Case of Dudchenko v. Russia

THIRD SECTION
CASE OF DUDCHENKO v. RUSSIA
(Application no. 37717/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 November 2017
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
DUDCHENKO v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 1
In the case of Dudchenko v. Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Helena Jderblom, President,
Branko Lubarda,
Helen Keller,
Dmitry Dedov,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Polkov,
Georgios A. Serghides, judges,
and Fato Arac, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 October 2017,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 37717/05) against the
Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the Convention) by a Russian national, Mr Vladimir Nikolayevich
Dudchenko (the applicant), on 1 September 2005.
2. The Russian Government (the Government) were represented by
Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office,
Mr M. Galperin.
3. Referring to Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant
alleged, in particular, that the conditions of his detention and transport had
been inadequate, that the length of this detention had been excessive and
unjustified, that the length of the criminal proceedings had also been
excessive, that the domestic authorities had violated his right to legal
assistance of his own choosing, and that he had been subjected to covert
surveillance in breach of the right to respect for his private life and
correspondence.
4. On 26 February 2010 the above complaints were communicated to the
Government.
2 DUDCHENKO v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Murmansk.
A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
6. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk regional prosecutors office

initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was suspected of
leadership of a criminal armed gang. According to the authorities, the
applicant, as the leader of the gang, had planned and committed several
offences, namely aggravated kidnapping, assault, aggravated robbery and
extortion, in Murmansk and Moscow.
7. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the
interception and recording of the applicants telephone communications on
his mobile telephone, number ...-15. The surveillance authorisation read in
its entirety as follows:
[The police] are investigating [a case] against a criminal gang involved in robberies
and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and
other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. [M.] and [Z.] are
members of that gang. According to intelligence information, these people are
planning to commit aggravated extortion from Murmansk businessmen. Operational-
search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-15,
registered as belonging to [M.].
In view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information
necessary to expose [the applicants] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the
court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 2 of [the
Code of Criminal Procedure]
decides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicants] telephone
communications on his mobile telephone number ...-15.
8. On 24 and 25 December 2003 the police intercepted the applicants
conversations with an accomplice, M.
9. On 25 December 2003 two of the applicants accomplices, M. and S.,
were arrested. The applicant went into hiding.
10. On the same day, 25 December 2003, at the applicants request his
brother retained G. as the applicants legal representative. The legal services
agreement stated that G. was to consult and defend the applicant while his
name was on the polices wanted persons list in connection with charges
that were not yet known to him. If the applicant were to be arrested by the
police, an additional agreement would be signed between G. and the
applicant. There is no evidence that the police or the investigator were
informed about that agreement.
11. On 26 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the

interception and recording of the applicants telephone communications on
his mobile telephone number ...-49. The surveillance authorisation read in
its entirety as follows:
[The police] have intelligence information about a criminal gang involved in
robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in
Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang.
Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone
number ...-49.
In view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information
necessary to expose [the applicants] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the
court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 2 of [the
Code of Criminal Procedure]
decides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicants] telephone
communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49.
12. On 26 and 27 December 2003 the police intercepted conversations
between the applicant and G.
13. On 27 December 2003 the applicant was arrested.
14. On 28 December 2003 G. informed the investigator that he was the
applicants defence counsel by virtue of instruction no. 1062 of the
Murmansk Regional Bar Association (the Bar Association). He was
formally admitted () as counsel for the applicant.
15. On 5 January 2004 the applicant was charged with aggravated
robbery, assault, kidnapping and extortion, committed by an organised
criminal group. S. and M. were also charged with the same criminal
offences.
16. At the beginning of August 2004 the investigator informed G. that
his presence was required during investigative procedures involving the
applicant. On 23 August 2004 the investigator was informed by the Bar
Association that G. was on annual leave until 4 October 2004.
17. On 24 August 2004 the investigator appointed legal aid counsel for
the applicant, noting that he had refused to choose replacement counsel and
had insisted on being represented by G.
18. On 30 August 2004 the investigator decided to remove G. as counsel
for the applicant, finding that it was necessary to question him about his
telephone conversations with the applicant on 26 and 27 December 2003.
He noted that at the time, G. had not yet been the applicants counsel.
However, well aware that the applicant had committed serious criminal
offences, G. had advised him what to do. In particular, he had told the
applicant that money was needed, which could possibly mean that G. had
intended to bribe a police official. He had also informed him about the
course of the criminal proceedings, which had become known to him as at
the time he had been representing the applicants accomplices, S. and M.
When the police had tried to force the applicants door, the applicant had
summoned G., who had said that he could not come and offered to send
another lawyer. He had then advised the applicant to try to avoid arrest and,
if that was not possible, to destroy his telephone and the SIM card, and to
remain silent when questioned. In the investigators opinion, by giving such
advice, G. had been trying to hide his connections with the applicant and his
knowledge of the criminal offences committed by him. Given that at the
material time G. had not been formally admitted as the applicants counsel,
he should be considered as having advised him in his capacity as a simple
citizen. He should therefore be called as a witness in the criminal
proceedings against the applicant.
19. On 11 October 2004 the criminal case against the applicant and his
accomplices was transferred to the Murmansk Regional Court for trial. The
criminal case file comprised twelve volumes; five criminal cases were
joined into one criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices.
20. A preliminary hearing was held on 21 and 22 October 2004.
21. The trial started on 3 November 2004. The applicant asked the court
for permission for his brother, a civil lawyer working at a company which
sold car spare parts, to act as his defence counsel. The court rejected his
request, stating that the applicants brother was not qualified to participate
as defence counsel in criminal proceedings, that he did not have the relevant
practical experience, and that the applicant was already represented by legal
aid counsel.
22. On 4 November 2004 the applicant requested that legal aid counsel
assigned to his case be removed for failure to provide adequate legal
assistance. The court rejected his request. The applicant then requested that
AM. be admitted as his defence counsel instead of the legal aid lawyer. The
judge granted that request and AM. represented the applicant throughout the
remainder of the criminal proceedings. The trial was adjourned until
15 November 2004 to let AM. study the case file.
23. On 15 November 2004 the hearing was again postponed, until
22 November 2004, owing to the failure of one of the co-accused to appear
due to illness.
24. Further hearings were held between 22 November and 9 December
2004.
25. On 22 November 2004 the applicant challenged the admissibility as
evidence of transcripts of his telephone conversations with G. on 26 and
27 December 2003. He argued that G. had been his counsel as from
25 December 2003, as confirmed by the legal services agreement of that
date and by relevant payment invoices. The conversations in question were
therefore protected by legal professional privilege and their transcripts could
not be used in evidence in criminal proceedings.
26. On 30 November 2004 the Murmansk Regional Court found that the
legal services agreement of 25 December 2003 stated that G. was to provide
the applicant with legal assistance in the framework of criminal
proceedings, without clearly identifying the criminal proceedings to which it

related. The investigator had not been informed about that agreement. G.
had not been formally admitted as the applicants counsel in the present
criminal proceedings until 28 December 2003 when he had shown the
investigator the relevant instruction by the Bar Association. The Regional
Court found it relevant that during the conversations intercepted by the
police, G. had advised the applicant to remain in hiding and to destroy the
evidence. Moreover, having been present, as their counsel, at S.s and M.s
questioning after their arrest, G. had informed the applicant about their
statements to the investigator. When summoned by the applicant to assist
him at the time of his arrest, he had refused to come and had offered to send
another lawyer. That gave reasons to doubt that G. had been representing
the applicant at the time in the present criminal proceedings. The
investigator had subsequently removed G. as counsel for the applicant. G.
had not, however, been called to testify against the applicant in breach of
legal professional privilege. Given that the applicants conversations with
G. intercepted by the police contained information about the applicants
criminal activities, they were not subject to legal professional privilege and
their transcripts were admissible as evidence.
27. On 9 December 2004 the court ordered a graphological expert report
and for that reason adjourned the trial until 5 April 2005.
28. On 4 April 2005 the applicant lodged an action before the
Oktyabrskiy District Court of Murmansk, challenging the investigators
decision of 30 August 2004 to remove G. as his counsel. On 6 June 2005 the
Oktyabrskiy District Court dismissed that complaint as inadmissible,
finding that it could not be examined once the investigation had been
completed. The applicant could raise the complaint before the trial court.
29. Meanwhile, further hearings were held on 5, 25 and 27 April and
5 and 12 May 2005.
30. On 19 May 2005 the court ordered a complex psychological expert
examination of one of the co-accused and adjourned the trial pending the
expert examination report. A further complex psychological examination
was ordered on 4 July 2005 and the trial was again adjourned until
7 October 2005.
31. On 7 October 2005 the trial was adjourned because the court ordered
that two prosecution witnesses who had testified against S. and who were
detained in Moscow be transported to Murmansk for a cross-examination.
32. The trial remained adjourned between 7 October 2005 and 6 March
2006 while awaiting the transfer of the prosecution witnesses, who at the
time were on trial in a criminal case in Moscow. They were transferred to
Murmansk on 3 March 2006, after their conviction of 7 October 2005 had
been upheld on appeal on 26 December 2005.
33. On 29 December 2005 the applicant challenged the admissibility as
evidence of the transcripts of his telephone conversations with M. on 24 and
25 December 2003 and with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He claimed,

in particular, that the transcripts had been obtained unlawfully.
34. The trial was resumed on 6 March 2006. Hearings were held on
16 March, 6, 7, 13 and 20 April 2006.
35. During the trial the court examined numerous pieces of evidence,
including three expert reports and the statements of six victims and
twenty-four witnesses from Murmansk and Moscow.
36. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as
charged and sentenced him to thirteen years imprisonment. It relied on the
transcripts of the applicants telephone conversations with G. and M.,
among other evidence, observing that the interception of the applicants
telephone communications had been authorised by a court. Having analysed
the transcripts of the applicants telephone conversations with G., it held as
follows:
The lawyer had not been formally admitted to provide legal assistance to [the
applicant] at the time [when the interception had taken place]. His actions were
considered by the investigator to be unlawful and served as a basis for the decision to
remove [G.] as counsel for [the applicant] and for considering the question of opening
criminal proceedings [against G.]. The court does not have any reason to believe that
the information obtained as a result of [intercepting the applicants] telephone
communications with [G.] cannot be used as evidence, given that the information in
question has not become known to [G.] as a result of providing legal assistance to [the
applicant].
37. The applicant appealed against the conviction, claiming that the
Regional Court had erred in its assessment of the evidence, that the
transcripts of his telephone conversations with his co-defendant M. and
counsel G. had been unlawfully used as evidence in the criminal
proceedings, that G. had been unlawfully removed as counsel from his case,
and that the authorities had refused to allow his brother to act as his legal
representative.
38. On 18 December 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
upheld the conviction. It held, in particular, that the transcripts of the
applicants telephone conversations with M. and G. had been correctly
admitted as evidence. It further observed that the applicants allegations of
violations of his right to defence during the preliminary investigation had
been examined by the first-instance court and had been rejected as
unsubstantiated.
B. The applicants detention pending investigation and trial
39. The applicant was arrested on 27 December 2003.

40. On 29 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court remanded the
applicant in custody. It held that he was suspected of particularly serious
offences, did not have a permanent job, and that his assertions that he
owned a family business were unconvincing. There were therefore sufficient

reasons to believe that he might abscond, obstruct the course of justice, and
continue his criminal activities.
41. On 24 February and 18 June 2004 the Regional Court ordered
extensions of the applicants detention, citing the need for further
investigation, the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant
absconding, putting pressure on witnesses and obstructing the course of
justice. There were no factors relating to the applicants character, state of
health, family or other circumstances which would warrant release. The
applicant did not appeal against those extension orders.
42. On 11 October 2004 the criminal case file was transferred to the
Regional Court for trial. On 22 October 2004 the Regional Court ordered
the applicants and his co-defendants detention during trial, referring to the
gravity of the charges and the lack of permanent employment at the time of
the commission of the crimes. It considered that the grounds which had
served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid. The applicant
did not appeal.
43. On 5 April, 4 July, 7 October and 29 December 2005 and 7 April
2006 the Regional Court extended the applicants and his co-defendants
detention, finding that the grounds which had served as the basis for the
preventive measure remained valid and that there were therefore no reasons
to change it. The trial could not proceed for objective reasons as it was
necessary to wait for the results of a psychological expert examination of S.
and for the transfer for questioning of two prosecution witnesses against S.
44. The applicant appealed against the above extension orders to the
Supreme Court. He submitted that he had been permanently residing in
Murmansk, that he had been working in the family business, that he had no
previous convictions and that he had no intention of absconding from the
authorities. The authorities had failed to substantiate their allegations that he
might abscond or continue with his criminal activity. As regards the risk
that he might put pressure on witnesses, it was no longer relevant as all the
witnesses had already been questioned by the trial court. According to the
applicant, the extension of his detention had been based solely on the
gravity of the charges against him. The trial had been adjourned for reasons
which were not related to his personal situation, but in order to carry out
expert psychological examinations of one of the co-accused and to ensure
the transfer from Moscow of two prosecution witnesses who were to give
evidence against that same co-accused. He asked to be released on bail or on
his fathers personal guarantee.
45. On 11 August, 9 November and 15 December 2005 and 30 March
2006 the Supreme Court upheld the above extension orders on appeal,
referring to the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant
absconding or putting pressure on witnesses. The fact that the witnesses had
already been questioned was irrelevant because the applicant might still put
pressure on them or otherwise obstruct the trial.
C. The conditions of the applicants detention
1. The Government
46. The applicant was held as follows: in remand prison no. IZ-51/1
(SIZO-1) in Murmansk from 30 December 2003 to 21 May 2006; in
correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, Murmansk Region, in a special
wing with the material conditions of detention of a remand prison (
, )
from 21 May to 9 October 2006; in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda
from 12 to 17 October 2006; and in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow
from 18 October 2006 to 24 January 2007.
47. The Government submitted that it was impossible to provide original
documentation concerning the conditions of the applicants detention in
remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk because all the official
records had been destroyed after the expiry of the statutory period for their
storage. In respect of that detention facility they submitted only statements
and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010. They also submitted
copies of the prison population register for the entire periods of the
applicants detention in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi and in
remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, and selected pages from the prison
population register for the period of detention in remand prison no. IZ-77/3
in Moscow.
48. The Government submitted the following information about the
applicants detention, which was based on the above-mentioned documents:
Detention Cell Period of Surface Number Number

facility No. detention area of of beds
(in square inmates
metres)
remand prison 331 30 December 13.1 3
IZ-51/1 2003 to
(SIZO-1) in 5 January 2004
Murmansk
417 5 January to 12.8 3

6 February 2004
315 6-16 February 12.9 3
2004

(in square inmates
metres)
312 16 February to 13.3 3
14 April 2004
315 14-21 April 12.9 3
2004
423 21 April to 12.9 3
6 December
2004
210 6-10 December 12.8 3
2004
203 10 December 24.4 6
2004 to 28 July
2005
212 28 July to 23.6 5
10 August 2005
307 10-11 August 13.3 3
2005
417 11-16 August 12.8 3
2005
219 16-19 August 13.4 3
2005
417 19-30 August 12.8 3
2005
307 30 August to 13.3 3
17 October 2005
403 17 October to 16.6 4
24 November
2005
406 24 November 22.7 5
2005 to 6 March
2006
215 6-9 March 2006 12.8 3
301 9-17 March 3.6 1
2006
405 17 March to 22.7 5
21 May 2006

(in square inmates
metres)
correctional 10 21 May to 24.9 5-6 6
facility IK-16 20 July 2006
in Murmashi,
Murmansk
Region
9 21 July to 26.2 4-6 6

9 October 2006
IZ-35/2 in 198 12-17 October 49.3 14-30
Vologda 2006
remand prison 434 18 October to 18.3 6-8
IZ-77/3 in 24 January 2007
Moscow
49. The Government asserted that in all the cells where the applicant had
been detained between 2003 and 2007, the number of inmates had not
exceeded the number of beds and that at all times while in detention the
applicant had been provided with an individual sleeping place. At the same
time, the Government submitted as follows:
... during the applicants detention the sanitary norm for space per inmate was not
always complied with. However, it happened only occasionally ... and the
prosecutors office demanded that these infractions be eliminated ...
50. Relying on the statements and reports prepared by the prison
authorities in 2010, the Government further submitted that the applicant had
been provided with bed sheets and cutlery. The cells were cleaned daily by
the inmates and the administration of the penal institutions carried out a
sanitary treatment of the premises every month.
51. All cells were equipped with wash basins supplying cold water; hot
water was available for personal and household needs. In addition, the
inmates were allowed to use their own kettles and water heaters.
52. At all times in all the remand prisons, the applicant and the other
inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week; their
linen was changed weekly.
53. The applicant and other inmates were allowed to take one hours
daily exercise in specially equipped yards.
2. The applicant
54. According to the applicant, remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in
Murmansk had been severely overcrowded and the space available to him
had been below the domestic standards. The applicant contested the
accuracy of the data submitted by the Government about the designated
number of bunk beds within the cells. For instance, in cell no. 423 the actual
number of bunk beds had been eight and not three as submitted by the
Government, as could be seen from the photographs he had submitted to the
Court. Cell no. 406 had seven sleeping bunks and housed up to nine
inmates.
55. In reply to the applicants complaints about poor conditions of
detention, the Murmansk regional prosecutors office stated, on
14 November 2005, as follows:
... the applicants complaints ... that the conditions of detention in SIZO-1 were not
fully compatible with the sanitary regulations prescribed by the Federal Law on
pre-trial detention ... that the minimum individual space prescribed by the Law
(4 sq. m per person) was not always complied with, that the premises needed repair,
that the walls in some of the cells were stained with mould and crumbling, that the
plumbing was often out of order, that not all the cells were equipped with a sufficient
number of shelves and TV sets, that broken glass in the windows was not replaced
promptly and that there were no refrigerators [all these complaints] reflect the
reality.
These deficiencies were noted by the prosecutors office during their inspection of
SIZO-1.
56. On 25 April 2006 the Murmansk regional prosecutors office stated:
... in 2005-06 the number of detainees in SIZO-1 frequently exceeded the
prescribed limits. For these reasons it was not always possible to comply with the
sanitary regulations (4 sq. m per inmate). For the same reasons the requirements
concerning the separate detention of different categories of detainees were
sometimes not complied with ...
57. As regards correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, the applicant
stated that during his stay there he had been detained in inadequate
conditions. The cells had been overcrowded. The space available to him
throughout the detention period had been below the domestic standards. In
particular, he had shared a cell measuring 20 sq. m with five other detainees.
58. On 28 September 2006 the applicant complained to the Murmansk
Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of inadequate
conditions of detention in IK-16. In particular, he complained of poor
nutrition, overcrowding, a lack of newspapers and television sets, and of the
authorities refusal to make copies of documents at inmates requests. He
received no reply.
59. Furthermore, as regards remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, the
applicant stated that the quality of the food in the prison had been extremely
poor. He had been detained with thirty-six other detainees in a cell
measuring 50 sq. m. The cell had been infested with cockroaches, bedbugs
and rats. The detainees had slept on bunk beds.
60. Lastly, as regards remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, according
to the applicant, he had been held in cell 434, which measured 13 sq. m,
with seven other detainees. The inmates had slept on bunk beds. There had
been a table measuring 1 m by 0.3 m but no benches or chairs to sit on. The
cell had been swarming with insects. The inmates had been allowed to take
exercise only in groups.
D. Conditions of the applicants transfer between detention facilities
1. The applicant
61. From 9 to 12 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train
from Murmansk to Vologda. He was given no food. He received his first
meal on 13 October 2006.
62. On 17 and 18 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train
from Vologda to Moscow.
63. From 24 January to 9 February 2007, on the way from Moscow to
Murmansk, between St Petersburg and Murmansk, the applicant was
transported in cramped conditions in a compartment with up to sixteen other
inmates, some of whom were suffering from tuberculosis.
2. The Government
64. As regards the conditions of the applicants transportation between
Murmansk and Vologda from 9 to 12 October 2006, the applicant was
transported in a compartment with other inmates, none of whom were
suffering from tuberculosis. He was transferred from Vologda railway
station to the local remand prison IZ-35/2 in a special vehicle separately
from other inmates.
65. When the applicant was transferred from Vologda railway station to
Moscow on 17 and 18 October 2006, he was not transported with inmates
who were suffering from tuberculosis.
66. When the applicant was transferred from Moscow to Murmansk
between 24 January and 9 February 2007, he was transported first alone in
the railway compartment, then from St Petersburg onwards he was
transported with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from
tuberculosis.
67. During the transfers the applicant was duly provided with dry food
rations; he was given permission to use hot water and the toilet.
68. The applicant did not lodge any complaints about the conditions of
his transportation between Murmansk and Moscow. He did not apply for
medical assistance, nor did he complain about the state of his health.
69. In their submission the Government neither specified the number of

inmates transported with the applicant, nor the size of the compartments in
which they had travelled. Nor did they submit any copies of documents
regarding that part of the applicants complaints, including the distribution
of dry rations for the trip.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Conditions of detention and preventive measures in the criminal

proceedings
70. For a summary of the relevant domestic law concerning conditions

of detention and preventive measures, including remand in custody, see
Idalov v. Russia ([GC], no. 5826/03, 70-73, 22 May 2012), and Zherebin
v. Russia (no. 51445/09, 16-26, 24 March 2016).
B. Interception of communications
71. The Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his
private life, personal and family secrets and the right to defend his honour
and reputation (Article 23 1). It further guarantees the right to respect for
correspondence, telephone, postal, telegraph and other communications.
That right may be restricted only on the basis of a court order (Article 23
2).
72. The Russian Code of Criminal Procedure of 2001 (the CCrP)
provides that investigative measures involving a search in a persons home
or interception of his or her telephone calls and other communications are
subject to prior judicial authorisation. A request to search a persons home
or intercept his or her communications must be submitted by an investigator
with a prosecutors approval and must be examined by a single judge within
twenty-four hours. The prosecutor and the investigator are entitled to attend.
The judge examining the request decides whether to authorise the requested
measure, or to refuse authorisation, giving reasons (Article 165 of the
CCrP).
73. Interception of telephone and other communications of a suspect, an
accused or other person may be authorised by a court if there are reasons to
believe that they may contain information relevant for the criminal case in
respect of a serious offence or an especially serious criminal offence
(Article 186 1 of the CCrP, as in force at the material time). If there is a
risk of violence, extortion or other criminal acts against the victim, a witness
or their close relations, interception of telephone and other communications
may be carried out at their written request or, in the absence of such request,
on the basis of judicial authorisation (Article 186 2 of the CCrP).
74. A request for judicial authorisation to intercept communications

must clearly mention the following: (1) the criminal case to which the
request is related; (2) the grounds for conducting the requested measures;
(3) the family name, the first name and the patronymic of the person whose
communications are to be intercepted; (4) the duration of the requested
measure; and (5) the State agency that will perform the interception
(Article 186 3 of the CCrP).
75. The judicial decision authorising interception of communications
must be forwarded by the investigator to the State agency charged with its
implementation. The interception of communications may be authorised for
a period not exceeding six months, and is discontinued by the investigator
when it is no longer necessary. It must in any case be discontinued when the
investigation has been completed (Article 186 4 and 5 of the CCrP).
C. Right to legal assistance
76. The CCrP provides that advocates (qualified lawyers who are
members of the Bar) may act as counsel in criminal proceedings. At the
defendants request the judge may allow a close relative or any other person
to represent the defendant along with the advocate (Article 49 2 of the
CCrP).
77. To be admitted to act as counsel in criminal proceedings, an
advocate must produce a practising certificate ( )
and an instruction by a Bar association to act as counsel in a specific case
() (Article 49 4 of the CCrP).
78. Counsel may participate in the proceedings from the date when
criminal proceedings are opened against a specific person, when charges are
brought, when the person is arrested or detained, or when any investigative
measures capable of affecting the persons rights are taken (Article 49 3 of
the CCrP).
79. Counsel may be removed by the investigator or the court in the
following cases: (i) he or she previously participated in the current criminal
proceedings as a judge, prosecutor, investigator, court stenographer,
witness, expert, translator or attesting witness; (ii) he or she is a close
relative of the judge, prosecutor, investigator or court stenographer who has
earlier participated in the current criminal proceedings, or a close relative of
a person whose interests contradict the interests of the party who is retaining
counsel; or (iii) he or she previously represented a person whose interests
contradict the interests of the party who is retaining counsel (Article 72 of
the CCrP).
80. The Federal Law on Advocacy of 31 May 2002 (no. 63-FZ, hereafter
the Advocates Act, as in force at the material time) provides that an
advocate represents his client on the basis of a legal services agreement
between them (section 25 of the Advocates Act). In cases provided for by
federal law, an advocate must obtain an instruction from a Bar association

to represent a client in a specific case. In other cases an advocate represents
his client on the basis of a power of attorney (section 6(2) of the Advocates
Act).
81. An advocate may not accept an obviously unlawful assignment from
a client (section 6(4)).
82. Section 8 of the Advocates Act provides as follows:
1. Any information relating to legal representation of a client by an advocate falls
within legal professional privilege.
2. An advocate cannot be questioned as a witness concerning matters which have
become known to him as a result of representing the client or as a result of an
application for legal representation by a prospective client.
3. Operational search measures and investigative measures in respect of an
advocate (including in residential or working premises used by an advocate for his
professional activities) are allowed only on the basis of a court order.
Information, objects and documents obtained as a result of operational search
measures and investigative measures (even if they are performed after the advocates
practising certificate has been suspended or annulled) may be used as evidence in
criminal proceedings only if they are not included in the advocates case files
concerning his clients. These limitations do not apply to weapons of crime and objects
with limited or prohibited circulation as prescribed by the law of the Russian
Federation.
83. In its decision no. 128- of 6 July 2000 the Constitutional Court
held that legal professional privilege covered all information which had
become known to the advocate as a result of representing the client,
including any information communicated by the client before the advocate
had been formally admitted as counsel in criminal proceedings.
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL
84. Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the

Council of Europe to member States on the freedom of exercise of the
profession of lawyer provides, inter alia, as follows:
Principle I - General principles on the freedom of exercise of the profession of
lawyer
...
6. All necessary measures should be taken to ensure the respect of the
confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship. Exceptions to this principle should be
allowed only if compatible with the rule of law.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
85. Referring to Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained

that the authorities had violated his right to respect for his private life by
tapping his telephone conversations in December 2003, including
conversations with his counsel and an accomplice. Article 8 of the
Convention provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
A. Admissibility
86. The Court considers that the applicants complaint under Article 8 of
the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties submissions

87. The Government submitted that the interception of the applicants
telephone communications had been ordered by a court as required by law.
It transpired from the court orders that the police had intelligence
information about the applicant being the leader of a criminal gang. The
transcripts of his telephone conversations had been admitted as evidence in
the criminal proceedings against him. The tapping of his telephone had
therefore been lawful and proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting
public safety and the rights and freedoms of others.
88. The applicant reiterated his complaint. He submitted, in particular,
that the telephone tapping had been in breach of section 8 of the Advocates
Act. The telephone conversations with his counsel on 26 and 27 December
2003 should have been protected by legal professional privilege, taking into
account that G. had been retained as his legal representative on
25 December 2003.
2. The Courts assessment

89. The Court accepts, and it is not disputed by the parties, that the
interception of the applicants telephone communications amounted to an
interference with the exercise of his right to respect for his private life and
correspondence, as set out in Article 8 of the Convention.
90. The Court reiterates that such interference will give rise to a breach
of Article 8 of the Convention unless it can be shown that it was in
accordance with law, pursued one or more legitimate aims as defined in the
second paragraph and was necessary in a democratic society to achieve
those aims (see, among other authorities, Goranova-Karaeneva v. Bulgaria,
no. 12739/05, 45, 8 March 2011).
91. The wording in accordance with the law requires the impugned
measure both to have some basis in domestic law and to be compatible with
the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the
Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8. The law
must thus meet quality requirements: it must be accessible to the person
concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Roman Zakharov v. Russia
[GC], no. 47143/06, 228, ECHR 2015).
92. An interference will be considered necessary in a democratic
society for a legitimate aim if it answers a pressing social need and, in
particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the
reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and
sufficient. While it is for the national authorities to make the initial
assessment in all these respects, the final evaluation of whether the
interference is necessary remains subject to review by the Court for
conformity with the requirements of the Convention (see S. and Marper
v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 101,
ECHR 2008). In the context of covert surveillance, the assessment depends
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration
of the surveillance measures, the grounds for ordering them, the authorities
competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of
remedy provided by the national law. The Court has to determine whether
the procedures for supervising the ordering and implementation of the
restrictive measures are such as to keep the interference to what is
necessary in a democratic society (see Roman Zakharov, cited above,
232).
(a) Interception of telephone conversations with an accomplice on the basis of

the judicial authorisation of 23 December 2003
93. The Court observes that on 24 and 25 December 2003 the police
intercepted the applicants conversations with one of his accomplices.
Judicial authorisation for the interception had been given on 23 December
2003.
94. As regards the question of lawfulness of the interception, it has not

been disputed by the parties that the covert surveillance of the applicant had
a basis in domestic law, namely in the relevant provisions of the CCrP.
95. Although the applicant has not complained that the quality of the
domestic law fell short of the Convention standards, when examining
whether the interference complained of was in accordance with the law,
the Court must assess the quality of the relevant domestic law in relation to
the requirements of the fundamental principle of the rule of law (see
Dragojevi v. Croatia, no. 68955/11, 86, 15 January 2015). The Court
notes in this connection that in the case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia it has
already found that Russian law does not meet the quality of law
requirement because the legal provisions governing the interception of
communications do not provide for adequate and effective guarantees
against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. They are therefore incapable of
keeping the interference to what is necessary in a democratic society
(see Roman Zakharov, cited above, 302-04). In the present case,
however, where the applicants complaints were based on specific and
undisputed instances of covert surveillance, the Courts assessment of the
quality of law, although it necessarily entails some degree of abstraction,
cannot be of the same level of generality as in cases such as Roman
Zakharov, which concern general complaints about the law permitting
covert surveillance and in which the Court must, of necessity and by way of
exception to its normal approach, carry out a completely abstract assessment
of such law. In cases arising from individual applications, the Court must as
a rule focus its attention not on the law as such but on the manner in which
it was applied to the applicant in the particular circumstances (see
Goranova-Karaeneva, cited above, 48).
96. In the Roman Zakharov case the Court has found, in particular, that
the judicial authorisation procedures provided for by Russian law are not
capable of ensuring that covert surveillance measures are not ordered
haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration. In
particular, the CCrP does not instruct judges ordering covert surveillance
measures to verify the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the
person concerned or to apply the necessity and proportionality tests.
The Court has also found it established, on the basis of evidence submitted
by the parties, that in their everyday practice the Russian courts do not
verify whether there is a reasonable suspicion against the person
concerned and do not apply the necessity and proportionality tests (see
Roman Zakharov, cited above, 260-67).
97. There is no indication in the case file that the Russian courts acted
differently in the present case. Although the court noted, without any further
details, that the police had intelligence information that the applicant was
the leader of a gang and planned to commit extortions (see paragraph 7
above), it did not mention any facts or information that would satisfy an
objective observer that the applicant might have committed or planned the
offences. There is no evidence that any information or documents
confirming the suspicion against the applicant had actually been submitted
to the judge.
98. Furthermore, there is no indication in the text of the surveillance
authorisation that the court applied the test of necessity in a democratic
society, and in particular assessed whether the surveillance measures
carried out against the applicant were proportionate to any legitimate aim
pursued. In particular, the court failed to recognise that the case involved a
conflict between the right to respect for private life and correspondence and
other legitimate interests and to perform a balancing exercise. The only
reason advanced by the court to justify the surveillance measures was that it
seem[ed] impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the
applicants] unlawful activities by overt investigation, without explaining
how it had come to that conclusion. The Court does not consider that such a
vague and unsubstantiated statement was sufficient to justify the decision to
authorise a lengthy (180 days) covert surveillance operation, which entailed
a serious interference with the right to respect for the applicants private life
and correspondence.
99. To sum up, the Court finds that the domestic court that authorised
covert surveillance measures against the applicant did not verify whether
there was a reasonable suspicion against him and did not apply the
necessity in a democratic society and proportionality tests.
100. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
(b) Interception of telephone conversations with counsel on the basis of the

judicial authorisation of 26 December 2003
101. The Court further observes that on 26 and 27 December 2003 the
police intercepted the applicants conversations with his lawyer, G. Judicial
authorisation for intercepting the applicants telephone conversations had
been given on 26 December 2003.
102. The Court notes at the outset that the judicial authorisation of
26 December 2003 repeated almost verbatim, with some abridgments, the
judicial authorisation of 23 December 2003 and therefore suffered from the
same defects. In particular, there is no indication in the text of the
surveillance authorisation that the judge verified whether there was a
reasonable suspicion against the applicant or applied the necessity in a
democratic society and proportionality tests (see paragraph 11 above).
103. While tapping the applicants telephone on the basis of that
authorisation, the police intercepted the applicants conversations with his
counsel, G. It is true that at the time the authorities did not know that G. had
been retained as counsel by the applicant. However, even after being
informed about that fact, the domestic authorities refused to recognise the
transcripts of the conversations in question as legally privileged and used

them as evidence in criminal proceedings against the applicant, finding that
G. had not yet been formally admitted as the applicants counsel at the time
when the interception had taken place. In the Courts opinion, it is of no
importance that at the time of the interception G. had not yet been formally
admitted as counsel in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. As
explained by the Constitutional Court, under Russian law legal professional
privilege protects all information which has become known to the advocate
as a result of representing a client, including any information communicated
by the client before the advocate has been formally admitted as counsel in
criminal proceedings (see paragraph 83 above).
104. The Court reiterates that, while Article 8 protects the confidentiality
of all correspondence between individuals, it will afford strengthened
protection to exchanges between lawyers and their clients, as lawyers
would be unable to defend their clients if they were unable to guarantee that
their exchanges would remain confidential (see Michaud v. France,
no. 12323/11, 118, ECHR 2012, and R.E. v. the United Kingdom,
no. 62498/11, 131, 27 October 2015).
105. In its case-law the Court has developed the following minimum
safeguards that should be set out in law in order to avoid abuses of power in
cases where legally privileged material has been acquired through measures
of secret surveillance.
106. Firstly, the law must clearly define the scope of the legal
professional privilege and state how, under what conditions and by whom
the distinction is to be drawn between privileged and non-privileged
material. Given that the confidential relations between a lawyer and his
clients belong to an especially sensitive area which directly concern the
rights of the defence, it is unacceptable that this task should be assigned to a
member of the executive, without supervision by an independent judge (see
Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, 73 and 74, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1998-II).
107. Secondly, the legal provisions concerning the examination, use and
storage of the material obtained, the precautions to be taken when
communicating the material to other parties, and the circumstances in which
recordings may or must be erased or the material destroyed must provide
sufficient safeguards for the protection of the legally privileged material
obtained by covert surveillance. In particular, the national law should set out
with sufficient clarity and detail: procedures for reporting to an independent
supervisory authority for review of cases where material subject to legal
professional privilege has been acquired as a result of secret surveillance;
procedures for secure destruction of such material; conditions under which
it may be retained and used in criminal proceedings and law-enforcement
investigations; and, in that case, procedures for safe storage, dissemination
of such material and its subsequent destruction as soon as it is no longer
required for any of the authorised purposes (see R.E. v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, 138-39).
108. The Court notes that Russian law proclaims protection of legal
professional privilege, which is understood as covering any information
relating to legal representation of a client by an advocate (see paragraphs 82
and 83 above). It does not, however, contain any specific safeguards
applicable to interception of lawyers communications; lawyers are subject
to the same legal provisions on interception of communications as anyone
else. The Court has already found that these legal provisions do not provide
for adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of
abuse and are therefore incapable of keeping the interference to what is
necessary in a democratic society (see Roman Zakharov, cited above,
302-04).
109. Most importantly for the case at hand, the domestic law does not
provide for any safeguards to be applied or any procedures to be followed in
cases where, while tapping a suspects telephone, the authorities
accidentally intercept the suspects conversations with his or her counsel
(compare R.E., loc. cit.).
110. It follows that Russian law does not provide for any safeguards
against abuse of power in cases where legally privileged material has been
acquired through measures of secret surveillance and does not therefore
meet the quality of law requirement. It also follows that the surveillance
measures applied to the applicant did not meet the requirements of Article 8
2 of the Convention as elucidated in the Courts case-law.
111. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

ON ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANTS
DETENTION
112. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in

remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk between 30 December
2003 and 21 May 2006, in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi
between 21 May and 9 October 2006, in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in
Vologda between 12 and 17 October 2006, and in remand prison
no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow between 18 October 2006 and 24 January 2007 had
been inadequate. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
A. Admissibility
113. The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted
domestic remedies, because he had not applied to the Russian courts with
claims for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in connection
with the allegedly inhuman conditions of his detention.
114. The Court notes that it has already found that the Russian legal
system does not at present dispose of an effective remedy in connection
with a complaint about inadequate conditions of detention in remand
prisons (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08,
99-119). Nor does it provide for an effective remedy for a complaint
about inadequate conditions of detention in correctional colonies (see Butko
v. Russia, no. 32036/10, 42-47, 12 November 2015). It therefore rejects
the Governments objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies.
115. Furthermore, the Court considers that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further considers that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
116. The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicants

detention had been in compliance with the standards required under
Article 3 of the Convention.
117. The applicant challenged the Governments arguments and
submitted, in particular, that the cells where he had been detained had been
severely overcrowded. He also complained of inadequate sanitary
conditions.
118. A summary of relevant principles can be found in the recent Grand
Chamber judgment of Muri v. Croatia ([GC], no. 7334/13, 136-41,
20 October 2016, with further references).
119. The Court notes that the Government did not provide any original
documents in respect of remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk,
concerning the size of the cells, the number of beds available therein and the
number of detainees sharing them, claiming that they had been destroyed
after the expiry of the statutory time-limit. The Governments submissions
that the conditions of the applicants detention had been satisfactory were
based on statements given by the prison officials several years after the
events in question. The Court has repeatedly declined to accept the validity
of similar statements on the grounds that they could not be viewed as
sufficiently reliable, given the lapse of time involved and the absence of any
supporting documentary evidence (see Belashev v. Russia, no. 28617/03,
52, 13 November 2007; Sudarkov v. Russia, no. 3130/03, 43, 10 July
2008; Kokoshkina v. Russia, no. 2052/08, 60, 28 May 2009; Kozhokar

v. Russia, no. 33099/08, 95, 16 December 2010; Idalov v. Russia [GC],
no. 5826/03, 99-100, 22 May 2012; and Zentsov and Others v. Russia,
no. 35297/05, 43, 23 October 2012). These statements are therefore of
little evidentiary value for the Court. In particular, the Court considers that
the Government have not substantiated their argument that the number of
inmates in the applicants cells did not exceed the capacity they were
designed for.
120. As regards remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, the Government
submitted only copies of certain pages of the prison population register. The
Court finds such incomplete and selective evidence unconvincing (see, for
similar reasoning, Sudarkov, cited above, 43; Kokoshkina, cited above,
60; and Vyatkin v. Russia, no. 18813/06, 40, 11 April 2013).
121. The Court further observes that the applicant described the
conditions of his detention in detail and submitted colour photographs of
one of his cells. His allegations of overcrowding as regards remand prison
no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk were supported by letters from the
prosecutor acknowledging that the remand prison was overpopulated at the
material time (see paragraphs 55 and 56 above). His allegations of
overcrowding as regards remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda and remand
prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow find support in the information submitted by
the Government, which permits the Court to establish that the applicant was
afforded between 1.6 sq. m and 3.5 sq. m of personal space there.
122. It follows from the material in the case file that for at least part of
his three-year detention the applicant had less than three square metres of
personal space. The Court reiterates in this connection that a strong
presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises when the personal space
available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy
accommodation (see Muri, cited above, 124). The Government have not
demonstrated that in the present case there were factors capable of
adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space and
rebutting that presumption.
123. There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
on account of the conditions of the applicants detention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

ON ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE APPLICANT
WAS TRANSPORTED
124. The applicant complained that the conditions in which he had been
transported between detention facilities had been inadequate. He relied on
Article 3 of the Convention.
A. Admissibility
125. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It
further considers that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
126. The Government submitted that the applicant had been transported
in conditions compatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the
Convention.
127. The applicant maintained his claims.
128. The Court reiterates that Convention proceedings, such as the
present application, do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous
application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges
something must prove that allegation), because in certain instances the
respondent Government alone have access to information capable of
corroborating or refuting these allegations. A failure on a Governments part
to submit such information without a satisfactory explanation may give rise
to the drawing of inferences as to the validity of the applicants allegations
(see, among other authorities, Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, 79,
ECHR 2005-IV, and Ahmet zkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93,
426, 6 April 2004).
129. The parties gave different descriptions of the general conditions in
which the applicant had been transported between detention facilities. The
Government, however, did not submit any documents in support of their
position that the conditions of transport had been satisfactory. In particular,
they did not submit documents indicating the size of the train compartments
or the number of inmates transported together with the applicant. Nor did
they submit any documents confirming that he had received dry rations
before the departure or meals during the journey. Having regard to the fact
that the Government, who alone have access to documents relating to the
conditions in which the applicant was transported, failed to produce them,
the Court will examine the issue on the basis of the applicants submissions.
130. The Court notes that the applicant was not given any food during
his four-day trip from Murmansk to Vologda. The Court has already found
that the clear insufficiency of food given to an applicant may in itself raise
an issue under Article 3 of the Convention (see Kadiis v. Latvia (no. 2),
no. 62393/00, 55, 4 May 2006; Stepuleac v. Moldova, no. 8207/06, 55,
6 November 2007; and Guliyev v. Russia, no. 24650/02, 62, 19 June
2008).
131. The Court further notes that during his transfer from St Petersburg
to Murmansk, which lasted several days, the applicant was transported in
cramped conditions with up to sixteen other inmates in a compartment. The

Court finds that the severe overcrowding of the railway carriage, providing
practically no personal space to the applicant, amounted to inhuman and
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see
Guliyev, cited above, 66-70; Sudarkov, cited above, 63-69;
M.S. v. Russia, no. 8589/08, 78-79, 10 July 2014; and Idalov v. Russia
(no. 2), no. 41858/08, 110-12, 13 December 2016, all concerning
conditions of transport by rail).
132. There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
on account of the conditions in which the applicant was transported by rail
between detention facilities.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 53 OF THE

CONVENTION
133. The applicant complained that his pre-trial detention from

27 December 2003 to 12 May 2006 had been too long, and that it had not
been based on relevant or sufficient reasons. He relied on Article 5 3 of
the Convention, which reads as follows:
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c)
of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
A. Admissibility
134. The Court considers that the applicants complaint under Article 5
3 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
135. The Government submitted that the applicants detention had been
justified not only by the gravity of the charges against him, but also by the
risk that he would abscond from the authorities, obstruct the course of
justice, and continue with criminal activities. In particular, he had been
charged with membership of an organised criminal gang and had attempted
to go into hiding and destroy incriminating evidence prior to his arrest.
136. The applicant stated that in extending his detention the domestic
courts had relied exclusively on the gravity of the charges against him. He
had lodged a number of requests with the courts to be released, either on
bail or on his fathers personal guarantee, but those requests had been
refused without a proper examination of all the relevant factors. The reasons
for his initial placement in custody had changed, and the factors which had
served as the grounds for the detention had become irrelevant with the
passage of time.
137. The Court observes that the general principles regarding the right to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as guaranteed by
Article 5 3 of the Convention, have been stated in a number of its previous
judgments (see, among many other authorities, Kuda v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, 110, ECHR 2000XI, and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, 41-44, ECHR 2006X, with further references).
138. The Court has already, on a large number of occasions, examined
applications against Russia raising similar complaints under Article 5 3 of
the Convention and found a violation of that Article on the grounds that the
domestic courts had extended an applicants detention relying essentially on
the gravity of the charges and using stereotyped formulae without
addressing his or her specific situation or considering alternative preventive
measures (see, among many others, Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05,
1 June 2006; Pshevecherskiy v. Russia, no. 28957/02, 24 May 2007;
Shukhardin v. Russia, no. 65734/01, 28 June 2007; Belov v. Russia,
no. 22053/02, 3 July 2008; Aleksandr Makarov v. Russia, no. 15217/07,
12 March 2009; Lamazhyk v. Russia, no. 20571/04, 30 July 2009;
Makarenko v. Russia, no. 5962/03, 22 December 2009; Gultyayeva
v. Russia, no. 67413/01, 1 April 2010; Logvinenko v. Russia, no. 44511/04,
17 June 2010; Sutyagin v. Russia, no. 30024/02, 3 May 2011; Romanova
v. Russia, no. 23215/02, 11 October 2011; Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia,
no. 57541/09, 24 January 2012; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461/10,
108-11, 27 November 2012; and Zherebin v. Russia, no. 51445/09,
59-63, 24 March 2016).
139. Having regard to the materials in its possession, the Court notes
that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The
applicant was kept in detention during the criminal proceedings for more
than two years and four months. The domestic courts inferred that he might
abscond, reoffend or interfere with the proceedings essentially from the
gravity of the charges against him. They did not point to any aspects of the
applicants character or behaviour that would justify their conclusion that he
presented such risks. The Government referred to his presumed membership
of an organised criminal gang and his previous attempt to go into hiding and
destroy incriminating evidence. The Court reiterates that it is not its task to
take the place of the national authorities who ruled on the applicants
detention and to supply its own analysis of the facts arguing for or against
detention (see Mamedova, cited above, 79, with further references).
However, the domestic courts did not rely on the circumstances referred to
by the Government in their decisions. Lastly, after the case had been
submitted for trial the domestic courts issued collective detention orders,
using the same summary formula to refuse the applications for release and
to extend the pre-trial detention of three people.
140. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to
address specific facts or consider alternative preventive measures, by
relying essentially on the gravity of the charges and by issuing collective
detention orders, the authorities extended the applicants detention on
grounds which, although relevant, cannot be regarded as sufficient. In
these circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings
were conducted with special diligence.
141. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 3 of the
Convention.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 1 OF THE CONVENTION
142. Referring to Article 6 1 of the Convention, the applicant alleged a

violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time. Article 6 1 of the
Convention, as far as relevant, provides as follows:
In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a
... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...
143. The Government submitted that the length of the criminal
proceedings against the applicant had not been unreasonable and had been
justified by the complexity of the criminal case against him. In particular,
they pointed out that the investigation had involved at least seven charges of
serious offences against the criminal gang and that the case file had
represented a joint investigation of five related criminal cases. The domestic
court had had to examine numerous pieces of evidence contained in twelve
volumes of the investigation file, and question six victims and twenty-four
witnesses who lived in Murmansk and Moscow. They further stressed that
the trial court had ordered, at the request of defence counsel, including that
of the applicant, three expert assessments. Two of those were ordered in
respect of the applicants accomplice, S., and lasted for almost seven
months. Moreover, the court had granted S.s request to question witnesses
against him, and those witnesses could not have been transferred from
Moscow to Murmansk more quickly, as they themselves had been on trial in
a criminal case.
144. The applicant reiterated his complaint and stated that the
unreasonable length of the criminal proceedings against him had been
caused by the examination of the criminal case against his accomplice, S.
145. Having examined all the material before it, the Court considers that
for the reasons stated below, the respondent Government cannot be held
liable for the allegedly excessive length of the criminal proceedings against
the applicant.
146. In particular, the Court notes that having regard to the overall
length of the proceeding (three years), the complexity of the case, the
conduct of the applicant and his co-defendants and that of the authorities,
including the diligence they displayed while dealing with the case, and the
levels of jurisdiction involved, the length of the proceedings was not
excessive and met the reasonable time requirement (see, among other
authorities, Khanov and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 15327/05
and 15 others, 30 June 2016, with further references).
147. In view of the above, the Court finds that this complaint is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35
3 and 4 of the Convention.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE

CONVENTION
148. Referring to Article 6 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, the

applicant alleged that he had been unable to defend himself through legal
assistance of his own choosing. The relevant part of Article 6 of the
Convention provides as follows:
1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ...
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or,
if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require.
A. Admissibility
149. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties submissions

150. The Government submitted that the applicants right to defence had
been guaranteed during the criminal proceedings. In particular, he had been
represented by a lawyer throughout the entire proceedings. He had been
defended by counsel of his own choosing and the domestic courts refusal to
allow the applicants brother to act as his legal representative had been in
compliance with the domestic regulations; the applicants requests for new
counsel had been granted immediately.
151. The applicant submitted that his first lawyer, G., had been
unlawfully removed as his counsel by the investigator, that the legal aid
counsel appointed instead had failed to provide him with adequate legal
assistance and that the trial court had unlawfully refused his request to allow
his brother to act as his counsel at the trial.
2. The Courts assessment

152. The relevant principles have been summarised in Dvorski
v. Croatia ([GC], no. 25703/11, 76-82, ECHR 2015) as follows:
81. Unlike in Salduz, where the accused, held in custody, had been denied access
to a lawyer during police questioning, the present case concerns a situation where the
applicant was afforded access to a lawyer from his first interrogation, but
not - according to his complaint a lawyer of his own choosing. In contrast to the
cases involving denial of access, the more lenient requirement of relevant and
sufficient reasons has been applied in situations raising the less serious issue of
denial of choice. In such cases the Courts task will be to assess whether, in the light
of the proceedings as a whole, the rights of the defence have been adversely affected
to such an extent as to undermine their overall fairness (see, for example, Croissant,
cited above, 31; Klimentyev, cited above, 117-18; and Martin, cited above,
96-97).
82. It is the latter test which is to be applied in the present case. Against the above
background, the Court considers that the first step should be to assess whether it has
been demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there
were relevant and sufficient grounds for overriding or obstructing the defendants
wish as to his or her choice of legal representation. Where no such reasons exist, the
Court should proceed to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. In
making its assessment, the Court may have regard to a variety of factors, including the
nature of the proceedings and the application of certain professional requirements (see
Meftah and Others, cited above, 45-48, and Martin, cited above, 90); the
circumstances surrounding the designation of counsel and the existence of
opportunities for challenging this (ibid., 90-97); the effectiveness of counsels
assistance (see Croissant, cited above 31, and Vitan, cited above 58-64); whether
the accuseds privilege against self-incrimination has been respected (see Martin,
cited above, 90); the accuseds age (ibid., 92); and the trial courts use of any
statements given by the accused at the material time (see, for example, Croissant,
cited above, 31, Klimentyev, cited above, 117-118; and Martin, cited above,
94-95). It is further mindful that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that
are practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory (see, among many other
authorities, Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, 24, Series A no. 32; Imbrioscia, cited
above, 38; Goddi v. Italy, 9 April 1984, 30, Series A no. 76; and Salduz, cited
above, 55) and that in determining Convention rights one must frequently look
beyond appearances and concentrate on the realities of the situation (see, inter alia,
Delcourt v. Belgium, 17 January 1970, 31, Series A no. 11; De Jong, Baljet and Van
den Brink v. the Netherlands, 22 May 1984, 48, Series A no. 77; Pavlenko, cited
above, 112; and Erkapi v. Croatia, no. 51198/08, 80-82, 25 April 2013). In
cases where the accused had no legal representation, the Court also took into
consideration the opportunity given to the accused to challenge the authenticity of
evidence and to oppose its use (see Panovits, cited above, 82), whether the accused
is in custody (Salduz, cited above, 60); whether such statements constituted a
significant element on which the conviction was based and the strength of the other
evidence in the case (Salduz, cited above, 57; and Panovits cited above, 76 and
82).
153. It follows from the documents in the case file that between
December 2003 and August 2004, during the investigation, the applicant
was represented by counsel of his own choosing, G. In August 2004, owing
to G.s absence on holiday until October 2004, legal aid counsel was
appointed to carry out the necessary procedural steps. Several days later G.
was removed as the applicants counsel by reference to the need to question
him as a witness about events that had occurred before he had been formally
admitted as counsel for the applicant in the criminal proceedings.
Immediately after the start of the trial at the beginning of November 2004
the trial court refused to allow the applicants brother to act as his counsel,
finding that the brother was a civil lawyer who had no experience in
criminal law and procedure and that the applicant was already represented
by experienced legal aid counsel. The next day, however, legal aid counsel
was replaced at the applicants request by counsel of his choosing, AM.,
who represented him throughout the trial.
154. The Court will first examine whether there were relevant and
sufficient reasons in the interests of justice for refusing to allow the
applicants brother to act as his counsel and for removing G. as the
applicants counsel. In the Courts opinion, the trial court provided relevant
and sufficient reasons for the refusal in respect of the applicants brother,
finding that as a lawyer specialising in civil matters he would not be able to
ensure efficient defence for the applicant in compliance with the criminal
procedure.
155. By contrast, the Court is not persuaded that the reasons advanced
for removing G. were relevant and sufficient. The only reason for removing
G. was the investigators finding that it would be useful to question him
about the telephone conversations he had had with the applicant before he
had been formally admitted as his counsel in the criminal proceedings. The
Court notes in this connection that the domestic law does not provide for the
removal of counsel in order to question him or her as a witness (see
paragraph 79 above). The Advocates Act explicitly prohibits the questioning
of an advocate about matters which have become known to him or her as a
result of representing the client or as a result of an application for legal
representation by a prospective client (see paragraph 82 above). As
explained by the Constitutional Court, legal professional privilege covers all
information which has become known to an advocate as a result of
representing his or her client, including any information communicated by
the client before the advocate had been formally admitted as counsel in
criminal proceedings (see paragraph 83 above). It is also significant that the
domestic law at the material time did not provide for an exception to the
legal professional privilege in the case of its suspected abuse, for example in
furtherance of criminal or fraudulent conduct. In any event, there is no
evidence in the case file that disciplinary or criminal proceedings were
opened against G. in connection with any abuses committed while
representing the applicant.
156. The Court reiterates that communications between a lawyer and his
client, whatever their purpose, enjoy privileged status where confidentiality
is concerned. It attaches particular weight to the risk of impingement on the
lawyers right to professional secrecy, since it may have repercussions on
the proper administration of justice. Strengthened protection of exchanges
between lawyers and their clients is justified by the fact that lawyers are
assigned a fundamental role in a democratic society, that of defending
litigants. Yet lawyers cannot carry out this essential task if there is no
guarantee that their exchanges with those they are defending will remain
confidential. Indirectly but necessarily dependent thereupon is the right of
everyone to a fair trial, including the right of accused persons not to
incriminate themselves (see, in the context of Article 8, Michaud, cited
above, 117-18, with further references). It is true that legal professional
privilege is not inviolable and may be overridden by other important
considerations (see, by way of example, situations described in Michaud,
cited above, 123, and Versini-Campinchi and Crasnianski v. France,
no. 49176/11, 78, 16 June 2016). Exceptions to the legal professional
privilege must be however strictly defined, be attended by adequate and
sufficient guarantees against abuse and, most importantly, should not affect
the clients defence rights (see, in the context of Article 8,
Versini-Campinchi and Crasnianski, cited above, 79 and 80).
157. In view of the above considerations the Court considers that no
relevant and sufficient reasons have been advanced for the decision to
remove G. as the applicants counsel. The Court must, however, also
examine whether G.s removal adversely affected the fairness of the
proceedings as a whole (see Dvorski, loc. cit.).
158. The Court observes that G. represented the applicant during the
major part of the investigation. He was removed and replaced by legal aid
counsel at the very end of the investigation. There is no evidence in the case
file that any significant investigative measures involving the applicant, such
as questioning, were carried out during the two-month period while the
applicant was represented by appointed legal aid counsel. It is noteworthy
that during most of that period, G. was in any case unavailable to represent
the applicant, being on annual leave. It is also important to note that legal
aid counsel was appointed only after it had been proposed that the applicant
retain another lawyer of his choosing and he had declined to do so. In so far
as the applicant alleged that legal aid counsel had been ineffective, the
Court notes that he has not substantiated any examples of the lawyers
manifest negligence. As soon as the applicant expressed a wish to be

represented by another lawyer of his choosing, AM., his request was
allowed and AM. was immediately admitted as his counsel. He represented
the applicant throughout the remainder of the criminal proceedings against
him. Lastly, the Court observes that G. was ultimately not questioned as a
witness against the applicant.
159. In the light of the above, and especially taking into account the
short period during which the applicant was not represented by counsel of
his own choosing and the fact that during that period no confession or other
evidence having a significant impact on the further development of the
criminal proceedings was obtained, the Court finds that G.s removal as
counsel for the applicant did not irretrievably prejudice the applicants
defence rights or undermine the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.
160. There has therefore been no violation of Article 6 1 and 3 (c) of
the Convention.
VII. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
161. Lastly, the Court has examined the other complaints submitted by
the applicant and, having regard to all the material in its possession and in
so far as the complaints fall within the Courts competence, it finds that they
do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the
application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to
Article 35 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
162. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.
A. Non-pecuniary damage
163. The applicant claimed 24,750 euros (EUR) in respect of

non-pecuniary damage.
164. The Government submitted that the claim was excessive.
165. The Court observes that it has found violations of Articles 3, 5 3
and Article 8 of the Convention. Making its assessment on an equitable
basis, it awards the applicant EUR 14,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
166. The applicant did not submit a claim under this head.
C. Default interest
167. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Declares, unanimously, the complaints of inhuman conditions of
detention and transport, excessive length of pre-trial detention, a breach
of the applicants right to defend himself through legal assistance of his
own choosing, and a breach of his right to respect for his private life and
correspondence admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the

Convention on account of the the conditions of the applicants detention
pending trial;
3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the

Convention on account of the conditions in which the applicant was
transported between detention facilities;
4. Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 5 3
of the Convention;
5. Holds, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 6 1

and 3 (c) of the Convention;
6. Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention on account of the interception of telephone
conversations with an accomplice on the basis of the judicial
authorisation of 23 December 2003;
7. Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 8 of
the Convention on account of the interception of telephone
conversations with counsel on the basis of the judicial authorisation of
26 December 2003;
8. Holds, by six votes to one,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final, in accordance with
Article 44 2 of the Convention, EUR 14,000 (fourteen thousand euros)
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be
chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during
the default period plus three percentage points;
9. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicants claim for just

satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 November 2017, pursuant

to Rule 77 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fato Arac Helena Jderblom

Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 2 of

the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Dedov is annexed to this
judgment.
H.J.
F.A.
DUDCHENKO v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT SEPRATE OPINION 35
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DEDOV

I regret that I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that there
has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court has applied
the proportionality test, even though the applicant claimed in the domestic
proceedings that the transcripts of his conversations had been obtained
unlawfully (paragraphs 33 and 37 of the judgment).
Before the Court, in his observations on page 27, the applicant merely
claimed that the surveillance sanction was given by an unauthorised court.
Also, he blamed the investigating authorities for having tapped another
telephone number which he used in order to speak with his lawyer. These
statements are contrary to the facts and the documents on file as the tapping
of both numbers was authorised by a national court (that the transcripts of
his conversations has been obtained unlawfully (paragraphs 7 and 11 of the
judgment).
The majority stated that the national court did not verify whether there is
a reasonable suspicion against the applicant as there is no indication in the
case file that the courts acted differently in the present case. Although the
Russian court noted, without giving details, that the police had information
that the applicant was the leader of the gang and planned to commit
extortions, there is no evidence that any documents confirming the
suspicion against the applicant had been submitted to the judge
(paragraphs 96 and 97 of the judgment).
This conclusion, in my view, contradicts to the findings of the trial court
that the applicant had participated in the gang which planned and committed
several offences, namely aggravated kidnapping, assault, aggravated
robbery and extortion (paragraphs 6 and 36 of the judgment). That means
that in fact there was a reasonable suspicion, that the interference was
necessary in a democratic society and that the national court did not act
arbitrarily. The majority, therefore, based their decision on allegations
which were not supported by the circumstances of the case, and not even
presented by the applicant himself. In my view, the present case should be
differentiated from the Dragojevic case (see Dragojevic v. Croatia,
no. 68955/11, 15 January 2015), where the suspicions were not confirmed
by the same surveillance measures.
The Court adopted the same wrongful approach to the violation of
Article 5 3 of the Convention. The national court did not mention the
factual circumstances of the case, which nevertheless confirm that there
were reasonable suspicions that the applicant had committed criminal
offences, that he would continue to commit the offences and that he would
try to abscond (see Article 5 1 (c) of the Convention). Such circumstances
were well-known to the national court and could be easily derived from the
case file as the applicant was a member of the organised criminal gang, and
36 DUDCHENKO v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT SEPRATE OPINION
he had already made an attempt to go into hiding and to destroy

incriminating evidence.
In both situations, in terms of the margin of appreciation, there were no
serious reasons, in the present case, that could lead the Court to substitute its
own assessment for that of the national authorities (see Mouvement ralien
suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, 66, 13 July 2012). I ought to
add that the approach in the present case contradicts that used in the recent
Grand Chamber case of Regner v. the Czech Republic (no. 35289/11,
150-58, 19 September 2017), where the Court relied on the domestic
courts assessment of classified documents and on their decision not to
disclose those documents as requested by the applicant. In the present case
the applicant did not request for any document which constituted the basis
for authorisation of surveillance measures.

Case of Dudchenko v. Russia

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Case of Dudchenko v. Russia

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THIRD SECTION

CASE OF DUDCHENKO v. RUSSIA

(Application no. 37717/05)

In the case of Dudchenko v. Russia,

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Murmansk.

A. Criminal proceedings against the applicant

6. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk regional prosecutors office

11. On 26 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the

proceedings, without clearly identifying the criminal proceedings to which it

25 December 2003 and with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He claimed,

B. The applicants detention pending investigation and trial

39. The applicant was arrested on 27 December 2003.

owned a family business were unconvincing. There were therefore sufficient

C. The conditions of the applicants detention

Detention Cell Period of Surface Number Number

417 5 January to 12.8 3

Detention Cell Period of Surface Number Number

Detention Cell Period of Surface Number Number

9 21 July to 26.2 4-6 6

D. Conditions of the applicants transfer between detention facilities

69. In their submission the Government neither specified the number of

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

A. Conditions of detention and preventive measures in the criminal

70. For a summary of the relevant domestic law concerning conditions

74. A request for judicial authorisation to intercept communications

C. Right to legal assistance

federal law, an advocate must obtain an instruction from a Bar association

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL

84. Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

85. Referring to Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained

1. The parties submissions

2. The Courts assessment

(a) Interception of telephone conversations with an accomplice on the basis of

94. As regards the question of lawfulness of the interception, it has not

(b) Interception of telephone conversations with counsel on the basis of the

transcripts of the conversations in question as legally privileged and used

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

112. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in

116. The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicants

2008; Kokoshkina v. Russia, no. 2052/08, 60, 28 May 2009; Kozhokar

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

125. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly

cramped conditions with up to sixteen other inmates in a compartment. The

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 53 OF THE

133. The applicant complained that his pre-trial detention from

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 1 OF THE CONVENTION

142. Referring to Article 6 1 of the Convention, the applicant alleged a

VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE

148. Referring to Article 6 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, the

149. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly

1. The parties submissions

2. The Courts assessment

manifest negligence. As soon as the applicant expressed a wish to be

VII. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

162. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

163. The applicant claimed 24,750 euros (EUR) in respect of

B. Costs and expenses

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

2. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the

3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the