the truth - which does not mean we should not keep trying to find
out. However, telling stories about the unknown is one of the most natural human behaviors, and
the seeds of another, more elevating, myth have been sown. Unlike a myth told for mere
propagandistic purposes (which, in the absence of unambiguous evidence, will be the case of any
story about 9/11 that seeks mainly to point out a culprit or undergird a policy) this myth can be
seen as noble, in inviting us to a perspective both tragic and philosophical, evoking the deepest
problems we face. For science, incited by its powerful delusion, speeds on inexorably right to
its limits at which point the scientist stares out into something which cannot be illuminated.
When, at this point, he sees to his horror how at these limits logic turns around on itself and
finally bites its own tail - then a new form of knowledge breaks through, tragic insight, which, in
order merely to be endured, requires art as a protector and healer.467 When, after delineating the
outlines of the case, the detective Dupin puts away his magnifying glass and despairs of proving
a suspects guilt, when Socrates voices an opinion but then wisely professes ignorance, the tragic
poet must spin his myths.

Friedrich Schiller observed that The philosophical mind cannot dwell on the material of world
history long, until a new impulse striving for harmony becomes active in him, one which
irresistibly stimulates him to assimilate everything around him into his rational nature, and to
raise every phenomenon he sees to its highest recognizable effect, to thought.468 As the thinker
studies in this spirit, he is inspired to connect that, as means and intent, which he sees to be
interlocked as cause and effect. One phenomenon after the other begins to shed blind caprice,
lawless freedom, and to add itself as a well-fitting link to an harmonious whole (which,
admittedly, exists only in his imagination).469

The researcher takes this harmony from out of himself, and plants it outside of himself into the
order of things, i.e., he brings a reasonable purpose into the course of the world, and a
teleological principle into world history. With this principle he wanders once more through
world history, and holds it up, testing it against each phenomenon which this grand theater
presents him. He sees it confirmed by a thousand concurring facts, and disproved by just as many
466
Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush, The New York Times Magazine, October 17, 2004
www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/17BUSH.html
467
The Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche, Kessinger Publishing, 2004, p. 50
468
What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History?, Friedrich Schiller, trans. Caroline Stephan and
Robert Trout, www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/Schiller_essays/universal_history.html
469
Ibid.

109
others; but as long as important links are missing in the course of changes in the world, as long
as destiny withholds the final explanations about so many events, he declares this question to be
undecided, and that opinion will triumph, which is able to offer the greater satisfaction to the
mind, and to the heart, the greater bliss.470

Schiller warns that a world history according to the latter plan can be expected only in the most
recent times. A precipitous application of this grand standard could easily lead the historian into
the temptation to do violence to events, and thus to move more and more away from this bright
epoch of world history, in the desire to accelerate it.471 Nonetheless,

attention cannot be called too early to this illuminated, and yet so neglected side of world history, that
through which it attaches itself to the highest object of all human endeavors; such a perspective will
enkindle light in your mind, and a charitable enthusiasm in your heart. It will cure your mind of the
common and narrow view of moral matters, and while it displays the grand picture of the times and nations
before your eyes, it will improve upon the rash decisions of the moment, and the limited judgments of
egoism. While it accustoms a person to connect himself with the entirety of what is past, and to rush on
with his conclusions into the far future, so it veils the boundary between birth and death which
circumscribes human life so narrowly and so oppressively, and it thus extends his brief existence, by
optical illusion, into an infinite space, and, unnoticed, leads the individual over into the species.472

In this light, even the evil acts of selfish leaders contribute something to humanity; What history
keeps secret from the reproachful conscience of a tyrant it rushes to proclaim to mankind: The
egoistic man may indeed pursue baser ends, but he unconsciously promotes splendid ones.473
What Schiller proposes might be called a sublime interpretation of world history.

Edmund Burke had observed before Schiller the strange phenomenon that, when confronted with
the misfortune of others in theatrical tragedy, we not only feel sympathy, but are enthralled by
the spectacle. Burke dismisses the argument that this is because the sufferings on the stage are
not real; on the contrary, The nearer it approaches the reality, and the farther it removes us from
all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power.474 Yet even the most realistic drama lacks the
power of real-life tragedy; This noble capital, the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no
man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a conflagration or an earthquake,
though he should be removed himself to the greatest distance from the danger. But suppose such
a fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all parts would crowd to behold the ruins,
and amongst many who would have been content never to have seen London in its glory!475
Such scenes command our attention with hypnotic power, and move us on the deepest levels.
Burke described this as the sublime.

According to Burke, the definitive effect of the sublime is astonishment; and astonishment is
that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this
case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by
consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the

470
Ibid.
471
Ibid.
472
Ibid.
473
Ibid.
474
The Sublime and Beautiful, Burke, op. cit. www.bartleby.com/24/2/
475
Ibid., p. 30

110
sublime, that, far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on
by an irresistible force.476 As such, terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or
latently, the ruling principle of the sublime, for No passion so effectually robs the mind of all
its powers of acting and reasoning as fear.477

Schiller begins his investigation of the sublime with the question of freedom. Human nature is to
be free, and as such man makes claim by his nature, to suffer from no violence, but we have
always been and remain surrounded by forces that threaten to or actually do hurt us, overwhelm
our free will, and thus throw our very humanity into question.478 Through physical culture man
has sought to defend himself, and By his understanding he does indeed enhance his natural
forces in an artificial manner, and up to a certain point he actually succeeds in becoming
physically master over everything physical.479 Yet if there is even a single exception, as
inevitably there will be, this would annul the whole notion of Man. By no means can he be the
being, which wills, if there is even but a single case, where he absolutely must, what he does not
will. This single terrible one, which he merely must and does not will, will accompany him as a
ghost and, as is also actually the case among the majority of men, deliver him as a prey to the
blind terrors of the phantasy; his boasted freedom is absolutely nothing, if he is bound even in a
single point.480

Now thus were his freedom done for, if it were capable of no other than physical culture; but
man is not merely a physical sensuous being.481 He possesses an inner sphere of moral and
intellectual freedom, sometimes perhaps forgotten and co-opted, but never extinguished. Here
the paradoxical experience of the sublime comes into play as a liberating force:

It is a combination of woefulness, which expresses itself in its highest degree as a shudder, and of
joyfulness, which can rise up to enrapture, and, although it is not properly pleasure, is yet widely preferred
to every pleasure by fine souls. This union of two contradictory sentiments in a single feeling proves our
moral independence in an irrefutable manner. For as it is absolutely impossible that the same object stand
in two opposite relations to us, so does it follow therefrom, that we ourselves stand in two different
relations to the object, so that consequently two opposite natures must be united in us, which are interested
in the conception of the same in completely opposite ways. We therefore experience through the feeling of
the sublime, that the state of our mind does not necessarily conform to the state of the senses, that the laws
of nature are not necessarily also those of ours, and that we have in us an independent principle, which is
independent of all sensuous emotions...And thus has nature even employed a sensuous means, to teach us,
that we are more than merely sensuous; thus did she even know to utilize sensations, to lead us to the track
of this discovery, that we are not in the least subjected slavishly to the violence of the sensations.482

In experiencing the sublime, reason and sensuousness do not harmonize, and precisely in this
contradiction between both lies the charm wherewith it seizes our soul. The physical and the
moral man are separated here from one another most sharply; for exactly in such objects, where
the first only feels its limits, does the other have the experience of its force and is elevated

476
Ibid., pp. 38 - 39
477
Ibid., pp. 39 - 40
478
On the Sublime, Friedrich Schiller, trans. William F. Wertz, Jr.
www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/trans_on_sublime.html
479
Ibid.
480
Ibid.
481
Ibid.
482
Ibid.

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infinitely precisely through that which presses the other to the ground; the mind is driven
irresistibly from the world of phenomena into the world of ideas, from the conditioned into the
unconditioned.483 It is confronted with the sublime that our sensuous nature feels its limits, but
our rational nature its superiority, its freedom from limits; in the face of this we thus derive
physically our brevity, which we surmount but morally, i.e. through ideas.484

The sublime, therefore, procures for us an exit from the sensuous world, wherein the beautiful would
gladly always keep us imprisoned. Not gradually (for there is no transition from dependency to freedom),
but rather suddenly and through a shock, does it tear the independent spirit away from the net, wherewith
the refined sensuousness ensnared him, and which binds so much the more tightly, the more transparently it
is spun... so is a single sublime emotion often enough to tear up this web of deceit, to give back to this
fettered spirit its entire elasticity all at once, to give it a revelation of its true destination, and to impose a
feeling of its dignity, at least for a moment. 485

9/11 is commonly called a tragedy, but this approach takes the assertion seriously. There are
practical reasons why the tragic version is more conspiratorial in nature (most proponents of the
official myth have not figured out that it is a myth, and if they did, it would seem a rather
uninspiring one) but there are also reasons inherent to the art. As Aristotle described it in its
theatrical heyday, tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain
magnitude and in particular of events inspiring fear or pity. Such an effect is best produced
when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time,
they follow as cause and effect. The tragic wonder will then be greater than if they happened of
themselves or by accident; for even coincidences are most striking when they have an air of
design.486 As such, most important of all is the structure of the incidents, for the incidents
and the plot are the end of a tragedy, and a plot and artistically constructed incidents can
make up for other deficiencies, for Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of
life, and life consists in action.487 Crucially, If an enemy kills an enemy, there is nothing to
excite pity either in the act or the intention - except so far as the suffering in itself is pitiful. So
again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic incident occurs between those who are near
or dear to one another - if, for example, a brother kills, or intends to kill, a brother, a son his
father, a mother her son, a son his mother, or any other deed of the kind is done - these are the
situations to be looked for by the poet.488 The object is a transformation of the audience;
through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.

The tragic approach might find something particularly intriguing in the symbolic drama of the
event. The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, writing shortly after the attacks, was one of the
first to pick up on this, writing rather cryptically (as French philosophers are wont to do) of a
symbolic strategy on the part of the terrorists:

It is almost they who did it, but we who wanted it. If one does not take that into account, the event lost all
symbolic dimension to become a pure accident, an act purely arbitrary, the murderous fantasy of a few
fanatics, who would need only to be suppressed... This goes much further than hatred for the dominant

483
Ibid.
484
Of the Sublime, Friedrich Schiller, trans. Daniel Platt www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/trans_of_sublime.html
485
On the Sublime, op. cit.
486
Poetics, Aristotle, trans. S. H. Butcher http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.html
487
Ibid.
488
Ibid.

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 global power from the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. That
malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share (this orders) benefits. An allergy to all definitive
order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied
perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order... it goes much beyond Islam
and America, on which one attempts to focus the conflict to give the illusion of a visible conflict and of an
attainable solution (through force). It certainly is a fundamental antagonism, but one which shows...
triumphant globalization fighting with itself.489

Jung describes a symbol as a term, a name, or even a picture that may be familiar in daily life,
yet that possesses specific connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning. It
implies something vague, unknown, or hidden from us... It has a wider unconscious aspect that
is never precisely defined or fully explained. Nor can one hope to define or explain it. As the
mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason.490 Symbols stand
in contrast to signs, which do no more than denote the objects to which they are attached.491
Unexplored, they conceal; explored, they reveal: symbols do not state the situation directly but
in a roundabout way.492 Symbols can hold power over us through our unconscious;
alternatively, they can be brought to consciousness and in the process reconcile our conflicts.

For such a dirty deed in human history, 9/11 was remarkably coherent symbolically. It gives the
impression less of the work of a desperate fanatic than that of an evil artist. German composer
Karlheinz Stockhausen and British artist Damien Hirst were widely condemned for their first
reaction to 9/11, to describe it as art; the former stated that it was the greatest work of art
imaginable for the whole cosmos, describing Minds achieving something in an act that we
couldnt even dream of in music, people rehearsing like mad for 10 years, preparing fanatically
for a concert, and then dying, just imagine what happened there. You have people who are that
focused on a performance and then 5,000 people are dispatched to the afterlife, in a single
moment. I couldnt do that. By comparison, we composers are nothing. Artists, too, sometimes
try to go beyond the limits of what is feasible and conceivable, so that we wake up, so that we
open ourselves to another world.493 Hirst remarked that it was an artwork in its own right. It
was wicked, but it was devised in this way for this kind of impact. It was devised visually... our
visual language has been changed by what happened on September 11.494 Coming so soon after
the tragedy, these remarks were interpreted merely as tasteless insults.

In New York, the perpetrators targeted two symmetrical pieces of architecture, symbols of
power, each of which fell unthinkably straight down into its footprint. The location of the attack
was so central and visible that all eyes and cameras were focused on one smoking tower when
the second plane hit, ensuring that the drama would not be missed. These edifices evoked

489
The Spirit of Terrorism, Jean Baudrillard, trans. Rachel Bloul, Le Monde, November 2, 2001
www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-spirit-of-terrorism/
490
Approaching the Unconscious, Carl Gustav Jung, in Man and his Symbols, Carl Gustav Jung (ed.), Random
House, 1968, p. 3
491
Ibid.
492
Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams, Carl Gustav Jung, in The Collected Works of C.G. Jung: Volume 18,
Sir Herbert Edward Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler (eds)., p. 204
493
Documentation of Stockhausens comments re: 9/11, William Osborne, www.osborne-
conant.org/documentation_stockhausen.htm
494
9/11 wicked but a work of art, says Damien Hirst, Rebecca Allison, The Guardian, September 11, 2002
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/sep/11/arts.september11

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religious and esoteric symbolism such as, individually, the transformative archetype of the
lightning-struck tower, perhaps the Tower of Babel; together, the duality of order, the temple
pulled down by Samson, perhaps the twin pillars of Freemasonry. The Pentagon, despite being a
remarkably difficult and unrewarding target for a plane crash, is suggestive of the pentagram, a
symbol with resonances across the worlds cultures. The date of 9/11 brings our mind
immediately to the concept of emergency, thanks to 911, the emergency services number in the
United States, originally known as the nine-eleven service; the 11 of September 11 reminds
us of the vanished Twin Towers. 2001 itself, as the first year of the third millennium, widely
symbolized at a popular level in the Western world some kind of ill-defined transformation; an
end and a new beginning. It emerged in more detailed imaginations ranging from those of
millennialists awaiting a third realm, to futurists envisioning a new utopia, to technological
paranoiacs fearing a secular Y2K apocalypse, to science-fiction writers such as Arthur C.
Clarke, who foresaw a very different sort of transformative event in his 2001 (the year 1422 on
the Islamic calendar held no such special significance). The WTC complex itself was intended
by architect Minoru Yamasaki to symbolize the importance of world trade to this country and
with trade the universal effort of men to seek and achieve world peace.495 9/11 is, from this
point of view, the worlds most widely viewed and most intensely contemplated artwork, and its
influence has been all the more profound from our failing to recognize it as such.

It is difficult to contemplate something as an artwork, knowing at the same time that thousands
of people died in its production. There is something twisted about looking at a very real tragedy
in the same way that we would an artistic imitation. Nonetheless, doing so may not only help to
break its hold over us, but to bring important new perspectives to consciousness; The distinction
between tragedy and the merely horrific accident or catastrophe lies in our expectation that
knowledge might emerge out of the chaos of human suffering.496

If the aesthetic may be one path to knowledge, the philosophical also instructs us. Plato proposed
what he described as a noble lie, or a magnificent myth, as a foundational story for his
Republic. This is what he proposed, in Socrates voice:

Now I wonder if we could contrive one of those convenient stories we were talking about a few
minutes ago... Some magnificent myth that would in itself carry conviction to our whole
community, including, if possible, the Guardians themselves?

What sort of story?

Nothing new - a fairy story like those the poets tell and have persuaded people to believe about
the sort of thing that often happened once upon a time, but never does now and is not likely to:
indeed it would need a lot of persuasion to get people to believe it... I shall try to persuade first
the Rulers and Soldiers, and then the rest of the community, that the upbringing and education
we have given them was all something that happened to them only in a dream.497

495
A Life in Architecture, Minoru Yamasaki, Weatherhill 1979, p. 112
496
Introduction, Rebecca Bushnell, in A Companion to Tragedy, Rebecca Bushnell (ed.), Blackwell 2005, p. 1
497
The Republic, Plato, trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin 2007, pp. 115 - 116

114
Socrates goes on to suggest telling citizens that they were born with a particular metal in their
souls: gold in the rulers, silver in the auxiliaries, and copper and iron in the farmers and
craftsmen. The objective would seem to be highly conservative: to ensure that citizens of
different capacities remain in the place to which they are most suited, to pacify the citizenry with
a unifying myth. The story reinforces political order. This is the level on which various
conspiracy theorists have understood 9/11, as a (not-so-noble) lie fed to the masses, to keep them
in their slumber.

But Platos intention with the Noble Lie may not have been a mere falsehood to placate the
masses. Jonathan Lear advances a bolder interpretation of the Noble Lie in the Republic: the aim
is to implant an allegory not recognized as such which in effect says that the entire content of
our experience up until now has been in a condition where we cannot recognize allegories as
such. It is a dream about dreaming and waking up. And unlike standard myths about the gods or
ancient heroes, this myth is explicitly about the people to whom it is being told. As such it serves
as a dreamlike wake-up call for them.498 While the Noble Lie may be politically conservative,
it is epistemically revolutionary. It is meant to instill discontent with ones entire current
epistemic condition... It teaches us to be dissatisfied with all the myths weve heard, at least
insofar as weve taken them to have more than dreamlike status.499

On a mass scale, the Noble Lie serves the same purpose as the analogy of the Cave does on the
level of a few philosophically-minded thinkers;

First, it attempts to give an account of the totality of our experience (up until now). It claims that all
experience (up till now) can be understood under the concept dream. Insofar as philosophy attempts to
comprehend the whole, this myth is an imitation of that aspiration... Secondly, the myth inherently sows the
seeds of discontent. It opens us to the idea that all our experience until now is somehow inadequate. And
although we do not yet know precisely what this allegory means, we do know that it is classifying all our
experience (until now) as somehow second-rate with regard to being well-oriented to reality. Thus it is a
myth which introduces the philosophical distinction between appearance and reality - and it tells us firmly
that up until now we have been living in appearance. In this way, the myth prepares us for philosophy.500

In other words, the first shock - the shock of 9/11 itself - is a dreamlike wake-up call, an allegory
told to people still living in a dream. It tells us that the pillars of our cultures thinking and values
can collapse; all that we think we know can be turned upside down in a moment; everything
changed in the action of a few hours. Everything before 9/11 was a pleasant dream. We discover
that we are children in the face of the worlds harsh realities, fundamental crises, and true evil,
which 9/11 condensed and dramatized into a single, inescapable moment. It acted out the
eruption of reality into an oblivious world of appearances; it seems that cold water has been
splashed on our faces, and we are now awake. Yet even afterwards, on a symbolic level, this
wake up call lets us know that even our waking up on 9/11 was not real. At the edges of our
awareness, the symbols insistently hint that we are still dreaming.

498
Allegory and Myth in Platos Republic, Jonathan Lear, in The Blackwell Guide to Platos Republic, Gerasimos
Xenophon Santas (ed.), Blackwell 2006, p. 32
499
Ibid., pp. 32 - 34
500
Ibid., p. 32

115
 WEBS

We have seen examples of private networks that bridged milieux, exploited terrorism,
manipulated politics on an ongoing basis, and remained secret until a firm decision was taken to
expose them. They benefited from, but are not to be confused with, the organizations they
operated in and around. A further shared characteristic deserves examination: these networks
were themselves all nested in still larger private networks of more subtle and inexorable power.

Such large, ramified and interlocking webs were not directly implicated in terrorism.
Nonetheless, they provided a strategic and ideological context, as well as political cover that
concealed the role of the real terrorist networks and allowed violent atrocities to secure the
intended effect by blaming suitable scapegoats. Whatever they knew, they were largely
successful in keeping secret. The Gladio networks in Italy were covered by the massive and
influential P2 web, which extended far beyond the registered members of P2 itself. The
Ergenekon networks in Turkey were - and are - covered by the larger deep state of secular
nationalists in the military and other state institutions. The Japanese officers who undertook false
flag operations in Manchuria and attempted coups detat in Japan were covered by a larger
current of militarism in the General Staff and among influential civilian ultranationalists.

These larger webs, unlike the terrorist offshoots a few have spawned, are not unusual in Western
democracies. Although some, such as P2, have engaged in criminal activities, for the most part
they are entirely legal. At times, the goals they have mobilized for have been noble and
beneficial; at times, self-serving and disastrous. The influence wielded by such broad networks
of elites can be suggestive of oligarchy, but even the most ideal democracy requires, rather than
abhors, the phenomenon of well-resourced, well-connected, and highly motivated individuals
banding together to pursue politics. In practice, a functioning democracy depends on such elite
activity at least as much as on popular mobilization (that is how the Declaration of Independence
and Constitution were written) and whether the democracy does well or poorly depends a great
deal on how much selflessness, farsightedness, and humility these elites bring to the table.
Whether their policies are narrow ideological prescriptions rammed through in the fear and anger
of a crisis, or shared aims subject to calm scrutiny and rational debate, with full respect to the
democratic process, makes the difference between elites who manipulate and elites who lead.

A common contemporary term for the activity of such webs is parapolitics, unobtrusive but far
from invisible action that shapes the more obvious political developments portrayed by the
media. Peter Dale Scott has favored the term deep politics, remarking that The key to
understanding Deep Politics is the distinction I propose between traditional conspiracy theory,
looking at conscious secret collaborations towards shared ends, and deep political analysis,
defined as the study of all those political practices and arrangements, deliberate or not, which
are usually repressed rather than acknowledged.501

What makes these webs para or deep is the fact that despite their considerable influence, they
are subject to relatively little scrutiny and attention, whether from the media or academia. Often
this is because hard data is scarce and connecting the dots is difficult; sometimes it is due to
501
Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, Peter Dale Scott, University of California Press, 1996, p. xi

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careful secrecy; perhaps also our egalitarian, democratic, and rationalist ideals are allergic to the
notion of elite politics; yet in some cases talking about well-entrenched and very self-aware
networks is actively discouraged. We will take a brief look at three such networks - not because
these particular networks are exceptionally objectionable, but because in a wide and deep ocean
they are three relatively well-documented fish, the examination of which may give us a better
general understanding of life under the waves.

The Israel Lobby is, of the three, probably the least secretive and centralized, and yet
exceptionally influential. The workings of the Lobby were laid bare in a paper and then book by
Stephen Walt, then-academic dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and John
Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago, two of Americas foremost international relations
theorists; the pair encountered great difficulty publishing their paper on the subject in America,
eventually settling for the London Review of Books. They describe the Israel Lobby as a loose
coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a
pro-Israel direction.502 While the Lobby is centered on a number of influential American Jews,
the Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals who believe Israels rebirth is part
of Biblical prophecy, support its expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to
Gods will.503

The Lobby has had a tremendous policy role, not only molding Americas actions in the Israeli-
Palestinian arena, but at times successfully framing Americas strategy for the entire region from
a pro-Israeli standpoint. Perhaps the most devastating exertion of the Lobbys power was its push
towards war in Iraq, an ideological project spearheaded as we have seen by a small band of
neoconservatives, many with close ties to Israels Likud Party, who took the lead in
manipulating the intelligence process, stirring up fear over the Saddam threat, and convincing
Bush himself of the need for action.504 Walt and Mearsheimer observe that American Jews were
actually less supportive of the war than the general population, Thus, it would be wrong to
blame the war in Iraq on Jewish influence. Rather, the war was due in large part to the Lobbys
influence, especially the neoconservatives within it.505 More recently the Lobby has been in the
forefront of those pressing for a confrontation with and even military action against Iran.
Binyamin Netanyahu was not exaggerating when he stated with confidence, early in 2001,
(unaware that he was being recorded) that I know what America is. America is a thing that can
be easily moved, moved in the right direction... They wont get in our way. They wont get in
our way.506

A key pillar of the Lobbys effectiveness is its influence in the U.S. Congress, where Israel is
virtually immune from criticism; while Jewish and Christian Zionist senators and
representatives play a role, as do pro-Israel congressional staffers, Walt and Mearsheimer
conclude that it is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, that forms the core

502
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, Kennedy School of
Government Working Paper, March 2006, p. 14 http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf
503
Ibid., p. 15
504
Ibid., p. 31
505
Ibid., p. 31 - 32
506
Bibi the Bamboozler, Richard Silverstein, July 14, 2010 (transcript and link to Israel Channel 10 clip on
Youtube) www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2010/07/14/bibi-the-bamboozler-to-settlers-america-wont-get-in-
our-way-its-easily-moved/

117
of the Lobbys influence in Congress.507 Although the Jewish vote has traditionally gone
heavily Democrat, the Lobby does not discriminate between Democrats and Republicans.
AIPACs strategy is simple but potent: fund those who uncritically support Israel, and fund the
opponents of those who dont; The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a
foreign government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.508

A second foundation of the Lobbys power is its ability to influence media coverage of the
Middle East through a wide array of outlets such as The Wall Street Journal, The New Republic,
The Washington Times, The Chicago Sun-Times, and the Weekly Standard that hew to a strictly
pro-Israeli editorial line, as well as the overwhelming number of pro-Israel pundits even in
newspapers renowned for balance. They cite former New York Times executive editor Max
Frankels remark that I was much more deeply devoted to Israel than I dared to assert...
Fortified by my knowledge of Israel and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle
East commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them from a pro-
Israel perspective.509 Coverage perceived to be hostile is countered with pressure and boycotts;
for instance, Bostons NPR station, WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in
contributions as a result of these efforts.510

A third base of influence is the think-tank community, which not only influences public opinion
but plays a vital role in policymaking. Not only does the Lobby have its own fair and balanced
think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, funded and run by individuals who
are deeply committed to advancing Israels agenda, but Over the past 25 years, pro-Israel
forces have established a commanding presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the
Brookings Institution, the Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the
Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. These think tanks are decidedly pro-Israel, and
include few, if any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.511 Such experts - whose
qualifications often do not extend beyond staunch Zionism - circulate in and out of the executive
branch, play leading roles in negotiations, and defend Israels interests at every turn.

Yet perhaps the most important technique at the Lobbys disposal is the accusation of anti-
Semitism: Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant
influence over U.S. Middle East policy - an influence that AIPAC celebrates - stands a good
chance of getting labeled an anti-Semite. In fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby
runs the risk of being charged with anti-Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to Americas Jewish Lobby. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power and then attacks
anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very effective, because anti-Semitism is loathsome
and no responsible person wants to be accused of it.512 The anti-Semitism charge is so effective
at silencing critics who challenge its power that the Israel Lobby has not been forced to conceal
its activities to the same degree as the next two networks of influence.

507
Ibid., p. 17
508
Ibid., p. 18
509
Ibid., p. 20 - 21
510
Ibid., p. 21
511
Ibid., p. 21 - 22
512
Ibid., p. 24

118
Carroll Quigley, a Georgetown University professor and Bill Clinton mentor, outlined a second
and less visible parapolitical web: that which underlay the Anglo-American special
relationship, which, like the American-Israeli relationship, is a much touted and little
understood arrangement. Some teachers camouflage their deeper insights by couching them in
language that only the careful and diligent reader will understand, a strategy highly
recommended by Leo Strauss; others such as Lyndon LaRouche achieve the same result by
playing the fool, a character easily overlooked by the somnambulant mainstream. Quigleys
technique, no less effective, was to disperse some blunt and astonishing remarks throughout a
dry 1000+ page tome that only the most fanatical bookworm would dream of hauling off the
shelf, were it not for rumors of treasure.

In this magnum opus, Tragedy and Hope (1965), Quigley remarks upon a radical Right fairy
tale which pictured the recent history of the United States... as a well-organized plot by
extreme Left-wing elements, operating from the White House itself and controlling all the chief
avenues of publicity.513 However, This myth, like all fables, does in fact have a modicum of
truth. There does exist and has existed for a generation, an international Anglophile network
which operates to some extent in the way the Radical Right believes the Communists act. In fact,
this network, which we may identify as the Round Table Groups, has no aversion to cooperating
with the Communists, or any other groups, and frequently does so. I know of the operations of
this network because I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the
early 1960s, to examine its papers and secret records... my chief difference of opinion is that it
wishes to remain unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant enough to be known.514

In Tragedy and Hope, Quigley describes the Round Table Groups as semi-secret discussion and
lobbying groups whose original purpose was to federate the English-speaking world along lines
laid down by Cecil Rhodes. By 1915, Round Table Groups existed in seven countries including
England, South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the United States.515
However, in The Anglo-American Establishment, a manuscript which went unpublished until
after his death, Quigley suggests that we are in fact dealing with a secret society [which] was
created by Rhodes and his principal trustee, Lord Milner, and continues to exist to this day.516

This was not a secret society as the melodramatic popular imagination might have it; it does not
have any secret robes, secret handclasps, or secret passwords. It does not need any of these, since
its members know each other intimately. It probably has no oaths of secrecy nor any formal
procedure of initiation. It does, however, exist and holds secret meetings, over which the senior
member present presides.517 Quigley conceptualizes the society in the form of two concentric
circles: an inner core of intimate associates, who unquestionably knew that they were members
of a group devoted to a common purpose; and an outer circle of a larger number, on whom the
inner circle acted by personal persuasion, patronage distribution, and social pressure.518 The
513
Tragedy and Hope, Carroll Quigley, Macmillan, 1966, p. 949
514
Ibid., p. 950
515
Ibid.
516
The Anglo-American Establishment, Carroll Quigley, Books in Focus, 1981, p. ix
www.archive.org/details/TheAnglo-americanEstablishment
517
Ibid.
518
Ibid., p. x

119
group has been able to conceal its existence quite successfully... satisfied to possess the reality
rather than the appearance of power.519

On the British side, as Quigley writes, the network took the lead in plotting episodes of imperial
misadventure in South Africa such as the 1895 Jameson Raid and the 1899 - 1902 Boer War;
exerted a profound influence on the British press and that of other countries under British rule;
held sway over the dominant colleges at Oxford, recruiting future international elites through the
Rhodes Scholarships; wielded often-commanding leverage with successive British governments;
played a leading role in the Treaty of Versailles and formation of the League of Nations; founded
the Royal Institute for International Affairs; and was one of the chief influences on British
policy toward Ireland, Palestine, and India in the period 1917 - 1945 and was a very important
influence on the policy of appeasement of Germany during the years 1920 - 1940.520

On the American side, the Round Table - run by J.P. Morgan bankers at first, and associated with
a number of New York law firms - put down deep roots in the Eastern Establishment,
penetrating academia and the media. It was deeply involved in the creation of the Council on
Foreign Relations and other foreign policy think-tanks, whose memberships it dominated, and
exerted much of its influence through five American newspapers (The New York Times, New
York Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, and the lamented Boston
Evening Transcript).521 Having led the policy of appeasement towards Germany, these networks
subsequently did much to secure and organize American backing for the fight against Hitler.

This network formed the intellectual hub of a relationship between the financial circles of
London and those of the eastern U.S. which reflects one of the most powerful influences in 20th
century American and world history... It is this power structure which the Radical Right in the
U.S. has been attacking for years in the belief they are attacking the Communists.522 From this
network there grew up in the 20th century a power structure between London and New York
which penetrated deeply into university life, the press, and the practice of foreign policy.523
Distinctively, the groups influence was not exercised by acting directly on public opinion; the
group never intended to influence events by acting through any instruments of mass
propaganda, but rather hoped to work on the opinions of the small group of important people,
who in turn could influence wider and wider circles of persons.524 The group accomplished this
through a number of different branches - newspapers, think tanks, academia, statesmen - whose
intimate connection was not apparent; The unanimity among the various branches was believed
by the outside world to be the result of the influence of a single Truth, while really it was the
result of the existence of a single group.525

In line with Rhodes vision, the Round Table sought to continue the universal project of the
British Empire in another form: a liberal internationalist, ultimately globalist project not unlike
the New World Order invoked by President George H. W. Bush after the end of the Cold War,
519
Ibid., p. 4
520
Ibid., p. 5
521
Tragedy and Hope, op. cit., pp. 952 - 953
522
Ibid., p. 956
523
Ibid., pp. 951 - 953
524
The Anglo-American Establishment, op. cit., p. 113
525
Ibid., p. 114

120
which he described as a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace... A world where the rule of law supplants the rule
of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and
justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.526 Quigley argues that the
Round Table and their financial backers were in no sense reactionary or Fascistic persons... they
were gracious and cultured gentlemen who were much concerned with the freedom of expression
of minorities and the rule of law for all and who were convinced that they could forcefully
civilize the Boers, the Irish, the Arabs, and the Hindus, and who are largely responsible for the
partitions of Ireland, Palestine, and India. If their failures now loom larger than their successes,
this should not be allowed to conceal the high motives with which they attempted both.527

Quigleys snapshots of this network were taken in the late 1940s and mid 1960s. It is not clear
how the power structures and relationships originally represented by the Round Table networks
have since transformed. It could be that real power in the transatlantic relationship may have
migrated elsewhere, leaving the Round Table a husk. At the very least, the network provides a
historical example of a highly influential transnational web of power that centered on a relatively
small number of people. Yet the manner in which the Blair government came to play a leading
role in the Bush administrations invasion of Iraq over great domestic opposition; the difficult-to-
explain alignment of MI6 with the neoconservatives, with active participation (in cooperation
with the British press) in efforts to spread fear; and the eerie echoes of high motives involving
attempts to forcefully civilize the Arabs and others, leave open the possibility that there may
yet be an undiscovered chapter in the history of the Anglo-American networks.

The third network has not been influential on quite the same scale as the Israel Lobby or the
Anglo-American networks. However, it is of equal interest, having gotten its hands considerably
dirtier, as documented in a manuscript by David Teacher. The Cercle-Pinay complex, or Le
Cercle, emerged in Western Europe during the early years of the Cold War, as Bilderberg Group
talks regarding Communist subversion morphed, over a few years, into discussions among
intelligence veterans, academics, clerics, politicians, businessmen, and union leaders regarding
the possibility of a covert European alliance to fight communism.528 Le Cercle, motivated by
apocalyptic visions of Bolshevik takeover, was at the center of a web of relationships associated
with coup attempts and strategies of tension in Italy, Belgium, and Portugal; linked to the
undermining of the Harold Wilson government in the United Kingdom; connected to the range of
European and American agencies, extending to South Africa and Saudi Arabia; and tied into the
same web of murky financial dealings as P2, namely, the Vatican Bank, Roberto Calvi, and the
Banco Ambrosiano scandal.529 Armed with considerable political and financial patronage, the
direct actors in the complex of organizations and discussion groups included disinformation
experts, psychological warfare specialists, and old counterinsurgency hands.

526
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,
George H. W. Bush, September 11, 1990
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9
527
Tragedy and Hope, op. cit., p. 954
528
Rogue Agents, David Teacher, Institute for the Study of Globalization and Covert Politics, 2008, p. 11
www.isgp.eu/organisations/Rogue_Agents_the_Cercle_Pinay_complex_1951_1991.pdf
529
Ibid., pp. 3 - 4, 145

121
The Cercle complex even developed a private intelligence agency, 6I, run by Brian Crozier. At
the inaugural 6I meeting, Crozier proposed... to create a Private Sector Operational Intelligence
agency, beholden to no government, but at the disposal of allied or friendly governments for
certain tasks which, for one reason or another, they were no longer able to tackle; these tasks
would not include armed force, but would rather be in the field of intelligence-gathering,
psychological warfare and covert funding; Crozier summarizes the tasks of the 6I as follows: to
provide reliable intelligence in areas which governments were barred from investigating, either
through recent legislation (as in the US) or because political circumstances made such inquiries
difficult or potentially embarrassing; to conduct secret counter-subversion operations in any
country in which such actions were deemed feasible.530

According to Crozier, The main requirement for recruitment was access. We needed well-
placed men and women, with access to leaders, to intelligence and security services, to selected
politicians, to editors of potentially useful publications. All that was needed was for those
selected from the contacts each had built up before and after the birth of the 6I, to be conscious
of our existence and our goals... In addition to our own network, we gained access to a number of
existing networks, both private and official... one of the senior intelligence officials [in
Germany] who had resigned in disgust took with him into retirement a substantial network of
agents, whose identities he had refused to disclose to his new political masters.531

Terrorism was a particular interest of Croziers, a phenomenon that Cercle outlets worked to
blame wholly on the machinations of the Soviet Union. Crozier was concerned that existing
research centers failed to take account of the more dangerous Soviet strategy of takeovers by
non-military means, such as subversion and terrorism, creating a need for studies on the ever-
widening range of groups and forces bringing violence, chaos and disruption into our societies,
but always in the context of Soviet strategy.532 As we have seen, some of this terrorism turned
out to be less far removed from Le Cercle itself than the Soviet Union. Crozier, Le Cercle, and
their associates, who also maintained ties to the Jonathan Institute in Israel, were involved in the
creation of many of the institutes and research programs that would contribute to the
development and publicizing of the concept of terrorism, such as the London-based Institute for
the Study of Terrorism, the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism, the German
Institute for Terrorism Research, the Canadian Centre for Conflict Studies, the Mackenzie
Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution and Propaganda, among others.533 The origins of
many contemporary notions about terrorism in black propaganda, disinformation, and
psychological warfare are worth remembering.

David Teacher contrasts the links uncovered by his parapolitical research with traditional
notions of conspiracy theory:

the links uncovered by parapolitical research are rarely lines of command. Parapolitical activity is not
pyramidal like a government hierarchy; it is connective, a network of nodes like a circle of friends. The
links between the nodes are lines of support arising not from a command structure, but from a community
of interest, shared objectives and interlocking memberships. Individual groups do not so much set the

530
Ibid., pp. 107 - 108
531
Ibid., p. 108
532
Ibid., p. 21
533
Ibid., pp. 157 - 160

122
 agenda or run the show as act within their own sphere of influence or specialty, occasionally supporting
actions taken by others. Many are isolated and have little impact outside their own country, and here the
Cercle came into its own as a group with a world-wide agenda, connecting and, to some extent,
coordinating the activities of groups in many different countries... Its activities - covert funding, black
propaganda, smear campaigns, and, at least, connections to planned coups detat - were those of any
intelligence agency, and, in many ways, that is what the Cercle complex has been: the rogue agents of the
international Right.534

The overviews of the Israel Lobby, the Anglo-American networks, and Le Cercle are just a
sampler. There are countless more or less known webs of influence that could be added to the
list. The military-industrial complex (or, as Eisenhower wished to call it in his speech before
being warned off, the military-industrial-congressional complex); the US-Saudi and Anglo-
Saudi relationships, tied up in massive investments, arms deals, corruption, and covert
arrangements as revealed by the Yamamah contracts; webs of consolidated media ownership;
networks of financial power and economic policymaking; the Oil Lobby. There are likely many
webs with similarly great influence that have not come to public attention.

The point of rehearsing these facts is emphatically not to suggest that any of these networks
harbor likely terrorist culprits. The point is to suggest that, in the wake of a crisis, such as a
terrorist atrocity, it is networks like these that influence who gets blamed and what gets done;
more so if a large number of these webs share an interest, material or ideological, in a single
interpretation. When such aspects of deep politics are taken into account, and we glimpse the
single group lurking behind the single truth, political cause-and-effect becomes much more
predictable than the confusion of a crisis may suggest.

534
Ibid., pp. 166 - 167

123
 XENOPHOBIA

For the alleged actions of 19 individuals, 1.5 billion Muslims paid a price. Iraq and Afghanistan
would be invaded at a cost of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives (not to mention the
maimed, the orphaned, the bereaved), while many other predominantly-Muslim countries were
bombed, threatened, or isolated. Resistance groups were labelled terrorists. Islamist parties were
shunned. Visas were restricted. Mosques were put under surveillance. Islam itself was suspect.

Yet the harshness of this reaction was not foreshadowed by the reaction of the American people.
Aside from some isolated incidents, Americans did not lash out at their Muslim neighbors. If
anything, most Americans tried harder to understand the problems of the Muslim world. If the
the architects of Americas Middle East policy had their own agendas - which their critics
pointed out to no avail - most of the rank-and-file supporters of intervention seemed to be
genuinely motivated by the idea of bringing democracy and freedom to oppressed peoples.

There was plenty of post-9/11 xenophobia, to be sure. But this was not a spontaneous reaction to
9/11. One would have expected Americans views of Islam to have reached the lowest point
immediately following 9/11. In fact, in polls taken after the events, for which Muslim extremists
were almost universally blamed, 59% of Americans still had a positive view of Islam; in 2010
that number had reached 30%.535 Americans, remarkably resilient in the face of a shocking
atrocity, had been worn down through deliberate, calculated propaganda efforts to paint Islam as
the enemy of the West and to make hatred of Muslims publicly acceptable in a way that hatred
towards any other group is not. These efforts have capitalized on brainless radicals on both sides.
However, while the stars in these charades are the ignorant and the stupid, those behind the
cameras are anything but. It would be rather surprising if they were influenced by the hatred of
Islam that they are attempting to inculcate, for they share an agenda with with the most fanatical
jihadists, the clash of civilizations.

Samuel Huntington famously prophesied in 1993 that the fundamental source of conflict in this
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic... The clash of civilizations
will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the
future.536 Huntington wrote in reaction to the end of history triumphalism prevalent at the
time. The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of harmony, he
argued; but While one-world expectations appear at the end of major conflicts, the tendency to
think in terms of two worlds recurs throughout human history. People are always tempted to
divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those
barbarians.537

In fact, Huntington suggests, enemies are necessary; We know who we are only when we know
who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against... For self-definition and

535
Fears rise over growing anti-Muslim feeling in U.S., Mark Egan, Reuters, September 12, 2010
www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/12/us-usa-muslims-view-idUSTRE68B1O920100912
536
The Clash of Civilizations?, Samuel P. Huntington, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 22
537
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel P. Huntington, Simon & Schuster, 2003,
pp. 31-32

124
motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, opponents in
politics. They naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability
to harm them. The resolution of one conflict and the disappearance of one enemy generate
personal, social, and political forces that give rise to new ones... In the contemporary world the
them is more and more likely to be people from a different civilization.538

Surrounded by the illusions of final victory, Huntington saw a West that exhibited many of the
signs that Carroll Quigley had identified as typical of a mature civilization on the brink of
decay, outflanked by the rapid economic advance of Asian civilizations and the rapid
population growth of Islam.539 Yet Far more significant than economics and demography are
problems of moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity in the West... The future health
of the West and its influence on other societies depends in considerable measure on its success in
coping with those trends, which, of course, give rise to the assertions of moral superiority by
Muslims and Asians.540 The global religious revival is not a rejection of modernity; it is a
rejection of the West and of the secular, relativistic, degenerate culture associated with the
West.541 Huntington clearly saw Islamic civilization as that with which the West was most
likely to clash in the near term - with Chinese civilization a more long-range threat.

What Huntington did not say (in fact explicitly rejected) was that a revival of the West would
require a conflict with another civilization to rediscover its identity, unity, and moral strength.
Nonetheless, that is the conclusion that flows from his analysis. A reader, perhaps a more cynical
character than the author, who connects these dots can quickly connect the rest. Islam is the best
candidate for enemy. How to get the conflict going? Huntington identifies one major cause of
civilizational conflicts as being when a state attempts to promote or to impose its values on the
people of another civilization.542 He explicitly remarks that the Gulf War of 1991 became a
civilization war because the West intervened militarily in a Muslim conflict, Westerners
overwhelmingly supported that intervention, and Muslims throughout the world came to see that
intervention as a war against them and rallied against what they saw as one more instance of
Western imperialism... For Muslims the war thus quickly became a war between civilizations, in
which the inviolability of Islam was at stake.543

The idea of needing an enemy recalls Carl Schmitt, the herald of the state of emergency. The
political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy, Schmitt wrote; Everywhere in
political history, in foreign as well as in domestic politics, the incapacity or the unwillingness to
make this distinction is a symptom of the political end.544 By description, The political enemy
need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor...
But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a
specially intense way, existentially something different and alien.545

538
Ibid., pp. 21, 130
539
Ibid., p. 304
540
Ibid.
541
Ibid. p. 101
542
Ibid., p. 208
543
Ibid., pp. 247-249
544
The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt, trans. George Schwab, with notes by Leo Strauss, University of
Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 53, 68
545
Ibid., p. 27

125
Leo Strauss, in a sympathetic commentary, clearly identified Schmitts emphasis of the political
as a reaction to the age of neutralizations and depoliticizations which culminated in liberal
modernity; without politics, without enemies, the value of human life would disappear: there
would be no opposition on the basis of which it could sensibly be demanded of men that they
sacrifice their lives.546 Strauss exclaimed: Let us listen to Schmitt himself!: if... the distinction
between friend and enemy ceases even as a mere possibility, there will only be a politics-free
weltanschauung [worldview], culture, civilization, economy, morals, law, art, entertainment...
politics and the state are the only guarantee against the worlds becoming a world of
entertainment.547

The apolitical world, Schmitt concedes, could be perhaps very interesting, but, as Strauss
notes, the perhaps only questions, but certainly does question, whether this capacity to be
interesting can claim the interest of a human being worthy of the name; the perhaps conceals
and betrays Schmitts nausea over this capacity to be interesting, which is only possible if man
has forgotten what genuinely matters.548 Liberalisms idolization of neutrality and peace was,
according to this view, bleeding the political from human life, the depth of meaning and spiritual
experience that could only come from taking a stand that might entail death. Schmitt presented
the enemy as a barrier against the spiritual threat of a world government; A world in which the
possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without
the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics... The acute question to
pose is upon whom will fall the frightening power implied in a world-embracing economic and
technical organization.549 Enemies and politics are not merely a guarantee, as some thought,
against cultural and social nothingness, but against The spirit of technicity, which has led to
the mass belief in an anti-religious activism, which can be called fantastic and satanic, but not
simply dead, spiritless, or mechanized soulnessness.550

Schmitts perspective, echoed by Strauss, is shared by many contemporary ideologues, such as

Michael Ledeen, who argues that peace is not normal, and even increases our peril, by
making discipline less urgent, encouraging some of our worst instincts, and depriving us of some
of our best leaders.551 Like Schmitt, Ledeen sees war as an integral part of spirituality,
approvingly citing Helmuth von Moltkes remark that Everlasting peace is a dream, not even a
pleasant one; war is a necessary part of Gods arrangement with the world... without war the
world would degenerate into materialism.552

The idea that struggle is an integral part of spirituality has deep roots in religion, although there
are sharp divides regarding the form that struggle takes. For instance, Sufi Muslims distinguish
between the lesser Jihad of struggle against foreign enemies and the greater Jihad of struggle
in the soul against ones own desire and temptation. For them, struggle is indeed necessary, but
the indispensable struggle is that against ones own shadow side. On the other end of the
546
Ibid., p. 116
547
Ibid., pp. 115-116
548
Ibid.
549
Ibid., pp. 35, 57
550
Ibid., p. 94
551
Machiavelli, op. cit., pp. 28, 62
552
Ibid.

126
spectrum, Ibn Taymiyya, a 13th century Islamic jurisprudent and inspiration for many
contemporary fanatics, advanced a positively Ledeenian view according to which military jihad
is central to individual spirituality and to a regimes spiritual legitimacy.

Yet the notion of a spiritual need for war and revolution also recalls the vision common to
those of a totalitarian cast, from pharaohs to fascists to communists, who have seen human
spirituality as another source of power and sacrifice to be harnessed to the needs of the state. The
insistence that some political measure is necessary for human spirituality may conceal the real
intention - to twist human spirituality to suit political needs. In case of need, Schmitt writes,
the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by
the individualism of liberal thought.553 This concrete concern seems to trouble him more than
purely spiritual issues. Ledeen argues along the same lines that Dying for ones country doesnt
come naturally. Modern armies, raised from the populace, must be inspired, motivated,
indoctrinated. Religion is central to the military enterprise, for men are more likely to risk their
lives if they believe they will be rewarded forever after for serving their country, while they will
be doomed to hellfire for eternity if they betray the nation.554 This is why Ledeen admires
Machiavellis tougher, more virile Christianity that will inspire men to fight for the glory of
their country.555 For these thinkers, does religion come first, or does it take second place to
political imperatives?

Its a fair guess that many of the more intelligent people who seek to portray Islam as an enemy,
unlike their dimmer associates, do not truly hate Islam; it is nothing personal for them. They
exploit xenophobia, rather than being motivated by it themselves. They just believe the West
needs an enemy. Perhaps they even admire Islams spiritual strength, and hope that by
confronting such strength in an adversary, we will rekindle it in ourselves.

Some have circulated lies about Jews being told not to show up for work on 9/11 (in fact, at least
400 Jews died in the attacks). Others have cast suspicion on Freemasonry, as though clandestine
networks and radical ideologies could only flourish amongst card-carrying members of a Secret
Society. Like attempts to associate 9/11 with Islam, these arguments do not aim to discover truth,
but simply to select a convenient, well-known, easily demonized enemy. Hitler argued that the
art of all truly great national leaders at all times consists among other things primarily in not
dividing the attention of a people, but in concentrating it upon a single foe... It belongs to the
genius of a great leader to make even adversaries far removed from one another seem to belong
to a single category... Once the wavering mass sees itself in a struggle against too many enemies,
objectivity will put in an appearance, throwing open the question whether all others are really
wrong and only their own people or their own movement are in the right. And this brings about
the first paralysis of their own power. Hence a multiplicity of different adversaries must always
be combined so that in the eyes of the masses of ones own supporters the struggle is directed
against only one enemy.556

553
Concept, op. cit., p. 71
554
Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 91
555
Ibid., p. 17
556
Mein Kampf, op. cit., p. 118

127
Real xenophobia must also be distinguished clearly from what is sometimes called xenophobia in
order to shut down debate and prevent questions being asked. For a long time, even the notion
that there were such people as neoconservatives scheming to invade Iraq was dismissed as an
anti-Semitic conspiracy theory. For instance, in an article published as the invasion of Iraq was
unfolding, Robert J. Lieber dismissed as A pure, pathetic myth the idea that A small band of
neoconservative (read, Jewish) defense intellectuals... has taken advantage of 9/11 to put their
ideas over on an ignorant, inexperienced, and easily manipulated president.557 He describes as
conspiratorial Michael Linds concern that the foreign policy of the worlds only global
power is being made by a small clique.558 Lieber goes on to ridicule the conspiracy theorists
such as Lind for suggesting that weapons of mass destruction might not exist, that Iraq might
become a quagmire, and that American forces might not be welcomed as liberators. This
suspicion of neoconservatism, in his view, is merely echoing classic anti-Semitic tropes.559
Incredibly, a great many of those who allege anti-Semitism adopt the exact same atavistic
racial/tribal logic as the anti-Semites - that the actions of a small group are attributable to a larger
group - by asserting that an attack on the smaller group is an attack on the larger group.

To properly grapple with xenophobia is to avoid it, but also, not to be bamboozled from fear of
being accused of it. Every large group of people has its share of unsavory characters. If these
large groups are to cooperate, rather than be played off against each other by said characters, we
need to find ways of talking about them that do not trigger primordial defense mechanisms.

557
The Neoconservative-Conspiracy Theory, Robert J. Lieber, The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 29, 2003
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=18461
558
Ibid.
559
Ibid.

128
 YEZHOVSHCHINA

At the highest levels, conspiracies and conspiracy theories can overlap and dissolve together in a
bloody solution of plots, lies, mass killing, and grabs for power. Perhaps the most horrific Reign
of Terror over a whole country began with the 1934 assassination (seemingly by a lone
gunman) of Sergei Kirov, a popular Bolshevik leader and head of the Leningrad party, and with
Stalins subsequent claim that counter-revolutionary elements in the Soviet Union, in
cooperation with capitalists and fascists abroad, were conspiring to undermine the revolution,
assassinate the leadership, and destroy the Soviet system.

Leon Trotsky, writing from exile, saw immediately after Kirovs slaying that

the leading bureaucratic group is not at all inclined to estimate Nikolaievs crime as an isolated and
accidental phenomenon, as a tragic episode; on the contrary, it is investing this act with a political
importance so exceptional that it does not stop at constructing an amalgam that compromises itself, nor
even at placing all types of opposition, discontent and criticism on the same plane with terrorist acts. The
goal of the maneuver is quite evident: to terrorize completely all critics and oppositionists, and this time not
by expulsion from the party, nor by depriving them of their daily bread, nor even by imprisonment or exile,
but by the firing squad.560

The alleged conspiracy was used to justify a wave of ever-expanding purges, show-trials, and
executions against terrorists - not the first or last in the Soviet Union, but certainly the worst.

The Great Terror began with the Moscow trial of the anti-Soviet joint Trotskyist-Zinovivist
center, including two leading Old Bosheviks, Kamenev and Zinoviev; this center was accused
and convicted not only of masterminding the Kirov killing but of plotting terrorist acts,
assassination attempts on Stalin and other leaders, manipulating other conspiratorial groups, and
contacts with foreign enemies. They were all shot. The trials snowballed; new centers were
discovered, senior generals were purged, and by the third major public trial in Moscow in 1938,
even the man behind the first trial, NKVD head Genrikh Yagoda, was on trial along with the last
of the Old Bolsheviks. These trials were based on testimony extracted under torture and heavy
psychological pressure, wild speculation, and often simply fabricated evidence.561 But the public
trials in Moscow were only the most visible element of the purge. Across the country, first
thousands, then literally millions of people were accused of membership of various branches of a
vast conspiracy whose main and major crime was the Kirov assassination.562 NKVD troikas,
commissions of three officials with power of life and death, were set up on local and regional
levels by new NKVD head Nikolai Yezhov and given quotas of anti-Soviet elements to be
executed or sent to gulags. The inquisition was extended into every corner of society. Organized
religion, ethnic minorities, and vital industries were decimated. A generation of Red Army
leadership was purged. But the harshest penalties fell on ordinary peasants suspected of being
ex-kulaks, rich peasants, who were killed in the hundreds of thousands.

560
On the Kirov Assassination, Leon Trotsky, trans. John G. Wright, Pioneer Publishers, 1956
www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1934/12/kirov.htm
561
The Great Terror: a Reassessment, Robert Conquest, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 109 - 133
562
Stalin and the Kirov Murder, Robert Conquest, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 4

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This reign of terror was called the Yezhovshchina, the Yezhov regime. Conspiracies were
everywhere; everyone was a suspect. Allies denounced allies; friends betrayed friends; family
spied on family; neighbors implicated neighbors; often the denouncers, betrayers, spies, and
implicators would be shot as well for good measure. The Yezhovshchina transformed an already-
dictatorial system into a fully totalitarian state where the slightest dissent from the party line was
crushed; Stalin and his inner circle sought to remove all strata of the population that were
hostile or potentially hostile to them. Stalin considered these targeted groups a potential fifth
column of internal opposition in the event of war with a foreign country.563 The
Yezhovshchina was finally brought to an end with the arrest and eventual execution of Yezhov
himself, but the system of fear the Terror created remained, firmly in Stalins grip. In the Great
Terror, at least 700,000 people were executed, and hundreds of thousands more died in the
gulags. When the episode is seen as one of one of many such purges against conspiratorial
enemies, the total number of victims of Soviet terror runs into the tens of millions. Even if there
really were plots against Stalin and his henchmen (and it would be slightly disappointing if there
were not) what fraction of this number could possibly have been involved in serious conspiracy?

At first, it was widely assumed that Stalin had merely exploited a convenient act of a lone
individual to launch his terror. But in the end, many began to suspect that there was indeed a
conspiracy behind Kirovs assassination - Stalins conspiracy. Khrushchev hinted darkly at this
in his Secret Speech of 1956 to the twentieth party congress, in which he exposed many of
Stalins crimes:

It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirovs murder hide many things which
are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the
suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty
it was to protect the person of Kirov... It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist
assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a
car accident in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top
functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can
assume that they were shot in order to cover up the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing.564

At this stunning break with official dogma about counter-revolutionary elements and the clear
implication of conspiracy at the very highest echelon, the Soviet transcript dryly notes,
Movement in the hall.565

Khrushchevs story was itself something of a conspiracy theory, serving to break decisively with
Stalins legacy and to consolidate his own grip on power. Even though leading scholars of the
period such as Robert Conquest have concluded that the scenario to which he alluded is the most
likely explanation, it seems that subsequent investigations failed to turn up conclusive evidence
of Stalins authorship. Nonetheless, if one conspiracy theory undergirded the Terror, another was
necessary, it seems, to break it, or at least to help initiate a relaxation of Soviet dictatorship.

563
The Objectives of the Great Terror, Oleg Khlevnyuk, in Stalinism: the essential readings, David L. Hoffman
(ed.), Blackwell, 2003, pp. 84 - 85
564
Speech to the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., Nikita Khrushchev, February 24-25 1956
www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm
565
Ibid.

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Conspiracy theories, then, like conspiracies, can be turned to quite a variety of purposes. Even
when the conspiracy theories target a demonstrably real conspiracy - such as with Turkeys
Ergenkon trials - the dynamics thus unleashed may readily lead to dramatic over-reach, what
some might even call a conspiracy in its own right. A worryingly large number of opponents of
the elected government have been indicted in the Ergenekon case. The chair of the Istanbul Bar
Association, Muammer Aydin, commented: the investigation seemingly started against an
illegal organization, but continues with open-ended arrests and detentions.566 A government
fighting a conspiracy, even a very real conspiracy, might be tempted to use the opportunity to
strike at purely political enemies. Indeed, the Ergenekon case shows how fighting a conspiracy
may involve many of the same methods that many conspiracy theorists so abhor. Massive use of
wiretaps, egregious violations of privacy, bending the letter of the law, widespread detentions,
and sexed-up evidence, are a central part of this process.

The best of the conspiracy theorists, and the best of the conspiracy-fighters, surely will not be
content to substitute one anti-democratic conspiracy for another. Allegations of conspiracy can
be turned to the same totalitarian purposes as conspiracies themselves. Conspiracy theories can
cover up conspiracies. As Ronald Syme wrote about the conspiracies of Augustus time as
Roman Emperor, A government may invent conspiracies for its own ends: if it cannot entirely
suppress the evidence of its own internal crises, it falsifies the symptoms. Most of the real history
of the Principate is secret history.567

Even America experienced a bitter taste of the consequences of official conspiracy paranoia in
the McCarthy era, when it was feared that large numbers of Communists may have infiltrated the
federal government. These fears were not entirely without foundation. Somehow, the Soviet
Union obtained vital information on the atomic bomb. There is strong evidence that Alger Hiss
and Harry Dexter White, influential officials in the State and Treasury departments respectively,
were agents working for the Soviet Union. Yet these fears led to investigations by the Senate and
House of Representatives, spearheaded by Senator Joseph McCarthy, which imprisoned
hundreds and destroyed the lives of thousands, most of whom were guilty of nothing more than
holding unpopular views.

(Indignation in the hall)

When dealing with either conspiracy or terrorism it is easy to violate, out of fear, the usual
principle of law, fundamental to democratic society, that it is better that ten guilty men go free
than that one innocent man is punished (to paraphrase William Blackstone and Benjamin
Franklin), in favor of the view that it is better that ten innocent men are punished than that one
guilty man goes free (to paraphrase Stalin and Pol Pot). This is the philosophy of totalitarianism,
and whether one gets there by fear of terror or of conspiracy, it is much the same.

(Tumultuous applause)

566
Judiciary gears up for close look at Ergenekon, Hurriyet Daily News, January 9, 2009
www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10735781.asp
567
The Roman Revolution, Ronald Syme, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 479

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After a terrible crime, it is a natural instinct to want to bring those responsible to justice. But that
determination has its downsides. Firstly, it can encourage governments and investigators to seize
upon the obvious, easy, and catchable culprits, rather than asking the difficult questions about
whether there were others involved, whose role may be much better concealed. More seriously, it
can lead to the investigation being exploited for political purposes ranging from unsavory to
sinister. It is important to remain focused on the long-term objectives and values of a society,
rather than to twist everything to punish the guilty in a moment of fear or moral panic. The real
enemy is not terrorism or conspiracy, but our own reaction to events that might well be either
one. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if
thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.568

(Prolonged applause)

Exposing a conspiracy and recovering freedom are not one and the same thing. Were the
majority of the population to come to the conclusion that 9/11 or another major attack was not, in
fact, an Al Qaeda attack but a vaguely-defined false-flag conspiracy, there is a danger that
leaders will attempt to pursue the same basic policies, through the same exhortations to fear and
anger, against the new evildoers. Not only does the conspiracy myth have the potential to serve
the same purposes as the terrorism myth, it is already an integral part of the Reign of Terror. Be
afraid of terrorists, be afraid of the government - just be afraid!

(Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.)

568
Beyond Good and Evil, Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Helen Zimmern www.authorama.com/beyond-good-and-evil-
1.html

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 ZEALOTS

Mass killers are usually the slaves of some transcendent vision. They see themselves as an elect
with a privileged insight into human affairs and destiny. Although this vision can sometimes be
religious, in recent Western history it has more often assumed a secularized, politicized form,
perhaps somehow spiritual but worldly nonetheless. The class of people willing to kill innocents
in the service of some ideology cuts across all religious, ethnic, and political lines. They are a
category of their own; they share with each other something exceptional that they do not share
with others from their own religion, people or party.

But the urge to immanentize a transcendent vision has underlain not only the very worst, but also
the very best, of human history. For every Hitler there is a Gandhi. For every Stalin there is a
Washington. For every Mao there is a Mandela. What separates the heroes from the villains?
Inevitably, brief and superficial remarks follow. The heroes operate within a framework of
morality that people across cultures can appreciate - for instance, dont kill innocent civilians;
dont launch aggressive wars. They accept the limits to their knowledge and understanding. They
appeal to the best in human nature, and take precautions against the worst. The villains see any
crime as justified in building their paradise. They conspire with the like-minded against the
unenlightened masses, who are at best raw material to be molded rather than valuable lives. To
one dogma they oppose another dogma. Their opponents are to be crushed or re-educated
rather than engaged in debate. In short, the heroes and the villains alike hold a transcendent,
enlightened vision of ends, but the heroes do not see their vision as justifying a special set of
means beyond the morality confirmed in the major religions and philosophies across the world.

One essential component of the character of a zealot is certitude. They have no doubt that they
are right and others are wrong. If they had the slightest shred of doubt, how could they stomach
killing innocents? Such a degree of certitude is not obtained through science. Even the most
treasured scientific theories are subject to revision given new evidence. This kind of certitude
emerges from the kind of transcendence that mystics have reserved for communion with God.
But in the past decade - and repeatedly throughout history - we have applied such certainty not to
divine matters, but to tawdry political beliefs, worldviews, even, God help us, intelligence
analyses. If we are honest with ourselves, the 9/11 perpetrators were not the only zealots. They
killed 3000 people because they were so sure they were right. We then proceeded to kill several
hundred thousand people because we were so sure we were right.

Conspiracy theorists must work hard not to fall victim themselves. There is a strong temptation
to insist on the unique validity of ones own special insight; to see ones political and intellectual
fight as a matter of pure good and pure evil; to dream of violently inaugurating a new era; to
blame everything on a favorite villain; to start a witch hunt. There is an inevitable danger that a
nugget of truth could become the basis for demagoguery and mass followership. At the extreme,
these could become manifestations of the same impulses that may characterize the perpetrators
of the crimes they are so determined to expose. Uninhibited, these forces would probably in the
end shatter what remains of American traditions and inaugurate, after a period of brutal chaos, a
new and more terrifying order.

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But there are other, more powerful impulses at work. Conspiracy theorists embody the desire for
citizen leadership, the concern for the truth, the penetrating criticism of out-of-touch, self-
centered ruling ideologies and policies, virtues that are the basis of a functioning democracy. For
every xenophobe and aimless speculator, there is another with the soul of a faithful guardian,
keeping a watchful eye on the dark side that many prefer not to acknowledge, in return for little
personal gain and often, in the present climate, considerable loss. They take the trouble to
enlighten others rather than using their intellect as just another competitive edge. Western
societies have long fought to free themselves from those who seek to force their certitudes on
others, rather than seeking ways to demonstrate their value and engage with other points of view.
The genuine spirit of reaction against the official 9/11 dogma is a continuation of that ancient
struggle.

While criticizing the certitude of others and insisting that our institutions take a deeper look at
events such as 9/11, it would be advisable to admit - and cultivate - ones own uncertainty. The
lessons of conspiracy teach us, more than anything else, that events are often ambiguous, and
that unreflective certainty one way or the other would be foolish. To base our consciousness, our
worldviews, our personal and political action on a single narrow interpretation of a single event,
seeking to force reality in its infinite complexity into the bonds of our egoistic speculation, leads
to disaster. It ends in revolutionary vanguardism. This would be no less true if the conspiratorial
myth were to gain ascendancy over the Al Qaeda myth (and, until either one is proven, both are
still myths). Anyone who is disgusted at how the Al Qaeda myth has twisted society, should
realize that a conspiracy myth could in a moment be turned to the same purposes: the spreading
of fear, the assumption of new government powers, the curtailment of rights, the ignition of war
or persecution. Ultimately, we should remain open to the idea that wisdom in reaction to
ambiguous events may be an enlightened agnosticism - not an I dont know of ignorance, but
of awareness of the different possibilities, their associated facts, and an understanding of the
worlds deep-running uncertainties. Learning to live with complex uncertainty rather than easy
certitude is the best qualification for coping with a future of intricacy and ambiguity. This is a
future for which die-hard no-second-thoughts adherents of the official story are manifestly
unprepared, refusing as they do to stare certain facts in the face and entertain a healthy
skepticism. In time, we will come to see uncertainty about politics as source of balance, not
disturbance - the surest antidote to zealotry.

Those skeptical of the official story should not fight fire with fire, but with water. It is, and must
remain, they who remain open-minded, eager for debate, ready to revise their views, unafraid to
voice their thoughts, and unconcerned to force their ideas on others. It is the proponents of the
official story who try to close off all debate, who refuse to accept the questioning of their views,
who laugh, sneer, and shout in the face of rational argument, and end up imprisoned in their own
failed dogma. The latter tactics usually work for a while; the former win out in time. At present,
too much of the debate involves official story advocates shouting it was Al Qaeda! while
conspiracy theorists shout it was a conspiracy!. If it comes down to a shouting match, the
official story advocates, with their vast resources of government, corporate media, and so on,
will surely win. The conspiracy theorists need to seize the intellectual high ground.

An agnostic attitude towards events will do much to thwart efforts at manipulation, from
whatever quarter. A country in which populations can be moved this way and that by flickering

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shadows in their televisual caves will be subject to ever more desperate efforts at mythical
manipulation, heading towards clandestine autocracy and/or utter incoherence. Such a system
depends on many techniques and apparatuses, but the indispensible element is the consent of the
public to buy into myths on the basis of news, events, and experts. The most powerful tool
of the public at large is to withhold belief in such ephemera, eschewing certainty, accepting
ambiguity, and rewarding those who have the courage to remain open to all possibilities. This is
the way in which society will come to be governed by more substantial truths - even if, in some
cases, the highest accessible truth may be we dont know for sure.

Zealots are generally a small percentage of the population. What gives them their power? It is
their willingness to transgress all bounds in committing destructive acts, which generates a
reaction from society out of all proportion to their number. How can this power be combated?
Simply - by not rewarding them with a reaction. This is the ultimate defense against terrorism; in
fact, it is a lesson we (at least the nerds among us) learn on the playground. Terrorism is parasitic
on the reactions of those it targets. What can a terrorist, whether jihadist or false-flag
conspirator, hope to gain if his target refuses to react, and continues firm in policies and
principles, unafraid? On the other hand, seismic changes in policies and principles in the shadow
of an event or attack ultimately rewards the attackers by committing to a dialectical engagement.
Such changes, beyond plugging security gaps and doing the necessary work to track down the
perpetrators, should be viewed with the greatest suspicion. At the very least, leaping to respond
is a sign we had not been very composed to begin with, which implies that our response is not
likely to be appropriate to the situation. To the extent that we react, it should be to ask: what is
wrong with us, that we are afraid of these worldly terrors? Are we afraid of the dark?

When attacked by zealots, the intelligent response is never to respond with an unbalanced
zealotry of ones own. A calm and steady response from the Bush administration would have
avoided the many irretrievable disasters into which they plunged. A calm and steady response
from questioners of the official story would probably have gained them a far earlier hearing. A
calm and steady response would ultimately have been largely indifferent to who attacked and
why; it draws on interests, not wishes; reason, not emotions; facts, not interpretations. Above all,
it confronts terror for what it really is: not a shadowy and terrible menace of one description or
another but a simple state of fear that distorts a societys reason from the depths, a fear that relies
on the victims complicity.

Platos story of the cave, and the journey from darkness to light, was an analogy for the ascent of
the soul from dependence on the evidence of the senses to a commitment to the truths of reason.
He proceeded to note that Any one who has common sense will remember that the
bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of
the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the
bodily eye; but when one sees someone stumbling around, unable to see, one should not be too
ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is
unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is
dazzled by excess of light.569 The first condition is happy; it is the second that is to be pitied.
And if one has a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be
more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light
569
The Republic, Plato, Book VII http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.8.vii.html

135
into the den.570 Dear reader, undoubtedly conspiracy theorists often present a comic sight, but
ask yourself if it may be because they consent to fumble around in your cave and try, however
haltingly, to explain the significance of the shadows playing on your walls.

570
Ibid.

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 About the Author

Kieran Banda Wanduragala, of Irish and Sri Lankan heritage, was born in the UK and grew up in
the USA, of which he is a citizen. He read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Balliol
College, Oxford and holds an AM in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard. He speaks Arabic.

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