Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia (Summary)
Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia (Summary)
AUSTRIA
Summary:
The appellant (Mr. Hoffmann) was the representative in Austria of the German firm of G.
Dralle which owned certain trade marks registered in Austria and which were applied to
goods manufactured by them and offered for sale by the appellant in Austria. A branch
office of the Hamburg firm in Bohemia was the owner of the mentioned trade marks
registered in the Austrian register. In 1945 the branch office was nationalized. The
nationalized firm requested the appellants customers in Austria not to offer for sale
under the mentioned trade marks any of the goods supplied by the appellant. Mr.
Hoffmann applied for an injunction to restrain the Czechoslovak firm (the respondent)
from using the mentioned trade marks in Austria. The respondent claimed to be immune
from Austrian jurisdiction and to be entitled in any case to use the trademarks
concerned.
1 The supreme Court stated that the question whether a foreign State can be subject to
jurisdiction of another State has not been answered in a uniform manner by Austrian and
foreign courts. Some countries stuck to the concept of absolute immunity others only in
the context of acts of ius imperii character. Thus there was no generally accepted rule in
international law establishing the concept of absolute immunity of foreign States. The
Supreme Court stated further that in the present case the respondents claim to
immunity concerned commercial and not political activities of a foreign sovereign State
and thus the respondent was subject to Austrian jurisdiction. The Czechoslovak
nationalization decree was only valid in the territory of Czechoslovakia and had no
extraterritorial effect. Accordingly the respondent was not entitled to use trademarks
owned by its predecessor in Austria. The Supreme Court decided that in result the
appellant was entitled to an injunction restraining the respondent from using the trade
marks in Austrian territory.
Summary:
The plaintiff held a default judgment against the Democratic Republic of A. The judgment
was subsequently declared enforceable and the plaintiff obtained an attachment order
on a bank account held by the embassy of the D. R. of A. in Vienna. The D. R. of A.
appealed against the attachment in reliance on a certificate issued by its embassy in
Vienna which stated that the bank account in question was an official account allocated
for the performance of sovereign functions.
The Court of Appeal held that in these circumstances the bank account was not subject
to attachment. The judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Contrary to its
previous view (see judgement no. 6 0b 126/58) the Supreme Court found that although
there was no rule in international law which prohibits execution against foreign States in
general, there is such rule as to the execution on property which serves the performance
of sovereign (embassy) functions.
Due to the difficulties involved in judging whether the ability of a diplomatic mission to
function was endangered international law gave wide protection to foreign States and
referred to the typical, abstract danger to the ability of the mission to function and not to
the specific threat in a particular case. Thus operating accounts of embassies were not
subject to execution without the consent of the State concerned, unless the plaintiff
proves that the account serves exclusively for private purposes of the embassy.
Summary:
An individual employed locally as a photographer by a foreign embassy in Vienna filed a
suit against her employer who had issued a notice terminating her contract arguing that
the employer had not observed the relevant provisions of Austrian industrial law. The
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court claiming immunity. The Court noted that the
employment contract in this case was a legal relationship under private law in respect of
which a foreign State was subject to Austrian jurisdiction by virtue of the rules of both
international and Austrian law. The Supreme Court noted as well that international
organisations enjoyed more far-reaching privileges and immunities than States, the
immunity of international organisations arose from the relevant international agreements
and intended to protect international organisations from interference of States.
The same case was dealt with by the Administrative Court, which agreed to the view of
the Supreme Court as to the applicability of Austrian industrial law in this case.
(a) Registration no A/4
(b) Date 10 February 1961
(c) Author(ity) Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), judgment
(d) Parties X:Y. (individual) vs. Embassy of X (State)
(e) Points of law The Court establishes that driving a government
owned vehicle for official purposes is not an act of
ius imperii character
(f) Classification no./n O.b.1, 1.b, 2.b
(g) Source(s) No. 2Ob243/60, Austrian legal information system
(see: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at); see as well: Grotius
International Law Reports Volume 40 p 73)
(h) Additional information judgement of the Supreme Court No. 1Ob167/49
and 1Ob171/1950
(i) Full text - extracts - translation Summary English: see below
summaries Full text: Appendix A/4 *
Summary:
The plaintiffs car was damaged in a car accident with a vehicle owned by the
Government of the United States (defendant). The defendant contended that since at the
time of the accident the car was carrying diplomatic mail, the act was of ius imperii
character and the case was therefore not subject to Austrian jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court reiterated its view previously expressed in Dralle vs Republic of Czechoslovakia
that a distinction must be drawn between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis and
that in respect of the latter a foreign State is subject to Austrian jurisdiction. In
determining whether an act was iure imperii or iure gestionis the Court stated that the act
itself and not the purpose for which it was performed had to be considered. In the
present case the US Government had operated a vehicle on a public road, an act which
could be performed as well by an individual. Therefore the case was subject to Austrian
jurisdiction.
Summary:
An individual employed locally by a foreign consulate in Austria filed a suit against her
employer for payment of overtime and vacation compensation. The defendant claimed
immunity pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the European
Convention on State Immunity. The Court noted that the first convention was not
applicable as the plaintiff had a contract with the sending State and not with a consular
officer . The European Convention on State immunity could only be applied if both the
State against which legal action is taken and the State in which the procedure takes
place were parties to the convention, which was not the case. The Court reiterated its
view that employment contracts of this kind were a legal relationship under private law in
respect of which a foreign State was subject to Austrian jurisdiction by virtue of the rules
of both international and Austrian law.
(a) Registration no. A/7
(b) Date 23 January 2001
(c) Author(ity) Regional Court Vienna as appellate Court
(Landesgericht Wien), judgment
(d) Parties E. AG Wien (individual) vs. L (State)
(e) Points of law The conclusion of a rental lease by a foreign
State is a relationship under private law, even if
the rented real estate is used for the location of
the embassy of that State.
(f) Classification no. O.b.1, 1.b, 2.b
(g) Source(s) 40/R7/01b, Austrian legal information system (see:
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at - Judikatur, Justiz LG)
(h) Additional information
(i) Full text - extracts - translation - Summary English: see below
summaries Full text: Appendix A/7 *
Summary:
The landlord (plaintiff) took legal action against the tenant (a State) who was in arrears
with the payment of rent. The defendant argued that the real estate had been rented to
accommodate its embassy in Vienna and that the conclusion of the lease contract was
therefore in performance of sovereign function and the case not subject to Austrian
jurisdiction. The Regional Court of Vienna noted that for determining whether an act was
iure imperii or iure gestionis the act itself and not the purpose for which it was performed
had to be considered. The conclusion of a rental lease by a foreign State needed to be
qualified as a relationship under private law, even if the rented real estate is used for
official purposes (location of the embassy) of that State. Therefore the case was subject
to Austrian jurisdiction.
Summary:
The plaintiff filed a suit against the US (her employer) for compensation for damages
arising from her employment contract. The Court requested the Federal Ministry of
Justice to forward the respective legal documents through diplomatic channels to the
defendant (US Department of Justice).
The documents were left with the Department of State by the driver of the Austrian
Embassy in Washington, the signature on the acknowledgement of receipt was not
readable. The defendant claimed immunity referring to a note verbale of its embassy and
failed to appear before the Court. The plaintiff requested a default judgment. The Court
did not comply with this request, arguing that there was no sufficient proof that the action
and the summon had been served on the defendant correctly. The Appellate and the
Supreme Court stated that according to international law the implementation of letters
rogatory or their denial was an act of ius imperii character and the case therefore not
subject to Austrian jurisdiction. In determining whether an act was iure imperii or iure
gestionis the Court repeated its view previously expressed (see A/4) that the act itself
and not the purpose for which it was performed had to be considered.
Summary:
The plaintiff brought an action against an incumbent head of State as well as against his
sister and two brothers and applied for a declaration of paternity.
The first defendant claimed immunity. The District Court dismissed the application. The
Regional Court as Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the District Court concerning
the question of absolute immunity of foreign heads of States. The plaintiff finally lodged
an appeal with the Supreme Court. She argued that the right of a person to a declaration
of paternity by a court took precedence over immunity. Even if the first respondent, due
to its immunity, did not fall under the jurisdiction of Austrian courts, the plaintiff had to be
granted a right to redress against the other respondents.
The Supreme Court stated that an essential principle deriving from international law was
that foreign heads of State, by virtue of their office (ex officio) and at least during the
term of their office ratione materiae, were exempt from the jurisdiction of other States.
They were also exempt from the jurisdiction of other States with regard to private acts
ratione personae (absolute immunity). The Supreme Court noted that the first
defendant therefore enjoyed immunity and was not subject to Austrian jurisdiction. This
was not true for the other defendants who do not live in the same household with the
head of State concerned.
The Supreme Court further stated that only if legal action against an incumbent head of
State in his home country is impossible the right of declaration of paternity might - under
the aspects of humanitarian law - precede the relevant principles of international law
concerning immunity of heads of State.
Summary:
An Austrian citizen filed an action against the Kingdom of B. claiming inter alia
compensation of damages which arose from the sanctions imposed by Austrias 14 EU
partners claiming that the call to boycott and the decision to impose sanctions on Austria
were not iure imperii acts and that the Kingdom of B. was therefore subject to Austrian
jurisdiction. The Kingdom of B claimed immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the
question whether and under which conditions legal action can be taken against a foreign
State was ruled both by international customary and treaty law. One of such international
treaties was the European Convention on State immunity. Both the Kingdom of B. and
Austria are parties to the convention, but Article 11 of this convention was not applicable
(as claimed by the plaintiff) as it did not cover immaterial damage. Therefore the
Kingdom of B. was immune from Austrian jurisdiction according to Article XV of the
mentioned convention. The Court noted further that there was no distinction between
acts iure imperii and iure gestionis in this context.
The Supreme Court also stated that the question of immunity had not been ruled
specifically EU law. Therefore general international law was applicable and this fact led
as well to the immunity of the Kingdom of B. from Austrian jurisdiction.
This legal situation was not changed by the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters (Lugano Convention 1988)
as this convention created a system of international jurisdiction and does not refer to the
immunity of states and diplomatic agents . Claims which arose from iure imperii acts and
state liability were excluded from the mentioned convention. Finally the Supreme Court
stated that the mentioned acts of the Kingdom of B. were with no doubt an activity in the
field of foreign policy and therefore acts of ius imperii character.